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PLOTINUS
PORPHYRY ON PLOTINUS
ENNEAD I

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PLOTINUS
ENNEAD III

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

I

PORPHYRY ON THE LIFE OF PLOTINUS
AND THE ORDER OF HIS BOOKS

ENNEADS
I. 1–9

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NOTE

THE text and translation of this revision (1987) are now in accordance with the latest published changes and corrections in the Henry-Schwyzer text as recorded in the *Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum* in the third volume of the Oxford Classical Text (*Plotini Opera* III, Oxford 1982, pp. 304–7).

Section III of the Preface has been completely revised.

PREFACE

I. THE ENNEADS

PLOTINUS, as Porphyry tells us in his *Life* (ch. 4), did not begin to write till the first year of the reign of Gallienus (253/4), when he was forty-nine years old and had been settled at Rome and teaching philosophy for ten years. He continued to write till his death in 270 in his sixty-sixth year. His writings thus all belong to the last sixteen years of his life and represent his mature and fully developed thought. We should not expect to find in them, and, in the opinion at least of the great majority of Plotinian scholars, we do not in fact find in them, any major development. The earliest of them are the fruit of over twenty years' study and teaching of philosophy. (He came to Alexandria to study philosophy at the age of twenty-seven, in 232.) There is a good deal of variation, and it is even perhaps sometimes possible to trace a genuine development, in his repeated handling of particular problems. Plotinus had an intensely active and critical mind, and was not easily satisfied with his own or other people's formulations. But in all essentials his philosophy was fully mature before he began to write; and we have very little evidence indeed upon which to base speculation about the stages of its growth.

Plotinus's writings grew naturally out of his teaching. He never set out to write down a sys-

tematic exposition of his philosophy, but as important and interesting questions came up for discussion in his school he wrote treatises on the particular problems involved (Porphyry, *Life*, 4. 11, 5. 60). Thus it seems likely that the treatise V. 5, *That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect; and on the Good* was the result of the discussion which Porphyry records in chapter 18 of the *Life*; and III. 4, *On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit*, was, Porphyry says (*Life*, 10. 31), provoked by the conjuration of Plotinus's guardian spirit in the temple of Isis. The treatises were not intended for publication, but for circulation among carefully selected members of the school (*Life*, 4. 14–16). They give us, therefore, an extremely unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy. No reader of the *Enneads* can long remain unaware that Plotinus has a fully and carefully worked-out philosophical system. But neither his writings nor Porphyry's description of his teaching (*Life*, 13 and 18) have any suggestion of the dry, tidy, systematic, authoritarian presentation of the scholastic text-book. His teaching was informal and left plenty of room for the freest discussion, and in his writings we find his philosophy presented, not step by step in an orderly exposition, but by a perpetual handling and rehandling of the great central questions, always from slightly different points of view and with reference to different types of objections and queries.

Plotinus appointed Porphyry to take charge of the revision[1] and arrangement of his writings (*Life*,

[1] διόρθωσις, the word used by Porphyry, need imply no more than the correction of the spelling and supplying of punctuation which he says that he undertook (*Life*, 26. 37).

7. 51, 24. 2), and the *Enneads* as we have them are the result of his editorial activity. He did not, however, publish his edition till more than thirty years after the death of Plotinus (i.e., somewhere between 301 and 305), and in the interval another edition of the treatises was published by Eustochius, also a pupil of Plotinus and the doctor who attended him in his last illness; of this only a few traces remain.[1] Porphyry has given us a good deal of information about his editorial methods in the *Life*; the full title of the work is *On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of his Books*, and it looks as if one of his main purposes in writing it was to explain, and perhaps to justify against actual or possible criticism, the principles which governed his edition. He adopted the same principle of arrangement, he tells us (*Life*, ch. 24) as that used by Apollodorus of Athens in his edition of Epicharmus and Andronicus the Peripatetic in his edition of Aristotle and Theophrastus; that is, he arranged the treatises according to subject-matter and not in chronological order.[2] In fact, a division of Plotinus's works

There is no reason to believe that he made any important modifications of the text of Plotinus's treatises as he received them.

[1] For a discussion of the evidence that the edition of Eustochius existed, and that Eusebius in several places in the *Praep. ev.* cites Plotinus according to it and not to Porphyry's edition see P. Henry, *Recherches sur la Préparation Évangélique d'Eusèbe*, pp. 73–80, and *États du Texte de Plotin*, 77 ff. (where the Eusebius texts are printed), and H-R. Schwyzer's article *Plotin* in *Pauly's Realencyclopädie* B. XXI. col. 488–490.

[2] He gives us, however, the chronological order of the treatises in chs. 4–6 of the *Life*.

according to subject-matter is bound to have a great deal that is arbitrary in it because Plotinus does not, as has already been remarked, write systematically; there is no tidy separation of ethics, metaphysics, cosmology, and psychology in his treatises. Porphyry's arrangement therefore is by no means altogether satisfactory and should not be taken as a safe guide to the content of the treatises; the student of Plotinus's ethics must be familiar with the Sixth (and all the other) Enneads as well as the First, and anyone interested in his metaphysics will be very ill advised to neglect the so-called "ethical" and "psychological" treatises. It is however interesting, if not very useful, to the student of Plotinus to understand how Porphyry made his division. He arranged the whole body of treatises into six Enneads, or sets of nine, forming three volumes (*Life*, chs. 24–26). The treatises on the Categories and those of which the principal subject is the One form one volume (the Sixth Ennead), those dealing chiefly with Soul and Intellect another (the Fourth and Fifth Enneads), and all the other treatises go into the first volume (the First, Second, and Third Enneads); the First Ennead has an ethical emphasis, the Second is predominantly cosmological, the Third has a greater variety of subject-matter than any of the others. It is clear from what Porphyry says in ch. 24 of the *Life* that his reason for adopting the six–nine division was nothing better than the pleasure in the symmetry of sacred number characteristic of his age. To achieve it he had to do some vigorous cutting-up of the treatises as he received them. He subdivided a number of the longer treatises (III. 2–3, IV. 3–5, VI. 1–3, VI.

4–5): more curiously, he not only cut up one treatise but also put the pieces into different Enneads (III. 8, V. 8, V. 5, and II. 9 were written by Plotinus as a single treatise[1]); and it is possible, though not certain, that it was he who, to make up his number, collected the short notes on various subjects which constitute III. 9 into a single treatise.

II. The Thought of Plotinus

A

Plotinus is, like other philosophers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, a practical religious and moral teacher and also a professional philosopher, engaged in the critical interpretation of a long and complicated school-tradition which we are beginning to know and understand a good deal better than formerly,[2] and working in an intellectual *milieu* which included not only those esoteric pietists the Gnostics and Hermetists, with whom he is sometimes rather misleadingly coupled, but a considerable number of other professional philosophers (about whom we know next to nothing) of very varying schools and points of view.[3] His philosophy is both an account of an ordered structure of living reality, which proceeds eternally from its transcendent First

[1] On the problems raised by the appearance of these subdivisions as separate treatises in Porphyry's chronological list see Schwyzer, art. cit., col. 487.

[2] Some important modern books dealing with this tradition are listed at the end of this *Introduction*.

[3] Cp. Porphyry, *Life*, ch. 20 (the preface to Longinus's book).

Principle, the One or Good, and descends in an unbroken succession of stages from the Divine Intellect and the Forms therein through Soul with its various levels of experience and activity to the last and lowest realities, the bodies perceived by our senses: and it is also a showing of the way by which the human self, which can experience and be active on every level of being, is able, if it will, to ascend by a progressive purification and simplification to that union with the Good which alone can satisfy it. There are two movements in Plotinus's universe, one of outgoing from unity to an ever-increasing multiplicity, and the other of return to unity and unification: and closely connected with these two movements is what is perhaps the deepest tension in his thought. This results from two opposed valuations of the movement from unity to multiplicity and two correspondingly different ways of regarding the First Principle. When Plotinus's attention is concentrated on the great process of spontaneous production by which the whole of derived reality streams out from the First Principle, he sees that First Principle as the superabundant spring of creativity, the Good which is source of all goodness, the One from whose rich unity all multiplicity unfolds: and to emphasise the goodness of the splendid multiplicity of derived being is all the more to exalt the goodness of its source. The One as creative source of all being is properly described in the language of positive transcendence, as better than all good existing and conceivable. But when his mind is bent on the ascent to the Good by the stripping off of our lower and the transcending even of our higher self, when the First Principle appears

no longer as superabundant source but as the goal of pure unity which we attain by a radical simplification, by putting away all the varied multiplicity of being: then in comparison with that One and Good so passionately desired everything else seems so hopelessly inferior that he can think of its very existence as due to a fault, and represent the timeless coming forth of the Divine Intellect[1] and of Soul[2] as acts of illegitimate self-assertion. Plato, when he fixed his mind on God, had a very poor opinion of the human race:[3] and Plotinus, when he fixes his mind on God, sometimes seems to have a very poor opinion of the whole of existence. But in neither philosopher was this way of looking at things a settled conviction, governing the whole of their philosophy. Plato's whole life and work show that he did, after all, usually think the human race worth taking seriously: and the positive view of derived reality, as good from the Good, greatly predominates over the negative in the Enneads. The tension between the two attitudes of mind is most apparent when Plotinus is considering the lowest level of reality, the material world. There is a very noticeable fluctuation in his thought about the precise degree of goodness or badness to be attributed to the body and the rightness or wrongness of the soul's descent into it. Plotinus is rightly conscious at this point of a similar tension in the thought of Plato, and in his effort to present Plato's thought as perfectly reasonable and consistent he tries hard, if not altogether successfully, to resolve it.[4] The same basic tension probably accounts for a certain in-

[1] III. 8. 8. [2] III. 7. 11. [3] *Laws* 804B.
[4] E.g., in IV. 8. 5.

consistency in his description of the matter of the sense-world. He speaks several times[1] of this matter as derived from the principles immediately preceding it (i.e., Soul), and so ultimately from the Good; which would imply (as the later Neo-Platonists saw) that it was itself good in its own kind, even if that kind was the lowest possible. But for Plotinus the matter of the sense-world is the principle of evil, and in I. 8 in particular he speaks of it as absolute evil in a way which suggests an ultimate dualism and is hardly compatible with its derivation from the Good.[2] It is possible to produce a philosophical reconciliation of these contrasting emphases, and even of Plotinus's divergent accounts of the matter of the sense-world. But I am not sure that they are ever fully reconciled in Plotinus himself. There are, too, perhaps other fluctuations and tensions besides this major one. There are elements in his experience which do not fit into his system, elements in the tradition he inherited which are not fully assimilated, and lines of thought suggested which if they had been followed up might have led to a radical revision of his philosophy—the same, after all, might be said of almost any great philosopher. But his thought cannot be resolved into a mere jumble of conflicting elements. Tension is not the same thing as in-

[1] II. 3. 17; III. 4. 1; IV. 8. 6.

[2] And a yet further inconsistency is introduced into his thought at this point by his attitude to celestial matter, the matter of the bodies of the "visible gods," the sun, moon and stars, which he regards, in accordance with the beliefs of the astral or cosmic piety of his time, as not a principle of evil because it is not a principle of resistance to form but perfectly docile and subdued to it, so that it in no way troubles the life of the celestial intelligences. Cp. II. 1. 4; II. 9. 8.

coherence, as anyone can see who turns from reading the *Enneads* to read the *Hermetica*.

B

It is impossible to read any treatise in the *Enneads* intelligently without some at least elementary understanding of Plotinus's system as a whole, because they are, as has been said already, an unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy. I shall therefore try to give here a summary account of how Plotinus conceives his First Principle, the One or Good, and of the stages in the descent or expansion of reality from that Principle, and also to say something about the way of return to the Good, to follow and show which was Plotinus's main object in living, writing, and teaching.

Plotinus insists repeatedly that the One or Good is beyond the reach of human thought or language, and, though he does in fact say a good deal about It, this insistence is to be taken seriously. Language can only point the mind along the way to the Good, not describe, encompass, or present It. As Plotinus himself says (VI. 9. 3), "strictly speaking, we ought not to apply any terms at all to It; but we should, so to speak, run round the outside of It trying to interpret our own feelings about It, sometimes drawing near and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about It." There is, however, a certain amount which ought to be said about the language Plotinus uses about the One if we are not to misunderstand completely the direction in which he is pointing. The One is not, as has sometimes been suggested, conceived as a mere negation, an ultimate void, a

great blank behind the universe in attaining to which the human personality disintegrates into unconscious nothingness, but as a positive reality of infinite power and content and superabundant excellence. The extreme negativity—partly inherited from the school-tradition—of the language which Plotinus uses about Him[1] is designed either to stress the inadequacy of all our ways of thinking and speaking about Him or to make clear the implications of saying that He is absolutely One and Infinite and the source of all defined and limited realities. Building on Plato's remark in Book VI of the *Republic*, Plotinus insists that the Good is "beyond being," that He cannot properly be even said to exist—surely the extreme of negation. But it is perfectly clear from all that Plotinus says about Him, in the very passages where His existence is denied, that He is existent in some sense, and the supreme Existence. What Plotinus is saying is that the unity of the Good is so absolute that no predicates at all can be applied to Him, not even that of existence; and that as the Source of being to all things He is not a thing Himself. Again, Plotinus insists that the One does not think, because thought for him always implies a certain duality of thinking and its object, and it is this that he is concerned to exclude in speaking of the One. But he is anxious to make clear that this does not mean that the life of the One is mere unconsciousness, to show

[1] Though the terms for One and Good are both neuter in Greek, Plotinus when speaking about his First Principle, even in passages where these neuter terms are used, passes over quite naturally from neuter to masculine pronouns and adjectives. I have followed him in this as closely as possible in my translation.

that He is more, not less, than Mind at the highest level at which we can conceive it, and so in some passages he attributes to the One a "super-intellection," a simple self-intuition, an immediate self-consciousness higher than the thought of the Divine Intellect.[1] And when he calls the One "formless" he does so because He is infinite, without limits, and because, precisely as One (here Plotinus follows the school-tradition very closely), He is the principle of form, number, measure, order, and limit; and a source or principle for Plotinus is always other and more than that which it produces.

Plotinus, by his use of negative language, stresses the transcendence of the One to an extreme degree. But he is very careful to exclude all ideas of a quasi-spatial sort about this transcendence. The One is not a God "outside" the world. Nor is He remote from us, but intimately present in the centre of our souls; or rather we are in Him, for Plotinus prefers to speak of the lower as in the higher, rather than the other way round; body is in soul, and soul in Intellect, and Intellect in the One (he is quite aware that whichever way we put it we are using an inadequate spatial metaphor). The hierarchical order of levels of being does not imply the remoteness of the One, because they are not spatially separate or cut off from each other; they are really distinct, but all are present together everywhere. And just because the One is not any particular thing He is present to all things according to their capacity to receive Him.

From the One proceeds the first great derived reality, Intellect, the Divine Mind which is also the

[1] Cp. V. 4. 2; VI. 7. 38–9; VI. 8. 16.

World of Forms or Ideas, and so the totality of true being in the Platonic sense. I have chosen Intellect as the best available translation of Plotinus's word for this second reality, Νοῦς: it should be understood in a sense like that of the Scholastic term *intellectus* as opposed to *ratio*—a distinction which derives from and corresponds exactly to the Greek distinction between *νόησις* (the proper activity of *νοῦς*) and *διάνοια*. So understood, Intellect means the activity of direct mental sight or immediate grasp of the object of thought, or a mind which grasps its object in this direct way and not as the conclusion of a process of discursive reasoning (*ratio* or *διάνοια*). I shall say more shortly about the relation of the Plotinian Intellect to its objects.

The procession of Intellect from the One is necessary and eternal, as are also the procession of Soul from Intellect and the forming and ordering of the material universe by Soul. The way in which Intellect proceeds from the One and Soul in its turn from Intellect is rather loosely and inadequately described as "emanation." The background of Plotinus's thought at this point is certainly a late Stoic doctrine of the emanation of intellect from a divinity conceived as material light or fire, and his favourite metaphor to describe the process is that of the radiation of light or heat from sun or fire (he also uses others of the same sort, the diffusion of cold from snow or perfume from something scented). But he is not content merely to use these traditional analogies and leave it at that, to allow the generation of spiritual beings to be thought of in terms of a materialistically conceived automatism. Intellect proceeds from the One (and Soul from Intellect)

without in any way affecting its source. There is no activity on the part of the One, still less any willing or planning or choice (planning and choice are excluded by Plotinus even on a much lower level when he comes to consider the forming and ruling of the material universe by Soul). There is simply a giving-out which leaves the source unchanged and undiminished. But though this giving-out is necessary, in the sense that it cannot be conceived as not happening or as happening otherwise, it is also entirely spontaneous: there is no room for any sort of binding or constraint, internal or external, in Plotinus's thought about the One. The reason for the procession of all things from the One is, Plotinus says, simply that everything which is perfect produces something else. Perfection is necessarily productive and creative. Here we touch an element in Plotinus's thought which is of great importance, the emphasis on life, on the dynamic, vital character of spiritual being. Perfection for him is not merely static. It is a fullness of living and productive power. The One for him is Life and Power, an infinite spring of power, an unbounded life, and therefore necessarily productive. And as it is one of the axioms which Plotinus assumes without discussion that the product is always less than, inferior to, the producer, what the One produces must be that which is next to Him in excellence, namely Intellect: when Plotinus concentrates his mind on the inferiority of even this derived reality to its source, of any sort of multiplicity to the pure unity to which he aspires, then he comes to think of its production as unfortunate even though necessary, and of the will to separate existence of Intellect and

Soul as a sort of illegitimate self-assertion. But this does not mean that he ever thinks that the One might not produce, that there is any possibility of the derived realities not existing, of all things relapsing back into the original partless unity. Plotinus, when he gives a more precise account of how Intellect proceeds from the One, introduces a psychological element into the process which goes beyond his light-metaphor. He distinguishes two "moments" in this timeless generation; the first in which Intellect is radiated as an unformed potentiality, and the second in which it turns back to the One in contemplation and so is informed and filled with content and becomes the totality of real existence. Here we meet another of the great principles of the philosophy of Plotinus: that all derived beings depend for their existence, their activity, and their power to produce in their turn, on their contemplation of their source. Contemplation always precedes and generates activity and production.

Intellect is for Plotinus also the Platonic World of Forms, the totality of real beings: it is both thought and the object of its thought. This unity of thought and Forms in a single reality obviously derives from the Middle Platonist teaching that the Forms were the "thoughts of God." But it is clear from the opposition which Plotinus's teaching on this point aroused from Porphyry on his entrance into the school and from Longinus[1] that it was by no means universally accepted by contemporary Platonists. And Plotinus's doctrine of the absolute co-equality and unity-in-diversity of thought, life, and being

[1] *Life*, ch. 18 and 20.

goes a good deal beyond anything that we know any of his predecessors to have taught. Plotinus's World of Forms is an organic living community of interpenetrating beings which are at once Forms and intelligences, all "awake and alive," in which every part thinks and therefore in a real sense is the whole; so that the relationship of whole and part in this spiritual world is quite different from that in the material world, and involves no sort of separation or exclusion. This unity-in-diversity is the most perfect possible image of the absolute unity of the One, whom Intellect in its ordinary contemplation cannot apprehend as He is in His absolute simplicity. It represents His infinity as best it can in the plurality of Forms. Intellect is itself infinite in power and immeasurable, because it has no extension and there is no external standard by which it could be measured, but finite because it is a complete whole composed of an actually existing number (all that can possibly exist) of Forms, which are themselves definite, limited realities.

Looked at from the point of view of our own human nature and experience, Intellect, as has already been suggested, is the level of intuitive thought which grasps its object immediately and is always perfectly united to it, and does not have to seek it outside itself by discursive reasoning: and we at our highest are Intellect, or Soul perfectly formed to the likeness of Intellect (this is a point on which there is some variation in Plotinus's thought). Plotinus in some passages at least admits the existence of Forms of individuals, and this enables him to give our particular personalities their place in the world of Intellect, with the eternal

value and status which this implies. And this means that in that world, where the laws of space and time do not apply and the part is the whole, we are Being and the All. This is the explanation of a number of passages in Plotinus which at first reading have a pantheistic sound.[1] In order to understand them correctly we must remember: (i) that they refer to Intellect (Being or the All), not to the One; (ii) that to become Intellect does not involve the destruction or absorption of the particular personality but its return to its perfect archetypal reality, distinguished in unity from all other archetypal realities, individual and universal.

Soul in Plotinus is very much what it is in Plato, the great intermediary between the worlds of intellect and sense and the representative of the former in the latter. It proceeds from Intellect and returns upon it and is formed by it in contemplation as Intellect proceeds from and returns upon the One; but the relationship of Soul to Intellect is a much more intimate one. Soul at its highest belongs to the world of Intellect. Universal Soul has two levels, the higher where it acts as a transcendent principle of form, order, and intelligent direction (without deliberate choice or previous planning), and the lower where it operates as an immanent principle of life and growth. This latter is in fact (though Plotinus is reluctant to admit it) a fourth distinct hypostasis, and has its own name, Nature. It is related to the higher soul as the higher soul is to Intellect and, like it, acts or produces as a necessary result of contemplation; but because its contemplation is the last and lowest sort of contemplation, a

[1] Notably VI. 5. 12.

sort of dream,[1] it is too weak to produce anything which is itself productive. So what it produces is the immanent forms in body, the ultimate level of spiritual being, which are non-contemplative and so sterile, and below which lies only the darkness of matter.

The characteristic of the life of Soul is movement from one thing to another; unlike Intellect, it does not possess being as a whole, but only one part at a time, and must always be moving from one to the other; it is on the level of discursive thought, which does not hold its object in immediate possession but has to seek it by a process of reasoning; and its continual movement from one thing to another produces time, which is "the life of the soul in movement";[2] this movement of soul is the cause of all physical movement in space and time.

Our individual souls are "Plotinian parts" of Universal Soul, parts, that is, which in the manner proper to spiritual being have the whole in a certain sense present in them and can if they wish expand themselves by contemplation into universality and be the whole because they completely share Universal Soul's detachment from the body it rules. The individual soul's descent into body is for Plotinus both a fall and a necessary compliance with the law of the universe and the plan of Universal Soul.[3] The spiritual state of the soul in body depends on its attitude. If it devotes itself selfishly to the interests of the particular body to which it is attached it becomes entrapped in the atomistic particularity of the material world and isolated from the whole. The root sin of the soul is self-isolation, by which it is

[1] III. 8. 4. [2] III. 7. 11. [3] IV. 8. 5.

imprisoned in the body and cut off from its high destiny. But the mere fact of being in body does not necessarily imply imprisonment in body. That comes only if the soul surrenders to the body; it is the inward attitude which makes the difference. It is always possible for a man in the body to rise beyond the particularism and narrowness of the cares of earthly life to the universality of transcendent Soul and to the world of Intellect. Universal Soul is in no way hampered by the body of the universe which it contains and administers; and the celestial bodies of the star-gods in no way interfere with their spiritual life.[1] It is not embodiment as such but embodiment in an earthly, animal body which the Platonist regards as an evil and a handicap.

The material universe for Plotinus is a living, organic whole, the best possible image of the living unity-in-diversity of the World of Forms in Intellect. It is held together in every part by a universal sympathy and harmony, in which external evil and suffering take their place as necessary elements in the great pattern, the great dance of the universe. As the work of Soul, that is as a living structure of forms, it is wholly good and everlasting as a whole, though the parts are perishable (the universe of Intellect is of course eternal as a whole and in every part). All in it that is life and form is good; but the matter which is its substratum is evil and the principle of evil, though, paradoxically, it is also the last and lowest stage of procession from the Good. Matter according to Plotinus never really unites with form; it remains a formless darkness upon which form is merely superimposed. It is non-

[1] II. 9. 8.

being in the sense not of a "zero" but a "minus," a force or principle of negation (in criticising the Aristotelian account of matter Plotinus identifies ὕλη and στέρησις). The pessimistic way of looking at procession from the One which I mentioned before is very much in evidence here. If all procession, because it is necessarily not only a going-out but a falling below the highest, is more or less an evil, then, Plotinus would seem to think, the last and lowest degree of procession will be an absolute falling below any trace of good, a complete negativity which will be the ultimate evil and source of all other evil. (In Plotinus's thought there is no such thing as purely spiritual evil: evil is confined to the material universe.) Matter then is responsible for the evil and imperfection of the material world; but that world is good and necessary, the best possible image of the world of spirit on the material level, where it is necessary that it should express itself for the completion of the whole. It has not the goodness of its archetype, but it has the goodness of the best possible image.

C

The primary object of all Plotinus's philosophical activity is to bring his own soul and the souls of others by way of Intellect to union with the One. His last words[1] "Try to bring back the god in you to the divine in the All" are a summing up of his

[1] According to the text now adopted by P. Henry (see his essay *La Dernière Parole de Plotin; Studi Classici e Orientali* II, pp. 113–30, Pisa, 1953) and which I translate: see note on *Life*, ch. 2. 26–7.

whole life and work. They are also a summing up of his religion—the two are the same, for I think this work of return can properly be called a religious work. Plotinus, like his contemporaries, believed in a great hierarchy of gods and spirits inside and outside the visible universe. But he does not appear to attach much religious importance to the beings in the lower ranks of this hierarchy (though he insists, as against the Gnostics, on proper respect being paid to the high gods of the visible universe, the sun, moon, and stars); nor does he consider that external religious rites are any help to the ascent of the soul. He takes a sacramental view of the visible universe, in that he regards it as a sign, or sacrament in the large sense, of the invisible; but there is no room for sacramentalism in his religion. The process of return is one of turning away from the external world, of concentrating one's powers inwardly instead of dissipating them outwardly, of rediscovering one's true self by the most vigorous intellectual and moral discipline, and then waiting so prepared for the One to manifest His presence. The rediscovery of one's true self is a return to Intellect; for, as we have seen, Plotinus teaches that our selves at their highest belong to the sphere of Intellect. This does not however mean that Plotinus simply reduces spiritual life to intellectual life. Intellect to him means something more than, and something different from, what we usually understand by the term; and in the ascent of the soul the moral life counts for at least as much as the intellectual life. The following passage[1] shows how misleading it would be to describe Plotinus as a

[1] VI. 7. 36, 6–10.

one-sided intellectualist (and his life here confirms his teaching): "We learn about the Good by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which proceed from It and intellectual progress by ascending degrees; but we advance towards it by purifications and virtues and adornings of the soul and by gaining a foothold in the world of Intellect and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents." Here moral and true intellectual life form an indissoluble unity.

The fact that we can only attain to the One when we are firmly established in Intellect has some important consequences, which are not always fully appreciated, for Plotinus's account of the final union. The first is that there is for him no short cut, no mysticism which does not demand moral and intellectual perfection. Union with the One transcends our moral and intellectual life, because in it we ascend to the source of intellect and goodness which is more than they are, but it is only possible because our intellectual and moral life has reached its perfection. We are "carried out by the very surge of the wave of Intellect."[1] It is the completion and confirmation, not the negation and destruction, of all that has been done to bring ourselves to perfection, to the fullest consciousness and activity. And again, because it is as Intellect that we attain to union, it would seem that it is not Plotinus's thought that our individual personalities are finally absorbed and disappear. It is true that in the union we rise above Intellect to a state in which there is no consciousness of difference from the One, in which there is no longer seer and seen,

[1] VI. 7. 36.

but only unity. But universal Intellect, of which we are then a part, exists continually in that state of union without prejudice to its proper life of intuitive thought and unity-in-diversity. There is never any suggestion in Plotinus that all things except the One are illusions or fleeting appearances.

III. Text, Editions, Translations

For full information about the history of the text of Plotinus, reference should be made to the Preface of the great critical edition of P. Henry and H–R. Schwyzer (Vols. I & II Paris & Brussels, Desclée de Brouwer; Vol. III Paris–Brussels–Leiden, Desclée de Brouwer and Brill 1951–73; *editio minor*, extensively revised, *Plotini Opera* I–III Oxford, Clarendon Press 1964–82), whose text is printed and translated in these volumes, and to the massive prolegomena to this edition published by P. Henry under the general title of *Études Plotiniennes* (Vol. I. *Les États du Texte de Plotin* 1938, Vol. II. *Les Manuscrits des Ennéades* 1941 and 1948; both Desclée de Brouwer). Briefly, their conclusions are: (i) The archetype of our present MSS represented the text of Porphyry's edition with remarkable fidelity. This archetype was certainly written after the beginning of the sixth century, and probably between the ninth and twelfth centuries. (ii) The extant MSS cannot safely be divided into *boni* and *deteriores*; in reconstituting the text of the archetype the primary MSS of four of the five families into which the MSS can be grouped (WXYZ) [1] must be used, and no one MS or family can

[1] The fifth family (D) consists of 1 MS (Marcianus Graecus 209) which, though the oldest, is too fragmentary and faulty to be of use in constituting the text.

be given predominant authority. (iii) As the text of the archetype is believed on good grounds to represent faithfully the text of Porphyry's edition, there is little room for conjectural emendation.

The text presented by the editors is therefore both extremely conservative and eclectic, in the sense that it does not rely exclusively on any one MS or family of MSS. Its conservatism has been criticised, perhaps in some particular cases justifiably. But in the case of Plotinus there are special reasons for ultra-conservatism. We have always to remember Porphyry's words in ch. 8 of the *Life* about his master's method of work "when Plotinus had written anything he could never bear to go over it twice: even to read it through once was too much for him, as his eyesight was not strong enough. In writing he did not form the letters with any regard to appearance or divide his syllables correctly, and he paid no attention to spelling." [1] And anyone who reads the *Enneads* will soon discover that Plotinus writes a Greek very much of his own, which is certainly not bad or barbarous, but is highly unconventional and irregular: it is therefore extremely dangerous to emend him according to any preconceived ideas of Greek, or even late Greek philosophical, usage, and very difficult to establish any reliable internal criteria derived from the *Enneads* themselves which will enable us to state with any confidence what oddities of language were impossible for Plotinus. As a translator, with no pretensions to competence as a textual critic, I can

[1] Cp. also Longinus's experience recorded in *Life*, ch. 19–20.

only say that in most difficult and disputed passages I have found that the Henry-Schwyzer text is easier to understand and gives a better sense than the versions of their predecessors. And since the publication of the first volume in 1951, the editors have been engaged in a continual process of critical (often self-critical) revision of the text, in the freest discussion with other Plotinian scholars, by which it has been greatly improved. Particularly notable contributions to this revision were made by the late Professor Jesus Igal of Bilbao ; and it has gone on in continual and fruitful interaction with the Harder-Beutler-Theiler edition of Plotinus (see below). Full account of this revision, at the stage which it has so far reached (H–R. Schwyzer is still continuing it), has been taken in the last four volumes of the Loeb Plotinus (IV–VII, containing *Enneads* IV–VI); on the text of this revision of Vol. I see the Note on page vi ; Vols. II and III represent the stage reached when Vol. I of the *editio minor* (= OCT) was published in 1964, with a few later revisions.

A full, severe, and sometimes entertaining account of the previous editions will be found in Henry and Schwyzer's Preface. They are as follows :

P. Perna. Basel 1580.
F. Creuzer and G. H. Moser. Oxford 1835.
A. Kirchhoff. Leipzig 1856.
H. F. Mueller. Berlin 1878–80.
R. Volkmann. Leipzig 1883–4.
E. Bréhier. Paris 1924–38.

Before his death Richard Harder had begun to prepare a Greek text of Plotinus to accompany a revision of his admirable German translation (first published

1930–37). The first volume of his text (containing the treatises 1–21 in the chronological order given in Porphyry's *Life*, which he preferred to Porphyry's later arrangement of them in Enneads) was published in 1956. After his death in 1957 the work was continued by R. Beutler and W. Theiler and completed in 1971. (*Plotins Schriften* V–VI Hamburg, Meiner 1956–71) ; in spite of Harder's too modest remarks in his preface to the first volume, this ranks as a major critical edition of great value ; its relation to the Henry-Schwyzer text is one of friendly independence. After these two great editions, the principal help to students of Plotinus which has appeared in recent years is the *Lexicon Plotinianum*, compiled by J. H. Sleeman and G. Pollet (Leiden, Brill ; Leuven, University Press 1980), which accords with the Henry-Schwyzer text.

There are several good commentaries on individual works of Plotinus. I have found the following particularly helpful ; all have Greek texts.

W. Beirwaltes *Plotin. Über Ewigheit und Zeit* (III 7) Frankfurt, Klostermann 1967 ; 3rd edition 1981.
V. Cilento *Paideia antignostica* (III 8, V 8, V 5, II 9, now generally recognised as parts of a single long work) Florence, Le Monnier 1971.
J. Bertier, L. Brisson and others *Plotin, Traité sur les nombres* (VI 6) Paris, Vrin 1980.
M. Atkinson *Plotinus : Ennead V 1* Oxford, Clarendon Press 1983.

Since Marsilius Ficinus re-introduced Plotinus to Western Europe with his great Latin translation in 1492, translations of the *Enneads* have played an

important part in Plotinian studies, and their number is rapidly increasing. Harder's German translation has already been referred to. V. Cilento's Italian version with critical commentary (*Plotino: Enneadi* Bari, Laterza 1947–9) is of great scholarly value. J. Igal, whose contributions to the revision of the Henry-Schwyzer text were so great (see above), was engaged on a Spanish translation at the time of his death: two volumes, with a long and excellent introduction, have been published (*Porfirio, Vida de Plotino*; *Plotino, Eneadas I–II* and *Plotino, Eneadas III–IV* Madrid, Gredos 1982 and 1985), and the third is in active preparation. There is a good Dutch translation by R. Ferwerda (Amsterdam, Ambo Athenaeum—Polak and Van Gennep 1984), and translations into Polish and Hebrew. A Japanese translation is now appearing (*Plotinos Zenshū*, tr. Michitaro Tanaka, Muneaki Mizuchi and Yasuhiko Tanogashira, 5 vols., Tokyo, Chūō-Kōron Sha 1986–7). P. Hadot has published the first volume of an important new French translation, to be completed by various hands under his direction, with extensive introductions and commentaries (*Plotin, Traité 38* (VI7), Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1988). The English translation by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page (4th edition London, Faber 1969—the third of the one-volume editions revised by Page) is of much scholarly value and will always hold the affection of some readers because of its noble esoteric-majestic style. My debt to it is considerable, but I have had a better critical text at my disposal and have tried to give a plainer version and one closer to the Greek.

Since the appearance of the first volume of the Henry-Schwyzer text in 1951 there has been a great increase in interest in Plotinus and later Platonism;

this is part of the general growth of interest in late antiquity, the period of transition from the ancient to the mediaeval world. The number of scholarly writings on Plotinus and his predecessors and successors is now very large and continues to grow rapidly. Good introductions to these studies are provided by *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press 1970, edited by A. H. Armstrong, who also wrote Part III, "Plotinus") and two excellent books in Duckworth's *Classical Life and Letters* series: John Dillon *The Middle Platonists* and R. T. Wallis *Neoplatonism* (London 1977 and 1972). A complete survey of everything published on Plotinus up to 1949 will be found in B. Marien's *Bibliografica critica degli studi Plotiniani* (Bari, Laterza 1949, published with the last volume of Cilento's translation). Two full bibliographical surveys of later publications have been published in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase, Berlin–New York, De Gruyter) II.36.1. (1987): the first, by H. J. Blumenthal, covering the period 1951–71, pp. 528–70 and the second, by K. Corrigan and P. O'Cleirigh, covering 1971–86, pp. 571–623.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A′ = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.

W = AE.
X = BRJ.
Y = USM.
Z = QL.

mg = in margine.
ac = ante correctionem.
pc = post correctionem.
γρ = γράφεται.

ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO

Enn.	chron.
I 1	53
I 2	19
I 3	20
I 4	46
I 5	36
I 6	1
I 7	54
I 8	51
I 9	16

Enn.	chron.
II 1	40
II 2	14
II 3	52
II 4	12
II 5	25
II 6	17
II 7	37
II 8	35
II 9	33

Enn	chron.
III 1	3
III 2	47
III 3	48
III 4	15
III 5	50
III 6	26
III 7	45
III 8	30
III 9	13

Enn.	chron.
IV 1	21
IV 2	4
IV 3	27
IV 4	28
IV 5	29
IV 6	41
IV 7	2
IV 8	6
IV 9	8

Enn.	chron.
V 1	10
V 2	11
V 3	49
V 4	7
V 5	32
V 6	24
V 7	18
V 8	31
V 9	5

Enn.	chron.
VI 1	42
VI 2	43
VI 3	44
VI 4	22
VI 5	23
VI 6	34
VI 7	38
VI 8	39
VI 9	9

ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS COMPARATVR CVM ORDINE ENNEADVM

chron.	Enn.
1	I 6
2	IV 7
3	III 1
4	IV 2
5	V 9
6	IV 8
7	V 4
8	IV 9
9	VI 9
10	V 1
11	V 2
12	II 4
13	III 9
14	II 2
15	III 4
16	I 9
17	II 6
18	V 7

chron.	Enn.
19	I 2
20	I 3
21	IV 1
22	VI 4
23	VI 5
24	V 6
25	II 5
26	III 6
27	IV 3
28	IV 4
29	IV 5
30	III 8
31	V 8
32	V 5
33	II 9
34	VI 6
35	II 8
36	I 5

chron.	Enn.
37	II 7
38	VI 7
39	VI 8
40	II 1
41	IV 6
42	VI 1
43	VI 2
44	VI 3
45	III 7
46	I 4
47	III 2
48	III 3
49	V 3
50	III 5
51	I 8
52	II 3
53	I 1
54	I 7

ΠΟΡΦΥΡΙΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΛΩΤΙΝΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΑΞΕΩΣ ΤΩΝ ΒΙΒΛΙΩΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ

1. Πλωτῖνος ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς γεγονὼς φιλόσοφος ἐῴκει μὲν αἰσχυνομένῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι εἴη. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως οὔτε περὶ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ διηγεῖσθαι ἠνείχετο οὔτε περὶ τῶν γονέων οὔτε περὶ τῆς πατρίδος. Ζωγράφου δὲ ἀνασχέσθαι ἢ πλάστου τοσοῦτον ἀπηξίου ὥστε καὶ λέγειν πρὸς Ἀμέλιον δεόμενον εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι ἐπιτρέψαι· οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ φέρειν ὃ ἡ φύσις εἴδωλον ἡμῖν περιτέθεικεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδώλου εἴδωλον συγχωρεῖν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦν πολυχρονιώτερον καταλιπεῖν ὡς δή τι τῶν ἀξιοθεάτων ἔργων; Ὅθεν ἀπαγορεύοντος καὶ καθεδεῖσθαι ἕνεκα τούτου ἀρνουμένου ἔχων φίλον ὁ Ἀμέλιος Καρτέριον τὸν ἄριστον τῶν τότε γεγονότων ζωγράφων εἰσιέναι καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὰς συνουσίας ποιήσας—ἐξῆν γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ φοιτᾶν εἰς τὰς συνουσίας—τὰς ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶν φαντασίας

[1] Eunapius (p. 6. Boissonade) says Plotinus came from Egypt and that his birthplace was Lyco. David, in his preface to his commentary on Porphyry's *Eisagoge* (4. pp. 91. 23–92. 1), gives the name of Plotinus's birthplace as Lycopolis, probably the town of that name in Upper Egypt (though the town of the same name in the Delta may be meant). But the reliability of this information must remain somewhat suspect. It is

PORPHYRY

ON THE LIFE OF PLOTINUS AND THE ORDER OF HIS BOOKS

1. PLOTINUS, the philosopher of our times, seemed ashamed of being in the body. As a result of this state of mind he could never bear to talk about his race or his parents or his native country.[1] And he objected so strongly to sitting to a painter or sculptor that he said to Amelius,[2] who was urging him to allow a portrait of himself to be made, "Why really, is it not enough to have to carry the image in which nature has encased us, without your requesting me to agree to leave behind me a longer-lasting image of the image, as if it was something genuinely worth looking at?" In view of his denial and refusal for this reason to sit, Amelius, who had a friend, Carterius, the best painter of the time, brought him in to attend the meetings of the school—they were open to anyone who wished to come, and accustomed him by pro-

difficult to see what good source of information could have been open to Eunapius which was not available to Porphyry.

[2] For Amelius Gentilianus from Etruria cp. *Life*, ch. 3, 7, 10, 17 (his epistle dedicatory to Porphyry), 18, and 20. He was, as the *Life* makes clear, the leading member of the school in which he seems to have acted as Plotinus's chief assistant (cp. especially ch. 18). He was extremely pious (ch. 10) and a diffuse and voluminous writer. Nothing survives of the hundred volumes of the notes which he made at the meetings of the school.

πληκτικωτέρας λαμβάνειν διὰ τῆς ἐπὶ πλέον προσοχῆς συνείθισεν. Ἔπειτα γράφοντος ἐκ τοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐναποκειμένου ἰνδάλματος τὸ εἴκασμα καὶ συνδιορθοῦντος εἰς ὁμοιότητα τὸ ἴχνος τοῦ Ἀμελίου εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι ἡ εὐφυία τοῦ Καρτερίου παρέσχεν ἀγνοοῦντος τοῦ Πλωτίνου ὁμοιοτάτην.

2. Κωλικῇ δὲ νόσῳ πολλάκις καταπονούμενος οὔτε κλυστῆρος ἠνέσχετο, οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τοῦ πρεσβύτου λέγων ὑπομένειν τὰς τοιαύτας θεραπείας, οὔτε τὰς θηριακὰς ἀντιδότους λαβεῖν ὑπέμεινε, μηδὲ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων τὰς ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τροφὰς προσίεσθαι λέγων. Λουτροῦ δὲ ἀπεχόμενος καὶ τρίψεσι καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν χρώμενος ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ λοιμοῦ ἐπιβρίσαντος συνέβη τοὺς τρίβοντας αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἀμελήσας τῆς τοιαύτης θεραπείας κατ' ὀλίγον τὴν τοῦ κυνάγχου ἀγριότητα κατασκευαζομένην ἔσχε. Καμοῦ μὲν παρόντος οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον ὑπεφαίνετο· ἀποπλεύσαντος δὲ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἠγριώθη τὸ πάθος, ὡς ἔλεγεν ἐπανελθόντι Εὐστόχιος ὁ ἑταῖρος ὁ καὶ παραμείνας αὐτῷ ἄχρι θανάτου, ὡς καὶ τῆς φωνῆς περιαιρεθῆναι τὸ τορὸν καὶ εὔηχον βραγχώντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν συγχυθῆναι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τοὺς πόδας ἑλκωθῆναι· ὅθεν ἐκτρεπομένων αὐτοῦ τὰς συναντήσεις τῶν φίλων διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ στόματος πάντας προσαγορεύειν ἔθος ἔχειν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεται, εἰς δὲ τὴν Καμπανίαν ἐλθὼν εἰς Ζήθου χωρίον ἑταίρου παλαιοῦ αὐτῷ γεγονότος καὶ

[1] A much more highly coloured account of Plotinus's last illness appears in Firmicus Maternus, *Mathesis* I. 7. 14 ff. H. Oppermann (*Plotins Leben*, Heidelberg 1929, ch. I) regards this as an independent account based on a lost biography by

gressive study to derive increasingly striking mental pictures from what he saw. Then Carterius drew a likeness of the impression which remained in his memory. Amelius helped him to improve his sketch to a closer resemblance, and so the talent of Carterius gave us an excellent portrait of Plotinus without his knowledge.

2. He often suffered from a disease of the bowels, but would not submit to an enema, saying that it was unsuitable for an elderly man to undergo this sort of treatment. He refused also to take medicines containing the flesh of wild beasts, giving as his reason that he did not approve of eating the flesh even of domestic animals. He kept away from the bath and had himself massaged every day at home. When the plague broke out and his masseurs died he gave up treatment of this kind, and soon contracted acute diphtheria. While I was with him no symptoms of this kind appeared, but after I left on my voyage his disease increased so much in violence (as our friend Eustochius, who stayed with him till his death, told me when I returned) that his voice lost its clearness and sonority as his throat grew worse, and his sight became blurred and his hands and feet ulcerated.[1] So, since his friends avoided meeting him because he had the habit of greeting everyone by word of mouth, he left the city and went to Campania, to a property belonging to Zethus, an old friend of his who was

Eustochius prefixed to his edition of Plotinus's writings (cp. *Introduction*, p. ix). Henry (*Plotin et l'Occident*, Louvain, 1934, ch. I) considers it, more probably, as a rhetorical amplification of the account given here by Porphyry. Both agree, however, that the disease described here of which Plotinus died was in fact *elephantiasis Graecorum*, i.e., a form of leprosy.

τεθνηκότος κατάγεται. Τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα αὐτῷ ἔκ τε τῶν τοῦ Ζήθου ἐτελεῖτο καὶ ἐκ Μητουρνῶν ἐκομίζετο ἐκ τῶν Καστρικίου· ἐν Μητούρναις γὰρ ὁ Καστρίκιος τὰς κτήσεις εἶχε. Μέλλων δὲ τελευτᾶν, ὡς ὁ Εὐστόχιος ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐν Ποτιόλοις κατοικῶν ὁ Εὐστόχιος βραδέως πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀφίκετο, εἰπὼν ὅτι σὲ ἔτι περιμένω καὶ φήσας πειρᾶσθε τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν θεὸν ἀνάγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, δράκοντος ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην διελθόντος ἐν ᾗ κατέκειτο καὶ εἰς ὀπὴν ἐν τῷ τοίχῳ ὑπάρχουσαν ὑποδεδυκότος ἀφῆκε τὸ πνεῦμα ἔτη γεγονώς, ὡς ὁ Εὐστόχιος ἔλεγεν, ἓξ τε καὶ ἑξήκοντα, τοῦ δευτέρου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας πληρουμένου. Τελευτῶντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐτύγχανον ἐν Λιλυβαίῳ, διατρίβων, Ἀμέλιος δὲ ἐν Ἀπαμείᾳ τῆς Συρίας, Καστρίκιος δὲ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ· μόνος δὲ παρῆν ὁ Εὐστόχιος. Ἀναψηφίζουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας εἰς τοὐπίσω ἔτη ἓξ τε καὶ ἑξήκοντα ὁ χρόνος αὐτῷ τῆς γενέσεως εἰς τὸ τρισκαιδέκατον ἔτος τῆς Σεβήρου βασιλείας πίπτει. Οὔτε δὲ τὸν μῆνα δεδήλωκέ τινι καθ' ὃν γεγέννηται, οὔτε τὴν γενέθλιον ἡμέραν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ θύειν ἢ ἑστιᾶν τινα τοῖς αὐτου γενεθλίοις ἠξίου, καίπερ ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους παραδεδομένοις γενεθλίοις θύων τε καὶ ἑστιῶν τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὅτε καὶ λόγον ἔδει τῶν ἑταίρων τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν συνελθόντων ἀναγνῶναι.

3. Ἃ μέντοι ἡμῖν αὐτὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμι-

dead. His wants were provided for partly from the estate of Zethus and partly from that of Castricius at Minturnae; for Castricius had his property there. When he was on the point of death, Eustochius told us, as Eustochius had been staying at Puteoli and was late in coming to him he said, "I have been waiting a long time for you." Then he said, "Try to bring back the god in us to the divine in the All!" and, as a snake crept under the bed on which he was lying and disappeared into a hole in the wall, he breathed his last. It was the end of the second year of the reign of Claudius, and according to Eustochius he was sixty-six years old. At the time of his death I, Porphyry, was staying at Lilybaeum, Amelius was at Apamea in Syria, and Castricus was in Rome: only Eustochius was with him. If we reckon sixty-six years back from the second year of the reign of Claudius the date of his birth falls in the thirteenth year of the reign of Severus;[1] but he never told anyone the month in which he was born or the day of his birth, because he did not want any sacrifice or feast on his birthday, though he sacrificed and entertained his friends on the traditional birthdays of Plato and Socrates; on these occasions those of his friends who were capable of it had to read a discourse before the assembled company.

3. All the same, he did often in the course of conversation spontaneously tell us something about his

[1] I.e., Plotinus was born in A.D. 205 and died in 270. For a discussion of the chronology of his life see Schwyzer, art. cit. (Introduction, p. xxxii), col. 472–4.

λίαις πολλάκις διηγεῖτο, ἣν τοιαῦτα. Προσφοιτᾶν μὲν γὰρ τῇ τροφῷ καίπερ εἰς γραμματοδιδασκάλου ἀπιόντα ἄχρις ὀγδόου ἔτους ἀπὸ γενέσεως ὄντα καὶ τοὺς μαζοὺς γυμνοῦντα θηλάζειν προθυμεῖσθαι· ἀκούσαντα δέ ποτε ὅτι ἀτηρόν ἐστι παιδίον, ἀποσχέσθαι αἰδεσθέντα. Εἰκοστὸν δὲ καὶ ὄγδοον ἔτος αὐτὸν ἄγοντα ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ τοῖς τότε κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν εὐδοκιμοῦσι συσταθέντα κατιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἀκροάσεως αὐτῶν κατηφῆ καὶ λύπης πλήρη, ὡς καί τινι τῶν φίλων διηγεῖσθαι ἃ πάσχοι· τὸν δὲ συνέντα αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βούλημα ἀπενέγκαι πρὸς Ἀμμώνιον, οὗ μηδέπω πεπείρατο. Τὸν δὲ εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἀκούσαντα φάναι πρὸς τὸν ἑταῖρον· τοῦτον ἐζήτουν. Καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας συνεχῶς τῷ Ἀμμωνίῳ παραμένοντα τοσαύτην ἕξιν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτήσασθαι, ὡς καὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Πέρσαις ἐπιτηδευομένης πεῖραν λαβεῖν σπεῦσαι καὶ τῆς παρ' Ἰνδοῖς κατορθουμένης. Γορδιανοῦ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας παριέναι μέλλοντος δοὺς ἑαυτὸν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ συνεισῄει ἔτος ἤδη τριακοστὸν ἄγων καὶ ἔννατον. Ἕνδεκα γὰρ ὅλων ἐτῶν παραμένων τῷ Ἀμμωνίῳ συνεσχόλασε. Τοῦ δὲ Γορδιανοῦ περὶ τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν ἀναιρεθέντος μόλις φεύγων εἰς τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν διεσώθη. Καὶ Φιλίππου τὴν βασιλείαν

[1] Ammonius (c. 175–242) was a self-taught philosopher who wrote nothing. We know very little about his teaching: the scanty evidence is fully reported and discussed by Schwyzer,

early life, to the following effect. Up to the age of eight, though he was already going to school, he used to keep going to his nurse and baring her breasts and wanting to suck; but when someone once told him that he was a little pest he was ashamed and stopped. In his twenty-eighth year he felt the impulse to study philosophy and was recommended to the teachers in Alexandria who then had the highest reputation; but he came away from their lectures so depressed and full of sadness that he told his trouble to one of his friends. The friend, understanding the desire of his heart, sent him to Ammonius,[1] whom he had not so far tried. He went and heard him, and said to his friend, "This is the man I was looking for." From that day he stayed continually with Ammonius and acquired so complete a training in philosophy that he became eager to make acquaintance with the Persian philosophical discipline and that prevailing among the Indians. As the Emperor Gordian was preparing to march against the Persians, he joined the army and went on the expedition; he was already in his thirty-ninth year, for he had stayed studying with Ammonius for eleven complete years. When Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia Plotinus escaped with difficulty and came safe to Antioch. After Philip

art. cit. col. 477–81. (See also E. R. Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius* in Entretiens Hardt V). The nickname Saccas and the story that he once earned his living as a porter appears for the first time in Theodoret. Porphyry never mentions it. Porphyry (in Eusebius H.E. 6. 19. 7) says that he was brought up a Christian, but later became a pagan. This may be true, but cannot be taken as certain, any more than Eusebius' denial (6. 19. 10). The name Ammonius was common in Egypt, and there may have been some confusion of persons.

κρατήσαντος τεσσαράκοντα γεγονὼς ἔτη εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἄνεισιν. Ἐρεννίῳ δὲ καὶ Ὠριγένει καὶ Πλωτίνῳ συνθηκῶν γεγονυιῶν μηδὲν ἐκκαλύπτειν τῶν Ἀμμωνίου δογμάτων ἃ δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀκροάσεσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνεκεκάθαρτο, ἔμενε καὶ ὁ Πλωτῖνος συνὼν μέν τισι τῶν προσιόντων, τηρῶν δὲ ἀνέκπυστα τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου δόγματα. Ἐρεννίου δὲ πρώτου τὰς συνθήκας παραβάντος, Ὠριγένης μὲν ἠκολούθει τῷ φθάσαντι Ἐρεννίῳ. Ἔγραψε δὲ οὐδὲν πλὴν τὸ "Περὶ τῶν δαιμόνων" σύγγραμμα καὶ ἐπὶ Γαλιήνου "Ὅτι μόνος ποιητὴς ὁ βασιλεύς". Πλωτῖνος δὲ ἄχρι μὲν πολλοῦ γράφων οὐδὲν διετέλεσεν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἀμμωνίου συνουσίας ποιούμενος τὰς διατριβάς· καὶ οὕτως ὅλων ἐτῶν δέκα διετέλεσε, συνὼν μέν τισι, γράφων δὲ οὐδέν. Ἦν δὲ ἡ διατριβή, ὡς ἂν αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν προτρεπομένου τοὺς συνόντας, ἀταξίας πλήρης καὶ πολλῆς φλυαρίας, ὡς Ἀμέλιος ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο. Προσῆλθε δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀμέλιος τρίτον ἔτος ἄγοντι ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ἔτος τῆς Φιλίππου βασιλείας καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ πρώτου ἔτους τῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας παραμείνας ἔτη ὅλα συγγέγονεν εἴκοσι καὶ τέσσαρα, ἕξιν μὲν ἔχων ὅτε προσῆλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Λυσιμάχου

[1] Or, possibly, "With reference to Gallienus, *That the Emperor is the Only Poet.*" But it is very difficult to believe that a fellow-philosopher whom Plotinus respected could have perpetrated such a fulsome piece of court flattery as this suggests, and the context leads one to expect a treatise about the teaching of Ammonius. Origen the Christian writer also attended the lectures of Ammonius (Porphyry in Eusebius H.E. 6. 19. 6), but it seems clear to most of those who have studied the question that the Origen mentioned here and in

had become Emperor he came to Rome, at the age of forty. Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus had made an agreement not to disclose any of the doctrines of Ammonius which he had revealed to them in his lectures. Plotinus kept the agreement, and, though he held conferences with people who came to him, maintained silence about the doctrines of Ammonius. Erennius was the first to break the agreement, and Origen followed his lead; but he wrote nothing except the treatise *On the Spirits* and, in the reign of Gallienus, *That the King is the Only Maker.*[1] Plotinus for a long time continued to write nothing, but began to base his lectures on his studies with Ammonius. So he continued for ten complete years, admitting people to study with him, but writing nothing. Since he encouraged his students to ask questions, the course was lacking in order and there was a great deal of pointless chatter, as Amelius told us. Amelius came to him during his third year in Rome (the third year of the reign of Philip), and stayed with him till the first year of the reign of Claudius, twenty-four years in all. He came with a philosophical training from the school of Lysimachus,

chs. 14 and 20 of the *Life* was quite a different person. Origen was not an uncommon name at Alexandria; there are chronological difficulties against identifying the two (for which see Schwyzer, art. cit., col. 480); there is no trace of the writings mentioned here among the known works of the Christian Origen; and, most important of all, the references in the *Life* clearly imply that the Origen mentioned here was a perfectly normal Platonist, enjoying the friendship and respect of other Platonists and of Plotinus himself. In the passage quoted by Eusebius, Porphyry speaks of the Christian Origen in a very different and thoroughly hostile tone, as one would expect the greatest antiChristian writer of antiquity to speak of the great Christian apologist.

συνουσίας, φιλοπονίᾳ δὲ ὑπερβαλλόμενος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν πάντων διὰ τὸ καὶ σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ Νουμηνίου καὶ γράψαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν καὶ σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκμαθεῖν· σχόλια δὲ ἐκ τῶν συνουσιῶν ποιούμενος ἑκατόν που βιβλία συνέταξε τῶν σχολίων, ἃ Οὐστιλλιανῷ Ἡσυχίῳ τῷ Ἀπαμεῖ, ὃν υἱὸν ἔθετο, κεχάρισται.

4. Τῷ δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει τῆς Γαλιήνου βασιλείας ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μετὰ Ἀντωνίου τοῦ Ῥοδίου γεγονὼς καταλαμβάνω μὲν τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὀκτωκαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχοντα τῆς πρὸς Πλωτῖνον συνουσίας, μηδὲν δέ πω γράφειν τολμήσαντα πλὴν τῶν σχολίων ἃ οὐδέπω εἰς ἑκατὸν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ συνῆκτο. Ἦν δὲ ὁ Πλωτῖνος τῷ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῆς Γαλιήνου βασιλείας ἀμφὶ τὰ πεντήκοντα ἔτη καὶ ἐννέα. Ἐγὼ δὲ Πορφύριος τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ συγγέγονα αὐτὸς ὢν τότε ἐτῶν τριάκοντα. Ἀπὸ μέντοι τοῦ πρώτου ἔτους τῆς Γαλιήνου ἀρχῆς προτραπεὶς ὁ Πλωτῖνος γράφειν τὰς ἐμπιπτούσας ὑποθέσεις, τὸ δέκατον ἔτος τῆς Γαλιήνου ἀρχῆς, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ ἐγὼ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐγνωρίσθην, γράψας εὑρίσκεται εἴκοσι καὶ ἓν βιβλίον ἃ καὶ κατείληφα ἐκδεδομένα ὀλίγοις. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν πω ῥᾳδία ἡ ἔκδοσις οὐδὲ εὐσυνειδήτως ἐγίγνετο οὐδ' ἁπλῶς κἀκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πάσης κρίσεως τῶν λαμβανόντων. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα ταῦτα ἃ διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸν ἐπιγράφειν ἄλλος ἄλλο ἑκάστῳ τοὐπίγραμμα ἐτίθει. Αἱ δ' οὖν κρατήσασαι ἐπιγραφαί εἰσιν αἵδε· θήσω δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν βιβλίων, εἰς τὸ εὐεπίγνωστον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἕκαστον τῶν δηλουμένων βιβλίων·

and was the most industrious of all Plotinus's associates; he wrote out and collected almost all the works of Numenius, and nearly knew the greater part of them by heart. He made notes of the meetings of Plotinus's school and put together about a hundred volumes of these notes, which he has presented to Hostilianus Hesychius of Apamea, his adopted son.

4. In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, I, Porphyry, arrived from Greece with Antonius of Rhodes, and found that Amelius, though he had been with Plotinus for eighteen years, had not yet brought himself to write anything except the notebooks, which he had not yet brought up to their total of a hundred. In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus Plotinus was about fifty-nine years old. I, Porphyry, when I first joined him was thirty. From the first year of Gallienus Plotinus had begun to write on the subjects that came up in the meetings of the school: in the tenth year of Gallienus, when I, Porphyry, first came to know him, I found that he had written twenty-one treatises, and I also discovered that few people had received copies of them. The issuing of copies was still a difficult and anxious business, not at all simple and easy; those who received them were most carefully scrutinised. These were the writings, to which, since he gave them no titles himself, each gave different titles for the several treatises. The following are the titles which finally prevailed. I add the first words of the treatises, to make it easy to recognise from them which treatise is indicated by each title.[1]

[1] As is customary in translations of the *Life*, these first words have been omitted here and the Ennead reference substituted.

α′ Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ· [I. 6].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ καλὸν ἔστι μὲν ἐν ὄψει πλεῖστον.

β′ Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας· [IV. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος.

γ′ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης· [III. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· πάντα τὰ γινόμενα.

δ′ Περὶ οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς· [IV. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν.

ε′ Περὶ νοῦ καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· [V. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενόμενοι.

ς′ Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς· [IV. 8].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος.

ζ′ Πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἑνός· [V. 4].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἴ τι ἐστὶ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον.

η′ Εἰ αἱ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ μία· [IV. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή. ἆρα ὥσπερ ψυχήν.

θ′ Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἑνός· [VI. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα.

ι′ Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων· [V. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί ποτε ἆρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχάς.

ια′ Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ τάξεως τῶν μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον· [V. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν πάντα.

ιβ′ Περὶ τῶν δύο ὑλῶν· [II. 4].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὴν λεγομένην ὕλην.

ιγ′ Ἐπισκέψεις διάφοροι· [III. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· νοῦς φησιν ὁρᾷ ἐνούσας ἰδέας.

1. On Beauty (I. 6).

2. On the Immortality of the Soul (IV. 7).

3. On Destiny (III. 1).

4. On the Essence of the Soul (IV. 2).

5. On Intellect, the Forms, and Being (V. 9).

6. On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies (IV. 8).

7. How That which is after the First comes from the First; and about the One (V. 4).

8. If All Souls are One (IV. 9).

9. On the Good or the One (VI. 9).

10. On the Three Primary Hypostases (V. 1).

11. On the Origin and Order of the Beings which come after the First (V. 2).

12. On the Two Kinds of Matter (II. 4).

13. Various Considerations (III. 9).

ιδ′ Περὶ τῆς κυκλοφορίας· [II. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· διὰ τί κύκλῳ κινεῖται.

ιε′ Περὶ τοῦ εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος· [III. 4].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τῶν μὲν αἱ ὑποστάσεις.

ις′ Περὶ εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς· [I. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· οὐκ ἐξάξεις, ἵνα μὴ ἐξίῃ.

ιζ′ Περὶ ποιότητος· [II. 6].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ οὐσία.

ιη′ Εἰ καὶ τῶν καθέκαστά εἰσιν ἰδέαι· [V. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστον.

ιθ′ Περὶ ἀρετῶν· [I. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα.

κ′ Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς· [I. 3].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος.

κα′ Πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας μέση εἶναι λέγεται· [IV. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴκοσι καὶ ἓν ὄντα, ὅτε αὐτῷ τὸ πρῶτον προσῆλθον ὁ Πορφύριος, εὕρηται γεγραμμένα· πεντηκοστὸν δὲ καὶ ἔννατον ἔτος ἦγε τότε ὁ Πλωτῖνος.

5. Συγγεγονὼς δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦτό τε τὸ ἔτος καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἄλλα ἔτη πέντε—ὀλίγον γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον τῆς δεκαετίας ἐγεγόνειν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, τοῦ Πλωτίνου τὰς θερινὰς μὲν ἄγοντος ἀργούς, συνόντος δὲ ἄλλως ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις—ἐν δὴ τοῖς ἓξ ἔτεσι τούτοις πολλῶν ἐξετάσεων ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις γιγνομένων καὶ γράφειν αὐτὸν ἀξιούντων Ἀμελίου τε καὶ ἐμοῦ, γράφει μὲν

14. On the Circular Motion (II. 2).

15. On our Allotted Guardian Spirit (III. 4).

16. On the Reasonable Departure (I. 9).

17. On Quality (II. 6).

18. Whether there are Ideas of Particulars (V. 7).

19. On Virtues (I. 2).

20. On Dialectic (I. 3).

21. In What Way the Soul is Said to be a Mean between Undivided and Divided Being (IV. 1).

These treatises, twenty-one in all, I, Porphyry, found already written when I first came to him. Plotinus was then in his fifty-ninth year.

5. I, Porphyry, had in fact already been in Rome a little before the tenth year of Gallienus, while Plotinus was taking his summer holiday and only engaging in general conversation with his friends. While I was with him this year and for five years afterwards, in these six years many discussions took place in the meetings of the school and Amelius and I kept urging him to write, so he wrote:

Περὶ τοῦ τί τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ὅλον εἶναι ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν βιβλία δύο· [VI. 4–5].

α′ τούτων δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχὴν ἔχει· ἆρα γε ἡ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ·

β′ τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου ἡ ἀρχή· ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ.

Γράφει δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἄλλα δύο, ὧν

γ′ τὸ μὲν Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος μὴ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ πρώτως νοοῦν καὶ τί τὸ δευτέρως· [V. 6].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ μέν ἐστι νοεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτό·

δ′ τὸ δὲ Περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· [II. 5].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· λέγεται τὸ μὲν δυνάμει.

ε′ Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀπαθείας· [III. 6].·

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες.

ς′ Περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον· [IV. 3].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ ψυχῆς ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ.

ζ′ Περὶ ψυχῆς δεύτερον· [IV. 4].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί οὖν ἐρεῖ.

η′ Περὶ ψυχῆς τρίτον ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ὁρῶμεν· [IV. 5].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερεθέμεθα.

θ′ Περὶ θεωρίας· [III. 8].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· παίζοντες τὴν πρώτην.

ι′ Περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους· [V. 8].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδή φαμεν.

ια′ Περὶ νοῦ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ· [V. 5].

οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν.

22, 23. On the Reason why Being is everywhere all present, One and the Same (VI. 4–5).

Next he wrote another two of which the first is the treatise

24. On the Fact that That Which is beyond Being does not think, and on What is the Primary and What the Secondary Thinking Principle (V. 6).

and the other

25. On What Exists Potentially and What Actually (II. 5).

Then came

26. On The Impassibility of Beings without Body (III. 6).

27. On the Soul I (IV. 3).

28. On the Soul II (IV. 4).

29. On the Soul III, or How we See (IV. 5).

30. On Contemplation (III. 8).

31. On the Intelligible Beauty (V. 8).

32. On Intellect, and That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect and On the Good (V. 5).

ιβ′ Πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς· [II. 9].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν.

ιγ′ Περὶ ἀριθμῶν. [VI. 6].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρ' ἐστὶ πλῆθος.

ιδ′ Πῶς τὰ πόρρω ὁρώμενα μικρὰ φαίνεται; [II. 8].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρά γε τὰ πόρρω ὁρώμενα.

ιε′ Εἰ ἐν παρατάσει χρόνου τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν; [I. 5].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

ις′ Περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων κράσεως· [II. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων λεγομένης.

ιζ′ Πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπέστη καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ· [VI. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰς γένεσιν πέμπων ὁ θεός.

ιη′ Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου· [VI. 8].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρ' ἐστὶ περὶ θεῶν.

ιθ′ Περὶ τοῦ κόσμου· [II. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ λέγοντες.

κ′ Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ μνήμης. [IV. 6].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις.

κα′ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος γενῶν πρῶτον· [VI. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα καὶ τίνα.

κβ′ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος γενῶν δεύτερον· [VI. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων.

κγ′ Περὶ τῶν τοῦ ὄντος γενῶν τρίτον· [VI. 3].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὅπῃ δοκεῖ.

κδ′ Περὶ αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου· [III. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον.

33. Against the Gnostics (II. 9).

34. On Numbers (VI. 6).

35. How Distant Objects appear Small (II. 8).

36. Whether Well-Being depends on Extension of Time (I. 5).

37. On Complete Intermingling (II. 7).

38. How the Multitude of the Forms came into being and On the Good (VI. 7).

39. On Free Will (VI. 8).

40. On the Universe (II. 1).

41. On Sense-Perception and Memory (IV. 6).

42. On the Kinds of Being I (VI. 1).

43. On the Kinds of Being II (VI. 2).

44. On the Kinds of Being III (VI. 3).

45. On Eternity and Time (III. 7).

Ταῦτα τὰ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα ὄντα ὅσα ἐν τῷ ἐξαέτει χρόνῳ τῆς παρουσίας ἐμοῦ Πορφυρίου ἔγραψεν, ἐκ προσκαίρων προβλημάτων τὰς ὑποθέσεις λαβόντα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν κεφαλαίων ἑκάστου τῶν βιβλίων ἐδηλώσαμεν, μετὰ τῶν πρὸ τῆς ἐπιδημίας ἡμῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα γίνεται τεσσαρακονταπέντε.

6. Ἐν δὲ τῇ Σικελίᾳ διατρίβοντός μου—ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀνεχώρησα περὶ τὸ πεντεκαιδέκατον ἔτος τῆς βασιλείας Γαλιήνου—ὁ Πλωτῖνος γράψας πέντε βιβλία ἀποστέλλει μοι ταῦτα·

α′ Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· [I. 4].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

β′ Περὶ προνοίας πρῶτον· [III. 2].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ μὲν τῷ αὐτομάτῳ·

γ′ Περὶ προνοίας δεύτερον· [III. 3].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί τοίνυν δοκεῖ περὶ τούτων.

δ′ Περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα· [V. 3].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα τὸ νοοῦν ἑαυτὸ ποικίλον δεῖ εἶναι.

ε′ Περὶ ἔρωτος· [III. 5].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ ἔρωτος πότερα θεός.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς Κλαυδίου πέμπει βασιλείας· ἀρχομένου δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὅτε καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον θνῄσκει, πέμπει ταῦτα·

α′ Τίνα τὰ κακά· [I. 8].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· οἱ ζητοῦντες πόθεν τὰ κακά.

β′ Εἰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἄστρα· [II. 3].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἡ τῶν ἄστρων φορά.

These twenty-four treatises are those which he wrote during the six-year period when I, Porphyry, was with him. He took their subjects from problems which came up from time to time in the meetings of the school, as I have shown in the summaries of the several treatises. With the twenty-one treatises written before I came to Rome the total comes to forty-five.

6. While I was living in Sicily—I went there about the fifteenth year of the reign of Gallienus—Plotinus wrote and sent me these five treatises:

46. On Well-Being (I. 4).

47. On Providence I (III. 2).

48. On Providence II (III. 3).

49. On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which is Beyond (V. 3).

50. On Love (III. 5).

He sent me these in the first year of the reign of Claudius. At the beginning of the second year, shortly before his death, he sent these:

51. On the Nature of Evils (I. 8).

52. Whether the Stars are Causes (II. 3).

γ′ Τί τὸ ζῷον; [I. 1].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι.

δ′ Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· [I. 7].
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρ' ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι.

Ταῦτα μετὰ τεσσαρακονταπέντε τῶν πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων γραφέντων γίνεται τέτταρα καὶ πεντήκοντα. Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐγράφη, τὰ μὲν κατὰ πρώτην ἡλικίαν, τὰ δὲ ἀκμάζοντος, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος καταπονουμένου, οὕτω καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔχει τὰ βιβλία. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα εἴκοσι καὶ ἓν ἐλαφροτέρας ἐστὶ δυνάμεως καὶ οὐδέπω πρὸς εὐτονίαν ἀρκοῦν μέγεθος ἐχούσης, τὰ δὲ τῆς μέσης ἐκδόσεως τυχόντα τὸ ἀκμαῖον τῆς δυνάμεως ἐμφαίνει καί ἐστι τὰ $\overline{κδ}$ πλὴν τῶν βραχέων τελεώτατα, τὰ μέντοι τελευταῖα ἐννέα ὑφειμένης ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως γέγραπται καὶ μᾶλλόν γε τὰ τελευταῖα τέσσαρα ἢ τὰ πρὸ τούτων πέντε.

7. Ἔσχε δὲ ἀκροατὰς μὲν πλείους, ζηλωτὰς δὲ καὶ διὰ φιλοσοφίαν συνόντας Ἀμέλιόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς Τουσκίας, οὗ τὸ ὄνομα ἦν Γεντιλιανὸς τὸ κύριον, αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ τοῦ ρ̄ Ἀμέριον αὐτὸν καλεῖν ἠξίου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀμερείας ἢ τῆς ἀμελείας πρέπειν αὐτῷ καλεῖσθαι λέγων. Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ ἰατρικόν τινα Σκυθοπολίτην Παυλῖνον ὃν ὁ Ἀμέλιος Μίκκαλον προσηγόρευε, παρακουσμάτων πλήρη γεγονότα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Ἀλεξανδρέα Εὐστόχιον ἰατρικὸν ἔσχεν ἕτερον, ὃς περὶ τὰ τελευταῖα τῆς ἡλικίας γνωρισθεὶς αὐτῷ διέμενε θεραπεύων ἄχρι τοῦ θανάτου καὶ μόνοις τοῖς Πλωτίνου σχολάζων ἕξιν περιεβάλλετο γνησίου φιλοσόφου. Συνῆν δὲ καὶ Ζωτικὸς κριτικός τε καὶ ποιητικός, ὃς καὶ τὰ

53. What is the Living Being? (I. 1).
54. On Well-Being (I. 7).

These, with the forty-five of the first and second sets that he wrote, amount to fifty-four. The power of the treatises varies according to the period in which he wrote them, in early life, in his prime, or in his illness. The first twenty-one show a slighter capacity, not yet attaining to the dimensions of his full vigour. Those produced in his middle period reveal his power at its height: these twenty-four, except for the short ones, are of the highest perfection. The last nine were written when his power was already failing, and this is more apparent in the last four than in the five which precede them.

7. He had many hearers, and some who were brought together by a real enthusiasm for philosophy. Among these was Amelius of Tuscany, whose family name was Gentilianus; the master preferred to substitute R for L and call him Amerius, saying that it suited him better to take his name from *amereia* (indivisibility) than *ameleia* (indifference). There was also a medical man, Paulinus of Scythopolis, whom Amelius used to call Mikkalos—he always got things wrong. There was too another medical man, Eustochius of Alexandria, who came to know Plotinus towards the end of his life and stayed with him and tended him till his death. He devoted himself entirely to the thought of Plotinus and acquired the character of a genuine philosopher.[1] Zoticus the critic and poet was also one of the com-

[1] For the edition which Eustochius made of the writings of Plotinus see Introduction (p. ix) and the references there given.

Ἀντιμάχου διορθωτικὰ πεποίηται καὶ τὸν "Ἀτλαντικὸν" εἰς ποίησιν μετέβαλε πάνυ ποιητικῶς, συγχυθεὶς δὲ τὰς ὄψεις πρὸ ὀλίγου τῆς Πλωτίνου τελευτῆς ἀπέθανεν. Ἔφθασε δὲ καὶ ὁ Παυλῖνος προαποθανὼν τοῦ Πλωτίνου. Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ Ζῆθον ἑταῖρον, Ἀράβιον τὸ γένος, Θεοδοσίου τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου γενομένου ἑταίρου εἰς γάμον λαβόντα θυγατέρα. Ἦν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἰατρικὸς καὶ σφόδρα πεφίλωτο τῷ Πλωτίνῳ· πολιτικὸν δὲ ὄντα καὶ ῥοπὰς ἔχοντα πολιτικὰς ἀναστέλλειν ὁ Πλωτῖνος ἐπειρᾶτο. Ἐχρῆτο δὲ αὐτῷ οἰκείως, ὡς καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀγροὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸ ἓξ σημείων Μητουρνῶν ὑπάρχοντας, οὓς Καστρίκιος ἐκέκτητο ὁ Φίρμος κεκλημένος, ἀνδρῶν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοκαλώτατος γεγονὼς καὶ τόν τε Πλωτῖνον σεβόμενος καὶ Ἀμελίῳ οἷα οἰκέτης ἀγαθὸς ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπηρετούμενος καὶ Πορφυρίῳ ἐμοὶ οἷα γνησίῳ ἀδελφῷ ἐν πᾶσι προσεσχηκώς. Καὶ οὗτος οὖν ἐσέβετο Πλωτῖνον τὸν πολιτικὸν ᾑρημένος βίον. Ἠκροῶντο δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς συγκλήτου οὐκ ὀλίγοι ὧν ἔργον ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ μάλιστα ἐποίουν Μάρκελλος Ὀρρόντιος καὶ Σαβινίλλος. Ἦν δὲ καὶ Ῥογατιανὸς ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου, ὃς εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀποστροφῆς τοῦ βίου τούτου προκεχωρήκει ὡς πάσης μὲν κτήσεως ἀποστῆναι, πάντα δὲ οἰκέτην ἀποπέμψασθαι, ἀποστῆναι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀξιώματος· καὶ πραίτωρ προιέναι μέλλων παρόντων τῶν ὑπηρετῶν μήτε προελθεῖν μήτε φροντίσαι τῆς λειτουργίας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ οἰκίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἑλέσθαι κατοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρός τινας τῶν φίλων καὶ συνήθων φοιτῶντα ἐκεῖ τε δειπνεῖν κἀκεῖ καθεύδειν, σιτεῖσθαι δὲ παρὰ μίαν· ἀφ' ἧς

panions of Plotinus; he corrected the text of Antimachus and made the "Story of Atlantis"[1] into a very good poem. He became blind and died a little before the death of Plotinus: Paulinus also predeceased him. Another of his companions was Zethus, an Arab by race, who married the daughter of Theodosius, a friend of Ammonius. He was another medical man and a close friend of Plotinus, who kept trying to divert him from the affairs of state in which he was active and influential.[2] Plotinus was on terms of great intimacy with him and used to go and stay at his place in the country, six miles from Minturnae. This had formerly belonged to Castricius, surnamed Firmus, who was the greatest lover of beauty of all of us and venerated Plotinus. He was Amelius's faithful servant and helper in every need and as devoted to me, Porphyry, as if I was his own brother. He was again an admirer of Plotinus who had chosen a public career. A good many members of the Senate also attended his lectures, of whom Marcellus Orrontius and Sabinillus worked hardest at philosophy. There was also Rogatianus, a senator, who advanced so far in renunciation of public life that he gave up all his property, dismissed all his servants, and resigned his rank. When he was on the point of appearing in public as praetor and the lictors were already there, he refused to appear or have anything to do with the office. He would not even keep his own house to live in, but went the round of his friends and acquaintances, dining at one house and sleeping at another (but he only ate every other day). As a

[1] Presumably that in Plato's *Critias*.

[2] Or, possibly, "for he was fond of them and had leanings towards a statesman's life."

δὴ ἀποστάσεως καὶ ἀφροντιστίας τοῦ βίου ποδαγρῶντα μὲν οὕτως, ὡς καὶ δίφρῳ βαστάζεσθαι, ἀναρρωσθῆναι, τὰς χεῖρας δὲ ἐκτεῖναι μὴ οἷόν τε ὄντα χρῆσθαι ταύταις πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐμαρῶς ἢ οἱ τὰς τέχνας διὰ τῶν χειρῶν μετιόντες. Τοῦτον ἀπεδέχετο ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἐπαινῶν διετέλει εἰς ἀγαθὸν παράδειγμα τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι προβαλλόμενος. Συνῆν δὲ καὶ Σεραπίων Ἀλεξανδρεὺς ῥητορικὸς μὲν τὰ πρῶτα, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ φιλοσόφοις συνὼν λόγοις, τοῦ δὲ περὶ χρήματα καὶ τὸ δανείζειν μὴ δυνηθεὶς ἀποστῆναι ἐλαττώματος. Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ Πορφύριον Τύριον ὄντα ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἑταῖρον, ὃν καὶ διορθοῦν αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα ἠξίου.

8. Γράψας γὰρ ἐκεῖνος δὶς τὸ γραφὲν μεταλαβεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἅπαξ γοῦν ἀναγνῶναι καὶ διελθεῖν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄρασιν μὴ ὑπηρετεῖσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν. Ἔγραφε δὲ οὔτε εἰς κάλλος ἀποτυπούμενος τὰ γράμματα οὔτε εὐσήμως τὰς συλλαβὰς διαιρῶν οὔτε τῆς ὀρθογραφίας φροντίζων, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ νοῦ ἐχόμενος καί, ὃ πάντες ἐθαυμάζομεν, ἐκεῖνο ποιῶν ἄχρι τελευτῆς διετέλεσε. Συντελέσας γὰρ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους τὸ σκέμμα, ἔπειτα εἰς γραφὴν παραδιδοὺς ἃ ἐσκέπτετο, συνεῖρεν οὕτω γράφων ἃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διέθηκεν, ὡς ἀπὸ βιβλίου δοκεῖν μεταβάλλειν τὰ γραφόμενα· ἐπεὶ καὶ διαλεγόμενος πρός τινα καὶ συνείρων τὰς ὁμιλίας πρὸς τῷ σκέμματι ἦν, ὡς ἅμα ἀποπληροῦν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῆς ὁμιλίας καὶ τῶν ἐν σκέψει προκειμένων ἀδιάκοπον τηρεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἀποστάντος γοῦν τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου οὐδ'

result of this renunciation and indifference to the needs of life, though he had been so gouty that he had to be carried in a chair, he regained his health, and, though he had not been able to stretch out his hands, he became able to use them much more easily than professional handicraftsmen. Plotinus regarded him with great favour and praised him highly, and frequently held him up as an example to all who practised philosophy. Another companion was Serapion of Alexandria, who began as a rhetorician and afterwards took to the study of philosophy as well, but was unable to free himself from the degradation of finance and money-lending. I myself, Porphyry of Tyre, was one of Plotinus's closest friends, and he entrusted to me the editing of his writings.

8. When Plotinus had written anything he could never bear to go over it twice; even to read it through once was too much for him, as his eyesight did not serve him well for reading. In writing he did not form the letters with any regard to appearance or divide his syllables correctly, and he paid no attention to spelling. He was wholly concerned with thought; and, which surprised us all, he went on in this way right up to the end. He worked out his train of thought from beginning to end in his own mind, and then, when he wrote it down, since he had set it all in order in his mind, he wrote as continuously as if he was copying from a book. Even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train of thought. He could take his necessary part in the conversation to the full, and at the same time keep his mind fixed without a break on what he was considering. When the person he had been talking to was gone he did not go over

ἐπαναλαβὼν τὰ γεγραμμένα, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπαρκεῖν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀνάληψιν, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, τὴν ὅρασιν, τὰ ἑξῆς ἂν ἐπισυνῆψεν, ὡς μηδένα διαστήσας χρόνον μεταξὺ ὅτε τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἐποιεῖτο. Συνῆν οὖν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἅμα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ τήν γε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν προσοχὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐχάλασεν, ἢ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ὃν ἂν ἀπέκρουεν ἥ τε τῆς τροφῆς ὀλιγότης—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄρτου πολλάκις ἂν ἥψατο—καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῦ διαρκὴς ἐπιστροφή.

9. Ἔσχε δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας σφόδρα φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκειμένας, Γεμίναν τε, ἧς καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ κατῴκει, καὶ τὴν ταύτης θυγατέρα Γεμίναν, ὁμοίως τῇ μητρὶ καλουμένην, Ἀμφίκλειάν τε τὴν Ἀρίστωνος τοῦ Ἰαμβλίχου υἱοῦ γεγονυῖαν γυναῖκα[, σφόδρα φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκειμένας]. Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες ἀποθνήσκειν μέλλοντες τῶν εὐγενεστάτων φέροντες τὰ ἑαυτῶν τέκνα, ἄρρενά τε ὁμοῦ καὶ θηλείας, ἐκείνῳ παρεδίδοσαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας ὡς ἱερῷ τινι καὶ θείῳ φύλακι. Διὸ καὶ ἐπεπλήρωτο αὐτῷ ἡ οἰκία παίδων καὶ παρθένων. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἦν καὶ Ποτάμων, οὗ τῆς παιδεύσεως φροντίζων πολλάκις ἓν καὶ μεταποιοῦντος ἠκροάσατο. Ἠνείχετο δὲ καὶ τοὺς λογισμούς, ἀναφερόντων τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις παραμενόντων, καὶ τῆς ἀκριβείας ἐπεμελεῖτο λέγων, ἕως ἂν μὴ φιλοσοφῶσιν, ἔχειν αὐτοὺς δεῖν τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἀνεπάφους τε καὶ σῳζομένας. Καὶ ὅμως τοσούτοις ἐπαρκῶν τὰς εἰς τὸν βίον φροντίδας τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας τὴν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τάσιν οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἐγρηγορότως ἐχάλασεν. Ἦν δὲ καὶ πρᾷος καὶ

[1] Or, possibly, "repeating the multiplication table." This meaning for πολλάκις ἕν, though it does not seem to occur elsewhere, would give a better sense than any rendering or emendation so far put forward.

what he had written, because his sight, as I have said, did not suffice for revision. He went straight on with what came next, keeping the connection, just as if there had been no interval of conversation between. In this way he was present at once to himself and to others, and he never relaxed his self-turned attention except in sleep: even sleep he reduced by taking very little food, often not even a piece of bread, and by his continuous turning in contemplation to his intellect.

2. There were women, too, who were greatly devoted to philosophy: Gemina, in whose house he lived, and her daughter Gemina, who had the same name as her mother, and Amphiclea, who became the wife of Ariston, son of Iamblichus. Many men and women of the highest rank, on the approach of death, brought him their children, both boys and girls, and entrusted them to him along with all their property, considering that he would be a holy and god-like guardian. So his house was full of young lads and maidens, including Potamon, to whose education he gave serious thought, and would even listen to him revising the same lesson again and again.[1] He patiently attended to the accounts of their property when their trustees submitted them, and took care that they should be accurate; he used to say that as long as they did not take to philosophy their properties and incomes must be kept safe and untouched for them. Yet, though he shielded so many from the worries and cares of ordinary life, he never, while awake, relaxed his intent concentration upon the intellect. He was gentle, too, and at the

πᾶσιν ἐκκείμενος τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν πρὸς αὐτὸν συνήθειαν ἐσχηκόσι. Διὸ εἴκοσι καὶ ἓξ ἐτῶν ὅλων ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ διατρίψας καὶ πλείστοις διαιτήσας τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀμφισβητήσεις οὐδένα τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐχθρόν ποτε ἔσχε.

10. Τῶν δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν προσποιουμένων Ὀλύμπιος Ἀλεξανδρεύς, Ἀμμωνίου ἐπ' ὀλίγον μαθητὴς γενόμενος, καταφρονητικῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔσχε διὰ φιλοπρωτίαν· ὃς καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ ἐπέθετο, ὥστε καὶ ἀστροβολῆσαι αὐτὸν μαγεύσας ἐπεχείρησεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στρεφομένην ᾔσθετο τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἔλεγε πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ Πλωτίνου δύναμιν, ὡς ἀποκρούειν δύνασθαι τὰς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιφορὰς εἰς τοὺς κακοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπιχειροῦντας. Πλωτῖνος μέντοι τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἐγχειροῦντος ἀντελαμβάνετο λέγων αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα τότε ὡς τὰ σύσπαστα βαλάντια ἕλκεσθαι τῶν μελῶν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλληλα συνθλιβομένων. Κινδυνεύσας δὲ ὁ Ὀλύμπιος πολλάκις αὐτός τι παθεῖν ἢ δρᾶσαι τὸν Πλωτῖνον ἐπαύσατο. Ἦν γὰρ καὶ κατὰ γένεσιν πλέον τι ἔχων παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ Πλωτῖνος. Αἰγύπτιος γάρ τις ἱερεὺς ἀνελθὼν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ διά τινος φίλου αὐτῷ γνωρισθεὶς θέλων τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας ἀπόδειξιν δοῦναι ἠξίωσε τὸν Πλωτῖνον ἐπὶ θέαν ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ συνόντος αὐτῷ οἰκείου δαίμονος καλουμένου. Τοῦ δὲ ἑτοίμως ὑπακούσαντος γίνεται μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἰσίῳ ἡ κλῆσις· μόνον γὰρ ἐκεῖνον τὸν

[1] On the details of Porphyry's account of this curious episode see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Appendix II, iii, *A Séance in the Iseum*. Since Porphyry connects the writing of the treatise *On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit* (III. 4) with the affair, it must have taken place before

disposal of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him. Though he spent twenty-six whole years in Rome and acted as arbitrator in very many people's disputes, he never made an enemy of any of the officials.

10. One of those claiming to be philosophers, Olympius of Alexandria, who had been for a short time a pupil of Ammonius, adopted a superior attitude towards Plotinus out of rivalry. This man's attacks on him went to the point of trying to bring a star-stroke upon him by magic. But when he found his attempt recoiling upon himself, he told his intimates that the soul of Plotinus had such great power as to be able to throw back attacks on him on to those who were seeking to do him harm. Plotinus was aware of the attempt and said that his limbs on that occasion were squeezed together and his body contracted "like a money-bag pulled tight." Olympius, since he was often rather in danger of suffering something himself than likely to injure Plotinus, ceased his attacks. Plotinus certainly possessed by birth something more than other men. An Egyptian priest who came to Rome and made his acquaintance through a friend wanted to give a display of his occult wisdom and asked Plotinus to come and see a visible manifestation of his own companion spirit evoked. Plotinus readily consented, and the evocation took place in the temple of Isis:[1] the Egyptian

his own arrival in Rome, when he found that treatise already written (ch. 4) and his account of it must be based on hearsay evidence. The treatise which Porphyry regards as prompted by it has in fact nothing to do with theurgic conjurations of this sort. As so often in the *Enneads*, Plotinus takes a popular religious or superstitious belief as his starting-point and transforms it into something quite different in bringing it into line with his own philosophy.

τόπον καθαρὸν φῆσαι εὑρεῖν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον. Κληθέντα δὲ εἰς αὐτοψίαν τὸν δαίμονα θεὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ μὴ τοῦ δαιμόνων εἶναι γένους· ὅθεν τὸν Αἰγύπτιον εἰπεῖν· "μακάριος εἶ θεὸν ἔχων τὸν δαίμονα καὶ οὐ τοῦ ὑφειμένου γένους τὸν συνόντα." Μήτε δὲ ἐρέσθαι τι ἐκγενέσθαι μήτε ἐπιπλέον ἰδεῖν παρόντα τοῦ συνθεωροῦντος φίλου τὰς ὄρνεις, ἃς κατεῖχε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, πνίξαντος εἴτε διὰ φθόνον εἴτε καὶ διὰ φόβον τινά. Τῶν οὖν θειοτέρων δαιμόνων ἔχων τὸν συνόντα καὶ αὐτὸς διετέλει ἀνάγων αὐτοῦ τὸ θεῖον ὄμμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. "Εστι γοῦν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας καὶ βιβλίον γραφὲν "Περὶ τοῦ εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος", ὅπου πειρᾶται αἰτίας φέρειν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν συνόντων. Φιλοθύτου δὲ γεγονότος τοῦ Ἀμελίου καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ κατὰ νουμηνίαν καὶ τὰς ἑορτὰς ἐκπεριιόντος καί ποτε ἀξιοῦντος τὸν Πλωτῖνον σὺν αὐτῷ παραλαβεῖν ἔφη· "ἐκείνους δεῖ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔρχεσθαι, οὐκ ἐμὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους." Τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ ποίας διανοίας οὕτως ἐμεγαληγόρησεν, οὔτ' αὐτοὶ συνεῖναι δεδυνήμεθα οὔτ' αὐτὸν ἐρέσθαι ἐτολμήσαμεν.

[1] If Plotinus had anything more in mind when he said this than a determination to stop Amelius bothering him, it may have been something like the view of the sort of spirits who

said it was the only pure spot he could find in Rome. When the spirit was summoned to appear a god came and not a being of the spirit order, and the Egyptian said, "Blessed are you, who have a god for your spirit and not a companion of the subordinate order." It was not however possible to ask any questions of the god or even to see him present for longer, as the friend who was taking part in the manifestation strangled the birds which he was holding as a protection, either out of jealousy or because he was afraid of something. So the companion of Plotinus was a spirit of the more god-like kind, and he continually kept the divine eye of his soul fixed on this companion. It was a reason of this kind that led him to write the treatise "On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit," in which he sets out to explain the differences between spirit-companions. When Amelius grew ritualistic and took to going round visiting the temples at the New Moon and the feasts of the gods and once asked if he could take Plotinus along, Plotinus said, "They ought to come to me, not I to them."[1] What he meant by this exalted utterance we could not understand and did not dare to ask.

attend sacrifices which is to be found in Porphyry's *De Abstinentia* II. 37–43; i.e., that they are δαίμονες, sublunary spirits of the lowest rank, and those of them who delight in blood-sacrifices are thoroughly evil δαίμονες. This crowd of lower spirits the philosopher, who lives on the level of Intellect and has the One for his guardian spirit (III. 4. 6), naturally regards as his inferiors, so that it is their duty to attend on him, not his on them. But there are higher ranks of divinities in the Platonic universe, and there is no suggestion, here or in the *Enneads*, that Plotinus thought himself superior to *them*.

11. Περιῆν δὲ αὐτῷ τοσαύτη περιουσία ἠθῶν κατανοήσεως, ὡς κλοπῆς ποτε γεγονυίας πολυτελοῦς περιδεραίου Χιόνης, ἥτις αὐτῷ συνῴκει μετὰ τῶν τέκνων σεμνῶς τὴν χηρείαν διεξάγουσα, καὶ ὑπ' ὄψιν τοῦ Πλωτίνου τῶν οἰκετῶν συνηγμένων ἐμβλέψας ἅπασιν· οὗτος, ἔφη, ἐστὶν ὁ κεκλοφώς, δείξας ἕνα τινά. Μαστιζόμενος δὲ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐπιπλεῖον ἀρνούμενος τὰ πρῶτα ὕστερον ὡμολόγησε καὶ φέρων τὸ κλαπὲν ἀπέδωκε. Προεῖπε δ' ἂν καὶ τῶν συνόντων παίδων περὶ ἑκάστου οἷος ἀποβήσεται· ὡς καὶ περὶ τοῦ Πολέμωνος οἷος ἔσται, ὅτι ἐρωτικὸς ἔσται καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιος, ὅπερ καὶ ἀπέβη. Καί ποτε ἐμοῦ Πορφυρίου ἤσθετο ἐξάγειν ἐμαυτὸν διανοουμένου τοῦ βίου· καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιστάς μοι ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ διατρίβοντι καὶ εἰπὼν μὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν προθυμίαν ἐκ νοερᾶς καταστάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ μελαγχολικῆς τινος νόσου, ἀποδημῆσαι ἐκέλευσε. Πεισθεὶς δὲ αὐτῷ ἐγὼ εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφικόμην Πρόβον τινὰ ἀκούων ἐλλόγιμον ἄνδρα περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον διατρίβειν· καὶ αὐτός τε τῆς τοιαύτης προθυμίας ἀπεσχόμην τοῦ τε παρεῖναι ἄχρι θανάτου τῷ Πλωτίνῳ ἐνεποδίσθην.

12. Ἐτίμησαν δὲ τὸν Πλωτῖνον μάλιστα καὶ ἐσεφθησαν Γαλιῆνός τε ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἡ τούτου γυνὴ Σαλωνίνα. Ὁ δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τῇ τούτων καταχρώμενος φιλοσόφων τινὰ πόλιν κατὰ τὴν Καμπανίαν γεγενῆσθαι λεγομένην, ἄλλως δὲ κατηριπωμένην, ἠξίου ἀνεγείρειν καὶ τὴν πέριξ χώραν χαρίσασθαι οἰκισθείσῃ τῇ πόλει, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοὺς κατοικεῖν μέλλοντας τοῖς Πλάτωνος

11. He had a surpassing degree of penetration into character. Once a valuable necklace was stolen, belonging to Chione, who lived with her children in his house in honourable widowhood. The slaves of the house were assembled before the eyes of Plotinus, and he looked carefully at them all; then, pointing to one man he said, "This is the thief." The man was flogged, and persisted at first in denial, but finally confessed and gave back what he had stolen. He was, too, in the habit of foretelling how each of the children who lived with him would turn out; that Polemon, for instance, would be amorous and short-lived, as he actually was. He once noticed that I, Porphyry, was thinking of removing myself from this life. He came to me unexpectedly while I was staying indoors in my house and told me that this lust for death did not come from a settled rational decision but from a bilious indisposition, and urged me to go away for a holiday. I obeyed him and went to Sicily, since I had heard that a distinguished man called Probus was living near Lilybaeum. So I was brought to abandon my longing for death and prevented from staying with Plotinus to the end.

12. The Emperor Gallienus[1] and his wife Salonina greatly honoured and venerated Plotinus. He tried to make full use of their friendship: there was said to have been in Campania a city of philosophers which had fallen into ruin; this he asked them to revive, and to present the surrounding territory to the city when they had founded it. Those who settled there were to live according to

[1] Joint emperor with Valerian 253–60, sole emperor 260–68.

καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν αὐτῇ Πλατωνόπολιν θέσθαι, ἐκεῖ τε αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν ἑταίρων ἀναχωρήσειν ὑπισχνεῖτο. Καὶ ἐγένετ' ἂν τὸ βούλημα ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, εἰ μή τινες τῶν συνόντων τῷ βασιλεῖ φθονοῦντες ἢ νεμεσῶντες ἢ δι' ἄλλην μοχθηρὰν αἰτίαν ἐνεπόδισαν.

13. Γέγονε δ' ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις φράσαι μὲν ἱκανὸς καὶ εὑρεῖν καὶ νοῆσαι τὰ πρόσφορα δυνατώτατος, ἐν δέ τισι λέξεσιν ἁμαρτάνων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶπεν "ἀναμιμνήσκεται", ἀλλὰ "ἀναμνημίσκεται", καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ παράσημα ὀνόματα ἃ καὶ ἐν τῷ γράφειν ἐτήρει. Ἦν δ' ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἡ ἔνδειξις τοῦ νοῦ ἄχρι τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμποντος· ἐράσμιος μὲν ὀφθῆναι, καλλίων δὲ τότε μάλιστα ὁρώμενος· καὶ λεπτός τις ἱδρὼς ἐπέθει καὶ ἡ πρᾳότης διέλαμπε καὶ τὸ προσηνὲς πρὸς τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ἐδείκνυτο καὶ τὸ εὔτονον. Τριῶν γοῦν ἡμερῶν ἐμοῦ Πορφυρίου ἐρωτήσαντος, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ σύνεστι τῷ σώματι, παρέτεινεν ἀποδεικνύς, ὥστε καὶ Θαυμασίου τινὸς τοὔνομα ἐπεισελθόντος τοὺς καθόλου λόγους πράττοντος καὶ εἰς βιβλία ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ λέγοντος θέλειν, Πορφυρίου δὲ ἀποκρινομένου καὶ ἐρωτῶντος μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι, ὁ δὲ ἔφη· "ἀλλὰ ἂν μὴ Πορφυρίου ἐρωτῶντος λύσωμεν τὰς ἀπορίας, εἰπεῖν τι καθάπαξ εἰς τὸ βιβλίον οὐ δυνησόμεθα."

14. Ἐν δὲ τῷ γράφειν σύντομος γέγονε καὶ πολύνους βραχύς τε καὶ νοήμασι πλεονάζων ἢ

[1] Though *laws* with a small *l* seems to be required in the translation, there can be little doubt that the constitution of Platonopolis was to be that of the "second-best state"

the laws of Plato,[1] and it was to be called Platonopolis; and he undertook to move there with his companions. The philosopher would easily have gained his wish if some of the courtiers, moved by jealousy, spite, or some such mean motive, had not prevented it.

13. In the meetings of the school he showed an adequate command of language and the greatest power of discovering and considering what was relevant to the subject in hand, but he made mistakes in certain words: he did not say *anamimnesketai* but *anamnemisketai* and made other slips which he also constantly committed in his writing. When he was speaking his intellect visibly lit up his face: there was always a charm about his appearance, but at these times he was still more attractive to look at: he sweated gently, and kindliness shone out from him, and in answering questions he made clear both his benevolence to the questioner and his intellectual vigour. Once I, Porphyry, went on asking him for three days about the soul's connection with the body, and he kept on explaining to me. A man called Thaumasius came in who was interested in general statements and said that he wanted to hear Plotinus speaking in the manner of a set treatise, but could not stand Porphyry's questions and answers. Plotinus said, "But if when Porphyry asks questions we do not solve his difficulties we shall not be able to say anything at all to put into the treatise".

14. In writing he is concise and full of thought. He puts things shortly and abounds more in ideas

described in Plato's *Laws*, rather than the ideal, but in Plato's own opinion unrealisable, constitution of the *Republic*.

λέξεσι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐνθουσιῶν καὶ ἐκπαθῶς φράζων †καὶ τὸ συμπαθείας ἢ παραδόσεως†. Ἐμμέμικται δ' ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι καὶ τὰ Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα καὶ τὰ Περιπατητικά· καταπεπύκνωται δὲ καὶ ἡ "Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ" τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματεία. Ἔλαθε δὲ αὐτὸν οὔτε γεωμετρικόν τι λεγόμενον θεώρημα οὔτ' ἀριθμητικόν, οὐ μηχανικόν, οὐκ ὀπτικόν, οὐ μουσικόν· αὐτὸς δὲ ταῦτα ἐξεργάζεσθαι οὐ παρεσκεύαστο. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνουσίαις ἀνεγινώσκετο μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ ὑπομνήματα, εἴτε Σεβήρου εἴη, εἴτε Κρονίου ἢ Νουμηνίου ἢ Γαίου ἢ Ἀττικοῦ, κἀν τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς τά τε Ἀσπασίου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀδράστου τε καὶ τῶν ἐμπεσόντων. Ἐλέγετο δὲ ἐκ τούτων οὐδὲν καθάπαξ, ἀλλ' ἴδιος ἦν καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένος ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τὸν Ἀμμωνίου φέρων νοῦν ἐν ταῖς ἐξετάσεσιν. Ἐπληροῦτο δὲ ταχέως καὶ δι' ὀλίγων δοὺς νοῦν βαθέος θεωρήματος ἀνίστατο. Ἀναγνωσθέντος δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ τε "Περὶ ἀρχῶν" Λογγίνου καὶ τοῦ "Φιλαρχαίου", "φιλόλογος μέν", ἔφη, "ὁ Λογγῖνος, φιλόσοφος δὲ οὐδαμῶς". Ὠριγένους δὲ ἀπαντήσαντός ποτε εἰς τὴν συνουσίαν πληρωθεὶς ἐρυθήματος ἀνίστασθαι μὲν ἐβούλετο,

[1] On Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius and Atticus, see John Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (Duckworth, London 1977). Atticus was the chief representative of the anti-Aristotelian group among the Middle Platonists. Cronius and Numenius are usually mentioned together and classed as Pythagoreans, though the boundary between Platonists and Pythagoreans was ill-defined, and Porphyry here quite naturally groups them with the Platonists. Numenius (late 2nd century) was

than in words; he generally expresses himself in a tone of rapt inspiration, and states what he himself really feels about the matter and not what has been handed down by tradition. His writings, however, are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, in particular, is concentrated in them. He had a complete knowledge of geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, optics and music, but was not disposed to apply himself to detailed research in these subjects. In the meetings of the school he used to have the commentaries read, perhaps of Severus, perhaps of Cronius or Numenius or Gaius or Atticus, and among the Peripatetics of Aspasius, Alexander, Adrastus, and others that were available.[1] But he did not just speak straight out of these books but took a distinctive personal line in his consideration, and brought the mind of Ammonius to bear on the investigations in hand. He quickly absorbed what was read, and would give the sense of some profound subject of study in a few words and pass on. When Longinus's[2] work *On Principles* and his *Lover of Antiquity* were read to him, he said, "Longinus is a scholar, but certainly not a philosopher." When Origen[3] once came to a meeting of the school he was filled with embarrassment and

one of the most important philosophers of the generation before Plotinus, who was sometimes accused of plagiarising his thought (see below, ch. 17). Alexander of Aphrodisias (head of the Peripatetic school at Atheus at the beginning of the 3rd century) was the greatest of the ancient commentators on Aristotle. Aspasius and Adrastus were Aristotelian commentators of the 2nd century. This passage shows clearly how scholarly and professional a philosopher Plotinus was and how he worked, though with great originality, on the basis of an extensive school tradition.

[2] For Longinus see below, ch. 19 n.1. [3] See note on ch. 3.

λέγειν δὲ ὑπὸ Ὠριγένους ἀξιούμενος ἔφη ἀνίλλεσθαι τὰς προθυμίας, ὅταν ἴδῃ ὁ λέγων, ὅτι πρὸς εἰδότας ἐρεῖ ἃ αὐτὸς λέγειν μέλλει· καὶ οὕτως ὀλίγα διαλεχθεὶς ἐξανέστη.

15. Ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐν Πλατωνείοις ποίημα ἀναγνόντος "Τὸν ἱερὸν γάμον", καί τινος διὰ τὸ μυστικῶς πολλὰ μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ ἐπικεκρυμμένως εἰρῆσθαι εἰπόντος μαίνεσθαι τὸν Πορφύριον, ἐκεῖνος εἰς ἐπήκοον ἔφη πάντων· "ἔδειξας ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον καὶ τὸν ἱεροφάντην." Ὅτε δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ Διοφάνης ἀνέγνω ὑπὲρ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ ἐν τῷ "Συμποσίῳ" τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀπολογίαν δογματίζων χρῆναι ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα μαθήσεως εἰς συνουσίαν αὐτὸν παρέχειν ἐρῶντι ἀφροδισίου μίξεως τῷ καθηγεμόνι, ἦιξε μὲν πολλάκις ἀναστὰς ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς συνόδου, ἐπισχὼν δ' ἑαυτὸν μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ ἀκουστηρίου ἐμοὶ Πορφυρίῳ ἀντιγράψαι προσέταξε. Μὴ θέλοντος δὲ τοῦ Διοφάνους τὸ βιβλίον δοῦναι διὰ τῆς μνήμης ἀναληφθέντων τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἀντιγράψας ἐγὼ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀκροατῶν συνηγμένων ἀναγνοὺς τοσοῦτον τὸν Πλωτῖνον ηὔφρανα, ὡς κἀν ταῖς συνουσίαις συνεχῶς ἐπιλέγειν·

"Βάλλ' οὕτως, αἴ κέν τι φόως ἄνδρεσσι γένηαι."

Γράφοντος δὲ Εὐβούλου Ἀθήνηθεν τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ διαδόχου καὶ πέμποντος συγγράμματα ὑπέρ τινων Πλατωνικῶν ζητημάτων ἐμοὶ Πορφυρίῳ ταῦτα δίδοσθαι ἐποίει καὶ σκοπεῖν καὶ ἀναφέρειν αὐτῷ τὰ γεγραμμένα ἠξίου. Προσεῖχε δὲ τοῖς μὲν περὶ τῶν ἀστέρων κανόσιν οὐ πάνυ τι μαθημα-

[1] Iliad 8.282 (with ἄνδρεσσι for Δαναοῖσι).

wanted to stop lecturing, and when Origen urged him to continue he said, "It damps one's enthusiasm for speaking when one sees that one's audience knows already what one is going to say"; and after talking for a little while he brought the session to an end.

15. At Plato's feast I read a poem, "The Sacred Marriage"; and because much in it was expressed in the mysterious and veiled language of inspiration someone said, "Porphyry is mad." But Plotinus said, so as to be heard by all, "You have shown yourself at once poet, philosopher, and expounder of sacred mysteries." The rhetorician Diophanes read a defence of Alcibiades in Plato's "Banquet" in which he asserted that a pupil for the sake of advancing in the study of virtue should submit himself to carnal intercourse with his master if the master desired it. Plotinus repeatedly started up to leave the meeting, but restrained himself, and after the end of the lecture gave me, Porphyry, the task of writing a refutation. Diophanes refused to lend me his manuscript, and I depended in writing my refutation on my memory of his arguments. When I read it before the same assembled hearers I pleased Plotinus so much that he kept on quoting during the meeting, "So strike and be a light to men."[1]

Eubulus the Platonic Successor wrote to him from Athens and sent treatises on some Platonic questions. Plotinus had them given to me, Porphyry, with instructions to consider them and submit my notes on them to him.

He studied the rules of astronomy, without going very far into the mathematical side, but went more

τικῶς, τοῖς δὲ τῶν γενεθλιαλόγων ἀποτελεσματικοῖς ἀκριβέστερον. Καὶ φωράσας τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τὸ ἀνεχέγγυον ἐλέγχειν πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν οὐκ ὤκνησε.

16. Γεγόνασι δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν τῶν Χριστιανῶν πολλοὶ μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι, αἱρετικοὶ δὲ ἐκ τῆς παλαιᾶς φιλοσοφίας ἀνηγμένοι οἱ περὶ Ἀδέλφιον καὶ Ἀκυλῖνον οἳ τὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Λίβυος καὶ Φιλοκώμου καὶ Δημοστράτου καὶ Λυδοῦ συγγράμματα πλεῖστα κεκτημένοι ἀποκαλύψεις τε προφέροντες Ζωροάστρου καὶ Ζωστριανοῦ καὶ Νικοθέου καὶ Ἀλλογενοῦς καὶ Μέσσου καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων πολλοὺς ἐξηπάτων καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠπατημένοι, ὡς δὴ ποῦ Πλάτωνος εἰς τὸ βάθος τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας οὐ πελάσαντος. Ὅθεν αὐτὸς μὲν πολλοὺς ἐλέγχους ποιούμενος ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις, γράψας δὲ καὶ βιβλίον ὅπερ "Πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς" ἐπεγράψαμεν, ἡμῖν τὰ λοιπὰ κρίνειν καταλέλοιπεν. Ἀμέλιος δὲ ἄχρι τεσσαράκοντα βιβλίων προκεχώρηκε πρὸς τὸ Ζωστριανοῦ βιβλίον ἀντιγράφων. Πορφύριος δὲ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸ Ζωροάστρου συχνοὺς πεπροίημαι ἐλέγχους. Ὅλως νόθον τε καὶ νέον τὸ βιβλίον παραδεικνὺς πεπλασμένον τε ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν αἵρεσιν συστησαμένων εἰς δόξαν τοῦ εἶναι τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ζωροάστρου τὰ δόγματα, ἃ αὐτοὶ εἵλοντο πρεσβεύειν.

17. Τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὰ Νουμηνίου αὐτὸν ὑποβάλλεσθαι λεγόντων καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς

[1] Cp. *Enn.* II. 3. *Whether the Stars are Causes.*

[2] These sectaries were Gnostics. It is very likely that we now have some of the works to which Porphyry here refers.

carefully into the methods of the casters of horoscopes. When he had detected the unreliability of their alleged results he did not hesitate to attack many of the statements made in their writings.[1]

16. There were in his time many Christians and others, and sectarians who had abandoned the old philosophy, men of the schools of Adelphius and Aculinus, who possessed a great many treatises of Alexander the Libyan and Philocomus and Demostratus and Lydus, and produced revelations by Zoroaster and Zostrianus and Nicotheus and Allogenes and Messus and other people of the kind,[2] deceived themselves and deceiving many, alleging that Plato had not penetrated to the depths of intelligible reality. Plotinus hence often attacked their position in his lectures, and wrote the treatise to which we have given the title "Against the Gnostics";[3] he left it to us to assess what he passed over. Amelius went to forty volumes in writing against the book of Zostrianus. I, Porphyry, wrote a considerable number of refutations of the book of Zoroaster, which I showed to be entirely spurious and modern, made up by the sectarians to convey the impression that the doctrines which they had chosen to hold in honour were those of the ancient Zoroaster.

17. When the people from Greece began to say that Plotinus was appropriating the ideas of

The collection of Gnostic books found at Nag Hammadi in Upper Egypt in 1945 includes "Revelations" attributed to Allogenes (the Foreigner, a Gnostic name for Seth), Zostrianus, Messus, and possibly Zoroaster.

[3] II. 9.

'Αμέλιον ἀγγέλλοντος Τρύφωνος τοῦ Στωικοῦ τε καὶ Πλατωνικοῦ γέγραφεν ὁ 'Αμέλιος βιβλίον ὃ ἐπεγράψαμεν "Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τοῦ Πλωτίνου πρὸς τὸν Νουμήνιον διαφορᾶς", προσεφώνησε δὲ αὐτὸ Βασιλεῖ ἐμοί· Βασιλεὺς δὲ τοὔνομα τῷ Πορφυρίῳ ἐμοὶ προσῆν, κατὰ μὲν πάτριον διάλεκτον Μάλκῳ κεκλημένῳ, ὅπερ μοι καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὄνομα κέκλητο, τοῦ δὲ Μάλκου ἑρμηνείαν ἔχοντος βασιλεύς, εἴ τις εἰς 'Ελληνίδα διάλεκτον μεταβάλλειν ἐθέλοι. Ὅθεν ὁ Λογγῖνος μὲν προσφωνῶν τὰ "Περὶ ὁρμῆς" Κλεοδάμῳ τε κἀμοὶ Πορφυρίῳ "Κλεόδαμέ τε καὶ Μάλκε" προὔγραψεν· ὁ δ' 'Αμέλιος ἑρμηνεύσας τοὔνομα, ὡς ὁ Νουμήνιος τὸν Μάξιμον εἰς τὸν Μεγάλον, οὕτω τὸν Μάλκον οὗτος εἰς τὸν Βασιλέα, γράφει·

"'Αμέλιος Βασιλεῖ εὖ πράττειν. Αὐτῶν μὲν ἕνεκα τῶν πανευφήμων ἀνδρῶν, οὓς διατεθρυλληκέναι ἐς ἑαυτὸν φής, τὰ τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῶν δόγματα εἰς τὸν 'Απαμέα Νουμήνιον ἀναγόντων, οὐκ ἂν προηκάμην φωνήν, σαφῶς ἐπίστασο. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀγαλλομένης προελήλυθεν εὐστομίας τε καὶ εὐγλωττίας, νῦν μὲν ὅτι πλατὺς φλήναφος, αὖθις δὲ ὅτι ὑποβολιμαῖος, ἐκ τρίτων δὲ ὅτι καὶ τὰ φαυλότατα τῶν ὄντων ὑποβαλλόμενος, τῷ διασιλλαίνειν αὐτὸν

[1] In fact, the system of Numenius, as far as we know it from scattered quotations and references in later authors, shows some resemblances to that of Plotinus, notably in its descending hierarchy of three gods, the Supreme Good or Mind, the Second Mind, and the cosmos conceived as an ensouled divine being. But there are also most important differences in the way Plotinus conceives his Three Hypostases

Numenius,[1] and Trypho the Stoic and Platonist told Amelius, the latter wrote a book to which we gave the title "On the Difference between the Doctrines of Plotinus and Numenius." He dedicated it to me under the name of Basileus [King]. Basileus was in fact my name, for in my native language I was called Malcus (my father's name), and if one translates Malcus into Greek it is interpreted as Basileus. So when Longinus dedicated his work "On Impulse" to me, Porphyry, and Cleodamus, he began his preface "My dear Cleodamus and Malcus." But Amelius translated Malcus into Basileus, as Numenius did Maximus into Megalos.

This is his letter to me.

"Amelius to Basileus, greeting. You may be sure that, for their own sakes, I should never have said a word in reply to their worships who have been, you say, pestering you with their continual attempts to attribute our friend's doctrines to Numenius of Apamea. For it is obvious that it is only that glibness and readiness of speech in which they take such pride and delight which makes them say at one time that he is a big driveller, at another that he is a plagiarist, or again that his fundamental principles are the meanest of realities:[2] they are clearly attacking him in this

and their relation to each other, and as far as we can tell from the evidence available, Amelius and Porphyry seem to be amply justified in claiming originality for their master.

[2] Possibly this is the result of a misunderstanding (which can be paralleled among modern interpreters of Plotinus) of the extreme negativity of the language which he sometimes uses about the One or Good.

δηλαδὴ κατ' αὐτοῦ λεγόντων. Σοῦ δὲ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ οἰομένου δεῖν ἀποχρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀρέσκοντα ἔχειν προχειρότερα εἰς ἀνάμνησιν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ὀνόματι ἑταίρου ἀνδρὸς οἵου τοῦ Πλωτίνου μεγάλου εἰ καὶ πάλαι διαβεβοημένα ὁλοσχερέστερον γνῶναι ὑπήκουσα, καὶ οὖν ἥκω ἀποδιδούς σοι τὰ ἐπηγγελμένα ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς οἶσθα, πεπονημένα. Χρὴ δὲ αὐτὰ ὡς ἂν μὴ ἐκ τῆς τῶν συνταγμάτων ἐκείνων παραθέσεως οὔτ' οὖν συντεταγμένα οὔτε ἐξειλεγμένα, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐντεύξεως ἀναπεπολημένα καὶ ὡς πρῶτα προὔπεσεν ἕκαστα οὕτω ταχθέντα ἐνταῦθα νῦν συγγνώμης δικαίας παρὰ σοῦ τυχεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ βουλήματος τοῦ ὑπὸ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁμολογίαν ὑπαγομένου πρός τινων ἀνδρὸς οὐ μάλα προχείρου ἑλεῖν ὑπάρχοντος διὰ τὴν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡς ἂν δόξειε φοράν. "Οτι δέ, εἴ τι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἑστίας παραχαράττοιτο, διορθώσει εὐμενῶς, εὖ οἶδα. Ἠνάγκασμαι δ' ὡς ἔοικεν, ὥς πού φησιν ἡ τραγῳδία, ὢν φιλοπράγμων τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν δογμάτων διαστάσει εὐθύνειν τε καὶ ἀποποιεῖσθαι. Τοιοῦτον ἄρα ἦν τὸ σοὶ χαρίζεσθαι ἐξ ἅπαντος βούλεσθαι. " Ἔρρωσο."

18. Ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστολὴν θεῖναι προήχθην οὐ μόνον πίστεως χάριν τοῦ τοὺς τότε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας τὰ Νουμηνίου οἴεσθαι ὑποβαλλόμενον κομπάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι πλατὺν αὐτὸν φλήναφον εἶναι ἡγοῦντο καὶ κατεφρόνουν τῷ μὴ

[1] Amelius seems to be referring to his use of the word εὐθύνειν which occurs in the tragedians (though not exclusively in them). It is the only trace of tragic diction in the works which follow. Amelius's style throughout this letter is excessively pompous and high-flown.

way just for the sake of mocking and jeering at him. But I have conformed to your idea that we should use the occasion to provide ourselves with a statement of the doctrines which we accept in a form easier to remember, and—even though they have long been famous—to make them more widely known, so as to increase the reputation of a friend as eminent as Plotinus is. So here is the work I promised you, written, as you know yourself, in three days. You must treat it with justified indulgence, as there has been no selection or arrangement corresponding to the order of the original attack; I have simply put down my recollections of our former discussions in the order in which they occurred to me; and besides, the intention of our friend, who is being put on trial for the opinions which he shares with us, is not very easy to grasp, because he treats the same subjects in different ways in different places. I am sure, however, that if I have misrepresented any of the doctrines of our spiritual home, you will have the kindness to correct me. As it says in the tragedy,[1] I must correct and reject, since I am a busy man and far from the teachings of our master. So you can see what a business it was to gratify your request as completely as you wished. Farewell."

18. I thought this letter worth inserting, to demonstrate not only that people in his own time thought that he was making a show on a basis of plagiarism from Numenius, but also that they considered he was a big driveller and despised him because they did not understand what he meant

νοεῖν ἃ λέγει καὶ τῷ πάσης σοφιστικῆς αὐτὸν σκηνῆς καθαρεύειν καὶ τύφου, ὁμιλοῦντι δὲ ἐοικέναι ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις καὶ μηδενὶ ταχέως ἐπιφαίνειν τὰς συλλογιστικὰς ἀνάγκας αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λαμβανομένας. Ἔπαθον δ' οὖν τὰ ὅμοια ἐγὼ Πορφύριος, ὅτε πρῶτον αὐτοῦ ἠκροασάμην. Διὸ καὶ ἀντιγράψας προσήγαγον δεικνύναι πειρώμενος ὅτι ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ ὑφέστηκε τὸ νόημα. Ἀμέλιον δὲ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἀναγνῶναι, ἐπειδὴ ἀνέγνω, μειδιάσας "σὸν ἂν εἴη", ἔφη, "ὦ Ἀμέλιε, λῦσαι τὰς ἀπορίας, εἰς ἃς δι' ἄγνοιαν τῶν ἡμῖν δοκούντων ἐμπέπτωκε". Γράψαντος δὲ βιβλίον οὐ μικρὸν τοῦ Ἀμελίου πρὸς τὰς τοῦ Πορφυρίου ἀπορίας, καὶ αὖ πάλιν πρὸς τὰ γραφέντα ἀντιγράψαντός μου, τοῦ δὲ Ἀμελίου καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντειπόντος, ἐκ τρίτων μόλις συνεὶς τὰ λεγόμενα ἐγὼ ὁ Πορφύριος μετεθέμην καὶ παλινῳδίαν γράψας ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ἀνέγνων· κἀκεῖθεν λοιπὸν τά τε βιβλία τὰ Πλωτίνου ἐπιστεύθην, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν διδάσκαλον εἰς φιλοτιμίαν προήγαγον τοῦ διαρθροῦν καὶ διὰ πλειόνων γράφειν τὰ δοκοῦντα. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀμέλιος εἰς τὸ συγγράφειν πρόθυμον ἐποίησεν.

19. Ἦν δὲ ἔσχε καὶ Λογγῖνος περὶ τοῦ Πλωτίνου δόξαν ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐγὼ γράφων ἐσήμαινον, δηλώσει μέρος ἐπιστολῆς γραφείσης πρός με ἐπέχον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. Ἀξιῶν γάρ

[1] Longinus (c. 213–272), scholar, rhetorician, and chief minister of Zenobia of Palmyra till her defeat and his execution by Aurelian, had been a pupil of Ammonius, and maintained a philosophical position opposed to that of Plotinus, especially disagreeing with him about the Platonic Forms or

and because he was so completely free from the staginess and windy rant of the professional speechifier: his lectures were like conversations, and he was not quick to make clear to anybody the compelling logical coherence of his discourse. I, Porphyry, experienced something of the sort when I first heard him. The result was that I wrote against him in an attempt to show that the object of thought existed outside the intellect. He made Amelius read this essay to him, and when the reading was finished smiled and said, "You shall have the task of solving these difficulties, Amelius. He has fallen into them because he does not know what we hold." Amelius wrote a lengthy treatise "In Answer to Porphyry's Difficulties"; I replied to what he had written; Amelius answered my reply; and the third time I with difficulty understood the doctrine, changed my mind and wrote a recantation which I read in the meeting of the school. After this I believed in Plotinus's writings, and tried to rouse in the master himself the ambition to organise his doctrine and write it down more at length; and Amelius also stimulated his desire to write books.

19. The opinion which Longinus,[1] too, had of Plotinus, derived mainly from what I had told him in my letters, will appear from part of a letter written to me, as follows. He is asking me to come from

Ideas, which he thought of as external to the Divine Mind (cp. chs. 18, 20). Plotinus called him "a scholar, not a philosopher" (ch. 14), which may mean that he stuck closer to the text in his interpretation of Plato and objected to Plotinus's speculative flights on the basis of a small number of passages. It is generally agreed by modern scholars, perhaps for not quite conclusive reasons, that he was not the author of the famous extant critical treatise *On the Sublime*.

με ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας κατιέναι πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Φοινίκην καὶ κομίζειν τὰ βιβλία τοῦ Πλωτίνου φησί·

"Καὶ σὺ μὲν ταῦτά τε πέμπειν, ὅταν σοι δοκῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ κομίζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀποσταίην τοῦ πολλάκις δεῖσθαί σου τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁδὸν τῆς ἑτέρωσε προκρῖναι, κἂν εἰ μηδὲν δι' ἄλλο—τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ σοφὸν παρ' ἡμῶν προσδοκῶν ἀφίκοιο;—τήν τε παλαιὰν συνήθειαν καὶ τὸν ἀέρα μετριώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἣν λέγεις τοῦ σώματος ἀσθένειαν· κἂν ἄλλο τι τύχῃς οἰηθείς, παρ' ἐμοῦ δὲ μηδὲν προσδοκᾶν καινότερον, μηδ' οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν ὅσα φὴς ἀπολωλεκέναι. Τῶν γὰρ γραφάντων τοσαύτη σπάνις ἐνταῦθα καθέστηκεν, ὥστε νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς πάντα τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τὰ λειπόμενα τῶν Πλωτίνου κατασκευάζων μόλις αὐτῶν ἐπεκράτησα τὸν ὑπογραφέα τῶν μὲν εἰωθότων ἀπάγων ἔργων, πρὸς ἑνὶ δὲ τούτῳ τάξας γενέσθαι. Καὶ κέκτημαι μὲν ὅσα δοκεῖν πάντα καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑπὸ σοῦ πεμφθέντα, κέκτημαι δὲ ἡμιτελῶς· οὐ γὰρ μετρίως ἦν διημαρτημένα, καίτοι τὸν ἑταῖρον Ἀμέλιον ὤμην ἀναλήψεσθαι τὰ τῶν γραφέων πταίσματα· τῷ δ' ἦν ἄλλα προυργιαίτερα τῆς τοιαύτης προσεδρείας. Οὔκουν ἔχω τίνα χρὴ τρόπον αὐτοῖς ὁμιλῆσαι καίπερ ὑπερεπιθυμῶν τά τε 'Περὶ ψυχῆς' καὶ τὰ 'Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος' ἐπισκέψασθαι· ταῦτα γὰρ οὖν καὶ μάλιστα διημάρτηται. Καὶ πάνυ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐλθεῖν μοι παρὰ σοῦ τὰ μετ' ἀκριβείας γεγραμμένα τοῦ παραναγνῶναι μόνον, εἶτα ἀποπέμψαι πάλιν. Αὖθις δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐρῶ λόγον, ὅτι μὴ πέμπειν,

Sicily to join him in Phoenicia and bring Plotinus's works with me. He says:

"Send them when you like, or, better, bring them: for I shall never stop asking you to give the journey to us the preference over any other, if for no other reason—for surely there is no wisdom which you could expect to learn from us as a result of your visit—for the sake of our old friendship and of the climate, which is particularly good for the ill-health of which you speak. Whatever else you think you may find, do not expect anything new from me, or even the old works which you say you have lost. There is such a shortage of copyists here that really all this time I have been trying to complete my set of Plotinus, and have only just managed it by taking my manuscript-writer away from his usual tasks and setting him to this one only. I have everything, as far as I know, including what you have just sent me; but I have it only half complete, because the manuscripts are extremely full of faults. I thought our friend Amelius would have corrected the mistakes of the copyists, but he had other more urgent duties than this sort of supervision. So I do not see how I am to get acquainted with them, though I am extremely anxious to examine *On The Soul*[1] and *On Being*:[2] for it is just these that are the most faulty. I should be very glad if you could send me the accurately written copies, simply to read for the purpose of comparison and then return; though I again repeat my request to you not to send, but to come yourself

[1] Probably the treatise which now appears as *Enneads* IV. 3–5.

[2] Probably *Enneads* VI. 1–3, another single treatise split up by Porphyry.

ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἥκειν ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἀξιῶ ταῦτά τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴ τι διαπέφευγε τὸν Ἀμέλιον. Ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἤγαγεν, ἅπαντα διὰ σπουδῆς ἐκτησάμην. Πῶς δ' οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς ὑπομνήματα πάσης ἰδοῦς ἀξίου καὶ τιμῆς κτήσασθαι; Τοῦτο γὰρ οὖν καὶ παρόντι σοι καὶ μακρὰν ἀπόντι καὶ περὶ τὴν Τύρον διατρίβοντι τυγχάνω δήπουθεν ἐπεσταλκὼς ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὑποθέσεων οὐ πάνυ με τὰς πολλὰς προσίεσθαι συμβέβηκε· τὸν δὲ τύπον τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τἀνδρὸς τὴν πυκνότητα καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον τῆς τῶν ζητημάτων διαθέσεως ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄγαμαι καὶ φιλῶ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐλλογιμωτάτων ἄγειν τὰ τούτου βιβλία φαίην ἂν δεῖν τοὺς ζητητικούς."

20. Ταῦτα ἐπιπλέον παρατέθεικα τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς κριτικωτάτου γενομένου καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν πάντα τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν διελέγξαντος δεικνὺς οἷα γέγονεν ἡ περὶ Πλωτίνου κρίσις· καίτοι τὰ πρῶτα ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀμαθίας καταφρονητικῶς ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν διετέλει. Ἐδόκει δὲ ἃ ἐκτήσατο ἐκ τῶν Ἀμελίου λαβὼν ἡμαρτῆσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὴν συνήθη ἑρμηνείαν. Εἰ γάρ τινα καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ τὰ παρ' Ἀμελίῳ διώρθωτο ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῶν αὐτογράφων μετειλημμένα. Ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Λογγίνου ἃ ἐν συγγράμματι γέγραφε περὶ Πλωτίνου τε καὶ Ἀμελίου καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν γεγονότων φιλοσόφων ἀναγκαῖον παραθεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ πλήρης γένηται ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν κρίσις οἵα γέγονε τοῦ ἐλλογιμωτάτου ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἐλεγκτικωτάτου. Ἐπιγράφεται δὲ τὸ βιβλίον Λογγίνου πρὸς Πλωτῖνον καὶ Γεντιλιανὸν Ἀμέλιον "Περὶ τέλους." Ἔχει δὲ τοιόνδε προοίμιον·

and bring better copies of these and of any others which Amelius may have overlooked. I eagerly acquired all he brought; of course I should want to possess works of Plotinus, who deserves every possible honour and respect. It is true of course that I have given you word, when you were here, when you were far away, and especially at the time when you were staying in Tyre, that I cannot go very far in agreeing with most of his theories; but I feel the utmost admiration and affection for the general character of his writing, the closeness of his thinking, and the philosophical way in which he deals with his enquiries; and I think that seekers after truth must rank his works among the most important."

20. I have inserted at length this judgement by the most discerning critic of our times, a man who subjected practically all the works of his other contemporaries to drastic investigation, to show what conclusion he came to about Plotinus—though at first, as a result of the stupidity of others, he persisted in despising him. He seems to have misjudged the manuscripts which he received from Amelius because he did not understand Plotinus's usual manner of expressing himself; for if there ever were any carefully corrected copies they were those of Amelius, which were transcribed from the author's own originals. I must also insert what Longinus wrote in a book about Plotinus, Amelius, and the philosophers of his time, to give a complete account of the judgement passed on them by this most outstanding man and extremely severe critic. The title of the book is *On The End: by Longinus in answer to Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius.* This is its preface:

"Πολλῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Μάρκελλε, γεγενημένων φιλοσόφων οὐχ ἥκιστα παρὰ τοὺς πρώτους τῆς ἡλικίας ἡμῶν χρόνους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νῦν καιρὸς οὐδ' εἰπεῖν ἔστιν ὅσην σπάνιν ἔσχηκε τοῦ πράγματος· ἔτι δὲ μειρακίων ὄντων ἡμῶν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων προέστησαν, οὓς ἅπαντας μὲν ὑπῆρξεν ἰδεῖν ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκ παίδων ἐπὶ πολλοὺς τόπους ἅμα τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἐπιδημίαν, συγγενέσθαι δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς ἐπιβιώσασι κατὰ ταὐτὸ συχνοῖς ἔθνεσι καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπιμίξαντας· οἱ μὲν καὶ διὰ γραφῆς ἐπεχείρησαν τὰ δοκοῦντα σφίσι πραγματεύεσθαι καταλιπόντες τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν ὠφελείας μετασχεῖν, οἱ δ' ἀποχρῆναι σφίσιν ἡγήσαντο τοὺς συνόντας προβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀρεσκόντων ἑαυτοῖς κατάληψιν. Ὧν τοῦ μὲν προτέρου γεγόνασι τρόπου Πλατωνικοὶ μὲν Εὐκλείδης καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Προκλῖνος ὁ περὶ τὴν Τρῳάδα διατρίψας οἵ τε μέχρι νῦν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ δημοσιεύοντες, Πλωτῖνος καὶ Γεντιλιανὸς Ἀμέλιος ὁ τούτου γνώριμος, Στωικῶν δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Φοιβίων οἵ τε μέχρι πρῴην ἀκμάσαντες Ἄννιός τε καὶ Μήδιος, Περιπατητικῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς Ἡλιόδωρος. Τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου Πλατωνικοὶ μὲν Ἀμμώνιος καὶ Ὠριγένης, οἷς ἡμεῖς τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ χρόνου προσεφοιτήσαμεν, ἀνδράσιν οὐκ ὀλίγῳ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς εἰς σύνεσιν διενεγκοῦσιν, οἵ τε Ἀθήνησι διάδοχοι Θεόδοτος καὶ Εὔβουλος· καὶ γάρ εἴ τι τούτων γέγραπταί τισιν, ὥσπερ Ὠριγένει μὲν τὸ 'Περὶ τῶν δαιμόνων', Εὐβούλῳ δὲ τὸ 'Περὶ τοῦ Φιλήβου καὶ τοῦ Γοργίου καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἀντειρημένων', οὐκ ἐχέγγυα πρὸς τὸ

"There have been in our time, Marcellus, many philosophers, especially in the early part of our life; I say this because at the present moment there is an indescribable shortage of philosophy. When I was a boy there were not a few masters of philosophical argument, all of whom I was enabled to see because from childhood I travelled to many places with my parents, and became acquainted in the same way with those who had lived on later in my intercourse with a great number of peoples and cities. Some of them undertook to set down their doctrines in writing, so as to give posterity the chance of deriving some benefit from them; others thought that all that was required of them was to lead the members of their school to an understanding of what they held. Of the first kind were the Platonists Eucleides and Democritus,[1] and Proclinus, who lived in the Troad, and Plotinus and his friend Gentilianus Amelius, who are still teaching publicly at Rome, and the Stoics Themistocles and Phoebion and the two who were in their prime a little while ago, Annius and Medius, and the Peripatetic Heliodorus, the Alexandrian. Of the second were the Platonists Ammonius and Origen, with whom I studied regularly for a very long time, men who much surpassed their contemporaries in wisdom, and the Successors at Athens, Theodotus and Eubulus. Some of these did write something, for instance Origen, *On The Spirits* and Eubulus, *On the Philebus and the Gorgias and Aristotle's objections to Plato's 'Republic'*; but these are not enough to

[1] The philosophers contemporary with Plotinus mentioned in this preface are only names to us.

μετὰ τῶν ἐξειργασμένων τὸν λόγον αὐτοὺς ἀριθμεῖν ἂν γένοιτο πάρεργον τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρησαμένων σπουδῇ καὶ μὴ προηγουμένην περὶ τοῦ γράφειν ὁρμὴν λαβόντων. Τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ἑρμῖνος καὶ Λυσίμαχος οἵ τε ἐν ἄστει καταβιώσαντες Ἀθηναῖος καὶ Μουσώνιος, καὶ Περιπατητικῶν Ἀμμώνιος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος φιλολογώτατοι μὲν τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἄμφω γενόμενοι καὶ μάλιστα ὁ Ἀμμώνιος· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἐκείνῳ γέγονεν εἰς πολυμαθίαν παραπλήσιος. οὐ μὴν καὶ γράψαντές γε τεχνικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ ποιήματα καὶ λόγους ἐπιδεικτικούς, ἅπερ οὖν καὶ σωθῆναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων οὐχ ἑκόντων οἶμαι· μὴ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὺς δέξασθαι διὰ τοιούτων βιβλίων ὕστερον γενέσθαι γνωρίμους, ἀφέντας σπουδαιοτέροις συγγράμμασι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀποθησαυρίσαι διάνοιαν. Τῶν δ' οὖν γραψάντων οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν πλέον ἢ συναγωγὴν καὶ μεταγραφὴν τῶν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις συντεθέντων ἐποιήσαντο, καθάπερ Εὐκλείδης καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Πρόκλινος, οἱ δὲ μικρὰ κομιδῇ πράγματα τῆς τῶν παλαιῶν ἱστορίας ἀπομνημονεύσαντες εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ἐκείνοις ἐπεχείρησαν συντιθέναι βιβλία, καθάπερ Ἄννιός τε καὶ Μήδιος καὶ Φοιβίων, οὗτος μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ λέξει κατασκευῆς γνωρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ συντάξεως ἀξιῶν· οἷς καὶ τὸν Ἡλιόδωρον συγκατανείμειέ τις ἄν, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνον παρὰ τὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἐν ταῖς ἀκροάσεσιν εἰρημένα πλέον τι συμβαλλόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου διάρθρωσιν. Οἱ δὲ καὶ πλήθει προβλημάτων ἃ μετεχειρίσαντο τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ γράφειν ἀποδειξά-

justify us in counting them among those who have written extensively on philosophy; they are occasional works of men whose interest was in teaching, not writing, and who did not make authorship their main concern. Of Stoics in this group there are Herminus and Lysimachus and the two who lived in town,[1] Athenaeus and Musonius, and among Peripatetics Ammonius and Ptolemaeus, both the greatest scholars of their time, especially Ammonius; there has been no one who has come near him in learning: but they did not write any work of professional philosophy, only poems and showspeeches which I believe to have been preserved without their consent; they would not have wanted to be known in later times by works of this kind when they had neglected to store up their thought in more serious treatises. Of those who wrote, some produced nothing except compilations and transcriptions of what their predecessors had composed, like Eucleides and Democritus and Proclinus; others recalled to mind quite small points of the investigations of the ancients and set to work to compose treatises on the same subjects as they, like Annius and Medius and Phoebion; this last chose to be distinguished for elegance of style rather than coherence of thought. One might class Heliodorus with these, for he too contributed nothing to the ordered exposition of philosophical thought beyond what his elders had said in their lectures. Those who have shown the seriousness with which they took their writing by the multitude of problems which

[1] *ἐν ἄστει*: probably at Athens, assuming that Longinus is being a little archaistic and literary in his usage. In Hellenistic Egypt the phrase could mean Alexandria.

μενοι καὶ τρόπῳ θεωρίας ἰδίῳ χρησάμενοι Πλωτῖνός εἰσι καὶ Γεντιλιανὸς Ἀμέλιος· ὃς μὲν τὰς Πυθαγορείους ἀρχὰς καὶ Πλατωνικάς, ὡς ἐδόκει, πρὸς σαφεστέραν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καταστησάμενος ἐξήγησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐγγύς τι τὰ Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου καὶ Μοδεράτου καὶ Θρασύλλου τοῖς Πλωτίνου περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν συγγράμμασιν εἰς ἀκρίβειαν· ὁ δὲ Ἀμέλιος κατ' ἴχνη μὲν τούτου βαδίζειν προαιρούμενος καὶ τὰ πολλὰ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν δογμάτων ἐχόμενος, τῇ δὲ ἐξεργασίᾳ πολὺς ὢν καὶ τῇ τῆς ἑρμηνείας περιβολῇ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ζῆλον ὑπαγόμενος. Ὧν καὶ μόνων ἡμεῖς ἄξιον εἶναι νομίζομεν ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι τὰ συγγράμματα. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λοιποὺς τί τις ἂν κινεῖν οἴοιτο δεῖν ἀφεὶς ἐξετάζειν ἐκείνους, παρ' ὧν ταῦτα λαβόντες οὗτοι γεγράφασιν οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν προσθέντες οὐχ ὅτι τῶν κεφαλαίων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, οὐδ' οὖν ἢ συναγωγῆς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πλείοσιν ἢ κρίσεως τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπιμεληθέντες; Ἤδη μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ἄλλων τουτὶ πεποιήκαμεν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ μὲν Γεντιλιανῷ περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτωνα δικαιοσύνης ἀντειπόντες, τοῦ δὲ Πλωτίνου τὸ Περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐπισκεψάμενοι· τὸν μὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἡμῶν τε κἀκείνων ἑταῖρον ὄντα, Βασιλέα τὸν Τύριον, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ὀλίγα πεπραγματευμένον κατὰ τὴν Πλωτίνου μίμησιν, ὃν ἀποδεξάμενος μᾶλλον τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγωγῆς ἐπεχείρησε διὰ συγγράμματος ἀποδεῖξαι βελτίω δόξαν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν τῆς ἡμῖν ἀρεσκούσης ἔχοντα, μετρίως ἀντιγραφῇ διελέγξαι δοκοῦμεν οὐκ εὖ παλινῳδήσαντα κἂν τούτοις οὐκ ὀλίγας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων κεκινη-

they treated and have had an original way of thinking are Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius. Plotinus, it would seem, has expounded the principles of Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy more clearly than anyone before him. The works of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasyllus come nowhere near the accuracy of Plotinus's treatises on the same subjects. Amelius chooses to walk in his footsteps, and mostly holds the same doctrines, but is diffuse in exposition, and in his roundabout method of explanation is led by an inclination opposed to that of Plotinus. Their treatises are the only ones which I consider worth attention. Why should anyone think he ought to turn over the works of the rest and neglect the authors from whom they derived what they wrote, when they did not add anything of their own, even in the arguments, to say nothing of the chief points, and did not try to do anything but collect the opinions of the majority or select the best?

"I have already expressed my own opinions elsewhere, for instance in my reply to Gentilianus about righteousness in Plato, and my examination of Plotinus, *On The Ideas*:[1] for my friend and theirs, Basileus of Tyre,[2] who has himself written a good deal in the manner of Plotinus, whose direction he has preferred to my own, tried to demonstrate in a treatise that the doctrine of Plotinus about the Ideas was better than that which I approve. I think I showed fairly thoroughly in my reply that his change of mind was a mistake; and I dealt with a con-

[1] Possibly *Enneads* VI. 7.
[2] I.e., Porphyry, cp. *Life*, ch. 17.

κότες δόξας, ὥσπερ κἀν τῇ πρὸς τὸν Ἀμέλιον ἐπιστολῇ, μέγεθος μὲν ἐχούσῃ συγγράμματος, ἀποκρινομένῃ δὲ πρὸς ἅττα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης ἐπεσταλμένων, ἣν αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπιστολὴν ' Περὶ τοῦ τρόπου τῆς Πλωτίνου φιλοσοφίας ' ⟨ἐπ⟩έγραψεν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτὸ μόνον προσηρκέσθημεν τῇ κοινῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐπιγραφῇ ' Πρὸς τὴν Ἀμελίου ἐπιστολὴν ' αὐτὸ προσαγορεύσαντες."

21. Ἐν δὴ τούτοις τότε ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντων τῶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότων " πλήθει τε προβλημάτων διενεγκεῖν Πλωτῖνόν τε καὶ Ἀμέλιον, τρόπῳ δὲ θεωρίας ἰδίῳ μάλιστα τούτους χρήσασθαι, τὰ Νουμηνίου δὲ οὐχ ὅτι ὑποβάλλεσθαι καὶ τἀκείνου πρεσβεύειν δόγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων αὐτοῦ τε ἑλομένου μετιέναι δόγματα, καὶ οὐδ' ἐγγὺς εἶναι τὰ Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου καὶ Μοδεράτου καὶ Θρασύλλου τοῖς Πλωτίνου περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν συγγράμμασιν εἰς ἀκρίβειαν ". Εἰπὼν δὲ περὶ Ἀμελίου, ὅτι " κατ' ἴχνη μὲν τοῦ Πλωτίνου ἐβάδιζε, τῇ δὲ ἐξεργασίᾳ πολὺς ὢν καὶ τῇ τῆς ἑρμηνείας περιβολῇ πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ζῆλον ὑπήγετο ", ὅμως μνησθεὶς ἐμοῦ Πορφυρίου ἔτι ἀρχὰς ἔχοντος τῆς πρὸς τὸν Πλωτῖνον συνουσίας φησὶν ὅτι " ὁ δὲ κοινὸς ἡμῶν τε κἀκείνων ἑταῖρος Βασιλεὺς ὁ Τύριος οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὀλίγα πεπραγματευμένος κατὰ τὴν Πλωτίνου μίμησιν." Συνέθηκε ταῦτα ὄντως κατιδών, ὅτι τῆς Ἀμελίου περιβολῆς τὸ ἀφιλόσοφον παντελῶς ἐφυλαξάμην καὶ πρὸς ζῆλον τὸν Πλωτίνου γράφων ἀφεώρων. Ἀρκεῖ τοίνυν ὁ τοσοῦτος ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐν κρίσει πρῶτος ὢν καὶ ὑπειλημμένος ἄχρι νῦν τοιαῦτα

siderable number of the opinions of these philosophers in this and in my letter to Amelius, which is as long as a book, and answers a number of the points in the letter which he addressed to me from Rome, which he entitled *On The Method of the Philosophy of Plotinus*. I was satisfied to give my treatise the ordinary title, calling it *In Answer to the Letter of Amelius*."

21. Longinus, then, admitted at that time in this preface "that among all his contemporaries Plotinus and Amelius were outstanding in the number of problems which they treated and had a particularly original way of thinking, and were so far from plagiarising from Numenius and giving his views the first place in their system that Plotinus deliberately propounded Pythagorean views, and the works of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasyllus come nowhere near the accuracy of Plotinus's treatises on the same subjects." He said of Amelius that "he walked in Plotinus's footsteps, but was diffuse in exposition and in his roundabout method of exposition was led by an inclination opposed to that of Plotinus"; and at the same time, in referring to me, Porphyry, when I was still at the beginning of my association with Plotinus, he says, "my friend and theirs, Basileus of Tyre, who has himself written a good deal in the manner of Plotinus." He put it in this way because he really recognised that I altogether avoided the unphilosophical circuitousness of Amelius and looked to the manner of Plotinus as my standard in writing. The opinion which so great a man, who is, and is recognised as the foremost critic of our time, expressed in writing like this about

γράφων περὶ Πλωτίνου, ὡς, εἰ καὶ καλοῦντί με τὸν Πορφύριον συνέβη δυνηθῆναι συμμῖξαι αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ἂν ἀντέγραψεν, ἃ πρὶν ἀκριβῶσαι τὸ δόγμα γράψαι ἐπεχείρησεν.

22. Ἀλλὰ τιή μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἢ περὶ πέτραν—φησὶν ὁ Ἡσίοδος—λέγειν; Εἰ γὰρ δεῖ ταῖς μαρτυρίαις χρῆσθαι ταῖς παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν γεγενημέναις, τίς ἂν εἴη σοφώτερος θεοῦ, καὶ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀληθῶς εἰρηκότος·

Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης
καὶ κωφοῦ ξυνίημι καὶ οὐ λαλέοντος ἀκούω;

Ὁ γὰρ δὴ Ἀπόλλων ἐρομένου τοῦ Ἀμελίου, ποῦ ἡ Πλωτίνου ψυχὴ κεχώρηκεν, ὁ τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ Σωκράτους·

Ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος,

ἐπάκουσον, ὅσα καὶ οἷα περὶ Πλωτίνου ἐθέσπισεν·

Ἄμβροτα φορμίζειν ἀναβάλλομαι ὕμνον ἀοιδῆς
ἀμφ' ἀγανοῖο φίλοιο μελιχροτάτοισιν ὑφαίνων
φωναῖς εὐφήμου κιθάρης χρυσέῳ ὑπὸ πλήκτρῳ.
Κλῄζω καὶ Μούσας ξυνὴν ὄπα γηρύσασθαι
παμφώνοις ἰαχαῖσι παναρμονίαισί τ' ἐρωαῖς,
οἷον ἐπ' Αἰακίδῃ στῆσαι χορὸν ἐκλήιχθεν
ἀθανάτων μανίαισιν Ὁμηρείαισί τ' ἀοιδαῖς.
Ἀλλ' ἄγε Μουσάων ἱερὸς χορός, ἀπύσωμεν
εἰς ἓν ἐπιπνείοντες ἀοιδῆς τέρματα πάσης·
ὔμμι καὶ ἐν μέσσαισιν ἐγὼ Φοῖβος βαθυχαίτης·

Plotinus is enough to indicate that if I, Porphyry, had been able to converse with him, as he invited me to, he would not have written in opposition things which he took it upon himself to write before arriving at a sufficiently accurate understanding of the doctrine of Plotinus.

22. But "Why should I talk of oak and rock?"[1] as Hesiod says; for if one wants to appeal to the evidence of the wise, who could be wiser than a god, and that god who truly said,

"I know the number of the sand, the measure of the sea.
I understand the dumb, and hear him who does not speak."[2]

For when Amelius asked where the soul of Plotinus had gone, Apollo, who said of Socrates,

"Socrates is the wisest of men"[3]

—hear what a great and noble oracle he uttered about Plotinus: "I begin to strike upon my lyre an immortal song, in honour of a gentle friend, weaving it of the sweetest notes of the tuneful harp struck by the golden plectrum. And I call the Muses to raise their voices with me in a full-noted crying of triumph, a sweep of universal melody, as when they were summoned to set the dance going for Aeacides with divine inspiration in the verses of Homer. Come, sacred company of Muses, let us unite our voices to accomplish the fullness of all song, I, Phoebus of the thick hair, singing in the midst of you.

[1] *Theogony* 35. [2] Herodotus I. 47. [3] Diogenes Laertius II. 5. 37. Cp. Plato, *Apology* 21A 6–7.

δαῖμον, ἄνερ τὸ πάροιθεν, ἀτὰρ νῦν δαίμονος αἴσῃ
θειοτέρῃ πελάων, ὅτ' ἐλύσαο δεσμὸν ἀνάγκης
ἀνδρομέης, ῥεθέων δὲ πολυφλοίσβοιο κυδοιμοῦ
ῥωσάμενος πραπίδεσσιν ἐς ἠόνα νηχύτου ἀκτῆς
νήχε' ἐπειγόμενος δήμου ἄπο νόσφιν ἀλιτρῶν
στηρίξαι καθαρῆς ψυχῆς εὐκαμπέα οἶμην,
ἧχι θεοῖο σέλας περιλάμπεται, ἧχι θέμιστες
ἐν καθαρῷ ἀπάτερθεν ἀλιτροσύνης ἀθεμίστου.
Καὶ τότε μὲν σκαίροντι πικρὸν κῦμ' ἐξυπαλύξαι
αἱμοβότου βιότοιο καὶ ἀσηρῶν εἰλίγγων
ἐν μεσάτοισι κλύδωνος ἀνωίστου τε κυδοιμοῦ
πολλάκις ἐκ μακάρων φάνθη σκοπὸς ἐγγύθι
νaίων.
Πολλάκι σεῖο νόοιο βολὰς λοξῇσιν ἀταρποῖς
ἰεμένας φορέεσθαι ἐρωῇσι σφετέρῃσιν
ὀρθοπόρους ἀνὰ κύκλα καὶ ἄμβροτον οἶμον ἄειραν
ἀθάνατοι θαμινὴν φαέων ἀκτῖνα πορόντες
ὄσσοισιν δέρκεσθαι ἀπαὶ σκοτίης λυγαίης.
Οὐδέ σε παμπήδην βλεφάρων ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος·
ἀλλ' ἄρ' ἀπὸ βλεφάρων πετάσας κληῖδα βαρεῖαν
ἀχλύος ἐν δίνῃσι φορεύμενος ἔδρακες ὅσσοις
πολλά τε καὶ χαρίεντα, τά κεν ῥέα οὔτις ἴδοιτο
ἀνθρώπων, ὅσσοι σοφίης μαιήτορες ἔπλευν.
Νῦν δ' ὅτε δὴ σκῆνος μὲν ἐλύσαο, σῆμα δ' ἔλειψας
ψυχῆς δαιμονίης, μεθ' ὁμήγυριν ἔρχεαι ἤδη
δαιμονίην ἐρατοῖσιν ἀναπνείουσαν ἀήταις,

[1] The oracle is full of Homeric tags: here we have a reminiscence of Odyssey 5, 399 *νῆχε δ' ἐπειγόμενος*, and this whole passage seems to be based on an allegorical interpretation of Odysseus's swim ashore after the wreck of his raft. For the interpretation (common in late antiquity and adopted by the

"Spirit, man once, but now nearing the diviner lot of a spirit, as the bond of human necessity has been loosed for you, and strong in heart, you swam swiftly[1] from the roaring surge of the body to that coast where the stream flows strong, far apart from the crowd of the wicked, there to set your steps firm in the easy path of the pure soul, where the splendour of God shines round you and the divine law abides in purity far from lawless wickedness.

"Then too, when you were struggling to escape from the bitter wave of this blood-drinking life, from its sickening whirlpools, in the midst of its billows and sudden surges, often the Blessed Ones showed you the goal ever near. Often when your mind was thrusting out by its own impulse along crooked paths the Immortals raised you by a straight path to the heavenly circuits, the divine way, sending down a solid shaft of light so that your eyes could see out of the mournful darkness. Sweet sleep never held your eyes, but scattering the heavy cloud that would have kept them closed, borne in the whirl you saw many fair sights which are hard for human seekers after wisdom to see.

"But now that you have been freed from this tabernacle[2] and have left the tomb[3] which held your heavenly soul, you come at once to the com-

Christians) of the voyages of Odysseus as a symbol of the journey of the soul cp. *Enneads*, I. 6. 8.

[2] The word *σκῆνος* is used of the body in a highly pessimistic and dualistic passage of the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* 366 A1.

[3] A reference to the *σῶμα-σῆμα* play on words (of Orphic origin) in Plato *Gorgias* 493 A3, where again it is said that life in the body is really death, and separation from it true life for the soul.

ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἔνι δ' ἵμερος ἁβρὸς ἰδέσθαι,
εὐφροσύνης πλείων καθαρῆς, πληρούμενος αἰὲν
ἀμβροσίων ὀχετῶν θεόθεν ὅθεν ἐστὶν ἐρώτων
πείσματα, καὶ γλυκερὴ πνοιὴ καὶ νήνεμος αἰθήρ,
χρυσείης γενεῆς μεγάλου Διὸς ἧχι νέμονται
Μίνως καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἀδελφεοί, ἧχι δίκαιος
Αἰακός, ἧχι Πλάτων, ἱερὴ ἴς, ἧχί τε καλὸς
Πυθαγόρης ὅσσοι τε χορὸν στήριξαν ἔρωτος
ἀθανάτου, ὅσσοι γενεὴν ξυνὴν ἐλάχοντο
δαίμοσιν ὀλβίστοις, ὅθι τοι κέαρ ἐν θαλίῃσιν
αἰὲν ἐυφροσύνῃσιν τ' ἰαίνεται. Ἃ μάκαρ, ὅσσους
ὁτλήσας ἀριθμοὺς ἀέθλων μετὰ δαίμονας ἁγνοὺς
πωλέεαι ζαμενῆσι κορυσσάμενος ζωῆσι.
Στήσωμεν μολπήν τε χοροῦ τ' εὐδίνεα κύκλον
Πλωτίνου, Μοῦσαι, πολυγηθέος· αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο
χρυσείη κιθάρη τόσσον φράσεν εὐαίωνι.

23. Ἐν δὴ τούτοις εἴρηται μὲν ὅτι ἀγανὸς γέγονε καὶ ἤπιος καὶ πρᾷός γε μάλιστα καὶ μείλιχος, ἅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως ἔχοντι συνῄδειμεν· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι ἄγρυπνος καὶ καθαρὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων καὶ ἀεὶ σπεύδων πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, οὗ διὰ πάσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἦρα, ὅτι τε πάντ' ἐποίει ἀπαλλαγῆναι, πικρὸν κῦμ' ἐξυπαλύξαι τοῦ αἱμοβότου τῇδε βίου. Οὕτως δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ τῷ δαιμονίῳ φωτὶ πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ "Συμποσίῳ" ὑφηγημένας ὁδοὺς τῷ Πλάτωνι ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς ὁ μήτε μορφὴν μήτε τινὰ ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος. Ὧι δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω

pany of heaven, where winds of delight blow, where is affection and desire that charms the sight, full of pure joy, brimming with streams of immortality from the gods which carry the allurements of the Loves, and sweet breeze and the windless brightness of high heaven. There dwell Minos and Rhadamanthus, brethren of the golden race of great Zeus, there righteous Aeacus and Plato, the sacred power, and noble Pythagoras and all who have set the dance of immortal love and won kinship with spirits most blessed, there where the heart keeps festival in everlasting joy. O blessed one, you have borne so many contests, and now move among holy spirits, crowned with mighty life.

"Muses, let us set going our song and the gracefully winding circle of our dance in honour of Plotinus the happy. My golden lyre has this much to tell of his good fortune."

23. The oracle says that he was mild and kind, most gentle and attractive, and we knew ourselves that he was like this. It says too that he sleeplessly kept his soul pure and ever strove towards the divine which he loved with all his soul, and did everything to be delivered and "escape from the bitter wave of blood-drinking life here." So to this god-like man above all, who often raised himself in thought, according to the ways Plato teaches in the *Banquet*,[1] to the First and Transcendent God, that God appeared who has neither shape nor any intelligible form, but is throned above intellect and all the intelligible. I, Porphyry, who am now in my sixty-

[1] 210–11: the second part of Diotima's speech, the "Greater Mysteries," which describes the ascent of the mind to the Absolute Beauty, identical with the Good.

πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι ἔτος ἄγων ἑξηκοστόν τε καὶ ὄγδοον. Ἐφάνη γοῦν τῷ Πλωτίνῳ σκοπὸς ἐγγύθι ναίων. Τέλος γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ. Ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις που, ὅτε αὐτῷ συνήμην, τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου ἐνεργείᾳ ἀρρήτῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμει. Καὶ ὅτι λοξῶς φερόμενον πολλάκις οἱ θεοὶ κατεύθυναν θαμινὴν φαέων ἀκτῖνα πορόντες, ὡς ἐπισκέψει τῇ παρ' ἐκείνων καὶ ἐπιβλέψει γραφῆναι τὰ γραφέντα, εἴρηται. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἀγρύπνου ἔσωθέν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν θέας ἕδρακες, φησίν, ὅσσοις πολλά τε καὶ χαρίεντα, τά κεν ῥέα οὔτις ἴδοιτο ἀνθρώπων τῶν φιλοσοφίᾳ προσεχόντων. Ἡ γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θεωρία ἀνθρωπίνης μὲν ἂν γέναιτο ἀμείνων· ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν θείαν γνῶσιν χαρίεσσα μὲν ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ὥστε τὸ βάθος ἐλεῖν ἂν δυνηθῆναι, ὥσπερ αἱροῦσιν οἱ θεοί. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅ τι ἔτι σῶμα περικείμενος ἐνήργει καὶ τίνων ἐτύγχανε δεδήλωκε. Μετὰ δὲ τὸ λυθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐλθεῖν μὲν αὐτόν φησιν εἰς τὴν δαιμονίαν ὁμήγυριν, πολιτεύεσθαι δ' ἐκεῖ φιλότητα, ἵμερον, εὐφροσύνην, ἔρωτα ἐξημμένον τοῦ θεοῦ, τετάχθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους δικαστὰς τῶν ψυχῶν, παῖδας τοῦ θεοῦ, Μίνω καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν καὶ Αἰακόν, πρὸς οὓς οὐ δικασθησόμενον οἴχεσθαι, συνεσόμενον δὲ τούτοις, οἷς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι ἄριστοι. Σύνεισι δὲ τοιοῦτοι Πλάτων, Πυθαγόρας ὁπόσοι τε ἄλλοι χορὸν στήριξαν ἔρωτος ἀθανάτου· ἐκεῖ δὲ τὴν γένεσιν τοὺς ὀλβίστους δαίμονας ἔχειν

eighth year, declare that once I drew near and was united to him. To Plotinus "the goal ever near was shown": for his end and goal was to be united to, to approach the God who is over all things. Four times while I was with him he attained that goal, in an unspeakable actuality and not in potency only. Also it is said that the gods often set him straight when he was going on a crooked course "sending down a solid shaft of light," which means that he wrote what he wrote under their inspection and supervision.[1] Through inward and outward wakefulness, the god says, "you saw many fair sights, hard to see" for men who study philosophy. The contemplation of men may certainly become better than human, but as compared with the divine knowledge it may be fair and fine, but not enough to be able to grasp the depths as the gods grasp them. Thus much the oracle has told about Plotinus's activity and fortunes while he was still in the body. After his deliverance from the body the god says that he came to "the company of heaven," and that there affection rules and desire and joy and love kindled by God, and the sons of God hold their stations, who are judges of the souls, as we are told, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus; to them, the god says, he went not to be judged but to be their companion, as are the other noblest of mankind. Such are their companions, Plato, Pythagoras, and all who "set the dance of immortal love." There, he says, the most blessed

[1] Note that Porphyry attributes his master's achievement predominantly to divine inspiration and guidance. This has little support from the *Enneads*. Plotinus normally thinks that the philosopher can attain to the divine level without this sort of special assistance.

βίον τε μετιέναι τὸν ἐν θαλείαις καὶ εὐφροσύναις καταπεπυκνωμένον καὶ τοῦτον διατελεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν μακαριζόμενον.

24. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ Πλωτίνου ἡμῖν ἱστόρηται βίος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων ποιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ κἀκείνῳ ζῶντι ὑπεσχόμην καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑταίροις ἐπηγγειλάμην ποιῆσαι τοῦτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἐᾶσαι φύρδην ἐκδεδομένα ἐδικαίωσα, μιμησάμενος δ' Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμῳδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ νδ' ὄντα ἔχων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βιβλία διεῖλον μὲν εἰς ἓξ ἐννεάδας τῇ τελειότητι τοῦ ἓξ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐννεάσιν ἁσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἑκάστῃ δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεῖα φέρων συνεφόρησα δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη ἐννεὰς ἔχει τὰ ἠθικώτερα τάδε·

I. 1. α' Τί τὸ ζῷον καὶ τίς ὁ ἄνθρωπος·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι.

I. 2. β' Περὶ ἀρετῶν·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα.

[1] Born c. 180 B.C.: chronologist and scholar; a pupil of the great Aristarchus.

[2] Of Rhodes; 1st century B.C. It was his edition (c. 40 B.C.) that brought the mature philosophical works of Aristotle back into general circulation.

spirits have their birth and live a life filled full of festivity and joy; and this life lasts for ever, made blessed by the gods.

24. This, then, is my account of the life of Plotinus. He himself entrusted me with the arrangement and editing of his books, and I promised him in his lifetime and gave undertakings to our other friends that I would carry out this task. So first of all I did not think it right to leave the books in confusion in order of time as they were issued. I followed the example of Apollodorus of Athens,[1] who collected the works of Epicharmus the comedian into ten volumes, and Andronicus the Peripatetic,[2] who classified the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus according to subject, bringing together the discussions of related topics. So I, as I had fifty-four treatises of Plotinus, divided them into six sets of nine (Enneads)—it gave me pleasure to find the perfection of the number six along with the nines. I put related treatises together in each Ennead, giving the first place to the less difficult questions.[3]

The First Ennead contains the treatises mainly concerned with morals, as follows:

I. 1. What is the Living Being, and what is Man?[4]

I. 2. On Virtues.

[3] On Porphyry's editorial methods see Introduction (pp. ix–xi).

[4] Again, as in the chronological list, the first words of the treatise have been omitted in the translation. For the variations of the titles in Porphyry's two lists, in the MSS of the *Enneads* themselves, and in references to the treatises by other authors, see the complete table (with commentary) in P. Henry, *États du Texte de Plotin*, ch. I.

I. 3. γ′ Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος.

I. 4. δ′ Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

I. 5. ε′ Εἰ ἐν παρατάσει χρόνου τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπίδοσιν.

I. 6. ς′ Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ καλὸν ἔστι μὲν ἐν ὄψει.

I. 7. ζ′ Περὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρ' ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ.

I. 8. η′ Πόθεν τὰ κακά·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· οἱ ζητοῦντες πόθεν τὰ κακά.

I. 9. θ′ Περὶ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ βίου εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· οὐκ ἐξάξεις ἵνα μὴ ἐξίῃ.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη ἐννεὰς τάδε περιέχει ἠθικωτέρας ὑποθέσεις περιλαβοῦσα. Ἡ δὲ δευτέρα τῶν φυσικῶν συναγωγὴν ἔχουσα τὰ περὶ κόσμου καὶ τὰ τῷ κόσμῳ ἐνήκοντα περιέχει. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα·

II. 1. α′ Περὶ τοῦ κόσμου·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ λέγοντες καὶ πρόσθεν εἶναι.

II. 2. β′ Περὶ τῆς κυκλοφορίας·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· διὰ τί κύκλῳ κινεῖται.

II. 3. γ′ Εἰ ποιεῖ τὰ ἄστρα·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ὅτι ἡ τῶν ἄστρων φορὰ σημαίνει.

I. 3. On Dialectic.

I. 4. On Well-Being.

I. 5. Whether Well-Being depends on Extension of Time.

I. 6. On Beauty.

I. 7. On the First Good and the other goods.

I. 8. On the Origin of Evils.

I. 9. On the Reasonable Departure from Life.

These are the treatises contained in the First Ennead, which includes mainly ethical subject-matter. The Second contains a collection of the treatises on natural philosophy, including those on the physical universe and subjects connected with it. They are:

II. 1. On the Universe.

II. 2. On the Circular Motion.

II. 3. Whether the Stars are Causes.

II. 4. δ′ Περὶ τῶν δύο ὑλῶν·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὴν λεγομένην ὕλην.

II. 5. ε′ Περὶ τοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· λέγεται τὸ μὲν δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.

II. 6. ς′ Περὶ ποιότητος καὶ εἴδους·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἕτερον.

II. 7. ζ′ Περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων κράσεως·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων.

II. 8. η′ Πῶς τὰ πόρρω ὁρώμενα μικρὰ φαίνεται·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα τὰ πόρρω ἐλάττω φαίνεται.

II. 9. θ′ Πρὸς τοὺς κακὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὸν κόσμον κακὸν εἶναι λέγοντας·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν.

Ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἐννεὰς ἔτι τὰ περὶ κόσμου ἔχουσα περιείληφε τὰ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν κόσμον θεωρουμένων ταῦτα·

III. 1. α′ Περὶ εἱμαρμένης·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἅπαντα τὰ γιγνόμενα.

III. 2. β′ Περὶ προνοίας πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ μὲν τῷ αὐτομάτῳ·

III. 3. γ′ Περὶ προνοίας δεύτερον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί τοίνυν δοκεῖ περὶ τούτων.

III. 4. δ′ Περὶ τοῦ εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τῶν μὲν αἱ ὑποστάσεις.

III. 5. ε′ Περὶ ἔρωτος·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ ἔρωτος πότερα θεός τις.

III. 6. ς′ Περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας τῶν ἀσωμάτων·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ λέγοντες πάθη.

II. 4. On the Two Kinds of Matter.

II. 5. On What Exists Potentially and What Actually.

II. 6. On Quality and Form.

II. 7. On Complete Intermingling.

II. 8. How Distant Objects appear Small.

II. 9. Against those who say that the Universe and its Maker are Evil.

The contents of the Third Ennead are still concerned with the physical universe; it includes the following treatises dealing with considerations about the universe:

III. 1. On Destiny.

III. 2. On Providence I.

III. 3. On Providence II.

III. 4. On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit.

III. 5. On Love.

III. 6. On the Impassibility of Beings without Body.

III. 7. ζ′ Περὶ αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον.

III. 8. η′ Περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῦ ἑνός·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· παίζοντες δὴ τὴν πρώτην.

III. 9. θ′ Ἐπισκέψεις διάφοροι·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· νοῦς φησιν ὁρᾷ ἐνούσας.

25. Ταύτας τὰς τρεῖς ἐννεάδας ἡμεῖς ἐν ἑνὶ σωματίῳ τάξαντες κατεσκευάσαμεν. Ἐν δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐννεάδι ἐτάξαμεν καὶ τὸ "Περὶ τοῦ εἰληχότος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος", ὅτι καθόλου θεωρεῖται τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔστι τὸ πρόβλημα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τὰ κατὰ τὰς γενέσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων σκεπτομένοις. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ "Περὶ ἔρωτος" τόπος. Τὸ δὲ "Περὶ αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου" διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἐνταῦθα ἐτάξαμεν. Τὸ δὲ "Περὶ φύσεως καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῦ ἑνός" διὰ τὸ περὶ φύσεως κεφάλαιον ἐνταῦθα τέτακται. Ἡ δὲ τετάρτη ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὰ περὶ κόσμου τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἴληχε συγγράμματα. Ἔχει δὲ τάδε·

IV. 1. α′ Περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι.

IV. 2. β′ Περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς δεύτερον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ.

IV. 3. γ′ Περὶ ψῡχῆς ἀποριῶν πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ ψυχῆς ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ εἰς εὐπορίαν καταστῆναι.

IV. 4. δ′ Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν δεύτερον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί οὖν ἐρεῖ.

III. 7. On Eternity and Time.

III. 8. On Nature and Contemplation and the One.

III. 9. Various Considerations.

25. We have arranged these three Enneads to form a single volume. We placed the treatise *On Our Allotted Guardian Spirit* in the Third Ennead because the subject is treated in a general way and the question is one of those which people consider when dealing with the origins of man. The same applies to the treatise entitled *On Love*. We included *Time and Eternity* here because of the discussion of time. *On Nature and Contemplation and the One* is placed here because of the section on Nature. After the treatises on the physical universe comes the Fourth Ennead, containing those dealing with the soul. Its contents are as follows:

IV. 1. On the Essence of the Soul I.

IV. 2. On the Essence of the Soul II.

IV. 3. On Difficulties about the Soul I.

IV. 4. On Difficulties about the Soul II.

IV. 5. ε′ Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀποριῶν τρίτον ἢ περὶ ὄψεως·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ ὑπερεθέμεθα σκέψασθαι.

IV. 6. ς′ Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ μνήμης·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις.

IV. 7. ζ′ Περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος.

IV. 8. η′ Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος.

IV. 9. θ′ Εἰ αἱ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ μία·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα ὥσπερ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου φαμέν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τετάρτη ἐννεὰς τὰς περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ὑποθέσεις πάσας. Ἡ δὲ πέμπτη ἔχει μὲν τὰς περὶ νοῦ, περιέχει δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν βιβλίων ἔν τισι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν. Ἔστι δὲ τάδε·

V. 1. α′ Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ἀρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἆρα τὸ πεποιηκός.

V. 2. β′ Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ τάξεως τῶν μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν πάντα.

V. 3. γ′ Περὶ τῶν γνωριστικῶν ὑποστάσεων καὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα τὸ νοοῦν ἑαυτὸ ποικίλον δεῖ εἶναι.

V. 4. δ′ Πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἑνός·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἴ τι ἔστι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἐκείνου εἶναι.

IV. 5. On Difficulties about the Soul III, or On Vision.

IV. 6. On Sense-Perception and Memory.

IV. 7. On the Immortality of the Soul.

IV. 8. On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies.

IV. 9. If All Souls are One.

So the Fourth Ennead contains all the treatises whose subject is the soul itself. The fifth includes those on Intellect, and all books in which there is also reference to That Which is beyond Intellect and to the intellect in the soul, and to the Ideas. They are as follows:

V. 1. On the Three Primary Hypostases.

V. 2. On the Origin and Order of the Beings which came after the First.

V. 3. On the Knowing Hypostases and That Which is Beyond.

V. 4. How That which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One.

V. 5. ε′ Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν.

V. 6. ς′ Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος μὴ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ πρώτως νοοῦν καὶ τί τὸ δευτέρως·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ μέν ἐστι νοεῖν.

V. 7. ζ′ Περὶ τοῦ εἰ καὶ τῶν καθέκαστά ἐστιν εἴδη·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστον.

V. 8. η′ Περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ κάλλους·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδή φαμεν τὸν ἐν θέᾳ τοῦ νοητοῦ.

V. 9. θ′ Περὶ νοῦ καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενόμενοι.

26. Καὶ τὴν τετάρτην οὖν καὶ πέμπτην ἐννεάδα εἰς ἓν σωμάτιον κατελέξαμεν. Λοιπὴν δὲ τὴν ἕκτην ἐννεάδα εἰς ἄλλο σωμάτιον, ὡς διὰ τριῶν σωματίων γεγράφθαι τὰ Πλωτίνου πάντα, ὧν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον σωμάτιον ἔχει τρεῖς ἐννεάδας, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δύο, τὸ δὲ τρίτον μίαν. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοῦ τρίτου σωματίου, ἐννεάδος δὲ ἕκτης, ταῦτα·

VI. 1. α′ Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα καὶ τίνα.

VI. 2. β′ Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος δεύτερον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων δέκα γενῶν ἐπέσκεπται.

VI. 3. γ′ Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος τρίτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· περὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὅπῃ δοκεῖ.

V. 5. That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect and on the Good.

V. 6. On the Fact that That Which is beyond Being does not think, and on What is the Primary and What the Secondary Thinking Principle.

V. 7. On whether there are Forms of Particulars.

V. 8. On the Intelligible Beauty.

V. 9. On Intellect, the Forms, and Being.

26. So we arranged the Fourth and Fifth Enneads to form one volume. The remaining, Sixth, Ennead we made into another volume, so that all of Plotinus's writings were distributed in three volumes, of which the first contains three Enneads, the second two, and the third one. The contents of the third volume, the Sixth Ennead, are these:

VI. 1. On the Kinds of Being I.

VI. 2. On the Kinds of Being II.

VI. 3. On the Kinds of Being III.

VI. 4. δ′ Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον πρῶτον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρά γε ἡ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ τῷ παντὶ πάρεστι.

VI. 5. ε′ Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον δεύτερον·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι.

VI. 6. ς′ Περὶ ἀριθμῶν·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή ἆρα ἐστὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπόστασις τοῦ ἑνός.

VI. 7. ζ′ Πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπέστη καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· εἰς γένεσιν πέμπων ὁ θεός.

VI. 8. η′ Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνός·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἆρα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ θεῶν εἴ τι ἔστιν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ζητεῖν.

VI. 9. θ′ Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἑνός·
οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἑνί ἐστιν ὄντα.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν βιβλία εἰς ἓξ ἐννεάδας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατετάξαμεν τέσσαρα καὶ πεντήκοντα ὄντα· καταβεβλήμεθα δὲ καὶ εἴς τινα αὐτῶν ὑπομνήματα ἀτάκτως διὰ τοὺς ἐπείξαντας ἡμᾶς ἑταίρους γράφειν εἰς ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τὴν σαφήνειαν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι ἠξίουν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν πάντων πλὴν τοῦ "Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ" διὰ τὸ λεῖψαι ἡμῖν πεποιήμεθα κατὰ τὴν χρονικὴν ἔκδοσιν τῶν βιβλίων· ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ οὐ τὰ κεφάλαια μόνον καθ' ἕκαστον ἔκκειται τῶν βιβλίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειρήματα, ἃ ὡς κεφάλαια

VI. 4. On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole I.

VI. 5. On the Presence of Being, One and the Same, Everywhere as a Whole II.

VI. 6. On Numbers.

VI. 7. How the Multitude of the Forms came into being and On the Good

VI. 8. On Free Will and the Will of the One.

VI. 9. On the Good or the One.

So we arranged the fifty-four books in this way in six Enneads; and we have included commentaries on some of them, irregularly, because friends pressed us to write on points they wanted cleared up for them. We also composed headings for all of them except *On Beauty*, because it was not available to us, following the chronological order in which the books were issued; and we have produced not only the headings for each book but also summaries of the arguments, which are numbered

συναριθμεῖται. Νυνὶ δὲ πειρασόμεθα ἕκαστον τῶν βιβλίων διερχόμενοι τάς τε στιγμὰς αὐτῶν προσθεῖναι καὶ εἴ τι ἡμαρτημένον εἴη κατὰ λέξιν διορθοῦν· καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ἄλλο κινήσῃ, αὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ ἔργον.

in the same way as the headings.[1] Now we shall try to revise all the books and put in the punctuation and correct any verbal errors: anything else that may occur to us the work itself will make clear.

[1] On the attempts of modern scholars to discover traces of the commentaries, headings, and summaries which Porphyry mentions here in the text of the Enneads see Schwyzer, art. cit., col. 495–499. The marginal numbers which appear in some MSS may be references to Porphyry's lost commentaries: cp. Henry, *États du Texte de Plotin*, pp. 312–332 and Henry-Schwyzer I, Preface, p. xxxvii. The curious "table of contents" which forms the second part of the Arabic *Theology of Aristotle* may be a translation of Porphyry's "headings" for the first 34 chapters of IV 4: cp. Henry-Schwyzer II, Preface pp. xxvii–xxviii. The English translation of these "headings" is printed under the text of IV 4, 1–34.

SVMMARIVM

Τάδε ἔνεστιν ἐννεάδος πρώτης Πλωτίνου φιλοσόφου·

I. 1. α′ Περὶ τοῦ τί τὸ ζῷον καὶ τίς ὁ ἄνθωπος.
I. 2. β′ Περὶ ἀρετῶν.
I. 3. γ′ Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς.
I. 4. δ′ Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας.
I. 5. ε′ Περὶ τοῦ εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπίδοσιν χρόνῳ λαμβάνει.
I. 6. ς′ Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
I. 7. ζ′ Περὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν.
I. 8. η′ Περὶ τοῦ τίνα καὶ πόθεν τὰ κακά.
I. 9. θ′ Περὶ ἐξαγωγῆς.

ENNEAD I. 1

I. 1. WHAT IS THE LIVING BEING, AND WHAT IS MAN?

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, though placed first by Porphyry in his edition, is the last but one (No. 53) in his chronological order, and was written by Plotinus shortly before his death (*Life*, ch. 6). Its purpose is to establish the impassibility of our higher soul or true self and its separateness from our animal nature, the compound of body and lower soul, which desires and fears, sins and suffers. This Plotinus does by a critical examination of Peripatetic and Stoic doctrine about the nature and functions of soul and its relationship to body, in which he adopts a great deal of Aristotle's teaching in the *De Anima*, but adapts it to his own views. He concludes by discussing the difficulties which arise for his view from Plato's teaching about the transmigration of souls and their judgement and punishment for sin after death.

Synopsis

What is it in us that feels and thinks—soul or body or a compound of both (ch. 1)? First of all what do we mean by soul? Is it a kind of Form? If so it will be impassible and transcend bodily life, giving to body and receiving nothing from it. How then is soul related to body? Our conclusion, after examining various views that have been put forward, is that our higher soul, our true self, is in fact entirely unaffected by the sensations and passions of bodily life; these belong to the compound of lower soul, a sort of emanation from the higher soul, and body; reason, on the other hand, is an activity of our true self

(chs. 2–7). The higher realities, Intellect and God, the One or Good who is beyond Intellect, we possess as "ours" in a sense but yet transcending us (ch. 8). Error and sin belong to our lower nature; and so do the moral virtues which result from habit and training; true reasoning and the intellectual virtues belong to our true, higher self (chs. 9–10). After a brief consideration of children's consciousness and the consciousness of transmigrated human souls in animal bodies (ch. 11) we come to the serious problem of how to reconcile our view of the sinlessness of the true self with Plato's teaching about judgement and punishment after death; we conclude that it is the lower soul, the "image" of the higher soul, which sins and is punished and goes to Hades (ch. 12). This investigation, being a properly intellectual activity, has been carried out by our true self or higher soul, and in carrying it out it has moved with a motion which is not that of bodies but its own life (ch. 13).

I. 1. (53) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΙ ΤΟ ΖΩΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ

1. Ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι φόβοι τε καὶ θάρρη ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀποστροφαὶ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν τίνος ἂν εἶεν; Ἢ γὰρ ψυχῆς, ἢ χρωμένης ψυχῆς σώματι, ἢ τρίτου τινὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Διχῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· ἢ γὰρ τὸ μῖγμα, ἢ ἄλλο ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων γινόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ δοξαζόμενα. Καὶ οὖν καὶ διάνοια καὶ δόξα ζητητέαι, πότερα ὧν τὰ πάθη, ἢ αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως. Καὶ τὰς νοήσεις δὲ θεωρητέον, πῶς καὶ τίνος, καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπισκοποῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιούμενον τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. Καὶ πρότερον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος; Ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι προσήκει, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάθη ἤ εἰσιν αἰσθήσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.

2. Πρῶτον δὲ ψυχὴν ληπτέον, πότερον ἄλλο μὲν ψυχή, ἄλλο δὲ ψυχῇ εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, σύνθετόν τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἤδη δέχεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ

[1] The starting-point of the discussion seems to be a passage of Aristotle, *De Anima* A. 4. 408b 1 ff., where Aristotle raises the question whether the soul is really "moved" when it has these affections. It is possible also that Plotinus has in mind (as Aristotle most probably has) Plato's description at *Laws* X 897A of the motions of soul which are prior to and the cause of the motions of body: this seems more relevant to the present

I. 1. WHAT IS THE LIVING BEING, AND WHAT IS MAN?

1. Pleasures and sadnesses, fears and assurances, desires and aversions and pain—whose are they?[1] They either belong to the soul or the soul using a body or a third thing composed of both (and this can be understood in two ways, either as meaning the mixture or another different thing resulting from the mixture). The same applies to the results of these feelings, both acts and opinions. So we must investigate reasoning and opinion, to see whether they belong to the same as the feelings, or whether this is true of some reasonings and opinions, and something different of others. We must also consider intellectual acts and see how they take place and who or what they belong to, and observe what sort of thing it is that acts as overseer and carries out the investigation and comes to a decision about these matters. And, first of all, who or what does sensation belong to? That is where we ought to begin, as feelings are either a sort of sensations or do not occur without sensation.

2. First we must consider soul. Is soul one thing and essential soulness another? If this is so, soul will be a composite thing and there will be nothing

discussion than the passages (*Republic* 429C–D and 430A–B; *Phaedo* 83B) cited by Henry-Schwyzer in their *apparatus fontium*. (They also cite the Aristotle passage.)

αὐτῆς εἶναι τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰ ἐπιτρέψει καὶ οὕτως ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅλως ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις χείρους καὶ βελτίους. Ἤ, εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι, εἶδός τι ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ ἄδεκτον τούτων ἁπασῶν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὧν ἐποιστικὸν ἄλλῳ, ἑαυτῷ δὲ συμφυᾶ ἔχον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἥντινα ἂν φήνῃ ὁ λόγος. Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀληθὲς λέγειν, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἀπαθὲς εἶναι, ἄλλῳ ἑαυτοῦ πως διδόν, αὐτὸ δὲ παρ' ἄλλου μηδὲν ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν, ὧν μὴ ἀποτέτμηται κρειττόνων ὄντων. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ φοβοῖτο τοιοῦτον ἄδεκτον ὂν παντὸς τοῦ ἔξω; Ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν φοβείσθω, ὃ δύναται παθεῖν. Οὐδὲ θαρρεῖ τοίνυν· τούτοις γὰρ θάρρος, οἷς ἂν τὰ φοβερὰ μὴ παρῇ; Ἐπιθυμίαι τε, αἳ διὰ σώματος ἀποπληροῦνται κενουμένου καὶ πληρουμένου, ἄλλου τοῦ πληρουμένου καὶ κενουμένου ὄντος; Πῶς δὲ μίξεως; Ἢ τὸ οὐσιῶδες ἄμικτον. Πῶς δὲ ἐπεισαγωγῆς τινων; Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν σπεύδοι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. Τὸ δ' ἀλγεῖν ἔτι πόρρω. Λυπεῖσθαι δὲ πῶς ἢ ἐπὶ τίνι; Αὔταρκες γὰρ τό γε ἁπλοῦν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, οἷόν ἐστι μένον ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ αὐτοῦ. Ἥδεται δὲ προσγενομένου τίνος, οὐδενὸς οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ προσιόντος;

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* H. 3. 1043 b. 3. Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται. "For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same, but 'to be man' and 'man' are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man" (Ross). For Plotinus, on this point in opposition to Aris-

strange in its admitting and possessing feelings of this kind (if the argument turns out to require this), and in general better and worse states and dispositions. If on the other hand soul and essential soulness are one and the same,[1] soul will be a kind of Form, which will not admit of all these activities which it imparts to something else, but has an immanent connatural activity of its own, whatever the discussion reveals that activity to be. If this is so, we can really call it immortal, if the immortal and incorruptible must be impassive, giving something of itself somehow to another thing, but receiving nothing from anything else, except what it has from the principles prior to it, those higher principles from which it is not cut off. What could a thing of this kind fear, since it admits nothing at all from outside? Let that fear which is capable of being affected! Nor does it feel assurance. How can there be assurance for those who never encounter anything frightening? And how can there be desires, which are satisfied by the body when it is emptied and filled, since that which is emptied and filled is different from the soul? And how could it admit of mixture? Substantial being is unmixed. How could there be any sort of addition? If there was, it would be hastening to be no more what it is. Pain is far from it too; and how could it feel sad, and what about? For that which is essentially simple is sufficient for itself, inasmuch as it stays set in its own essential nature. And will it be pleased at any increase, when nothing, not even any good, can accrue to it? It is

totle, the rational soul *is* the "true man," the "man within" (ch. 10): our lower nature is "another man" which has attached itself to the first man, our true self (VI. 4. 14).

Ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἀεί. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθήσεται οὐδὲ διάνοια οὐδὲ δόξα περὶ αὐτό· αἴσθησις γὰρ παραδοχὴ εἴδους ἢ καὶ πάθους σώματος, διάνοια δὲ καὶ δόξα ἐπ' αἴσθησιν. Περὶ δὲ νοήσεως ἐπισκεπτέον πῶς, εἰ ταύτην αὐτῇ καταλείψομεν· καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς αὖ καθαρᾶς, εἰ συμβαίνει περὶ αὐτὴν μόνην οὖσαν.

3. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν σώματι θετέον ψυχήν, οὖσαν εἴτε πρὸ τούτου, εἴτ' ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ καὶ αὐτῆς ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη. Χρωμένη μὲν οὖν σώματι οἷα ὀργάνῳ οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται δέξασθαι τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ὀργάνων παθήματα οἱ τεχνῖται· αἴσθησιν δὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀναγκαίως, εἴπερ δεῖ χρῆσθαι τῷ ὀργάνῳ γινωσκούσῃ τὰ ἔξωθεν παθήματα ἐξ αἰσθήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι ὄμμασίν ἐστιν ὁρᾶν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ βλάβαι περὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ὥστε καὶ λῦπαι καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ὅλως ὅ τι περ ἂν περὶ τὸ σῶμα πᾶν γίγνηται· ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ζητούσης τὴν θεραπείαν τοῦ ὀργάνου. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς αὐτὴν ἥξει τὰ πάθη; Σῶμα μὲν γὰρ σώματι ἄλλῳ μεταδώσει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. Σῶμα δὲ ψυχῇ πῶς; Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν οἷον ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλο παθεῖν. Μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ ᾧ χρῆται, χωρίς ἐστιν ἑκάτερον· χωρίζει γοῦν ὁ τὸ χρώμενον τὴν ψυχὴν διδούς. Ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ χωρίσαι διὰ φιλοσοφίας αὐτὸ πῶς εἶχεν; Ἢ ἐμέμικτο. Ἀλλὰ εἰ ἐμέμικτο, ἢ κρᾶσίς

[1] This is Aristotelian; cp. *De Anima* B. 12. 24a 18.

[2] The phrase is taken from Plato, *Phaedrus* 246C5: the idea of the soul using the body as a tool comes from *Alcibiades* 129C–E.

always what it is. Furthermore it will have no sensations and reasoning and opinion will have no connection with it; for sensation is the reception of a form or of an affection of a body,[1] and reasoning and opinion are based on sensation. We must enquire how it is with intelligence, whether we are going to allow this to the soul; and also whether it experiences pure pleasure when it is alone.

3. We must certainly too consider soul as being in body (whether it does in fact exist before it or in it) since it is from the combination of body and soul that "the complete living creature takes its name."[2] Now if soul uses body as a tool it does not have to admit the affections which come through the body; craftsmen are not affected by the affections of their tools. Perhaps one might suggest that it would necessarily have sensation, if a necessary accompaniment of using the tool is knowing by sensation the ways in which it is affected from outside; for using the eyes is just seeing. But there can be harm in seeing, and it can bring sadness and pain and in general anything that may happen to the whole body; and so desire, when the soul seeks the service of its tool. But how will the affections which come from body manage to reach the soul? Body can give of its own to another body, but how can body give to soul? This amounts to saying that if one thing is affected, so must another different thing be. For insofar as one is the user and the other what it uses, they are two separate things. At any rate anyone who states that the soul uses the body as a tool separates the two. But what was their relationship before the separation of soul by philosophy? There was a mixture. But if there was a mixture, there was

τις ἦν, ἢ ὡς διαπλακεῖσα, ἢ ὡς εἶδος οὐ κεχωρισμένον, ἢ εἶδος ἐφαπτόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἢ τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐκείνως· λέγω δὲ ἢ τὸ μὲν κεχωρισμένον, ὅπερ τὸ χρώμενον, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ὀπωσοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν ἐν τάξει τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ἵνα τοῦτο ἡ φιλοσοφία καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπιστρέφῃ πρὸς τὸ χρώμενον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον ἀπάγῃ, ὅσον μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ᾧ χρῆται, ὡς μὴ ἀεὶ μηδὲ χρῆσθαι.

4. Θῶμεν τοίνυν μεμῖχθαι. Ἀλλ' εἰ μέμικται, τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔσται βέλτιον, τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, ἡ ψυχή· καὶ βέλτιον μὲν τὸ σῶμα ζωῆς μεταλαβόν, χεῖρον δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ θανάτου καὶ ἀλογίας. Τὸ δὴ ἀφαιρεθὲν ὀπωσοῦν ζωῆς πῶς ἂν προσθήκην λάβοι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; Τοὐναντίον δ' ἂν τὸ σῶμα ζωὴν λαβὸν τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως παθημάτων μεταλαμβάνον. Τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ὀρέξεται—τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀπολαύσει ὧν ὀρέγεται—καὶ φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ οὐ τεύξεται τῶν ἡδέων καὶ φθαρήσεται. Ζητητέον δὲ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μίξεως, μήποτε οὐ δυνατὸς ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι μεμῖχθαι λευκῷ γραμμήν, φύσιν ἄλλην ἄλλῃ. Τὸ δὲ "διαπλακεῖσα" οὐ ποιεῖ ὁμοιοπαθῆ τὰ διαπλακέντα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ διαπλακὲν καὶ ἔστι

[1] So Plato describes the soul of the universe as "woven through" its body, *Timaeus* 36E2.

either a sort of intermingling, or the soul was in some way "woven through"[1] the body, or it was like a form not separated from the matter, or a form handling the matter as the steersman steers the ship, or one part of it was related in one way and another in another. I mean that one part is separate, the part which uses the body, and the other somehow mixed with body and on a level with that which it uses. In this case philosophy should turn this lower part towards the using part, and draw the using part away from that which it uses, insofar as the connection is not absolutely necessary, so that it may not always have even to use it.

4. Let us assume, then, that there is a mixture. But, if this is so, the worse element, the body, will be improved and the other element, the soul, will be made worse. The body will be improved by sharing in life, the soul made worse by sharing in death and unreason. How then can that which has its life reduced in any way whatever acquire thereby an additional faculty, that of sense-perception? The opposite is true; it is the body which receives life, and so the body which shares in sensation and the affections which come from sensation. So too, it will be the body that desires—for it is the body which is going to enjoy the objects of desire—and is afraid for itself—for it is going to miss its pleasures and be destroyed. And we must investigate the way in which this "mixture" takes place, and see if it is not really impossible; it is like talking about a line being mixed with white, one kind of thing with another kind of thing.

The idea of "being interwoven" does not imply that the things interwoven are affected in the same

ψυχὴν διαπεφοιτηκυῖαν μήτοι πάσχειν τὰ ἐκείνου πάθη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ οὕτω, δι' ὅλου ὡς διαπεπλέχθαι· οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὖν πείσεται τὰ σώματος πάθη, ὅτι διαπέπλεκται. Ἀλλ' ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ἔσται ἐν τῷ σώματι; Πρῶτον μὲν ὡς χωριστὸν εἶδος ἔσται, εἴπερ οὐσία, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον. Εἰ δὲ ὡς τῷ πελέκει τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ σιδήρῳ, καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον ὁ πέλεκυς ποιήσει ἃ ποιήσει ὁ σίδηρος ὁ οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένος, κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα μέντοι, μᾶλλον ἂν τῷ σώματι διδοῖμεν ὅσα κοινὰ πάθη, τῷ μέντοι τοιούτῳ, τῷ φυσικῷ, ὀργανικῷ, δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντι. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπόν φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν λέγειν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον μᾶλλον.

5. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῷον ἢ τὸ σῶμα δεῖ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε, ἢ τὸ κοινόν, ἢ ἕτερόν τι τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γεγενημένον. Ὅπως δ' ἂν ἔχῃ, ἤτοι ἀπαθῆ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάττειν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γενομένην ἄλλῳ τοῦ τοιούτου, ἢ συμπάσχειν καὶ αὐτήν· καὶ ἢ ταὐτὸν πάσχουσαν πάθημα πάσχειν, ἢ ὅμοιόν

[1] This comparison is taken from Aristotle, *De Anima* B. 1. 412b. 12.

[2] These phrases are quotations from *De Anima* B. 1. 412a. 27–8. The reference to Aristotle which follows is to the key passage already quoted, *De Anima* A. 4. 408b. 12–13. Plotinus is here using Aristotle's doctrine of the soul as the immanent (and, except for the intellect, inseparable) form of the body as a starting-point from which to develop his own really very different doctrine of the relationship of soul and body.

way: it is possible for the principle interwoven to be unaffected and for the soul to pass and repass through the body without being touched by its affections, just like light, especially if it is interwoven right through the whole; this sort of interweaving will not make it subject to the affections of the body. Will it then be in the body like form in matter? First of all, it will be like a separable form, assuming it to be a substantial reality, and so will correspond still more exactly to the conception of it as a "user." But if we assume it to be like the shape of an axe imposed on the iron[1] (in this case it is the compound of matter and form, the axe, which performs its functions, that is to say the iron shaped in this particular way, though it is in virtue of the shape that it does so) we shall attribute all the common affections rather to the body, but to a body "of a specific kind," "formed by nature," "adapted to the use of the soul," "having life potentially."[2] Aristotle says that it is absurd "to talk about the soul weaving," and it follows that it is also absurd to talk about it desiring or grieving; we should attribute these affections rather to the living being.

5. But we must define the living being as either the body of this special kind, or the community of body and soul, or another, third, thing, the product of both.[3] However that may be, the soul must either remain unaffected and only cause affections in something else or must be affected itself along with the body: and, if it is affected, it must either be

[3] The question raised here is discussed in the *Alcibiades* 130A7–C7, a passage which Plotinus seems to have in mind at this point (the word *συναμφότερον* is used of the compound of body and soul 130A9).

τι, οἷον ἄλλως μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον οἷον λυπεῖσθαι πῶς; Ἆρα ὅτι τοῦ σώματος οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος καὶ μέχρις αἰσθήσεως διελθόντος τοῦ πάθους τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτώσης; Ἀλλ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὔπω δῆλον πῶς. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ λύπη ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ κρίσεως λάβῃ τοῦ κακόν τι παρεῖναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ τινι τῶν οἰκείων, εἶτ' ἐντεῦθεν τροπὴ λυπηρὰ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ ζῷον γένηται; Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῆς δόξης οὔπω δῆλον τίνος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου· εἶτα ἡ μὲν δόξα ἡ περί του κακὸν τὸ τῆς λύπης οὐκ ἔχει πάθος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ δυνατὸν τῆς δόξης παρούσης μὴ πάντως ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὸ λυπεῖσθαι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι δόξης τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι γενομένης, μηδ' αὖ ἀγαθοῦ δόξης κινεῖσθαι τὴν ὄρεξιν. Πῶς οὖν κοινὰ ταῦτα; Ἢ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς τοῦ θυμικοῦ καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ ἡ ἐπί τι ἔκστασις; Ἀλλ' οὕτως οὐκέτι κοινὰ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης· ἢ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι δεῖ αἷμα καὶ χολὴν ζέσαι καί πως διατεθὲν τὸ σῶμα

subjected to the same affection or a similar one (as for instance, if the living being desires in one way, the desiring part of the soul may be active or affected in a different one). We will consider this special kind of body later. But in what way is the compound of body and soul, for instance, capable of grief? Is it that the body is disposed in this particular way, and its affection penetrates to sense-perception, and sense-perception ends in the soul? But this leaves it still obscure how sense-perception comes about. Or alternatively, does grief originate from an opinion, a judgement[1] that there is some evil there for the person concerned himself or something belonging to him, and does this result in an unpleasant change in the body and the living being as a whole? But then it is not yet clear which the opinion belongs to, the soul or the compound. Besides, the opinion about someone's evil does not contain the feeling of grief. It is possible to have the opinion without being grieved at all in consequence, as it is possible not to be angry when we have the opinion that we have been slighted, and for our appetite not to be stirred when we have the opinion that a good is present. How then are affections common to body and soul? Is it because desire belongs to the desiring part of the soul and passion to the passionate part, and in general the movement out towards anything to the appetitive part? But then they are no longer common to body and soul but belong to soul alone. Or do they belong to the body too, because blood and bile must boil and the body be in

[1] This idea of the emotions as judgements or opinions is Stoic (Chrysippus); cp. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III. 459.

τὴν ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀφροδισίων. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις μὴ κοινὸν πάθημα ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς ἔστω, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ πάντα τοῦ κοινοῦ δίδωσί τις λόγος. Ἀλλὰ ὀρεγομένου ἀφροδισίων τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν, ἔσται δὲ ἄλλως καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἐπιθυμοῦν. Καὶ πῶς; Ἆρα ἄρξει μὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἐπακολουθήσει δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; Ἀλλὰ πῶς ὅλως ἐπεθύμησεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κεκινημένου; Ἀλλ' ἄρξει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ πρότερον οὑτωσὶ διατεθέντος πόθεν ἄρξεται;

6. Ἀλλ' ἴσως βέλτιον εἰπεῖν καθόλου τῷ παρεῖναι τὰς δυνάμεις τὰ ἔχοντα εἶναι τὰ ἐνεργοῦντα κατ' αὐτάς, αὐτὰς δὲ ἀκινήτους εἶναι χορηγούσας τὸ δύνασθαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστι πάσχοντος τοῦ ζῴου τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ζῆν τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ δοῦσαν αὑτὴν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τοῦ ἔχοντος ὄντων. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅλως οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ἔσται. Ἢ τὸ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου ζῆν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔσται· καὶ ἡ δύναμις δὲ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ σώματος κίνησις οὖσα εἰς ψυχὴν τελευτᾷ, πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ οὐκ αἰσθήσεται; Ἢ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αἰσθητικῆς παρούσης τῷ ταύτην παρεῖναι αἰσθήσεται ⟨ὅ⟩τι αἰσθήσεται τὸ συναμφότερον. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ δύναμις μὴ κινήσε-

a certain state to stir appetite, as in the case of sexual passion? Let us grant anyhow that the appetite for the good is not an affection of both, but of the soul, and this is true of other affections too; a reasoned examination does not attribute them all to the joint entity. But when man has an appetite for sexual pleasures, it will be the man that desires, but in another way it will be the desiring part of the soul that desires. How will this come about? Will the man start the desire and the desiring part of soul follow on? But how could the man manage to desire at all if the desiring part was not moved? Perhaps the desiring part will start. But where will it start from, if the body is not previously disposed in the appropriate way?

6. But perhaps it is better to say that, in general, as a result of the presence of the powers of soul it is their possessors which act by them, and the powers themselves are unmoved and only impart the power to act to their possessors. But if this is so, when the living being is affected, the cause of its life, which gave itself to the compound, can remain unaffected, and the affections and activities belong to the possessor. But if this is so, life will belong altogether, not to the soul, but to the compound. Certainly the life of the compound will not be that of the soul: and the power of sense-perception will not perceive, but that which has the power. But if sense-perception is a movement through the body which ends in the soul, how will the soul not perceive? When the power of sense-perception is present the compound will perceive whatever it perceives by its presence. But if the power is not going to be moved, how will it still be the compound

ται, πῶς ἔτι τὸ συναμφότερον μὴ συναριθμουμένης ψυχῆς μηδὲ τῆς ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως;

7. Ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἔστω τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ παρεῖναι οὐχ αὐτὴν δούσης τῆς τοιαύτης εἰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ εἰς θάτερον, ἀλλὰ ποιούσης ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τοιούτου καί τινος οἷον φωτὸς τοῦ παρ' αὐτὴν δοθέντος τὴν τοῦ ζῴου φύσιν ἕτερόν τι, οὗ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα ζῴου πάθη εἴρηται. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡμεῖς αἰσθανόμεθα; Ἢ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπηλλάγημεν τοῦ τοιούτου ζῴου, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἡμῖν τιμιώτερα εἰς τὴν ὅλην ἀνθρώπου οὐσίαν ἐκ πολλῶν οὖσαν πάρεστι. Τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμιν οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἶναι δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγιγνομένων τῷ ζῴῳ τύπων ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι μᾶλλον· νοητὰ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα· ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν ἔξω εἴδωλον εἶναι ταύτης, ἐκείνην δὲ ἀληθεστέραν τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὖσαν εἰδῶν μόνων ἀπαθῶς εἶναι θεωρίαν. Ἀπὸ δὴ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ ἤδη παραδέχεται μόνη τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ἡγεμονίαν, διάνοιαι δὴ καὶ δόξαι καὶ νοήσεις· ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα. Τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα, ἡμεῖς δὴ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἄνω ἐφεστηκότες τῷ ζῴῳ. Κωλύσει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ σύμπαν ζῷον λέγειν, μικτὸν μὲν τὰ κάτω, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθὴς σχεδόν· ἐκεῖνα δὲ

[1] That is "below"; sensation and emotion belong to the body-soul compound, the "living being"; the true self begins where thought begins.

that perceives if neither soul nor soul-power are reckoned as included in it?

7. Let us say that it *is* the compound which perceives, and that the soul by its presence does not give itself qualified in a particular way either to the compound or to the other member of it, but makes, out of the qualified body and a sort of light which it gives of itself, the nature of the living creature, another different thing to which belong sense-perception and all other affections which are ascribed to the living body. But then, how is it we who perceive? It is because we are not separated from the living being so qualified, even if other things too, of more value than we are, enter into the composition of the whole essence of man, which is made up of many elements. And soul's power of sense-perception need not be perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being; these are already intelligible entities. So external sensation is the image of this perception of the soul, which is in its essence truer and is a contemplation of forms alone without being affected. From these forms, from which the soul alone receives its lordship over the living being, come reasonings, and opinions and acts of intuitive intelligence; and this precisely is where "we" are. That which comes before[1] this is "ours" but "we," in our presidency over the living being, are what extends from this point upwards. But there will be no objection to calling the whole thing "living being"; the lower parts of it are something mixed, the part which begins on the level of thought is, I suppose, the true man: those lower parts are

τὸ λεοντῶδες καὶ τὸ ποικίλον ὅλως θηρίον. Συνδρόμου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ, ὅταν λογιζώμεθα, ἡμεῖς λογιζόμεθα τῷ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ψυχῆς εἶναι ἐνεργήματα.

8. Πρὸς δὲ τὸν νοῦν πῶς; Νοῦν δὲ λέγω οὐχ ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἕξιν οὖσαν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν. Ἢ ἔχομεν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπεράνω ἡμῶν. Ἔχομεν δὲ ἢ κοινὸν ἢ ἴδιον, ἢ καὶ κοινὸν πάντων καὶ ἴδιον· κοινὸν μέν, ὅτι ἀμέριστος καὶ εἷς καὶ πανταχοῦ ὁ αὐτός, ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτὸν ὅλον ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ πρώτῃ. Ἔχομεν οὖν καὶ τὰ εἴδη διχῶς, ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ οἷον ἀνειλιγμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα, ἐν δὲ νῷ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα. Τὸν δὲ θεὸν πῶς; Ἢ ὡς ἐποχούμενον τῇ νοητῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ὄντως, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τρίτους ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου, φησί, τῆς ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς, ἣν δὴ δεῖ νοεῖν οὕτω μεριστὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅτι δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν τοῖς σώματος μεγέθεσιν, ὁπόσον ἂν ζῷον ἢ ἕκαστον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ παντὶ ὅλῳ, οὖσα μία· ἤ, ὅτι φαντάζεται τοῖς σώμασι παρεῖναι ἐλλάμπουσα εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ζῷα ποιοῦσα οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ

[1] Plotinus is here quoting *Republic* IX 590A9 and 588C7. The "lion" in Plato symbolises the higher emotions, the "various beast" (a sort of many-headed dragon) the carnal lusts and desires. It is noteworthy that the difference in quality and value of these two lower parts of the soul, which is so important in the psychology of the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, has little significance for Plotinus.

[2] The "true reality" is the world of Forms which is identical with Intellect. God (the One or Good) is beyond Intellect and Reality.

[3] Plotinus is again quoting from Plato's description of the making of the world-soul in *Timaeus* 35A: in what

the "lion-like," and altogether "the various beast."[1] Since man coincides with the rational soul, when we reason it is really we who reason because rational processes are activities of soul.

8. But how are we related to the Intellect? I mean by "Intellect" not that state of the soul, which is one of the things which derive from Intellect, but Intellect itself. We possess this too, as something that transcends us. We have it either as common to all or particular to ourselves, or both common and particular; common because it is without parts and one and everywhere the same, particular to ourselves because each has the whole of it in the primary part of his soul. So we also possess the forms in two ways, in our soul, in a manner of speaking unfolded and separated, in Intellect all together.

But how do we possess God? He rides mounted on the nature of Intellect and true reality—that is how we possess him;[2] "we" are third in order counting from God, being made, Plato says, "from the undivided," that which is above, "and from that which is divided in bodies";[3] we must consider this part of soul as being divided in bodies in the sense that it gives itself to the magnitudes of bodies, in proportion to the size of each living being, since it gives itself to the whole universe, though the soul is one: or because it is pictured as being present to bodies since it shines into them and makes

follows he gives an interpretation of Plato's phrase in terms of his own doctrine of the lower soul and its powers as emanations of the higher soul, which "gives itself" to bodies by illuminating, forming, and vivifying them, remaining itself undiminished and unaffected.

σώματος, ἀλλὰ μένουσα μὲν αὐτή, εἴδωλα δὲ αὐτῆς διδοῦσα, ὥσπερ πρόσωπον ἐν πολλοῖς κατόπτροις. Πρῶτον δὲ εἴδωλον αἴσθησις ἡ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ· εἶτα ἀπὸ ταύτης αὖ πᾶν ⟨ὃ⟩ ἄλλο εἶδος λέγεται ψυχῆς, ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου ἀεί, καὶ τελευτᾷ μέχρι γεννητικοῦ καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ὅλως ποιήσεως ἄλλου καὶ ἀποτελεστικοῦ ἄλλου παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐπεστραμμένης αὐτῆς τῆς ποιούσης πρὸς τὸ ἀποτελούμενον.

9. Ἔσται τοίνυν ἐκείνης ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φύσις ἀπηλλαγμένη αἰτίας κακῶν, ὅσα ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον ταῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, [καὶ κοινόν], ὡς εἴρηται. Ἀλλ' εἰ δόξα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διάνοια, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος; Ψευδὴς γὰρ δόξα καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν πράττεται τῶν κακῶν. Ἡ πράττεται μὲν τὰ κακὰ ἡττωμένων ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος—πολλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς—ἢ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ θυμοῦ ἢ εἰδώλου κακοῦ· ἡ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν λεγομένη διάνοια φαντασία οὖσα οὐκ ἀνέμεινε τὴν τοῦ διανοητικοῦ κρίσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπράξαμεν τοῖς χείροσι πεισθέντες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὶν τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐπικρῖναι ψευδῆ ὁρᾶν συμβαίνει τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθήσει. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἢ ἐφήψατο ἢ οὔ, ὥστε ἀναμάρτητος. Ἢ οὕτω δὲ λεκτέον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἢ ἐφηψάμεθα τοῦ ἐν τῷ νῷ νοητοῦ ἢ οὔ. Ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν· δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ πρόχειρον ἔχειν. Διείλομεν δὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῷ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι, ὅσα

[1] Cp. *Theaetetus* 198D7 (from the comparison, which Plato afterwards rejects as unsatisfactory, of the mind to an aviary).

living creatures, not of itself and body, but abiding itself and giving images of itself, like a face seen in many mirrors. The first image is the faculty of sensation in the joint entity, and after this comes everything which is called another form of soul, each in its turn proceeding from the other; the series ends in the powers of generation and growth, and, speaking generally, in the powers which make and perfect other things different from the soul which makes, while the making soul itself stays directed towards its product.

9. The nature of that higher soul of ours will be free from all responsibility for the evils that man does and suffers; these concern the living being, the joint entity, as has been said. But if opinion and reasoning belong to the soul, how is it free from sin? For opinion is a cheat and is the cause of much evil-doing. Evil is done when we are mastered by what is worse in us—for we are many—by desire or passion or an evil image. What we call thinking falsities is a making of mind-pictures which has not waited for the judgement of the reasoning faculty—we have acted under the influence of our worse parts, just as in sensation the perception of the joint entity may see falsely before the reasoning faculty has passed judgement on it. The intellect is either in touch with the proceedings or it is not, and so sinless: but we ought rather to say that we are in touch with the intelligible in the intellect or we are not—with the intelligible in ourselves; for one can have it and not have it available.[1]

So we have distinguished what belongs to the joint entity and what is proper to the soul in this way: what belongs to the joint entity is bodily or not

δὲ οὐ δεῖται σώματος εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ταῦτα ἴδια ψυχῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίκρισιν ποιουμένην τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τύπων εἴδη ἤδη θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν οἷον συναισθήσει, τήν γε κυρίως τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀληθοῦς διάνοιαν· νοήσεων γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ διάνοια ἡ ἀληθὴς καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλάκις πρὸς τἄνδον ὁμοιότης καὶ κοινωνία. Ἀτρεμήσει οὖν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ· αἱ δὲ τροπαὶ καὶ ὁ θόρυβος ἐν ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν συνηρτημένων καὶ τῶν τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὅ τι δήποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο, ὡς εἴρηται, παθημάτων.

10. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡ ψυχή, πάσχομεν δὲ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς, ταῦτα ἂν εἴη πάσχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὖ ποιήσει ἃ ποιοῦμεν. Ἢ καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἔφαμεν ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα οὔπω κεχωρισμένων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἃ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς φαμεν πάσχειν. Διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, ἢ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ θηρίου, ἢ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἤδη· θηρίον δὲ ζῳωθὲν τὸ σῶμα. Ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὁ καθαρὸς τούτων τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχων τὰς ἐν νοήσει αἳ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χωριζομένῃ ψυχῇ ἵδρυνται, χωριζομένῃ δὲ καὶ χωριστῇ ἔτι ἐνταῦθα οὔσῃ· ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἀποστῇ, καὶ ἡ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐλλαμφθεῖσα ἀπελήλυθε συνεπομένη. Αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ αἱ μὴ φρονήσει, ἔθεσι δὲ ἐγγινόμεναι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι, τοῦ κοινοῦ· τούτου γὰρ αἱ κακίαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φθόνοι

[1] For the "clamour" of the body cp. *Phaedo* 66D6 and *Timaeus* 43B6.
[2] Cp. *Republic* 518E1–2.

without body, but what does not require body for its operation is proper to the soul. Reasoning when it passes judgement on the impressions produced by sensation is at the same time contemplating forms and contemplating them by a kind of sympathy—I mean the reasoning which really belongs to the true soul: for true reasoning is an operation of acts of the intelligence, and there is often a resemblance and community between what is outside and what is within. So in spite of everything the soul will be at peace, turned to itself and resting in itself. The changes and the clamour[1] in us come, as we have said, from what is attached to us and from the affections of the joint entity, whatever precisely that is.

10. But if we are the soul, and we are affected in this way, then it would be the soul that is affected in this way, and again it will be the soul which does what we do. Yes, but we said that the joint entity is part of ourselves, especially when we have not yet been separated from body: for we say that we are affected by what affects our body. So "we" is used in two senses, either including the beast or referring to that which even in our present life transcends it. The beast is the body which has been given life. But the true man is different, clear of these affections; he has the virtues which belong to the sphere of intellect and have their seat actually in the separate soul, separate and separable even while it is still here below. (For when it withdraws altogether, the lower soul which is illumined by it goes away too in its train.) But the virtues which result not from thought but from habit and training[2] belong to the joint entity; for the vices belong to this, since envy and jealousy and emotional sympathy are located

καὶ ζῆλοι καὶ ἔλεοι. Φιλίαι δὲ τίνος; Ἢ αἱ μὲν τούτου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἔνδον ἀνθρώπου.

11. Παίδων δὲ ὄντων ἐνεργεῖ μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου, ὀλίγα δὲ ἐλλάμπει ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰς αὐτό. Ὅταν δ' ἀργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω· εἰς ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, ὅταν μέχρι τοῦ μέσου ἥκῃ. Τί οὖν; Οὐχ ἡμεῖς καὶ πρὸ τούτου; Ἀλλ' ἀντίληψιν δεῖ γενέσθαι· οὐ γάρ, ὅσα ἔχομεν, τούτοις χρώμεθα ἀεί, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ μέσον τάξωμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὅσα ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἕξεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγομεν. Τὰ δὲ θηρία πῶς τὸ ζῷον ἔχει; Ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχαὶ εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπειοι, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἁμαρτοῦσαι, οὐ τῶν θηρίων γίνεται τοῦτο, ὅσον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ παρὸν οὐ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἡ συναίσθησις τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδωλον μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔχει· σῶμα δὴ τοιόνδε οἷον ποιωθὲν ψυχῆς εἰδώλῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ εἰσέδυ, ἐλλάμψει ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης τὸ τοιοῦτον ζῷον γενόμενόν ἐστιν.

12. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχή, πῶς αἱ δίκαι; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσυμφωνεῖ παντὶ λόγῳ, ὃς φησιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν καὶ διδόναι δίκας καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ μετενσωματοῦσθαι. Προσθετέον μὲν οὖν ὅτῳ τις βούλεται λόγῳ· τάχα δ' ἄν τις ἐξεύροι καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ μαχοῦνται. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον διδοὺς τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος ἓν

[1] In *Republic* 589A7 the "man within" is the reason, who should rule the whole man by dominating the "many-headed beast" with the help of the "lion."

[2] The doctrine of the transmigration of human souls into animal bodies is accepted by Plotinus on the authority of

there. But which do our loves belong to? Some to the jointd entity, some to the man within.[1]

11. While we are children the powers of the compound are active, and only a few gleams come to it from the higher principles. But when these are inactive as regards us their activity is directed upwards: it is directed towards us when they reach the middle region. But then does not the "we" include what comes before the middle? Yes, but there must be a conscious apprehension of it. We do not always use all that we have, but only when we direct our middle part towards the higher principles or their opposites, or to whatever we are engaged in bringing from potency or state to act.

And how does the living thing include brute beasts? If as it is said[2] there are sinful human souls in them, the separable part of the soul does not come to belong to the beasts but is there without being there for them; their consciousness includes the image of soul and the body: a beast is then a qualified body made, as we may say, by an image of soul. But if a human soul has not entered the beast it becomes a living being of such and such a kind by an illumination from the universal soul.

12. But if the soul is sinless, how is it judged? This line of thought disagrees with all the arguments which maintain that the soul sins and acts rightly and undergoes punishment, punishment in Hades, and passes from body to body. We can accept whichever view we like; and perhaps we can find a point of view where they do not conflict. The argument which concludes that the soul is sinless

Plato: it does not however play any important part in his thought about the nature and destiny of man.

ἁπλοῦν πάντη ἐτίθετο τὸ αὐτὸ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι λέγων, ὁ δ' ἁμαρτεῖν διδοὺς συμπλέκει μὲν καὶ προστίθησιν αὐτῇ καὶ ἄλλο ψυχῆς εἶδος τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ἔχον πάθη· σύνθετος οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτὴ γίνεται καὶ πάσχει δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἁμαρτάνει τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ διδὸν δίκην αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο. Ὅθεν φησί· τεθεάμεθα γὰρ αὐτήν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὁρῶντες. Δεῖ δὲ περικρούσαντας τὰ προστεθέντα, εἴπερ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν, φησίν, αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὧν ἐφάπτεται καὶ τίσι συγγενὴς οὖσά ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν. Ἄλλη οὖν ζωὴ καὶ ἄλλαι ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸ κολαζόμενον ἕτερον· ἡ δὲ ἀναχώρησις καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς οὐ μόνον τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅπαντος τοῦ προστεθέντος. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡ προσθήκη· ἢ ὅλως ἡ γένεσις τοῦ ἄλλου ψυχῆς εἴδους. Τὸ δὲ πῶς ἡ γένεσις, εἴρηται, ὅτι καταβαινούσης, ἄλλου του ἀπ' αὐτῆς γινομένου τοῦ καταβαίνοντος ἐν τῇ νεύσει. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀφίησι τὸ εἴδωλον; Καὶ ἡ νεῦσις δὲ πῶς οὐχ ἁμαρτία; Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νεῦσις ἔλλαμψις πρὸς τὸ κάτω, οὐχ ἁμαρτία, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ σκιά, ἀλλ' αἴτιον τὸ ἐλλαμπόμενον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη, οὐκ ἔχει ὅπῃ ἐλλάμψει. Καταβαίνειν οὖν καὶ νεύειν λέγεται τῷ συνεζηκέναι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐλλαμφθὲν παρ'

[1] Here Plotinus is quoting *Republic* X 611D7–612A5, a passage which expresses extremely clearly that sharp dualism of rational soul and bodily nature which repeatedly appears in Plato's thought about the soul (though it is not the whole of it) and from which Plotinus has developed his own doctrine

assumes that it is a single completely simple thing and identifies soul and essential soulness; that which concludes that it sins interweaves with it and adds to it another form of soul which is affected in this dreadful way: so the soul itself becomes compound, the product of all its elements, and is affected as a whole, and it is the compound which sins, and it is this which for Plato is punished, not that other single and simple soul. This is why he says, "We have seen the soul like the people who see the sea-god Glaucus." But, he says, if anyone wants to see its real nature, they must "knock off its encrustations" and "look at its philosophy,"[1] and see "with what principles it is in contact" and "by kinship with what realities it is what it is." So there is another life of soul, and other activities, and that which is punished is different. The ascent and the separation is not only from this body but from all that has been added. The addition takes place in the process of coming-to-be; or rather coming-to-be belongs altogether to the other form of soul. We have explained how the process of coming-to-be takes place; it results from the descent of the soul, when something else comes to be from it which comes down in the soul's inclination. Does it then abandon its image? And how is this inclination not a sin? If the inclination is an illumination directed to what is below it is not a sin, just as casting a shadow is not a sin; what is illuminated is responsible, for if it did not exist the soul would have nowhere to illuminate. The soul is said to go down or incline in the sense that the thing which receives light from it lives with

of the higher and lower self with the help of Aristotelian and Stoic ideas.

αὐτῆς. Ἀφίησιν οὖν τὸ εἴδωλον, εἰ μὴ ἐγγὺς τὸ ὑποδεξάμενον· ἀφίησι δὲ οὐ τῷ ἀποσχισθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μηκέτι εἶναι· οὐκέτι δέ ἐστιν, ἐὰν ἐκεῖ βλέπῃ ὅλη. Χωρίζειν δὲ ἔοικεν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ διδοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐν θεοῖς εἶναι ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν λόγων κατεχόμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ὅτι ἐν Ἅιδου· ἐμέρισε δ' οὖν. Τάχα δ' ἂν οὕτω πιθανὸς ὁ λόγος εἴη· ὅτι δὴ πρακτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων Ἡρακλῆς καὶ ἀξιωθεὶς διὰ καλοκἀγαθίαν θεὸς εἶναι, ὅτι πρακτικός, ἀλλ' οὐ θεωρητικὸς ἦν, ἵνα ἂν ὅλος ἦν ἐκεῖ, ἄνω τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔτι ἐστί τι αὐτοῦ καὶ κάτω.

13. Τὸ δὲ ἐπισκεψάμενον περὶ τούτων ἡμεῖς ἢ ἡ ψυχή; Ἢ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ. Τὸ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ πῶς; Ἆρα τῷ ἔχειν ἐπεσκέψατο; Ἢ ᾗ ψυχή. Οὐκοῦν κινήσεται; Ἢ κίνησιν τὴν τοιαύτην δοτέον αὐτῇ, ἢ μὴ σωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ζωή. Καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ἡμῶν οὕτω, ὅτι καὶ νοερὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ κρείττων ἡ νόησις, καὶ ὅταν ψυχὴ νοῇ, καὶ ὅταν νοῦς ἐνεργῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς· μέρος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἡμῶν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἄνιμεν.

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[1] The reference is to *Odyssey* 11. 601–2; the passage (as Plotinus in the next sentence seems to recognise) is an attempt to combine two traditions, one which made Heracles a mortal hero and the other which made him that most exceptional kind of being in the world of genuine Greek traditional religion, a man who had become a god.

it. It abandons its image if there is nothing at hand to receive it; and it abandons it not in the sense that it is cut off but in that it no longer exists: and the image no longer exists when the whole soul is looking to the intelligible world. The poet seems to be separating the image with regard to Heracles when he says that his shade is in Hades, but he himself among the gods.[1] He was bound to keep to both stories, that he is in Hades and that he dwells among the gods, so he divided him. But perhaps this is the most plausible explanation of the story: because Heracles had this active virtue and in view of his noble character was deemed worthy to be called a god—because he was an active and not a contemplative person (in which case he would have been altogether in that intelligible world), he is above, but there is also still a part of him below.

13. What is it that has carried out this investigation? Is it "we" or the soul? It is "we," but by the soul. And what do we mean by "by the soul"? Did "we" investigate by having soul? No, but in so far as we *are* soul. Will soul move then?[2] Yes, we must allow it this sort of movement, which is not a movement of bodies but its own life. And intellectual activity is ours in the sense that the soul is intellectual and intellectual activity is its higher life, both when the soul operates intellectually and when intellect acts upon us. For intellect too is a part of ourselves and to it we ascend.

[2] Here Plotinus returns to the question raised by Aristotle in the *De Anima* with which he started (cp. the note on ch. 1 of this treatise). But the answer he gives here is Platonic, not Aristotelian; for Aristotle thought is not a movement, as it is for Plato.

I. 2. ON VIRTUES

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 19 in Porphyry's chronological order; that is, it belongs to the group of twenty-one treatises which Plotinus had already written by his 59th year, when Porphyry joined him. It is a commentary on the passage from the *Theaetetus* (176A) cited at the beginning of the first chapter, and its object is to determine in what precise sense the virtues can be said to make us godlike. In pursuing this enquiry Plotinus, as often, makes great use of ideas taken from Aristotle, that the gods themselves cannot be said to possess moral virtue (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* X. 8. 1178b) and that there are two kinds of virtue, intellectual and moral (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI. 2. 1139a ff.)—a doctrine which seems to underlie and be the origin of Plotinus' own rather different doctrine of higher and lower virtue, in which there are also some Stoic elements. In chs. 1–3 Plotinus develops a very interesting and important doctrine of analogy.

Synopsis

We escape from the evils here below by becoming godlike by means of virtue. But what god does virtue make us like?—perhaps the lowest of the three great divine principles, Universal Soul. But does this really possess the cardinal virtues? It does not have civic or moral virtues, but these as well as the higher virtues must play their part in making us godlike (ch. 1). The divinities possess, not virtues as we have them, but the principles from which our virtues derive, and this is sufficient for us to speak of "likeness", which means something different when it is applied to the relationship of a derived thing

to its origin from what it means when applied to the relationship of two derived things on the same level (chs. 1–3). The distinction between "civic" and "purifying" virtues (ch. 3). What precisely we mean by "purification" (ch. 4). Its effects on our higher and lower self (ch. 5). What the virtues are in the highest stage of our development, when we are completely free of our lower self, and no longer good men but gods (chs. 6–7).

I. 2. (19) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ

1. Ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φυγεῖν τὰ κακά, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῷ, φησιν, ὁμοιωθῆναι. Τοῦτο δέ, εἰ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι μετὰ φρονήσεως γενοίμεθα καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀρετῇ. Εἰ οὖν ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ἆρα ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι; Καὶ δὴ καὶ τίνι θεῷ; Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μᾶλλον δοκοῦντι ταῦτα ἔχειν καὶ δὴ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν ταύτῃ ἡγουμένῳ ᾧ φρόνησις θαυμαστὴ ὑπάρχει; Καὶ γὰρ εὔλογον ἐνταῦθα ὄντας τούτῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι. Ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, εἰ καὶ τούτῳ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι· οἷον σώφρονι ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, ᾧ μήτε τι δεινόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξωθεν· μήτε προσιὸν ἡδὺ οὗ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἂν γένοιτο μὴ παρόντος, ἵν' ἔχῃ ἢ ἔλῃ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ὀρέξει ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν ὧν καὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖθεν ὁ κόσμος καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνο ταύτας ἔχει; Ἢ οὐκ εὔλογον τάς γε πολιτικὰς λεγομένας ἀρετὰς ἔχειν, φρόνησιν μὲν

[1] The text which Plotinus is quoting here is Plato, *Theaetetus* 176 A–B. He comments on it again at I. 8. 7, where he is discussing the necessary existence of evil in this lower world.
[2] Cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X. 8. 1178b8–18.

I. 2. ON VIRTUES

1. Since it is here that evils are, and "they must necessarily haunt this region," and the soul wants to escape from evils, we must escape from here. What, then, is this escape? "Being made like god," Plato says. And we become godlike "if we become righteous and holy with the help of wisdom," and are altogether in virtue.[1] If then it is virtue which makes us like, it presumably makes us like a being possessing virtue. Then what god would that be? Would it be the one that appears to be particularly characterised by the possession of virtue, that is, the soul of the universe and its ruling principle, in which there is a wonderful wisdom? It is reasonable to suppose that we should become like this principle, as we are here in its universe.

But, first of all, it is debatable whether this principle has all the virtues; whether, for instance, it is self-controlled and brave when it has nothing to frighten it, for there is nothing outside the universe, and nothing attractive can come to it which it has not already got, and produce a desire to have or get it.[2] But if this principle is in a state of aspiration towards the intelligible realities to which our aspirations too are directed, it is clear that our good order and our virtues also come from the intelligible. Has the intelligible, then, virtues? It is at any rate improbable that it has the virtues called "civic,"

περὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον, ἀνδρίαν δὲ περὶ τὸ θυμούμενον, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς λογισμόν, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἑκάστου τούτων ὁμοῦ οἰκειοπραγίαν ἀρχῆς πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὁμοιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς μείζους τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρωμένας; Ἀλλ' εἰ κατ' ἄλλας, κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὅλως οὔ; Ἢ ἄλογον μηδ' ὁπωσοῦν ὁμοιοῦσθαι κατὰ ταύτας—τούτους γοῦν καὶ θείους ἡ φήμη λέγει καὶ λεκτέον ἀμηγέπῃ ὡμοιῶσθαι—κατὰ δὲ τὰς μείζους τὴν ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι. Ἀλλ' ἑκατέρως γε συμβαίνει ἀρετὰς ἔχειν κἂν εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας. Εἰ οὖν τις συγχωρεῖ[, κἂν εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας,] ὁμοιοῦσθαι δύνασθαι, ἄλλως ἡμῶν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλλας, οὐδὲν κωλύει, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὰς ὁμοιουμένων, ἡμᾶς ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀρεταῖς ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ μὴ ἀρετὴν κεκτημένῳ. Καὶ πῶς; Ὧδε· εἴ τι θερμότητος παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὅθεν ἡ θερμότης ἐλήλυθε θερμαίνεσθαι; Καὶ εἴ τι πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ πυρὸς παρουσίᾳ θερμαίνεσθαι; Ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρότερον εἴποι ἄν τις καὶ ἐν τῷ πῦρ εἶναι θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον, ὥστε τὸν λόγον ποιεῖν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ἑπόμενον ἐπακτὸν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐκείνῳ δέ, ὅθεν μιμησαμένη ἔχει, σύμφυτον· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς λόγον

[1] This description of the "civic" virtues is based on the discussion of the virtues in the ideal state in Plato, *Republic* IV 427E–434D.

practical wisdom which has to do with discursive reason, courage which has to do with the emotions, balanced control which consists in a sort of agreement and harmony of passion and reason, justice which makes each of these parts agree in "minding their own business where ruling and being ruled are concerned."[1] Then are we not made godlike by the civic virtues, but by the greater virtues which have the same names? But if by the others, are the civic virtues no help at all to this likeness? It is unreasonable to suppose that we are not made godlike in any way by the civic virtues but that likeness comes by the greater ones—tradition certainly calls men of civic virtue godlike and we must say that somehow or other they were made like by this kind of virtue. It is possible to have virtues on both levels, even if not the same kind of virtues. If then it is agreed that we can be made like even if we are differently related to different virtues, there is nothing to prevent us, even if we are not made like in regard to virtues, being made like by our own virtues to that which does not possess virtue. How? In this way: if something is made hot by the presence of heat, must that from which the heat comes also be heated? And if something is made hot by the presence of fire, must the fire itself be heated by the presence of fire? One might object in answer to the first argument that there is heat in fire, but as part of its nature, so that the argument, if it kept to its analogy, would make virtue something extraneous to the soul but part of the nature of that from which the soul receives it by imitation: and in answer to the argument from fire that it would

τὸ ἐκεῖνον ἀρετὴν εἶναι· ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι μείζονα. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὗ μεταλαμβάνει ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οὕτως ἔδει λέγειν· νῦν δὲ ἕτερον μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ νοητῇ, καίτοι ὡμοίωται· καὶ τάξεως δὲ καὶ κόσμου μεταλαμβάνει ἡ οἰκία ἡ αἰσθητὴ κἀκεῖ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστι τάξις οὐδὲ κόσμος οὐδὲ συμμετρία. Οὕτως οὖν κόσμου καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὁμολογίας μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τούτων ὄντων τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνθάδε, οὐ δεομένων δὲ τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογίας οὐδὲ κόσμου οὐδὲ τάξεως, οὐδ' ἂν ἀρετῆς εἴη χρεία, καὶ ὁμοιούμεθα οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς ἐκεῖ δι' ἀρετῆς παρουσίαν. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον κἀκεῖ ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐπείπερ ἡμεῖς ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ταυτί· δεῖ δὲ πειθὼ ἐπάγειν τῷ λόγῳ μὴ μένοντας ἐπὶ τῆς βίας.

2. Πρῶτον τοίνυν τὰς ἀρετὰς ληπτέον καθ' ἃς φαμεν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, ἵν' αὖ τὸ αὐτὸ εὕρωμεν ὃ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν μίμημα ὂν ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ οἷον ἀρχέτυπον ὂν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐπισημηνάμενοι ὡς ἡ ὁμοίωσις διττή· καὶ ἡ μέν τις ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀπαιτεῖ, ὅσα ἐπίσης ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡμοίωται πρὸς ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλον τρόπον ληπτέον οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶδος ἀπαιτοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἕτερον, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸν

[1] Order, arrangement, and proportion only appear when a form is "extended" in matter, and are not present in the archetypal unity of the intelligible form; they are its expression on a lower level. This is a principle of great importance in Plotinus's theory of art; cp. V. 8. 1.

make that principle virtue; but we consider it greater than virtue. But if that in which the soul participates was the same as the source from which it comes, it would be right to speak in this way; but in fact the two are distinct. The perceptible house is not the same thing as the intelligible house, though it is made in its likeness; the perceptible house participates in arrangement and order, but There, in its formative principle, there is no arrangement or order or proportion.[1] So then, if we participate in order and arrangement and harmony which come from There, and these constitute virtue here, and if the principles There have no need of harmony or order or arrangement, they will have no need of virtue either, and we shall all the same be made like them by the presence of virtue. This is enough to show that it is not necessary for virtue to exist There because we are made like the principles There by virtue. But we must make our argument persuasive, and not be content to force agreement.

2. First then we must consider the virtues by which we assert that we are made like, in order that we may discover this one and the same reality which when we possess it as an imitation is virtue, but There, where it exists as an archetype, is not virtue. We should note that there are two kinds of likeness; one requires that there should be something the same in the things which are alike; this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same principle. But in the case of two things of which one is like the other, but the other is primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in its likeness and not said to be like it, likeness must be understood in a different sense; we must not require the

ἕτερον τρόπον ὡμοίωται. Τί ποτε οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἥ τε σύμπασα καὶ ἑκάστη; Σαφέστερος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἐφ' ἑκάστης· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὅ τι κοινόν, καθ' ὃ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ῥᾳδίως ἔσται. Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἃς ἄνω που εἴπομεν, κατακοσμοῦσι μὲν ὄντως καὶ ἀμείνους ποιοῦσιν ὁρίζουσαι καὶ μετροῦσαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη μετροῦσαι καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀφαιροῦσαι τῷ ὅλως ἀμείνονι καὶ τῷ ὡρίσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀμέτρων καὶ ἀορίστων ἔξω εἶναι κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, καὶ αὐταὶ ὁρισθεῖσαι. Ἡι μέτρα γε ἐν ὕλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, ὡμοίωνται τῷ ἐκεῖ μέτρῳ καὶ ἔχουσιν ἴχνος τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρίστου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντη ἄμετρον ὕλη ὂν πάντη ἀνωμοίωται· καθ' ὅσον δὲ μεταλαμβάνει εἴδους, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὁμοιοῦται ἀνειδέῳ ἐκείνῳ ὄντι. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἐγγὺς μεταλαμβάνει· ψυχὴ δὲ ἐγγυτέρω σώματος καὶ συγγενέστερον· ταύτῃ καὶ πλέον μεταλαμβάνει, ὥστε καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν θεὸς φαντασθεῖσα, μὴ τὸ πᾶν θεοῦ τοῦτο ᾖ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν οὗτοι ὁμοιοῦνται.

3. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλην ὑποφαίνει ὡς τῆς μείζονος ἀρετῆς οὖσαν, περὶ ἐκείνης λεκτέον· ἐν ᾧ καὶ σαφέστερον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἥτις ἡ μείζων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι ἔστι παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν

[1] This doctrine of the two kinds of likeness may well have arisen, as Bréhier suggests, as an answer to the objection of Parmenides to the view that the Forms are παραδείγματα (patterns) (Plato, *Parmenides* 132D–133A).

[2] Soul is of course a god for Plotinus, though of the lowest rank; what we are not to believe is that it is the whole, or the most important part, of divinity.

same form in both, but rather a different one, since likeness has come about in this different way.[1]

What then is virtue, in general and in particular? Our account of it will be clearer if we deal separately with the particular kinds; in this way that which they have in common, by which they are all virtues, will easily become clear. The civic virtues, which we mentioned above, do genuinely set us in order and make us better by giving limit and measure to our desires, and putting measure into all our experience; and they abolish false opinions, by what is altogether better and by the fact of limitation, and by the exclusion of the unmeasured and indefinite in accord with their measuredness; and they are themselves limited and clearly defined. And so far as they are a measure which forms the matter of the soul, they are made like the measure There and have a trace in them of the Best There. That which is altogether unmeasured is matter, and so altogether unlike: but in so far as it participates in form it becomes like that Good, which is formless. Things which are near participate more. Soul is nearer and more akin to it than body; so it participates more, to the point of deceiving us into imagining that it is a god,[2] and that all divinity is comprised in this likeness. This is how those possessed of political virtue are made like.

3. But, since Plato indicates that likeness is different as belonging to the greater virtue, we must speak about that different likeness. In this discussion the real nature of civic virtue will become clear, and we shall also understand what is the virtue which is greater than it in its real nature, and in general that there is another kind different from civic virtue.

ἑτέρα. Λέγων δὴ ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φυγὴν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς διδούς, ἀλλὰ προστιθεὶς πολιτικάς γε, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ καθάρσεις λέγων ἁπάσας δῆλός τέ ἐστι διττὰς τιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν οὐ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τιθείς. Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ταύτας καθάρσεις καὶ πῶς καθαρθέντες μάλιστα ὁμοιούμεθα; Ἡ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθὴς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα, εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα, εἰ μήτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἐνεργοῖ—ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν—μήτε ὁμοπαθὴς εἴη—ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν—μήτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος—ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι—ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνοι—δικαιοσύνη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. Τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθὴς οὕτως ἐστίν, εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγοι πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· καθαρὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοιαύτη, ὡς τὸ μιμούμενον ἔχειν φρόνησιν. Τί οὖν οὐ κἀκεῖνο οὕτω διάκειται; Ἢ οὐδὲ διάκειται, ψυχῆς δὲ ἡ διάθεσις. Νοεῖ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἄλλως· τῶν δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν ἑτέρως, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως. Πάλιν οὖν

1 The reference here is to the passage of the *Theaetetus* quoted at the beginning of the first chapter.

Plato, when he speaks of "likeness" as a "flight to God" from existence here below,[1] and does not call the virtues which come into play in civic life just "virtues," but adds the qualification "civic," and elsewhere calls all the virtues "purifications,"[2] makes clear that he postulates two kinds of virtues and does not regard the civic ones as producing likeness. What then do we mean when we call these other virtues "purifications," and how are we made really like by being purified? Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body and shares its experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess virtue when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone—this is intelligence and wisdom—and does not share the body's experiences —this is self-control—and is not afraid of departing from the body—this is courage—and is ruled by reason and intellect, without opposition—and this is justice. One would not be wrong in calling this state of the soul likeness to God, in which its activity is intellectual, and it is free in this way from bodily affections. For the Divine too is pure, and its activity is of such a kind that that which imitates it has wisdom. Well then, why is the Divine itself not in this state? It has no states at all; states belong to the soul. The soul's intellectual activity is different: but of the realities There one thinks differently, and the other does not think at all. Another question then: is "intellectual activity" just a common term covering two different things?

2 Plato uses the epithet "civic" of virtues at *Republic* IV. 430C, but without any implication of the sort of distinction made here. Virtues are called "purifications" in the *Phaedo*, 69B–C.

τὸ νοεῖν ὁμώνυμον; Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἐκείνου ἑτέρως. Ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. Ὡς οὖν μεμερισμένος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐν ψυχῇ ἑρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς· νοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα.

4. Ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἡ κάθαρσις ταὐτὸν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ, ἣ προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, ἕπεται δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ πότερον ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι. Ἀτελεστέρα τῆς ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι ⟨ἡ ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ κεκαθάρθαι⟩ οἷον τέλος ἤδη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ. Ἤ, εἰ πρὸ τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας ἀγαθὸν ἦν, ἡ κάθαρσις ἀρκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τὸ δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ἡ κάθαρσις. Καὶ τί τὸ καταλειπόμενόν ἐστι, ζητητέον· ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἡ φύσις ἡ καταλειπομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀγαθοειδῆ λεκτέον; Ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ μένειν ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ· πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ' ἄμφω. Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ συγγενεῖ, τὸ δὲ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Δεῖ οὖν καθηραμένην συνεῖναι. Συνέσται δὲ ἐπιστραφεῖσα. Ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; Ἢ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς;

[1] I.e., in Intellect, which is τὸ θεῖον just referred to.

Not at all. It is used primarily of the Divine, and secondarily of that which derives from it. As the spoken word is an imitation of that in the soul, so the word in the soul is an imitation of that in something else: as the uttered word, then, is broken up into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that in the soul as compared with that before it,[1] which it interprets. And virtue belongs to the soul, but not to Intellect or That which is beyond it.

4. We must investigate whether purification is the same thing as this kind of virtue, or whether purification comes first and virtue follows, and whether virtue consists in the process of being purified or the achieved state of purification. The virtue in the process of purification is less perfect than that in the achieved state, for the achieved state of purification is already a sort of perfection. But being completely purified is a stripping of everything alien, and the good is different from that. If goodness existed before the impurity, purification is enough; but even so, though the purification will be enough, the good will be what is left after purification, not the purification itself. And we must enquire what that which is left is; perhaps the nature which is left was never really the good; for if it was it would not have come into evil. Should we call it something like the good? Yes, but not a nature capable of remaining in the real good, for it has a natural tendency in both directions. So its good will be fellowship with that which is akin to it, and its evil fellowship with its opposites. Then it must attain to this fellowship after being purified; and it will do so by a conversion. Does it then turn itself after the purification? Rather, after the purification it is already turned.

Ἢ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. Τί οὖν τοῦτο; Θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὀφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. Οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἀναμιμνήσκεται; Ἢ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα· ἵνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γνῷ αὐτὰ ἐνόντα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι. Εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους· δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι, ἐφαρμόσαι. Τάχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται ἔχειν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπῃ· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ παρὼν ἀλλότριος. Ἐπεὶ κἂν[1] ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις· ἐὰν μηδ' ὅλως ἐνεργῶμεν κατ' αὐτάς, ἀλλότριαι.

5. Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πόσον κάθαρσις λεκτέον· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι ⟨θεῷ⟩ φανερὰ καὶ ἡ ταυτότης [τίνι θεῷ]. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μάλιστα ζητεῖν θυμὸν πῶς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, λύπην καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ, καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ σώματος ἐπὶ πόσον δυνατόν. Ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ σώματος ἴσως μὲν καὶ τοῖς οἷον τόποις συνάγουσαν πρὸς ἑαυτήν, πάντως μὴν ἀπαθῶς ἔχουσαν καὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰσθήσεις μόνον ποιουμένην καὶ ἰατρεύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγὰς πόνων, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλοῖτο, τὰς δὲ ἀλγηδόνας ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε,

[1] ἐπεὶ κἂν Harder : ἐπεί καί codd.

[1] What the soul sees, the realities which become consciously present to and active in it after its conversion, are the beings of the realm of Intellect, the Forms; they were continually present to it, but it was not conscious of them when it was unpurified and unconverted.

Is this, then, its virtue? It is rather that which results for it from the conversion. And what is this? A sight and the impression of what is seen,[1] implanted and working in it, like the relationship between sight and its object. But did it not have the realities which it sees? Does it not recollect them? It had them, but not active, lying apart and unilluminated; if they are to be illuminated and it is to know that they are present in it, it must thrust towards that which gives it light. It did not have the realities themselves but impressions of them; so it must bring the impressions into accord with the true realities of which they are impressions. Perhaps, too, this, they say, is how it is; intellect is not alien and is particularly not alien when the soul looks towards it; otherwise it is alien even when it is present. The same applies to the different branches of knowledge;[2] if we do not act by them at all, they do not really belong to us.

5. But we must state the extent of the purification; in this way it will become clear what god we are made like to and identified with. The question is substantially this; how does the purification deal with passion and desire and all the rest, pain and its kindred, and how far is separation from the body possible? We might say that the soul draws together to itself in a sort of place of its own away from the body, and is wholly unaffected, and only makes itself aware of pleasures when it has to, using them as remedies and reliefs to prevent its activity being impeded; it gets rid of pains or if it cannot, bears them quietly and makes them less by not suffer-

[2] I read here κἂν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις with Harder (*Gnomon* 1952. 188), an emendation now approved by Henry-Schwyzer.

πράως φέρουσαν καὶ ἐλάττους τιθεῖσαν τῷ μὴ συμπάσχειν· τὸν δὲ θυμὸν ὅσον οἷόν τε ἀφαιροῦσαν καί, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντη, εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ γοῦν αὐτὴν συνοργιζομένην, ἀλλ' ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον, τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον ὀλίγον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενές· τὸν δὲ φόβον πάντη· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ φοβήσεται—τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ ἐνταῦθα—πλήν γ' ἐν νουθετήσει. Ἐπιθυμίαν δέ; Ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς φαύλου, δῆλον· σίτων δὲ καὶ ποτῶν πρὸς ἄνεσιν οὐκ αὐτὴ ἕξει· οὐδὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων δέ· εἴ δ' ἄρα, φυσικῶν, οἶμαι, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ἐχουσῶν· εἴ δ' ἄρα, ὅσον μετὰ φαντασίας προτυποῦς καὶ ταύτης. Ὅλως δὲ αὕτη μὲν πάντων τούτων καθαρὰ ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον δὲ βουλήσεται καὶ αὐτὸ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι, ὥστε μηδὲ πλήττεσθαι· εἰ δ' ἄρα, μὴ σφόδρα, ἀλλ' ὀλίγας τὰς πληγὰς αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ εὐθὺς λυομένας τῇ γειτονήσει. ὥσπερ εἴ τις σοφῷ γειτονῶν ἀπολαύοι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ γειτνιάσεως ἢ ὅμοιος γενόμενος ἢ αἰδούμενος, ὡς μηδὲν τολμᾶν ποιεῖν ὧν ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ θέλει. Οὔκουν ἔσται μάχη· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ παρὼν ὁ λόγος, ὃν τὸ χεῖρον αἰδέσεται, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρον δυσχεραῖναι, ἐάν τι ὅλως κινηθῇ, ὅτι μὴ ἡσυχίαν ἦγε παρόντος τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ ἀσθένειαν αὑτῷ ἐπιτιμῆσαι.

6. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτία, ἀλλὰ κατόρθωσις ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ

ing with the body. It gets rid of passion as completely as possible, altogether if it can, but if it cannot, at least it does not share its emotional excitement; the involuntary impulse belongs to something else, and is small and weak as well. It does away with fear altogether, for it has nothing to be afraid of—though involuntary impulse comes in here too—except, that is, where fear has a corrective function. What about desire? It will obviously not desire anything bad; it will not itself have the desire of food and drink for the relief of the body, and certainly not of sexual pleasures either. If it does have any of these desires they will, I think, be natural ones with no element of involuntary impulse in them; or if it does have other kinds, only as far as it is with the imagination, which is also prone to these.

The soul will be pure in all these ways and will want to make the irrational part, too, pure, so that this part may not be disturbed; or, if it is, not very much; its shocks will only be slight ones, easily allayed by the neighbourhood of the soul: just as a man living next door to a sage would profit by the sage's neighbourhood, either by becoming like him or by regarding him with such respect as not to dare to do anything of which the good man would not approve. So there will be no conflict: the presence of reason will be enough; the worse part will so respect it that even this worse part itself will be upset if there is any movement at all, because it did not keep quiet in the presence of its master, and will rebuke its own weakness.

6. There is no sin in anything of this sort for a man, but only right action. Our concern, though, is not to

ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπροαίρετον γίνοιτο, θεὸς ἂν εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δαίμων διπλοῦς ὤν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχων σὺν αὐτῷ ἄλλον ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα· εἰ δὲ μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον· θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ πρώτῳ. Αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃς ἦλθεν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ τὸ καθ' αὑτόν, εἰ γένοιτο οἷος ἦλθεν, ἐκεῖ ἐστιν· ᾧ δὲ συνῳκίσθη ἐνθάδε ἥκων, καὶ τοῦτον αὐτῷ ὁμοιώσει κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνου, ὥστε, εἰ δυνατόν, ἄπληκτον εἶναι ἢ ἄπρακτόν γε τῶν μὴ δοκούντων τῷ δεσπότῃ. Τίς οὖν ἑκάστη ἀρετὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ; Ἡ σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὢν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ. Διττὴ δὲ ἑκατέρα, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ. Κἀκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετή, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετή. Ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; Ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρετή. Οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἑκάστη ἀρετή, ἀλλ' οἷον παράδειγμα· τὸ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετή. Τινὸς

[1] The allusion is to the procession of the gods in *Phaedrus* 246E4 ff. In Plato those who follow the first god, Zeus the leader of the procession, are the philosophical souls (250B7, 252E1); but Plotinus is probably using Plato's language to express his own thought and means by the First his own First Principle, the Good, and by the gods who follow, the divinities of the realm of Intellect.

be out of sin, but to be god. If, then, there is still any element of involuntary impulse of this sort, a man in this state will be a god or spirit who is double, or rather who has with him someone else who possesses a different kind of virtue: if there is nothing, he will be simply god, and one of those gods who follow the First.[1] For he himself is the god who came Thence, and his own real nature, if he becomes what he was when he came, is There. When he came here he took up his dwelling with someone else, whom he will make like himself to the best of the powers of his real nature, so that if possible this someone else will be free from disturbance or will do nothing of which his master does not approve. What, then, is each particular virtue when a man is in this state? Wisdom, theoretical and practical, consists in the contemplation of that which intellect contains; but intellect has it by immediate contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one in intellect, one in soul. That which is There [in intellect] is not virtue, that in the soul is virtue. What is it, then, There? The act of the self, what it really is; virtue is what comes Thence and exists here in another. For neither absolute justice nor any other moral absolute is virtue, but a kind of exemplar; virtue is what is derived from it in the soul. Virtue is someone's virtue; but the exemplar of each particular virtue in the intellect belongs to itself, not to someone else.

If justice is "minding one's own business" does that mean that it always requires a plurality of parts for its existence? There is one kind of justice which exists in a plurality, when the parts which it orders are many, and another which is solely and entirely

γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή· αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἄλλου τινός. Δικαοσύνη δὲ εἴπερ οἰκειοπραγία, ἆρα αἰεὶ ἐν πλήθει μερῶν; Ἢ ἡ μὲν ἐν πλήθει, ὅταν πολλὰ ᾖ τὰ μέρη, ἡ δὲ ὅλως οἰκειοπραγία, κἂν ἑνὸς ᾖ. Ἡ γοῦν ἀληθὴς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἑνὸς πρὸς αὐτό, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει ἀπαθὲς ὂν τὴν φύσιν, αὕτη δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χείρονι συνοίκῳ.

7. Ἀντακολουθοῦσι τοίνυν ἀλλήλαις καὶ αὗται αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς [αἱ] ἐν νῷ ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἡ οἰκειοπραγία, τὸ δὲ οἷον ἀνδρία ἡ ἀυλότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ μένειν καθαρόν. Ἐν ψυχῇ τοίνυν πρὸς νοῦν ἡ ὅρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὴ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ τῇ καθάρσει δέ, εἴπερ πᾶσαι καθάρσεις κατὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι, ἀνάγκη πάσας· ἢ οὐδεμία τελεία. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰς

[1] Plotinus is here trying to fit Plato's definition of justice as "minding one's own business" (from the passage in *Republic* IV referred to in the note on ch. 1) into his own scheme of higher and lower virtues by means of his principle that the order and pattern in a lower multiplicity is always the expression of a higher unity.

[2] The doctrine that the virtues imply one another reciprocally is Stoic. Cp. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III. 295 and 299. Plotinus in this treatise, as Bréhier points out in his introduction, reconciles, by means of his doctrine of

"minding one's own business" even if it is the business of a unity. True absolute justice is the disposition of a unity to itself, a unity in which there are not different parts.[1]

So the higher justice in the soul is its activity towards intellect, its self-control is its inward turning to intellect, its courage is its freedom from affections, according to the likeness of that to which it looks which is free from affections by nature: this freedom from affections in the soul comes from virtue, to prevent its sharing in the affections of its inferior companion.

7. These virtues in the soul, too, imply one another reciprocally, in the same way as the exemplars (so to call them) There in intellect which are prior to virtue.[2] For intuitive thought There is knowledge and wisdom, self-concentration is self-control, its own proper activity is "minding its own business"; its equivalent to courage is immateriality and abiding pure by itself. In the soul, sight directed towards intellect is wisdom, theoretical and practical; these are virtues belonging to soul; for it is not itself they, as is the case There, and the others follow in the same way. And if all virtues are purifications, in the sense that they are the result of a completed process of purification, that process must produce them all, otherwise, [if they are not all present], no single one of them will be perfect. Whoever has the greater virtues

higher and lower virtues, the Stoic view that the virtue of the sage is identical with divine virtue, one and indivisible, with Aristotle's view that the virtues are specifically human excellences, not found in the divine, which is above virtue as the beast is below it (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VII 1. 1145a 25–7).

μείζους καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνάμει, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐλάττους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐκείνας. Ὁ μὲν δὴ προηγούμενος τοῦ σπουδαίου βίος οὗτος. Πότερα δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχει καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ὁ τὰς μείζους ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καθ' ἑκάστην· οἷον φρόνησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς χρήσεται, πῶς ἔτι ἐκείνη μένει κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐνεργοῦσα; Καὶ εἰ ἡ μὲν φύσει τοσόνδε, ἡ δὲ τοσόνδε, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐκείνη μετροῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὅλως ἀναιροῦσα; Ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως τῆς φρονήσεως κινηθείσης. Ἡ εἰδήσει γε αὐτὰς καὶ ὅσον παρ' αὐτῶν ἕξει; τάχα δέ ποτε περιστατικῶς ἐνεργήσει κατά τινας αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μείζους δὲ ἀρχὰς ἥκων καὶ ἄλλα μέτρα κατ' ἐκεῖνα πράξει· οἷον τὸ σωφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ ἐκείνῳ τιθείς, ἀλλ' ὅλως κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν χωρίζων καὶ ὅλως ζῶν οὐχὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃν ἀξιοῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν καταλιπών, ἄλλον δὲ ἑλόμενος τὸν τῶν θεῶν· πρὸς γὰρ τούτους, οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς ἡ ὁμοίωσις. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὡς εἰκὼν εἰκόνι ὡμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑκατέρα. Ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα.

must necessarily have the lesser ones potentially, but it is not necessary for the possessor of the lesser virtues to have the greater ones. Here, then, we have described the life of the good man in its principal features.

The question whether the possessor of the greater virtues has the lesser ones in act or in some other way must be considered in relation to each individual virtue. Take, for example, practical wisdom. If other principles are in use, how is it still there, even inactive? And if one kind of virtue naturally permits so much, but the other a different amount, and one kind of self-control measures and limits, the other totally abolishes? The same applies to the other virtues, once the question of practical wisdom has been raised. Perhaps the possessor of the virtues will know them, and how much he can get from them, and will act according to some of them as circumstances require. But when he reaches higher principles and different measures he will act according to these. For instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like. Likeness to good men is the likeness of two pictures of the same subject to each other; but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves.

I. 3. ON DIALECTIC

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 20 in Porphyry's chronological order; it was probably written about the same time as the preceding treatise *On Virtues* (No. 19) and is closely connected with it. It was established in the former treatise that our object is to become godlike, and that this is to be attained by purifying the soul by separating it from the body and ascending in spirit to the intelligible world. *On Dialectic*, as its first words show, is intended to indicate the way of intellectual purification and ascent which we must follow. The first three chapters are an admirable summary of Plato's account of the beginning of the ascent in the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium*, with two significant (all the more so for being unconscious) alterations: the first is that in Plato *φιλόσοφος*, *μουσικός* and *ἐρωτικός* (*Phaedrus* 248D3) are three different descriptions of the same kind of person, but in Plotinus they are three distinct people: the second is that *μουσικός* in Plato is used, as always, in the wide classical sense of "cultivated person", one versed in the arts of the Muses; but in Plotinus (as sometimes in Aristotle) it means what we mean by "musician" (in the sense of "music-lover", not specifically composer or performer). The second part of the treatise gives an exposition of Platonic dialectic based on the *Republic*, *Phaedrus* and *Sophist*, asserts its superiority to Aristotelian and Stoic logic, and sketches the relationship to it of natural and moral philosophy.

Synopsis

What is our way up to the Good, and who is best fitted to start on it? The people best qualified are those of

whom Plato speaks, the philosopher, the musician, and the lover. The two stages of the journey, from the sense-world, and in that higher world up to its top (ch. 1). Characteristics of the musician (ch. 1), of the lover (ch. 2) and the philosopher (ch. 3). Description of Platonic dialectic (ch. 4): it is the valuable part of philosophy, concerned with realities (the Forms) and not with words like logic (ch. 5). The dependence on it of natural and moral philosophy and its relationship to moral virtue (ch. 6).

I. 3. (20) ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗΣ

1. Τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος ἢ ἐπιτήδευσις ἡμᾶς οἷ δεῖ πορευθῆναι ἀνάγει; Ὅπου μὲν οὖν δεῖ ἐλθεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ ταγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην, κείσθω διωμολογημένον καὶ διὰ πολλῶν δεδειγμένον· καὶ δὴ καὶ δι' ὧν τοῦτο ἐδείκνυτο, ἀναγωγή τις ἦν. Τίνα δὲ δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀναχθησόμενον; Ἆρά γε τὸν πάντα ἢ τὸν πλεῖστά φησιν ἰδόντα, ὃς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς ἐσομένου φιλοσόφου μουσικοῦ τινος ἢ ἐρωτικοῦ; Ὁ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ ὁ ἐρωτικὸς ἀνακτέοι. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος; Ἆρά γε εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅπασι τούτοις, ἢ καθ' ἕνα εἷς τις; Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ πορεία διττὴ πᾶσιν ἢ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἢ ἄνω ἐλθοῦσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ προτέρα ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἡ δέ γε δευτέρα, οἷς ἤδη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γενομένοις καὶ οἷον ἴχνος θεῖσιν ἐκεῖ πορεύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ τόπου ἀφίκωνται, ὃ δὴ τέλος τῆς πορείας ὂν τυγχάνει, ὅταν τις ἐπ' ἄκρῳ γένηται τῷ νοητῷ. Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περιμενέτω, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς πρότερον πειρατέον λέγειν. Πρῶτον δὴ διασταλ-

[1] The quotation is from *Phaedrus* 248D1–4 (slightly adapted). "All or most things" refers to the Forms, seen by the soul in its heavenly journeying before birth.

I. 3. ON DIALECTIC

1. What art is there, what method or practice, which will take us up there where we must go? Where that is, that it is to the Good, the First Principle, we can take as agreed and established by many demonstrations; and the demonstrations themselves were a kind of leading up on our way. But what sort of person should the man be who is to be led on this upward path? Surely one who has seen all or, as Plato says, "who has seen most things, and in the first birth enters into a human child who is going to be a philosopher, a musician or a lover."[1] The philosopher goes the upward way by nature, the musician and the lover must be led by it. What then is the method of guidance? Is it one and the same for all these, or is there a different one for each? There are two stages of the journey for all, one when they are going up and one when they have arrived above. The first leads from the regions below, the second is for those who are already in the intelligible realm and have gained their footing There, but must still travel till they reach the furthest point of the region; that is the "end of the journey,"[2] when you reach the top of the intelligible. But that can wait. Let us first of all try to speak about the ascent.

[2] From the description of dialectic in *Republic* VII (532E3). The "end of the journey" is the vision of the Good.

τέον τοὺς ἄνδρας τούτους ἡμῖν ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ τοῦ μουσικοῦ ὅστις ἐστὶ λέγοντας τὴν φύσιν. Θετέον δὴ αὐτὸν εὐκίνητον καὶ ἐπτοημένον μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ἀδυνατώτερον δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι, ἕτοιμον δὲ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων οἷον ἐκτύπων, ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ψόφους, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον πρὸς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἕτοιμον, φεύγοντα δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ᾄδομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τὸ εὔρυθμον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον διώκειν. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς τούτους φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχήματα οὕτως ἀκτέον· χωρίζοντα τὴν ὕλην ἐφ' ὧν αἱ ἀναλογίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι εἰς τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀκτέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὡς περὶ ἃ ἐπτόητο ἐκεῖνα ἦν, ἡ νοητὴ ἁρμονία καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ καλὸν καὶ ὅλως τὸ καλόν, οὐ τό τι καλὸν μόνον, καὶ λόγους τοὺς φιλοσοφίας ἐνθετέον· ἀφ' ὧν εἰς πίστιν ἀκτέον ὧν ἀγνοεῖ ἔχων. Τίνες δὲ οἱ λόγοι, ὕστερον.

2. Ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικός, εἰς ὃν μεταπέσοι ἂν καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ μεταπεσὼν ἢ μένοι ἂν ἢ παρέλθοι, μνημονικός ἐστί πως κάλλους· χωρὶς δὲ ὃν ἀδυνατεῖ καταμαθεῖν, πληττόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄψει καλῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ἐπτόηται. Διδακτέον οὖν αὐτὸν μὴ περὶ ἓν σῶμα πεσόντα ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντα ἀκτέον τῷ λόγῳ σώματα δεικνύντα τὸ ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων

First of all we must distinguish the characteristics of these men: we will begin by describing the nature of the musician. We must consider him as easily moved and excited by beauty, but not quite capable of being moved by absolute beauty; he is however quick to respond to its images when he comes upon them, and just as nervous people react readily to noises, so does he to articulate sounds and the beauty in them; and he always avoids what is inharmonious and not a unity in songs and verses and seeks eagerly after what is rhythmical and shapely. So in leading him on, these sounds and rhythms and forms perceived by the senses must be made the starting-point. He must be led and taught to make abstraction of the material element in them and come to the principles from which their proportions and ordering forces derive and to the beauty which is in these principles, and learn that this was what excited him, the intelligible harmony and the beauty in it, and beauty universal, not just some particular beauty, and he must have the doctrines of philosophy implanted in him; by these he must be brought to firm confidence in what he possesses without knowing it. We shall explain later what these doctrines are.

2. The lover (into whom the musician may turn, and then either stay at that stage or go on farther) has a kind of memory of beauty. But he cannot grasp it in its separateness, but he is overwhelmingly amazed and excited by visible beauties. So he must be taught not to cling round one body and be excited by that, but must be led by the course of reasoning to consider all bodies and shown the beauty that is the same in all of them, and that it is something

καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοθεν λεκτέον καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ νόμους καλοὺς δεικνύντα—ἐν ἀσωμάτοις γὰρ ὁ ἐθισμὸς τοῦ ἐρασμίου ἤδη—καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τέχναις καὶ ἐν ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ἐν ἀρεταῖς. Εἶτα ἓν ποιητέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὅπως ἐγγίνονται. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἤδη ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν· κἀκεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν.

3. Ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν ἕτοιμος οὗτος καὶ οἷον ἐπτερωμένος καὶ οὐ δεόμενος χωρίσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι οὗτοι, κεκινημένος τὸ ἄνω, ἀπορῶν δὲ τοῦ δεικνύντος δεῖται μόνον. Δεικτέον οὖν καὶ λυτέον βουλόμενον καὶ αὐτὸν τῇ φύσει καὶ πάλαι λελυμένον. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μαθήματα δοτέον πρὸς συνεθισμὸν κατανοήσεως καὶ πίστεως ἀσωμάτου—καὶ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον δέξεται φιλομαθὴς ὤν—καὶ φύσει ἐνάρετον πρὸς τελείωσιν ἀρετῶν ἀκτέον καὶ μετὰ τὰ μαθήματα λόγους διαλεκτικῆς δοτέον καὶ ὅλως διαλεκτικὸν ποιητέον.

4. Τίς δὲ ἡ διαλεκτική, ἣν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς προτέροις παραδιδόναι; Ἔστι μὲν δὴ ἡ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου δυναμένη ἕξις εἰπεῖν τί τε ἕκαστον καὶ τί ἄλλων διαφέρει καὶ τίς ἡ κοινότης ἐν οἷς ἐστι καὶ ποῦ τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ὃ ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὄντα

[1] This is the ascent of the mind to the vision of Absolute Beauty in the *Symposium* 210A ff.

[2] The perfect soul is winged in the *Phaedrus* myth (246C1).

[3] The description of dialectic which follows is entirely in Platonic terms, and there seems no need to assume any Stoic influence, as Bréhier does. The principal passages from Plato which Plotinus is using are the descriptions of dialectic in

other than the bodies and must be said to come from elsewhere, and that it is better manifested in other things, by showing him, for instance, the beauty of ways of life and laws—this will accustom him to loveliness in things which are not bodies—and that there is beauty in arts and sciences and virtues.[1] Then all these beauties must be reduced to unity, and he must be shown their origin. But from virtues he can at once ascend to intellect, to being; and There he must go the higher way.

3. But the philosopher—he is the one who is by nature ready to respond and "winged," [2] we may say, and in no need of separation like the others. He has begun to move to the higher world, and is only at a loss for someone to show him the way. So he must be shown and set free, with his own good will, he who has long been free by nature. He must be given mathematical studies to train him in philosophical thought and accustom him to firm confidence in the existence of the immaterial—he will take to them easily, being naturally disposed to learning; he is by nature virtuous, and must be brought to perfect his virtues, and after his mathematical studies instructed in dialectic, and made a complete dialectician.

4. What then is dialectic, which the former kinds of men as well as philosophers must be given? [3] It is the science which can speak about everything in a reasoned and orderly way, and say what it is and how it differs from other things and what it has in common with those among which it is and

Republic 531C–535A and *Sophist* 253C–D (with the long discussion which follows) and of the method of division in *Phaedrus* 265D–266A.

ὁπόσα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα αὖ, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντων. Αὕτη καὶ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διαλέγεται καὶ περὶ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ τί τὸ ἀίδιον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ πάντων, οὐ δόξῃ. Παύσασα δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πλάνης ἐνιδρύει τῷ νοητῷ κἀκεῖ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος ἀφεῖσα ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἀληθείας πεδίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφουσα, τῇ διαιρέσει τῇ Πλάτωνος χρωμένη μὲν καὶ εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν εἰδῶν, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστι, χρωμένη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων νοερῶς πλέκουσα, ἕως ἂν διέλθῃ πᾶν τὸ νοητόν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀναλύουσα, εἰς ὃ ἂν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἔλθῃ, τότε δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἄγουσα, ὡς μέχρι γε τοῦ ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ οὐδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονοῦσα εἰς ἓν γενομένη βλέπει, τὴν λεγομένην λογικὴν πραγματείαν περὶ προτάσεως καὶ συλλογισμῶν, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ εἰδέναι γράφειν, ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ δοῦσα· ὧν τινα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πρὸ τέχνης ἡγουμένη, κρίνουσα δὲ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἡγουμένη καὶ μεθόδου τῆς ταῦτα βουλομένης.

5. Ἀλλὰ πόθεν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη; Ἡ νοῦς δίδωσιν ἐναργεῖς ἀρχάς, εἴ τις λαβεῖν δύναιτο ψυχή· εἶτα τὰ ἐξῆς καὶ συντίθησι

[1] The symbolic place of the Forms in *Phaedrus* 248B6, where the soul finds its true food.

[2] Plotinus speaks of logic here and in ch. 5 in very general terms, which apply both to Aristotelian and Stoic logic. The essential difference for him between logic and dialectic is that logic deals with words and sentences and their relationships, but dialectic discerns the relationships between

where each of these stands, and if it really is what it is, and how many really existing things there are, and again how many non-existing things, different from real beings. It discusses good and not good, and the things that are classed under good and its opposite, and what is the eternal and what not eternal, with certain knowledge about everything and not mere opinion. It stops wandering about the world of sense and settles down in the world of intellect, and there it occupies itself, casting off falsehood and feeding the soul in what Plato calls "the plain of truth,"[1] using his method of division to distinguish the Forms, and to determine the essential nature of each thing, and to find the primary kinds, and weaving together by the intellect all that issues from these primary kinds, till it has traversed the whole intelligible world; then it resolves again the structure of that world into its parts, and comes back to its starting-point; and then, keeping quiet (for it is quiet in so far as it is present There) it busies itself no more, but contemplates, having arrived at unity. It leaves what is called logical activity, about propositions and syllogisms, to another art, as it might leave knowing how to write. Some of the matter of logic it considers necessary, as a preliminary, but it makes itself the judge of this, as of everything else, and considers some of it useful and some superfluous, and belonging to the discipline which wants it.[2]

5. But from where does this science derive its principles? Intellect gives clear principles to any soul which can receive them: and then it combines

things, the only true realities, the Forms, with which the mind of the dialectician is in immediate contact.

καὶ συμπλέκει καὶ διαιρεῖ, ἕως εἰς τέλεον νοῦν ἥκῃ. Ἔστι γάρ, φησιν, αὕτη τὸ καθαρώτατον νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τιμιωτάτην οὖσαν ἕξιν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον εἶναι, φρόνησιν μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, νοῦν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Τί οὖν; ἡ φιλοσοφία τὸ τιμιώτατον; ἢ ταὐτὸν φιλοσοφία καὶ διαλεκτική; Ἢ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον ὄργανον τοῦτο εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου· οὐ γὰρ ψιλὰ θεωρήματά ἐστι καὶ κανόνες, ἀλλὰ περὶ πράγματά ἐστι καὶ οἷον ὕλην ἔχει τὰ ὄντα· ὁδῷ μέντοι ἐπ' αὐτὰ χωρεῖ ἅμα τοῖς θεωρήμασι τὰ πράγματα ἔχουσα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ σόφισμα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινώσκει ἄλλου ποιήσαντος ὡς ἀλλότριον κρίνουσα τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀληθέσι τὸ ψεῦδος, γινώσκουσα, ὅταν τις προσαγάγῃ, ὅ τι παρὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Περὶ προτάσεως οὖν οὐκ οἶδε—καὶ γὰρ γράμματα—εἰδυῖα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οἶδεν ὃ καλοῦσι πρότασιν, καὶ καθόλου οἶδε τὰ κινήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅ τε τίθησι καὶ ὃ αἴρει, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο αἴρει ὃ τίθησιν ἢ ἄλλο, καὶ εἰ ἕτερα ἢ ταὐτά, προσφερομένων ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπιβάλλουσα, ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι δὲ ἑτέρᾳ δίδωσι τοῦτο ἀγαπώσῃ.

6. Μέρος οὖν τὸ τίμιον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ἄλλα φιλοσοφία· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ φύσεως θεωρεῖ βοήθειαν

[1] *Philebus* 58D6–7.

and interweaves and distinguishes their consequences, till it arrives at perfect intelligence. For, Plato says, dialectic is "the purest part of intelligence and wisdom."[1] So, since it is the most valuable of our mental abilities, it must be concerned with real being and what is most valuable; as wisdom it is concerned with real being, as intelligence with That which is beyond being. But surely philosophy is the most valuable thing? Are dialectic and philosophy the same? It is the valuable part of philosophy. For it must not be thought to be a tool the philosopher uses. It is not just bare theories and rules; it deals with things and has real beings as a kind of material for its activity; it approaches them methodically and possesses real things along with its theories. It knows falsehood and sophism incidentally, as another's product, and judges falsehood as something alien to the truths in itself, recognising, when anyone brings it forward, something contrary to the rule of truth. So it does not know about propositions—they are just letters—but in knowing the truth it knows what they call propositions, and in general it knows the movements of the soul, what it affirms and what it denies, and whether it affirms the same thing as it denies or something else, and if things are different from each other or the same; whatever is submitted to it it perceives by directing intuition, as sense-perception also does, but it hands over petty precisions of speech to another discipline which finds satisfaction in them.

6. So dialectic is the valuable part. Philosophy has other parts; it also surveys the nature of the physical world with assistance from dialectic, as the

παρὰ διαλεκτικῆς λαβοῦσα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀριθμητικῇ προσχρῶνται αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι· μᾶλλον μέντοι αὕτη ἐγγύθεν κομίζεται παρὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν ὡσαύτως θεωροῦσα μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, προστιθεῖσα δὲ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς ἀσκήσεις, ἐξ ὧν προίασιν αἱ ἕξεις. Ἴσχουσι δὲ αἱ λογικαὶ ἕξεις καὶ ὡς ἴδια ἤδη τὰ ἐκεῖθεν· καὶ γὰρ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὰ πλεῖστα· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐπιλογισμός τις καὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον καὶ εἰ ἀντακολουθοῦσι καὶ εἰ δεῖ νῦν ἐπισχεῖν ἢ εἰσαῦθις ἢ ὅλως ἄλλο βέλτιον· ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἔτι καθόλου καὶ ἀύλως πάντα εἰς χρῆσιν προφέρει τῇ φρονήσει. Πότερα δὲ ἔστι τὰ κάτω εἶναι ἄνευ διαλεκτικῆς καὶ σοφίας; Ἢ ἀτελῶς καὶ ἐλλειπόντως. Ἔστι δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ διαλεκτικὸν οὕτως ἄνευ τούτων; Ἢ οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ ἢ πρότερον ἢ ἅμα συναύξεται. Καὶ τάχα ἂν φυσικάς τις ἀρετὰς ἔχοι, ἐξ ὧν αἱ τέλειαι σοφίας γενομένης. Μετὰ τὰς φυσικὰς οὖν ἡ σοφία· εἶτα τελειοῖ τὰ ἤθη.

[1] The idea of the dependence of the other skills on arithmetic comes from *Republic* VII. 522C 1–6. Plotinus is here claiming for dialectic the same position in relation to natural and moral philosophy as the Stoics claimed for logic (cp.

other skills use arithmetic to help them;[1] though natural philosophy stands closer to dialectic in its borrowing: in the same way moral philosophy derives from dialectic on its contemplative side, but adds the virtuous dispositions and the exercises which produce them. The intellectual virtues have principles from dialectic almost as their proper possession; although they are with matter most of their principles came from that higher realm.[2] The other virtues apply reasoning to particular experiences and actions, but practical wisdom is a kind of superior reasoning concerned more with the universal; it considers questions of mutual implication, and whether to refrain from action, now or later, or whether an entirely different course would be better. Dialectic and theoretical wisdom provide everything for practical wisdom to use, in a universal and immaterial form.

Can the lower kinds of virtue exist without dialectic and theoretical wisdom? Yes, but only incompletely and defectively. And can one be a wise man and a dialectician without these lower virtues? It would not happen; they must either precede or grow along with wisdom. One might perhaps have natural virtues, from which the perfect ones develop with the coming of wisdom. So wisdom comes after the natural virtue, and then perfects the character; or rather when the natural virtues exist both increase and come to perfection together: as

Diogenes Laertius VII. 83), with the essential differences due to the distinction referred to in the note on ch. 4.

[2] Following Bréhier, Cilento, and Schwyzer, I take *καὶ* here as concessive and *τὰ πλεῖστα* as accusative with *ἴσχουσι*: the intellectual virtues operate in the material world with principles mainly derived from the intelligible world.

Ἢ τῶν φυσικῶν οὐσῶν συναύξεται ἤδη ἄμφω καὶ συντελειοῦται· ἢ προλαβοῦσα ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν ἐτελείωσεν· ὅλως γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὄμμα ἀτελὲς καὶ ἦθος ἔχει, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀμφοτέραις, ἀφ' ὧν ἔχομεν.

the one progresses it perfects the other; for in general natural virtue is imperfect both in vision and character, and the principles from which we derive them are the most important thing both in natural virtue and wisdom.

I. 4. ON WELL-BEING

Introductory Note

THIS is a late treatise (No. 46 in the chronological order), written towards the end of Plotinus's life. It is concerned with what was always, and more than ever in his last years, his chief preoccupation, the practical and most urgent question of how we are to live well and attain our true good. The first four chapters are devoted to an establishment of his fundamental position, that the good life is the life of Intellect, independent of all outward circumstances and material and emotional satisfactions of our lower nature, by a critical examination of Aristotelian and Stoic views. The rest of the treatise is a sermon on true well-being; this is very much in the manner of, and deals with the usual themes of, the Stoic–Cynic diatribe: but there are important differences even here between the thought of Plotinus and that of the Stoics due to his different conception of man as a double being, not a single and simple one.

Synopsis

If the good life is simply a matter of successfully performing one's proper functions and attaining one's natural end, as Aristotle thinks, one cannot deny it to other living things, plants included (ch. 1). The Epicurean attempt to make the good life consist in a feeling of pleasure or tranquillity, a particular kind of conscious experience, also breaks down on examination (ch. 2). The Stoic position, that the good life is the life of reason, is nearer the truth, but their doctrine of "primary natural needs" confuses the issue (ch. 2). The good life, the true human good, can only be the highest and most perfect kind of

life, that of the Intellect (which depends on the Absolute Good as its cause) (ch. 3). And a man to attain perfection must not only *have* Intellect but *be* Intellect, and so perfectly virtuous; and if he is this he has all he needs for well-being (ch. 4). His well-being will be unaffected by pain, sickness and even the greatest misfortune (chs. 5–8): it will be even independent of consciousness, which is something secondary, the reflection of the life of Intellect on the level of the body–soul composite (chs. 9–10). Outward circumstances and bodily goods will add nothing to his well-being, and if he has too much of them may even detract from it; but he will recognise a responsibility to his body and give it what it really needs (chs. 11–16).

I. 4. (46) ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ

1. Τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιθέμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἆρα τούτων μεταδώσομεν; Εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἢ πεφύκασιν ἀνεμποδίστως διεξάγειν, κἀκεῖνα τί κωλύει ἐν εὐζωίᾳ λέγειν εἶναι; Καὶ γὰρ εἴτε ἐν εὐπαθείᾳ τὴν εὐζωίαν τις θήσεται, εἴτε ἐν ἔργῳ οἰκείῳ τελειουμένῳ, κατ' ἄμφω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρξει. Καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθεῖν ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργῳ εἶναι· οἷον καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα τοῖς τε ἄλλοις εὐπαθεῖ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἄδοντα ἢ πέφυκε καὶ ταύτῃ αἱρετὴν αὐτοῖς τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει. Καὶ τοίνυν καὶ εἰ τέλος τι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τιθέμεθα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἐν φύσει ὀρέξεως, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν αὐτοῖς μεταδοίημεν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἔσχατον ἀφικνουμένων, εἰς ὃ ἐλθοῦσιν ἵσταται ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις πᾶσαν ζωὴν αὐτοῖς διεξελθοῦσα καὶ πληρώσασα ἐξ ἀρχῆς τέλος. Εἰ δέ τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας

[1] I translate *εὐδαιμονία* and kindred words by "well-being," "being well off" because this kind of expression, though inadequate, is at least less misleading than the common translation "happiness." Happiness, as we normally use the word, means *feeling* good; but *εὐδαιμονία* means *being* in a good state; and Plotinus devotes a great part of this treatise to showing that one can be *εὐδαίμων* if one has no

I. 4. ON WELL-BEING[1]

1. Suppose we assume the good life and well-being to be one and the same;[2] shall we then have to allow a share in them to other living things as well as ourselves? If they can live in the way natural to them without impediment,[3] what prevents us from saying that they too are in a good state of life? For whether one considers the good life as consisting in satisfactory experience or accomplishing one's proper work, in either case it will belong to the other living things as well as us. For they can have satisfactory experiences and be engaged in their natural work; musical creatures, for instance, which are otherwise well off and sing in their natural way as well, and so have the life they want. Then again, suppose we make well-being an end,[4] that is, the ultimate term of natural desire; we shall still have to allow other living things a share in well-being when they reach their final state, that where, when they come to it, the nature in them rests, since it has passed through their whole life and fulfilled it from beginning to end. But if anyone dislikes the idea of extending some degree of well-being down to the other

happy emotions and even if one is completely unconscious of one's *εὐδαιμονία*.

[2] This is Aristotle's position; cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* I. 8 1098b. 21.

[3] Cp. *N.E.* VII. 14. 1153b. 11.

[4] Cp. *N.E.* X. 16. 1176a. 31.

καταφέρειν εἰς τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις αὐτῶν μεταδώσειν· μεταδώσειν δὲ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ζῶσι καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ζωὴν ἐξελιττομένην εἰς τέλος ἔχουσι—πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος διὰ τί εἶναι οὐ δόξει μὴ ζῆν εὖ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα λέγων, ὅτι μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξια αὐτῷ δοκεῖ εἶναι; Τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν διδόναι ὃ τοῖς ἅπασι ζῴοις δίδωσιν, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς. Εἴη δ' ἄν τις ἴσως καὶ ὁ διδοὺς τοῖς φυτοῖς, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν· ζωὴ δὲ ἡ μέν εὖ ἂν εἴη, ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον· οἷον ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν εὐπαθεῖν καὶ μή, καρπὸν αὖ φέρειν καὶ μὴ φέρειν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὸ τέλος καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ἄτοπος ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὸ εὖ ζῆν· καὶ εἰ ἀταραξία δὲ εἴη, ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν δὲ λέγοιτο τὸ εὖ ζῆν εἶναι.

2. Τοῖς μέντοι φυτοῖς διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ διδόντες κινδυνεύσουσιν οὐδὲ ζῴοις ἤδη ἅπασι διδόναι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ πάθος πρὸ τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν, οἷον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν, κἂν λανθάνῃ, καὶ οἰκεῖον εἶναι, κἂν μήπω γινώσκῃ ὅτι οἰκεῖον καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ· δεῖ γὰρ ἡδὺ εἶναι. Ὥστε ἀγαθοῦ τούτου ὄντος καὶ παρόν-

[1] Both Hedonists and Epicureans maintained this, in different senses; but as Epicurus is clearly alluded to in the next sentence, this is probably meant to be a reference to the Hedonists only; cp. Aristippus in Diog. Laert. II. 88.

[2] *ἀταραξία*, the untroubled peace of mind which was the Epicurean ideal.

living things—which would involve giving a share in it even to the meanest; one would have to give a share to plants, because they too are alive and have a life which unfolds to its end—first of all, why will it not seem absurd of him to deny that other living things live well just because he does not think them important? Then, one is not compelled to allow to plants what one allows to all other living beings; for plants have no sensations. But there might perhaps be someone who would allow well-being to plants just because they have life; one life can be good, another the opposite, as plants too can be well or badly off, and bear fruit or not bear fruit. If pleasure is the end[1] and the good life is determined by pleasure, it is absurd of anyone to deny the good life to other living things; the same applies to tranquillity,[2] and also if the life according to nature is stated to be the good life.

2. Those who deny it to plants because they have no sensation[3] run the risk of denying it to all living things. For if they mean by sensation being aware of one's experiences, the experience must be good before one is aware of it; for example, to be in a natural state is good, even if one is not aware of it, and so is to be in one's own proper state, even if one does not yet know that it is one's own proper state, and that it is pleasant (as it must necessarily be).

[3] As Aristotle did; in *N.E.* X. 8 1178b. 28 he denies it to all living beings except man because they have no share in *θεωρία*. Plotinus criticises Aristotle because, though he regards *εὐδαιμονία* as something distinctively human, he often defines it in terms which must necessarily apply to all living things. Both Aristotle and Plotinus place *εὐδαιμονία* in the life of the intellect, though they conceive that life in very different ways.

τος ἤδη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ εὖ τὸ ἔχον. Ὥστε τί δεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν προσλαμβάνειν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ πάθει [ἢ καταστάσει] τὸ ἀγαθὸν διδόασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ γνώσει καὶ αἰσθήσει; Ἀλλ' οὕτω γε τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐνέργειαν ζωῆς αἰσθητικῆς· ὥστε καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἀντιλαμβανομένοις. Εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον αἰσθήσεως τοιούτου, πῶς ἑκατέρου ἀδιαφόρου ὄντος τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι λέγουσιν; Εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν τοιάνδε κατάστασιν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὅταν γνῷ τις τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ παρόν, ἐρωτητέον αὐτούς, εἰ γνοὺς τὸ παρὸν δὴ τοῦτο ὅτι πάρεστιν εὖ ζῇ, ἢ δεῖ γνῶναι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἡδύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλ' εἰ ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο ἔργον ἤδη, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας μείζονος ἢ κατ' αἴσθησιν δυνάμεως. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκειν δυναμένῳ, ὅτι ἡδονὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Αἴτιον δὴ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ κρίνειν δυνάμενον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν κρῖνον βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ πάθος· λόγος γὰρ ἢ νοῦς· ἡδονὴ δὲ πάθος· οὐδαμοῦ δὲ κρεῖττον ἄλογον λόγου. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτὸν ἀφεὶς ἄλλο θήσεται ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει κείμενον κρεῖττον εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ; Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐοίκασιν, ὅσοι τε τοῖς φυτοῖς οὐ διδόασι καὶ ὅσοι αἰσθήσει τοιᾷδε τὸ εὖ, λανθάνειν ἑαυτοὺς μεῖζόν τι τὸ εὖ ζῆν

So if something is good and is there its possessor is already well off; so why should we bring sensation into it, unless of course people attribute good not to the actual experience but to the knowledge and perception of it? But in this way they will be saying that the good is really the sensation, the activity of the sense-life; so that it will be all the same whatever is sensed. But if they say that the good is the product of the two, the sensation of an object of a particular kind, why, when each of the constituents is neutral, do they say that the product is good? But if it is the experience which is good, and the good life is the special state when someone knows that the good is present to him, we must ask them whether he lives well by knowing that this present thing is present or whether he must know not only that it gives him pleasure but that it is the good. But if he must know that it is the good, this is no longer the business of sensation but of another greater power than that of sense. So the good life will not belong to those who feel pleasure but to the man who is able to know that pleasure is the good. Then the cause of living well will not be pleasure, but the power of judging that pleasure is good. And that which judges is better than mere experience, for it is reason or intellect; but pleasure is an experience; and the irrational is never better than reason. How then can the reason set itself aside and assume that something else which has its place in the contrary kind is better than itself? It looks as if the people who deny well-being to plants, and those who place it in a particular kind of sensation, were unconsciously in search of a good life which is something higher, and were assuming that it is

ζητοῦντες καὶ ἐν τρανοτέρᾳ ζωῇ τὸ ἄμεινον τιθέντες. Καὶ ὅσοι δὲ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ζωῇ, οὐδὲ εἰ αἰσθητικὴ εἴη, καλῶς μὲν ἴσως ἂν λέγοιεν. Διὰ τί δὲ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον μόνον τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθενται, ἐρωτᾶν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. Ἆρά γε τὸ λογικὸν προσλαμβάνετε, ὅτι εὐμήχανον μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀνιχνεύειν καὶ περιποιεῖν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν δύναται, ἢ κἂν μὴ δυνατὸς ᾖ ἀνιχνεύειν μηδὲ τυγχάνειν; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀνευρίσκειν μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, ἔσται καὶ τοῖς μὴ λόγον ἔχουσιν, εἰ ἄνευ λόγου φύσει τυγχάνοιεν τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· καὶ ὑπουργὸς ἂν ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' αὖ ἡ τελείωσις αὐτοῦ, ἣν φαμεν ἀρετὴν εἶναι. Εἰ δὲ φήσετε μὴ διὰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτα ἔχειν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι, λεκτέον τί τε ἄλλο ἔργον αὐτοῦ καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ τί τέλειον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ. Ποιεῖν γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν τέλειον οὐ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τὸ τέλειον αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ φύσιν ἄλλην εἶναι αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν τούτων τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν μηδὲ ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν μηδ' ὅλως τούτου τοῦ γένους εἶναι,

[1] These are the Stoics, cp. Diog. Laert. VII. 130. The serious discussion of their position begins here (there has been a passing allusion to their teaching—"the life according to nature"—at the end of ch. 1). Plotinus in his criticism of the Stoics in this chapter fastens upon what was generally regarded by opponents of the school as the weakest point in their ethical theory, the difficulty of reconciling their insistence that the life of reason and virtue was the only real good

better the purer and clearer life is. Those who say that it is to be found in a rational life,[1] not simply in life, even life accompanied by sensation, may very likely be right; but we ought to ask them why they posit well-being only in the case of rational living things. "Do you add the 'rational' because reason is more efficient and can easily find out and procure the primary natural needs, or would you require reason even if it was not able to find them out or obtain them? If you require it because it is better able to find them out, then irrational creatures too, if by their nature they can satisfy the primary natural needs without reason, will have well-being; and then reason would be a servant and not worth having for itself, and the same would apply to its perfection, which we say is virtue. But if you say that reason has not its place of honour because of the primary natural needs, but is welcome for its own sake, you must tell us what other work it has and what is its nature and what makes it perfect." For it cannot be the study of these primary natural needs which perfects reason; its perfection is something else, and its nature is different, and it is not itself one of these primary natural needs or of the sources from which the primary natural needs derive; it does not belong to this class of beings at all, but is

for man with their doctrine of the importance of *τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν*, the primary natural needs. For criticism of Stoic ethics on these lines cp. Cicero, *De Finibus*, Book IV, and Plutarch, *De Communibus Notitiis* (especially chs. 23 and 26). Plotinus however is closer to the Stoic position than its earlier critics; he agrees completely with them that external goods and natural advantages are indifferent, and that true well-being lies in the life of reason and virtue alone; but, he says, the Stoics cannot explain *why* this is so.

ἀλλὰ κρείττονα τούτων ἁπάντων· ἢ πῶς τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶμαι ἔξειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν. Ἀλλ' οὗτοι μέν, ἕως ἂν κρείττονα εὕρωσι φύσιν τῶν περὶ ἃ νῦν ἵστανται, ἐατέοι ἐνταυθοῖ εἶναι, οὗπερ μένειν ἐθέλουσιν, ἀπόρως ἔχοντες ὅπῃ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οἷς δυνατόν ἐστι τούτων.

3. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τί ποτε τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. Τιθέμενοι δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν ζωῇ, εἰ μὲν συνώνυμον τὸ ζῆν ἐποιούμεθα, πᾶσι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἀπέδομεν δεκτικοῖς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι, εὖ δὲ ζῆν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνα, οἷς παρῆν ἕν τι καὶ ταὐτόν, οὗ ἐπεφύκει δεκτικὰ πάντα τὰ ζῷα εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν λογικῷ ἔδομεν δύνασθαι τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ ἀλόγῳ οὐκέτι· ζωὴ γὰρ ἦν τὸ κοινόν, ὃ δεκτικὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔμελλεν εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐν ζωῇ τινι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπῆρχεν. Ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἐν λογικῇ ζωῇ λέγοντες τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ ζωῇ τιθέντες ἠγνόησαν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν οὐδὲ ζωὴν ὑποτιθέμενοι. Ποιότητα δὲ τὴν λογικὴν δύναμιν, περὶ ἣν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἀναγκάζοιντο ἂν λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς λογικὴ ἐστι ζωή· περὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται· ὥστε περὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ζωῆς. Λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἀντιδιῃρημένον τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. Πολλαχῶς τοίνυν τῆς ζωῆς λεγο-

[1] Plotinus is distinguishing here between a simple classification, by dichotomy or genus and species, of the sort of which ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι is used by Aristotle (*Categories* 13. 14b33 ff.), and the recognition of a hierarchical order of reality,

better than all these; otherwise I do not think they would be able to explain its place of honour. But until these people find a better nature than the things at which they now stop, we must let them stay where they are, which is where they want to be, unable to answer the question how the good life is possible for the beings which are capable of it.

3. We, however, intend to state what we understand by well-being, beginning at the beginning. Suppose we assume that it is to be found in life; then if we make "life" a term which applies to all living things in exactly the same sense, we allow that all of them are capable of well-being, and that those of them actually live well who possess one and the same thing, something which all living beings are naturally capable of acquiring; we do not on this assumption grant the ability to live well to rational beings, but not to irrational. Life is common to both, and it is life which by the same acquisition [in both cases] tends towards well-being, if well-being is to be found in a kind of life. So I think that those who say that well-being is to be found in rational life are unaware that, since they do not place it in life in general, they are really assuming that it is not a life at all. They would have to say that the rational power on which well-being depends is a quality. But their starting-point is rational *life*. Well-being depends on this as a whole; that is, on another kind of life. I do not mean "another kind" in the sense of a logical distinction, but in the sense in which we Platonists speak of one thing as prior and another as posterior.[1] The term "life" is used in many

in which one kind of life is dependent on another higher kind and the image of it.

μένης καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχούσης κατὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὁμωνύμως τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου ἄλλως μὲν τοῦ φυτοῦ, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τρανότητι καὶ ἀμυδρότητι τὴν διαφορὰν ἐχόντων, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ. Καὶ εἰ εἴδωλον ἄλλο ἄλλου, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ εὖ ὡς εἴδωλον αὖ τοῦ εὖ. Εἰ δὲ ὅτῳ ἄγαν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν— τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδενὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐλλείπει— τὸ εὖ, μόνῳ ἂν τῷ ἄγαν ζῶντι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχοι· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, εἴπερ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἄριστον τὸ ὄντως ἐν ζωῇ καὶ ἡ τέλειος ζωή· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλαχόθεν γενόμενον παρέξει αὐτὸ ἐν ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. Τί γὰρ τῇ τελείᾳ ζωῇ ἂν προσγένοιτο εἰς τὸ ἀρίστῃ εἶναι; Εἰ δέ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἐρεῖ, οἰκεῖος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, οὐ μὴν τὸ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον ζητοῦμεν. Ὅτι δ' ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει, καὶ ὅτι αἱ ἄλλαι ἀτελεῖς καὶ ἐνδάλματα ζωῆς καὶ οὐ τελείως οὐδὲ καθαρῶς καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ζωαὶ ἢ τοὐναντίον, πολλάκις μὲν εἴρηται· καὶ νῦν δὲ λελέχθω συντόμως ὡς, ἕως ἂν πάντα τὰ ζῶντα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ᾖ, μὴ ἐπίσης δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ζῇ, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν καὶ τὴν τελειοτάτην εἶναι.

4. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὴν τελείαν ζωὴν ἔχειν οἷός τε ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν ζωὴν εὐδαίμων. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν θεοῖς ἄν τις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν θεῖτο, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνοις μόνοις ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή. Ἐπειδὴ

different senses, distinguished according to the rank of the things to which it is applied, first, second and so on; and "living" means different things in different contexts; it is used in one way of plants, in another of irrational animals, in various ways of things distinguished from each other by the clarity or dimness of their life; so obviously the same applies to "living well." And if one thing is an image of another, obviously its good life is the image of another good life. If then the good life belongs to what has a superabundance of life (this means what is in no way deficient in life), well-being will belong only to the being which lives superabundantly: this will have the best, if the best among realities is being really alive, is perfect life. So its good will not be something brought in from outside, nor will the basis of its goodness come from somewhere else and bring it into a good state; for what could be added to the perfect life to make it into the best life? If anyone says "The Absolute Good," that is our own way of talking, but at present we are not looking for the cause, but for the immanent element.

We have often said that the perfect life, the true, real life, is in that transcendent intelligible reality, and that other lives are incomplete, traces of life, not perfect or pure and no more life than its opposite. Let us put it shortly; as long as all living things proceed from a single origin, but have not life to the same degree as it, the origin must be the first and most perfect life.

4. If then man can have the perfect life, the man who has this life is well off. If not, one would have to attribute well-being to the gods, if among them alone this kind of life is to be found. But since we

τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο, σκεπτέον πῶς ἔστι τοῦτο. Λέγω δὲ ὧδε· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ νοῦν ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. Ἀλλ' ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; Ἢ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχων, ὃν δὴ καί φαμεν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. Ἀλλ' ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; Ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ τοῦτο καὶ μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, εἶναι τοῦτο· περικεῖσθαι δ' αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι περικείμενα· ἦν δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα. Τούτῳ τοίνυν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅπερ ἔχει· τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ παρὸν ἄλλως. Μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄλλο ζητεῖν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα. Τί γὰρ ἄν καὶ ζητήσειε; Τῶν μὲν γὰρ χειρόνων οὐδέν, τῷ δὲ ἀρίστῳ σύνεστιν. Αὐτάρκης οὖν ὁ βίος τῷ οὕτως ζωὴν ἔχοντι. Κἂν σπουδαῖος ᾖ, αὐτάρκης εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἰς κτῆσιν ἀγαθοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἔχει. Ἀλλ' ὃ ζητεῖ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ζητεῖ, καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλά τινι τῶν αὐτοῦ. Σώματι γὰρ προσηρτημένῳ ζητεῖ· κἂν ζῶντι δὲ σώματι, τὰ αὐτοῦ ζῶντι τούτῳ, οὐχ ἃ τοιούτου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐστί. Καὶ γινώσκει ταῦτα καὶ δίδωσιν ἃ δίδωσιν οὐδὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ παραιρούμενος ζωῆς. Οὐδ' ἐν τύχαις τοίνυν ἐναντίαις

maintain that this well-being is to be found among men we must consider how it is so. What I mean is this; it is obvious from what has been said elsewhere that man has perfect life by having not only sense-life but reasoning and true intelligence. But is he different from this when he has it? No, he is not a man at all unless he has this, either potentially or actually (and if he has it actually we say that he is in a state of well-being). But shall we say that he has this perfect kind of life in him as a part of himself? Other men, we maintain, who have it potentially, have it as a part, but the man who is well off, who actually is this and has passed over into identity with it, [does not have it but] *is* it. Everything else is just something he wears; you could not call it part of him because he wears it without wanting to; it would be his if he united it to him by an act of the will. What then is the good for him? He is what he has, his own good. The Transcendent Good is Cause of the good in him; the fact that It is good is different from the fact that It is present to him. There is evidence for this in the fact that the man in this state does not seek for anything else; for what could he seek? Certainly not anything worse, and he has the best with him. The man who has a life like this has all he needs in life. If he is virtuous, he has all he needs for well-being and the acquisition of good; for there is no good that he has not got. What he seeks he seeks as a necessity, not for himself but for something that belongs to him; that is, he seeks it for the body which is joined to him; and even granting that this is a living body, it lives its own life and not the life which is that of the good man. He knows its needs, and gives it what he gives it without

ἐλαττώσεται εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν· μένει γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή· ἀποθνῃσκόντων τε οἰκείων καὶ φίλων οἶδε τὸν θάνατον ὅ τι ἐστίν, ἴσασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πάσχοντες σπουδαῖοι ὄντες. Οἰκεῖοι δὲ καὶ προσήκοντες τοῦτο πάσχοντες κἂν λυπῶσιν, οὐκ αὐτόν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, οὗ τὰς λύπας οὐ δέξεται.

5. Ἀλγηδόνες δὲ τί καὶ νόσοι καὶ τὰ ὅλως κωλύοντα ἐνεργεῖν; Εἰ δὲ δὴ μηδ' ἑαυτῷ παρακολουθοῖ; Γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν καὶ ἐκ φαρμάκων καί τινων νόσων. Πῶς δὴ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τὸ ζῆν εὖ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν ἔχοι; Πενίας γὰρ καὶ ἀδοξίας ἐατέον. Καίτοι καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἄν τις ἀποβλέψας ἐπιστήσειε καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολυθρυλλήτους αὖ μάλιστα Πριαμικὰς τύχας· ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ φέροι καὶ ῥαδίως φέροι, ἀλλ' οὐ βουλητά γε ἦν αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ βουλητὸν τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον ψυχὴν τοιάνδε, μὴ συναριθμεῖσθαι δ' αὐτοῦ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν. Ἑτοίμως γὰρ τοῦτο φαῖεν ἂν λαμβάνειν, ἕως ἂν αἱ τοῦ σώματος πείσεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρωνται καὶ αὖ καὶ αἱ αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγαὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνωνται αὐτῷ. Ἡδονῆς δὲ συναριθμουμένης τῷ εὐδαίμονι βίῳ, πῶς ἂν λυπηρὸν διὰ τύχας καὶ ὀδύνας ἔχων εὐδαίμων εἴη, ὅτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαίῳ ὄντι γίγνοιτο; Ἀλλὰ θεοῖς μὲν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις εὐδαίμων καὶ

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I. 10. 1100a8 and 11. 1101a8. Plotinus in this section of the treatise is defending the essential Stoic position, that the good man is absolutely independent of external circumstances, against an attack on Peripatetic lines.

taking away anything from his own life. His well-being will not be reduced even when fortune goes against him; the good life is still there even so. When his friends and relations die he knows what death is—as those who die do also if they are virtuous. Even if the death of friends and relations causes grief, it does not grieve him but only that in him which has no intelligence, and he will not allow the distresses of this to move him.

5. But what about pain and sickness and everything that hinders activity? And suppose the good man is not even conscious? That could happen as the result of drugs and some kinds of illness. How could he in all these circumstances have a good life and well-being? We need not consider poverty and disgrace; though someone might raise an objection in regard of these too, and especially that "fate of Priam" that people are always talking about.[1] For even if he bore them and bore them lightly, he would not want them; and the life of well-being must be something one wants. This good man, it might be objected, is not a good soul, without reckoning his bodily nature as part of his essential being. Our opponents might say that they willingly accept our point of view, as long as the bodily affections are referred to the man himself, and it is he himself who chooses and avoids for reasons connected with the body. But if pleasure is counted as part of the life of well-being, how can a man be well off when chance and pain bring distress, even if it is a good man that these things happen to? This kind of state of self-sufficient well-being belongs to the

αὐτάρκης, ἀνθρώποις δὲ προσθήκην τοῦ χείρονος λαβοῦσι περὶ ὅλον χρὴ τὸ γενόμενον τὸ εὔδαιμον ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ μέρος, ὃ ἐκ θατέρου κακῶς ἔχοντος ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν καὶ θάτερον τὸ κρεῖττον ἐμποδίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου καλῶς ἔχει. Ἢ ἀπορρήξαντα δεῖ σῶμα ἢ καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν σώματος οὕτω τὸ αὔταρκες ζητεῖν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν.

6. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀλγεῖν μηδὲ νοσεῖν μηδὲ δυστυχεῖν μηδὲ συμφοραῖς μεγάλαις περιπίπτειν ἐδίδου ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἦν τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων εἶναι ὁντινοῦν εὐδαίμονα· εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κτήσει τοῦτό ἐστι κείμενον, τί δεῖ παρέντας τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντας κρίνειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα τὰ ἄλλα ζητεῖν, ἃ μὴ ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἠρίθμηται; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ συμφόρησις ἦν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ' ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτων λεγομένων, ἐχρῆν καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἕν τι εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ πολλὰ δεῖ—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τέλη ἂν ζητοῖ—ἐκεῖνο χρὴ λαμβάνειν μόνον, ὃ ἔσχατόν τέ ἐστι καὶ τιμιώτατον καὶ ὃ ἡ ψυχὴ ζητεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγκολπίσασθαι. Ἡ δὲ ζήτησις αὕτη καὶ ἡ βούλησις οὐχὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρόντα μόνον φεύγει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποικονομούμενος ἢ καὶ προσλαμβάνων ζητεῖ· αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτῆς, οὗ ἐγγενομένου

gods; since men have a supplement of lower nature one must look for well-being in the whole of what has come into existence, and not in a part; for if one part is in a bad state the other, higher, part must necessarily be hindered in its proper work if the affairs of the lower part are not going well. Otherwise one must cut off the body, and even perception of the body, from human nature, and in this way try to find self-sufficiency in the matter of well-being.

6. But [we should answer], if our argument made well-being consist in freedom from pain and sickness and ill-luck and falling into great misfortunes, it would be impossible for anyone to be well off when any of these circumstances opposed to well-being was present. But if well-being is to be found in possession of the true good, why should we disregard this and omit to use it as a standard to which to look in judging well-being, and look for other things which are not reckoned as a part of well-being? If it was a collection of goods and necessities, or things as well which are not necessities but even so are called goods, we should have to try and see that these were there too. But if the end at which we aim must be one and not many—otherwise one would not be aiming at an end but at ends—one must gain that alone which is of ultimate and highest value, and which the soul seeks to clasp close within itself. This search and willing is not directed to not being in this condition. These things are not of our very nature, but only [incidentally] present, and it is our reasoning power that avoids and manages to get rid of them, or also sometimes seeks to acquire them. But the real drive of desire of our soul is towards that which is better than itself. When that is present

ἀποπεπλήρωται καὶ ἔστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ βουλητὸς ὄντως βίος. Τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων τι παρεῖναι οὐ βούλησις ἂν εἴη, εἰ κυρίως τὴν βούλησιν ὑπολαμβάνοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ καταχρώμενος ἄν τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα παρεῖναι ἀξιοῦμεν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνομεν, καὶ οὐ δήπου βουλητὸν τὸ τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης· μᾶλλον γὰρ βουλητὸν τὸ μηδὲ δεηθῆναι τῆς ἐκκλίσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά, ὅταν παρῇ· οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ ἀνωδυνία. Τί γὰρ τούτων ἐπαγωγόν ἐστι; Καταφρονεῖται γοῦν ὑγίεια παροῦσα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν. Ἃ δὲ παρόντα μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαγωγὸν ἔχει οὐδὲ προστίθησί τι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀπόντα δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν λυπούντων παρουσίαν ζητεῖ⟨ται⟩, εὔλογον ἀναγκαῖα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαθὰ φάσκειν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ συναριθμητέα τοίνυν τῷ τέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων παρόντων ἀκέραιον τὸ τέλος τηρητέον.

7. Διὰ τί οὖν ὁ εὐδαιμονῶν ταῦτα ἐθέλει παρεῖναι καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀπωθεῖται; Ἢ φήσομεν οὐχ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰσφέρεταί τινα μοῖραν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων ἢ πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ὅτι ἐνοχλεῖ τῷ τέλει παρόντα, οὐχ ὡς ἀφαιρούμενα αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὸ ἄριστον αὐτὸ μόνον βούλεται ἔχειν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὃ ὅταν παρῇ, οὐκ ἀφῄρηται μὲν ἐκεῖνο, ἔστι δ' ὅμως κἀκείνου ὄντος. Ὅλως δὲ οὐκ, εἴ τι ὁ εὐδαίμων μὴ ἐθέλοι, παρείη δὲ

within it, it is fulfilled and at rest, and this is the way of living it really wills. We cannot be said to "will" the presence of necessities, if "willing" is used in its proper sense and not misapplied to the occasions when we prefer the necessities also to be there: for we generally avoid evils, but this sort of avoidance is not, I suppose, a matter of willing, for we should will rather not to have occasion for this sort of avoidance. The necessities themselves provide evidence of this when we have them, health and freedom from pain, for instance. What attraction have they for us? We despise health when we have it, and freedom from pain as well. But these things, which have no attraction for us when they are there and do not contribute anything to our well-being, but which we seek in their absence because of the presence of things which distress us, can reasonably be called necessities, but not goods. So they must not be reckoned as part of the end we aim at; even when they are absent and their opposites are present, the end must be kept intact.

7. Why then does the man who is in a state of well-being want these necessities to be there and reject their opposites? We shall answer that it is not because they make any contribution to his well-being, but rather, to his existence: and he rejects their opposites either because they help towards non-existence or because they get in the way of his aim by their presence, not by taking anything away from it but because he who has the best wants to have it alone, and not something else with it, something which when it is there has not made away with the best, but, still, exists alongside it. But even if something which the man who is well off does not

τοῦτο, ἤδη παραιρεῖταί τι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· ἢ οὕτω γε καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν μεταπίπτοι ἂν καὶ ἐκπίπτοι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· οἷον εἰ καὶ παῖδα ἀποβάλλοι ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν κτημάτων. Καὶ μυρία ἂν εἴη ἃ οὐ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβάντα οὐδέν τι παρακινεῖ τοῦ παρόντος τέλους αὐτῷ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα, φασί, καὶ οὐ τὰ τυχόντα. Τί δ' ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγα, ὥστ' ἂν μὴ καταφρονηθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναβεβηκότος πρὸς τὸ ἀνωτέρω ἁπάντων τούτων καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν κάτω ἐξηρτημένου; Διὰ τί γὰρ τὰς μὲν εὐτυχίας, ἡλικαιοῦν ἂν ὦσιν, οὐ μεγάλας ἡγεῖται, οἷον βασιλείας καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν ἀρχάς, οὐδὲ οἰκίσεις καὶ κτίσεις πόλεων, οὐδ' εἰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γίγνοιντο, ἐκπτώσεις δὲ ἀρχῶν καὶ πόλεως αὐτοῦ κατασκαφὴν ἡγήσεταί τι εἶναι μέγα; Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ κακὸν μέγα ἢ ὅλως κακόν, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δόγματος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σπουδαῖος εἴη ξύλα καὶ λίθους καὶ νὴ Δία θανάτους θνητῶν μέγα ἡγούμενος, ᾧ φαμεν δεῖν δόγμα παρεῖναι περὶ θανάτου τὸ ἄμεινον ζωῆς τῆς μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. Αὐτὸς δὲ εἰ τυθείη, κακὸν οἰήσεται αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον, ὅτι παρὰ βωμοῖς τέθνηκεν; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ταφείη, πάντως που καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τεθὲν τὸ σῶμα σαπείη. Εἰ δ' ὅτι μὴ πολυδαπάνως, ἀλλ' ἀνωνύμως τέθαπται οὐκ ἀξιωθεὶς ὑψηλοῦ μνήματος, τῆς μικρολογίας. Ἀλλ' εἰ αἰχμάλωτος ἄγοιτο, πάρ τοί ἐστιν ὁδὸς ἐξιέναι,

[1] In the last days of St. Augustine's life, while the Vandals were besieging Hippo he comforted himself with these words; see Possidius, *Vita Augustini* XXVIII: et se inter haec mala

want is there all the same, nothing at all of his well-being is taken away; otherwise he would change every day and fall from his well-being—if he lost a servant, for instance, or any one of his possessions: there are thousands of things which, if they do not turn out according to his mind, disturb in no way the final good which he has attained. But, people say, consider great disasters, not ordinary chances! What human circumstance is so great that a man will not think little of it who has climbed higher than all this and depends on nothing below? He does not think any piece of good fortune great, however important it may be, kingship, for instance, and rule over cities and peoples, or founding of colonies and states (even if he founds them himself). Why then should he think that falling from power and the ruin of his city are great matters? If he thought that they were great evils, or evils at all, he would deserve to be laughed at for his opinion; there would be no virtue left in him if he thought that wood and stones, and (God help us!) the death of mortals, were important,[1] this man who, we say, ought to think about death that it is better than life with the body! If he himself is offered in sacrifice, will he think his death an evil, because he dies by the altars? If he is not buried, his body will rot anyhow, on the earth or under it. If he is distressed because he does not have an expensive funeral but is buried without a name and not thought worth a lofty monument—the pettiness of it! If he is taken away as a war-slave, "the way lies open" to depart,

cuiusdam sapientis sententia consolabatur dicentis: *Non erit magnus magnum putans, quod cadunt ligna et lapides et moriuntur mortales.*

εἰ μὴ εἴη εὐδαιμονεῖν. Εἰ δὲ οἰκεῖοι αὐτῷ αἰχμάλωτοι, οἷον ἑλκόμεναι νυοὶ καὶ θυγατέρες— τί οὖν, φήσομεν, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἑωρακώς; Ἆρ' ἂν οὕτω δόξης ἔχοι ἀπιών, ὡς μὴ ἂν τούτων ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι; Ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν δοξάσειεν, ὡς ἐνδέχεται τοιαύταις τύχαις τοὺς οἰκείους περιπεσεῖν; Ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἂν δόξαι ὡς καὶ γενησομένου ἂν οὐκ εὐδαίμων; Ἢ καὶ δοξάζων οὕτως εὐδαίμων· ὥστε καὶ γινομένου. Ἐνθυμοῖτο γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις τοιαύτη, οἷα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φέρειν, καὶ ἕπεσθαι χρή. Καὶ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον αἰχμάλωτοι γενόμενοι πράξουσι. Καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δὲ βαρυνομένοις ἀπελθεῖν· ἢ μένοντες ἢ εὐλόγως μένουσι καὶ οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἢ ἀλόγως μένοντες, δέον μή, αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄνοιαν οἰκείων ὄντων αὐτὸς ἐν κακῷ ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἄλλων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστυχίας ἀναρτήσεται.

8. Τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων αὐτοῦ, ὅταν σφοδραὶ ὦσιν, ἕως δύναται φέρειν, οἴσει· εἰ δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ἐξοίσουσι. Καὶ οὐκ ἐλεεινὸς ἔσται ⟨καὶ⟩ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ [καίεται] ἔνδον φέγγος οἷον ἐν λαμπτῆρι φῶς πολλοῦ ἔξωθεν πνέοντος ἐν πολλῇ ζάλῃ ἀνέμων καὶ χειμῶνι. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ παρακολουθοῖ, ἢ παρατείνοι τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αἰρόμενον, ὥστε ἐν τῷ σφοδρῷ ὅμως μὴ ἀποκτιν-

[1] This means suicide, which Plotinus admitted as legitimate, though only in absolutely desperate circumstances; cp. the next chapter and I. 9. 11–14, and 17.

[2] Again an allusion to Priam, cp. *Iliad* 22. 65.

if it is not possible to live well.[1] If his relatives are captured in war, "his daughters-in-law and daughters dragged off"[2]—well, suppose he had died without seeing anything of the sort; would he then leave the world in the belief that it was impossible that it should happen? If so, he would be a fool. So will he not think that it is possible for his relatives to fall into such misfortune? And does his belief that this may happen prevent his well-being? Then neither does the fact of its happening. For he will think that the nature of this universe is of a kind to bring these sorts of misfortunes, and we must follow it obediently. Anyhow, many people will do better by becoming war-slaves; and it is in their own power to depart if they find the burden heavy. If they stay, either it is reasonable for them to stay and there is nothing terrible about it, or if they stay unreasonably, when they ought not to, it is their own fault. The good man will not be involved in evil because of the stupidity of others, even if they are his relatives; he will not be dependent on the good or bad fortune of other people.

8. As far as his own pains go, when they are very great, he will bear them as long as he can; when they are too much for him, they will bear him off.[3] He is not to be pitied even in his pain; his light within is like the light in a lantern when it is blowing hard outside with a great fury of wind and storm.[4] But suppose the pain brings delirium, or goes on at such a height that, though it is extreme it does not

[3] Cp. Epicurus fr. V. B64–65 Bailey.

[4] There may be a reminiscence here of Empedocles fr. B 84, Diels, but the context there is quite different—the storm-lantern is only an analogy for the structure of the eye.

νύναι; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν παρατείνοι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν βουλεύσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἀφῄρηται τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐν τούτοις. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ, οἷα τοῖς ἄλλοις φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ φανεῖται ἕκαστα, καὶ οὐ μέχρι τοῦ εἴσω ἕκαστα οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα, [οὔτε ἀλγεινὰ] οὔτε τὰ λυπηρά. Καὶ ὅταν περὶ ἄλλους τὰ ἀλγεινά; ἀσθένεια γὰρ εἴη ψυχῆς ἡμετέρας. Καὶ τοῦτο μαρτυρεῖ, ὅταν λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς κέρδος ἡγώμεθα καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν, εἰ γίγνοιτο, κέρδος εἶναι τιθεμένων καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐκείνων ἔτι σκοπουμένων, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῶν, ὅπως μὴ λυποίμεθα. Τοῦτο δὲ ἡμετέρα ἤδη ἀσθένεια, ἣν δεῖ περιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐῶντας φοβεῖσθαι μὴ γένηται. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οὕτως ἡμᾶς πεφυκέναι, ὥστε ἀλγεῖν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν οἰκείων συμφοραῖς, γιγνωσκέτω, ὅτι οὐ πάντες οὕτω, καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον ἄγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον παρὰ τοὺς πολλούς· κάλλιον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς νομιζομένοις τῇ κοινῇ φύσει δεινοῖς εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ ἰδιωτικῶς δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀθλητὴν μέγαν διακεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης πληγὰς ἀμυνόμενον, γινώσκοντα μὲν ὅτι τινὶ φύσει ταῦτα οὐκ ἀρεστά, τῇ δὲ αὐτοῦ φύσει οἰστά, οὐχ ὡς δεινά, ἀλλ' ὡς παισὶ φοβερά. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἤθελεν; Ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ μὴ θελητά, ὅταν παρῇ, ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχει δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν παρέχουσαν.

9. Ἀλλ' ὅταν μὴ παρακολουθῇ βαπτισθεὶς ἢ νόσοις ἢ μάγων τέχναις; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν φυλάξουσιν

[1] Plotinus's view, expounded in this and the next chapter, of the secondary and relatively inferior status of consciousness

kill? If it goes on, he will consider what he ought to do; the pain has not taken away his power of self-disposal. One must understand that things do not look to the good man as they look to others; none of his experiences penetrate to the inner self, griefs no more than any of the others. And when the pains concern others? [To sympathise with them] would be a weakness in our soul. There is evidence for this in the fact that we think it something gained if we do not know about other people's sufferings, and even regard it as a good thing if we die first, not considering it from their point of view but from our own, trying to avoid being grieved. This is just our weakness, which we must get rid of and not leave it there and then be afraid of its coming over us. If anyone says that it is our nature to feel pain at the misfortunes of our own people, he should know that this does not apply to everybody, and that it is the business of virtue to raise ordinary nature to a higher level, something better than most people are capable of; and it is better not to give in to what ordinary nature normally finds terrible. One must not behave like someone untrained, but stand up to the blows of fortune like a great trained fighter, and know that, though some natures may not like them, one's own can bear them, not as terrors but as children's bogeys. Does the good man, then, want misfortune? No, but when what he does not want comes he sets virtue against it, which makes his soul hard to disturb or distress.

9. But suppose he is unconscious, his mind swamped by sickness or magic arts?[1] If they maintain that

is entirely un-Stoic and based (see ch. 10) on a most original development of his own double-self psychology.

αὐτὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ οἷα ἐν ὕπνῳ κιομώμενον, τί κωλύει εὐδαίμονα αὐτὸν εἶναι; Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀφαιροῦνται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτόν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ λόγον ποιοῦνται τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ πάντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ σπουδαῖον φήσουσιν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔτι τὸν λόγον ποιοῦνται. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑποθέμενοι σπουδαῖον, εἰ εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἕως ἂν εἴη σπουδαῖος, ζητοῦμεν. Ἀλλ' ἔστω σπουδαῖος, φασί· μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηδ' ἐνεργῶν κατ' ἀρετήν, πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων εἴη; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο ὅτι ὑγιαίνοι, ὑγιαίνει οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὅτι καλός, οὐδὲν ἧττον καλός· εἰ δὲ ὅτι σοφὸς μὴ αἰσθάνοιτο, ἧττον σοφὸς ἂν εἴη; Εἰ μή πού τις λέγοι ὡς ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι· ἐν γὰρ τῇ κατ' ἐνέργειαν σοφίᾳ καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν παρεῖναι. Ἐπακτοῦ μὲν οὖν ὄντος τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τῆς σοφίας λέγοι ἄν τι ἴσως ὁ λόγος οὗτος· εἰ δ' ἡ τῆς σοφίας ὑπόστασις ἐν οὐσίᾳ τινί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐκ ἀπόλωλε δὲ αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἔν τε τῷ κοιμωμένῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτὴ ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄυπνος ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργοῖ μὲν ἂν καὶ τότε ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾗ τοιοῦτος· λανθάνοι δ' ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐκ αὐτὸν πάντα, ἀλλά τι μέρος αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ τῆς φυτικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐνεργούσης οὐκ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἀντίληψις τῷ

[1] Contrast Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* X. 6. 1176a33–35.

he is a good man when he is in this state, only fallen into a sort of sleep, what prevents him from being well off? After all, they do not remove him from well-being when he is asleep, or reckon the time he spends asleep so as to show that he is not well off for his whole life.[1] But if they say that he is not good when he is in this state, then they are not any longer discussing the good man. But we are taking the good man as our starting-point, and enquiring if he is well off as long as he is good. "But," they say, "granted that he is good, if he is not conscious of it or engaged in virtuous activity, how can he be in a state of well-being?" But if he does not know that he is healthy, he *is* healthy just the same, and if he does not know that he is handsome, he *is* handsome just the same. So if he does not know that he is wise, will he be any the less wise? Perhaps someone might say that wisdom requires awareness and consciousness of its presence, because it is in actual and active wisdom that well-being is to be found. If intelligence and wisdom were something brought in from outside, this argument would perhaps make sense: but if wisdom essentially consists in a substance, or rather in *the* substance, and this substance does not cease to exist in someone who is asleep or what is called unconscious; if the real activity of the substance goes on in him, and this activity is unsleeping; then the good man, in that he is a good man, will be active even then. It will not be the whole of him that is unaware of this activity, but only a part of him. In the same way when our growth-activity is active no perception of it reaches the rest of the man through our sense-faculties; and, if that in us which grows were our-

αἰσθητικῷ, καί, εἴπερ ἦμεν τὸ φυτικὸν ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς, ἡμεῖς ἂν ἐνεργοῦντες ἦμεν· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐσμέν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοοῦντος ἐνέργεια· ὥστε ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου ἐνεργοῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.

10. Λανθάνει δὲ ἴσως τῷ μὴ περὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· διὰ γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὥσπερ μέσης περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων. Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ νοῦς διὰ τί οὐκ ἐνεργήσει καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὅλως ἀντιλήψεως; Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πρὸ ἀντιλήψεως ἐνέργημα εἶναι, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι. Καὶ ἔοικεν ἡ ἀντίληψις εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀνακάμπτοντος τοῦ νοήματος καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον ἀπωσθέντος πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡσυχάζον. Ὡς οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις παρόντος μὲν τοῦ κατόπτρου ἐγένετο τὸ εἴδωλον, μὴ παρόντος δὲ ἢ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἐνεργείᾳ πάρεστιν οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον ἦν ἄν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἄγοντος τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν τοιούτου, ᾧ ἐμφαίνεται τὰ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονίσματα, ἐνορᾶται ταῦτα καὶ οἷον αἰσθητῶς γινώσκεται μετὰ τῆς προτέρας γνώσεως, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργεῖ. Συγκλασθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ταραττομένην ἁρμονίαν ἄνευ εἰδώλου ἡ διάνοια καὶ ὁ νοῦς νοεῖ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας ἡ νόησις τότε·

[1] Parmenides fr. B3 Diels. What Parmenides may have really meant by these words is not relevant here. Plotinus,

selves, it would be ourselves that would be active [irrespective of the fact that we were unconscious of it]. Actually, however, we are not it, but we *are* the activity of the intellect; so that when that is active, we are active.

10. Perhaps we do not notice it because it is not concerned with any object of sense; for our minds, by means of sense-perception—which is a kind of intermediary when dealing with sensible things—do appear to work on the level of sense and think about sense-objects. But why should not intellect itself be active [without perception], and also its attendant soul, which comes before sense-perception and any sort of awareness? There must be an activity prior to awareness if "thinking and being are the same."[1] It seems as if awareness exists and is produced when intellectual activity is reflexive and when that in the life of the soul which is active in thinking is in a way projected back, as happens with a mirror-reflection when there is a smooth, bright, untroubled surface. In these circumstances when the mirror is there the mirror-image is produced, but when it is not there or is not in the right state the object of which the image would have been is [all the same] actually there. In the same way as regards the soul, when that kind of thing in us which mirrors the images of thought and intellect is undisturbed, we see them and know them in a way parallel to sense-perception, along with the prior knowledge that it is intellect and thought that are active. But when this is broken because the harmony of the body is upset, thought and intellect

as his citation of them at V. 1. 8. 17 makes clear, interprets them as referring to his own doctrine of the unity of Real Being and Intellect.

ὥστε καὶ τοιοῦτον ἄν τι νοοῖτο μετὰ φαντασίας τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι οὐκ οὔσης τῆς νοήσεως φαντασίας. Πολλὰς δ' ἄν τις εὕροι καὶ ἐγρηγορότων καλὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ πράξεις, ὅτε θεωροῦμεν καὶ ὅτε πράττομεν, τὸ παρακολουθεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἀναγινώσκοντα ἀνάγκη παρακολουθεῖν ὅτι ἀναγινώσκει καὶ τότε μάλιστα, ὅτε μετὰ τοῦ συντόνου ἀναγινώσκοι· οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνδριζόμενος ὅτι ἀνδρίζεται καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνεργεῖ ὅσῳ ἐνεργεῖ· καὶ ἄλλα μυρία· ὥστε τὰς παρακολουθήσεις κινδυνεύειν ἀμυδροτέρας αὐτὰς τὰς ἐνεργείας αἷς παροκολουθοῦνσι ποιεῖν, μόνας δὲ αὐτὰς οὔσας καθαρὰς τότε εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖν καὶ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει τῶν σπουδαίων γενομένων μᾶλλον τὸ ζῆν εἶναι, οὐ κεχυμένον εἰς αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνηγμένον.

11. Εἰ δέ τινες μηδὲ ζῆν λέγοιεν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ζῆν μὲν αὐτὸν φήσομεν, λανθάνειν δ' αὐτοὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ τοιούτου, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ζῆν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ πείθοιντο, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑποθεμένους τὸν ζῶντα καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον οὕτω ζητεῖν εἰ εὐδαίμων, μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῦ ἐλαττώσαντας τὸ εὖ ζῆν ζητεῖν εἰ πάρεστι μηδὲ ἀνελόντας τὸν ἄνθρωπον περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπου ζητεῖν μηδὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον συγχωρήσαντας εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπεστράφθαι ἐν ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐνεργείαις αὐτὸν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ὅλως τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω. Οὕτω γὰρ

[1] *φαντασία* is here used in its Aristotelian sense, for which see *De Anima* III. 3. 427b–429a.

operate without an image, and then intellectual activity takes place without a mind-picture.[1] So one might come to this sort of conclusion, that intellectual activity is [normally] accompanied by a mind-picture but is not a mind-picture. One can find a great many valuable activities, theoretical and practical, which we carry on both in our contemplative and active life even when we are fully conscious, which do not make us aware of them. The reader is not necessarily aware that he is reading, least of all when he is really concentrating: nor the man who is being brave that he is being brave and that his action conforms to the virtue of courage; and there are thousands of similar cases. Conscious awareness, in fact, is likely to enfeeble the very activities of which there is consciousness; only when they are alone are they pure and more genuinely active and living; and when good men are in this state their life is increased, when it is not spilt out into perception, but gathered together in one in itself.

11. If some people were to say that a man in this state is not even alive, we shall maintain that he is alive, but they fail to observe his well-being just as they do his life. If they will not believe us, we shall ask them to take as their starting-point a living man and a good man and so to pursue the enquiry into his well-being, and not to minimise his life and then to enquire if he has a good life, or to take away his humanity and then enquire about human well-being, or to agree that the good man has his attention directed inward and then to look for him in external activities, still less to seek the object of his desire in outward things. There would not be any possibility

ἂν οὐδὲ ὑπόστασις εὐδαιμονίας εἴη, εἰ τὰ ἔξω βουλητὰ λέγοι καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον βούλεσθαι ταῦτα. Ἐθέλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὖ πράττειν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν κακῶν περὶ μηδένα εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μὴ γινομένων ὅμως εὐδαίμων. Εἰ δέ τις παράλογον ἂν αὐτὸν ποιήσειν φήσει, εἰ ταῦτα ἐθελήσει—μὴ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰ κακὰ μὴ εἶναι—δῆλον ὅτι συγχωρήσει ἡμῖν ἐπιστρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν βούλησιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω.

12. Τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ τῷ βίῳ τοιούτῳ ὅταν ἀπαιτῶσιν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀκολάστων οὐδὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς ἀξιώσουσι παρεῖναι—αὗται γὰρ ἀδύνατοι παρεῖναι καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀφανιοῦσιν—οὐδὲ μὴν τὰς περιχαρίας—διὰ τί γάρ;—ἀλλὰ τὰς συνούσας παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐν κινήσεσιν οὔσας, οὐδὲ γινομένας τοίνυν· ἤδη γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάρεστι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάρεστι· καὶ ἕστηκε τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἵλεων τοῦτο· ἵλεως δὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀεὶ καὶ κατάστασις ἥσυχος καὶ ἀγαπητὴ ἡ διάθεσις ἣν οὐδὲν τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν παρακινεῖ, εἴπερ σπουδαῖος. Εἰ δέ τις ἄλλο εἶδος ἡδονῆς περὶ τὸν [σπουδαῖον] βίον ζητεῖ, οὐ τὸν σπουδαῖον βίον ζητεῖ.

13. Οὐδ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι δὲ διὰ τὰς τύχας ἐμποδίζοιντο ἄν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλαι ἂν κατ' ἄλλας γίγνοιντο τύχας, πᾶσαι δὲ ὅμως καλαὶ καλλίους ἴσως ὅσῳ περιστατικαί. Αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς θεωρίας ἐνέργειαι

of the existence of well-being if one said that outward things were to be desired and that the good man desired them. He would like all men to prosper and no one to be subject to any sort of evil; but if this does not happen, he is all the same well off. But if anyone maintains that it will make the good man absurd to suppose him wanting anything like this—for it is impossible that evils should not exist—then the person who maintains this will obviously agree with us in directing the good man's desire inwards.

12. When they demand to be shown what is pleasant in a life of this kind, they will not be requiring the presence of the pleasures of debauchees, or of bodily pleasures at all—these could not be there and would abolish well-being—or of violent emotions of pleasure—why should the good man have any?—but only those pleasures which accompany the presence of goods, pleasures not consisting in movements, which are not the results of any process: for the goods are there already, and the good man is present to himself; his pleasure and happiness are at rest. The good man is always happy; his state is tranquil, his disposition contented and undisturbed by any so-called evils—if he is really good. If anyone looks for another kind of pleasure in life it is not the life of virtue he is looking for.

13. The good man's activities will not be hindered by changes of fortune, but will vary according to what change and chance brings; but they will all be equally fine, and, perhaps, finer for being adapted to circumstances. As for his speculative activities, some of them which are concerned with particular points will possibly be hindered by circumstances,

αἱ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα τάχα ἄν, οἷον ἂς ζητήσας ἂν καὶ σκεψάμενος προφέροι· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μάθημα πρόχειρον ἀεὶ καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον, κἂν ἐν τῷ Φαλάριδος ταύρῳ λεγομένῳ ᾖ, ὃ μάτην λέγεται ἡδὺ δὶς ἢ καὶ πολλάκις λεγόμενον. Ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φθεγξάμενον τοῦτο αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν ὑπάρχον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀλγοῦν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὃ συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνῇ, οὐκ ἀπολελείψεται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅλου θέας.

14. Τὸ δὲ μὴ συναμφότερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ μάλιστα τὸν σπουδαῖον μαρτυρεῖ καὶ ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἡ τῶν λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν τοῦ σώματος καταφρόνησις. Τὸ δὲ καθόσον ἀξιοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι γελοῖον εὐζωίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὔσης, ἣ περὶ ψυχὴν συνίσταται, ἐνεργείας ταύτης οὔσης καὶ ψυχῆς οὐ πάσης—οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς φυτικῆς, ἵν' ἂν καὶ ἐφήψατο σώματος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τοῦτο ἦν σώματος μέγεθος καὶ εὐεξία—οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εὖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσουσιν αἱ τούτων πλεονεξίαι βαρύνασαι πρὸς αὑτὰς φέρειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἀντισηκώσεως δὲ οἷον ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα γενομένης μινύθειν καὶ χείρω τὰ σώματα ποιεῖν, ἵνα δεικνύοιτο οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος ὢν ἢ τὰ ἔξω. Ὁ δὲ τῶν τῇδε ἄνθρωπος ἔστω καὶ καλὸς καὶ μέγας καὶ πλούσιος καὶ

[1] The "greatest study" is for both Plato and Plotinus that of the Good; cp. *Republic* VI. 505A2 and *Enn.* VI. 7. 36.

[2] The paradox that the wise and good man would be εὐδαίμων on the rack or while being roasted in the brazen bull of Phalaris was common to Stoics and Epicureans.

those for instance which require research and investigation. But the "greatest study"[1] is always ready to hand and always with him, all the more if he is in the so-called "bull of Phalaris"—which it is silly to call pleasant, though people keep on saying that it is;[2] for according to their philosophy that which says that its state is pleasant is the very same thing which is in pain; according to ours that which suffers pain is one thing, and there is another which, even while it is compelled to accompany that which suffers pain, remains in its own company and will not fall short of the vision of the universal good.

14. Man, and especially the good man, is not the composite of soul and body; separation from the body and despising of its so-called goods make this plain. It is absurd to maintain that well-being extends as far as the living body, since well-being is the good life, which is concerned with soul and is an activity of soul, and not of all of it—for it is not an activity of the growth-soul, which would bring it into connexion with body. This state of well-being is certainly not in the body's size or health, nor again does it consist in the excellence of the senses, for too much of these advantages is liable to weigh man down and bring him to their level. There must be a sort of counterpoise on the other side, towards the best, to reduce the body and make it worse, so that it may be made clear that the real man is other than his outward parts. The man who belongs to this world may be handsome and tall and rich and the

Plotinus argues that it makes no sense on their assumptions about the nature of man, but does on his, for he distinguishes the lower self (which really suffers) from the higher self (which remains unaffected).

πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄρχων ὡς ἂν ὢν τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου, καὶ οὐ φθονητέον αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων ἠπατημένῳ. Περὶ δὲ σοφὸν ταῦτα ἴσως μὲν ἂν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γένοιτο, γενομένων δὲ ἐλαττώσει αὐτός, εἴπερ αὐτοῦ κήδεται. Καὶ ἐλαττώσει μὲν καὶ μαρανεῖ ἀμελείᾳ τὰς τοῦ σώματος πλεονεξίας, ἀρχὰς δὲ ἀποθήσεται. Σώματος δὲ ὑγίειαν φυλάττων οὐκ ἄπειρος νόσων εἶναι παντάπασι βουλήσεται· οὐδὲ μὴ οὐδὲ ἄπειρος εἶναι ἀλγηδόνων· ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ γινομένων νέος ὢν μαθεῖν βουλήσεται, ἤδη δὲ ἐν γήρᾳ ὢν οὔτε ταύτας οὔτε ἡδονὰς ἐνοχλεῖν οὐδέ τι τῶν τῇδε οὔτε προσηνὲς οὔτε ἐναντίον, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα βλέπῃ. Γινόμενος δ' ἐν ἀλγηδόσι τὴν πρὸς ταύτας αὐτῷ πεπορισμένην δύναμιν ἀντιτάξει οὔτε προσθήκην ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑγιείαις καὶ ἀπονίαις πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λαμβάνων οὔτε ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἐλάττωσιν ταύτης ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίου μὴ προστιθέντος τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ἀφαιροῖ;

15. Ἀλλ' εἰ δύο εἶεν σοφοί, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ παρείη ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται, τῷ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, ἴσον φήσομεν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι; Φήσομεν, εἴπερ ἐπίσης σοφοί. Εἰ δὲ καλὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁ ἕτερος καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα μὴ πρὸς σοφίαν μηδὲ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου θέαν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι, τί τοῦτο ἂν εἴη; Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ταῦτα ἔχων σεμνυνεῖται ὡς μᾶλλον εὐδαίμων τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν πρὸς

ruler of all mankind (since he is essentially of this region), and we ought not to envy him for things like these, by which he is beguiled. The wise man will perhaps not have them at all, and if he has them will himself reduce them, if he cares for his true self. He will reduce and gradually extinguish his bodily advantages by neglect, and will put away authority and office. He will take care of his bodily health, but will not wish to be altogether without experience of illness, nor indeed also of pain. Rather, even if these do not come to him he will want to learn them when he is young, but when he is old he will not want either pains or pleasures to hinder him, or any earthly thing, pleasant or the reverse, so that he may not have to consider the body. When he finds himself in pain he will oppose to it the power which he has been given for the purpose; he will find no help to his well-being in pleasure and health and freedom from pain and trouble, nor will their opposites take it away or diminish it. For if one thing adds nothing to a state, how can its opposite take anything away?

15. But suppose there were two wise men, one of whom had all of what are called natural goods and the other their opposites, shall we say that they both have well-being equally? Yes, if they are equally wise. Even if one is good-looking and has all the other advantages which have nothing to do with wisdom, or in any way with virtue and the vision of the best, or with the best itself, what does that amount to? After all, even the man who has these advantages will not give himself airs about them as if he was better off than the one who has not got them; to have more of them than others would be no help

αὐλητικὸν τέλος ἡ τούτων πλεονεξία συμβάλλοιτο. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ θεωροῦμεν τὸν εὐδαίμονα μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσθενείας φρικτὰ καὶ δεινὰ νομίζοντες, ἃ μὴ ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων νομίσειεν· ἢ οὔπω οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε εὐδαίμων εἴη μὴ τὰς περὶ τούτων φαντασίας ἁπάσας ἀλλαξάμενος καὶ οἷον ἄλλος παντάπασι γενόμενος πιστεύσας ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι μηδέν ποτε κακὸν ἕξει· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀδεὴς ἔσται περὶ πάντα. Ἡ δειλαίνων περί τινα οὐ τέλεος πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ ἡμισύς τις ἔσται. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον πρὸ κρίσεως δέος κἂν ποτε πρὸς ἄλλοις ἔχοντι γένηται, προσελθὼν ὁ σοφὸς ἀπώσεται καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ κινηθέντα οἷον πρὸς λύπας παῖδα καταπαύσει ἢ ἀπειλῇ ἢ λόγῳ· ἀπειλῇ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἐμβλέψαντος σεμνὸν μόνον παῖς ἐκπλαγείη. Οὐ μὴν διὰ ταῦτα ἄφιλος οὐδὲ ἀγνώμων ὁ τοιοῦτος· τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. Ἀποδιδοὺς οὖν ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις φίλος ἂν εἴη μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχειν.

16. Εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ νῷ τούτῳ ἄρας θήσειε τὸν σπουδαῖον, κατάγοι δὲ πρὸς τύχας καὶ ταύτας φοβήσεται περὶ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, οὔτε σπουδαῖον τηρήσει, οἷον ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῆ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ διδοὺς μικτὸν βίον ἔκ τινος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἀποδώσει τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον γενέσθαι. Ὃς εἰ καὶ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάζεσθαι εὐδαίμων εἴη ἄξιος οὐκ ἔχων τὸ μέγα οὔτε ἐν

even towards becoming a piper. But we bring our own weakness into it when we are considering whether a man is well off, and regard things as frightening and terrible which the man in a state of well-being would not so regard. He would not yet have attained to wisdom or well-being if he had not freed himself of all imaginations about this sort of thing, and become in a way quite a different man, with confidence in himself that evil can never touch him. In this state of mind he will be without fear of anything. If he is afraid at all he is not perfect in virtue, but a kind of half-man. If sometimes when he is concerned with other things an involuntary fear comes upon him before he has time to reflect, the wise man [in him] will come and drive it away and quiet the child in him which is stirred to a sort of distress, by threatening or reasoning; the threatening will be unemotional, as if the child was shocked into quietness just by a severe look. A man of this sort will not be unfriendly or unsympathetic; he will be like this to himself and in dealing with his own affairs: but he will render to his friends all that he renders to himself, and so will be the best of friends as well as remaining intelligent.

16. If anyone does not set the good man up on high in this world of intellect, but brings him down to chance events and fears their happening to him, he is not keeping his mind on the good man as we consider he must be, but assuming an ordinary man, a mixture of good and bad, and assigning to him a life which is also a mixture of good and bad and of a kind which cannot easily occur. Even if a person of this sort did exist, he would not be worth calling well off; he would have no greatness in him, either of the

ἀξίᾳ σοφίας οὔτε ἐν καθαρότητι ἀγαθοῦ. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐκεῖθεν ἄνωθεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιοῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπειν τὸν μέλλοντα σοφὸν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ζῆν. Τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν μόνον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὡς ἂν καὶ τόπους μεταβάλλοι οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τόπων προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς στοχαζόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περικεχυμένων αὐτόν, οἷον εἰ ὠδὶ κατακείσεται ἢ ὠδί, διδοὺς μὲν τούτῳ ὅσα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ δύναται, αὐτὸς δὲ ὢν ἄλλος οὐ κωλυόμενος καὶ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, καὶ ἀφήσων δὲ ἐν καιρῷ φύσεως, κύριος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τούτου. Ὥστε αὐτῷ τὰ ἔργα τὰ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνοντα ἔσται, τὰ δ' οὐ τοῦ τέλους χάριν καὶ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ προσεζευγμένου, οὗ φροντιεῖ καὶ ἀνέξεται, ἕως δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ μουσικὸς λύρας, ἕως οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλην ἀλλάξεται, ἢ ἀφήσει τὰς λύρας χρήσεις καὶ τοῦ εἰς λύραν ἐνεργεῖν ἀφέξεται ἄλλο ἔργον ἄνευ λύρας ἔχων καὶ κειμένην πλησίον περιόψεται ᾄδων ἄνευ ὀργάνων. Καὶ οὐ μάτην αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄργανον ἐδόθη· ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις.

dignity of wisdom or the purity of good. The common life of body and soul cannot possibly be the life of well-being. Plato was right in maintaining that the man who intends to be wise and in a state of well-being must take his good from There, from above, and look to that good and be made like it and live by it.[1] He must hold on to this only as his goal, and change his other circumstances as he changes his dwelling-place, not because he derives any advantage in the point of well-being from one dwelling-place or another, but guessing, as it were, how his alien covering will be affected if he lodges here or there. He must give to this bodily life as much as it needs and he can, but he is himself other than it and free to abandon it, and he will abandon it in nature's good time, and, besides, has the right to decide about this for himself. So some of his activities will tend towards well-being; others will not be directed to the goal and will really not belong to him but to that which is joined to him, which he will care for and bear with as long as he can, like a musician with his lyre, as long as he can use it; if he cannot use it he will change to another, or give up using the lyre and abandon the activities directed to it. Then he will have something else to do which does not need the lyre, and will let it lie unregarded beside him while he sings without an instrument. Yet the instrument was not given him at the beginning without good reason. He has used it often up till now.

[1] Plotinus is referring to *Symposium* 212A1 and the *Theaetetus* passage (176B1) quoted at the beginning of the treatise *On Virtue* (I. 2).

I. 5. ON WHETHER WELL-BEING INCREASES WITH TIME

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise is No. 36 in the chronological order; its subject is one that had been much discussed in the philosophical schools since Aristotle (see *Nicomachean Ethics* I. ch. 10), and, for once, Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans were substantially in agreement that the length of time a man was well off made no essential difference to his well-being. Plotinus's own original contribution to the discussion is his argument (ch. 7) that the life of well-being is really lived in eternity, not in time, and so the passage of time cannot affect it.

Synopsis

Well-being must consist in an actual present state, not in memory or anticipation (chs. 1–2). Short refutations of opposing arguments (chs. 2–5). The case of the man who is badly off (ch. 6). Well-being, time, and eternity (ch. 7). Memory of past goodness and pleasure can add nothing to well-being (chs. 8–9). Well-being a matter, not primarily of good external acts but of a good interior disposition (ch. 10).

I. 5. (36) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΤΟ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΙΝ ΕΠΙΔΟΣΙΝ ΧΡΟΝΩΙ ΛΑΜΒΑΝΕΙ

1. Εἰ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐπίδοσιν τῷ χρόνῳ λαμβάνει τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὼς καμβανομένου; Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ εὐδαιμονῆσαι ποιοῖ ἄν τι, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Ἡ δὲ διάθεσις ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ζωῆς.

2. Εἰ δ' ὅτι ἐφιέμεθα ἀεὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ τυγχάνειν τοῦ τοιούτου εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγοι μᾶλλον, πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω καὶ ἡ αὔριον εὐδαιμονία μείζων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἑξῆς ἀεὶ τῆς προτέρας, καὶ οὐκέτι μετρηθήσεται τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τῇ ἀρετῇ. Ἔπειτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ νῦν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονήσουσιν ἢ πρότερον καὶ οὔπω τέλεον καὶ οὐδέποτε τέλεον. Ἔπειτα καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις λαβοῦσα τὴν τεῦξιν τὸ παρὸν εἴληφε καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ ζητεῖ τὸ ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔχειν. Ἡ δ' ἔφεσις τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι ζητοῦσα τοῦ παρόντος ἂν εἴη, εἰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι. Εἰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θέλοι, ὃ ἔχει θέλει καὶ ὅ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὃ παρελήλυθεν οὐδ' ὃ μέλλει, ἀλλ' ὃ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ εἰσαεὶ ζητοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη εἶναι ἤδη.

3. Τί οὖν τὸ "πλείονα χρόνον εὐδαιμόνησε καὶ πλείονα χρόνον εἶδε τοῖς ὄμμασι τὸ αὐτό"; Εἰ

I. 5. ON WHETHER WELL-BEING INCREASES WITH TIME

1. Does well-being increase with time, though it is understood always to refer to our present state? Memory, surely, can play no part in well-being; nor is it a matter of talking, but of being in a particular state. And a state is something present, and so is actuality of life.

2. But if it is said that, because we are always aiming at life and actuality, attaining [progressively] to this is greater well-being; first of all tomorrow's well-being will always be greater, and that which comes after greater than what was before it, and well-being will no longer be measured by virtue. Even the gods will be better off now than they were before, but they will not be perfectly well off; they will never be perfectly well off. And then, desire when it attains its end attains something present, something present at each particular moment, and seeks to possess well-being as long as it exists. Then too, since the desire of life seeks existence, it will be desire of the present, if existence is in the present. Even if it does want the future and what comes after, it wants what it has and what it is, not what it has been or is going to be; it wants what is already to exist; it is not seeking for the everlasting but wants what is present now to exist now.

3. What, then, about the statement "he has been well off for longer and had the same thing before his

μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλείονι τὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶδε, πλέον ἄν τι ὁ χρόνος αὐτῷ εἰργάσατο· εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς εἶδε, τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁ ἅπαξ θεασάμενος ἔχει.

4. Ἀλλὰ πλείονα ἄτερος ἥσθη χρόνον. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι ἀριθμεῖν εἰς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγοι τις τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ζητουμένῳ λέγει. Καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ δὲ ἡ πλείων ἀεὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἔχει, τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς αὐτῆς οἴχεται.

5. Τί οὖν; Εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐδαιμόνησεν εἰς τέλος, ὁ δὲ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον, ὁ δὲ πρότερον εὐδαιμονήσας μετέβαλεν, ἔχουσι τὸ ἴσον; Ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἡ παραβολὴ οὐκ εὐδαιμονούντων γεγένηται πάντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐδαιμονούντων, ὅτε μὴ εὐδαιμόνουν, πρὸς εὐδαιμονοῦντα. Εἴ τι οὖν πλέον ἔχει, τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅσον ὁ εὐδαίμων πρὸς οὐκ εὐδαίμονας, ᾧ καὶ συμβαίνει πλεονεκτεῖν αὐτοὺς τῷ παρόντι.

6. Τί οὖν ὁ κακοδαίμων; Οὐ μᾶλλον κακοδαίμων τῷ πλείονι; Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα δυσχερῆ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλείονι χρόνῳ πλείω τὴν συμφορὰν δίδωσιν, οἷον ὀδύναι πολυχρόνιοι καὶ λῦπαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτου τοῦ τύπου; Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ κακὸν ἐπαύξει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὡσαύτως; Ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λυπῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν ἔχοι ἄν τις λέγειν, ὡς προσθήκην

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII. 14. 1153b. 10–12.

eyes for longer"? If in the longer time he gained a more accurate knowledge of it, then the time would have done something more for him. But if he knows it just the same all the time, the man who has seen it once has as much.

4. "But the first man had a longer period of pleasure." But it is not right to count pleasure in reckoning well-being. But if someone says that pleasure is "unhindered activity,"[1] he is stating just the conclusion we are seeking. And anyhow this longer-lasting pleasure at any moment only has what is present; past pleasure is gone and done with.

5. Well then, if one man has been well off from beginning to end, and another in the latter part of his life, and yet another has been well off at first and then changed his state, do they have equal shares? Here the comparison is not being made between people who are all in a state of well-being; it is a comparison of those who are not well off, at the time when they are not well off, with a man who is well off. So if this latter has anything more, he has just what the man in a state of well-being has in comparison with those who are not; and that means that his advantage is by something in the present.

6. Then what about the man who is badly off? Is he not worse off the longer his bad fortune lasts? And do not all other troubles make the misfortune worse the longer they last, long-lasting pains and griefs for instance, and other things of that stamp? But if these troubles in this way make the evil increase with the passage of time, why do not their opposites in the same way cause an increase of well-being? One could, certainly, say in the case of griefs and pains that time brings about an increase,

ὁ χρόνος δίδωσιν, οἷον τὸ ἐπιμένειν τὴν νόσον· ἕξις γὰρ γίνεται, καὶ κακοῦται μᾶλλον τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ σῶμα. Ἐπεί, εἴ γε τὸ αὐτὸ μένοι καὶ μὴ μείζων ἡ βλάβη, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν ἔσται, εἰ μὴ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς προσαριθμοῖ ἀφορῶν εἰς τὸ γενόμενον καὶ μένον· ἐπί τε τῆς κακοδαίμονος ἕξεως τὸ κακὸν ἐς τὸν πλείονα χρόνον ἐπιτείνεσθαι αὐξανομένης καὶ τῆς κακίας τῷ ἐμμόνῳ. Τῇ γοῦν προσθήκῃ τοῦ μᾶλλον, οὐ τῷ πλείονι ἴσῳ τὸ μᾶλλον κακοδαιμονεῖν γίνεται. Τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἴσον οὐχ ἅμα ἐστὶν οὐδὲ δὴ πλεῖον ὅλως λεκτέον τὸ μηκέτι ὂν τῷ ὄντι συναριθμοῦντα. Τὸ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ὅρον τε καὶ πέρας ἔχει καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπίδοσις παρὰ τὸν πλείονα χρόνον, ὥστε μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδόντα μείζονα, οὐ τὴν πολυετῆ εὐδαιμονίαν ἀριθμῶν ἐπαινεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μᾶλλον γενομένην τότε, ὅτε μᾶλλόν ἐστιν.

7. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἰ τὸ παρὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ μόνον καὶ μὴ συναριθμεῖν τῷ γενομένῳ, οὐ κἀπὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τῷ παρόντι συναριθμοῦντες πλείω λέγομεν; Διὰ τί οὖν οὐχ, ὅσος ὁ χρόνος, τοσαύτην καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐροῦμεν; Καὶ διαιροῖμεν ἂν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ χρόνου διαιρέσεις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῷ παρόντι μετροῦντες ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὴν

for instance in chronic illness; it becomes a permanent state, and as time goes on the condition of the body grows worse. For if it remains the same and the damage is no greater, then here too it will be the present state always which is painful, if one does not add on what is past in consideration of the persistence of the illness once it has come into existence; in the case of a state of ill-being, too, the evil will grow worse the longer it lasts since the badness of the state will be increased by its persistence. So the greater misfortune will be due to the addition of the increase, not to the persistence for a longer time in the same state. That which lasts longer in the same state is not all present at once; one ought not really to talk about "longer" at all, because it means reckoning that which does not any longer exist along with that which does. But as regards well-being, it has a boundary and a limit and is always the same. But if here too there is an increase with greater length of time, so that as a man progresses to greater virtue he is better off, one is not counting the many years of well-being and praising it for lasting so long, but praising it for being greater at the time when it is greater.

7. But why, if we ought only to consider the present and not to count it along with the past, do we not do the same with time? Why do we count the past along with the present and say that it is more? Why, then, should we not say that well-being is equal in quantity to the time its lasts? We should then divide well-being according to the divisions of time; of course if we measure it by the present we shall make it indivisible. Now it is not

ποιήσομεν. Ἢ τὸν μὲν χρόνον ἀριθμεῖν καὶ μηκέτι ὄντα οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ τῶν γενομένων μέν, μηκέτι δὲ ὄντων, ἀριθμὸν ἂν ποιησαίμεθα, οἷον τῶν τετελευτηκότων· εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ μηκέτι οὖσαν [παρεῖναι] λέγειν τῆς παρούσης πλείονα ἄτοπον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν συμμεμενηκέναι ἀξιοῖ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁ πλείων παρὰ τὸν παρόντα τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι. Ὅλως δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ πλέον σκέδασιν βούλεται ἑνός τινος ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄντος. Διὸ καὶ εἰκὼν αἰῶνος εἰκότως λέγεται ἀφανίζειν βουλομένη ἐν τῷ σκιδναμένῳ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐκείνου μένον. Ὅθεν κἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἀφέληται τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μεῖναν ἂν καὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσηται, ἀπώλεσεν αὐτό, σῳζόμενον τέως ἐκείνῳ τρόπον τινά, ἀπολόμενον δέ, ἐν αὐτῇ εἰ πᾶν γένοιτο. Εἴπερ οὖν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν κατὰ ζωὴν ἀγαθήν, δηλονότι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος αὐτὴν θετέον ζωήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀριθμητέα χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' αἰῶνι· τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον οὔτε μήκει τινί, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἀδιάστατον καὶ τὸ οὐ χρονικὸν εἶναι. Οὐ συναπτέον τοίνυν τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲ [τῷ αἰῶνι] τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲ τὸ χρονικὸν δὲ ἀεὶ τῷ αἰῶνι οὐδὲ παρεκτατέον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὅλον ληπτέον, εἴ ποτε λαμβάνοις, λαμβάνων οὐ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος τὴν ζωὴν τὴν οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ παντὸς χρόνου πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ.

8. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν μνήμην τῶν παρεληλυθότων ἐν τῷ ἐνεστηκότι μένουσαν παρέχεσθαι τὸ πλέον τῷ πλείονα χρόνον ἐν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν γεγενημένῳ, τί ἂν τὸ τῆς μνήμης λέγοι; Ἢ γὰρ

unreasonable to count time even when it does not exist any longer, since we reckon the number of things which have been there in the past but no longer exist, the dead for instance; but it is unreasonable to say that well-being which no longer exists is more than that which is present. For well-being requires to persist, but time over and above the present admits of existing no longer. In general extension of time means the dispersal of a single present. That is why it is properly called "the image of eternity," [1] since it intends to bring about the disappearance of what is permanent in eternity by its own dispersion. So if it takes from eternity what would be permanent in it and makes it its own, it destroys it—it is preserved, up to a point, by eternity, in one way, but destroyed if it passes altogether into temporal dispersion. So if well-being is a matter of good life, obviously the life concerned must be that of real being; for this is the best. So it must not be counted by time but by eternity; and this is neither more nor less nor of any extension, but is a "this here," unextended and timeless. So one must not join being to non-being or time or everlastingness of time to eternity nor must one extend the unextended; one must take it all as a whole, if one takes it at all, and apprehend, not the undividedness of time but the life of eternity, which is not made up of many times, but is all together from the whole of time.

8. But if someone says that the memory of the past remaining in the present gives more to the man who has been longer in a state of well-being, what does he mean by memory? If it is memory of previous

[1] Plato, *Timaeus* 37D5.

φρονήσεως μνήμη τῆς πρόσθεν γεγενημένης, ὥστε φρονιμώτερον ἂν λέγοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν τηροῖ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν μνήμην, ὥσπερ πολλῆς περιχαρίας δεομένου τοῦ εὐδαίμονος καὶ οὐκ ἀρκουμένου τῇ παρούσῃ. Καίτοι τί ἂν ἡδὺ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ ἡδέος ἔχοι; Ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ μνημονεύοι τις ὅτι ἐχθὲς ἐπὶ ὄψῳ ἥσθη· ἢ εἰς δέκατον ἔτος ἔτι ἂν εἴη γελοιότερος· τὸ δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως. ὅτι πέρυσιν ἐφρόνουν.

9. Εἰ δὲ τῶν καλῶν εἴη ἡ μνήμη, πῶς οὐκ ἐνταῦθα λέγοιτο ἄν τι; Ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐλλείποντος τοῖς καλοῖς ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν νυνὶ ζητοῦντος τὴν μνήμην τῶν γεγενημένων.

10. Ἀλλ' ὁ πολὺς χρόνος πολλὰς ποιεῖ καλὰς πράξεις, ὧν ἄμοιρος ὁ πρὸς ὀλίγον εὐδαίμων· εἰ δεῖ λέγειν ὅλως εὐδαίμονα τὸν οὐ διὰ πολλῶν τῶν καλῶν. Ἢ ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων λέγει, ἐκ τῶν μηκέτι ὄντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων καὶ ἑνός τινος τοῦ παρόντος τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν συνίστησι. Διὸ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐθέμεθα τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, εἶτα ἐζητοῦμεν εἰ μᾶλλόν ⟨ἐστι⟩ τὸ ἐν πλείονι εὐδαιμονῆσαι [μᾶλλόν ἐστι]. Τοῦτο οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ ταῖς πράξεσι ταῖς πλείοσι πλεονεκτεῖ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἔστι καὶ μὴ ἐν πράξεσι γενόμενον εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ πεπραγότος· ἔπειτα αἱ πράξεις οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν τὸ

virtue and intelligence, he will be saying that the man is more virtuous and intelligent [not better off] and so will not be keeping to the point; if it is memory of pleasure, he will be representing the man in a state of well-being as needing a great deal of extra enjoyment and not being satisfied with what he has. And besides what pleasure is there in the memory of pleasantness—for instance, if someone remembers that yesterday he enjoyed some nice food? And if it was ten years ago that he enjoyed it, he would be even more ridiculous. The same applies to the memory that one was virtuous and intelligent last year.

9. But if it is memory of excellence that is in question, is there not some sense in this? This is the idea of a man whose life is without excellence in the present, and because he has not got it now is seeking for memories of past excellences.

10. But length of time brings many excellent actions, in which the man who has only been well off for a short time has no share; if indeed we can call anyone well off who is not so as the result of much well-doing. Anyone who says that the state of well-being is produced by many times and actions is putting it together out of pieces which no longer exist but are past and one which is present. That is why we started by positing well-being in the present, and then enquired whether longer duration of well-being meant an increase. So we must enquire whether well-being which lasts for a long time is increased by a greater number of actions. First of all, it is possible for someone who is not active to be well off, and better off than the active man; then, actions do not produce goodness of themselves, but

εὖ διδόασιν, ἀλλ' αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ποιοῦσι καρποῦταί τε ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πράττων, οὐχ ὅτι πράττει οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ ἔχει. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πατρίδος γένοιτο ἂν καὶ παρὰ φαύλου, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς πατρίδος ἡδὺ καὶ ἄλλου πράξαντος γένοιτο ἂν αὐτῷ. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εἴ τι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν τίθεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι τιθέντος· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὠδὶ ἐνεργῆσαι. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐδαιμόνως.

it is men's dispositions which make actions excellent, and the wise and good man gets the benefit of goodness in his action, not from the fact that he acts nor the circumstances of his action, but from what he has. Even a bad man can save his country; and the good man's pleasure that his country is saved will be there even if someone else saves it. So it is not this which causes the pleasure of well-being; it is one's inner state which produces both well-being and any pleasure that results from it. To place well-being in actions is to locate it in something outside virtue and the soul; the activity of the soul lies in thought, and action of this kind within itself; and this is the state of well-being.

I. 6. ON BEAUTY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the first in Porphyry's chronological order (which does not necessarily mean that it was the first which Plotinus wrote). It has been perhaps the best known and most read treatise in the *Enneads*, both in ancient and modern times. It should be read with the later treatise *On the Intelligible Beauty* (V. 8). The two together give a fairly complete view of Plotinus's most original and important aesthetic philosophy and of how he understands the relationship of physical to moral beauty and of both to their origin in the intelligible beauty of the World of Forms and its principle, the Good. The object of the treatise *On Beauty*, as becomes clear in the later chapters, is not to provide its readers with an aesthetic philosophy but to exhort them to ascend through all the visible and invisible beauties of derived reality to the source of all beauty, the Good, on that journey of the mind to God which was always Plotinus's main concern.

Synopsis

What is it that makes things beautiful? We will start our enquiry by considering the beauty of bodies. The Stoic view that it is entirely a matter of good proportion will not do (ch. 1). It is due to the presence of form from the intelligible world (ch. 2) and we recognise and appreciate it by our inward knowledge of intelligible form (ch. 3). The beauty of virtue (ch. 4). It is the beauty of true reality in its transcendent purity, and its opposite, moral ugliness, is due to admixture with body (ch. 5). We attain to it by purifying ourselves (ch. 6). The supreme and absolute beauty, the Good (ch. 7). The way to it (ch. 8). The power of inner sight and how to develop it (ch. 9).

I. 6. (1) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ

1. Τὸ καλὸν ἔστι μὲν ἐν ὄψει πλεῖστον, ἔστι δ' ἐν ἀκοαῖς κατά τε λόγων συνθέσεις, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ ἁπάσῃ· καὶ γὰρ μέλη καὶ ῥυθμοί εἰσι καλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ προιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἕξεις καὶ ἐπιστῆμαί τε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν κάλλος. Εἰ δέ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, αὐτὸ δείξει. Τί οὖν δὴ τὸ πεποιηκὸς καὶ τὰ σώματα καλὰ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐπινεύειν ταῖς φωναῖς, ὡς καλαί; Καὶ ὅσα ἐφεξῆς ψυχῆς ἔχεται, πῶς ποτε πάντα καλά; Καὶ ἆρά γε ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλῷ τὰ πάντα, ἢ ἄλλο μὲν ἐν σώματι τὸ κάλλος, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ; Καὶ τίνα ποτὲ ταῦτα ἢ τοῦτο; Τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καλά, οἷον τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ μεθέξει, τὰ δὲ κάλλη αὐτά, ὥσπερ ἀρετῆς ἡ φύσις. Σώματα μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁτὲ μὲν καλά, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ καλὰ φαίνεται, ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ σώματα εἶναι, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ καλά. Τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρὸν τοῖς σώμασι; Πρῶτον γὰρ περὶ τούτου σκεπτέον. Τί οὖν ἐστιν, ὃ κινεῖ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν θεωμένων καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἕλκει καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι τῇ θέᾳ ποιεῖ; Τοῦτο γὰρ εὑρόντες τάχ' ἂν ἐπιβάθρᾳ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεασαί-

[1] Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 211C3.

I. 6. ON BEAUTY

1. Beauty is mostly in sight, but it is to be found too in things we hear, in combinations of words and also in music, and in all music [not only in songs]; for tunes and rhythms are certainly beautiful: and for those who are advancing upwards from sense-perception ways of life and actions and characters and intellectual activities are beautiful, and there is the beauty of virtue. If there is any beauty prior to these, it itself will reveal it.

Very well then, what is it which makes us imagine that bodies are beautiful and attracts our hearing to sounds because of their beauty? And how are all the things which depend on soul beautiful? Are they all made beautiful by one and the same beauty or is there one beautifulness in bodies and a different one in other things? And what are they, or what is it? Some things, bodies for instance, are not beautiful from the nature of the objects themselves, but by participation, others are beauties themselves, like the nature of virtue. The same bodies appear sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful, so that their being bodies is one thing, their being beautiful another. What is this principle, then, which is present in bodies? We ought to consider this first. What is it that attracts the gaze of those who look at something, and turns and draws them to it and makes them enjoy the sight? If we find this perhaps we can use it as a stepping-stone [1] and get

μεθα. Λέγεται μὲν δὴ παρὰ πάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τὸ τε τῆς εὐχροίας προστεθὲν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν κάλλος ποιεῖ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅλως τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τὸ καλοῖς εἶναι τὸ συμμέτροις καὶ μεμετρημένοις ὑπάρχειν· οἷς ἁπλοῦν οὐδέν, μόνον δὲ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀνάγκης καλὸν ὑπάρξει· τό τε ὅλον ἔσται καλὸν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἕκαστα οὐχ ἕξει παρ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὅλον συντελοῦντα, ἵνα καλὸν ᾖ· καίτοι δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅλον, καὶ τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐξ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὸ κάλλος. Τά τε χρώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ καλά, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἁπλᾶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἐκ συμμετρίας ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος ἔξω ἔσται τοῦ καλὰ εἶναι. Χρωσός τε δὴ πῶς καλόν; Καὶ νυκτὸς ἡ ἀστραπὴ ἢ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι τῷ καλά; Ἐπί τε τῶν φωνῶν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἁπλοῦν οἰχήσεται, καίτοι ἑκάστου φθόγγου πολλαχῇ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καλῷ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. Ὅταν δὲ δὴ τῆς αὐτῆς συμμετρίας μενούσης ὁτὲ μὲν καλὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον, ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ φαίνηται, πῶς οὐκ ἄλλο δεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ συμμέτρῳ λέγειν τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καλὸν εἶναι δι' ἄλλο; Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεταβαίνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καλοὺς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν αἰτιῷντο, τίς ἂν

[1] That good proportion was an essential part of beauty was a general Greek conviction, accepted by Plato and Aristotle; but it was the Stoics who defined beauty strictly and exclusively in these terms, cp. Cicero, *Tusculans* IV. 31, *et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris*

a sight of the rest. Nearly everyone says that it is good proportion of the parts to each other and to the whole, with the addition of good colour,[1] which produces visible beauty, and that with the objects of sight and generally with everything else, being beautiful is being well-proportioned and measured. On this theory nothing single and simple but only a composite thing will have any beauty. It will be the whole which is beautiful, and the parts will not have the property of beauty by themselves, but will contribute to the beauty of the whole. But if the whole is beautiful the parts must be beautiful too; a beautiful whole can certainly not be composed of ugly parts; all the parts must have beauty. For these people, too, beautiful colours, and the light of the sun as well, since they are simple and do not derive their beautifulness from good proportion, will be excluded from beauty. And how do they think gold manages to be beautiful? And what makes lightning in the night and stars beautiful to see? And in sounds in the same way the simple will be banished, though often in a composition which is beautiful as a whole each separate sound is beautiful. And when, though the same good proportion is there all the time, the same face sometimes appears beautiful and sometimes does not, surely we must say that being beautiful is something else over and above good proportion, and good proportion is beautiful because of something else? But if when these people pass on to ways of life and beautiful expressions of thought they allege good proportion as the cause of

quadam suavitate eaque dicitur pulchritudo..., repeated by S. Augustine with only slight variation in *De Civitate Dei* XXII. 19.

λέγοιτο ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασι συμμετρία καλοῖς ἢ νόμοις ἢ μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐπιστήμαις; Θεωρήματα γὰρ σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν εἴη; Εἰ δ' ὅτι σύμφωνά ἐστι, καὶ κακῶν ἔσται ὁμολογία τε καὶ συμφωνία. Τῷ γὰρ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἠλιθιότητα εἶναι τὸ τὴν δικαιοσύνην γενναίαν εἶναι εὐήθειαν σύμφωνον καὶ συνῳδὸν καὶ ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα. Κάλλος μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ πᾶσα καὶ κάλλος ἀληθινώτερον ἢ τὰ πρόσθεν· ἀλλὰ πῶς σύμμετρα; Οὔτε γὰρ ὡς μεγέθη οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρα· καὶ πλειόνων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντων, ἐν ποίῳ γὰρ λόγῳ ἡ σύνθεσις ἢ ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν μερῶν ἢ τῶν θεωρημάτων; Τὸ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κάλλος μονουμένου τί ἂν εἴη;

2. Πάλιν οὖν ἀναλαβόντες λέγωμεν τί δῆτά ἐστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καλὸν πρῶτον. Ἔστι μὲν γάρ τι καὶ βολῇ τῇ πρώτῃ αἰσθητὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ συνεῖσα λέγει καὶ ἐπιγνοῦσα ἀποδέχεται καὶ οἷον συναρμόττεται. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνίλλεται καὶ ἀρνεῖται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὐ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριουμένη. Φαμὲν δή, ὡς τὴν φύσιν οὖσα ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τῆς κρείττονος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐσίας, ὅ τι ἂν ἴδῃ συγγενὲς ἢ ἴχνος τοῦ συγγενοῦς, χαίρει τε καὶ διεπτόηται καὶ ἀναφέρει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεται ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῆς. Τίς οὖν ὁμοιότης τοῖς τῇδε πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ καλά;

[1] Cicero, in the *Tusculans* passage quoted above, goes on to draw a precise parallel between the beauty of body, which consists in good proportion with pleasant colour, and beauty of soul.

beauty in these too,[1] what can be meant by good proportion in beautiful ways of life or laws or studies or branches of knowledge? How can speculations be well-proportioned in relation to each other? If it is because they agree, there can be concord and agreement between bad ideas. The statement that "righteousness is a fine sort of silliness" agrees with and is in tune with the saying that "morality is stupidity";[2] the two fit perfectly. Again, every sort of virtue is a beauty of the soul, a truer beauty than those mentioned before; but how is virtue well-proportioned? Not like magnitudes or a number. We grant that the soul has several parts, but what is the formula for the composition or mixture in the soul of parts or speculations? And what [on this theory] will the beauty of the intellect alone by itself be?

2. So let us go back to the beginning and state what the primary beauty in bodies really is. It is something which we become aware of even at the first glance; the soul speaks of it as if it understood it, recognises and welcomes it and as it were adapts itself to it. But when it encounters the ugly it shrinks back and rejects it and turns away from it and is out of tune and alienated from it. Our explanation of this is that the soul, since it is by nature what it is and is related to the higher kind of reality in the realm of being, when it sees something akin to it or a trace of its kindred reality, is delighted and thrilled and returns to itself and remembers itself and its own possessions. What likeness, then, is there between beautiful things here and There? If

[2] Cp. Plato, *Republic* 348C11–12 and 560D2–3.

καὶ γάρ, εἰ ὁμοιότης, ὅμοια μὲν ἔστω· πῶς δὲ καλὰ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα; Μετοχῇ εἴδους φαμὲν ταῦτα. Πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄμορφον πεφυκὸς μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος δέχεσθαι ἄμοιρον ὂν λόγου καὶ εἴδους αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἔξω θείου λόγου· καὶ τὸ πάντη αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο. Αἰσχρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ μορφῆς καὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀνασχομένης τῆς ὕλης τὸ πάντη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μορφοῦσθαι. Προσιὸν οὖν τὸ εἶδος τὸ μὲν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐσόμενον μερῶν ἓν συνθέσει συνέταξέ τε καὶ εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ἤγαγε καὶ ἓν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ πεποίηκεν, ἐπείπερ ἓν ἦν αὐτὸ ἕν τε ἔδει τὸ μορφούμενον εἶναι ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτῷ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντι. Ἵδρυται οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος ἤδη εἰς ἓν συναχθέντος καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι διδὸν ἑαυτὸ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις. Ὅταν δὲ ἕν τι καὶ ὁμοιομερὲς καταλάβῃ, εἰς ὅλον δίδωσι τὸ αὐτό· οἷον ὁτὲ μὲν πάσῃ οἰκίᾳ μετὰ τῶν μερῶν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἑνὶ λίθῳ διδοίη τις φύσις τὸ κάλλος, τῇ δὲ ἡ τέχνη. Οὕτω μὲν δὴ τὸ καλὸν σῶμα γίγνεται λόγου ἀπὸ θείων ἐλθόντος κοινωνίᾳ.

3. Γινώσκει δὲ αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δύναμις τεταγμένη, ἧς οὐδὲν κυριώτερον εἰς κρίσιν τῶν ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη συνεπικρίνῃ ψυχή, τάχα δὲ καὶ αὕτη λέγῃ συναρμόττουσα τῷ παρ' αὐτῇ εἴδει κἀκείνῳ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν χρωμένη ὥσπερ

there is a likeness, let us agree that they are alike. But how are both the things in that world and the things in this beautiful? We maintain that the things in this world are beautiful by participating in form; for every shapeless thing which is naturally capable of receiving shape and form is ugly and outside the divine formative power as long as it has no share in formative power and form. This is absolute ugliness. But a thing is also ugly when it is not completely dominated by shape and formative power, since its matter has not submitted to be completely shaped according to the form. The form, then, approaches and composes that which is to come into being from many parts into a single ordered whole; it brings it into a completed unity and makes it one by agreement of its parts; for since it is one itself, that which is shaped by it must also be one as far as a thing can be which is composed of many parts. So beauty rests upon the material thing when it has been brought into unity, and gives itself to parts and wholes alike. When it comes upon something that is one and composed of like parts it gives the same gift to the whole; as sometimes art gives beauty to a whole house with its parts, and sometimes a nature gives beauty to a single stone. So then the beautiful body comes into being by sharing in a formative power which comes from the divine forms.

3. The power ordained for the purpose recognises this, and there is nothing more effective for judging its own subject-matter, when the rest of the soul judges along with it; or perhaps the rest of the soul too pronounces the judgement by fitting the beautiful body to the form in itself and using this for judg-

κανόνι τοῦ εὐθέος. Πῶς δὲ συμφωνεῖ τὸ περὶ σῶμα τῷ πρὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὲ τὴν ἔξω οἰκίαν τῷ ἔνδον οἰκίας εἶδει ὁ οἰκοδομικὸς συναρμόσας καλὴν εἶναι λέγει; Ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἔξω, εἰ χωρίσειας τοὺς λίθους, τὸ ἔνδον εἶδος μερισθὲν τῷ ἔξω ὕλης ὄγκῳ, ἀμερὲς ὂν ἐν πολλοῖς φανταζόμενον. Ὅταν οὖν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ ἐν σώμασιν εἶδος ἴδῃ συνδησάμενον καὶ κρατῆσαν τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐναντίας ἀμόρφου οὔσης καὶ μορφὴν ἐπὶ ἄλλαις μορφαῖς ἐκπρεπῶς ἐποχουμένην, συνελοῦσα ἀθρόον αὐτὸ τὸ πολλαχῇ ἀνήνεγκέ τε καὶ εἰσήγαγεν εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἀμερὲς ἤδη καὶ ἔδωκε τῷ ἔνδον σύμφωνον καὶ συναρμόττον καὶ φίλον· οἷα ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ προσηνὲς ἐπιφαινόμενον ἀρετῆς ἴχνος ἐν νέῳ συμφωνοῦν τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῷ ἔνδον. Τὸ δὲ τῆς χρόας κάλλος ἁπλοῦν μορφῇ καὶ κρατήσει τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ σκοτεινοῦ παρουσίᾳ φωτὸς ἀσωμάτου καὶ λόγου καὶ εἴδους ὄντος. Ὅθεν καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα σώματα καλόν, ὅτι τάξιν εἴδους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα ἔχει, ἄνω μὲν τῇ θέσει, λεπτότατον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὂν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ εἰσδεχόμενον τὰ ἄλλα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα δέχεται αὐτό. Θερμαίνεται γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, οὐ ψύχεται δὲ τοῦτο, κέχρωσταί τε πρώτως, τὰ δ' ἄλλα παρὰ τούτου τὸ εἶδος τῆς χρόας λαμβάνει. Λάμπει οὖν καὶ στίλβει, ὡς ἂν εἶδος ὄν. Τὸ δὲ

ing beauty as we use a ruler for judging straightness. But how does the bodily agree with that which is before body? How does the architect declare the house outside beautiful by fitting it to the form of house within him? The reason is that the house outside, apart from the stones, is the inner form divided by the external mass of matter, without parts but appearing in many parts. When sense-perception, then, sees the form in bodies binding and mastering the nature opposed to it, which is shapeless, and shape riding gloriously upon other shapes, it gathers into one that which appears dispersed and brings it back and takes it in, now without parts, to the soul's interior and presents it to that which is within as something in tune with it and fitting it and dear to it; just as when a good man sees a trace of virtue in the young, which is in tune with his own inner truth, the sight delights him. And the simple beauty of colour comes about by shape and the mastery of the darkness in matter by the presence of light which is incorporeal[1] and formative power and form. This is why fire itself is more beautiful than all other bodies, because it has the rank of form in relation to the other elements; it is above them in place and is the finest and subtlest of all bodies, being close to the incorporeal.[2] It alone does not admit the others; but the others admit it: for it warms them but is not cooled itself; it has colour primarily and all other things take the form of colour from it. So it shines and glitters as if it was a form. The inferior

[1] For Plotinus light is the incorporeal *ἐνέργεια* of the luminous body; cp. IV. 5, chs. 6 and 7.

[2] This seems to be a Platonic adaptation of the Stoic doctrine of fire as the divine formative principle.

μὴ κρατοῦν ἐξίτηλον τῷ φωτὶ γινόμενον οὐκέτι καλόν, ὡς ἂν τοῦ εἴδους τῆς χρόας οὐ μετέχον ὅλου. Αἱ δὲ ἁρμονίαι αἱ ἐν ταῖς φωναῖς αἱ ἀφανεῖς τὰς φανερὰς ποιήσασαι καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν ψυχὴν σύνεσιν καλοῦ λαβεῖν ἐποίησαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ δείξασαι. Παρακολουθεῖ δὲ ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς μετρεῖσθαι ἀριθμοῖς ἐν λόγῳ οὐ παντί, ἀλλ' ὃς ἂν ᾖ δουλεύων εἰς ποίησιν εἴδους εἰς τὸ κρατεῖν. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐν αἰσθήσει καλῶν, ἃ δὴ εἴδωλα καὶ σκιαὶ οἷον ἐκδραμοῦσαι εἰς ὕλην ἐλθοῦσαι ἐκόσμησάν τε καὶ διεπτόησαν φανεῖσαι, τοσαῦτα.

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν προσωτέρω καλῶν, ἃ οὐκέτι αἴσθησις ὁρᾶν εἴληχε, ψυχὴ δὲ ἄνευ ὀργάνων ὁρᾷ καὶ λέγει, ἀναβαίνοντας δεῖ θεάσασθαι καταλιπόντας τὴν αἴσθησιν κάτω περιμένειν. Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καλῶν οὐκ ἦν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν τοῖς μήτε ἑωρακόσι μήθ' ὡς καλῶν ἀντειλημμένοις, οἷον εἴ τινες ἐξ ἀρχῆς τυφλοὶ γεγονότες, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ περὶ κάλλους ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοῖς μὴ ἀποδεξαμένοις τὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων κάλλος, οὐδὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς φέγγους τοῖς μηδὲ φαντασθεῖσιν ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον, καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος οὔτε ἑῷος

[1] τὸ μὴ κρατοῦν in this sense is very odd, and unparalleled, but not quite impossible. I take the point of the sentence to be that Plotinus had noticed that dull, ugly colours sometimes look uglier and not more beautiful in a bright light and is trying to explain this in terms of his own theory; the matter of the thing is incapable of receiving enough of the form of colour which the light gives it to look beautiful. Another

thing[1] which becomes faint and dull by the fire's light is not beautiful any more, as not participating in the whole form of colour. The melodies in sounds, too, the imperceptible ones which make the perceptible ones, make the soul conscious of beauty in the same way, showing the same thing in another medium. It is proper to sensible melodies to be measured by numbers, not according to any and every sort of formula but one which serves for the production of form so that it may dominate. So much, then, for the beauties in the realm of sense, images and shadows which, so to speak, sally out and come into matter and adorn it and excite us when they appear.

4. But about the beauties beyond, which it is no more the part of sense to see, but the soul sees them and speaks of them without instruments—we must go up to them and contemplate them and leave sense to stay down below. Just as in the case of the beauties of sense it is impossible for those who have not seen them or grasped their beauty—those born blind, for instance—to speak about them, in the same way only those can speak about the beauty of ways of life who have accepted the beauty of ways of life and kinds of knowledge and everything else of the sort; and people cannot speak about the splendour of virtue who have never even imagined how fair is the face of justice and moral order; "neither the evening nor the morning star are as

possible translation is "fire that is overcome and vanishes in the sunlight." This has been suggested by Professor Post, who cites for comparison Plutarch *De Facie in Orbe Lunae* 933 D. It has obviously very much to commend it; my only reason for hesitation about adopting it is that there is nothing about the sun and its relationship to earthly fires in the context.

οὕτω καλά. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἰδόντας μὲν εἶναι ᾧ ψυχὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα βλέπει, ἰδόντας δὲ ἡσθῆναι καὶ ἔκπληξιν λαβεῖν καὶ πτοηθῆναι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ἅτε ἀληθινῶν ἤδη ἐφαπτομένους. Ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ πάθη γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ καλόν, θάμβος καὶ ἔκπληξιν ἡδεῖαν καὶ πόθον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ πτόησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα παθεῖν καὶ πάσχουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα πᾶσαι μέν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μᾶλλον μέντοι αἱ τούτων ἐρωτικώτεραι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων πάντες μὲν ὁρῶσι, κεντοῦνται δ' οὐκ ἴσα, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἳ μάλιστα, οἳ καὶ λέγονται ἐρᾶν.

5. Τῶν δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐν οὐκ αἰσθήσει ἐρωτικῶν ἀναπυνθάνεσθαι δεῖ· τί πάσχετε περὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ τρόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἤθη σώφρονα καὶ ὅλως ἔργα ἀρετῆς καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν κάλλος; Καὶ ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ἰδόντες τὰ ἔνδον καλοὺς τί πάσχετε; Καὶ πῶς ἀναβακχεύεσθε καὶ ἀνακινεῖσθε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς συνεῖναι ποθεῖτε συλλεξάμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων; Πάσχουσι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ ὄντως ἐρωτικοί. Τί δέ ἐστι, περὶ ὃ ταῦτα πάσχουσιν; Οὐ σχῆμα, οὐ χρῶμα, οὐ μέγεθός τι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχήν, ἀχρώματον μὲν αὐτήν, ἀχρώματον δὲ καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχουσαν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν ἀρετῶν φέγγος, ὅταν ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἴδητε, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ θεάσησθε μέγεθος

[1] Aristotle applies this quotation, probably from the *Melanippe* of Euripides (fr. 486 Nauck), to justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* V. 3. 1129b 28–9. Plotinus recalls the passage again at VI. 6. 6. 39.

[2] Cp. Plato, *Symposium* 210B–C.

fair."[1] But there must be those who see this beauty by that with which the soul sees things of this sort, and when they see it they must be delighted and overwhelmed and excited much more than by those beauties we spoke of before, since now it is true beauty they are grasping. These experiences must occur whenever there is contact with any sort of beautiful thing, wonder and a shock of delight and longing and passion and a happy excitement. One can have these experiences by contact with invisible beauties, and souls do have them, practically all, but particularly those who are more passionately in love with the invisible, just as with bodies all see them, but all are not stung as sharply, but some, who are called lovers, are most of all.

5. Then we must ask the lovers of that which is outside sense "What do you feel about beautiful ways of life, as we call them, and beautiful habits and well-ordered characters and in general about virtuous activities and dispositions and the beauty of souls?[2] What do you feel when you see your own inward beauty?[3] How are you stirred to wild exultation, and long to be with yourselves, gathering your selves together away from your bodies?" For this is what true lovers feel. But what is it which makes them feel like this? Not shape or colour[4] or any size, but soul, without colour itself and possessing a moral order without colour and possessing all the other light of the virtues; you feel like this when you see, in yourself or in someone else,

[3] Socrates prays for "inward beauty" at the end of the *Phaedrus*, 279B9.

[4] Plato's real being, the World of Forms, is described as "without colour or shape" at *Phaedrus* 247C6.

ψυχῆς καὶ ἦθος δίκαιον καὶ σωφροσύνην καθαρὰν καὶ ἀνδρίαν βλοσυρὸν ἔχουσαν πρόσωπον καὶ σεμνότητα καὶ αἰδῶ ἐπιθέουσαν ἐν ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ ἀκύμονι καὶ ἀπαθεῖ διαθέσει, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις τὸν θεοειδῆ νοῦν ἐπιλάμποντα. Ταῦτα οὖν ἀγάμενοι καὶ φιλοῦντες πῶς αὐτὰ λέγομεν καλά; Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ μήποτε ὁ ἰδὼν ἄλλο τι φῇ ἢ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα ταῦτα εἶναι. Τί ὄντα ὄντως; Ἢ καλά. Ἀλλ' ἔτι ποθεῖ ὁ λόγος, τί ὄντα πεποίηκε τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἐράσμιον· τί τὸ ἐπὶ πάσαις ἀρεταῖς διαπρέπον οἷον φῶς; Βούλει δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία λαβών, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν αἰσχρὰ γινόμενα, ἀντιπαραθεῖναι; Τάχα γὰρ ἂν συμβάλλοιτο πρὸς ὃ ζητοῦμεν τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστι καὶ διότι φανέν. Ἔστω δὴ ψυχὴ αἰσχρά, ἀκόλαστός τε καὶ ἄδικος, πλείστων μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμουσα, πλείστης δὲ ταραχῆς ἐν φόβοις διὰ δειλίαν, ἐν φθόνοις διὰ μικροπρέπειαν, πάντα φρονοῦσα ἃ δὴ καὶ φρονεῖ θνητὰ καὶ ταπεινά, σκολιὰ πανταχοῦ, ἡδονῶν οὐ καθαρῶν φίλη, ζῶσα ζωὴν τοῦ ὅ τι ἂν πάθῃ διὰ σώματος ὡς ἡδὺ λαβοῦσα αἶσχος. Αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ αἶσχος αὐτῇ ἆρα οὐ προσγεγονέναι οἷον ἐπακτὸν καλὸν φήσομεν, ὃ ἐλωβήσατο μὲν αὐτῇ, πεποίηκε δὲ αὐτὴν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ πολλῷ τῷ κακῷ συμπεφυρμένην, οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔτι ἔχουσαν οὐδὲ αἴσθησιν καθαράν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μίγματι τοῦ κακοῦ ἀμυδρᾷ τῇ ζωῇ κεχρημένην καὶ πολλῷ τῷ θανάτῳ κεκραμένην, οὐκέτι μὲν ὁρῶσαν ἃ δεῖ ψυχὴν ὁρᾶν, οὐκέτι δὲ ἐωμένην ἐν

[1] The phrase is taken from the description of Ajax advancing to battle in *Iliad* 7. 212.

greatness of soul, a righteous life, a pure morality, courage with its noble look,[1] and dignity and modesty advancing in a fearless, calm and unperturbed disposition, and the godlike light of intellect shining upon all this. We love and delight in these qualities, but why do we call them beautiful? They exist and appear to us and he who sees them cannot possibly say anything else except that they are what really exists. What does "really exists" mean? That they exist as beauties. But the argument still requires us to explain why real beings make the soul lovable. What is this kind of glorifying light on all the virtues? Would you like to take the opposites, the uglinesses in soul, and contrast them with the beauties? Perhaps a consideration of what ugliness is and why it appears so will help us to find what we are looking for. Suppose, then, an ugly soul, dissolute and unjust, full of all lusts, and all disturbance, sunk in fears by its cowardice and jealousies by its pettiness, thinking mean and mortal thoughts as far as it thinks at all, altogether distorted, loving impure pleasures, living a life which consists of bodily sensations and finding delight in its ugliness. Shall we not say that its ugliness came to it as a "beauty"[2] brought in from outside, injuring it and making it impure and "mixed with a great deal of evil,"[3] with its life and perceptions no longer pure, but by the admixture of evil living a dim life and diluted with a great deal of death, no longer seeing what a soul ought to see, no longer left in

[2] A beauty, that is, to the soul's corrupt perception; its perversion makes it apprehend *αἶσχος* as *καλὸν* as well as *ἡδύ*.

[3] From a violently dualistic passage in the *Phaedo* 66B5.

αὐτῇ μένειν τῷ ἔλκεσθαι ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ σκοτεινόν; Ἀκάθαρτος δή, οἶμαι, οὖσα καὶ φερομένη πανταχοῦ ὁλκαῖς πρὸς τὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει προσπίπτοντα, πολὺ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα ἐγκεκραμένον, τῷ ὑλικῷ πολλῷ συνοῦσα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν εἰσδεξαμένη εἶδος ἕτερον ἠλλάξατο κράσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· οἷον εἴ τις δὺς εἰς πηλὸν ἢ βόρβορον τὸ μὲν ὅπερ εἶχε κάλλος μηκέτι προφαίνοι, τοῦτο δὲ ὁρῷτο, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἢ βορβόρου ἀπεμάξατο· ᾧ δὴ τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσθήκῃ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου προσῆλθε καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἔσται πάλιν καλός, ἀπονιψαμένῳ καὶ καθηραμένῳ ὅπερ ἦν εἶναι. Αἰσχρὰν δὴ ψυχὴν λέγοντες μίξει καὶ κράσει καὶ νεύσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὕλην ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν. Καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο αἶσχος ψυχῇ μὴ καθαρᾷ μηδὲ εἰλικρινεῖ εἶναι ὥσπερ χρυσῷ, ἀναπεπλῆσθαι δὲ τοῦ γεώδους, ὃ εἴ τις ἀφέλοι, καταλέλειπται χρυσὸς καὶ ἔστι καλός, μονούμενος μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῷ δὲ συνὼν μόνῳ. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ψυχή, μονωθεῖσα μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἃς διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἔχει, ᾧ ἄγαν προσωμίλει, ἀπαλλαγεῖσα δὲ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν καὶ καθαρθεῖσα ἃ ἔχει σωματωθεῖσα, μείνασα μόνη τὸ αἰσχρὸν τὸ παρὰ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἅπαν ἀπεθήκατο.

6. Ἔστι γὰρ δή, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή. Διὸ καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς Ἅιδου κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον· οἷα

peace in itself because it keeps on being dragged out, and down, and to the dark? Impure, I think, and dragged in every direction towards the objects of sense, with a great deal of bodily stuff mixed into it, consorting much with matter and receiving a form other than its own it has changed by a mixture which makes it worse; just as if anyone gets into mud or filth he does not show any more the beauty which he had: what is seen is what he wiped off on himself from the mud and filth; his ugliness has come from an addition of alien matter, and his business, if he is to be beautiful again, is to wash and clean himself and so be again what he was before. So we shall be right in saying that the soul becomes ugly by mixture and dilution and inclination towards the body and matter. This is the soul's ugliness, not being pure and unmixed, like gold, but full of earthiness; if anyone takes the earthy stuff away the gold is left, and is beautiful, when it is singled out from other things and is alone by itself. In the same way the soul too, when it is separated from the lusts which it has through the body with which it consorted too much, and freed from its other affections, purged of what it gets from being embodied, when it abides alone has put away all the ugliness which came from the other nature.

6. For, as was said in old times, self-control, and courage and every virtue, is a purification, and so is even wisdom itself. This is why the mysteries are right when they say riddlingly that the man who has not been purified will lie in mud when he goes to Hades, because the impure is fond of mud by reason of its badness;[1] just as pigs, with their unclean

[1] Cp. Plato, *Phaedo* 69C1–6.

δὴ καὶ ὗες, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη σωφροσύνη ἀληθὴς ἢ τὸ μὴ προσομιλεῖν ἡδοναῖς τοῦ σώματος, φεύγειν δὲ ὡς οὐ καθαρὰς οὐδὲ καθαροῦ; Ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία ἀφοβία θανάτου. Ὁ δέ ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος. Οὐ φοβεῖται δὲ τοῦτο, ὃς ἀγαπᾷ μόνος γενέσθαι. Μεγαλοψυχία δὲ δὴ ὑπεροψία τῶν τῇδε. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις νόησις ἐν ἀποστροφῇ τῶν κάτω, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄνω τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγουσα. Γίνεται οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρθεῖσα εἶδος καὶ λόγος καὶ πάντη ἀσώματος καὶ νοερὰ καὶ ὅλη τοῦ θείου, ὅθεν ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ πάντα τοιαῦτα. Ψυχὴ οὖν ἀναχθεῖσα πρὸς νοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλόν ἐστι καλόν. Νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ νοῦ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῇ οἰκεῖον καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον, ὅτι τότε ἐστὶν ὄντως μόνον ψυχή. Διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιωθῆναι εἶναι θεῷ, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡ μοῖρα ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν ὄντων. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἡ καλλονή ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα φύσις τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον κακόν, ὥστε κἀκείνῳ ταὐτὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλόν, ἢ τἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλλονή. Ὁμοίως οὖν ζητητέον καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν τε καὶ κακόν. Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον θετέον τὴν καλλονήν, ὅπερ καὶ τἀγαθόν· ἀφ' οὗ νοῦς εὐθὺς τὸ καλόν· ψυχὴ δὲ νῷ καλόν·

[1] Diels, followed by Henry-Schwyzer, thinks that there is an allusion here to a remark Heraclitus appears to have made about pigs liking mud (fr. B13): but it seems to me at least possible that Plotinus might have thought of pigs at this point for himself, without any assistance from earlier philosophy.
[2] Cp. *Phaedo* 64C5–7.

bodies, like that sort of thing.[1] For what can true self-control be except not keeping company with bodily pleasures, but avoiding them as impure and belonging to something impure? Courage, too, is not being afraid of death. And death is the separation of body and soul;[2] and a man does not fear this if he welcomes the prospect of being alone. Again, greatness of soul is despising the things here: and wisdom is an intellectual activity which turns away from the things below and leads the soul to those above. So the soul when it is purified becomes form and formative power, altogether bodiless and intellectual and entirely belonging to the divine, whence beauty springs and all that is akin to it. Soul, then, when it is raised to the level of intellect increases in beauty. Intellect and the things of intellect are its beauty, its own beauty and not another's, since only then [when it is perfectly conformed to intellect] is it truly soul. For this reason it is right to say that the soul's becoming something good and beautiful is its being made like to God, because from Him come beauty and all else which falls to the lot of real beings. Or rather, beautifulness is reality, and the other kind of thing is the ugly, and this same is the primary evil; so for God the qualities of goodness and beauty are the same, or the realities, the good and beauty.[3] So we must follow the same line of enquiry to discover beauty and goodness, and ugliness and evil. And first we must posit beauty which is also the good; from this immediately comes intellect, which is beauty; and

[3] God, the First Principle of reality, has no qualities, but is absolutely single and simple, at once Absolute Good and Absolute Beauty.

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη παρὰ ψυχῆς μορφούσης καλά, τά τε ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τά τε ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, ψυχὴ ἤδη ποιεῖ· ἅτε γὰρ θεῖον οὖσα καὶ οἷον μοῖρα τοῦ καλοῦ, ὧν ἂν ἐφάψηται καὶ κρατῇ, καλὰ ταῦτα, ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς μεταλαβεῖν, ποιεῖ.

7. Ἀναβατέον οὖν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὗ ὀρέγεται πᾶσα ψυχή. Εἴ τις οὖν εἶδεν αὐτό, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὅπως καλόν. Ἐφετὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τοῦτο, τεῦξις δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀναβαίνουσι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐπιστραφεῖσι καὶ ἀποδυομένοις ἃ καταβαίνοντες ἠμφιέσμεθα· οἷον ἐπὶ τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἱερῶν τοῖς ἀνιοῦσι καθάρσεις τε καὶ ἱματίων ἀποθέσεις τῶν πρὶν καὶ τὸ γυμνοῖς ἀνιέναι· ἕως ἄν τις παρελθὼν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει πᾶν ὅσον ἀλλότριον τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτῷ μόνῳ αὐτὸ μόνον ἴδῃ εἰλικρινές, ἁπλοῦν, καθαρόν, ἀφ' οὗ πάντα ἐξήρτηται καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ ἔστι καὶ ζῇ καὶ νοεῖ· ζωῆς γὰρ αἴτιος καὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι. Τοῦτο οὖν εἴ τις ἴδοι, ποίους ἂν ἴσχοι ἔρωτας, ποίους δὲ πόθους, βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι, πῶς δ' ἂν ⟨οὐκ⟩ ἐκπλαγείη μεθ' ἡδονῆς; Ἔστι γὰρ τῷ μὲν μήπω ἰδόντι ὀρέγεσθαι ὡς ἀγαθοῦ· τῷ δὲ ἰδόντι ὑπάρχει ἐπὶ καλῷ ἄγασθαί τε καὶ θάμβους πίμπλασθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐκπλήττεσθαι ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἐρᾶν ἀληθῆ ἔρωτα καὶ δριμεῖς πόθους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων καταγελᾶν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν νομιζομένων καλῶν καταφρονεῖν· ὁποῖον πάσχουσιν ὅσοι θεῶν εἴδεσιν ἢ δαιμόνων προστυχόντες οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ὁμοίως ἄλλων κάλλη σωμάτων.

[1] Cp. *Symposium* 211E1.

soul is given beauty by intellect. Everything else is beautiful by the shaping of soul, the beauties in actions and in ways of life. And soul makes beautiful the bodies which are spoken of as beautiful; for since it is a divine thing and a kind of part of beauty, it makes everything it grasps and masters beautiful, as far as they are capable of participation.

7. So we must ascend again to the good, which every soul desires. Anyone who has seen it knows what I mean when I say that it is beautiful. It is desired as good, and the desire for it is directed to good, and the attainment of it is for those who go up to the higher world and are converted and strip off what we put on in our descent; (just as for those who go up to the celebrations of sacred rites there are purifications, and strippings off of the clothes they wore before, and going up naked) until, passing in the ascent all that is alien to the God, one sees with one's self alone That alone, simple, single and pure,[1] from which all depends and to which all look and are and live and think: for it is cause of life and mind and being. If anyone sees it, what passion will he feel, what longing in his desire to be united with it, what a shock of delight! The man who has not seen it may desire it as good, but he who has seen it glories in its beauty and is full of wonder and delight, enduring a shock which causes no hurt, loving with true passion and piercing longing; he laughs at all other loves and despises what he thought beautiful before; it is like the experience of those who have met appearances of gods or spirits and do not any more appreciate as they did the beauty of other bodies. "What then are we to think, if any-

Τί δῆτα οἰόμεθα, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν θεῷτο αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καθαρόν, μὴ σαρκῶν, μὴ σώματος ἀνάπλεων, μὴ ἐν γῇ, μὴ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἵν' ᾖ καθαρόν; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπακτὰ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ μέμικται καὶ οὐ πρῶτα, παρ' ἐκείνου δέ. Εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ χορηγεῖ μὲν ἅπασιν, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μένον δίδωσι καὶ οὐ δέχεταί τι εἰς αὐτό, ἴδοι, μένων ἐν τῇ θέᾳ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἀπολαύων αὐτοῦ ὁμοιούμενος, τίνος ἂν ἔτι δέοιτο καλοῦ; Τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ μάλιστα κάλλος ὂν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐργάζεται τοὺς ἐραστὰς αὐτοῦ καλοὺς καὶ ἐραστοὺς ποιεῖ. Οὗ δὴ καὶ ἀγὼν μέγιστος καὶ ἔσχατος ψυχαῖς πρόκειται, ὑπὲρ οὗ καὶ ὁ πᾶς πόνος, μὴ ἀμοίρους γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρίστης θέας, ἧς ὁ μὲν τυχὼν μακάριος ὄψιν μακαρίαν τεθεαμένος· ἀτυχὴς δὲ [οὗτος] ὁ μὴ τυχών. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ χρωμάτων ἢ σωμάτων καλῶν μὴ τυχὼν οὐδὲ δυνάμεως οὐδὲ ἀρχῶν οὐδὲ ὁ βασιλείας μὴ τυχὼν ἀτυχής, ἀλλ' ὁ τούτου καὶ μόνου, ὑπὲρ οὗ τῆς τεύξεως καὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἀρχὰς γῆς ἁπάσης καὶ θαλάττης καὶ οὐρανοῦ προέσθαι χρεών, εἰ καταλιπών τις ταῦτα καὶ ὑπεριδὼν εἰς ἐκεῖνο στραφεὶς ἴδοι.

8. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος; Τίς μηχανή; Πῶς τις θεάσηται κάλλος ἀμήχανον οἷον ἔνδον ἐν ἁγίοις ἱεροῖς μένον οὐδὲ προιὸν εἰς τὸ ἔξω, ἵνα τις καὶ βέβηλος ἴδῃ; Ἴτω δὴ καὶ συνεπέσθω εἰς τὸ εἴσω ὁ δυνάμενος ἔξω καταλιπὼν ὄψιν ὀμμάτων μηδ'

[1] Cp. *Symposium* 211A8 and D8–E2 (this is not an exact quotation but is amplified by Plotinus).
[2] A partial quotation from *Phaedrus*, 247B5–6.

one contemplates the absolute beauty which exists pure by itself, uncontaminated by flesh or body, not in earth or heaven, that it may keep its purity?"[1] All these other things are external additions and mixtures and not primary, but derived from it. If then one sees That which provides for all and remains by itself and gives to all but receives nothing into itself, if he abides in the contemplation of this kind of beauty and rejoices in being made like it, how can he need any other beauty? For this, since it is beauty most of all, and primary beauty, makes its lovers beautiful and lovable. Here the greatest, the ultimate contest is set before our souls;[2] all our toil and trouble is for this, not to be left without a share in the best of visions. The man who attains this is blessed in seeing that "blessed sight", and he who fails to attain it has failed utterly. A man has not failed if he fails to win beauty of colours or bodies, or power or office or kingship even, but if he fails to win this and only this. For this he should give up the attainment of kingship and of rule over all earth and sea and sky, if only by leaving and overlooking them he can turn to That and see.

8. But how shall we find the way?[3] What method can we devise? How can one see the "inconceivable beauty"[4] which stays within the holy sanctuary and does not come out where the profane may see it? Let him who can, follow and come within, and leave outside the sight of his eyes and

[3] This chapter made a deep impression on the mind of S. Augustine, and he uses phrases from it more than once in speaking of the return of the soul to God; cp. *De Civitate Dei* IX. 17 and *Confessions* I. 18 and VIII. 8.
[4] *Symposium* 218E2.

ἐπιστρέφων αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς προτέρας ἀγλαίας σωμάτων. Ἰδόντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ ἐν σώμασι καλὰ μήτοι προστρέχειν, ἀλλὰ γνόντας ὡς εἰσιν εἰκόνες καὶ ἴχνη καὶ σκιαὶ φεύγειν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὗ ταῦτα εἰκόνες. Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιδράμοι λαβεῖν βουλόμενος ὡς ἀληθινόν, οἷα εἰδώλου καλοῦ ἐφ' ὕδατος ὀχουμένου, ὁ λαβεῖν βουληθείς, ὡς πού τις μῦθος, δοκῶ μοι, αἰνίττεται, δὺς εἰς τὸ κάτω τοῦ ῥεύματος ἀφανὴς ἐγένετο, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ὁ ἐχόμενος τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων καὶ μὴ ἀφιεὶς οὐ τῷ σώματι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ καταδύσεται εἰς σκοτεινὰ καὶ ἀτερπῆ τῷ νῷ βάθη, ἔνθα τυφλὸς ἐν Ἅιδου μένων καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ σκιαῖς συνέσται. Φεύγωμεν δὴ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα, ἀληθέστερον ἄν τις παρακελεύοιτο. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγὴ καὶ πῶς; ἀναξόμεθα οἷον ἀπὸ μάγου Κίρκης (φησὶν) ἢ Καλυψοῦς Ὀδυσσεὺς (αἰνιττόμενος, δοκεῖ μοι) μεῖναι οὐκ ἀρεσθείς, καίτοι ἔχων ἡδονὰς δι' ὀμμάτων καὶ κάλλει πολλῷ αἰσθητῷ συνών. Πατρὶς δὴ ἡμῖν, ὅθεν παρήλθομεν, καὶ πατὴρ ἐκεῖ. Τίς οὖν ὁ στόλος καὶ ἡ φυγή; Οὐ ποσὶ δεῖ διανύσαι· πανταχοῦ γὰρ φέρουσι πόδες ἐπὶ γῆν ἄλλην ἀπ' ἄλλης· οὐδέ σε δεῖ ἵππων ὄχημα ἤ τι

not turn back to the bodily splendours which he saw before. When he sees the beauty in bodies he must not run after them; we must know that they are images, traces, shadows, and hurry away to that which they image. For if a man runs to the image and wants to seize it as if it was the reality (like a beautiful reflection playing on the water, which some story somewhere, I think, said riddlingly a man wanted to catch and sank down into the stream and disappeared) then this man who clings to beautiful bodies and will not let them go, will, like the man in the story, but in soul, not in body, sink down into the dark depths where intellect has no delight, and stay blind in Hades, consorting with shadows there and here. This would be truer advice "Let us fly to our dear country."[1] What then is our way of escape, and how are we to find it? We shall put out to sea, as Odysseus did, from the witch Circe or Calypso—as the poet says (I think with a hidden meaning)—and was not content to stay though he had delights of the eyes and lived among much beauty of sense. Our country from which we came is there, our Father is there. How shall we travel to it, where is our way of escape? We cannot get there on foot; for our feet only carry us everywhere in this world, from one country to another. You

[1] The quotation is from *Iliad* 2. 140 (of course from a quite irrelevant context). But Plotinus's mind turns immediately to reminiscences of *Odyssey* 9. 29 ff. and 10. 483–4, where Odysseus tells Alcinous how Calypso and Circe had loved him and tried to detain him on his journey home. Odysseus became in late antiquity, for Christians as well as pagans, the type of the soul journeying to its true home and overcoming all difficulties and temptations on the way.

θαλάττιον παρασκευάσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἀφεῖναι δεῖ καὶ μὴ βλέπειν, ἀλλ' οἷον μύσαντα ὄψιν ἄλλην ἀλλάξασθαι καὶ ἀνεγεῖραι, ἣν ἔχει μὲν πᾶς, χρῶνται δὲ ὀλίγοι.

9. Τί οὖν ἐκείνη, ἢ ἔνδον βλέπει; Ἄρτι μὲν ἐγειρομένη οὐ πάνυ τὰ λαμπρὰ δύναται βλέπειν. Ἐθιστέον οὖν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν πρῶτον μὲν τὰ καλὰ βλέπειν ἐπιτηδεύματα· εἶτα ἔργα καλά, οὐχ ὅσα αἱ τέχναι ἐργάζονται, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀγαθοί· εἶτα ψυχὴν ἴδε τῶν τὰ ἔργα τὰ καλὰ ἐργαζομένων. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἴδοις ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν οἷον τὸ κάλλος ἔχει; Ἄναγε ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καὶ ἴδε· κἂν μήπω σαυτὸν ἴδῃς καλόν, οἷα ποιητὴς ἀγάλματος, ὃ δεῖ καλὸν γενέσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀφαιρεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀπέξεσε, τὸ δὲ λεῖον, τὸ δὲ καθαρὸν ἐποίησεν, ἕως ἔδειξε καλὸν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀγάλματι πρόσωπον, οὕτω καὶ σὺ ἀφαίρει ὅσα περιττὰ καὶ ἀπεύθυνε ὅσα σκολιά, ὅσα σκοτεινὰ καθαίρων ἐργάζου εἶναι λαμπρὰ καὶ μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα, ἕως ἂν ἐκλάμψειέ σοι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ θεοειδὴς ἀγλαία, ἕως ἂν ἴδῃς σωφροσύνην ἐν ἁγνῷ βεβῶσαν βάθρῳ. Εἰ γέγονας τοῦτο καὶ εἶδες αὐτὸ καὶ σαυτῷ καθαρὸς συνεγένου οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὸ εἷς οὕτω γενέσθαι οὐδὲ σὺν αὐτῷ ἄλλο τι ἐντὸς μεμιγμένον ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅλος αὐτὸς φῶς ἀληθινὸν μόνον, οὐ μεγέθει μεμετρημένον οὐδὲ σχήματι εἰς ἐλάττωσιν περιγραφὲν οὐδ' αὖ εἰς μέγεθος δι' ἀπειρίας αὐξηθέν, ἀλλ' ἀμέτρητον πανταχοῦ, ὡς ἂν μεῖζον παντὸς

must not get ready a carriage, either, or a boat. Let all these things go, and do not look. Shut your eyes, and change to and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has but few use.

9. And what does this inner sight see? When it is just awakened it is not at all able to look at the brilliance before it. So that the soul must be trained, first of all to look at beautiful ways of life: then at beautiful works, not those which the arts produce, but the works of men who have a name for goodness: then look at the souls of the people who produce the beautiful works. How then can you see the sort of beauty a good soul has? Go back into yourself and look; and if you do not yet see yourself beautiful, then, just as someone making a statue which has to be beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth and clears another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too must cut away excess and straighten the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright, and never stop "working on your statue"[1] till the divine glory of virtue shines out on you, till you see "self-mastery enthroned upon its holy seat."[2] If you have become this, and see it, and are at home with yourself in purity, with nothing hindering you from becoming in this way one, with no inward mixture of anything else, but wholly yourself, nothing but true light, not measured by dimensions, or bounded by shape into littleness, or expanded to size by unboundedness, but everywhere unmeasured, because greater than all measure and

[1] A reference to *Phaedrus* 252D7; but in Plato it is the lover who works on the soul of his beloved, fashioning it into the likeness of the god they once followed together.
[2] *Phaedrus* 254B7.

μέτρου καὶ παντὸς κρεῖσσον ποσοῦ· εἰ τοῦτο γενόμενον σαυτὸν ἴδοις, ὄψις ἤδη γενόμενος θαρσήσας περὶ σαυτῷ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἀναβεβηκὼς μηκέτι τοῦ δεικνύντος δεηθεὶς ἀτενίσας ἴδε· οὗτος γὰρ μόνος ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ μέγα κάλλος βλέπει. Ἐὰν δὲ ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν λημῶν κακίαις καὶ οὐ κεκαθαρμένος ἢ ἀσθενής, ἀνανδρίᾳ οὐ δυνάμενος τὰ πάνυ λαμπρὰ βλέπειν, οὐδὲν βλέπει, κἂν ἄλλος δεικνύῃ παρὸν τὸ ὁραθῆναι δυνάμενον. Τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη. Γενέσθω δὴ πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς καὶ καλὸς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι θεόν τε καὶ καλόν. Ἥξει γὰρ πρῶτον ἀναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν κἀκεῖ πάντα εἴσεται καλὰ τὰ εἴδη καὶ φήσει τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο εἶναι, τὰς ἰδέας· πάντα γὰρ ταύταις καλά, τοῖς νοῦ γεννήμασι καὶ οὐσίας. Τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τούτου τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγομεν φύσιν προβεβλημένον τὸ καλὸν πρὸ αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν. Ὥστε ὁλοσχερεῖ μὲν λόγῳ τὸ πρῶτον καλόν· διαιρῶν δὲ τὰ νοητὰ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν καλὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν φήσει τόπον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐπέκεινα καὶ

superior to all quantity; when you see that you have become this, then you have become sight; you can trust yourself then; you have already ascended and need no one to show you; concentrate your gaze and see. This alone is the eye that sees the great beauty. But if anyone comes to the sight bleareyed with wickedness, and unpurified, or weak and by his cowardice unable to look at what is very bright, he sees nothing, even if someone shows him what is there and possible to see. For one must come to the sight with a seeing power made akin and like to what is seen. No eye ever saw the sun without becoming sun-like,[1] nor can a soul see beauty without becoming beautiful. You must become first all godlike and all beautiful if you intend to see God and beauty. First the soul will come in its ascent to intellect and there will know the Forms, all beautiful, and will affirm that these, the Ideas, are beauty; for all things are beautiful by these, by the products of intellect and essence. That which is beyond this we call the nature of the Good, which holds beauty as a screen before it.) So in a loose and general way of speaking the Good is the primary beauty; but if one distinguishes the intelligibles [from the Good] one will say that the place of the Forms[2] is the intelligible beauty, but the Good is That which is beyond, the "spring and

[1] Cp. *Republic* VI. 508B3 and 509A1. Plato's point in these passages is, however, not that the eye must become sun-like in order to see the sun, but that the eye (the symbol of knowledge) is sun-like but *not* the sun (the symbol of the Good). This Platonic context may perhaps be relevant to the correct interpretation of Plotinus's thought here and elsewhere where he speaks of the vision of the Good.

[2] Cp. *Republic* VII. 517B5.

πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ καλοῦ. Ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν πρῶτον θήσεται· πλὴν ἐκεῖ τὸ καλόν.

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[1] Cp. *Phaedrus* 245C9: the context of the phrase there is, however, quite different.

[2] Plotinus in these last sentences is discussing questions of language; he is very conscious of the inadequacy of all human

origin"[1] of beauty; or one will place the Good and the primal beauty on the same level: in any case, however, beauty is in the intelligible world.[2]

language to describe the realities here under discussion, and is prepared to tolerate a variety of ways of expressing the relationship of beauty to the Good; cp. the discussions of the same subject in V. 5. 12 and VI. 7. 22. The one thing he insists on is that true beauty is only to be found in the intelligible world, not in that of sense-perception.

I. 7. ON THE PRIMAL GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise is the last which Plotinus wrote before his death; in it we find the essentials of his moral and religious teaching in their simplest form. In the first chapter he establishes briefly the necessity of accepting the transcendent Platonic Good, refuting Aristotle's rejection of it according to Aristotle's own principles. Then, after stating that life is a way of sharing in the Good and so a good, he shows that death, the death he himself saw approaching, is a greater good than life in the body.

Synopsis

If, as Aristotle says, a thing's proper good is its full natural activity, then that to which the soul directs its best activity will be the Absolute Good; this has no activity directed towards other things but is the source and goal of all activities; it is, in a truer sense than Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, the supreme object of desire (ch. 1). Unity, existence, form, life, intellect are all in their degree ways of sharing in the Good, and soul approaches the Good through its life and intellect (ch. 2). But if life, then, is a good, is not death an evil? No, for life in the body is only good in so far as the soul separates itself from the body by virtue, and death, the separation of soul and body, brings the soul to a better life (ch. 3).

I. 7. (54) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ

1. Ἆρ' ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ἢ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργειαν, καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ πολλῶν εἴη, τούτῳ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειαν οἰκείαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπουσαν; Ψυχῆς δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἐνεργοῖ ἀρίστη οὖσα, οὐ μόνον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη. Εἰ οὖν τι μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνεργοῖ ἄριστον ὂν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, δι' ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διχῶς ἂν ἔχοι, ὅσα οὕτω τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὡμοιῶσθαι καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖσθαι. Εἰ οὖν ἔφεσις καὶ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν, δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπον μηδ' ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσαν πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐνεργειῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦσαν οὐ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργείᾳ—ἐκεῖνα γὰρ πρὸς αὐτήν—οὐ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐδὲ τῇ νοήσει τἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ

[1] These first lines are a compressed summary of Aristotelian and Stoic views about the good of the individual which are

I. 7. ON THE PRIMAL GOOD AND THE OTHER GOODS

1. Could one say that the good for a thing was anything else than the full natural activity of its life? If the thing was made up of many parts, would not its good be the proper, natural, and never-failing activity of the better part of it? So the soul's activity will be its natural good.[1] Now if it is of the best sort itself and its activity is directed towards the best, this best will not only be the good for it but it will be the good absolutely. Then if something does not direct its activity towards another thing, since it is the best of beings and transcends all beings, and all other things direct their activities towards it, it is obvious that this will be the Good, through which other things are enabled to participate in good. All the other things which have the good like this will have it in two ways, by being made like it and by directing their activity towards it. So if the aspiration and activity towards the best is good, the Good must not look or aspire to something else, but stay quiet and be the "spring and origin" of natural activities, and give other things the form of good, not by its activity directed to them—for they are directed to it, their source. It must not be the Good by activity or thought, but by reason of its

made in what follows to lead up to a Platonic view of the Absolute Good.

μονῇ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ νοήσεως. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τοῦτο δεῖ τἀγαθὸν τίθεσθαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς μηδέν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀληθὲς τὸ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. Δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα, ὥσπερ κύκλον πρὸς κέντρον ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσαι γραμμαί. Καὶ παράδειγμα ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ κέντρον ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτημένον πρὸς αὐτόν· πανταχοῦ γοῦν μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται· κἂν ἀποτεμεῖν ἐθελήσῃς ἐπὶ θάτερα, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιόν ἐστι τὸ φῶς.

2. Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸ πῶς; Ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα πρὸς ψυχήν, ψυχὴ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ διὰ νοῦ. Ἔχει δέ τι αὐτοῦ τῷ ἕν πως καὶ τῷ ὄν πως ἕκαστον εἶναι. Καὶ μετέχει δὲ καὶ εἴδους· ὡς οὖν μετέχει τούτων, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Εἰδώλου ἄρα· ὧν γὰρ μετέχει, εἴδωλα ὄντος καὶ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὡσαύτως. Ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ζῆν, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ τῇ μετὰ νοῦν, ἐγγυτέρω ἀληθείας, καὶ διὰ νοῦ ἀγαθειδὲς αὕτη· ἔχοι δ' ἂν τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέποι· νοῦς δὲ μετὰ τἀγαθόν. Ζωὴ τοίνυν, ὅτῳ τὸ ζῆν, τὸ ἀγαθόν,

[1] The famous phrase in Plato, *Republic* VI. 509B9, which is one of the foundations of Neo-Platonic theology.

very abiding. For because it is "beyond being," [1] it transcends activity and transcends mind and thought. For, to put it another way, one must assume the Good to be that on which everything else depends and which itself depends on nothing; for so the statement is true that it is that "to which everything aspires." [2] So it must stay still, and all things turn back to it, as a circle does to the centre from which all the radii come. The sun, too, is an example, since it is like a centre in relation to the light which comes from it and depends on it; for the light is everywhere with it and is not cut off from it; even if you want to cut it off on one side, the light remains with the sun.

2. And how is everything else directed towards it? Soulless things are directed towards soul, and soul to the Good through intellect. But soulless things too have something of it, because each particular thing is one somehow and is existent somehow. Soulless things, too, share in form; and as they share in unity, existence and form so they share in the Good. In an image of the Good, that is to say; for what they share in are images of existence and the One, and their form is an image too. But the life of soul, of the first soul which comes next after intellect, is nearer to truth, and this first soul has through intellect the form of good. It can have the Good if it looks to it (Intellect comes after the Good). Life, then, is the good to that which

[2] Aristotle's definition of the Good (*Nicomachean Ethics* I. 1094a3) here applied to the transcendent Platonic Good, probably not without some remembrance of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover in *Metaphysics* Λ 7. 1072a–b, which moves all things as the object of desire.

καὶ νοῦς, ὅτῳ νοῦ μέτεστιν· ὥστε ὅτῳ ζωὴ μετὰ νοῦ, διχῶς καὶ ἐπ' αὐτό.

3. Εἰ δ' ἡ ζωὴ ἀγαθόν, ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ζῶντι παντί; Ἢ οὔ· χωλεύει γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ τῷ φαύλῳ, ὥσπερ ὄμμα τῷ μὴ καθαρῶς ὁρῶντι· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. Εἰ δὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῖν, ᾗ μέμικται κακόν, ἀγαθόν, πῶς οὐχ ὁ θάνατος κακόν; Ἢ τίνι; Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν συμβεβηκέναι δεῖ τῳ· ὃ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι ὄν, ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἐστερημένον ζωῆς, οὐδ' οὕτω κακὸν ⟨οὐδέν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲν κακὸν⟩ τῷ λίθῳ. Εἰ δ' ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ θάνατον, ἤδη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὰ αὐτῆς ἄνευ σώματος. Εἰ δὲ τῆς ὅλης γίνεται, τί ἂν ἐκεῖ οὖσῃ εἴη κακόν; Καὶ ὅλως ὥσπερ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀγαθὸν μέν ἐστι, κακὸν δὲ οὐδέν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σωζούσῃ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ σῴζοι, οὐχ ὁ θάνατος ἂν εἴη κακὸν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ἡ ζωή. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκαι, πάλιν αὐτῇ ἡ ζωὴ κἀκεῖ κακόν, ὅτι μὴ ζωὴ μόνον. Ἀλλ' εἰ σύνοδος μὲν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ζωή, θάνατος δὲ διάλυσις τούτων, ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται ἀμφοτέρων δεκτική. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀγαθὴ ἡ ζωή, πῶς ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν; Ἢ ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡ ζωὴ οἷς ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν οὐ καθόσον σύνοδος, ἀλλ' ὅτι δι' ἀρετῆς ἀμύνεται τὸ κακόν· ὁ δὲ θάνατος μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν. Ἢ λεκτέον αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν ἐν σώματι ζωὴν κακὸν παρ' αὐτῆς, τῇ δὲ ἀρετῇ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ ζῶσαν τὸ σύνθετον, ἀλλ' ἤδη χωρίζουσαν ἑαυτήν.

lives, and intellect to that which has a share in intellect; so that if something has life and intellect, it has a twofold approach to the Good.

3. If life is a good, does every living thing have this good? No; in the bad, life limps; it is like an eye in one who does not see clear; it is not doing its proper work. But if our life, with its mixture of evil, is good, why is not death an evil? Evil for whom? Evil must happen to *someone*; and as for what does not exist any more or, if it exists, is deprived of life, there is nothing evil for this, just as nothing is evil for a stone. But if life and soul exist after death, then there is good, in proportion as it pursues its proper activity better without the body. If it becomes part of the universal soul, what evil can there be for it there? And altogether, just as the gods have good and no evil, so there is no evil for the sould which keeps its purity; and if it does not keep pure, it is not death that is an evil for it, but life. Even if there are punishments in Hades, it will be again life that is an evil for it, there too, because it is not simply life. But if life is a union of soul and body, and death is their separation, then the soul will be adapted to both. But if life is good, how can death not be an evil? Life is good to those for whom it is a good, not in so far as it is a union but because by virtue it keeps away evil; and death is a greater good. We must say that life in a body is an evil in itself, but the soul comes into good by its virtue, by not living the life of the compound but separating itself even now.

I. 8. ON WHAT ARE AND WHENCE COME EVILS

Introductory Note

THIS is again a very late treatise (No. 51 in Porphyry's chronological order). Its primary object appears to be to provide a solid metaphysical foundation for Plotinus's moral teaching about the necessity of purifying the soul by separating it from the material: this it does by showing that evil is not an imperfection or weakness of the soul but has an independent quasi-existence and is identical with matter. The treatise falls into three parts; the first (chs. 1–5) is intended to show that there is an absolute evil and that it is identical with matter, absolute formlessness; the second (chs. 6–7) is a commentary on Plotinus's favourite text from the *Theaetetus* (176A), coupled in ch. 7 with others from the *Timaeus* (47E–48A and 41B), in which two important objections to the idea of an absolute contrary to good, drawn from Aristotle's logic, are refuted; they are, that the existence of a term does not necessarily imply the existence of its contrary and that substance has no contrary; the third part (chs. 8 to 15) deals with a series of objections to the idea of matter as absolute evil, which come from various sources, mostly Aristotelian and Stoic.

The genuineness of various parts of the treatise has been attacked by Thedinga and Heinemann. Bréhier refutes their arguments briefly but adequately in the introduction to the treatise in his edition.

Synopsis

What is evil and how do we know it (ch. 1)? It cannot be included in what exists or in what is beyond existence;

there is no evil in the Good, Intellect or Soul (ch. 2). It must, then, be absolute non-existence, formlessness and unmeasuredness (ch. 3). Bodies are evil in the second degree, not absolute evil, and soul is not evil in itself at all; its evil comes from matter (ch. 4). Matter is absolute deficiency, not any particular evil but the source of them all (ch. 5). Commentary on a text from the *Theaetetus*, with refutation of objections drawn from Aristotle's logic (ch. 6). Linking of the *Theaetetus* text with texts from the *Timaeus* (ch. 7). It is never pure form, but form in matter and corrupted by matter which causes particular evils like ignorance and bad desires (ch. 8). We know particular evils by measuring them against good and seeing the falling short, but absolute evil by a process of extreme abstraction which leads to a "seeing which is not seeing" (ch. 9). Matter is evil by its very absence of quality (ch. 10). Refutation of arguments which make evil a privation, an impediment, or a weakness in the soul (chs. 11–14). The relationship between matter and soul and the nature of the soul's fall into matter (ch. 14). Summing-up, with emphasis on the moral implications of the doctrine (ch. 15).

I. 8. (51) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΘΕΝ ΤΑ ΚΑΚΑ

1. Οἱ ζητοῦντες, πόθεν τὰ κακά, εἴτ' οὖν εἰς τὰ ὄντα εἴτε περὶ γένος τῶν ὄντων παρελήλυθεν, ἀρχὴν ἂν προσήκουσαν τῆς ζητήσεως ποιοῖντο, εἰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ κακοῦ φύσις πρότερον ὑποθεῖντο. Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὅθεν ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὅπου ἵδρυται καὶ ὅτῳ συμβέβηκε γνωσθείη, καὶ ὅλως εἰ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὁμολογηθείη. Κακοῦ δὲ φύσιν τίνι ποτὲ δυνάμει τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνοίημεν ἄν, τῆς γνώσεως ἑκάστων δι' ὁμοιότητος γιγνομένης, ἄπορον ἂν εἴη. Νοῦς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχὴ εἴδη ὄντα εἰδῶν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν ἂν ποιοῖντο, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἂν ἔχοιεν τὴν ὄρεξιν· εἶδος δὲ τὸ κακὸν πῶς ἄν τις φαντάζοιτο ἐν ἀπουσίᾳ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐνδαλλόμενον; Ἀλλ' εἰ, ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον τὸ κακόν, ἥπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἔσται, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ διιδεῖν τοῖς μέλλουσι τὰ κακὰ γνώσεσθαι, ἐπείπερ προηγούμενα τὰ ἀμείνω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ εἴδη, τὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μᾶλλον. Ζήτημα δ' ὅμως καὶ πῶς ἐναντίον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ· εἰ μὴ ἄρα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὡς στέρησις. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον.

I. 8. ON WHAT ARE AND WHENCE COME EVILS

1. Those who enquire whence evils come, either into reality as a whole or to a particular kind of reality, would make an appropriate beginning of their enquiry if they proposed the question first, what evil is and what is its nature. In this way one would know whence it came and where its seat is and what it affects, and one would be able to decide the general question whether it really exists. But there would be no way to decide by which of the powers in us we know evil, if knowledge of everything comes by likeness. For intellect and soul, since they are Forms, would produce knowledge of Forms and have a natural tendency towards them. But how could anyone imagine that evil is a Form when it appears in the absence of every sort of good? But if, because opposites are known by one and the same kind of knowledge and evil is opposite to good, the knowledge of good will also be knowledge of evil, then those who mean to know evils must have a clear perception of good, since the better precedes the worse, and the better is Form, and the worse is not, but rather privation of form. How good is the opposite of evil is also something to investigate—perhaps one is the beginning, the other the end, and one is Form, the other privation. But we shall discuss this later.

2. Νῦν δὲ λεγέσθω, τίς ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, καθ' ὅσον τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις προσήκει. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται καὶ οὗ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεται ἀρχὴν ἔχοντα αὐτὸ κἀκείνου δεόμενα· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνενδεές, ἱκανὸν ἑαυτῷ, μηδενὸς δεόμενον, μέτρον πάντων καὶ πέρας, δοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοῦν καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ περὶ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν. Καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτου καλὰ πάντα· αὐτός τε γὰρ ὑπέρκαλος καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ἀρίστων βασιλεύων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, νοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος οὐ κατὰ νοῦν, ὃν οἰηθείη ἄν τις κατὰ τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένους νοῦς εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ προτάσεων συμπληρουμένους καὶ τῶν λεγομένων συνιέναι δυναμένους λογιζομένους τε καὶ τοῦ ἀκολούθου θεωρίαν ποιουμένους ὡς ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τὰ ὄντα θεωμένους ὡς πρότερον οὐκ ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ κενοὺς ἔτι πρὶν μαθεῖν ὄντας, καίτοι νοῦς ὄντας. Οὐ δὴ ἐκεῖνος ὁ νοῦς τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ἔχει πάντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ συνὼν καὶ ἔχει πάντα οὐκ ἔχων. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὅλον τε γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πανταχῇ πᾶν· καὶ οὐ συγκέχυται, ἀλλὰ αὖ χωρίς. Τὸ γοῦν μεταλαμβάνον οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅτου δύναται μεταλαμβάνει. Καὶ ἔστι πρώτη ἐνέργεια ἐκείνου καὶ πρώτη οὐσία ἐκείνου μένοντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· ἐνεργεῖ μέντοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον οἷον περὶ ἐκεῖνον ζῶν. Ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περὶ τοῦτον χορεύουσα ψυχὴ ἐπὶ αὐτὸν βλέπουσα καὶ τὸ εἴσω αὐτοῦ θεωμένη τὸν θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ βλέπει. Καὶ οὗτος θεῶν ἀπήμων καὶ μακάριος βίος καὶ τὸ κακὸν

[1] The Aristotelian definition of the Good; cp. I. 7. 1.

2. Now we must state what is the nature of the Good, as far as the present argument requires. It is that on which everything depends and "to which all beings aspire";[1] they have it as their principle and need it: but it is without need, sufficient to itself, lacking nothing, the measure and bound of all things, giving from itself intellect and real being and soul and life and intellectual activity. Up to it all things are beautiful. But he is beautiful beyond all beauty, and is king in the intelligible realm, transcending the best—intellect there is not the sort one might conceive on the analogy of our so-called intellects which get their content from premises and are able to understand what is said, and reason discursively and observe what follows, contemplating reality as the result of a process of reasoning since they did not have it before but were empty before they learnt, though they were intellects. Intellect there is not like this, but has all things and is all things, and is with them when it is with itself and has all things without having them. For it is not one thing and they another; nor is each individual thing in it separate; for each is the whole and in all ways all, and yet they are not confused, but each is in a different sense separate; at any rate what participates in it does not participate in everything at once, but in what it is capable of. That intellect is the first act of the Good and the first substance; the Good stays still in himself; but intellect moves about him in its activity, as also it lives around him. And soul dances round intellect outside, and looks to it, and in contemplating its interior sees God through it. "This is the life of the gods,"[2] without

[2] *Phaedrus* 248A1.

οὐδαμοῦ ἐνταῦθα καὶ εἰ ἐνταῦθα ἔστη, κακὸν οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερα τἀγαθὰ καὶ τρίτα· περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστί, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον πάντων καλῶν, καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐκείνου, καὶ δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.

3. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ κακὸν ἐνείη, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων· ἀγαθὰ γὰρ ταῦτα. Λείπεται τοίνυν, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι οἷον εἶδός τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὂν καὶ περί τι τῶν μεμιγμένων τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἢ ὁπωσοῦν κοινωνούντων τῷ μὴ ὄντι. Μὴ ὂν δὲ οὕτι τὸ παντελῶς μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον τοῦ ὄντος· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ μὴ ὂν ὡς κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἢ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πάθη ἢ ὕστερόν τι τούτων καὶ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς τούτοις ἢ ἀρχὴ τούτων ἢ ἕν τι τῶν συμπληρούντων τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ὄν. Ἤδη γὰρ ἄν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἥκοι αὐτοῦ οἷον ἀμετρίαν εἶναι πρὸς μέτρον καὶ ἄπειρον πρὸς πέρας καὶ ἀνείδεον πρὸς εἰδοποιητικὸν καὶ ἀεὶ ἐνδεὲς πρὸς αὔταρκες, ἀεὶ ἀόριστον, οὐδαμῇ ἑστώς, παμπαθές, ἀκόρητον, πενία παντελής· καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκότα ταῦτα

[1] This passage from the doubtfully genuine Platonic Second Letter (312E1–4) is one of the foundation-texts of Neo-Platonic theology.

[2] Cp. V. 8. 7. 22, where matter is called εἶδός τι ἔσχατόν.

[3] Plotinus is alluding to the discussion in Plato, *Sophist*, 250 ff. The point he is making is that he is not using "non-being" here in the sense in which it could be applied to a term

sorrow and blessed; evil is nowhere here, and if things had stopped here there would not have been any evil, only a First and the second and third goods. "All things are around the King of all, and That is the cause of all good and beautiful things, and all things belong to That, and the second things are around the Second and the third around the Third."[1]

3. If, then, these are what really exists and what is beyond existence, then evil cannot be included in what really exists or in what is beyond existence; for these are good. So it remains that if evil exists, it must be among non-existent things, as a sort of form of non-existence,[2] and pertain to one of the things that are mingled with non-being or somehow share in non-being. Non-being here does not mean absolute non-being but only something other than being; not non-being in the same way as the movement and rest which affect being,[3] but like an image of being or something still more non-existent. The whole world of sense is non-existent in this way, and also all sense-experience and whatever is posterior or incidental to this, or its principle, or one of the elements which go to make up the whole which is of this non-existent kind. At this point one might be able to arrive at some conception of evil as a kind of unmeasuredness in relation to measure, and unboundedness in relation to limit, and formlessness in relation to formative principle, and perpetual neediness in relation to what is self-sufficient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of influence, insatiate, complete poverty: and

logically distinct from being ("motion" means something different from "being") but to refer to matter as a pseudo-being, something which really is not being, a real unreality.

αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ ταῦτα, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ μέρος ἴδῃς, καὶ αὐτὸ πάντα ταῦτα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα, ὅσα ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλάβῃ καὶ ὁμοιωθῇ, κακὰ μὲν γίνεσθαι, οὐχ ὅπερ δὲ κακὰ εἶναι. Τίνι οὖν ὑποστάσει ταῦτα πάρεστιν οὐχ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη; Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἑτέρῳ συμβαίνει τὸ κακόν, δεῖ τι πρότερον αὐτὸ εἶναι, κἂν μὴ οὐσία τις ᾖ. Ὡς γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὃ συμβέβηκεν, οὕτω καὶ κακὸν τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἤδη κατ' ἐκεῖνο συμβεβηκὸς ἑτέρῳ. Τίς οὖν ἀμετρία, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ἀμέτρῳ; [Τί δὲ "μέτρον μὴ ἐν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ";] Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐστὶ μέτρον μὴ ἐν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ, οὕτω καὶ ἀμετρία οὐκ ἐν ἀμέτρῳ. Εἰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἢ ἐν ἀμέτρῳ—ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ αὐτῷ ἀμετρίας αὐτῷ ἀμέτρῳ ὄντι—ἢ ἐν μεμετρημένῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ μεμετρημένον ἀμετρίαν ἔχειν καθ' ὃ μεμέτρηται. Καὶ οὖν εἶναί τι καὶ ἄπειρον καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνείδεον αὖ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πρόσθεν, ἃ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ ἐχαρακτήριζε φύσιν, καὶ εἴ τι μετ' ἐκεῖνο τοιοῦτον, ἢ μεμιγμένον ἔχει τοῦτο ἢ βλέπον πρὸς αὐτό ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἢ ποιητικόν ἐστι τοιούτου. Τὴν δ' ὑποκειμένην σχήμασι καὶ εἴδεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ μέτροις καὶ πέρασι καὶ ἀλλοτρίῳ κόσμῳ κοσμουμένην, μηδὲν παρ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθὸν ἔχουσαν, εἴδωλον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ ὄντα,

[1] These words seem to be a rather stupid gloss on the sentence which follows. Plotinus speaks of both Intellect (VI. 5. 11, VI. 6. 18) and the One (V. 5. 4) as "measure which is not measured," the absolute standard of measurement which transcends all that is measured or numbered and is the source of measure or number.

all this is not accidental to it but in a sort of way its essence; whatever part of it you see, it is all this; and everything which participates in it and is made like it becomes evil, though not essential evil. What sort of entity, then, is it, in which all this is present, not as something different from itself but as itself? For if evil occurs accidentally in something else, it must be something itself first, even if it is not a substance. Just as there is absolute good and good as a quality, so there must be absolute evil and the evil derived from it which inheres in something else. What then is unmeasuredness, if it is not in what is unmeasured? [But what about "measure which is not in that which is measured?"][1] But just as there is measure which is not in that which is measured, so there is unmeasuredness which is not in the unmeasured. If it is in something else, it is either in something unmeasured—and then this something will have no need of unmeasuredness if it is unmeasured itself—or in something measured; but it is not possible for that which is measured to have unmeasuredness in the respect in which it is measured. So there must be something which is unbounded in itself and absolutely formless and has all the other attributes which we mentioned before as characterising the nature of evil; and if there is anything of the same sort posterior to this, it either has an admixture of this or is of the same sort because it directs its attention towards it, or because it is productive of something of this kind. So that which underlies figures and forms and shapes and measures and limits, decked out with an adornment which belongs to something else, having no good of its own, only a shadow in comparison with real being,

κακοῦ δὴ οὐσίαν, εἴ τις καὶ δύναται κακοῦ οὐσία εἶναι, ταύτην ἀνευρίσκει ὁ λόγος κακὸν εἶναι πρῶτον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ κακόν.

4. Σωμάτων δὲ φύσις, καθόσον μετέχει ὕλης, κακὸν ἂν οὐ πρῶτον εἴη· ἔχει μὲν γὰρ εἴδός τι οὐκ ἀληθινὸν ἐστέρηταί τε ζωῆς φθείρει τε ἄλληλα φορά τε παρ' αὐτῶν ἄτακτος ἐμπόδιά τε ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν φεύγει τε οὐσίαν ἀεὶ ῥέοντα, δεύτερον κακόν· ψυχὴ δὲ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὐ κακὴ οὐδ' αὖ πᾶσα κακή. Ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κακή; Οἷόν φησι· δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧ πέφυκε κακία ψυχῆς ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὡς τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους τὸ κακὸν δεχομένου, ἀμετρίαν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς κακία, ἀκούσια παθήματα, δόξας ψευδεῖς ἐμποιοῦντα κακά τε νομίζειν καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἃ φεύγει τε καὶ διώκει. Ἀλλὰ τί τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὴν κακίαν ταύτην καὶ πῶς εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐκείνην καὶ αἰτίαν ἀνάξεις; Ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔξω ὕλης οὐδὲ καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη. Μέμικται οὖν ἀμετρίᾳ καὶ ἄμοιρος εἴδους τοῦ κοσμοῦντος καὶ εἰς μέτρον ἄγοντος· σώματι γὰρ ἐγκέκραται ὕλην ἔχοντι. Ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον εἰ βλάπτοιτο, ὁρᾶν κωλύεται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ πρὸς ὕλην νενευκέναι καὶ ὅλως οὐ πρὸς οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γένεσιν ὁρᾶν, ἧς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλης φύσις οὕτως

[1] *Phaedrus* 256B2–3.

is the substance of evil (if there really can be a substance of evil); this is what our argument discovers to be the primal evil, absolute evil.

4. The nature of bodies, in so far as it participates in matter, will be an evil, not the primal evil. For bodies have a sort of form which is not true form, and they are deprived of life, and in their disorderly motion they destroy each other, and they hinder the soul in its proper activity, and they evade reality in their continual flow, being secondary evil. The soul is not in itself evil, nor is it all evil. Which, then, is the evil soul? It is the sort of thing which Plato means when he says "those in whom the part of the soul in which evil naturally resides has been brought into subjection,"[1] that is, it is the irrational part of the soul which is receptive of evil, that is of unmeasuredness and excess and defect, from which come unrestrained wickedness and cowardice and all the rest of the soul's evil, involuntary affections which produce false opinions, making it think that the things which it shuns and seeks after are evil and good respectively. But what is it which produces this evil, and how are you going to trace it back to the source and cause of evil which you have just described? First of all, this kind of soul is not outside matter or by itself. So it is mixed with unmeasuredness and without a share in the form which brings order and reduces to measure, since it is fused with a body which has matter. And then its reasoning part, if that is damaged, is hindered in its seeing by the passions and by being darkened by matter, and inclined to matter, and altogether by looking towards becoming, not being; and the principle of becoming is the nature of matter, which is so evil

οὖσα κακὴ ὡς καὶ τὸ μήπω ἐν αὐτῇ, μόνον δὲ βλέψαν εἰς αὐτὴν, ἀναπιμπλάναι κακοῦ ἑαυτῆς. Ἄμοιρος γὰρ παντελῶς οὖσα ἀγαθοῦ καὶ στέρησις τούτου καὶ ἄκρατος ἔλλειψις ἐξομοιοῖ ἑαυτῇ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῆς προσάψηται ὁπωσοῦν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία καὶ πρὸς νοῦν νεύουσα ψυχὴ ἀεὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ὕλην ἀπέστραπται καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ ἄμετρον καὶ κακὸν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὔτε πελάζει· καθαρὰ οὖν μένει ὁρισθεῖσα νῷ παντελῶς. Ἡ δὲ μὴ μείνασα τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς προελθοῦσα τῷ μὴ τελείῳ μηδὲ πρώτῳ οἷον ἴνδαλμα ἐκείνης τῷ ἐλλείμματι καθόσον ἐνέλιπεν ἀοριστίας πληρωθεῖσα σκότος ὁρᾷ καὶ ἔχει ἤδη ὕλην βλέπουσα εἰς ὃ μὴ βλέπει, ὡς λεγόμεθα ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ σκότος.

5. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰτία τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ συνεῖναι τῷ σκότει, τὸ κακὸν εἴη ἂν ἐν τῇ ἐλλείψει [ἢ τῷ σκότῳ] τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πρῶτον— δεύτερον δὲ ἔστω τὸ σκότος—καὶ ἡ φύσις τοῦ κακοῦ οὐκέτι ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὕλης. Ἢ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλλείψει, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ παντελεῖ τὸ κακόν· τὸ γοῦν ἐλλεῖπον ὀλίγῳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ κακόν, δύναται γὰρ καὶ τέλεον εἶναι ὡς πρὸς φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' ὅταν παντελῶς ἐλλείπῃ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως κακὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει ἡ ὕλη, ἵνα ἀγαθοῦ ταύτῃ μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμον αὐτῇ τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν αὐτὸ μὴ εἶναι. Ἡ οὖν ἔλλειψις ἔχει μὲν τὸ μὴ

that it infects with its own evil that which is not in it but only directs its gaze to it. For since it is altogether without any share in good and is a privation of good and a pure lack of it, it makes everything which comes into contact with it in any way like itself. The perfect soul, then, which directs itself to intellect is always pure and turns away from matter and neither sees nor approaches anything undefined and unmeasured and evil. It remains, therefore, pure, completely defined by intellect. That which does not stay like this, but goes out from itself because it is not perfect or primary but is a sort of ghost of the first soul, because of its deficiency, as far as it extends, is filled with indefiniteness and sees darkness, and has matter by looking at that which it does not look at (as we say that we see darkness as well as the things we really see).

5. But if lack of good is the cause of seeing and keeping company with darkness, then evil for the soul will lie in the lack [or the dark] and this will be primary evil—the darkness can be put second—and the nature of evil will no longer be in matter but before matter. Yes, but evil is not in any sort of deficiency but in absolute deficiency; a thing which is only slightly deficient in good is not evil, for it can even be perfect on the level of its own nature. But when something is absolutely deficient—and this is matter—this is essential evil without any share in good. For matter has not even being—if it had it would by this means have a share in good; when we say it "is" we are just using the same word for two different things, and the true way of speaking is to say it "is not." Deficiency, then, involves being not good, but

ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἡ δὲ παντελὴς τὸ κακόν· ἡ δὲ πλείων τὸ πεσεῖν εἰς τὸ κακὸν δύνασθαι καὶ ἤδη κακόν. Τῷ χρὴ [δὴ] τὸ κακὸν νοεῖσθαι μὴ τόδε τὸ κακόν, οἷον ἀδικίαν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ κακίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ οὐδὲν μέν πω τούτων, ταῦτα δὲ οἷον εἴδη ἐκείνου προσθήκαις εἰδοποιούμενα· οἷον ἐν μὲν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν καὶ ταύτης αὖ εἴδη ἢ ὕλῃ περὶ ἣν, ἢ τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τῷ τὸ μὲν οἷον ὁρᾶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὁρμᾶν ἢ πάσχειν. Εἰ δέ τις θεῖτο καὶ τὰ ἔξω ψυχῆς κακὰ εἶναι, πῶς ἐπ' ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν ἀνάξει, οἷον νόσον, πενίαν; Ἡ νόσον μὲν ἔλλειψιν καὶ ὑπερβολὴν σωμάτων ἐνύλων τάξιν καὶ μέτρον οὐκ ἀνεχομένων, αἶσχος δὲ ὕλην οὐ κρατηθεῖσαν εἴδει, πενίαν δὲ ἔνδειαν καὶ στέρησιν ὧν ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν διὰ τὴν ὕλην ᾗ συνεζεύγμεθα φύσιν ἔχουσαν χρησμοσύνην εἶναι. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐ θετέον ἡμᾶς ἀρχὴν κακῶν εἶναι κακοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν ὄντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἡμῶν ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν ἀνθρώπους κατάσχῃ, κατέχειν οὐχ ἑκόντας, ἀλλ' εἶναι μὲν ἀποφυγὴν κακῶν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τοῖς δυνηθεῖσι, πάντας δὲ οὐ δύνασθαι. Θεοῖς δὲ ὕλης παρούσης τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ κακὸν μὴ παρεῖναι, τὴν κακίαν ἣν ἀνθρωποι ἔχουσιν, μηδ' ἀνθρώποις ἅπασι· κρατεῖν γὰρ αὐτῆς—ἀμείνους δέ, οἷς μὴ πάρεστι—καὶ τούτῳ κρατεῖν δὲ τῷ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντι.

6. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πῶς λέγεται μὴ ἂν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καὶ ἐν θεοῖς μὲν οὐκ εἶναι, περιπολεῖν δὲ τὴν

[1] θεοῖς (Heintz) seems a certain correction for the MSS θέσις or θέσεις.

absolute deficiency evil; great deficiency involves the possibility of falling into evil and is already an evil in itself. On this principle one must not think of evil as this or that particular kind of evil, injustice for instance or any other vice, but that which is not yet any of these particular evils; these are a sort of species of evil, specified by their own particular additions; as wickedness in the soul and its species are specified by the matter which they concern or the parts of the soul, or by the fact that one is like a sort of seeing, another like an impulse or experience.

But if one considers that things external to the soul are evils, illness or poverty for instance, how will one trace them back to the nature of matter? Illness is defect and excess of material bodies which do not keep order and measure; ugliness is matter not mastered by form; poverty is lack and deprivation of things which we need because of the matter with which we are coupled, whose very nature is to be need. If this is true, then we must not be assumed to be the principle of evil as being evil by and from ourselves; evils are prior to us, and those that take hold on men do not do so with their good will, but there is an "escape from the evils in the soul" for those who are capable of it, though not all men are. Though there is matter with the visible gods [1], evil is not there, not the vice which men have—since not even all men have it; the visible gods master matter,—yet the gods with whom there is no matter are better—and they master it by that in them which is not in matter.

6. We must consider, too, what Plato means when he says "Evils can never be done away with," but exist "of necessity"; and that "they have no

θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον ἀεί.
Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως εἴρηται, ὡς τοῦ μὲν οὐρανοῦ καθαροῦ κακῶν ὄντος ἀεὶ ἐν τάξει ἰόντος καὶ κόσμῳ φερομένου καὶ μήτε ἀδικίας ἐκεῖ οὔσης μήτε ἄλλης κακίας μήτε ἀδικοῦντα ἄλληλα, κόσμῳ δὲ φερόμενα, ἐν γῇ δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας οὔσης; Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ θνητὴ φύσις καὶ ὅδε ὁ τόπος. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν φεύγειν δεῖ οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς λέγεται. Φυγὴ γάρ, φησιν, οὐ τὸ ἐκ γῆς ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄντα ἐπὶ γῆς δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι μετὰ φρονήσεως, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον φεύγειν κακίαν δεῖν, ὥστε τὰ κακὰ αὐτῷ ἡ κακία καὶ ὅσα ἐκ κακίας· καὶ τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου δὲ ἀναίρεσιν λέγοντος κακῶν ἔσεσθαι, εἰ πείθοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἃ λέγει, ὁ δέ φησι μὴ δύνασθαι τοῦτο γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, ἐπείπερ τοὐναντίον τι δεῖ εἶναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Τὴν μὲν οὖν κακίαν τὴν περὶ ἄνθρωπον πῶς οἷόν τε ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀγαθῷ; Ἐναντίον γὰρ τοῦτο τῇ ἀρετῇ, αὕτη δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθόν, ὃ κρατεῖν τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖ. Ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ πῶς ἄν τι εἴη ἐναντίον; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιόν. Εἶτα τίς ἀνάγκη πανταχοῦ, εἰ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ θάτερον; Ἐνδεχέσθω μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἔστω γε καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ ὄντος—οἷον ὑγιείας οὔσης ἐνδέχεται καὶ νόσον εἶναι—οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

[1] Here again we have *Theaetetus* 176A (cp. I. 2. 1).

[2] Plotinus clearly means to reject the suggested interpretation of Plato in terms of the spatial other-worldliness common in his own day; which would make earth the place of evil

place among the gods, but haunt our mortal nature and this region for ever."[1] Is it meant that heaven is "clean of evil" because it always moves regularly and goes on in order, and there is no injustice or other vice there, nor do the heavenly bodies do injustice to each other, but go on in order, but on earth there is injustice and disorder? For this is what is meant by "mortal nature" and "this place." But when he says "we must take flight from thence" he is no longer referring to life on earth.[2] For "flight," he says, is not going away from earth but being on earth "just and holy with the help of wisdom"; what he means is that we must fly from wickedness; so evil for him is wickedness and all that comes from wickedness; and when the answering speaker in the dialogue says that there would be an end of evils "if he convinced men of the truth of his words" Socrates answers that "this cannot be; evils must exist of necessity, since the good must have its contrary." But how can human wickedness be the contrary of that transcendent Good? Human wickedness is contrary to virtue, and virtue is not the Good, but a good, which enables us to master matter. How can anything be contrary to the transcendent Good? It is not of a particular quality; and then what universal necessity is there, that if one of a pair of contraries exists, the other must also exist? Granted that it is possible, and may in fact be the case, that when one contrary exists, the other does also—as when health exists sickness can also exist—all the same it is not necessarily so. But Plato does

and the visible heavens above the moon altogether good and pure. The quotations here and in what follows are all from *Theaetetus*, 176–7.

Ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐπὶ παντὸς ἐναντίου τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴρηται. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὐσία τἀγαθόν, πῶς ἐστιν αὐτῷ τι ἐναντίον; ἢ τῷ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας; Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ εἶναι μηδὲν οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὐσιῶν ἐστι πιστὸν τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ δεδειγμένον· ὅλως δὲ οὐσίᾳ οὐκ ἔστι δεδειγμένον. Ἀλλὰ τί τῇ καθόλου οὐσίᾳ ἔσται ἐναντίον καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πρώτοις; Ἢ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ ἡ μὴ οὐσία, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ φύσει ἥτις ἐστὶ κακοῦ φύσις καὶ ἀρχή· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ ἄμφω, ἡ μὲν κακῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθῶν· καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἑκατέρᾳ ἐναντία· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅλα ἐναντία καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία ἢ τὰ ἄλλα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει ὄντα ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει καὶ κοινοῦ τινός ἐστι μετειληφότα ἐν οἷς ἐστιν· ὅσα δὲ χωρίς ἐστι, καὶ ἃ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐστὶ συμπληρώσει τοῦ ὅ ἐστι, τούτων τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐστί, πῶς οὐ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἐναντία, εἴπερ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστηκότα; Πέρατι δὴ καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ [τὰ ἄλλα,] ὅσα ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ θείᾳ φύσει, ἀπειρία καὶ ἀμετρία καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἔχει ἡ κακὴ φύσις, ἐναντία· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῷ ὅλῳ ἐναντίον. Καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ ψευδόμενον ἔχει καὶ πρώτως καὶ ὄντως ψεῦδος· τῷ δὲ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθῶς εἶναι· ὥστε καὶ καθὰ τὸ ψεῦδος τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ ⟨μὴ⟩ κατ' οὐσίαν τῷ κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἐναντίον. Ὥστε ἡμῖν ἀνα-

not necessarily mean that this is true in the case of every contrary; he is only referring to the Good. But if the Good is substance, or something which transcends substance, how can it have any contrary? That there is nothing contrary to substance is established by inductive demonstration in the case of particular substances; but it has not been demonstrated that this applies in general. But what can there be contrary to universal substance and, in general, to the first principles? Non-substance is contrary to substance, and that which is the nature and principle of evil to the nature of good: for both are principles, one of evils, the other of goods; and all the things which are included in each nature are contrary to those in the other; so that the wholes are contrary, and more contrary to each other than are the other contraries. For the other contraries belong to the same species or the same genus and have something in common as a result of this belonging. But things which are completely separate, and in which there are present in one the contraries to whatever is necessary for the fulfilment of the being of the other, must surely be most of all contraries, if by contraries we mean things that are furthest of all removed from each other. Indefiniteness and unmeasuredness and all the other characteristics which the evil nature has are contrary to the definition and measure and all the characteristics present in the divine nature; so the whole, too, is contrary to the whole. The evil nature, too, has a false being, primary and absolute falsehood; the being of the divine is true being; so that as falsehood is contrary to truth, so is the non-substantiality of the evil nature contrary to the substantial reality of

πέφανται τὸ μὴ πανταχοῦ οὐσίᾳ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐναντίον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἐδεξάμεθα ἂν εἶναι ἐναντία, εἰ μὴ κοινὸν ἦν ἡ ὕλη ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐφ' ἧς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν συμβεβηκότα ἐγίνετο· εἰ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἦν μόνα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν συμπληροῦντα ἄνευ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ἐγίγνετο ἂν ἐναντίον καὶ ἐνταῦθα, οὐσία οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίον. Τὰ ἄρα πάντη κεχωρισμένα καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα κοινὸν καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ φύσει αὐτῶν ἐναντία· ἐπείπερ ἡ ἐναντίωσις οὐχ ᾗ ποιόν τι οὐδὲ ὅλως ὁτιοῦν γένος τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ᾗ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται καὶ ἐξ ἀντιθέτων συνέστηκε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖ.

7. Ἀλλὰ πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ κακόν; Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ὅτι ἐν τῷ παντὶ δεῖ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι; Ἐξ ἐναντίων γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόδε τὸ πᾶν· ἢ οὐδ' ἂν εἴη μὴ ὕλης οὔσης. Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἔκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ὅσα παρὰ θεοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν ἥκει, ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχαίας φύσεως, τὴν ὕλην λέγων τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὔπω κοσμηθεῖσαν [εἰ θεῷτο]. Ἀλλὰ πῶς θνητὴν

[1] *Timaeus* 47E5–48A1.

[2] There is an allusion here to *Politicus* 273B5 and D4.

[3] *Timaeus* 41B2–4. If the material universe is never to be dissolved, then matter-evil is a permanent element in our mortal life, from which we cannot escape by getting into a

the divine. So we have shown that it is not universally true that there is nothing contrary to substance. Besides, even in the case of fire and water, we should accept that they were contraries if they did not have matter as a common element in them, in which hot and dry and wet and cold occurred as accidents. If they only had the things which go to make up their substantial forms without what they have in common, there would be here too a contrariety of substance to substance. So things which are altogether separate, and have nothing in common, and are as far apart as they can be, are contrary in their very nature: for their contrariety does not depend on quality or any other category of being, but on their furthest possible separation from each other, and on their being made up of opposites and on their contrary action.

7. But how then is it necessary that if the Good exists, so should evil? Is it because there must be matter in the All? This All must certainly be composed of contrary principles; it would not exist at all if matter did not exist. "For the generation of this universe was a mixed result of the combination of intellect and necessity." [1] What comes into it from God is good; the evil comes from the "ancient nature" (Plato means the underlying matter, not yet set in order).[2] But what does he mean by "mortal nature," granted that "this place" refers to the All? The answer is given where he says "Since you have come into being, you are not immortal, but you shall by no means be dissolved" through me.[3] If this is so, the statement is

superior part of the universe but only by a radical inner detachment from the body.

φύσιν; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόνδε τὸν τόπον ἔστω δεικνύειν τὸ πᾶν. Ἢ τὸ ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ ἐγένεσθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὔκ ἐστε, οὔτι γε μὴν λυθήσεσθε δι' ἐμέ. Εἰ δὴ οὕτως, ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο μὴ ἂν ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά. Πῶς οὖν ἐκφεύξεται; Οὐ τῷ τόπῳ, φησίν, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴν κτησάμενος καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὸν χωρίσας· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὕλης· ὡς ὅ γε συνὼν τῷ σώματι καὶ ὕλῃ σύνεστι. Τὸ δὲ χωρίσαι καὶ μὴ δῆλόν που αὐτὸς ποιεῖ· τὸ δ' ἐν θεοῖς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀθάνατοι. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ οὕτω τὴν ἀνάγκην. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη τῇ ἐκβάσει τῇ παρ' αὐτό, ἤ, εἰ οὕτω τις ἐθέλοι λέγειν, τῇ ἀεὶ ὑποβάσει καὶ ἀποστάσει, τὸ ἔσχατον, καὶ μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι γενέσθαι ὁτιοῦν, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ κακόν. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲν ἔτι ἔχουσα αὐτοῦ. Καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ κακοῦ.

8. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ διὰ τὴν ὕλην ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι κακούς—μήτε γὰρ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διὰ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι μήτε τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς πονηράς· καὶ γάρ, εἰ διὰ σώματος κακίαν ἡ σύστασις γίνοιτο, μὴ τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖν, οἷον θερμότητας, ψυχρότητας, πικρὸν, ἁλμυρὸν καὶ ὅσα χυμῶν εἴδη, ἔτι πληρώσεις, κενώσεις, καὶ πληρώσεις οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ πληρώσεις τοιῶνδε, καὶ ὅλως τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καί, εἰ βούλει, δοξῶν ἐσφαλμένων, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ὕλην τὸ κακὸν εἶναι—καὶ οὗτος οὐδὲν ἧττον τὴν ὕλην συγχωρεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται τὸ κακὸν εἶναι.

correct that "evils will never be done away with." How then is one to escape? Not by movement in place, Plato says, but by winning virtue and separating oneself from the body: for in this way one separates oneself from matter as well, since the man who lives in close connection with the body is also closely connected with matter. Plato himself explains somewhere about separating or not separating oneself: but being "among the gods" means "among the beings of the world of intellect"; for these are immortal.

One can grasp the necessity of evil in this way too. Since not only the Good exists, there must be the last end to the process of going out past it, or if one prefers to put it like this, going down or going away: and this last, after which nothing else can come into being, is evil. Now it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and therefore that the Last should exist; and this is matter, which possesses nothing at all of the Good. And in this way too evil is necessary.

8. But if someone says that we do not become evil because of matter—giving as a reason that ignorance is not caused by matter, nor are bad desires; even supposing that their coming into existence is caused by the badness of body, it is not the matter but the form that causes them, heat, cold, bitter, salt and all the forms of flavour, and also fillings and emptyings, and not just fillings, but fillings with bodies of a particular quality; and in general it is the qualified thing which produces the distinction of desires, and, if you like, of falsified opinions, so that form rather than matter is evil—he too will be compelled all the same to admit that matter is evil. For what the

Ἃ τε γὰρ ποιεῖ ἡ ἐν ὕλῃ ποιότης, οὐ χωρὶς οὖσα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ πελέκεως ἄνευ σιδήρου ποιεῖ· εἶτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἴδη οὐ ταὐτά ἐστιν, ἅπερ ἦν, εἰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ λόγοι ἔνυλοι φθαρέντες ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐκείνης ἀναπλησθέντες· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ καίει οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ταῦτα ἐργάζεται, ἃ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ γενόμενα λέγεται ποιεῖν. Γενομένη γὰρ κυρία τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμφαντασθέντος φθείρει αὐτὸ καὶ διόλλυσι τὴν αὐτῆς παραθεῖσα φύσιν ἐναντίαν οὖσαν, οὐ τῷ θερμῷ τὸ ψυχρὸν προσφέρουσα, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ αὐτῆς ἀνείδεον προσάγουσα καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν τῇ μορφῇ καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν τῷ μεμετρημένῳ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸ ποιήσῃ αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔτι εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐν τροφῇ ζῴων τὸ εἰσενεχθὲν μηκέτι εἶναι ὅπερ προσελήλυθεν, ἀλλ' αἷμα κυνὸς καὶ πᾶν κύνιον, καὶ χυμοὶ πάντες οἷπερ τοῦ δεξαμένου ἐκείνου. Εἰ δὴ σῶμα αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν, ὕλη ἂν εἴη καὶ ταύτῃ αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν. Ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν ἔδει, ἄλλος ἄν εἴποι. Ἀλλ' οὐ καθαρὸν τὸ δυνάμενον κρατεῖν, εἰ μὴ φύγοι. Καὶ σφοδρότεραι δέ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κράσει τοιᾷδε σωμάτων, ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλων, ὥστε μὴ κρατεῖν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ἀμβλύτεροι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν διὰ σωμάτων κάκην κατεψυγμένοι καὶ ἐμπεποδισμένοι, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι ποιοῦσιν ἀνερματίστους. Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ αἱ πρὸς καιρὸν ἕξεις. Πλήρεις μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι καὶ

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *De Anima* B. 1. 412b12. This is good Aristotelian doctrine used to lead to a very un-Aristotelian conclusion.

quality in matter does, it does not do when it is separate, as the shape of the axe does not do anything without the iron.[1] Then, too, the forms in matter are not the same as they would be if they were by themselves; they are formative forces immanent in matter, corrupted in matter and infected with its nature. Essential fire does not burn, nor do any other forms existing by themselves do what they are said to do when they come to exist in matter. For matter masters what is imaged in it and corrupts and destroys it by applying its own nature which is contrary to form, not bringing cold to hot but putting its own formlessness to the form of heat and its shapelessness to the shape and its excess and defect to that which is measured, till it has made the form belong to matter and no longer to itself; just as when animals feed that which is taken in is no longer as it came but becomes dog's blood and everything doggish, and all the juices become like those of the animal which receives them. If then the body is the cause of evils, matter would be in this way too the cause of evils.

But, someone else might say, we have to get the better of it. But that which could get the better of it is not in a pure state unless it escapes. And the passions are stronger because of a corresponding mixture of bodies, and some people's passions are stronger than others', so that the individual's power cannot get the better of them, and some people have their powers of judgement dulled because bodily badness has chilled and restricted them; the opposite vices of bodily constitution make them unstable. The variations in our state of mind at different times are evidence of this too. When we

ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, κενοὶ δὲ ἄλλοι, καὶ ταδὶ πληρωθέντες ἄλλοι, ταδὶ δὲ ἄλλοι. Ἔστω δὴ πρώτως μὲν τὸ ἄμετρον κακόν, τὸ δ' ἐν ἀμετρίᾳ γενόμενον ἢ ὁμοιώσει ἢ μεταλήψει τῷ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ δευτέρως κακόν· καὶ πρώτως μὲν τὸ σκότος, τὸ δὲ ἐσκοτισμένον δευτέρως ὡσαύτως. Κακία δὴ ἄγνοια οὖσα καὶ ἀμετρία περὶ ψυχὴν δευτέρως κακὸν καὶ οὐκ αὐτοκακόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀρετὴ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὡμοίωται ἢ μετείληφεν αὐτοῦ.

9. Τίνι οὖν ἐγνωρίσαμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ πρῶτον κακίαν τίνι; Ἀρετὴν μὲν γὰρ νῷ αὐτῷ καὶ φρονήσει· αὐτὴν γὰρ γνωρίζει· κακίαν δὲ πῶς; Ἢ ὥσπερ κανόνι τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ μή, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐναρμόζον τῇ ἀρετῇ [κακίαν]. Βλέποντες οὖν αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ βλέποντες, τὴν κακίαν λέγω; Ἢ τὴν μὲν παντελῆ κακίαν οὐ βλέποντες· καὶ γὰρ ἄπειρον· ἀφαιρέσει οὖν τὸ μηδαμοῦ τοῦτο· τὴν δὲ μὴ παντελῆ τῷ ἐλλείπειν τούτῳ. Μέρος οὖν ὁρῶντες τῷ παρόντι μέρει τὸ ἀπὸν λαμβάνοντες, ὅ ἐστι μὲν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ εἶδει, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἄπεστιν, οὕτω κακίαν λέγομεν, ἐν ἀορίστῳ τὸ ἐστερημένον καταλιπόντες. Καὶ δὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης οἷον αἰσχρόν τι πρόσωπον ἰδόντες, οὐ κρατήσαντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε κρύψαι τὸ τῆς ὕλης αἶσχος, αἰσχρὸν φανταζόμεθα τῇ τοῦ εἴδους ἐλλείψει. Ὁ δὲ

are full we are different, both in our desires and our thoughts, from what we are when we are empty, and when we have eaten our fill of one kind of food we are different from what we are when we are filled with another.

So then, let unmeasure be the primary evil, and that which is in a state of unmeasuredness by likeness or participation evil in a secondary sense, because its unmeasuredness is accidental. Primary evil is the darkness, secondary evil the darkened, in the same way. Vice, which is ignorance and unmeasuredness in the soul, is evil secondarily, not absolute evil: just as virtue is not primary good, but that which is made like to or participates in it.

9. With what, then, do we know good and evil? First, of all, with what do we know vice? We know virtue by our very intellect and power of thought; it knows itself: but how do we know vice? Just as with a ruler we know what is straight and also what is not straight, so we know what does not fit with virtue. Do we see it then or do we not see it when we know it, vice I mean? We do not see absolute wickedness, because it is unbounded; we know it by removal, as what is in no way virtue; but we know vice which is not absolute by its falling short of virtue. So we see a part, and by the part which is there we grasp what is not there, which is in the complete form but missing in that particular thing, and so we speak of vice, leaving the missing part in indefiniteness. So too, when for instance we see an ugly face in matter, because the formative principle in it has not got the better of the matter so as to hide its ugliness, we picture it to ourselves as ugly because it falls short of the form.

μηδαμῇ εἴδους τετύχηκε, πῶς; Ἢ τὸ ⟨πᾶν⟩ παράπαν εἶδος ἀφαιροῦντες [πᾶν εἶδος], ᾧ μὴ ταῦτα πάρεστι, λέγομεν εἶναι ὕλην, ἀμορφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡμῖν λαβόντες ἐν τῷ πᾶν εἶδος ἀφελεῖν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν ὕλην θεάσασθαι. Διὸ καὶ νοῦς ἄλλος οὗτος, οὐ νοῦς, τολμήσας ἰδεῖν τὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ. Ὥσπερ ὄμμα ἀποστῆσαν αὐτὸ φωτός, ἵνα ἴδῃ τὸ σκότος καὶ μὴ ἴδῃ—τὸ καταλιπεῖν τὸ φῶς, ἵνα ἴδῃ τὸ σκότος, μεθ' οὗ οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν αὐτό· οὐδ' αὖ ἄνευ του οἷόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδεῖν—ἵνα γένηται αὐτῷ ὡς οἷόν τε ἰδεῖν, οὕτως οὖν καὶ νοῦς, εἴσω αὑτοῦ τὸ αὐτοῦ καταλιπὼν φῶς καὶ οἷον ἔξω αὑτοῦ προελθὼν εἰς τὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ ἐλθών, μὴ ἐπαγόμενος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ φῶς ἔπαθε τοὐναντίον ἢ ἐστιν, ἵν' ἴδῃ τὸ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον.

10. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. Ἄποιος δὲ οὖσα πῶς κακή; Ἢ ἄποιος λέγεται τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τούτων τῶν ποιοτήτων ἃς δέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὡς ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσονται, οὐ μὴν οὕτως, ὡς μηδεμίαν φύσιν ἔχειν. Εἰ δὴ ἔχει τινὰ φύσιν, ταύτην τὴν φύσιν τί κωλύει κακὴν εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ κακήν, ὡς ποιόν; Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τοῦτό ἐστι, καθ' ὃ ἕτερον ποιὸν λέγεται. Συμβεβηκὸς οὖν τὸ ποιὸν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ· ἡ δὲ ὕλη οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ αὐτό. Τοῦ οὖν ποιοῦ τοῦ φύσιν συμβεβηκότος ἔχοντος οὐ τυχοῦσα ἄποιος λέγεται. Εἰ ποίνυν καὶ ἡ ποιότης αὐτὴ ἄποιος, πῶς ἡ ὕλη

But how do we know what has absolutely no part in form? By absolutely taking away all form, we call that in which there is no form matter; in the process of taking away all form we apprehend formlessness in ourselves, if we propose to look at matter. So this which sees matter is another intellect which is not intellect, since it presumes to see what is not its own. As an eye withdraws itself from the light so that it may see the darkness and not see it—leaving the light is so that it may see the darkness, since with the light it cannot see it; but without something it cannot see, but only not see—that it may be able to see in the way it is possible to see darkness; so intellect, leaving its own light in itself and as it were going outside itself and coming to what is not its own, by not bringing its own light with it experiences something contrary to itself, that it may see its own contrary.

10. So that is how this is. But if matter is without quality, how is it evil? It is called "without quality" because it has in its own right none of the qualities which it is going to receive and which are going to be in it as their substrate, but not in the sense that it has no nature at all. Well then, if it has a nature, what prevents this nature from being evil, but not evil in the way it would be if it had quality? Furthermore, quality is that in virtue of which something else is said to have quality. So quality occurs accidentally, and in something else, but matter is not in something else, but is the substratum on which the accident occurs. Since it has not the quality which has the nature of an accident, it is said to be without quality. Then too, if quality in itself is without quality, how could matter which

οὐ δεξαμένη ποιότητα ποιὰ ἂν λέγοιτο; Ὀρθῶς ἄρα λέγεται καὶ ἄποιος εἶναι καὶ κακή· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται κακὴ τῷ ποιότητα ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῷ ποιότητα μὴ ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ ἦν ἴσως κακὴ εἶδος οὖσα, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει φύσις.

11. Ἀλλ' ἡ ἐναντία τῷ εἴδει παντὶ φύσις στέρησις· στέρησις δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῆς οὐχ ὑπόστασις· ὥστε τὸ κακὸν εἰ ἐν στερήσει, ἐν τῷ ἐστερημένῳ εἴδους τὸ κακὸν ἔσται· ὥστε καθ' ἑαυτὸ οὐκ ἔσται. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσται κακόν, ἡ στέρησις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ κακία ἔσται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξω. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλοι λόγοι τὴν ὕλην ὅλως ἀναιρεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐδ' αὐτὴν κακὴν εἶναι οὖσαν. Οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ ἄλλοθι ζητεῖν τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ θέμενον ἐν ψυχῇ οὕτω θέσθαι ἀπουσίαν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ στέρησις ἐπιβάλλοντός ἐστι παρεῖναι εἴδους τινός, εἰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις ἐν ψυχῇ, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ζωὴν οὖσα ψυχή. Ἄψυχον ἄρα ἔσται ἡ ψυχή, εἴπερ μηδὲ ζωήν· ὥστε ψυχὴ οὖσα οὐκ ἔσται ψυχή. Ἔχει ἄρα τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ ζωήν· ὥστε οὐ στέρησιν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὐτῆς. Ἀγαθοειδὲς ἄρα ἔχουσά τι ἀγαθὸν νοῦ ἴχνος καὶ οὐ κακὸν παρ' αὐτῆς· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ πρώτως κακὸν οὐδὲ συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῇ τὸ πρώτως κακόν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἄπεστιν αὐτῆς πᾶν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

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[1] This is the Aristotelian doctrine, implying the distinction between matter and privation which forms the basis of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic doctrine of matter

has not received quality be said to have it? So it is rightly said to be both without quality and evil; for it is not called evil because it has, but rather because it has not quality; so that perhaps it would not have been evil if it was a form instead of a nature opposed to form.

11. But the nature which is opposed to all form is privation; but privation is always in something else and has no existence by itself.[1] So if evil consists in privation, it will exist in the thing deprived of form and have no independent existence. So if there is evil in the soul, it will be the privation in it which will be evil and vice, and nothing outside. There are some lines of argument which claim to abolish matter altogether, and others which say that though it exists it is not itself evil: so [on these assumptions] one should not look for evil elsewhere, but place it in the soul in such a way that it is simply absence of good. But if the privation is privation of a form which ought to be present, if the privation in the soul is a privation of good and produces vice in the soul corresponding to its own definition, soul then has no good in it; so then it has no life in it, though it is still soul So then soul will be soulless, if it has not even any life in it; so though it is still a soul it will not be a soul. But it has life by its own definition; so it does not have the privation of good from itself: so it is a thing of a good kind since it has some good, a trace of intellect, and it is not evil of itself. It is not then primary evil, nor is primary evil an accident of it, because the good is not altogether absent from it.

(*Physics* I. 9) and which is attacked by Plotinus in II. 4. 14 (see note there).

12. Τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ παντελῆ στέρησιν λέγοι ἀγαθοῦ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀλλά τινα στέρησιν ἀγαθοῦ; Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, τὸ μὲν ἔχουσα, τοῦ δὲ ἐστερημένη, μικτὴν ἕξει τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ οὐκ ἄκρατον τὸ κακόν, καὶ οὔπω εὕρηται τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἄκρατον κακόν· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔσται ἐν οὐσίᾳ, συμβεβηκὸς δέ τι τὸ κακόν.

13. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα τούτῳ τὸ κακὸν ᾗ ἐμπόδιον, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμῷ πρὸς τὸ βλέπειν. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ποιητικὸν κακοῦ ἔσται τὸ κακὸν αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω ποιητικόν, ὡς ἑτέρου τοῦ κακοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. Εἰ οὖν ἡ κακία ἐμπόδιον τῇ ψυχῇ, ποιητικὸν κακοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ κακὸν ἡ κακία ἔσται· καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ὡς συνεργόν· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἡ κακία τὸ κακόν. Εἶτα καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' αὐτοαγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἡ κακία αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐδ' αὐτοκακόν. Ἔφαμεν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ αὐτοκαλὸν οὐδ' αὐτοαγαθόν, ὅτι πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπέκεινα αὐτῆς αὐτοκαλὸν καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν· καὶ μεταλήψει πως ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. Ὡς οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀναβαίνοντι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας καταβαίνοντι τὸ κακὸν αὐτό, ἀρξαμένῳ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας. Θεωροῦντι μὲν ἡ θεωρία ἥτις ἐστὶ τοῦ κακοῦ αὐτοῦ, γινομένῳ δὲ ἡ μετάληψις αὐτοῦ· γίνεται γὰρ παντάπασιν ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος

[1] Plato speaks of the "bottomless sea of unlikeness" in *Politicus* 273D6–E1. S. Augustine uses Plotinus's phrase, *in regione dissimilitudinis*, of the state of alienation from God

12. But what is the answer if someone says that the vice and evil in the soul is not absolute privation of good, but only a [particular, limited] privation of good? In this case, if it has some good and is deprived of some, it will be in a mixed state and the evil will not be undiluted, and we have not yet found primary, undiluted evil: and the soul will have good in its very substance, but evil as some kind of accident.

13. But perhaps evil is an impediment to good, as the eye has impediments which prevent its seeing. Yes, but in this way evil will be what produces evil for the things where it occurs, and produces it in such a way that the actual evil produced is different from the evil which produces it. If then vice is an impediment to the soul, it is not evil but something which produces evil; and virtue is not the good, except in so far as it helps to produce it: so if virtue is not good, vice is not evil. Then too, virtue is not absolute beauty or absolute good; so it follows that vice is not absolute ugliness or absolute evil. We said that virtue was not absolute beauty or absolute good because absolute beauty and absolute good are prior to it and transcend it; it is good and beautiful by some kind of participation. So just as when one goes up from virtue one comes to the beautiful and the good, when one goes down from vice one comes to absolute evil, taking vice as the starting-point. One will contemplate it with the contemplation which belongs to absolute evil, and participate in it when one becomes it: one enters altogether into "the region of unlikeness"[1] when one sinks into it

in *Confessions*, VII. 10. 16. The "mud" is Orphic, taken over by Plato. Cp. *Phaedo* 69C6.

τόπῳ, ἔνθα δὴ εἰς αὐτὴν εἰς βόρβορον σκοτεινὸν ἔσται πεσών· ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ παντελῶς εἴη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς παντελῆ κακίαν, οὐκέτι κακίαν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν χείρω ἠλλάξατο· ἔτι γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὸν ἡ κακία μεμιγμένη τινὶ ἐναντίῳ. Ἀποθνήσκει οὖν, ὡς ψυχὴ ἂν θάνοι, καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτῇ καὶ ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι βεβαπτισμένῃ ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καταδῦναι καὶ πλησθῆναι αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξελθούσῃ ἐκεῖ κεῖσθαι, ἕως ἀναδράμῃ καὶ ἀφέλῃ πως τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ τοῦ βορβόρου· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐν Ἅιδου ἐλθόντα ἐπικαταδαρθεῖν.

14. Εἰ δέ τις ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς τὴν κακίαν λέγοι—εὐπαθῆ γοῦν καὶ εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὴν κακὴν ἀπὸ παντὸς εἰς ἅπαν κακὸν φερομένην, εὐκίνητον μὲν εἰς ἐπιθυμίας, εὐερέθιστον δὲ εἰς ὀργάς, προπετῆ δὲ εἰς συγκαταθέσεις, καὶ ταῖς ἀμυδραῖς φαντασίαις εἴκουσαν ῥᾳδίως, οἷα τὰ ἀσθενέστατα τῶν τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει πεποιημένων, ἃ ῥᾳδίαν ἔχει ὑπό τε πνευμάτων ὑπό τε εἰλήσεων τὴν φθοράν—ἄξιον ἂν εἴη ζητεῖν, τίς καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀσθένεια τῇ ψυχῇ. Οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀσθενές· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ εὐπαθές, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἔσχε προσηγορίαν· εἰ μὴ ταύτῃ εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον ἡ ὕλη τῆς ἀσθενείας. Ἀλλὰ προσιτέον ἐγγὺς τῷ λόγῳ, τί τὸ αἴτιον ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πυκνότητες ἢ ἀραιότητες οὐδ' αὖ ἰσχνότητες ἢ παχύτητες ἢ νόσος, ὥσπερ τις πυρετός, ἀσθενῆ ἐποίησε ψυχὴν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς ἢ ἐν ταῖς χωρισταῖς παντελῶς ἢ

and has gone falling into the mud of darkness; for when the soul is fallen utterly into utter vice, it no longer *has* vice, but has changed to another nature, a worse one (for vice which is mixed with anything of its contrary is still human). So it dies, as far as the soul can die, and its death, while it is still plunged in the body, is to sink in matter and be filled with it, and, when it has gone out of the body, to lie in matter till it raises itself and somehow manages to look away from the mud; this is "going to Hades and falling asleep there."[1]

14. But if someone says that vice is a weakness of the soul—pointing out that the bad soul is easily affected and easily stirred, carried about from one evil to another, easily stirred to lust, easily roused to anger, hasty in its assents, giving way freely to confused imaginations, like the weakest of the products of art or nature, which the winds or the sun's heat so easily destroy[2]—it will be worth enquiring what this weakness is and where the soul gets it from. For weakness in the soul is not just like that in bodies; but incapacity for work and being easily affected, as in the body, so by analogy in the soul has the name of weakness: unless we are to refer weakness in the soul to the same cause as that in the body, matter. But we must get to grips with the question, what is the cause for what we call weakness in the soul; it is not density or rarity or thinness or fatness, or an illness, like fever, which makes the soul weak. This kind of weakness of the soul must be found either in those souls which are completely separate or in those which are in matter

[1] *Republic* VII. 534C7–D1.
[2] Cp. *Republic* II. 380E5.

ἐν ταῖς ἐνύλοις ἢ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις εἶναι. Εἰ δὴ μὴ ἐν ταῖς χωρὶς ὕλης—καθαραὶ γὰρ πᾶσαι καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπτερωμέναι καὶ τέλειοι καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐταῖς ἀνεμπόδιστον—λοιπὸν ἐν ταῖς πεσούσαις εἶναι τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ταῖς οὐ καθαραῖς οὐδὲ κεκαθαρμέναις, καὶ ἡ ἀσθένεια αὐταῖς εἴη ἂν οὐκ ἀφαίρεσις τινός, ἀλλὰ ἀλλοτρίου παρουσία, ὥσπερ φλέγματος ἢ χολῆς ἐν σώματι. Τοῦ δὲ πτώματος τὸ αἴτιον ψυχῇ σαφέστερον λαμβάνουσι καὶ ὡς προσήκει λαβεῖν καταφανὲς ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον ἡ ψυχῆς ἀσθένεια. Ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὕλη, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ψυχή, καὶ οἷον τόπος εἷς τις. Οὐ γὰρ χωρὶς μὲν ὁ τόπος τῇ ὕλῃ, χωρὶς δὲ αὖ ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς—οἷον ὁ μὲν ἐν γῇ τῇ ὕλῃ, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἀέρι τῇ ψυχῇ—ἀλλ' ὁ τόπος τῇ ψυχῇ χωρὶς τὸ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐνωθῆναι τῇ ὕλῃ· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μὴ ἕν τι ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ὕλης γενέσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ γενέσθαι· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ χωρὶς εἶναι. Δυνάμεις δὲ ψυχῆς πολλαὶ καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ ἔσχατα ψυχὴ ἔχει· ὕλη δὲ παροῦσα προσαιτεῖ καὶ οἷον καὶ ἐνοχλεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ εἴσω παρελθεῖν θέλει· πᾶς δὲ ὁ χῶρος ἱερὸς καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἄμοιρόν ἐστι ψυχῆς. Ἐλλάμπεται οὖν ὑποβάλλουσα ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ μὲν ἐλλάμπεται οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνέχεται αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνο καίτοι παροῦσαν, ὅτι

[1] *Phaedrus* 246B7–C1.

[2] The word προσαιτεῖ may be a reminiscence of *Symposium* 203B4, where Poverty comes begging to the feast of the gods.

[3] Sophocles *Oedipus at Colonus*, 54; cp. 16. If Plotinus fully remembered what he was quoting, and the passion of

or in both. So if it is not in those without matter—they are all pure, and, as Plato says, "winged and perfect"[1] and their activity is unhindered—it remains that the weakness must be in the souls which have fallen, those which are not pure and have not been purified; and their weakness will not be a taking away of something but the presence of something alien, like the presence of phlegm or bile in the body. When we understand the cause of the fall of the soul more clearly, and as it ought to be understood, what we are looking for, the soul's weakness, will be obvious. There is matter in reality and there is soul in reality, and one single place for both of them. For there are not two separate places for matter and for the soul,—on earth, for instance, for matter and in the air for the soul: the soul's separate place is its not being in matter; and this means not being united to matter; and this means that not one single thing comes into being from it and matter; and this means that it is not in matter as a substratum; and this is being separate. But there are many powers of soul, and it has a beginning, a middle and an end; and matter is there, and begs it and, we may say, bothers it and wants to come right inside.[2] "All the place is holy,"[3] and there is nothing which is without a share of soul. So matter spreads itself out under soul and is illumined, and cannot grasp the source from which its light comes: that source cannot endure matter though it is there, because

love for the "holy place" of Colonus with which the whole play is charged, this must be taken as one of the strongest affirmations of the goodness of the material world in the *Enneads*. Soul is a god and the material world is holy as being the place where it dwells; cp. Introduction, p. xxiv.

μὴ ὁρᾷ διὰ κάκην. Τὴν δὲ ἔλλαμψιν καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν φῶς ἐσκότωσε τῇ μίξει καὶ ἀσθενὲς πεποίηκε τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὴ παρασχοῦσα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦλθε τῷ μὴ παρόντι. Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι πτῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς ὕλην καὶ ἀσθενεῖν, ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις οὐ πάρεισιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν κωλυούσης ὕλης παρεῖναι τῷ τὸν τόπον ὃν κατέχει αὐτὴ καταλαβεῖν καὶ οἷον συσπειραθῆναι ποιῆσαι ἐκείνην, ὃ δ' ἔλαβεν οἷον κλέψασα ποιῆσαι κακὸν εἶναι, ἕως ἂν δυνηθῇ ἀναδραμεῖν. Ὕλη τοίνυν καὶ ἀσθενείας ψυχῇ αἰτία καὶ κακίας αἰτία. Πρότερον ἄρα κακὴ αὐτὴ καὶ πρῶτον κακόν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν ὕλην ἐγέννησε παθοῦσα, καὶ εἰ ἐκοινώνησεν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐγένετο κακή, ἡ ὕλη αἰτία παροῦσα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο εἰς αὐτὴν μὴ τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῆς τὴν γένεσιν λαβοῦσα.

15. Εἰ δέ τις τὴν ὕλην μή φησιν εἶναι, δεικτέον αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ὕλης λόγων τὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῆς διὰ πλειόνων ἐκεῖ περὶ τούτου εἰρημένου. Κακὸν δὲ εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ παράπαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀναιρεῖν καὶ μηδὲ ὀρεκτὸν μηδὲν εἶναι· μὴ τοίνυν μηδὲ ὄρεξιν μηδ' αὖ ἔκκλισιν μηδὲ νόησιν· ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, ἡ δὲ ἔκκλισις κακοῦ, ἡ δὲ νόησις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ αὐτὴ ἕν τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Εἶναι μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄμικτον ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ μεμιγμένον ἤδη ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πλείονος τοῦ κακοῦ μεταλα-

[1] I.e., the treatise *On the Two Kinds of Matter* II. 4.

its evil makes it unable to see. Matter darkens the illumination, the light from that source, by mixture with itself, and weakens it by itself offering it the opportunity of generation and the reason for coming to matter; for it would not have come to what was not present. This is the fall of the soul, to come in this way to matter and to become weak, because all its powers do not come into action; matter hinders them from coming by occupying the place which soul holds and producing a kind of cramped condition, and making evil what it has got hold of by a sort of theft—until soul manages to escape back to its higher state. So matter is the cause of the soul's weakness and vice: it is then itself evil before soul and is primary evil. Even if soul had produced matter, being affected in some way, and had become evil by communicating with it, matter would have been the cause by its presence: soul would not have come to it unless its presence had given soul the occasion of coming to birth.

15. If anyone says that matter does not exist, he must be shown the necessity of its existence from our discussions about matter,[1] where the subject is treated more fully. But if anyone says that there is no evil at all in the nature of things, he must also abolish the good and have no object to aim at, and, for that matter, no aiming or avoidance or intelligence; for aiming is at the good and avoidance, of the evil, and intelligence and practical wisdom deal with good and evil, and are a good in themselves. So there must be good, and unmixed good, and that which is a mixture of bad and good, when it has a larger share of evil making itself totally evil, when it has a smaller share tending, because the evil is less,

βὸν ἤδη καὶ αὐτὸ συντελέσαν ἐκείνῳ ⟨ὃ⟩ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ κακόν, ἐλάττονος δέ, ᾗ ἠλάττωται, τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Ἐπεὶ ψυχῇ τί ἂν εἴη κακόν; Ἢ τίνι ἂν μὴ ἐφαψαμένῃ τῆς φύσεως τῆς χείρονος; Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμίαι οὐδ' αὖ λῦπαι, οὐ θυμοί, οὐ φόβοι· καὶ γὰρ φόβοι τῷ συνθέτῳ, μὴ λυθῇ, καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἀλγηδόνες λυομένου· ἐπιθυμίαι δὲ ἐνοχλοῦντός τινος τῇ συστάσει ἤ, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλῇ, ἴασιν προνοουμένου. Φαντασία δὲ πληγῇ ἀλόγου ἔξωθεν· δέχεται δὲ τὴν πληγὴν διά του οὐκ ἀμεροῦς· καὶ δόξαι ψευδεῖς ἔξω γενομένῃ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αὐτοῦ· ἔξω δὲ γίνεται τῷ μὴ εἶναι καθαρά. Ἡ δὲ πρὸς νοῦν ὄρεξις ἄλλο· συνεῖναι γὰρ δεῖ μόνον καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἱδρυμένην, οὐ νεύσασαν εἰς τὸ χεῖρον. Τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ κακὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φύσιν· ἐπείπερ ἐφάνη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, περιληφθὲν δεσμοῖς τισι καλοῖς, οἷα δεσμῶταί τινες χρυσῷ, κρύπτεται τούτοις, ἵν' ἄμουσα μὴ ὁρῷτο τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἔχοιεν μὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κακὸν βλέπειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ βλέπωσιν, εἰδώλοις τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν συνῶσιν.

to the good. What, after all, is the evil of the soul? What soul would have it if it did not come into contact with a lower nature? If it did not there would be no desires or sorrows or passions or fears; for fears are for the composite nature, dreading its dissolution; and sorrows and pains belong to it when it is being dissolved; desires arise when something interferes with the composition or when one is planning a remedy to prevent its being interfered with. Imagination is from a stroke of something irrational from outside; and the soul is accessible to the stroke because of what in it is not undivided. It has false opinions because it has come to be outside absolute truth; and it has come to be outside by not being pure. The impulse towards intellect is a different kind of thing; all that is necessary here is to be with intellect and established in it, without inclination to what is worse. But because of the power and nature of good, evil is not only evil; since it must necessarily appear, it is bound in a sort of beautiful fetters, as some prisoners are in chains of gold, and hidden by them, so that it may not appear in its charmlessness to the gods, and men may be able not always to look at evil, but even when they do look at it, may be in company with images of beauty to remind them.

I. 9. ON GOING OUT OF THE BODY

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise is one of the early group (No. 16 in the chronological order), written before Porphyry joined Plotinus; it cannot therefore present the arguments Plotinus used to discourage Porphyry from suicide (*Life* ch. 11). Creuzer supposed it to be an abridgement taken from the edition of Eustochius; Heinemann, a paraphrase or summary (and an inaccurate one) by Porphyry which has displaced the original text: but there seems no sufficient reason against believing, with Bréhier, Harder, Henry and Schwyzer, that it is the genuine treatise of Plotinus which held this place in Porphyry's edition.

Synopsis

If you take your soul out of your body by suicide, something evil will come with it; one must wait till the body goes from the soul by natural death; the violent emotions, too, which accompany suicide, harm the soul. One must not therefore go out of the body by suicide except in the case of desperate necessity.

Plotinus on Voluntary Death

L. G. Westerink has shown convincingly that this is not any sort of genuine quotation from Plotinus ("Elias and Plotin", *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 57 (1964) 26–32); the editors are agreed that it should be deleted from the works of Plotinus (*Addenda ad textum* in OCT Plotinus vol. III, p. 307). But as it is still printed in vol. I of the OCT Plotinus I have retained the text and translation. [A.H.A. 1986]

I. 9. (16) ΠΕΡΙ ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗΣ

Οὐκ ἐξάξεις, ἵνα μὴ ἐξίῃ· ἐξελεύσεται γὰρ ἔχουσά τι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξέλθῃ, τό τε ἐξελθεῖν ἐστι μεταβῆναι εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. Ἀλλὰ μένει τὸ σῶμα ἀποστῆναι πᾶν αὐτῆς, ὅτε μὴ δεῖται μετελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔστι πάντη ἔξω. Πῶς οὖν ἀφίσταται τὸ σῶμα; Ὅταν μηδὲν ἔτι δεδεμένον ᾖ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἔτι τοῦ σώματος συνδεῖν, τῆς ἁρμονίας αὐτοῦ οὐκέτ' οὔσης, ἣν ἔχον εἶχε τὴν ψυχήν. Τί οὖν, εἰ μηχανήσαιτό τις λυθῆναι τὸ σῶμα; Ἢ ἐβιάσατο καὶ ἀπέστη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀφῆκε· καὶ ὅτε λύει, οὐκ ἀπαθής, ἀλλ' ἢ δυσχέρανσις ἢ λύπη ἢ θυμός· δεῖ δὲ μηδὲν πράττειν. Εἰ οὖν ἀρχὴν αἴσθοιτο τοῦ ληρεῖν; Ἢ τάχα μὲν οὐ περὶ σπουδαῖον· εἰ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο, τάττοιτ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ περιστάσεως αἱρετοῖς, οὐχ ἁπλῶς αἱρετοῖς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν φαρμάκων προσαγωγὴ πρὸς ἔξοδον ψυχῆς τάχα ἂν ψυχῇ οὐ πρόσφορος. Καὶ εἰ εἱμαρμένος χρόνος ὁ δοθεὶς

[1] This cryptic saying is stated by the Byzantine Psellus to have been taken by Plotinus from the *Chaldaean Oracles* (PG122. 1125C–D): if so, it would be the only place in the

I. 9. ON GOING OUT OF THE BODY

You shall not take out your soul, so that it may not go[1]; for if it goes thus, it will go taking something with it so that it can manage to get out; and going out is moving to another place. But the soul waits for the body to depart altogether from it; then soul does not have to change its place, but is completely outside. But how does the body depart? When nothing of soul is any longer bound up with it, because the body is unable to bind it any more, since its harmony is gone; as long as it has this it holds the soul. But suppose someone contrives the dissolution of his body? He has used violence and gone away himself, not let his body go; and in dissolving it he is not without passion; there is disgust or grief or anger; one must not act like this. But suppose he is aware that he is beginning to go mad? This is not likely to happen to a really good man; but if it does happen, he will consider it as one of the inevitable things, to be accepted because of the circumstances, though not in themselves acceptable.[2] And after all, taking drugs to give the soul a way out is not likely to be good for the soul. And if each man has a destined time allotted to him, it is not

Enneads where Plotinus quotes from this sort of occultist literature; but it is by no means certain whether Plotinus is quoting the oracle or whether the oracle was later taken from Plotinus.

[2] Cp. I. 4. 7–8.

ἑκάστῳ, πρὸ τούτου οὐκ εὐτυχές, εἰ μή, ὥσπερ φαμέν, ἀναγκαῖον. Εἰ δέ, οἷος ἕκαστος ἕξεισι, ταύτην ἴσχει ἐκεῖ τάξιν, εἰς τὸ προκόπτειν οὔσης ἐπιδόσεως οὐκ ἐξακτέον.

Plotinus de Voluntaria Morte
Apud Eliam

Ὁ μέντοι Πλωτῖνος περὶ εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς γράφει μονόβιβλον καὶ οὐδένα τῶν πέντε τρόπων τούτων ἀποδέχεται· φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἀφίσταται ἡμῶν προνοούμενος, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἑαυτοὺς ποιοῦμεν ἀνεπιτηδείους καὶ νομίζομεν τὸν θεὸν πόρρω εἶναι ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀεὶ παρόντα πᾶσιν ἐπίσης, ὡς δηλοῦσιν οἱ καθαροὶ τὸν βίον, αὐτόπται τοῦ θείου καὶ συνομιληταὶ γινόμενοι· ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος χορηγεῖ ἐπίσης τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' αἱ νυκτερίδες ἀνεπιτήδειοι οὖσαι ἀποφεύγουσιν αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ φωτίζονται ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ σκότος αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν εἶναι πηγὴν φωτὸς ὑπάρχοντα· οὕτως δεῖ καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον μιμούμενον θεὸν καὶ ἥλιον μὴ ἀμελεῖν πάντη τοῦ σώματος δι' ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν, ἕως οὗ ἐκεῖνο ἀνεπιτήδειον γενόμενον διαστήσοι ἑαυτὸ τῆς πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν κοινωνίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ πρὸ καιροῦ ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν, πρὸ οὗ λύσῃ ὁ δήσας.

[1] The "five ways of reasonable departure" are the five good reasons for suicide according to the Stoics; cp. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III. 768. In I. 4. 7–8 and I. 9 Plotinus does in fact accept at least three of them, long and extremely painfull illness, madness, and, probably, coercion to immoral behaviour (I. 4. 7. 43–45) as reasons for suicide.

a good thing to go out before it, unless, as we maintain, it is necessary. And if each man's rank in the other world depends on his state when he goes out, one must not take out the soul as long as there is any possibility of progress.

Plotinus on Voluntary Death
(In Elias, Prolegomena 6. 15. 23–16. 2.)

Plotinus writes a single treatise about "reasonable departure" and does not accept any of these five ways:[1] he says, that just as God does not leave off taking thought for us, but we make ourselves unfit and think God is far from us when he is always present equally to all, as men of pure life show, who came to see God face to face and be his close companions; and just as the sun dispenses his light equally, but bats, because they are unfit for the sunlight, fly from him and are not enlightened by him, but think that he is darkness when he is the source of light; so the philosopher must imitate God and the sun and not neglect his body altogether in caring for his soul, but take thought for it in the appropriate way till it becomes unfit and separates itself from its community with the soul. It is all wrong to take oneself out before the right time, when he who bound body and soul together looses the bond.

PLOTINUS

ENNEAD II

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

A. H. ARMSTRONG

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II. 1. ON HEAVEN (ON THE UNIVERSE)

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 40 in Porphyry's chronological order. Its purpose is to defend the doctrine, vigorously maintained by all pagan Neoplatonists, of the incorruptibility of the heavens and the heavenly bodies, the unchangingness and everlastingness of everything in the regions above the moon. This was one of the main points of disagreement between Christians and pagans in late antiquity. But, though Plotinus seems to have the Christian doctrine of the end of the world in mind at the end of ch. 4, his arguments in this treatise are mainly directed against Stoics and Stoicising Platonists who interpreted Plato's *Timaeus* to fit in with their own doctrines that the universe as a whole, including the heavenly regions, was subject to change in a regular, never-ending cycle, and that there was a real community of substance and interaction between the regions below and the regions above the moon. Plotinus is concerned to refute these errors without falling into the opposite, Aristotelian, heresy that the heavens are made of the " quintessence " or fifth element, and not, as Platonists held, of fire.

Synopsis

What is the reason why the visible heaven is everlasting in all its parts as well as the whole? The will of God and the fact that there is nothing outside it are not sufficient explanations (ch. 1). Plato's view that all bodies are in a state of flux, and our rejection of Aristotle's " fifth element " make the explanation more difficult, but none the

less, if we consider what the heavenly fire in its own proper region is like and how perfectly adapted it is to the control of the universal soul which contains it, we shall find in the action of universal soul (which it is quite unreasonable to suppose will ever bring the universe to an end) sufficient reason to be assured that the heaven is everlasting (ch. 2–4). It is everlasting in all its parts as well as the whole because it is made and ruled by a better soul than that which makes our bodies and other earthly things, as well as out of better material (ch. 5). The heavenly bodies do not contain any admixture of the elements of the sublunary world, and this is the true teaching of Plato if we interpret the *Timaeus* rightly. They need no nourishment, and are not nourished by exhalations from below; the elements of the lower world in no way affect the regions above the moon (chs. 6–8).

II. 1. (40) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ

1. Τὸν κόσμον ἀεὶ λέγοντες καὶ πρόσθεν εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι σῶμα ἔχοντα εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνάγοιμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἂν ἴσως λέγοιμεν, σαφήνειαν δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἂν παρεχοίμεθα. Ἔπειτα τῶν στοιχείων ἡ μεταβολὴ καὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν περὶ γῆν ἡ φθορὰ τὸ εἶδος σῴζουσα μήποτε οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀξιώσει γίγνεσθαι ὡς τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦτο δυναμένης ἀεὶ ὑπεκφεύγοντος καὶ ῥέοντος τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτιθέναι τὸ εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῳ, ὡς μὴ σῴζεσθαι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν τῷ εἴδει· ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μόνον τὸ ἀεὶ ἕξει, τὰ δ' ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς κατὰ τὸ τόδε ἕξει τὸ ἀεί; Εἰ δὲ τῷ πάντα συνειληφέναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰς ὃ τὴν μεταβολὴν ποιήσεται μηδὲ τὸ ἔξωθεν ἂν προσπεσὸν φθεῖραι δύνασθαι τούτῳ δώσομεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς οὐ φθορᾶς, τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ δώσομεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὴ ἂν φθαρῆναι, ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ἡ οὐσία τῷ

[1] This is a reference to Plato, *Timaeus* 41B4 (the address of the Demiurge to the gods whom he has made, of whom

II. 1. ON HEAVEN [ON THE UNIVERSE]

1. When we say that the universe has always existed before and will always exist, although it has a body, if we refer the cause of its everlasting existence to the will of God [1], then, first of all, we may quite likely be speaking the truth, but we are not giving any sort of a clear explanation. Next, the preservation of the form in the changing of the elements and the passing away of the living beings on earth may perhaps make us think that the same happens with the All, that God's will is able as the body continually fleets and flows to impose the same form now on one thing and now on another, so that it is not the single individual thing which lasts for ever but the unity of form; for why should the things of earth have only an everlasting duration of form, while the things in heaven and the heaven itself have an everlasting duration of particular individuals? But if we say that the cause why the heaven does not pass away is that it contains everything and there is nothing it can change into or anything outside which could fall upon it and destroy it, then by this argument we shall grant indestructibility to the Whole and the All, but since our sun and the substance of the other stars

the "visible gods," the heavenly bodies, are the most important group).

μέρη καὶ μὴ ὅλον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πᾶν, οὐχ ἕξει τὴν πίστιν παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι εἰς ἅπαντα μένει τὸν χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κατ' εἶδος τὴν μονὴν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πυρὶ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μόνον ἂν δόξειε παρεῖναι καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ὑπ' ἄλλου ἔξωθεν μὴ φθειρόμενον, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τῶν μερῶν ἄλληλα φθειρόντων, τὴν φθορὰν ἀεὶ ἔχοντα, τῷ εἴδει μόνον μένειν, καὶ ῥεούσης ἀεὶ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ εἶδος ἄλλου διδόντος, γίγνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτός. Οὐ τοίνυν ἔσται τὸ μὲν μένον αὐτοῦ ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ οὐρανός, τὰ δὲ περὶ γῆν φθειρόμενα, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαντα, τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχοντα μόνον τῷ χρόνῳ· ἔστω γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω συγχωρησόμεθα τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν εἶναι, ἧττον ἂν τὸ ἄπορον τῇ δόξῃ προσείη· μᾶλλον δὲ παντάπασιν ἔξω ἀπορίας ἂν γιγνοίμεθα, εἰ τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ θεοῦ ἱκανὸν εἶναι δεικνύοιτο κἂν οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον συνέχειν τὸ πᾶν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ τόδε τι αὐτοῦ ὁποσονοῦν λέγοιμεν ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, ἥ τε βούλησις δεικτέα εἰ ἱκανὴ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, τό τε ἄπορον μένει διὰ τί τὰ μὲν οὕτω, τὰ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει μόνον, τά τε μέρη τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ πῶς καὶ αὐτά· ἐπειδὴ οὕτω καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πάντα εἶναι.

2. Εἰ οὖν ταύτην παραδεχόμεθα τὴν δόξαν καί φαμεν τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ

are parts, and not each of them a whole and all, the argument will give no assurance that they will last for ever; they will have only permanence of form, and the same will apply to fire and such-like things, and even to the whole universe itself. For there is nothing to prevent it, even if it is not being destroyed by something from outside, from having its own continual destruction as its parts destroy each other, and so being permanent only in form; as its substratum is in continual flux and its form comes from elsewhere it will be in the same state as every living thing, man and horse and the rest; man and horse always exist, but not the same man and horse. So there will not be one permanent part of the universe, like the heaven, while the things on earth pass away, but all will be alike, differing only in the time they last; for we can grant that the things in heaven last longer. If then we admit that both the whole and the parts are permanent in this way, our doctrine will be less difficult: or rather we shall have got completely out of our difficulty, if it can be shown that the will of God is adequate to hold the All together in this way and manner. But if we say that any individual constituent of the All, whatever its size, is permanent, we must show that the divine will is adequate to make it so; and the difficulty remains why some things are permanent in this way and others are not, but have only permanence of form, and also why the parts in heaven are permanent as well as the whole; since on the supposition that they are it would seem that all the parts of the universe were permanent.

2. If, then, we accept this view and maintain that the heaven and everything in it last for ever as

τὸ τόδε ἔχειν τὸ ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῇ τῆς σελήνης σφαίρᾳ τὸ κατ' εἶδος, δεικτέον πῶς σῶμα ἔχων ἔξει τὸ τόδε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κυρίως, ὡς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ὡσαύτως, τῆς φύσεως τοῦ σώματος ῥεούσης ἀεί. Τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ φύσεως εἰρηκόσι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Πλάτωνι οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων αὐτῶν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, φησι, σώματα ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα τὸ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἕξει καὶ τὸ ὡσαύτως; Συγχωρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων δηλονότι τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ, ὃς ἔφη ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον γίνεσθαι. Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τοῦ πέμπτου παραδέξαιτο σώματος. Τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτο τιθεμένοις, τοῦ σώματος δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὄντος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰ τῇδε ζῷα, πῶς τὸ τόδε ἂν ἔχοι; Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πῶς ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ μόρια ὄντα; Συγκειμένου δὴ παντὸς ζῴου ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς σώματος φύσεως ἀνάγκη τὸν οὐρανόν, εἴπερ ἀεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἔσται, ἢ δι' ἄμφω ἔσεσθαι, ἢ διὰ θάτερον τῶν ἐνόντων, οἷον ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα. Ὁ μὲν δὴ τῷ σώματι διδοὺς τὸ ἄφθαρτον οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς δέοιτο,

[1] *Republic* VII. 530B2–3 (slightly adapted). Plato is here arguing that the true, philosophical astronomer should not seriously study the motions of the visible heavenly bodies, which, being material, are imperfect and changeable, but devote his attention to the laws of motion perceived by the intellect alone.

individuals, but the things below the sphere of the moon are only everlasting in form, we must show how heaven, which has a body, can have proper individual identity, in the sense that each particular detail remains unchanged, when the nature of body is in continual flux. This is the view held by Plato himself, as well as by all other natural philosophers, not only about other bodies but about the heavenly bodies themselves. For "how," he says, "when they have bodies and are visible can they be unchangeable and always the same?"[1]—agreeing, obviously, in this, too, with Heraclitus, who said that the sun kept on coming into being.[2] There would be no difficulty for Aristotle, if one accepted his assumption of the fifth body.[3] But for those who do not postulate this fifth element but hold that the body of the heaven is composed of the same elements of which the living creatures down here are made, the question does arise how there can be individual identity. And still more, how can the sun and the other things in heaven be individually everlasting when they are parts? Now every living thing is composed of soul and the nature of body; so it follows necessarily that the heaven, if it exists for ever as one and the same individual, must owe its immortality either to both of its component parts or to one or other of them, i.e. soul or body. Anyone, then, who attributes indestructibility to the body will have no need of the soul for this purpose, except that it will always have

[2] Cp. Diels–Kranz, B6 (quoted by Aristotle, *Meteorologica* B. 2. 355a13–15, from where Plotinus probably takes it).

[3] For Aristotle's conception of the "fifth body," cp. *De Caelo* A. 3. 270b1 ff.

ἢ τοῦ ὁμοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι πρὸς ζῴου σύστασιν· τῷ δὲ τὸ σῶμα παρ' αὐτοῦ φθαρτὸν εἶναι λέγοντι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ διδόντι τὴν αἰτίαν πειρατέον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν μηδ' αὐτὴν ἐναντιουμένην τῇ συστάσει καὶ τῇ διαμονῇ δεικνύναι, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀσύμφωνον ἐν τοῖς συνεστηκόσιν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πρόσφορον καὶ τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τοῦ ἀποτελέσαντος[1] ὑπάρχειν προσήκει.

3. Πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντὸς συνεργὸν ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἀθανασίαν ἀεὶ ῥέον; Ἢ ὅτι, φαῖμεν ἄν, ⟨ῥεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ·⟩ ῥεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω. Εἰ οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μένον τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτ' ἂν αὔξοιτο οὔτε φθίνοι· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ γηράσκει. Ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ καὶ γῆν μένουσαν ἀεὶ ἐν σχήματι τῷ αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀιδίου καὶ ὄγκῳ, καὶ ἀὴρ οὐ μήποτε ἐπιλείπῃ οὐδὲ ἡ ὕδατος φύσις· καὶ τοίνυν ὅσον μεταβάλλει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἠλλοίωσε τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ζῴου φύσιν. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ μεταβαλλόντων μορίων καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἀπιόντων μένει ἕκαστος εἰς πολύ· ᾧ δὲ ἔξω μηδέν, οὐκ ἀσύμφωνος ἂν τούτων ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ζῷον καὶ ἀεὶ μένον. Πῦρ δὲ ὀξὺ μὲν καὶ ταχὺ τῷ μὴ ὧδε μένειν, ὥσπερ καὶ γῇ τῷ μὴ ἄνω· γενόμενον δὲ ἐκεῖ, οὗ στῆναι δεῖ, οὕτοι δεῖν νομίζειν οὕτως ἔχειν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἱδρυμένον, ὡς μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα στάσιν ἐπ' ἄμφω ζητεῖν. Ἀνωτέρω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν φέροιτο· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι· κάτω δ' οὐ πέφυκε. Λείπεται δὲ αὐτῷ εὐαγώγῳ

[1] ἀποτελέσαντος H-S², ἀποτελέσματος codd.

to be with the body to make up the living creature. But anyone who says that the body is in itself destructible and makes the soul the cause of immortality will have to try and show that the character of body is not essentially opposed to permanent association with soul, that there is no natural discord between the components, but that even the matter of body must be favourably disposed to assist the purpose of the accomplishing power.

3. How, then, can the matter and body of the All, when it is always in a state of flux, co-operate towards the immortality of the universe? It is, we should say, because it flows in itself; it does not flow out. If, then, it flows *in* itself and not away from itself, it remains the same and does not increase or decrease; so it does not grow old either. One must observe that the earth, too, remains always from eternity in the same shape and bulk and the air never fails, nor does the nature of water; and all that changes of them does not alter the nature of the total living thing. With us too, though parts of us change and go away outside us, each individual lasts a long time; and when something has no outside, the nature of body is not so discordant with the soul as to prevent it being one and the same everlasting living thing. Fire is keen and swift by not staying here below (just as earth will not stay above); when it comes there where it has to stop one must not think of it as being so firmly established in its own place that it does not, like the other elements, seek a position for itself in both directions. Now it cannot go any higher, for there is nothing beyond; and it is not its nature to go down. It remains for it to be tractable

τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν ὁλκὴν ἑλκομένῳ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν εὖ μάλα ἐν καλῷ τόπῳ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Καὶ γάρ, εἴ τῳ φόβος μὴ πέσῃ, θαρρεῖν δεῖ· φθάνει γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ πᾶσαν νεῦσιν, ὡς κρατοῦσαν ἀνέχειν. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἀντιτεῖνον μένει. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερα μέρη ἐν μορφῇ γενόμενα οὐ στέγοντα αὐτῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἀπαιτεῖ ἀπ' ἄλλων μόρια, ἵνα μένοι· εἰ δ' ἐκεῖθεν μὴ ἀπορρέοι, οὐδὲν δεῖ τρέφεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ ἀπορρέοι ἀποσβεννύμενον ἐκεῖθεν, πῦρ δεῖ ἕτερον ἐξάπτεσθαι καί, εἰ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔχοι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορρέοι, δεῖ καὶ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄλλου. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μένοι ἂν τὸ πᾶν ζῷον τὸ αὐτό, εἰ καὶ οὕτως.

4. Ἀλλ' αὐτό γε ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον, σκεπτέον εἴτε τι ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν, ὥστε δεῖσθαι κἀκεῖνα τῆς λεγομένης οὐ κυρίως τροφῆς, ἢ ἅπαξ τὰ ἐκεῖ ταχθέντα κατὰ φύσιν μένοντα οὐδεμίαν πάσχει ἀπορροήν· καὶ πότερον πῦρ μόνον ἢ πλέον τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰωρεῖσθαι καὶ μετεωρίζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος. Εἰ γάρ τις προσθείη καὶ τὴν κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν, τὴν ψυχήν, μετὰ τῶν οὕτω σωμάτων καθαρῶν καὶ πάντως ἀμεινόνων—ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις αὐτῶν τὰ ἀμείνω ἐκλέγεται

and, drawn by soul to an excellent life in a way according with its nature, to move in soul in a noble place. If anyone is afraid it will fall, he should feel reassured; the soul's guidance on its circular path anticipates any tendency to decline, mastering it and holding it up: and if fire has no spontaneous inclination downward, it stays in place without resistance. Our own members, which come to be in a definite shape, cannot maintain their own structure and demand portions from other things to make them last: but if there is no loss by flux in heaven there is no need for nourishment. If anything was lost there through fire being extinguished, other fire would have to be kindled; and if it had this other fire from something else and that something else lost it by flux, that again would have to replaced by other fire. But as a result of this the universal living creature would not remain the same thing, even if it remained the same sort of thing.

4. But we ought to consider this question in itself, and not in relation to our main investigation, whether anything in heaven is lost by flux so that the heavenly bodies do need nutrition (not in the strict and proper sense of the word), or whether the beings there, once established, remain naturally and endure no loss by flux; and also whether there is only fire or whether fire predominates and it is possible for the other elements to be carried up and held on high by the dominant fire. If one takes into account the sovereign cause, the soul, along with bodies of the kind which exist in heaven, pure and altogether better than those of earth (for in other living things, too, nature selects and places in their most important

ἡ φύσις—πάγιον ἂν τὴν δόξαν περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τῆς ἀθανασίας λάβοι. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν φλόγα ζέσιν τινὰ καὶ πῦρ οἷον διὰ κόρον ὑβρίζον· τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ἠρεμαῖον καὶ τῇ τῶν ἄστρων πρόσφορον φύσει. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς ἀρίστοις κινουμένην δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ κειμένην, πῶς ἐκφεύξεταί τι αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῶν ἅπαξ ἐν αὐτῇ τεθέντων; Μὴ παντὸς δὲ δεσμοῦ οἴεσθαι κρείττονα εἶναι ἐκ θεοῦ ὡρμημένην, ἀνθρώπων ἀπείρων ἐστὶν αἰτίας τῆς συνεχούσης τὰ πάντα. Ἄτοπον γὰρ τὴν καὶ ὁποσονοῦν χρόνον δυνηθεῖσαν συνέχειν μὴ καὶ ἀεὶ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ὥσπερ βίᾳ τοῦ συνέχειν γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλου ἢ τούτου ὄντος, ὃ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντός ἐστι φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς καλῶς τεθεῖσιν, ἢ ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ βιασομένου καὶ διαλύσοντος τὴν σύστασιν καὶ οἷον βασιλείας τινὸς καὶ ἀρχῆς καταλύσοντος τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν. Τό τε μήποτε ἄρξασθαι—ἄτοπον γὰρ καὶ ἤδη εἴρηται—πίστιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔχει. Διὰ τί γὰρ ἔσται, ὅτε καὶ οὐκ ἦδη; Οὐ γὰρ ἐκτέτριπται τὰ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· μενόντων δ' ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ πᾶν μένει. Καὶ εἰ μεταβάλλει ἀεί, τὸ πᾶν μένει· μένει γὰρ καὶ ἡ τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτία. Ἡ δὲ μετάνοια τῆς ψυχῆς ὅτι κενόν ἐστι δέδεικται,

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Meteorologica* A. 3. 340b23 and 4. 341b22.

[2] Plotinus particularly disliked the idea that the divine power which made the universe might change its mind and

parts the bodies of better quality), one will have a solid conviction about the immortality of the heaven. Aristotle, certainly, is right in calling flame a "boiling-over,"[1] fire rioting because it is full fed; but fire in heaven is equable and placid, adapted to the nature of the stars. But the greatest argument of all is: when soul, moved with a marvellous power, is situated next after the best of realities, how can anything which was once set in it escape from it into non-being? Only those who have no understanding of the cause which holds all things together would not think soul, sprung from God, stronger than any bond. For it would be absurd for soul, if it is able to hold the universe together for any length of time, however short, not to do so for ever, as if it held it together by force and the natural state of affairs was other than this existing one which is in the nature of the universe and the noble disposition of things, or as if there was someone who was going to dissolve the universal structure by violence and depose the nature of soul as if from some sort of kingship or magistracy. The fact, too, that it had no beginning—we have already said that that would be absurd—gives us assurance for the future. For why should there come a time when it exists no more? The elements do not wear out like pieces of wood and things of that kind; and if they last the All lasts. And even if they are continually changing, the All lasts; for the cause of change endures. And we have shown that it is empty to suppose that soul might change its mind,[2] for its direction of the

destroy it. He had already attacked it in his treatise *Against the Gnostics* (II9. 4).

ὅτι ἄπονος καὶ ἀβλαβὴς ἡ διοίκησις· καὶ εἰ πᾶν οἷόν τε σῶμα ἀπολέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἀλλοιότερον αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο.

5. Πῶς οὖν τὰ ἐκεῖ μέρη μένει, τὰ δ' ἐνταῦθα στοιχεῖα τε καὶ ζῷα οὐ μένει; Ἤ, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, τὰ μὲν παρὰ θεοῦ γεγένηται, τὰ δ' ἐνταῦθα ζῷα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων παρ' αὐτοῦ θεῶν· γενόμενα δὲ παρ' ἐκείνου οὐ θεμιτὸν φθείρεσθαι. Τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐφεξῆς μὲν τῷ δημιουργῷ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν οὐρανίαν, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας δέ· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς οὐρανίας ἴνδαλμα αὐτῆς ἰὸν καὶ οἷον ἀπορρέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῷα ποιεῖν. Ψυχῆς οὖν μιμουμένης τοιαύτης τὴν ἐκεῖ, ἀδυνατούσης δὲ τῷ καὶ χείροσι σώμασι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν καὶ ἐν τόπῳ χείρονι καὶ τῶν εἰς τὴν σύστασιν ληφθέντων οὐκ ἐθελόντων μένειν, τά τε ζῷα ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀεὶ δύναται μένειν, τά τε σώματα οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατοῖτο ἄν, ὡς ἂν ἄλλης ψυχῆς αὐτῶν προσεχῶς ἀρχούσης. Τὸν δὲ ὅλον οὐρανὸν εἴπερ ἔδει μένειν, καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, τὰ ἄστρα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔδει· ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔμεινε μὴ ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων μενόντων; Τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐκέτι οὐρανοῦ μέρη· ἢ οὐ μέχρι σελήνης ὁ οὐρανός. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πλασθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς διδομένης παρὰ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν ψυχῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατ' ἐκείνην καὶ σύνεσμεν τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἄλλη ψυχή, καθ' ἣν ἡμεῖς, τοῦ εὖ

universe is without trouble or harm to it; and even if it were possible for all body to perish, nothing unpleasant would happen to soul.

5. How then do the parts in heaven last, but down here the elements and living things do not last? Because, Plato says, the heavenly things derive their being from God, but the living things down here from the gods derived from him;[1] and it is not lawful for the things which derive their being from him to perish.[2] This amounts to saying that the heavenly soul (and our souls too) comes next in order after the maker of the universe; from the heavenly soul comes out an image of it and so to speak flows down from above and makes the living things on earth. Since, then, this kind of soul tries to imitate the soul up there but is unable to because it is using worse bodies for its making and is working in a worse place, and since the ingredients which it takes for its composition are unwilling to endure, the living things here cannot last for ever and the bodies are not as effectively mastered by soul as if the other (heavenly) soul ruled them directly. But if the heaven must last as a whole, then its parts, the stars in it, must last too; how could it last if they do not last as well? (The things under heaven are no longer part of heaven; if we assumed that they were, then heaven would not stop at the moon.) We, however, are formed by the soul given from the gods in heaven and heaven itself, and this soul governs our association with our bodies. The other soul, by which we are ourselves, is cause of our well-being, not of our

[1] *Timaeus* 69C3–5.
[2] Cp. *Timaeus* 41A7–B5.

εἶναι, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι αἰτία. Ἤδη γοῦν τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται γενομένου μικρὰ ἐκ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι συνεκλαμβανομένη.

6. Ἀλλὰ πότερον πῦρ μόνον καὶ εἰ ἀπορρεῖ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς νῦν σκεπτέον. Τῷ μὲν οὖν Τιμαίῳ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα πεποιηκότι πρῶτον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός, ἵνα ὁρατόν τε ᾖ διὰ τὸ πῦρ, στερρὸν δὲ διὰ τὴν γῆν, ἀκολουθεῖν ἔδοξε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ποιεῖν οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον πυρὸς ἔχειν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἄστρα τὸ στερεὸν φαίνεται ἔχοντα. Καὶ ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι συνεπικρίναντος καὶ Πλάτωνος τῷ εἰκότι τὴν γνώμην ταύτην. Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατά τε τὴν ὄψιν κατὰ τε τὴν τῆς ἁφῆς ἀντίληψιν πυρὸς ἔχειν τὸ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ πᾶν φαίνεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκοποῦσιν, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν ἄνευ γῆς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γῆς ἂν ἔχοι. Ὕδατος δὲ καὶ ἀέρος τί ἂν δέοιτο; Ἀτοπόν τε γὰρ δόξει ὕδατος εἶναι ἐν τοσούτῳ πυρί, ὅ τε ἀὴρ εἰ ἐνείη μεταβάλλοι ἂν εἰς πυρὸς φύσιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ δύο στερεὰ ἄκρων λόγον ἔχοντα δύο μέσων δεῖται, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, εἰ καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς οὕτως· ἐπεὶ καὶ γῆν ἄν τις ὕδατι μίξειεν οὐδενὸς δεηθεὶς μέσου. Εἰ δὲ λέγοιμεν· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῇ γῇ καὶ τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, δόξομεν ἴσως τι λέγειν· εἴποι δ' ἄν τις· ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ

[1] *Timaeus* 31B4–8.
[2] *Timaeus* 40A2–3.
[3] This is, perhaps, a reference to what Plato makes Timaeus say at 29B3–D3, that his account of the formation of the universe is a probable but not a certain one.
[4] *Timaeus* 32B2–3.

being. It comes when our body is already in existence, making only minor contributions from reasoning to our being.

6. But now we must consider whether the heavenly bodies are made of fire only, and whether anything flows away from them and so they need nourishment. To Timaeus, who formed the body of the All primarily from earth and fire, so that it might be visible by means of the fire and solid by means of the earth,[1] it seemed consistent to make the stars contain, not all fire but mostly fire, since the stars obviously have solidity.[2] And he is probably right, since Plato agrees that this view is probable.[3] From our sense-perception, by sight and the apprehension of contact [with their rays], they seem to contain all fire or mostly fire; but when we consider them rationally, we see that, if there is no solidity without earth, they must contain earth. But what need would they have of water and air? It will seem absurd to suppose that there is any water in so much fire, and if there was any air in it, it would change into the nature of fire. But even if two solids standing in the relationship of extremes need two middle terms,[4] one might find it difficult to suppose that this logical relationship held good for natural bodies; for one can mix earth and water without needing any middle term. But if we say " The other elements are already present in earth and water " there will, perhaps, appear to be some sense in this argument, though one might object " These other elements will not serve to bind

συνδῆσαι συνιόντα τὰ δύο. Ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐροῦμεν ἤδη συνδεῖσθαι τῷ ἔχειν ἑκάτερον πάντα. Ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄνευ πυρὸς οὐχ ὁρατὸν γῆ, καὶ ἄνευ γῆς οὐ στερεὸν πῦρ· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, τάχ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἔχοι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αὑτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ πάντα μὲν μέμικται, λέγεται δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον. Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ ὑγροῦ φασι συστῆναι δύνασθαι· κόλλαν γὰρ εἶναι τῇ γῇ τὴν ὕδατος ὑγρότητα. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ δώσομεν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστόν γε ἄτοπον λέγοντα εἶναί τι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μὴ διδόναι σύστασιν αὐτῷ, μετὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοῦ, οὐδενὸς ἑκάστου ὄντος. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη γῆς φύσις καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι γῇ μηδενὸς ὄντος μορίου γῆς ὃ γῇ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὕδωρ ἐνείη εἰς κόλλησιν; Τί δ' ἂν κολλήσειε μὴ ὄντος ὅλως μεγέθους, ὃ πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον συνεχὲς συνάψει; Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέγεθος γῆς αὐτῆς ἔσται, ἔσται γῆν φύσει καὶ ἄνευ ὕδατος εἶναι· ἤ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὃ κολλήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος. Ἀέρος δὲ τί ἂν δέοιτο γῆς ὄγκος πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἔτι ἀέρος μένοντος πρὶν μεταβάλλειν; Περὶ δὲ πυρὸς εἰς μὲν τὸ γῇ εἶναι οὐκ εἴρηται, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὁρατῇ εἶναι καὶ αὐτῇ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· εὔλογον μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν παρὰ φωτὸς τὸ ὁρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ

[1] This is the doctrine of *Epinomis* 981D–E, where all living beings are composed of all the elements, but in the earthly group (men, animals, plants) the earthly and solid element

the two when they come together." But all the same we shall say [for the sake of argument] that they are joined because each of them contains all things. But we must consider whether it is true that earth is not visible without fire and fire is not solid without earth. If this is so, it looks as if no element would ever have its own essential nature by itself, but all are mixed and take their names from the dominant element in each.[1] They say that earth cannot have concrete existence without moisture; the moisture of water is earth's adhesive. But even if we grant that this is so, it is absurd to say that each element is a separate something and not give it any concrete existence but only an existence along with the others, without anything being separate. How could there be a nature and substantial reality of earth if there is no particle of earth which is earth unless water is present in it to stick it together? What could the water stick if there was no bulk of earth at all which it could join to another contiguous particle? And if there is any bulk of absolute earth at all, then earth can exist by nature without water; and if it is not so, there will be nothing to be stuck together by the water. And how could the mass of earth require air for its existence, air that was still air, before it changed? As for fire, it was not maintained that it was needed for earth to exist, but for it and the other elements to be visible,[2] and it is certainly reasonable to agree that visibility comes from light. For we should not say that darkness is

predominates, in the heavenly group (the heavenly bodies) the element of fire.

[2] *Timaeus* 31B5.

σκότος ὁρᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φατέον, ὥσπερ τὴν ἀψοφίαν μὴ ἀκούεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ πῦρ γε ἐν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι· φῶς γὰρ ἀρκεῖ. Χιὼν γοῦν καὶ τὰ ψυχρότατα πολλὰ λαμπρὰ πυρὸς ἄνευ. Ἀλλ' ἐνεγένετο, φήσει τις, καὶ ἔχρωσε πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν. Καὶ περὶ ὕδατος δὲ ἀπορητέον, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὕδωρ, εἰ μὴ γῆς λάβοι. Ἀὴρ δὲ πῶς ἂν λέγοιτο μετέχειν γῆς εὔθρυπτος ὤν; Περὶ δὲ πυρός, εἰ γῆς δεῖ αὐτῷ τὸ συνεχὲς παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχοντι οὐδὲ τὸ διάστατον τριχῇ. Ἡ δὲ στερεότης αὐτῷ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν τὴν τριχῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντέρεισιν δηλονότι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται ᾗ φυσικὸν σῶμα; Σκληρότης δὲ γῇ μόνῃ. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν τῷ χρυσῷ ὕδατι ὄντι προσγίνεται οὐ γῆς προσγενομένης, ἀλλὰ πυκνότητος ἢ πήξεως. Καὶ πῦρ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ διὰ τί ψυχῆς παρούσης οὐ συστήσεται πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς; Καὶ ζῷα δὲ πύρινά ἐστι δαιμόνων. Ἀλλὰ κινήσομεν τὸ πᾶν ζῷον ἐκ πάντων τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν. Ἢ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τις ἐρεῖ, γῆν δὲ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν αἴρειν παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῆς τεταγμένοις· συμπεριάγειν δὲ τὴν ταχίστην φορὰν γεηρὰ σώματα οὐ πιθανὸν εἶναι ἐμπόδιόν τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ φανὸν καὶ λευκὸν τοῦ ἐκεῖ πυρός.

7. Ἴσως οὖν βέλτιον χρὴ ἀκούειν τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος ἐν μὲν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ δεῖν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον στερεόν, τὸ ἀντίτυπον ὄν, ἵνα τε ἡ γῆ ἐν μέσῳ ἱδρυμένη ἐπιβάθρα καὶ τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῆς

visible but that it is invisible, just as noiselessness is inaudible. But there is no need for fire to be present in earth: light is enough. Snow, anyhow, and many very cold things are bright without fire—but there *was* fire in them, someone will say, and it coloured them before it went away. And there is a difficulty about water, too; is it not water unless it contains some earth? And how could one say that air has earth in it when it is so unstable? As for fire, one must ask if it needs earth because it has neither continuity nor three-dimensionality of itself. But why has it not solidity (in the sense not of three-dimensionality but of resistance) simply from being a natural body? Hardness is the property of earth alone. For gold, for example, which is water, acquires density not by the accession of earth but of denseness or coagulation.[1] And why, then, should not fire, since soul is present to it, attain existence by itself through soul's power? There are, in fact, fiery living beings among the spirits. We shall question the assumption that every living thing is constituted of all the elements. One can agree that this is true of the things on earth, but to lift up earth into heaven is against nature and opposed to her laws; it is not probable that the swiftest of all movements carries round earthly bodies; it would impede the brightness and clearness of the heavenly fire.

7. So perhaps we should listen more carefully to Plato; this is what he says: there must in the universal order be a solidity, that is a resistance, of such a kind that the earth set in the middle may be a founda-

[1] *Timaeus* 59B1–4.

βεβηκόσιν ἑδραία ᾖ, τά τε ζῷα τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ τοιοῦτον στερεὸν ἔχῃ, ἡ δὲ γῆ τὸ μὲν εἶναι συνεχὴς καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχοι, ἐπιλάμποιτο δὲ ὑπὸ πυρός· μετέχειν δὲ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ μὴ αὐχμηρόν—ἔχειν δέ—καὶ μερῶν πρὸς μέρη μὴ κωλύεσθαι συναγωγήν· ἀέρα δὲ κουφίζειν γῆς ὄγκους· μεμῖχθαι δὲ τῷ ἄνω πυρὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν ἄστρων τὴν γῆν, ἀλλ' ἐν κόσμῳ γενομένου ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἀπολαῦσαί τι τῆς γῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν γῆν τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον ἑκάστων, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἀπολαῦσαν γενέσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ οὗ μετέσχεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίαν ὃν ὅ ἐστι λαβεῖν οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ, οἷον οὐκ ἀέρα, ἀλλ' ἀέρος τὴν ἀπαλότητα καὶ τὴν γῆν πυρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα· τὴν δὲ μῖξιν πάντα διδόναι καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τότε ποιεῖν, οὐ γῆν μόνον καὶ τὴν πυρὸς φύσιν, τὴν στερεότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν πυκνότητα. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τούτοις εἰπών· φῶς ἀνῆψεν ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὴν δευτέραν ἀπὸ γῆς περιφοράν, τὸν ἥλιον λέγων, καὶ λαμπρότατόν που λέγει ἀλλαχοῦ τὸν ἥλιον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λευκότατον, ἀπάγων ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἄλλο τι νομίζειν ἢ πυρὸς εἶναι, πυρὸς δὲ οὐδετέρων τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς ὅ φησιν ἕτερον φλογὸς εἶναι, θερμὸν δὲ

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 55E1–3 and 59D6. This is not exactly what Plato says but what Plotinus thinks he means. Here, as always in his Platonic exegesis, Plotinus shows himself determined to extract some meaning from Plato which will fit in with his own ideas of what is reasonable and true.

tion and firm support for those who stand upon it, and the living beings upon it may necessarily have a solidity of this kind;[1] the earth will possess continuity from itself and will be illuminated by fire; it has a share of water to prevent dryness (as, in fact, it has) and so as not to hinder the cohesion of its particles; and air gives lightness to the bulk of earth; but earth is mingled with the upper fire, not in the constitution of the stars but because, since they are both in the universal order, fire gains something from earth as earth does from fire and each element from each of the others; not in the sense that the element which gains something is composed of both, itself and that of which it has a share; but, through the community of the universe, while remaining itself it takes, not the actual other element but something which belongs to it, not air, for instance, but the yielding softness of air, and earth the brightness of fire: the mixture gives all qualities and consequently produces the compound thing, not supplying earth only and the nature of fire but this solidity and density of earth. Plato himself supports this view when he says " God kindled a light in the second circuit from the earth," meaning the sun;[2] and elsewhere he calls the sun " the brightest,"[3] and also says it is the clearest; so he prevents us from thinking that it is made of anything but fire, but by fire he does not mean either of the other kinds of fire but the

[2] *Timaeus* 39B4–5.

[3] *Theaetetus* 208D2: *Republic* 616E9.

προσηνῶς μόνον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ φῶς σῶμα εἶναι, ἀποστίλβειν δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὁμώνυμον αὐτῷ φῶς, ὃ δή φαμεν καὶ ἀσώματον εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ φωτὸς παρέχεσθαι, ἐκλάμπον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὥσπερ ἄνθος ἐκείνου καὶ στιλπνότητα, ὃ δὴ καὶ εἶναι τὸ ὄντως λευκὸν σῶμα. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ γεηρὸν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον λαμβάνοντες, τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν στερεότητα λαβόντος τὴν γῆν, ἕν τι γοῦν δὴ ὀνομάζομεν ἡμεῖς διαφορὰς γῆς ἐκείνου τιθεμένου. Τοῦ δὴ τοιούτου πυρὸς τοῦ φῶς παρέχοντος τὸ καθαρώτατον ἐν τῷ ἄνω τόπῳ κειμένου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκεῖ ἱδρυμένου, ταύτην τὴν φλόγα οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὑπολεπτέον, ἀλλὰ φθάνουσαν μέχρι τινὸς ἀποσβέννυσθαι ἐντυχοῦσαν πλείονι ἀέρι ἀνελθοῦσά τε μετὰ γῆς ῥίπτεσθαι κάτω οὐ δυναμένην ὑπερβαίνειν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, κάτω δὲ τῆς σελήνης ἵστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ λεπτότερον ποιεῖν τὸν ἐκεῖ ἀέρα καὶ φλόγα, εἰ μένοι, μαραινομένην εἰς τὸ πραότερον γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν μὴ ἔχειν ὅσον εἰς τὴν ζέσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον παρὰ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἄνω ἐναυγάζεσθαι· τὸ δὲ φῶς ἐκεῖ, τὸ μὲν ποικιλθὲν ἐν λόγοις, τοῖς ἄστροις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς χρόαις τὴν διαφορὰν ἐργάσασθαι, τὸν δ' ἄλλον οὐρανὸν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν τοιούτου φωτός, μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι δὲ λεπτότητι τοῦ σώματος καὶ διαφανείᾳ οὐκ ἀν-

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 58C5–7.

[2] Light for Plotinus is the incorporeal ἐνέργεια of the

light which he says is other than flame, and only gently warm.[1] This light is a body, but another light shines from it which has the same name, which we teach is incorporeal.[2] This is given from that first light, shining out from it as its flower and splendour; that first light is the truly bright and clear body. We take "earthly" in the lower sense, but Plato understands "earth" in the sense of "solidity";[3] we apply the name "earth" in one and the same sense, but Plato distinguishes different kinds of "earth".[4] Now since fire of this kind, which gives the purest light, rests in the upper region and is established there by nature, we must not suppose that the flame down here mingles with the fires of heaven; it reaches a certain way and then is extinguished when it encounters a greater quantity of air, and as it takes earth with it on its ascent it falls back and is not able to get up to the upper fire but comes to a standstill below the moon, so as to make the air finer there; the flame, if it lasts, fades into softness and has not enough brightness to blaze out but only enough to be illuminated by the upper light; the light in the heavens, being varied in different proportions, brings about the distinction of the stars both in size and colour; the rest of the heaven is also made of light of this kind, but is not seen because of the

luminous body, closely parallel to life, the ἐνέργεια of the soul. Cp. IV. 5. 6–7. I have discussed this doctrine and the important place which it holds in the thought of Plotinus in my *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in Plotinus*, pp. 54–58.

[3] *Timaeus* 31B6.

[4] Plotinus may be thinking of *Timaeus* 60B6, but the passage is really quite irrelevant to his argument here.

τιτύπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν καθαρὸν ἀέρα· πρόσεστι δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ πόρρω.

8. Τούτου δὴ μείναντος ἄνω τοῦ τοιούτου φωτὸς ἐν ᾧ τέτακται καθαροῦ ἐν καθαρωτάτῳ, τίς ἂν τρόπος ἀπορροῆς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἂν γένοιτο; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸ κάτω πέφυκεν ἀπορρεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις, οὐδ' αὖ τί ἐστιν ἐκεῖ τῶν βιαζομένων ὠθεῖν πρὸς τὸ κάτω. Πᾶν δὲ σῶμα μετὰ ψυχῆς ἄλλο καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, οἷον μόνον ἦν· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ ἐκεῖ, οὐχ οἷον τὸ μόνον. Τό τε γειτονοῦν εἴτε ἀὴρ εἴτε πῦρ εἴη, ἀὴρ μὲν τί ἂν ποιήσειε; Πυρὸς δὲ οὐδ' ἂν ἓν ἁρμόσειε πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφάψαιτο εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαι· τῇ ῥύμῃ τε γὰρ παραλλάξειεν ἂν πρὶν παθεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ἔλαττόν τε τοῦτο ἰσχῦόν τε οὐκ ἴσα τοῖς ἐνθάδε. Εἶτα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι θερμῆναί ἐστι· δεῖ τε τὸ θερμανθησόμενον μὴ θερμὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι. Εἰ δέ τι φθαρήσεται παρὰ πυρός, θερμανθῆναι δεῖ πρότερον αὐτὸ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ θερμαίνεσθαι γίνεσθαι. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τοίνυν ἄλλου σώματος τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἵνα μένῃ, οὐδ' αὖ, ἵνα κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περιφορά· οὐ γάρ πω δέδεικται οὐδὲ ἐπ' εὐθείας οὖσα ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ φορά· ἢ γὰρ μένειν ἢ περιφέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι βιασθέντων. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τροφῆς δεῖσθαι φατέον τὰ ἐκεῖ, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τῇδε περὶ ἐκείνων ἀποφαντέον οὔτε ψυχὴν

fineness and non-reflecting transparency of its body (just like pure air); and besides this it is far away.

8. Now when light of this kind stays on high in the place in which it is set, pure in the purest region, what kind of outflow could there possibly be from it? A nature of this kind is certainly not naturally adapted to flow downwards; and there is nothing of a violent sort up there to push it down. Every body is different when it is combined with soul, and not the same as it is when it is left to itself; and body in the heavens is with soul, and not as it would be by itself. And that which borders on it would be either air or fire, and what could air do? And there is no single kind of fire which would be fitted for acting on the heavenly fire, nor could it make contact to do anything; the heavenly fire would be carried on by its momentum to another place before anything could happen to it; and the fire in the upper air is less in strength, not equal to the fires here on earth. Then, too, it would act by heating; and that which is going to be heated must not be hot of itself. And if anything is going to be destroyed by fire, it must be heated first, and be brought in the heating into an unnatural state. So, then, the heaven needs no other body for it to last or for its revolution to take its natural course; for it has never been demonstrated that its natural movement is in a straight line: it is natural to the heavenly bodies either to stay still or to go round in a circle; other movements belong to beings which are subject to force. We must assert, then, too, that the heavenly beings have no need of nourishment, nor must we base our statements about them on the things here on earth, since they have not the

τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν συνέχουσαν ἐχόντων οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον οὔτε αἰτίας οὔσης ἐκεῖ, δι' ἣν τὰ τῇδε τρέφεται συγκρίματα ἀεὶ ῥέοντα, τήν τε μεταβολὴν τῶν τῇδε σωμάτων ἀφ' αὑτῶν μεταβάλλειν ἄλλης ἐπιστατούσης φύσεως αὐτοῖς, ἣ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας οὐκ οἶδε κατέχειν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, μιμεῖται δὲ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ἢ γεννᾶν τὴν πρὸ αὐτῆς φύσιν. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὡσαύτως πάντη, ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά, εἴρηται.

same soul holding them together and do not inhabit the same region; and the reason why the compound things on earth are nourished does not apply in heaven; the bodies here are always in a state of flux, and their change is a change away from their true selves, for they are under the direction of another nature, which because of its weakness has no way of keeping them in being, but imitates the nature before it in becoming and generating.—But we have already explained that the heavenly bodies are not in every way unchanging like the beings of the realm of Intellect.

II. 2. ON THE MOVEMENT OF HEAVEN

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise (No. 14 in Porphyry's chronological order), has an alternative title, *On the Circular Motion*, in the *Life* (ch. 4. 49 and 24. 42), which is used in some modern editions and translations. It is a defence of the Platonic doctrine (the movement of heaven is the bodily expression of the spiritual movement of the soul of the universe) against the Aristotelian conception of movement by an unmoved mover and the materialist explanation given by the Stoics. Heinemann denied the authenticity of the treatise: but its opening words are quoted as being by Plotinus by Proclus, Damascius, Simplicius and Philoponus (references in the Henry–Schwyzer edition and Cilento's commentary): and Heinemann's arguments drawn from the contents of the treatise are adequately refuted by Bréhier in his introduction to it (Vol. II, pp. 17–19).

Synopsis

What makes the heaven move in a circle? Its movement cannot be the result of any local or spatial movement of soul, for soul is not moved spatially. The movement of heaven is only local accidentally; it is a movement of awareness and life, the movement of an ensouled living thing. It cannot be the natural movement of fire; fire, like all other bodies, moves naturally in a straight line; circular motion is the result of providence, the action of universal soul—it is not of course unnatural, for " nature " is just what universal soul ordains. Argument

against the idea of an unmoved mover (ch. 1). Why do we not move in circles? Our souls, our real selves, which are " private wholes," do so move, circling lovingly round God; but our bodies are only parts, and parts whose nature is to move in straight lines (ch. 2). Explanation of *Timaeus* 36E in terms of Plotinus's own psychology (ch. 3).

II. 2. (14) ΠΕΡΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ

1. Διὰ τί κύκλῳ κινεῖται; Ὅτι νοῦν μιμεῖται. Καὶ τίνος ἡ κίνησις, ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος; Τί οὖν ὅτι ψυχὴ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστι καὶ πρὸς αὐτήν; Ἢ σπεύδει ἰέναι; ἢ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ συνεχεῖ οὖσα; ἢ φερομένη συμφέρει; Ἀλλ' ἔδει συμφέρουσαν μηκέτι φέρειν, ἀλλ' ἐνηνοχέναι, τουτέστι στῆναι μᾶλλον ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ κύκλῳ. Ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ στήσεται ἤ, εἰ κινεῖται, οὔτι γε τοπικῶς. Πῶς οὖν τοπικῶς κινεῖ αὐτὴ ἄλλον τρόπον κινουμένη; Ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲ τοπικὴ ἡ κύκλῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Ποία οὖν τις; Εἰς αὐτὴν συναισθητικὴ καὶ συννοητικὴ καὶ ζωτικὴ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔξω οὐδ' ἄλλοθι· καὶ τὸ πάντα δεῖν περιλαμβάνειν; τοῦ γὰρ ζῴου τὸ κύριον περιληπτικὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἕν. Οὐ περιλήψεται δὲ ζωτικῶς, εἰ μένοι, οὐδὲ σώσει τὰ ἔνδον σῶμα ἔχον· καὶ γὰρ σώματος ζωὴ κίνησις. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τοπική, ὡς δυνήσεται κινήσεται

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 34A4. Throughout this chapter Plotinus seems to have in mind Aristotle's criticism of the *Timaeus* in *De Anima* A. 3. 407a6–407b12, and to be answering Aristotle's arguments there.

II. 2. ON THE MOVEMENT OF HEAVEN

1. Why does it move in a circle?[1] Because it imitates intellect. And what does the movement belong to, soul or body? Is it that soul is in the movement and directed towards it? Or [does it move] because soul is eager to go? Or does soul exist in a state of discontinuity? Or is soul carried along itself and carries heaven with it? But if that was so, it would be no longer carrying it round; it would have finished its conveyance; that is, it would rather make it stand still, and not always go round in a circle. Surely soul will stand still, or if it is moved is certainly not moved spatially. How, then, does it move heaven spatially when it is moved in another way itself? Perhaps the circular movement is not spatial, or if it is, only accidentally. What sort of movement, then, is it? A movement of self-concentrated awareness and intellection and of life, and at no point outside or elsewhere. And [what about] the necessity of encompassing everything? It does so in the sense that the dominant part of the living being is that which encompasses it and makes it one. If it stayed still, it would not encompass it in a living way, nor would it, since it has a body, preserve what is within it; for the life of the body is movement. If, then, there is local movement

καὶ οὐχ ὡς ψυχὴ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὡς σῶμα ἔμψυχον καὶ ὡς ζῷον· ὥστε εἶναι μικτὴν ἐκ σωματικῆς καὶ ψυχικῆς, τοῦ μὲν σώματος εὐθὺ φερομένου φύσει, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς κατεχούσης, ἐκ δ' ἀμφοῖν γενομένου φερομένου τε καὶ μένοντος. Εἰ δὲ σώματος ἡ κύκλῳ λέγοιτο, πῶς παντὸς εὐθυποροῦντος καὶ τοῦ πυρός; Ἢ εὐθυπορεῖ, ἕως ἂν ἥκῃ εἰς τὸ οὗ τέτακται· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ταχθῇ, οὕτω δοκεῖ καὶ ἑστάναι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φέρεσθαι εἰς ὃ ἐτάχθη. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐ μένει ἐλθόν; Ἆρα, ὅτι ἡ φύσις τῷ πυρὶ ἐν κινήσει; Εἰ οὖν μὴ κύκλῳ, σκεδασθήσεται ἐπ' εὐθύ· δεῖ ἄρα κύκλῳ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προνοίας· ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ παρὰ τῆς προνοίας· ὥστε, εἰ ἐκεῖ γένοιτο, κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Ἢ ἐφιέμενον τοῦ εὐθέος οὐκ ἔχον οὐκέτι τόπον ὥσπερ περιολισθάνον ἀνακάμπτει ἐν οἷς τόποις δύναται· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τόπον μεθ' ἑαυτό· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσχατος. Θεῖ οὖν ἐν ᾧ ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τόπος, οὐχ ἵνα μένῃ γεγενημένος, ἀλλ' ἵνα φέροιτο. Καὶ κύκλου δὲ τὸ μὲν κέντρον μένει κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἔξωθεν περιφέρεια εἰ μένοι, κέντρον ἔσται μέγα. Μᾶλλον οὖν ἔσται περὶ τὸ κέντρον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ἔχοντι σώματι. Οὕτω γὰρ συννεύσει πρὸς τὸ κέντρον, οὐ τῇ συνιζήσει—ἀπολεῖ γὰρ τὸν κύκλον—ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται, τῇ περι-

[1] This is Aristotelian doctrine. Cp. *De Caelo* A. 9. 279a17–18.

too, then it will move as it can, and not as soul alone but as an ensouled body and a living thing; so its movement will be a mixture of body-movement and soul-movement; body is naturally transported in a straight line and soul's natural tendency is to contain, and from both of them together there comes to be something which is both carried along and at rest. If circular motion is to be attributed to body, how can it be when all body, including fire, moves in a straight line? It moves in a straight line till it comes to its ordained place; for as it is ordained, so it appears both to rest naturally and to be conveyed to the place where it was ordained to be. Why, then, does it not stay still when it has come to heaven? It is, is it not, because the nature of fire is to be in motion. So if it does not move in a circle, going on in a straight line will dissipate it; so it must move in a circle. But this is the doing of providence; rather, it is something in it which comes from providence, so that if it comes to heaven it moves in a circle of its own accord. It seeks to go on in a straight line, but has no longer any place to go to, so it glides round, we may say, and curves back in the regions where it can; for it has no place beyond itself; this is the last.[1] So it runs in the space it occupies and is its own place; it came to be there not in order to stay still but to move. The centre of a circle naturally stays still, but if the outside circumference stayed still, it would be a big centre. So it can rather be expected, in the case of a living body in its natural state, to go round the centre. In this way, then, it will direct itself towards the centre, not by coinciding with it—that would abolish the circle—but, since it cannot

δινήσει· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἀποπληρώσει τὴν ἔφεσιν. Εἰ ψυχὴ δὲ περιάγοι, οὐ καμεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἕλκει, οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις τὸ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς τῆς πάσης ταχθέν. Ἔτι πανταχοῦ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη καὶ οὐ διειλημμένη ἡ τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ μέρος δίδωσι καὶ τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὡς δύναται, πανταχοῦ εἶναι· δύναται δὲ τῷ πάντα μετιέναι καὶ ἐπιπορεύεσθαι. Ἔστη μὲν γάρ, εἴ που ἑστῶσα ἦν ἡ ψυχή, ἐλθὸν ἐκεῖ· νῦν δέ, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσά ἐστιν, αὐτῆς πάντη[1] ἐφίεται. Τί οὖν; Οὐδέποτε τεύξεται; Ἢ οὕτως ἀεὶ τυγχάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἄγουσα ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ ἀεὶ ἄγειν ἀεὶ κινεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλαχοῦ κινοῦσα ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐπ' εὐθὺ ἀλλὰ κύκλῳ ἄγουσα δίδωσιν αὐτῷ οὗ ἐὰν ἦκῃ ἐκεῖ ἔχειν αὐτήν. Εἰ δὲ μένοι, ὡς ἐκεῖ οὔσης μόνον, οὗ ἕκαστον μένει, στήσεται. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐκεῖ μόνον ὁπουοῦν, πανταχοῦ οἰσθήσεται καὶ οὐκ ἔξω· κύκλῳ ἄρα.

2. Τὰ οὖν ἄλλα πῶς; Ἢ οὐχ ὅλον ἕκαστον, μέρος δὲ καὶ κατεχόμενον μερικῷ τόπῳ. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὅλον καὶ οἷον τόπος καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει· αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν. Πῶς οὖν ἄνθρωποι; Ἢ, ὅσον παρὰ

[1] ἐστιν, αὐτῆς πάντη nunc proponunt Henry et Schwyzer: ἐστιν αὐτῆς, παντὸς codd: H-S: ἐστιν πάντη, παντὸς Sleeman.

do that, by whirling round it; for in this way alone can it satisfy its impulse. But if soul does carry it round, it will not get tired; for it does not drag it, nor is the movement against nature.[1] "Nature" is just what has been ordained by universal soul. Then again, since the whole soul is everywhere and, being the soul of the All, is not divided part to part, it gives omnipresence to the heaven too, as far as it is capable of it; and it is capable of it by pursuing and reaching all things. If soul stood still anywhere, the heavenly fire would stand when it came to that point; but as it is, since soul is universal,[2] the heavenly fire seeks it in every direction. Will it never, then, attain it? In this way it always attains it; or rather, soul itself, drawing heaven to itself, moves it continually in drawing it continually, not moving it to some other place but towards itself in the same place; it does not draw it on in a straight line but in a circle, and so gives it possession of soul at every stage in its progress. If soul stayed still, being only at that point where each individual thing was at rest, then the heaven would stand still too. If, then, soul is not just there at any particular point, the heaven will move everywhere, and not outside soul; in a circle, therefore.

2. Then what about other things? Each of them is not a whole but a part, and contained in a partial place. But that other [that is heaven] is a whole; it *is* space, in a way, and there is nothing to hinder it, because it is the All. What about men, then? In

[1] This answers Aristotle, *De Anima* A.3.407b2. Cp. *De Caelo* B1. 284a27–35.

[2] I print and translate the reading which Schwyzer now proposes, with Henry's agreement. The MSS πᾶσά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, παντὸς, retained in the Oxford text, would give the sense, "soul all belongs to itself," which is a good Plotinian expression but not relevant to the context.

τοῦ παντός, μέρος, ὅσον δ' αὐτοί, οἰκεῖον ὅλον. Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἔχει αὐτήν, τί δεῖ περιέναι; Ἢ ὅτι μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖ. Εἰ δὲ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς περὶ τὸ μέσον, καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν κύκλῳ· μέσον δὲ οὐχ ὡσαύτως σώματος καὶ φύσεως ψυχῆς ληπτέον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἄλλη, τοπικῶς δὲ σώματος. Ἀνάλογον οὖν δεῖ τὸ μέσον· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα μέσον δεῖ εἶναι, ὃ μόνως ἐστὶ μέσον σώματος καὶ σφαιρικοῦ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνο περὶ αὐτό, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὴ ψυχῆς ἐστι, περιθέουσα τὸν θεὸν ἀμφαγαπάζεται καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτὴ ἔχει· ἐξήρτηται γὰρ αὐτοῦ πάντα. Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς αὐτόν, περὶ αὐτόν. Πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶσαι οὕτως; Ἢ ἑκάστη ὅπου ἐστὶν οὕτως. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν οὕτως; Ὅτι τὸ εὐθύπορον προσήρτηται καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα αἱ ὁρμαὶ καὶ τὸ σφαιροειδὲς ἡμῶν οὐκ εὔτροχον· γεηρὸν γάρ· ἐκεῖ δὲ συνέπεται λεπτὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον· διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ σταίη ἠντινοῦν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς κινουμένης; Ἴσως δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦτο ποιεῖ. Εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἐν πᾶσι, τὴν συνεῖναι βουλομένην ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτὸν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι·

[1] " Our spherical part " is the head, which according to the *Timaeus* (44D) is mounted on the body as its vehicle so that it shall not have to roll about.

[2] This is a reference to the description of respiration as a circular process, like a turning wheel, in *Timaeus* 79A5–E9.

so far as he derives from the All, man is a part, in so far as men are themselves, each is a private universe. If, then, heaven, wherever it is, possesses soul everywhere, why does it have to go round? Because it does not possess it only in that particular place. And if the soul's power is movement round its centre, in this way, too, it would make heaven move in a circle: though " centre " is not to be understood in the same way when one is speaking of the nature of soul as it is when one is speaking of a body: with soul the centre is the source from which the other nature derives, with body " centre " has a spatial meaning. So one must use " centre " analogically; there must be a centre for soul as there is for body (though " centre " in the literal sense means the middle point of a body, a spherical one), because just as a body is round its centre, so is soul. If it is the centre of soul that is in question, soul runs round God and embraces him lovingly and keeps round him as far as it can; for all things depend on him: since it cannot go to him, it goes round him. Then why do not all souls do this? Each individual soul does, in its own place. Why, then, do our bodies not go round too? Because there is an additional constituent in them which moves in straight lines, and the impulses of body are directed elsewhere, and our spherical part does not run easily, being earthy.[1] But there the body of heaven follows along with soul, being light and easy to move; why ever should it stop when it goes on moving, whatever its motion? And in us, too, it seems that the breath which is around the soul moves in a circle.[2] If God is in all things, the soul which desires to be with him must

οὐ γάρ πῃ. Καὶ Πλάτων δὲ τοῖς ἄστροις οὐ μόνον τὴν μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου σφαιρικὴν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑκάστῳ δίδωσι τὴν περὶ τὸ κέντρον αὐτῶν· ἕκαστον γάρ, οὗ ἐστι, περιειληφὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀγάλλεται οὐ λογισμῷ ἀλλὰ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις.

3. Ἔστω δὲ καὶ ὧδε· τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ μέν τις δύναμις ἡ ἐσχάτη ἀπὸ γῆς ἀρξαμένη καὶ δι' ὅλου διαπλεκεῖσά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκυῖα καὶ ἡ λόγον δοξαστικὸν δεχομένη πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις ἑαυτὴν ἔχει ἐποχουμένη καὶ τῇ προτέρᾳ καὶ δύναμιν διδοῦσα παρ' αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ζωτικωτέραν. Κινεῖται οὖν ὑπ' αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περιεχούσης καὶ ἐφιδρυμένης παντὶ ὅσον αὐτῆς εἰς τὰς σφαίρας ἀνέδραμε. Κύκλῳ οὖν ἐκείνης περιεχούσης συννεύουσα ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς αὐτήν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστροφὴ αὐτῆς περιάγει τὸ σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ ἐμπέπλεκται. Ἑκάστου γὰρ μορίου κἂν ὁπωσοῦν κινηθέντος ἐν σφαίρᾳ, εἰ μόνον[1] κινοῖτο, ἔσεισεν ἐν ᾧ ἐστι καὶ τῇ σφαίρᾳ κίνησις γίνεται. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἡμετέρων τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλως κινουμένης, οἷον ἐν χαραῖς καὶ τῷ φανέντι ἀγαθῷ, τοῦ σώματος ἡ κίνησις καὶ τοπικὴ γίνεται. Ἐκεῖ δὴ ἐν ἀγαθῷ γινομένη ψυχὴ καὶ αἰσθητικωτέρα γενομένη κινεῖται πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ σείει ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖ τοπικῶς τὸ σῶμα. Ἥ τε αἰσθητικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄνω αὖ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν

[1] μόνον H-S²: μένον codd.

move around him; for he is not in any place. And Plato gives the stars not only their spherical motion with the whole universe but also individual motions, each around its own centre:[1] for each in its place encompasses God and rejoices, not by rational planning but by natural necessity.

3. This, too, is another way of putting it; there is the ultimate power of soul which begins at the earth and is interwoven through the whole universe,[2] and there is the power of soul which is naturally perceptive and receives the opinionative kind of reasoning; this keeps itself above in the heavenly spheres and is in contact with the other from above and gives it power from itself to make it more alive. The lower soul, therefore, is moved by the higher which encompasses it in a circle and bears upon all of it that has risen to the spheres. So the lower soul, as the higher encircles it, inclines and tends towards it, and its tendency carries round the body with which it is interwoven. For if any particular part of a sphere is moved even in the slightest degree, then, if it only is moved, it stirs that in which it is and the sphere is set in motion. In our bodies too, when our soul is moved in a different way from the body —by joy, for instance, and by something which appears good to it—then there is a spatial movement of the body as well. And in heaven, where the soul is in good and more vividly perceptive, it moves to the good and sets its body moving in space in the manner natural to it there. The perceptive power in its turn receives the good from that which

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 40A8–B2.
[2] *Timaeus* 36E2.

λαβοῦσα καὶ τὰ αὐτῆς ἡσθεῖσα διώκουσα αὐτὸ ὂν
20 πανταχοῦ πρὸς τὸ πανταχοῦ συμφέρεται. Ὁ δὲ
νοῦς οὕτω κινεῖται· ἕστηκε γὰρ καὶ κινεῖται· περὶ
αὐτὸν γάρ. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῷ κύκλῳ
κινεῖται ἅμα καὶ ἕστηκεν.

is above and in delight pursues its own and is carried everywhere to the good which is everywhere. This is how intellect is moved; it is both at rest and in motion; for it moves around Him [the Good]. So, then, the universe, too, both moves in its circle and is at rest.

II. 3. ON WHETHER THE STARS ARE CAUSES

Introductory Note

THIS very late treatise (No. 52 in Porphyry's chronological order) takes up again and develops the objections to the ideas of the astrologers about the stars which Plotinus had already put forward in the early work *On Destiny* (III. 1: No. 3 in the chronological order). Plotinus does not deny that the stars foretell, or even that influences coming from them may make a limited contribution to our fortunes and physical make-up. He finds the astrologers objectionable because: (1) they make stars evil and causes of evil to us; (2) they make them changeable, varying in mood and activity according to their aspect and position, a view which Plotinus shows is unscientific, incompatible with the findings of the astronomers, as well as unorthodox from the point of view of Platonic astral theology; (3) they reduce the universe to a disorderly chaos by making the stars act independently and capriciously, instead of seeing it as a living organic whole in which star-movements and influences as well as everything else form part of the pattern of its rational direction by Universal Soul; (4) they very much exaggerate the degree to which the stars are responsible for our physical constitution and fortunes; star-influences are only one kind of cause among many, and not the most important. Further, Plotinus maintains in this as in other treatises (notably that which he wrote next, I. 1) that our true, higher self transcends the physical universe and is beyond the reach of its necessity.

A curious little problem is presented by the section

printed in square brackets in ch. 12 (if it really belongs to this treatise it would fit in better where the translation of Ficino and the *editio princeps* of Perna place it, immediately before the last sentence of ch. 5). This seems to be more favourable to the views of the astrologers than the rest of the treatise, and even to be trying to answer the scientific objections brought against them in ch. 5, though it expresses the view of the universe as an organic whole which is found elsewhere in the treatise and is always taken by Plotinus. It looks almost as if it was a fragment of an essay written by a member of the school in defence of astrology, rather like the papers written by Porphyry in defence of the doctrine of Longinus and answered by Amelius which are mentioned in ch. 18 of the *Life*. But, if this were really what it was, it would be very difficult to explain how it got into the text of this treatise—there is no parallel anywhere else in the *Enneads*.

Synopsis

Detailed refutation of astrological doctrines by scientific and common-sense arguments (chs. 1–6). Explanation of why the stars give signs of things to come from the organic unity of the universe (chs. 7–8). Our higher and lower self (ch. 9). The real nature and limitations of astral influences and the modest part they play in determining our constitution and fortunes (chs. 10–15). How soul directs the All, and reasons for the existence of evils in this world (chs. 16–18).

II. 3. (52) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑ ΑΣΤΡΑ

1. Ὅτι ἡ τῶν ἄστρων φορὰ σημαίνει περὶ ἕκαστον τὰ ἐσόμενα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὴ πάντα ποιεῖ, ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς δοξάζεται, εἴρηται μὲν πρότερον ἐν ἄλλοις, καὶ πίστεις τινὰς παρείχετο ὁ λόγος, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ νῦν ἀκριβέστερον διὰ πλειόνων· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν τὸ ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε ἔχειν δοξάζειν. Τοὺς δὴ πλανήτας φερομένους ποιεῖν λέγουσιν οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, πενίας καὶ πλούτους καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσους, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἴσχη καὶ κάλλη αὖ, καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετὰς καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων πράξεις καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ καιρῶν ἑκάστων, ὥσπερ θυμουμένους εἰς ἀνθρώπους, ἐφ' οἷς μηδὲν αὐτοὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδικοῦσιν οὕτω παρ' αὐτῶν κατεσκευασμένοι, ὡς ἔχουσι· καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι οὐκ ἀγασθέντας τῶν λαμβανόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἢ κακουμένους κατὰ τόπους τῇ φορᾷ ἢ αὖ εὐπαθοῦντας καὶ αὖ ἄλλους αὐτοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις γιγνομένους ὅταν τε ἐπὶ κέντρων ὦσι καὶ ἀποκλίνοντας ἄλλους· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον,

[1] III.1. 5. 33 ff.

[2] For a full explanation of the astrological doctrines criticised in these first six chapters see A. Bouché-Leclercq, *L'Astrologie Grecque:* there is an excellent short account

II. 3. ON WHETHER THE STARS ARE CAUSES

1. That the course of the stars indicates what is going to happen in particular cases, but does not itself cause everything, as most people think, has been said before elsewhere [1] (and the argument offered some proofs); but now we need a more precise and detailed discussion, for to take one view rather than the other is of no small importance. They say that the planets in their courses do not only cause everything else, poverty and riches, sickness and health, but also ugliness and beauty and, what is most important of all, virtue and vice, and even the actions which result from them in each particular case on each particular occasion; just as if they were angry with men over things in which men have done them no wrong, since it was the planets which made the men what they are; and that they give benefits (so-called), not because they feel kindly towards those who receive them but because they themselves are either pleasantly or unpleasantly affected according to the point they have reached on their course, and again are in a different state of mind when they are at their zeniths and when they are declining; [2] and

of the basic absurdities of this pseudo-science in A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* I. ch. V, pp. 89–101.

τοὺς μὲν κακοὺς αὐτῶν λέγοντες, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, ὅμως καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς αὐτῶν λεγομένους ἀγαθὰ διδόναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς φαύλους γίγνεσθαι· ἔτι δὲ ἀλλήλους ἰδόντας ποιεῖν ἕτερα, μὴ ἰδόντας δὲ ἄλλα, ὥσπερ οὐχ αὑτῶν ὄντας ἀλλὰ ἰδόντας μὲν ἄλλους, μὴ ἰδόντας δὲ ἑτέρους· καὶ τόνδε μὲν ἰδόντα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, εἰ δ' ἄλλον ἴδοι, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· καὶ ἄλλως μὲν ὁρᾶν, εἰ κατὰ σχῆμα τόδε ἡ ὄψις, ἄλλως δέ, εἰ κατὰ τόδε· ὁμοῦ τε πάντων τὴν κρᾶσιν ἑτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑγρῶν διαφόρων τὸ κρᾶμα ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ μεμιγμένα. Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα δοξαζόντων περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν ἐπισκοπουμένους προσήκει. Ἀρχὴ δ' ἂν εἴη προσήκουσα αὕτη.

2. Πότερα ἔμψυχα νομιστέον ἢ ἄψυχα ταῦτα τὰ φερόμενα; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄψυχα, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ παρεχόμενα, εἰ δὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἄττα τῶν ἄστρων φήσομεν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐν τῇ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν φύσει στήσουσι τὴν δόσιν φορᾶς δηλονότι σωματικῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς γινομένης, ὡς μηδὲ πολλὴν τὴν παραλλαγὴν τῶν σωμάτων γίνεσθαι τῆς τε ἀπορροῆς ἑκάστων τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ δὴ ὁμοῦ εἰς ἓν ἐπὶ γῆς μιγνυμένων, ὡς μόνον κατὰ τοὺς τόπους τὰς διαφορὰς γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγύθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν, πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν διδόντος καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὡσαύτως. Σοφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ γραμματικοὺς ἄλλους, τοὺς δὲ ῥήτορας, τοὺς δὲ

the most important point is, they say that some of the planets are bad and others good, but that the ones which are called bad give good gifts, and the good ones become wicked; and again that when they see each other they cause one kind of thing, when they do not see, another, as if they were not really in control of themselves but varied according to whether they saw or not; and that a planet is good when it sees this particular other planet, but changes if it sees another one; and that it sees differently according to whether its seeing is in this figure or in that; and that the mixture of all the planets together is different again, just as the mixture of distinct liquids is something unlike any of the ingredients. These, and others of the same kind, are their opinions: now we ought to examine and discuss each individual point. This would be a good starting-point.

2. Should we think that these things which go round in their courses have souls or not? If they have no souls, they will have nothing to offer but heat or cold—if we assume that some of the stars are cold; however that may be, they will determine our given destiny only in our bodily nature, since there is a corporeal transference from them to us, and one of such a kind that the alteration it produces in our bodies is not great, since the outflow from each individual star is the same, and they are all mixed together into one on earth, so that the only differences are local differences, according to how near or far we are from the stars—and the cold kind of star will give an influence differentiated in the same way. But, then, how will they make some men wise and some foolish, some teachers of letters and others of rhetoric,

κιθαριστὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἔτι δὲ πλουσίους καὶ πένητας, πῶς; Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα μὴ ἐκ σωμάτων κράσεως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ γίγνεσθαι; Οἷον καὶ ἀδελφὸν τοιόνδε καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν γυναῖκά τε καὶ τὸ νῦν εὐτυχῆσαι καὶ στρατηγὸν καὶ βασιλέα γενέσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἔμψυχα ὄντα προαιρέσει ποιεῖ, τί παρ' ἡμῶν παθόντα κακὰ ἡμᾶς ποιεῖ ἑκόντα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν θείῳ τόπῳ ἱδρυμένα καὶ αὐτὰ θεῖα ὄντα; Οὐδὲ γάρ, δι' ἃ ἄνθρωποι γίγνονται κακοί, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει, οὐδέ γε ὅλως γίνεται ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν ἢ εὐπαθούντων ἢ κακὰ πασχόντων.

3. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑκόντες ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἠναγκασμένοι τοῖς τόποις καὶ τοῖς σχήμασιν. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἠναγκασμένοι, τὰ αὐτὰ δήπουθεν ἐχρῆν ἅπαντας ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων καὶ σχημάτων γινομένους. Νῦν δὲ τί διάφορον πέπονθεν ὅδε τόδε τὸ τμῆμα τοῦ τῶν ζῳδίων κύκλου παριὼν καὶ αὖ τόδε; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ζῳδίῳ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐτὸ πλεῖστον ἀπέχων, καὶ καθ' ὁποῖον ἂν γίγνηται κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὤν. Γελοῖον γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ὢν τις παρέρχεται ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον γίγνεσθαι καὶ διδόναι ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα· ἀνατέλλων δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ κέντρου γεγονὼς καὶ ἀποκλίνας ἄλλος. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοτὲ μὲν ἥδεται ἐπὶ τοῦ κέντρου ὤν, τοτὲ δὲ λυπεῖται ἀποκλίνας ἢ ἀργὸς γίνεται, οὐδ'

and others lyre-players and practitioners of the other arts, or again rich and poor? How will they produce the other effects which do not have their cause of origin in bodily mixture? For instance, how will they give a man a brother or a father, a son or a wife of a particular kind, or make him prosper for the moment and become a general or a king? But if they have souls and act with conscious purpose, what have we done to them to make them deliberately injure us, these beings which are set in a divine region and are divine themselves? They do not have what makes men evil, nor does any good or evil to them result from our happiness or suffering.

3. But the planets do not do these things willingly, but under the compulsion of their positions and figures! But if they are under compulsion, they ought, surely, all to do the same things when they are in the same positions and figures. And really, what difference can it make to a particular planet that it is passing through, now this and now that section of the zodiac? It is not even in the zodiac itself but far below it, and at whatever point it is, it is in heaven. It is ridiculous for a planet to become different and to give different gifts according to the sign it is passing; and to be different when it is rising and when it stands at the centre and when it is declining. It is certainly not pleased when it is at the centre, nor is it distressed and enfeebled when it is declining, nor does a planet grow angry when it is rising and gentle when it is declining—and another of them is even better when it is declining. For each particular planet is at the centre for some when it is declining in relation to others, and when it is declining for one group it is at

αὖ θυμοῦται ἀνατείλας ἄλλος, πραΰνεται δὲ ἀποκλίνας, εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποκλίνας ἀμείνων. Ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ ἕκαστος καὶ ἐπίκεντρος ἄλλοις ἀποκλίνας ἄλλοις καὶ ἀποκλίνας ἑτέροις ἐπίκεντρος ἄλλοις· καὶ οὐ δήπου κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον χαίρει τε καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ θυμοῦται καὶ πρᾷός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν χαίρειν λέγειν δύνοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἀνατολαῖς ὄντας, πῶς οὐκ ἄλογον; Καὶ γὰρ οὕτω συμβαίνει ἅμα λυπεῖσθαί τε καὶ χαίρειν. Εἶτα διὰ τί ἡ ἐκείνων λύπη ἡμᾶς κακώσει; Ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι οὐδ' ἐπὶ καιροῦ χαίρειν αὐτοῖς δοτέον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὸ ἴλεων ἔχειν χαίροντας ἐφ' οἷς ἀγαθοῖς ἔχουσι καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ὁρῶσι. Βίος γὰρ ἑκάστῳ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ, ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ εὖ· τὸ δὲ οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς οὐ κοινωνοῦσιν ἡμῖν ζῴοις κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ προηγούμενον· οὐδὲ ὅλως τὸ ἔργον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, εἰ ὥσπερ ὄρνισι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ σημαίνειν.

4. Κἀκεῖνο δὲ ἄλογον, τόνδε μὲν τόνδε ὁρῶντα χαίρειν, τόνδε δὲ τόνδε τοὐναντίον· τίς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔχθρα ἢ περὶ τίνων; Διὰ τί δὲ τρίγωνος μὲν ὁρῶν ἄλλως, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ ἢ τετράγωνος ἄλλως; Διὰ τί δὲ ὠδὶ μὲν ἐσχηματισμένος ὁρᾷ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἑξῆς ζῴδιον ἐγγυτέρω ὢν μᾶλλον οὐχ ὁρᾷ; Ὅλως δὲ τίς καὶ ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τοῦ ποιεῖν ἃ λέγονται ποιεῖν; Πῶς τε χωρὶς ἕκαστος καὶ ἔτι πῶς ὁμοῦ πάντες ἄλλο ἐκ πάντων; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ συνθέμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτω ποιοῦσιν εἰς ἡμᾶς

the centre for another; and it cannot, presumably, be glad and sad and angry and gentle all at the same time. And surely it is quite irrational to say that some planets are glad when they are setting and others when they are rising; this would again have the consequence that they are glad and sad at the same time. And then, why should their grief harm us? But one cannot admit at all that they are glad on one occasion and sad on another. They are always serene and rejoice in the goods they have and in what they see. For each has its own life to itself, and each one's good is in its own act, and has nothing to do with us. The action on us of living beings that have no part with us is always something incidental, not their dominant activity. If, as with birds, their acting as signs is incidental, their work is not directed to us at all.

4. It is irrational, too, to say that one planet is glad when it sees a particular other planet, but another is in the opposite state when it sees another: for what enmity is there between them, and about what? And why should it make a difference whether one planet sees another triangularly or in opposition or quadrilaterally?[1] And why should one see another in one particular figure, but not see it when it is in the next sign of the zodiac, and so nearer? And altogether, how ever do they manage to do what they are supposed to do? How does each act separately, and again how do they all together produce an effect different from all their separate effects? They certainly do not hold meetings and then execute the

[1] On the doctrine of "aspects" see Bouché-Leclercq, p. 165 (summarised in Festugière, p. 100).

τὰ δόξαντα ὑφεὶς ἕκαστός τι τῶν ἀφ' αὑτοῦ, οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλος ἐκώλυσε τὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου δόσιν γενέσθαι βιασάμενος, οὐδ' αὖ ὁ ἕτερος παρεχώρησε τῷ ἑτέρῳ πεισθεὶς αὐτῷ πράττειν. Τὸ δὲ τόνδε μὲν χαίρειν ἐν τοῖς τοῦδε γενόμενον, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ἑτέρου γενόμενον. πῶς οὐχ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ὑποθέμενος δύο φιλοῦντας ἀλλήλους ἔπειτα λέγοι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον φιλεῖν τὸν ἕτερον, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ θάτερον μισεῖν θάτερον;

5. Λέγοντες δὲ ψυχρόν τινα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ἔτι πόρρω γινόμενον ἀφ' ἡμῶν μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐν τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ κακὸν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς τιθέμενοι· καίτοι ἔδει ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ζῳδίοις ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι· καὶ ἐναντίους γινομένους τὸν ψυχρὸν τῷ θερμῷ δεινοὺς ἀμφοτέρους γίνεσθαι· καίτοι ἔδει κρᾶσιν εἶναι· καὶ τόνδε μὲν χαίρειν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι θερμαινόμενον, τόνδε δὲ τῇ νυκτὶ χαίρειν πυρώδη ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἡμέρας αὐτοῖς οὔσης, λέγω δὲ φωτός, ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταλαμβανομένου ὑπὸ νυκτὸς πολὺ ὑπεράνω τῆς σκιᾶς τῆς γῆς ὄντος. Τὸ δὲ τὴν σελήνην πλησίφωτον μὲν οὖσαν ἀγαθὴν εἶναι τῷδε συνερχομένην, λείπουσαν δὲ κακήν, ἀνάπαλιν, εἴπερ δοτέον. Πλήρης γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκείνῳ ὑπεράνω ὄντι ἀφώτιστος ἂν εἴη τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἡμισφαιρίῳ, λείπουσα δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκείνῳ πλησίφως· ὥστε τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἔδει λείπουσαν, ἐκεῖνον[1] μετὰ φωτὸς ὁρῶσαν. Αὐτῇ

[1] ἐκεῖνον Müller, H-S²: ἐκείνῳ codd.

decision of the meeting on us, each surrendering something of his own influence, nor does one hinder by force the giving of another from coming to pass, nor does one yield under persuasion a free field of action to another. And to suppose that one is glad when it is in the region of another, but the other, when it is in the region of the first, feels the reverse, is like saying that two people love each other, and then going on to add that one loves the other but the other hates the first!

5. Then they say that one of the planets is cold, and further, that when it is far away from us it is better for us, assuming that its harmfulness for us consists in its coldness; but it ought, when it is in the opposed signs of the zodiac, to be good for us: and they say that when the cold planet is in opposition to the hot both are dangerous: but there ought to be a blend of temperaments. They allege that one planet delights in the day and becomes good when it is warmed, but another, a fiery one, enjoys the night—as if it was not always day (that is, light) for the planets, and as if the second one was ever overtaken by night, though it is far above the shadow of the earth. And as for their statement that the moon when she is full is good in conjunction with a particular planet, but bad when she is waning, the reverse would be true, if this sort of thing is to be admitted as possible at all. For when she is full in relation to us she would be dark in the other hemisphere to the planet which stands above her, and when she is waning for us she is full for that planet: so she ought to do the opposite when she is waning [for us] since she is looking at that planet with her full light. It will make no difference

μὲν οὖν ὅπως ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ἥμισυ ἀεὶ φωτιζομένῃ· τῷ δ' ἴσως διαφέροι ἂν θερμαινομένῳ, ὡς λέγουσιν. Ἀλλὰ θερμαίνοιτο ἄν, εἰ ἀφώτιστος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡ σελήνη εἴη· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαθὴ οὖσα ἐν τῷ ἀφωτίστῳ πλήρης ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτόν. Ταῦτ' οὖν πῶς οὐ σημεῖα ἐξ ἀναλογίας εἴη ἄν;

6. Ἄρεα δὲ τόνδε ἢ Ἀφροδίτην θεμένους μοιχείας ποιεῖν, εἰ ὠδὶ εἶεν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκολασίας αὐτοὺς ἐμπιπλάντας ὧν πρὸς ἀλλήλους δέονται, πῶς οὐ πολλὴν ἀλογίαν ἔχει; Καὶ τὴν μὲν θέαν αὐτοῖς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, εἰ οὑτωσὶ θεῷντο, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι, πέρας δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι, πῶς ἄν τις παραδέξαιτο; Μυριάδων δὲ ζῴων ἀναριθμήτων γινομένων καὶ οὐσῶν ἑκάστῳ τελεῖν ἀεὶ τὸ τοι⟨όν⟩δε, δόξαν αὐτοῖς διδόναι, πλουτεῖν ποιεῖν, πένητας, ἀκολάστους, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἑκάστων αὐτοὺς τελεῖν, τίς αὐτοῖς ἐστι βίος; Ἢ πῶς δυνατὸν τοσαῦτα ποιεῖν; Τὸ δὲ ἀναφορὰς ζῳδίων ἀναμένειν καὶ τότε τελεῖν, καὶ ὅσαις μοίραις ἀνατέλλει ἕκαστον, ἐνιαυτοὺς εἶναι τοσούτους τῆς ἀναφορᾶς, καὶ οἷον ἐπὶ δακτύλων τίθεσθαι, ὅτε ποιήσουσι, μὴ ἐξεῖναι δ' αὐτοῖς πρὸ

[1] At this point the *editio princeps* and Ficino's translation insert the puzzling passage printed in square brackets in ch. 12 (on which see *Introductory Note*) which would certainly be more in place here.

[2] This sentence, which does not seem to belong to the argument here, may possibly have strayed from the beginning of ch. 7.

whatever to the moon herself what phase she is in since half of her is always illuminated; it might, however, on their assumption, make some difference to the planet when it is warmed. But it would be warmed when the moon is dark in relation to us: when it is good in relation to the other planet in the dark phase it is, in relation to it, full.[1] Surely, then, these things are signs from the correspondence of different spheres . . .[2]

6. But it is surely absolute nonsense for the astrologers, having called one planet Ares and another Aphrodite, to say they cause adulteries when they are in a certain relationship, as if they satisfied their desires for each other from men's abandoned wickedness. And how could anyone accept that the sight of each other, in a particular aspect, gives them pleasure, but they have no limit[3]? And what sort of a life is it for the planets if, when innumerable living beings have been born and continue to exist, they are always effecting something for each one of them, giving them reputation, making them rich or poor or wicked, being themselves responsible for bringing the activities of all the separate individuals to completion. How could they do so much? And as for thinking that they wait for the ascendancy of the signs of the zodiac and then act, and that according to the number of degrees it has risen are the number of years of its ascendancy, and that they reckon on their fingers the time when they will act, and may not act before these periods are reached, and altogether to refuse

[3] *πέρας* here seems to make very little sense. L. A. Post suggests *πείρας* in the sexual sense, "intercourse".

τούτων τῶν χρόνων, ὅλως δὲ μηδενὶ ἑνὶ τὸ κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως διδόναι, τούτοις δὲ τὰ πάντα διδόναι, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐπιστατοῦντος ἑνός, ἀφ' οὗ διηρτῆσθαι τὸ πᾶν, ἑκάστῳ διδόντος κατὰ φύσιν τὸ αὑτοῦ περαίνειν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὰ αὑτοῦ συντεταγμένον αὖ μετ' αὐτοῦ, λύοντός ἐστι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντος κόσμου φύσιν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος καὶ αἰτίαν πρώτην ἐπὶ πάντα ἰοῦσαν.

7. Ἀλλ' εἰ σημαίνουσιν οὗτοι τὰ ἐσόμενα, ὥσπερ φαμὲν πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα σημαντικὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐσομένων, τί ἂν τὸ ποιοῦν εἴη; Καὶ ἡ τάξις πῶς; Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσημαίνετο τεταγμένως μὴ ἑκάστων γιγνομένων. Ἔστω τοίνυν ὥσπερ γράμματα ἐν οὐρανῷ γραφόμενα ἀεὶ ἢ γεγραμμένα καὶ κινούμενα, ποιοῦντα μέν τι ἔργον καὶ ἄλλο· ἐπακολουθείτω δὲ τῷδε ἡ παρ' αὐτῶν σημασία, ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐν ἑνὶ ζῴῳ παρ' ἄλλου μέρους ἄλλο ἄν τις μάθοι. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἦθος ἄν τις γνοίη εἰς ὀφθαλμούς τινος ἰδὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο μέρος τοῦ σώματος καὶ κινδύνους καὶ σωτηρίας. Καὶ οὖν μέρη μὲν ἐκεῖνα, μέρη δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς· ἄλλα οὖν ἄλλοις. Μεστὰ δὲ πάντα σημείων καὶ σοφός τις ὁ μαθὼν ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο. Πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη ἐν συνηθείᾳ γιγνόμενα γινώσκεται πᾶσι. Τίς οὖν ἡ σύνταξις ἡ μία; Οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς ὄρνεις εὔλογον καὶ τὰ

[1] The thought here is Stoic. Cp., e.g., Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones* II. 32.

to grant to any one principle authority over the direction of the universe, but to give everything to the planets, as if there was not one ruler, from whom the universe has separated out, and who gives to each according to its nature to fulfil its own function and do its own work, in union with the ruling principle—this is the opinion of someone who wants to dissolve the unity of the universe and knows nothing about its nature; the universe which has a principle and first cause which reaches to everything.

7. But if these planets give signs of things to come—as we maintain that many other things do—what might the cause be? How does the order work? There would be no signifying if particular things did not happen according to some order. Let us suppose that the stars are like characters always being written on the heavens, or written once for all and moving as they perform their task, a different one: and let us assume that their significance results from this, just as because of the one principle in a single living being, by studying one member we can learn something else about a different one. For instance, we can come to conclusions about someone's character, and also about the dangers that beset him and the precautions to be taken, by looking at his eyes or some other part of his body. Yes, they are members and so are we; so we can learn about one from the other. All things are filled full of signs,[1] and it is a wise man who can learn about one thing from another. Yet, all the same, many processes of learning in this way are customary and known to all. Then what is the single-linked order? If there is one, our auguries from birds and other living creatures, by which we

ἄλλα ζῷα, ἀφ' ὧν σημαινόμεθα ἕκαστα. Συνηρτῆσθαι δὴ δεῖ ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντα—καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν ἑνὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα—τοῦ εὖ εἰρημένου—σύμπνοια μία, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῷ παντί—καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἓν πολὺ ζῷον ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν, καὶ ὡς ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέρη ἕν τι ἔργον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἕκαστα ἔργα ἕκαστον ἔχειν καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα, ὅσον μὴ μόνον μέρη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλα καὶ μείζω. Πρόεισι μὲν δὴ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ μιᾶς τὸ αὑτοῦ πρᾶττον, συμβάλλει δὲ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλλακται τοῦ ὅλου· καὶ δὴ καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει ὑπ' ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλο αὖ προσῆλθε καὶ ἐλύπησεν ἢ ἥσε. Πρόεισι δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ κατ' ἐπιτυχίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλο τι καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐφεξῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλο.

8. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴ τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ποιεῖν ὡρμημένη—ψυχὴ γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα λόγον—κἂν εὐθυποροῖ καὶ παράγοιτο αὖ, καὶ ἕπεται τοῖς δρωμένοις ἐν τῷ παντὶ δίκη, εἴπερ μὴ λυθήσεται. Μένει δ' ἀεὶ ὀρθουμένου τοῦ ὅλου τάξει καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ κρατοῦντος· συνεργοῦντα

[1] The *σύμπνοια* of the universe is also Stoic (Posidonius and others), cp. Diogenes Laertius VII. 140.

[2] This Platonic conception (*Timaeus* 30D–31A) developed by the Stoics of the universe as a single living being is of great importance in the thought of Plotinus cp. e.g., IV. 4. 32 ff.

[3] Bouillet is probably right in supposing that Plotinus here had in mind the great passage about Soul, divine and human,

predict particular events, are reasonable. All things must be joined to one another; not only must there be in each individual part what is well called a single united breath of life [1] but before them, and still more, in the All. One principle must make the universe a single complex living creature, one from all; [2] and just as in individual organisms each member undertakes its own particular task, so the members of the All, each individual one of them, have their individual work to do; this applies even more to the All than to particular organisms, in so far as the members of it are not merely members but wholes, and more important than the members of particular things. Each one goes forth from one single principle and does its own work, but they also co-operate one with another; for they are not cut off from the whole. They act on and are affected by others; one comes up to another, bringing it pain or pleasure. Their going out has nothing random or casual about it. Something else proceeds again from these; and something else in succession from that, according to the order of nature.

8. Soul, then, is set upon doing its own work—for soul, since it has the status of a principle, does everything—and it may keep to the straight path [3] and it may also be led astray; and just payment follows upon what is done in the All; otherwise it will be dissolved.[4] But the All remains for ever, since the whole is directed by the ordering and the power of its ruler. And the stars co-operate towards the whole,

in Plato, *Phaedrus* 245C ff.: so *εὐθυποροῖ* here may be a reminiscence of *μετεωροπορεῖ* 246C1.

[4] A reminiscence of *Timaeus* 41A8.

δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ὡς ἂν μόρια οὐ σμικρὰ ὄντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἀριπρεπῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν ἐστί. Σημαίνει μὲν οὖν πάντα, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ποιεῖ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅσα φανερῶς ποιεῖ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔργα κατὰ φύσιν ποιοῦμεν, ἕως μὴ ἐσφάλημεν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τοῦ παντός· σφαλέντες δὲ ἔχομεν δίκην καὶ τὸ σφάλμα αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν χείρονι μοίρᾳ εἰς ὕστερον. Πλοῦτοι μὲν οὖν καὶ πενίαι συντυχίᾳ τῶν ἔξω· ἀρεταὶ δὲ καὶ κακίαι; Ἀρεταὶ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ψυχῆς, κακίαι δὲ συντυχίᾳ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὰ ἔξω. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται.

9. Νῦν δὲ ἀναμνησθέντες τοῦ ἀτράκτου, ὃν τοῖς μὲν πρόπαλαι αἱ Μοῖραι ἐπικλώθουσι, Πλάτωνι δὲ ὁ ἄτρακτός ἐστι τό τε πλανώμενον καὶ τὸ ἀπλανὲς τῆς περιφορᾶς, καὶ αἱ Μοῖραι δὲ καὶ ἡ Ἀνάγκη μήτηρ οὖσα στρέφουσι καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἑκάστου ἐπικλώθουσι καὶ δι' αὐτῆς εἶσιν εἰς γένεσιν τὰ γεννώμενα. Ἔν τε Τιμαίῳ θεὸς μὲν ὁ ποιήσας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς δίδωσιν, οἱ δὲ φερόμενοι θεοὶ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πάθη, θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας αὖ, καὶ ψυχῆς ἄλλο εἶδος, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ παθήματα ταυτί. Οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι συνδέουσιν ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἄστροις παρ' αὐτῶν ψυχὴν κομιζομένους καὶ ὑποτάττουσι τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνταῦθα ἰόντας· καὶ ἤθη τοίνυν παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὰ ἤθη πράξεις καὶ

[1] The reference back is probably to I. 8 (51), cp. ch. 12. 5–7.

since they are no small part of the heaven; this is why they are so bright and well adapted for signs. So they signify everything that happens in the sense-world, but do other things, the things which they are seen to do. We, however, do the works of soul according to nature, as long as we do not fail in the multiplicity of the All; if we fail we have as just penalty both the failure itself and the being in a worse position afterwards. Wealth, then, and poverty are due to chance encounters with things outside. But what about virtues and vices? Virtues are due to the ancient state of our soul, vices to its chance encounter with things outside it. But this has been discussed elsewhere.[1]

9. But now we should call to mind the Spindle, which according to the ancients the Fates spin; but for Plato the Spindle is the wandering and the fixed parts of the heavenly circuit,[2] and the Fates and Necessity, who is their mother, turn the spindle and spin a thread at the birth of each one of us, and what is born comes to birth through Necessity. And in the *Timaeus*[3] the God who makes the world gives the "first principle of the soul," but the gods who are borne through the heavens "the terrible and inevitable passions," "angers" and desires and "pleasures and pains," and the "other kind of soul," from which come passions of this kind. These statements bind us to the stars, from which we get our souls, and subject us to necessity when we come down here; from them we get our moral characters, our characteristic actions, and our

[2] *Republic* X. 616C4 ff.
[3] 69C5–D3.

πάθη ἀπὸ ἕξεως παθητικῆς οὔσης· ὥστε τί λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς; Ἢ ὅπερ ἐσμὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡμεῖς, οἷς καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν παθῶν ἔδωκεν ἡ φύσις. Καὶ γὰρ ὅμως ἐν τούτοις τοῖς κακοῖς διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀπειλημμένοις ἀδέσποτον ἀρετὴν θεὸς ἔδωκεν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσιν ἀρετῆς δεῖ ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅταν κίνδυνος ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι ἀρετῆς οὐ παρούσης. Διὸ καὶ φεύγειν ἐντεῦθεν δεῖ καὶ χωρίζειν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ μὴ τὸ σύνθετον εἶναι σῶμα ἐψυχωμένον ἐν ᾧ κρατεῖ μᾶλλον ἡ σώματος φύσις ψυχῆς τι ἴχνος λαβοῦσα, ὡς τὴν ζωὴν τὴν κοινὴν μᾶλλον τοῦ σώματος εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ σωματικά, ὅσα ταύτης. Τῆς δὲ ἑτέρας τῆς ἔξω ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω φορὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον ὧν οὐδεὶς κρατεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ προσχρῆται, ἵν' ᾖ ἐκεῖνο καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ζῇ ἀναχωρήσας· ἢ ἔρημος ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς γενόμενος ζῇ ἐν εἱμαρμένῃ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὰ ἄστρα αὐτῷ οὐ μόνον σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ γίνεται αὐτὸς οἷον μέρος καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνέπεται, οὗ μέρος. Διττὸς γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὁ μὲν τὸ συναμφότερόν τι, ὁ δὲ αὐτός· καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τινος δεθείσης σώματι, ὁ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἡ μὴ ἐν σώματι, ἐλλάμπουσα δὲ ἴχνη τῇ ἐν σώματι· καὶ ἥλιος δὴ καὶ τἆλλα διττὰ οὕτω· καὶ τῇ μὲν ἑτέρᾳ ψυχῇ τῇ καθαρᾷ οὐδὲν φαῦλον δίδωσιν, ἃ δὲ γίνεται εἰς τὸ

[1] Cp. I 1. 7. 17 ff.
[2] *Republic* X. 617E3.

emotions, coming from a disposition which is liable to emotion. So what is left which is "we"? Surely, just that which we really are, we to whom nature gave power to master our passions.[1] Yes, and God gave us too, in the midst of all these evils which we receive through the body, "virtue who is no man's slave."[2] For we do not need virtue when we are in peace but when there is a risk of being in evils if virtue is not there. So we must "fly from here"[3] and "separate"[4] ourselves from what has been added to us, and not be the composite thing, the ensouled body in which the nature of body (which has some trace of soul) has the greater power, so that the common life belongs more to the body; for everything that pertains to this common life is bodily. But to the other soul, which is outside the body, belongs the ascent to the higher world, to the fair and divine which no one masters, but either makes use of it that he may be it and live by it, withdrawing himself; or else he is bereft of this higher soul and lives under destiny, and then the stars do not only show him signs but he also becomes himself a part, and follows along with the whole of which he is a part. For every man is double, one of him is the sort of compound being and one of him is himself; and the whole universe is, one part the composite of body and a sort of soul bound to body, and one the soul of the All which is not in body but makes a trace of itself shine on that which is in body. And the sun and the other heavenly bodies are double in this way; they communicate no evil to the other pure soul, but what comes into the All

[3] Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A8–B1.
[4] Plato, *Phaedo* 67C6.

πᾶν παρ' αὐτῶν, καθ' ὃ μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ παντός καὶ σῶμα[1] ἐψυχωμένον, τὸ σῶμα μέρος μέρει δίδωσι προαιρέσεως τοῦ ἄστρου καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς ὄντως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον βλεπούσης. Παρακολουθεῖ δ' αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα, μᾶλλον δ' οὐκ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς θερμότητος εἰς τὸ ὅλον ἰούσης, καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης εἰς ψυχὴν ἄλλην συγγενῆ οὖσαν· τὰ δὲ δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν μῖξιν. Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς φύσις, καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν χωριστὴν αὐτοῦ χωρίσειε, τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ μέγα. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν ἐκείνης συναριθμουμένης, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν δαίμων, φησί, μέγας καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ δαιμόνια.

10. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὰς σημασίας καὶ νῦν δοτέον· τὰς δὲ ποιήσεις οὐ πάντως οὐδὲ τοῖς ὅλοις αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ὅσα τοῦ παντὸς πάθη, καὶ ὅσον τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτῶν. Καὶ ψυχῇ μὲν καὶ πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς γένεσιν δοτέον ἥκειν τι φερούσῃ παρ' αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλθοι εἰς σῶμα μὴ μέγα τι παθητικὸν ἔχουσα. Δοτέον δὲ καὶ τύχας εἰσιούσῃ [τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φορὰν εἰσιέναι]· δοτέον δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν φορὰν ποιεῖσθαι συνεργοῦσαν καὶ ἀποπληροῦσαν παρ' αὐτῆς, ἃ δεῖ τελεῖν τὸ πᾶν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τάξιν μερῶν λαβόντος.

[1] καὶ σῶμα Müller, H-S²: σῶμα καὶ codd.

[1] Plato *Timaeus* 47E5.

[2] The distinction of θεός and δαίμων comes from *Symposium* 202D5–E1 (the demonstration that Eros is a daemon, not a

from them, in so far as they are part of the All and ensouled body, their body, which is a part, gives to another part—while the star's intention and the soul which is really itself is looking to the Best. The other effects happen in sequence upon it (or rather not upon it but upon its environment), like heat from a fire spreading through the whole—and perhaps something comes from the star's other soul to another soul which is akin to it. The bad effects are because of the mixture. For the nature of " this All " is " mixed," [1] and if anyone separates from him the separable soul, what is left is not much. The universe is a god if the separable soul is reckoned as part of it; the rest, Plato says, is a " great daemon " [2] and what happens in it is daemonic.

10. If this is so, we must grant even at this stage of the discussion the power of signifying to the stars, but action not completely nor to their whole natures, but only in so far as affections of the All are concerned and as regards what is left of them [when their separable souls are left out of account]. And we must admit that the soul, even before it enters the realm of becoming, brings something [lower] of itself when it comes: for it would not have come into body unless it had a large part subject to affections. And we must grant, too, that it enters into the domain of chance. And we must grant that the heavenly circuit does act of itself, co-operating and completing by its own power what the All must accomplish; and in its action each individual heavenly body in it has the status of a part.

god), but Plato does not apply it there or anywhere else to the universe.

11. Χρὴ δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἰὸν οὐ τοιοῦτόν εἶσιν [1] εἰς τοὺς λαβόντας, οἷον παρ' ἐκείνων ἔρχεται· οἷον εἰ πῦρ, ἀμυδρὸν τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ φιλιακὴ διάθεσις, ἀσθενὴς γενομένη ἐν τῷ λαβόντι οὐ μάλα καλὴν τὴν φίλησιν εἰργάσατο, καὶ θυμὸς δὴ οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ τυχόντος, ὡς ἀνδρεῖον γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀκροχολίαν ἢ ἀθυμίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ τὸ τιμῆς ἐν ἔρωτι ὂν καὶ περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔχον τῶν δοκούντων καλῶν ἔφεσιν εἰργάσατο, καὶ νοῦ ἀπόρροια πανουργίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πανουργία ἐθέλει νοῦς εἶναι τυχεῖν οὗ ἐφίεται οὐ δυνάμενος. Γίνεται οὖν κακὰ ἕκαστα τούτων ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ οὐ τούτων ὄντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐλθόντα, καίτοι οὐκ ἐκεῖνα ὄντα, οὐ μένει οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἷα ἦλθε σώμασι μιγνύμενα καὶ ὕλῃ καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

12. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ἰόντα εἰς ἓν συμπίπτει καὶ κομίζεται ἕκαστον τῶν γινομένων τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κράματος, ὥστε ὅ ἐστι καὶ ποιόν τι γενέσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἵππον ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἵππῳ τι δίδωσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἵππος ἐξ ἵππου καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος· συνεργὸς δὲ ἥλιος τῇ πλάσει· ὁ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γίνεται. Ἀλλ' ἔβλαψέ ποτε ἢ ὠφέλησε τὸ ἔξω· ὁμοίως γὰρ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον πολλάκις, ἔστι δ' ὅτε πρὸς τὸ

[1] εἶσιν Kirchhoff, H-S²: ἐστιν codd.

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Physics* B. 2. 194b13. "Man begets man and so does the sun." Cp. *De Gen. et Corr.* B. 10, where it is explained that the movement of the sun in the eclip-

11. We must consider, too, that what comes from the stars will not reach the recipients in the same state in which it left them. If it is fire, for instance, the fire down here is dim [by comparison with that of the stars], and if it is a loving disposition it becomes weak in the recipient and produces a rather unpleasant kind of loving; and manly spirit, when the receiver does not take it in due measure, so as to become brave, produces violent temper or spiritlessness; and that which belongs to honour in love and is concerned with beauty produces desire of what only seems to be beautiful, and the efflux of intellect produces knavery; for knavery wants to be intellect, only it is unable to attain what it aims at. So all these things become evil in us, though they are not so up in heaven; since even the things which have come down, though they are not that which they were in heaven, do not remain what they were when they came since they are mingled with bodies and matter and each other.

12. And, further, the influences which come from the stars combine into one, and each thing that comes into being takes something from the mixture, so that what it already is acquires a certain quality. The star-influences do not make the horse; they give something to the horse. Horse comes from horse and man from man: the sun co-operates in their making;[1] but man comes from the formative principle of man. The outside influence sometimes harms or helps. A man is like his father, but often he turns out better, sometimes worse. But the

tic is the "cause of the rhythm of generation and decay" (Cornford).

χεῖρον συνέπεσεν. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκβιβάζει τοῦ ὑπο-
κειμένου· ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη κρατεῖ, οὐχ ἡ φύσις,
ὡς μὴ τέλεον γενέσθαι ἡττωμένου τοῦ εἴδους.

[Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῆς σελήνης ἀφώτιστόν ἐστι
πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, οὐ τὸ ἄνω λυπεῖ. Οὐκ ἐπικου-
ροῦντος δὲ ἐκείνου τῷ πόρρω χείρον εἶναι δοκεῖ·
ὅταν δὲ πλήρης ᾖ, ἀρκεῖ τῷ κάτω, κἂν ἐκεῖνος
πόρρωθεν ᾖ. Πρὸς δὲ τὸν πυρώδη ἀφώτιστος
οὖσα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔδοξεν εἶναι ἀγαθή· ἀνταρκεῖ γὰρ
τὸ ἐκείνου πυρωδεστέρου ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὄντος.
Τὰ δὲ ἰόντα ἐκεῖθεν σώματα ἐμψύχων ἄλλα ἄλλων
ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμά, ψυχρὸν δὲ οὐδέν·
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ ὁ τόπος. Δία δὲ ὃν λέγουσιν, εὔκρατος
πυρί· καὶ ὁ Ἑῷος οὕτως·[1] διὸ καὶ σύμφωνοι
δοκοῦσιν ὁμοιότητι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Πυρόεντα καλού-
μενον τῇ κράσει, πρὸς δὲ Κρόνον ἀλλοτρίως τῷ
πόρρω· Ἑρμῆς δ' ἀδιάφορος πρὸς ἅπαντας, ὡς
δοκεῖ, ὁμοιούμενος. Πάντες δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον
σύμφοροι· ὥστε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως, ὡς τῷ
ὅλῳ συμφέρει, ὡς ἐφ' ἑνὸς ζῴου ἕκαστα τῶν
μερῶν ὁρᾶται. Τούτου γὰρ χάριν μάλιστα, οἷον
χολὴ καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐγγύς· καὶ γὰρ ἔδει
καὶ θυμὸν ἐγείρειν καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλησίον μὴ

[1] οὕτως Creuzer, H-S: οὗτος codd.

[1] The planets mentioned in this passage are Jupiter, Venus, Mars, Saturn and Mercury.

outside influence does not force anything out of its fundamental nature; sometimes, however, the matter, not the nature, gets the upper hand, so that, as a result of the defeat of the form, the thing does not come to perfection.

[The side of the moon which is towards us is unlighted in relation to the regions of earth, but does no harm to that which is above it. But since that which is above does not help because it is far away, this conjunction is thought to be worse. But when the moon is full, it is sufficient for what is below even if the star above is far away. But when the moon is unlighted on the side towards the fiery star she is thought to be good in relation to us: for the power of that star persists which is fierier than it needs to be for itself [?]. The bodies of living things which come from that upper region differ from each other according to their degrees of heat, but none of them is cold. Their place is evidence of this. The planet that people call Zeus [1] is of fire in a well-balanced mixture; and so is the Morning Star; so these two because of their likeness are considered as "harmonious," but are alien in disposition to the star called Fiery because of its composition and to Cronos because of its distance. Hermes, however, is indifferent and is, it is thought, like all. But all contribute to the whole, and are therefore related to each other in a way that brings advantage to the whole, as we see that all the parts individually are of a living thing. For they are there precisely for the sake of the whole living thing, as, for instance, the gall is to serve the whole and in relation to the part next to it: for it has to stir up the manly spirit and keep the

ἐᾶν ὑβρίζειν. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ἔδει τινὸς τοιούτου καί τινος ἄλλου πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ ἀνημμένου· τὰ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς εἶναι· συμπαθῆ δὲ πάντα τῷ ἀλόγῳ αὐτῶν εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἓν καὶ μία ἁρμονία.]

13. Δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν καὶ παρὰ τῆς φορᾶς γίνεται, τὰ δὲ οὔ, διαλαβεῖν καὶ διακρῖναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πόθεν ἕκαστα ὅλως. Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἥδε· ψυχῆς δὴ τὸ πᾶν τόδε διοικούσης κατὰ λόγον, οἷα δὴ καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου ζῴου ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀρχή, ἀφ' ἧς ἕκαστα τὰ τοῦ ζῴου μέρη καὶ πλάττεται καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συντέτακται, οὗ μέρη ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. Τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν προσιόντα, τὰ μὲν καὶ ἐναντία τῇ βουλήσει τῆς φύσεως, τὰ δὲ καὶ πρόσφορα· τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ πάντα ἅτε μέρη ὄντα αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα συντέτακται φύσιν μὲν λαβόντα ἣν ἔχει καὶ συμπληροῦντα τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὅμως ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὸν ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς βίον. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντη ὄργανα καὶ οἷον ὠθούμενα ἔξω εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν· τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα, τὰ μὲν τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀορίστως ἔχει, ὡς ὑφ' ἅρμασιν ἵπποι πρὶν τὸν ἡνίοχον ἀφορίσαι αὐτοῖς τὸν δρόμον, ἅτε δὴ πληγῇ νεμόμενα· λογικοῦ δὲ ζῴου φύσις ἔχει παρ'

[1] On this passage see Introductory Note.

[2] Again a reminiscence of the *Phaedrus* (246C2; cp. note on ch. 8).

[3] The phrase is taken from Plato, *Critias* 109C1, where it is used in a context relevant to the argument here. But

whole and the part next to it from excess. So, too, in the complete whole [of the universe] there is need of some organ like the gall and of some other directed to producing sweetness; others are the eyes of the universe; all are united in feeling by their irrational part. So the universe is one and a single melody.][1]

13. We must, then, in consequence of this discussion (since some things do happen as a result of the movement of the heavens, but others do not) distinguish and discriminate and say from what cause in general each particular happening results. Our starting-point is this: since soul directs this All according to a rational order [2] (as with each individual living thing the principle in it does, from which the formation of the individual parts of the living thing and their ordering to the whole derive), it is altogether present in the whole, but in the parts only proportionately to the being of the individual. The influences which come from outside [to each individual thing] are sometimes opposed to the intention of its nature and sometimes favourable to it. But all are ordered to the whole because they are all parts of it; they received the nature which they have, but all the same they contribute, each by its own individual impulse, to the whole life of the All. The lifeless things in the All are altogether instruments and are, so to speak, pushed from outside to act. As for living things, some have unlimited movement, like horses harnessed to chariots before the driver marks off their course, in that he "controls them with the whip." [3] But the nature of a rational

Plotinus also still has in mind the *Phaedrus* myth, with its image of the charioteer and his horses.

ἑαυτῆς τὸν ἡνίοχον· καὶ ἐπιστήμονα μὲν ἔχουσα κατ' ἰθὺ φέρεται, μὴ δέ, ὡς ἔτυχε πολλάκις. Ἄμφω δὲ εἴσω τοῦ παντὸς καὶ συντελοῦντα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· καὶ τὰ μὲν μείζω αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν πλείονι τῇ ἀξίᾳ πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ζωὴν συντελεῖ τάξιν ποιητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ παθητικὴν ἔχοντα, τὰ δὲ πάσχοντα διατελεῖ μικρὰν δύναμιν πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔχοντα· τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων, πάσχοντα μὲν παρ' ἄλλων, ποιοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀρχὴν παρ' αὐτῶν εἰς πράξεις καὶ ποιήσεις ἔχοντα. Καὶ γίνεται τὸ πᾶν ζωὴ παντελὴς τῶν μὲν ἀρίστων ἐνεργούντων τὰ ἄριστα, καθ' ὅσον τὸ ἄριστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ· ὃ δὴ καὶ τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι συντακτέον, ὥσπερ στρατιώτας στρατηγῷ, οἳ δὴ λέγονται καὶ ἕπεσθαι Διὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν τὴν νοητὴν ἰεμένῳ. Τὰ δὲ ἧττονι τῇ φύσει κεχρημένα δεύτερα τοῦ παντός, οἷα καὶ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς δεύτερα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐν ἡμῖν μέρεσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῶν πάντα ἴσα. Ζῷα μὲν οὖν πάντα κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ὅλον, τά τε ἐν οὐρανῷ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα εἰς τὸ ὅλον μεμέρισται, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν μερῶν, οὐδ' εἰ μέγα, δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ ἐξαλλαγὴν ἐργάσασθαι τῶν λόγων οὐδὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους γενομένων· ἀλλοίωσιν δὲ ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, χείρονός τε καὶ βελτίονος, ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκστῆσαί γε τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως δύναται. Χεῖρον δὲ ἐργάζεται ἢ κατὰ σῶμα ἀσθένειαν διδὸν ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ συμπαθεῖ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ δοθείσῃ εἰς τὸ κάτω κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φαυλότητος αἴτιον γινόμενον ἢ σώματος

creature has its driver of itself; and if it has a skilled one it goes straight, but if not, then often just as it chances. But both are within the All, and contribute to the whole. The greater living things which are higher in rank do much that is important, and contribute to the life of the whole in an active rather than a passive capacity; others continue passive, having little power to act; others are between the two, acted upon by others, but doing much and in many things having a principle of doing and making which is their own. And the All becomes a complete life when the best parts do the best, according to the best in each of them: and each has to subordinate its best to the ruling principle, as soldiers to the general; so they are said to "follow Zeus"[1] in his progress towards the nature of Intellect. The things which are equipped with a lower nature hold second place in the All, as we, too, have a second part of soul; the rest are like our parts; not everything in us is equal either. So then living things are all conformed to the complete pattern of the All, both the ones in heaven and the rest which have been made parts in the whole, and no part, even if it is a great one, has power to bring about a complete change in the patterns or the things which happen according to the patterns. It can bring about a non-essential alteration in either direction, for better or worse, but it cannot make anything abandon its own proper nature. It makes a thing worse either by giving it bodily infirmity, or by becoming responsible for an incidental badness in the soul which is in sympathy with it and was given out by it into the lower region, or, when the body is

[1] Cp. *Phaedrus* 246E6.

κακῶς συντεθέντος ἐμπόδιον τὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνέργειαν δι' αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι· οἷον οὐχ οὕτως ἁρμοσθείσης λύρας, ὡς δέξασθαι τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἁρμονίας εἰς τὸ μουσικοὺς ἀποτελεῖν τοὺς φθόγγους.

14. Περὶ δὲ πενίας καὶ πλούτους καὶ δόξας καὶ ἀρχὰς πῶς; Ἢ, εἰ μὲν παρὰ πατέρων οἱ πλοῦτοι, ἐσήμηναν τὸν πλούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ εὐγενῆ τὸν ἐκ τοιούτων διὰ τὸ γένος τὸ ἔνδοξον ἔχοντα ἐδήλωσαν μόνον· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνδραγαθίας, εἰ σῶμα συνεργὸν γεγένηται, συμβάλλοιντο ἂν οἱ τὴν σώματος ἰσχὺν ἐργασάμενοι, γονεῖς μὲν πρῶτον, εἶτα, εἴ τι παρὰ[1] τῶν τόπων ἔσχε, τὰ οὐράνια καὶ ἡ γῆ· εἰ δὲ ἄνευ σώματος ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτῇ μόνῃ δοτέον τὸ πλεῖστον καί, ὅσα παρὰ τῶν ἀμειψαμένων, συνεβάλλετο. Οἱ δὲ δόντες εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοί, εἰς ἀρετὴν ἀνακτέον καὶ οὕτω τὴν αἰτίαν· εἰ δὲ φαῦλοι, δικαίως δὲ δόντες, τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς βελτίστῳ ἐνεργήσαντι τοῦτο γεγονέναι. Εἰ δὲ πονηρὸς ὁ πλουτήσας, τὴν μὲν πονηρίαν προηγουμένην καὶ ⟨ὅ⟩τι[2] τὸ αἴτιον τῆς πονηρίας, προσληπτέον δὲ καὶ τοὺς δόντας συναιτίους ὡσαύτως γενομένους. Εἰ δ' ἐκ πόνων, οἷον ἐκ γεωργίας, ἐπὶ τὸν γεωργόν, συνεργὸν τὸ περιέχον γεγενημένον. Εἰ δὲ θησαυρὸν εὗρε, συμπεσεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντός· εἰ δέ, σημαίνεται·

[1] τι παρὰ Bury, H-S: τις ἄρα codd.
[2] ⟨ὅ⟩τι nunc proponunt Henry et Schwyzer: τί codd. τι edd.

[1] For the metaphor of the body as lyre, cp. I4. 16. 23 ff.

badly put together, it may by means of it hinder the activity of the soul which is directed towards it: as when a lyre is not so tuned that it takes the melody accurately so as to make its sounds musical.[1]

14. But how about poverty and wealth and reputations and offices? If people are rich by inheritance from their fathers, the stars announce the rich man, just as they do no more than declare the man of good birth who comes of well-born parents and owes his distinction to his family. But if the wealth comes from manly virtue, then if the body has helped in producing this, those who have produced the body's vigour will have contributed, the parents first, then, if any place contributed anything, the heavenly regions and the earth. But if the virtue arose without the body, then the greatest part must be attributed to virtue alone, and it contributed all that was given by those who rewarded it. If the people who gave the riches were good, in this way, too, the cause must be referred back to virtue; but if they were bad, but were justified in giving the wealth, we must say that this happened by the activity of that which was best in them. But if the man who became rich was wicked his wealth must be attributed to his pre-existent wickedness and whatever was responsible for that wickedness, and we must include also those who gave the wealth, who also share in the responsibility. If a man's riches come from hard work, from farming, for instance, the cause is to be referred to the farmer, with the environment helping. If he found a treasure, we must say that something from the All cooperated; if so, it is indicated [in the heavens]; for

πάντως γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις πάντα· διὸ καὶ πάντως. Εἰ δ' ἀπέβαλέ τις πλοῦτον, εἰ ἀφαιρεθείς, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀφελόμενον, κἀκεῖνον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρχήν· εἰ δ' ἐν θαλάττῃ, τὰ συμπεσόντα. Τὸ δ' ἔνδοξον ἢ δικαίως ἢ οὔ. Εἰ οὖν δικαίως, τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς δοξάζουσι βέλτιον· εἰ δ' οὐ δικαίως, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τιμώντων ἀδικίαν. Καὶ ἀρχῆς δὲ πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· ἢ γὰρ προσηκόντως ἢ οὔ· καὶ θάτερον μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τῶν ἑλομένων, ἢ ἐπ' αὐτὸν διαπραξάμενον ἑτέρων συστάσει καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως. Περὶ δὲ γάμων ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ συντυχία καὶ σύμπτωσις ἐκ τῶν ὅλων. Παίδων δὲ γενέσεις ἀκόλουθοι τούτοις, καὶ ἢ πέπλασται κατὰ λόγον ἐμποδίσαντος οὐδενός, ἢ χεῖρον ἔσχε γενομένου ἔνδον κωλύματός τινος ἢ παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν κύουσαν ἢ τοῦ περιέχοντος οὕτω διατεθέντος ὡς ἀσυμμέτρως πρὸς τήνδε τὴν κύησιν ἐσχηκότος.

15. Ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πρὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δοὺς κλήρους καὶ προαιρέσεις συνεργοὺς ὕστερον δίδωσι τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀτράκτῳ, ὡς πάντως τὰ αἱρεθέντα συναποτελοῦντας· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ δαίμων συνεργὸς εἰς πλήρωσιν αὐτῶν. Ἀλλ' οἱ κλῆροι τίνες; Ἢ ⟨τὸ⟩[1] τοῦ παντὸς ἔχοντος οὕτως, ὡς τότε

[1] ⟨τὸ⟩ Müller, H-S².

[1] *Republic* X. 617D–E.
[2] Ibid. 620D–E.

all things without exception are connected with each other; so everything without exception is indicated. If someone loses his wealth, then if it is taken away, the taker is responsible, and his own principle is responsible for him: if it is lost in the sea, the circumstances are responsible. And as for fame, a man is either rightly famous or not. If rightly, then it is his achievements that are responsible and that which is better in those who glorify him; but if not rightly, it is the unrighteousness of those who honour him that is responsible. The same argument applies to office: it is either appropriately conferred or not—in the one case the conferment is to be attributed to that which is better in the selectors; in the other to the man himself who has managed to succeed in getting it by the co-operation of others, or in some kind of other way. About marriages, the causes are free choice, or chance coming together with some incidental influence from the universal order. And births of children follow upon marriages, and the child is either formed according to pattern, when there is no hindrance, or it is in a worse state when some obstacle has occurred within, either due to the mother herself or because the environment is so disposed as to be out of harmony with this particular birth.

15. Plato gives the souls lots and choices before the circling of the Spindle,[1] and afterwards gives them the beings on the Spindle as helpers, to bring to accomplishment in every way what they have chosen: since the guardian spirit also co-operates in the fulfilment of their choices.[2] But what are the lots? Being born when the All was in the state in which it

εἶχεν, ὅτε εἰσῄεσαν εἰς τὸ σῶμα, γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τόδε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τῶνδε γονέων καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅλως, ὡς εἴπομεν, τὰ ἔξω. Πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ γενόμενα καὶ οἷον συγκλωσθέντα διὰ τῆς μιᾶς τῶν λεγομένων Μοιρῶν δεδήλωται ἐπί τε ἑκάστων ἐπί τε τῶν ὅλων· ἡ δὲ Λάχεσις τοὺς κλήρους· καὶ τὰ συμπεσόντα τάδε πάντως ἀναγκαῖον τὴν Ἄτροπον ἐπάγειν. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν γίγνονται τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, ὥσπερ γοητευθέντες, καὶ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτοί· οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες τούτων καὶ ὑπεραίροντες οἷον τῇ κεφαλῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς ἀποσῴζουσι τὸ ἄριστον καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩[1] ἀρχαῖον τῆς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ νομιστέον τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, οἷον, ὅ τι ἂν ἔξωθεν πάθῃ, ταύτην φύσιν ἴσχειν, μόνην τῶν πάντων οἰκείαν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν· ἀλλὰ χρὴ πολὺ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα, ἅτε ἀρχῆς λόγον ἔχουσαν, πολλὰς οἰκείας δυνάμεις πρὸς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν τε οὐσίαν οὖσαν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὀρέξεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸ εὖ κεκτῆσθαι. Τὸ μὲν οὖν συναμφότερον ἐκ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοιόνδε καὶ ἔργα ἔχει τοιάδε·

[1] ⟨τὸ⟩ Kirchhoff, H-S².

[1] For the allegorical interpretation of the names of the Fates, cp. Cornutus *Theologiae Graecae Compendium* ch. 13 (p. 13, Lang). Here, as in Cornutus, they stand for different aspects of the same power of destiny, Clotho (only indirectly

was when they came into the body, and coming into this particular body and being born of these particular parents, and in such and such a place, and in general what we call the external circumstances. That all happenings form a unity and are as it were spun together, in the cases of individuals as well as wholes, is signified by one of the Fates, as they are called. Lachesis signifies the lots. And it is altogether necessary that it should be Atropos who brings in these concurrent circumstances.[1] Of men some are born belonging to the powers that come from the whole and to external circumstances, as if under an enchantment, and are in few things or nothing themselves. Others master these powers and circumstances and rise above them, so to speak, by their heads,[2] towards the upper world and beyond soul, and so preserve the best and ancient part of the soul's substance. For we must not think of the soul as of such a kind that the nature which it has is just whatever affection it receives from outside, and that alone of all things it has no nature of its own; but it, far before anything else, since it has the status of a principle, must have many powers of its own for its natural activities. It is certainly not possible for it, since it is a substance, not to possess along with its being desires and actions and the tendency towards its good. The compound entity results from a composition of its nature and is of this particular [composite] kind and has these particular works. But any

referred to here) for the way things are "spun together," Lachesis for destiny as "lot," Atropos for the way our circumstances are unchangeably determined.

[2] The *Phaedrus* myth again (248A1–3).

ψυχὴ δὲ εἴ τις χωρίζεται, χωριστὰ καὶ ἴδια ἐνεργεῖ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη οὐκ αὐτῆς τιθεμένη, ἅτε ἤδη ὁρῶσα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

16. Ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μικτὸν καὶ τί τὸ μὴ καὶ τί τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ ἀχώριστον, ὅταν ἐν σώματι ᾖ, καὶ ὅλως τί τὸ ζῷον ἀρχὴν ἑτέραν ὕστερον λαβοῦσι ζητητέον· οὐ γὰρ ἅπαντες τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔσχον περὶ τούτου. Νῦν δὲ ἔτι λέγωμεν πῶς τὸ[1] "κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς διοικούσης τὸ πᾶν" εἴπομεν. Πότερα γὰρ ἕκαστα οἷον ἐπ' εὐθείας ποιοῦσα, ἄνθρωπον, εἶτα ἵππον καὶ ἄλλο ζῷον καὶ δὴ καὶ θηρία, πῦρ δὲ καὶ γῆν πρότερον, εἶτα συμπεσόντα ταῦτα ἰδοῦσα καὶ φθείροντα ἄλληλα ἢ καὶ ὠφελοῦντα, τὴν συμπλοκὴν τὴν ἐκ τούτων ἰδοῦσα μόνον καὶ τὰ ὕστερον συμβαίνοντα ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ἔτι συμβαλλομένη πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ζῴων γενέσεις τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν ποιοῦσα καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς δι' ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ συγχωροῦσα; Ἢ αἰτίαν λέγοντες καὶ τῶν οὕτω γινομένων, ὅτι παρ' αὐτῆς γενόμενα τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐργάζεται; Ἢ καὶ τὸ τόδε τόδε ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν ἔχει ὁ λόγος οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲ κατ' ἐπιτυχίαν οὐδὲ[2] τῶνδε γιγνομένων, ἀλλ'

[1] πῶς τὸ Creuzer, H-S: τὸ πῶς codd.
[2] οὐδὲ Kirchhoff, H-S²: οὐδὲν codd.

[1] An announcement of the next treatise (I 1).
[2] Cp. ch. 13. 3–4 and *Phaedrus* 246C1–2.
[3] Harder rejects πῦρ δὲ καὶ γῆν πρότερον, perhaps rightly; it seems oddly inconsequent and inappropriate; but Plotinus is sometimes inconsequent and it seems safer to keep the words in the text.

soul which is separating itself has separate activities of its own and does not consider the body's affections as belonging to itself, because it already sees that body is one thing and soul is another

16. But what the mixed is and what the unmixed, and what the separated is and what the unseparated, when the soul is in the body, and in general what the living being is, are questions which we must enquire into afterwards, taking a different starting-point;[1] for everyone does not hold the same opinion on this subject. But now, continuing our present discussion, let us state in what sense we speak of "soul directing the All according to rational plan."[2] Does soul, then, make individual things, so to speak, in a straight line one after another, man, then horse and some other living being, and wild beasts too, and fire and earth first,[3] and then see these coming together and destroying or benefiting each other, only seeing their interweaving and the continual succession of its consequences, making no new contribution to what happens after but only again causing the births of living creatures from the original ones and giving them up to what they experience from their action upon each other? Or do we mean that soul is the cause of the things which happen in this way, because the beings produced by it accomplish what happens in consequence of their production? Or does the "rational plan" include this particular thing's acting or being acted on in this particular way, so that not even these particular events happen at random or by chance but occur in the way they do

ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως; Ἆρ' οὖν τῶν λόγων αὐτὰ ποιούντων; Ἢ ὄντων μὲν τῶν λόγων, οὐχ ὡς ποιούντων δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδότων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς γεννητικοὺς ἐχούσης εἰδυίας τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνοντα αὐτῆς ἁπάντων· τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμπιπτόντων καὶ περιεστηκότων τὰ αὐτὰ πάντως προσήκει ἀποτελεῖσθαι· ἃ δὴ παραλαβοῦσα ἢ προϊδοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐφεξῆς περαίνει καὶ συνείρει, προηγούμενα οὖν καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντα πάντως καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰ ἐφεξῆς προηγούμενα, ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων· ὅθεν ἴσως ἀεὶ χείρω τὰ ἐφεξῆς· οἷον ἄνδρες ἄλλοι πάλαι, νῦν δὲ ἄλλοι, τῷ μεταξὺ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀναγκαίῳ τῶν λόγων εἰκόντων τοῖς τῆς ὕλης παθήμασι. Συνορῶσα οὖν ἀεὶ ἄλλα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα, καὶ παρακολουθοῦσα τοῖς τῶν αὐτῆς ἔργων παθήμασι τὸν βίον τοιοῦτον ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπήλλακται τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ φροντίδος τέλος ἐπιθεῖσα τῷ ποιήματι καὶ ὅπως ἕξει καλῶς καὶ εἰς ἀεὶ ἅπαξ μηχανησαμένη, οἷα δέ τις γεωργὸς σπείρας ἢ καὶ φυτεύσας ἀεὶ διορθοῦται, ὅσα χειμῶνες ἔβλαψαν ὑέτιοι ἢ κρυμῶν συνέχεια ἢ ἀνέμων ζάλαι. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα ἄτοπα, ἐκεῖνο δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι ἤδη ἔγνωσται ἢ καὶ κεῖται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα; Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰς κακίας τοὺς λόγους

by necessity? Is it, then, the rational forming principles which cause these happenings? The forming principles certainly exist, but not as causing but as knowing—or rather the soul which contains the generative rational principles knows the consequences which come from all its works; when the same things come together, the same circumstances arise, then it is altogether appropriate that the same results should follow. Soul takes over or foresees these antecedent conditions and taking account of them accomplishes what follows and links up the chain of consequences, bringing antecedents and consequents into complete connection, and again linking to the antecedents the causes which precede them in order, as far as it can in the existing circumstances. This is, perhaps, why what comes later in the series is always worse. Men, for instance, were quite different once from what they are now, since by reason of the space between them and their origins and the continual pressure of necessity their forming principles have yielded to the affections of matter. So soul sees the continual succession of different events and, following what happens to its works, has a corresponding kind of life, and is not freed from care for its work when it has set the crown on its achievement and has arranged once for all that it shall be in a good state for ever; but it is like a farmer who, when he has sown or planted, is always putting right what rainstorms or continuous frosts or gales of wind have spoiled. But if this account is absurd, then must we maintain the alternative, that corruption and the works that come from evil are known and already present in the forming principles? But if this is so, then we shall be

ποιεῖν φήσομεν, καίτοι ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔνι ἁμαρτία οὐδὲ παρὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδ' ἡ φθορὰ τοῦ κατὰ τέχνην. Ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθά τις ἐρεῖ μὴ εἶναι μηδὲν παρὰ [1] φύσιν μηδὲ κακὸν τῷ ὅλῳ· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον συγχωρήσεται. Τί οὖν, εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸ χεῖρον συνεργόν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ πάντα καλὰ εἶναι; Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐναντία συντελεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων κόσμος· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ζῴων οὕτω· καὶ τὰ μὲν βελτίω ἀναγκάζει καὶ πλάττει ὁ λόγος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, δυνάμει κεῖται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεομένης ἐκείνης ποιεῖν οὐδ' ἀνακινεῖν τοὺς λόγους ἤδη τῆς ὕλης τῷ σεισμῷ τῷ ἐκ τῶν προηγουμένων λόγων καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῆς ποιούσης τὰ χείρω, κρατουμένης δ' αὖ οὐδὲν ἧττον πρὸς τὰ βελτίω· ὥστε ἓν ἐκ πάντων ἄλλως ἑκατέρως γινομένων καὶ ἄλλως αὖ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

17. Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ νοήματα; Ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει; Ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν φυσικῶς οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ ὅρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ εἰδυῖα ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι, [ὥσπερ κύκλος], ἄλλου ἐνδόντος

[1] παρὰ Ficinus, H-S: κατὰ codd.

[1] Cp. Plato, *Republic* I 342B3.

asserting that the forming principles are the causes of evil, though in the arts and their principles there is no error and nothing contrary to the art or any corruption of the work of art.[1] But here someone will say that there is nothing contrary to nature or evil in the Whole; all the same, he will admit that there is worse and better. Suppose, then, the worse helps towards the completion of the Whole, and everything ought not to be good? For the opposites, too, co-operate for the perfection of the universe, and without them there is no universal order; yes, and it is so with particular living beings too. The forming principle compels the better things to exist and shapes them; the things which are not so, are present potentially in the principles, but actually in what comes to be; there is no need then any more for soul to make or to stir up the forming principles as matter is already, by the disturbance which comes from the preceding principles, making the things which come from it, the worse ones; though it is none the less overruled towards the production of the better. So there is one universe composed of all the things that have come to be, differently in each of these two ways, and that exist differently again in the forming principles.

17. Are these forming principles which are in soul thoughts? But, then, how will it make things in accordance with these thoughts? For it is in matter that the forming principle makes things, and that which makes on the level of nature is not thought or vision, but a power which manipulates matter, which does not know but only acts, like an impression or a figure in water; something else, different from what

εἰς τοῦτο τῆς φυτικῆς δυνάμεως καὶ γεννητικῆς λεγομένης τὸ ποιεῖν. Εἰ τοῦτο, ποιήσει τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ τρέπειν[1] τὴν ἔνυλον καὶ γεννητικὴν ψυχήν. Τρέψει οὖν λογισαμένη αὐτή;
10 Ἀλλ' εἰ λογισαμένη, ἀναφορὰν ἕξει πρότερον εἰς ἄλλο ἢ εἰς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδὲν δεῖ λογισμῶν· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος τρέψει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχον τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ποιεῖν ἐν ψυχῇ δυνάμενον. Κατ' εἴδη ἄρα ποιεῖ. Δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὴν παρὰ νοῦ ἔχουσαν
15 διδόναι. Νοῦς δὴ ψυχῇ δίδωσι τῇ τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴ δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ μετὰ νοῦν τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν ἐλλάμπουσα καὶ τυποῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὥσπερεὶ ἐπιταχθεῖσα ἤδη ποιεῖ· ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνεμποδίστως, τὰ δὲ ἐμποδισθεῖσα χείρω. Ὅτε δὲ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν λαβοῦσα καὶ λόγων οὐ τῶν πρώτων πληρωθεῖσα
20 οὐ μόνον καθ' ἃ ἔλαβε ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ γένοιτο ἄν τι καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦτο δηλονότι χεῖρον· καὶ ζῷον μέν, ζῷον δὲ ἀτελέστερον καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὴν αὐτοῦ ζωήν, ἅτε χείριστον καὶ δύσκολον δὴ καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἐξ ὕλης χείρονος οἷον ὑποστάθμης τῶν προηγουμένων πικρᾶς καὶ πικρὰ ποιούσης·
25 καὶ ταῦτα παρέξει καὶ αὐτὴ τῷ ὅλῳ.

[1] *τρέπειν* Ficinus, H-S²: *τρέφειν* codd.

[1] If the text is sound this translation, suggested by Henry–Schwyzer in their critical note, is probably right, but the word-order is extraordinarily unnatural and there is a good deal to

is called the power of growth and generation, gives it what is required for this making.[1] If this is so, the ruling principle of the soul will make by manipulating the generative soul in matter. Will it, then, manipulate it as the result of having reasoned? But if it is after having reasoned, it will first refer to something else, or to what it has in itself. But if it refers to what it has in itself, there is no need of reasoning. For it is not reasoning that manipulates, but the part of the soul which possesses the forming principles: for this is both more powerful, and is able to make in the soul. It makes, then, according to forms: that is, it must give what it receives from Intellect. Intellect gives to the Soul of the All, and Soul (the one which comes next after Intellect) gives from itself to the soul next after it, enlightening it and impressing form on it, and this last soul immediately makes, as if under orders. It makes some things without hindrance, but in others, the worse ones, it meets obstruction. Since its power to make is derived, and it is filled with forming principles which are not the original ones, it will not simply make according to the forms which it has received but there would be a contribution of its own, and this is obviously worse. Its product is a living being, but a very imperfect one, and one which finds its own life disgusting since it is the worst of living things, ill-conditioned and savage, made of inferior matter, a sort of sediment of the prior realities, bitter and embittering. This is the lowest soul's contribution to the Whole.

be said for Kirchhoff's deletion of *τῆς . . . λεγομένης* as a gloss, which is accepted by Cilento.

18. Ἆρ' οὖν τὰ κακὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀναγκαῖα, ὅτι ἕπεται τοῖς προηγουμένοις; Ἢ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἦν, ἀτελὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πᾶν. Καὶ γὰρ χρείαν τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ πάντα παρέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ, οἷον τὰ τῶν ἰοβόλων, λανθάνει δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ τί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν κακίαν αὐτὴν ἔχειν πολλὰ χρήσιμα καὶ πολλῶν ποιητικὴν ⟨εἶναι⟩[1] καλῶν, οἷον κάλλους τεχνητοῦ παντός, καὶ κινεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν μὴ ἐῶσαν ἐπ' ἀδείας εὕδειν. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, δεῖ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν θεωρεῖν μὲν τὰ ἄριστα ἀεὶ ἱεμένην πρὸς τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν θεόν, πληρουμένης δὲ αὐτῆς καὶ πεπληρωμένης οἷον ἀπομεστουμένης αὐτῆς τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἴνδαλμα καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ κάτω τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦτο εἶναι. Ποιητὴς οὖν ἔσχατος οὗτος· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρώτως πληρούμενον παρὰ νοῦ· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ νοῦς δημιουργός, ὃς καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ μετ' αὐτὸν δίδωσιν ὧν ἴχνη ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ. Εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἑστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένου. Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ᾖ νοῦς καὶ ψυχή, ῥεύσονται οἱ λόγοι εἰς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἥλιος, πάντα τὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ φῶτα.

[1] ⟨εἶναι⟩ Müller, H-S².

18. Then are the evils in the All necessary, because they follow on the prior realities? Rather because if they did not exist the All would be imperfect. Most of them, even all of them, contribute something useful to the Whole—poisonous snakes do, for instance—though generally the reason why remains obscure. Even moral evil itself has many advantages and is productive of much excellence, for example, all the beauty of art,[1] and rouses us to serious thought about our way of living, not allowing us to slumber complacently. If this is correct, it must be that the Soul of the All contemplates the best, always aspiring to the intelligible nature and to God, and that when it is full, filled right up to the brim, its trace, its last and lowest expression, is this productive principle that we are discussing. This, then, is the ultimate maker; over it is that part of soul which is primarily filled from Intellect: over all is Intellect the Craftsman, who gives to the soul which comes next those gifts whose traces are in the third. This visible universe, then, is properly called an image [2] always in process of being made; its first and second principles are at rest, the third at rest too, but also in motion, incidentally and in matter. As long as Intellect and Soul exist, the forming principles will flow into this lower form of soul, just as, as long as the sun exists, all its rays will shine from it.

[1] Is Plotinus thinking here, perhaps, of tragic poetry? If so, the argument shows a startling reversal of Plato's standpoint. Plato in *Republic* II refused to allow poets to portray moral evil; Plotinus here seems to be justifying the existence of moral evil in the universe because it produces art.

[2] Cp. the end of the *Timaeus* 92C7.

II. 4. ON MATTER

Introductory Note

THE title of this treatise (No. 12 in Porphyry's chronological order) is given by Porphyry in the *Life* as *περὶ τῶν δύο ὑλῶν* (On the Two Kinds of Matter); in the MSS of the *Enneads* and the ancient tables of contents (*Pinax, Summarium*) it appears simply as *On Matter*. It is referred to by Plotinus himself in I. 8. 15. 2 . . . *δεικτέον αὐτῷ ἐκ τῶν περὶ ὕλης λόγων* . . . but Harder is surely right in saying that there is no question of a title there—the phrase simply means "from our discussions about matter." Plotinus in fact, we know (*Life* ch. 4), gave no titles to his treatises: and the title given in the *Life* to this one seems preferable, because it describes the contents better, since the first part of the treatise is devoted to intelligible matter, the second to the matter of the sense-world. The treatise is a good example of Plotinus's method of work at its most professional and technical, a close and critical discussion of the views of the Stoics and of Aristotle. As often, he is particularly concerned to carry through a critical rethinking of Aristotle's doctrine designed to adapt it to Platonism as he understood it. The main points on which he differs from Aristotle in this treatise are: (1) he accepts matter in the intelligible world; the objections to belief in its existence stated in ch. 2. and refuted in the following chapters are in substance Aristotelian; (2) he identifies matter in the sense-world with privation; this is established against Aristotle in chs. 14–end, as is essential if Plotinus is to maintain his doctrine that matter is the principle of evil, the ultimate negativity,

which appears clearly at the end of the treatise. On the other hand, Plotinus is maintaining Aristotle's doctrine against the Stoics when he argues that matter is incorporeal and without any sort of dimension (chs. 1, 8–12).

Synopsis

Matter is the substrate and receptacle of forms. Diverse views of its nature; corporeal (Stoics) incorporeal (Platonists and Aristotelians). The Platonist doctrine of intelligible matter (ch. 1). Objections to the existence of intelligible matter (ch. 2). Refutation of the objections and explanation of the true nature and function of intelligible matter (chs. 3–5). Matter in the sense-world, Aristotelian arguments for its existence (ch. 6). Criticism of pre-Socratic conceptions, also from Aristotle (ch. 7). Arguments to show that matter is incorporeal and without size, and that the conception of a sizeless incorporeal matter has a real meaning and philosophical value (chs. 8–12). Neither is matter quality, either positive or negative (ch. 13). As against Aristotle, it is identical with privation, (chs. 14–16), and so is absolute negativity and evil (ch. 16).

II. 4. (12) ΠΕΡΙ ΥΛΗΣ

1. Τὴν λεγομένην ὕλην ὑποκείμενόν τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν λέγοντες εἶναι κοινόν τινα τοῦτον λόγον περὶ αὐτῆς πάντες λέγουσιν, ὅσοι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθον τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, καὶ μέχρι τούτου τὴν αὐτὴν φέρονται· τίς δέ ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ ὑποκειμένη φύσις καὶ πῶς δεκτικὴ καὶ τίνων, τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ζητοῦντες διέστησαν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν σώματα μόνον τὰ ὄντα εἶναι θέμενοι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τούτοις μίαν τε τὴν ὕλην λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οἷον πάθη ταύτης καί πως ἔχουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμῶσι καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν ἄγειν καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῶν τὸν θεὸν ὕλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι. Διδόασι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ ἄποιον αὐτὸ σῶμα λέγοντες καὶ μέγεθος δέ. Οἱ δὲ ἀσώματον

[1] *ὑποκείμενον* is Aristotle's word (cp., e.g., *Physics* A. 9. 192a33), *ὑποδοχή* Plato's (*Timaeus* 49A6). The two conceptions, of course, differ from each other considerably more than this summary definition would suggest.

II. 4. ON MATTER

1. What is called " matter " is said to be some sort of " substrate " and " receptacle " of forms;[1] this account is common to all those who have arrived at a conception of a nature of this kind, and as far as this they all go the same way. But they disagree as soon as they begin to pursue the further investigation into what this underlying nature is and how it is receptive and what of. Those who adopt the position that realities are exclusively bodies and that substance consists in bodies say there is one matter and that it underlies the elements and is itself substance; all other things are, so to speak, affections of matter, and the elements, too, are matter in a certain state. They even dare to take matter as far as the gods, and finally, even [to say] that their God himself is this matter in a certain state.[2] And they give it a body too, for they say that it is a body without quality and a magnitude.[3] But others [4] say that

[2] *εἶναι* cannot be dependent on *τολμῶσι*: a verb of saying is required. Henry and Schwyzer tentatively suggest *ἀντεῖν* for *αὐτῶν*. But this is rather far-fetched, and it seems to me possible that this is a piece of careless writing by Plotinus himself.

[3] These are the Stoics: cp. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II. 316, 309, 326.

[4] Platonists and Aristotelians.

λέγουσι καὶ ταύτην οὐ μίαν τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ περὶ ἧς οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν, ἑτέραν μέντοι προτέραν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὑποβεβλημένην τοῖς ἐκεῖ εἴδεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις.

2. Διὸ πρότερον ζητητέον περὶ ταύτης εἰ ἔστι, καὶ τίς οὖσα τυγχάνει, καὶ πῶς ἐστιν. Εἰ δὴ ἀόριστόν τι καὶ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ τῆς ὕλης εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀρίστοις οὖσιν οὐδὲν ἀόριστον οὐδὲ ἄμορφον, οὐδ' ἂν ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἴη· καὶ εἰ ἁπλοῦν ἕκαστον, οὐδ' ἂν δέοι ὕλης, ἵν' ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλου τὸ σύνθετον· καὶ γινομένοις μὲν ὕλης δεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων ἕτερα ποιουμένοις, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ἡ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὕλη ἐνοήθη, μὴ γινομένοις δὲ οὔ. Πόθεν δὲ ἐλήλυθε καὶ ὑπέστη; Εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὑπό τινος· εἰ δὲ ἀίδιος, καὶ ἀρχαὶ πλείους καὶ κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰ πρῶτα. Κἂν εἶδος δὲ προσέλθῃ, τὸ σύνθετον ἔσται σῶμα· ὥστε κἀκεῖ σῶμα.

3. Πρῶτον οὖν λεκτέον ὡς οὐ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἀόριστον ἀτιμαστέον, οὐδὲ ὃ ἂν ἄμορφον ᾖ τῇ

[1] It seems probable that Plotinus is making a distinction between Platonists and Aristotelians here. The only incorporeal beings whose existence was recognised by Aristotle were pure forms (intelligences), not composites of form and matter (cp. Met. Λ. 6. 1071b2). Aristotle speaks of *ὕλη νοητή* in the *Metaphysics* (Z. 10. 1036a9–12, 11. 1037a4–5, H. 6. 1045a33–37), and Plotinus may have taken the term from these passages. But the senses in which Aristotle uses it (see Ross's note on the passages from Z. in his edition of the *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, pp. 199–200) are very remote from that in which Plotinus understands it.

matter is incorporeal, and some of them [1] that this incorporeal matter is not one, but they, too, maintain that the same kind of matter underlies bodies which the people mentioned before speak of, but that there is another, prior, kind in the intelligible world which underlies the forms there and the incorporeal substances.

2. So first we must enquire about this second matter, whether it exists, and what sort of thing it is, and how it exists. If what is of the matter kind must be something undefined and shapeless, and there is nothing undefined or shapeless among the beings there, which are the best, there would not be matter there. And if every intelligible being is simple, there would be no need of matter, so that the composite being might come from it and from something else. And there is need of matter for beings that come into existence and are made into one thing after another—this was what led people to conceive the matter of beings perceived by the senses—but not for beings that do not come into existence. And where did it come from, from where did it get its being? If it came to be, it was by some agency; but if it was eternal, there would be several principles and the primary beings would exist by chance. And if form comes to matter, the composite being will be a body; so that there will be body in the intelligible world too.

3. First, then, we must say that we should not in every case despise the undefined or anything of which

ἑαυτοῦ ἐπινοίᾳ, εἰ μέλλοι παρέχειν αὐτὸ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοις· οἷόν τι καὶ ψυχὴ πρὸς νοῦν καὶ λόγον πέφυκε μορφουμένη παρὰ τούτων καὶ εἰς εἶδος βέλτιον ἀγομένη· ἔν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς τὸ σύνθετον ἑτέρως, οὐχ ὡς τὰ σώματα· ἐπεὶ καὶ λόγοι σύνθετοι καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ σύνθετον ποιοῦσι τὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς εἶδος φύσιν. Εἰ δέ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ παρ' ἄλλου, καὶ μᾶλλον. Ἡ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ὕλη ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἴσχει, τῶν δὲ ἀιδίων ἡ αὐτὴ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Τάχα δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ ἐνταῦθα. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ παρὰ μέρος πάντα καὶ ἓν ἑκάστοτε· διὸ οὐδὲν ἐμμένει ἄλλου ἄλλο ἐξωθοῦντος· διὸ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἅμα πάντα· διὸ οὐκ ἔχει εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλοι, ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει πάντα. Οὐδέποτ' οὖν ἄμορφος οὔδε[1] ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἑκατέρα. Τὸ δὲ εἴτε ἀίδιος, εἴτε γενομένη, ἐπειδὰν ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ λάβωμεν, δῆλον ἔσται.

4. Ὁ δὴ λόγος ἡμῖν ὑποθεμένοις τὸ νῦν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη—δέδεικται γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις—προίτω. Εἰ οὖν πολλὰ τὰ εἴδη, κοινόν μέν τι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη

[1] οὐδὲ Volkmann, H-S²: οὔτε codd.

[1] The reference is probably to the earlier treatise V. 9 (5) 3–4.

the very idea implies shapelessness, if it is going to offer itself to the principles before it and to the best beings. Soul, for instance, is naturally disposed like this to Intellect and Reason; it is shaped by them and brought to a better form. And in the intelligible world the composite being is differently constituted, not like bodies: since forming principles, too, are composite, and by their actuality make composite the nature which is active towards the production of form. But if this nature both works on and derives from something other than itself, it is composite to an even higher degree. The matter, too, of the things that came into being is always receiving different forms, but the matter of eternal things is always the same and always has the same form. With matter here, it is pretty well exactly the other way round; for here it is all things in turn and only one thing at each particular time; so nothing lasts because one thing pushes out another; so it is not the same for ever. But in the intelligible world matter is all things at once; so it has nothing to change into, for it has all things already. Therefore, intelligible matter is certainly not ever shapeless in the intelligible world, since even the matter here is not, but each of them has shape in a different way. The question whether matter is eternal or came into being will be cleared up when we grasp what sort of a thing it is.

4. Let us assume for the present that the Forms exist—for it has been demonstrated elsewhere[1]—and continue our discussion on this assumption. If, then, the Forms are many, there must be something in them common to them all; and also something

εἶναι· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἴδιον, ᾧ διαφέρει ἄλλο ἄλλου. Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ χωρίζουσα ἡ οἰκεία ἐστὶ μορφή. Εἰ δὲ μορφή, ἔστι τὸ μορφούμενον, περὶ ὃ ἡ διαφορά. Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ ὕλη ἡ τὴν μορφὴν δεχομένη καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Ἔτι εἰ κόσμος νοητὸς ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, μίμημα δὲ οὗτος ἐκείνου, οὗτος δὲ σύνθετος καὶ ἐξ ὕλης, κἀκεῖ δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι. Ἢ πῶς προσερεῖς κόσμον μὴ εἰς εἶδος ἰδών; Πῶς δὲ εἶδος μὴ ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ εἶδος λαβών; Ἀμερὲς μὲν γὰρ παντελῶς πάντη αὐτό, μεριστὸν δὲ ὑπωσοῦν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν διασπασθέντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ μέρη, ἡ τομὴ καὶ ἡ διάσπασις ὕλης ἐστὶ πάθος· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τμηθεῖσα· εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὂν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντα ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτὰ μορφαὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο [τὸ ποικίλον] νόησον ποικίλον καὶ πολύμορφον. Οὐκοῦν ἄμορφον αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ ποικίλον· εἰ γὰρ τῷ νῷ ἀφέλοις τὴν ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ νοήματα, τὸ πρὸ τούτων ἄμορφον καὶ ἀόριστον καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.

5. Εἰ δ', ὅτι ἀεὶ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ ὁμοῦ, ἓν ἄμφω καὶ οὐχ ὕλη ἐκεῖνο, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα ἔσται τῶν σωμάτων ὕλη· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄνευ μορφῆς, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὅλον σῶμα, σύνθετον μὴν ὅμως. Καὶ νοῦς

individual, by which one differs from another. Now this something individual, this separating difference, is the shape which belongs to each. But if there is shape, there is that which is shaped, about which the difference is predicated. Therefore, there is matter which receives the shape, and is the substrate in every case. Further, if there is an intelligible universal order There, and this universe here is an imitation of it, and this is composite, and composed of matter, then there must be matter There too. Or else how can you call it a universal order except with regard to its form? And how can you have form without something on which the form is imposed? Intelligible reality is certainly altogether absolutely without parts, yet it has parts in a kind of way. If the parts are torn apart from each other, then the cutting and tearing apart is an affection of matter: for it is matter that is cut. But if intelligible reality is at once many and partless, then the many existing in one are in matter which is that one, and they are its shapes: conceive this unity as varied and of many shapes. So, then, it must be shapeless before it is varied; for if you take away in your mind its variety and shapes and forming principles and thoughts, what is prior to these is shapeless and undefined and is none of these things that are on it and in it.

5. But if it is objected that, because intelligible matter always has these forms and has them all together, both are one and that underlying reality is not matter, then the matter of the bodies here will not exist in this world either: for it is never without shape but is always a complete body, but all the same a composite one. Intellect finds out its doubleness,

εὑρίσκει τὸ διττόν· οὗτος γὰρ διαιρεῖ, ἕως εἰς ἁπλοῦν ἦκῃ μηκέτι αὐτὸ ἀναλύεσθαι δυνάμενον· ἕως δὲ δύναται, χωρεῖ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ βάθος. Τὸ δὲ βάθος ἑκάστου ἡ ὕλη· διὸ καὶ σκοτεινὴ πᾶσα, ὅτι τὸ φῶς ὁ λόγος. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς λόγος· διὸ τὸν ἐφ' ἑκάστου λόγον ὁρῶν τὸ κάτω ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς σκοτεινὸν ἥγηται, ὥσπερ ὀρθαλμὸς φωτοειδὴς ὢν πρὸς τὸ φῶς βαλὼν καὶ χρόας φῶτα ὄντα τὰ ὑπὸ τὰ χρώματα σκοτεινὰ καὶ ὑλικὰ εἶναι λέγει κεκρυμμένα τοῖς χρώμασι. Διάφορόν γε μὴν τὸ σκοτεινὸν τό τε ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τό τε ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχει διάφορός τε ἡ ὕλη, ὅσῳ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπικείμενον ἀμφοῖν διάφορον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ θεία λαβοῦσα τὸ ὁρίζον αὐτὴν ζωὴν ὡρισμένην καὶ νοερὰν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ ὡρισμένον μέν τι γίγνεται, οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον. Καὶ ἡ μορφὴ δὲ εἴδωλον· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἴδωλον. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἡ μορφὴ ἀληθινόν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Διὸ καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, εἰ περὶ ἐκείνης ἔλεγον, ὀρθῶς ἔδει ὑπολαμβάνειν λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἐκεῖ οὐσία, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νοουμένη καὶ ὅλη οὖσα πεφωτισμένη οὐσία. Πότερα δὲ ἀίδιος ἡ νοητὴ ὁμοίως ζητητέον, ὡς ἄν τις καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ζητοῖ· γενητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, ἀγένητα δέ, ὅτι μὴ χρόνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ παρ'

[1] This is an allusion to Plato's theory of vision. Cp. *Timaeus* 45B.

for it divides till it comes to something simple which cannot itself be resolved into parts; but as long as it can it advances into the depth of body. And the depth of each individual thing is matter: so all matter is dark, because the light [in each thing] is the rational forming principle. Now intellect too is rational principle. So intellect sees the forming principle in each thing and considers that what is under it is dark because it lies below the light; just as the eye, which has the form of light,[1] directs its gaze at the light and at colours (which are lights) and reports that what lies below the colours is dark and material, hidden by the colours. The darkness, however, in intelligible things differs from that in the things of sense, and so does the matter, by just as much as the form superimposed on both is different. The divine matter when it receives that which defines it has a defined and intelligent life, but the matter of this world becomes something defined, but not alive or thinking, a decorated corpse. Shape here is only an image; so that which underlies it is also only an image. But There the shape is true shape, and what underlies it is true too. So those who say that matter is substance must be considered to be speaking correctly if they are speaking of matter in the intelligible world. For that which underlies form There is substance, or rather, considered along with the form imposed upon it, it makes a whole which is illuminated substance. As for the question whether intelligible matter is eternal, one must investigate it in the same way as one investigates the ideas: intelligible realities are originated in so far as they have a beginning, but unoriginated because they

ἄλλου, οὐχ ὡς γινόμενα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ κόσμος, ἀλλὰ ὄντα ἀεί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐκεῖ κόσμος. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἐκεῖ ἀεί, ἣ τὴν ὕλην ποιεῖ· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ὕλης αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη· διὸ καὶ αὕτη ἑτερότης ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ὁμοῦ ἐξέφυσαν κίνησις καὶ ἑτερότης· ἀόριστον δὲ καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, κἀκείνου πρὸς τὸ ὁρισθῆναι δεόμενα· ὁρίζεται δέ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστραφῇ· πρὶν δὲ ἀόριστον καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ οὔπω ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἀφώτιστον ἐκείνου. Εἰ γὰρ παρ' ἐκείνου τὸ φῶς, τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ φῶς, πρὶν δέξασθαι, φῶς οὐκ ἔχει ἀεί, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο ὃν ἔχει, εἴπερ τὸ φῶς παρ' ἄλλου. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὕλης πλείω τῶν προσηκόντων παρα-γυμνωθέντα ταύτῃ.

6. Περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν σωμάτων ὑποδοχῆς ὧδε λεγέσθω. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι τοῖς σώμασιν ὑποκείμενον εἶναι ἄλλο ὂν παρ' αὐτά, ἥ τε εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ τῶν στοιχείων δηλοῖ. Οὐ γὰρ

[1] Here we encounter Plotinus's interpretation of the *μέγιστα γένη* of Plato, *Sophist* 254D ff. (Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness and Otherness) as "categories of the intelligible world," for which, cp. V. 1. 4 and the full exposition in VI. 2. 7–8.

[2] The doctrine briefly stated here is of cardinal importance in the thought of Plotinus; it is that two moments are to be distinguished in the timeless generation of Intellect from the One; the first, in which it proceeds as an unformed potentiality; the second, in which it returns upon the One in contemplation

have not a beginning in time; they always proceed from something else, not as always coming into being, like the universe, but as always existing, like the universe There. For Otherness There[1] exists always, which produces intelligible matter; for this is the principle of matter, this and the primary Movement. For this reason Movement, too, was called Otherness, because Movement and Otherness sprang forth together. The Movement and Otherness which came from the First are undefined, and need the First to define them; and they are defined when they turn to it.[2] But before the turning, matter, too, was undefined and the Other and not yet good, but unilluminated from the First. For if light comes from the First, then that which receives the light, before it receives it has everlastingly no light; but it has light as other than itself, since the light comes to it from something else. And now we have disclosed about the intelligible matter more than the occasion demanded.

6. About the receptacle of bodies, let this be our account.[3] That there must be something underlying bodies, which is different from the bodies themselves, is made clear by the changing of the elements into each other. For the destruction of that which

and is informed and actualised by him. For the basic doctrine, cp. V. 4. 2; for Plotinus's explanation of why the multiplicity of Forms results from Intellect's contemplation of the One, cp. V. 3. 11, V. 1. 7.

[3] What follows is an accurate exposition of Aristotle's doctrine of matter, in Aristotelian language: it reads like a Peripatetic commentary on *Met.* Λ 1–2. 1069b. The criticism of Pre-Socratic views in the following chapter is also entirely based on Aristotle; see the first note to ch. 7.

παντελὴς τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος ἡ φθορά· ἢ ἔσται τις οὐσία εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολομένη· οὐδ' αὖ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ παντελῶς μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὂν ἐλήλυθεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἴδους μεταβολὴ ἐξ εἴδους ἑτέρου. Μένει δὲ τὸ δεξάμενον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἀποβαλὸν θάτερον. Τοῦτό τε οὖν δηλοῖ καὶ ὅλως ἡ φθορά· συνθέτου γάρ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἕκαστον. Ἥ τε ἐπαγωγὴ μαρτυρεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον σύνθετον δεικνῦσα· καὶ ἡ ἀνάλυσις δέ· οἷον εἰ ἡ φιάλη εἰς τὸν χρυσόν, ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς εἰς ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δὲ φθειρόμενον τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀπαιτεῖ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ εἶδος εἶναι ἢ ὕλην πρώτην ἢ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους. Ἀλλ' εἶδος μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πῶς γὰρ ἄνευ ὕλης ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ μεγέθει; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη· φθείρεται γάρ. Ἐξ ὕλης ἄρα καὶ εἴδους. Καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀόριστον, ὅτι μὴ εἶδος.

7. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν ὕλῃ θέμενος ἀντιμαρτυροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν φθορὰν αὐτῶν. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸ μῖγμα ὕλην[1] ποιῶν, οὐκ ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς πάντα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχειν λέγων ὃν εἰσάγει νοῦν ἀναιρεῖ οὐκ αὐτὸν τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ

[1] ὕλην Steinhart, H-S: ὕδωρ codd.

[1] The criticism of the Pre-Socratics in this chapter does not indicate any independent study of them by Plotinus; it is based on Aristotle (cp. *Physics* A. 4. 187a12 ff.; *Met.* A. 7. 988a27 ff.; Λ 2.. 1069b20–23), and is entirely Peripatetic in spirit.

changes is not complete; otherwise, there will be a being which has totally perished into non-being; nor has the engendered thing come to being from absolute non-being, but there is a change from one form into another. But if this is so there remains that which has received the form of the engendered thing and lost the other one. And then destruction also makes this completely clear; for it is destruction of a composite; but if each individual thing is a composite, it is composed of matter and form. Induction demonstrates this by showing that what is being destroyed is a composite; and the process of reduction to a thing's elements shows it too; if, for example, the cup is reduced to its gold and the gold to water, the water in process of dissolution requires something analogous to be reduced to. And the elements must be either form or first matter or composed of matter and form. But it is not possible for them to be form; for without matter how could they be in a state of having bulk and dimension? But they are not first matter either; for they are destroyed; so they must be composed of matter and form: form is in relation to their quality and shape, and matter to their substrate, which is undefined because it is not form.

7. Empedocles, who classes the elements as matter, has their destruction as evidence against him.[1] Anaxagoras, when he makes his mixture matter, and says that it is not a capacity for everything but contains everything in actuality, does away with the mind which he introduces by not making it the giver

εἶδος διδόντα ποιῶν οὐδὲ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης ἀλλ' ἅμα. Ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ ἅμα. Εἰ γὰρ μετέχει τὸ μῖγμα τοῦ εἶναι, πρότερον τὸ ὄν· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὂν τὸ μῖγμα κἀκεῖνο, ἄλλου ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεήσει τρίτου. Εἰ οὖν πρότερον ἀνάγκη τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τί ἔδει τὰ εἴδη κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι, εἶτα τὸν νοῦν διὰ πραγμάτων ἀνηνύτων διακρίνειν ἐξὸν ἀποίῳ οὔσῃ τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐκτεῖναι; Τό τε πᾶν ἐν παντὶ εἶναι πῶς οὐκ ἀδύνατον; Ὁ δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον ὑποθεὶς τί ποτε τοῦτο λεγέτω. Καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἄπειρον, ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτόν τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὔτε αὐτοάπειρον οὔτε ἐπ' ἄλλῃ φύσει ὡς συμβεβηκὸς σώματί τινι, τὸ μὲν αὐτοάπειρον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ ὡς συμβεβηκός, ὅτι τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἄπειρον εἴη οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ὕλη ἔτι, δῆλον. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αἱ ἄτομοι τάξιν ὕλης ἔξουσιν αἱ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ οὖσαι· τμητὸν γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα κατὰ πᾶν· καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ οἷόν τε ἄνευ νοῦ ἕκαστα καὶ ψυχῆς, ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀτόμων εἶναι—ἄλλην τε φύσιν παρὰ τὰς ἀτόμους ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων δημιουργεῖν

[1] This obscure criticism is less Peripatetic than the rest of the chapter, as it seems to imply Plotinus's own equation of Intellect and being.

[2] Anaximander. Plotinus's criticism shows how closely

of shape and form, and not prior to matter but simultaneous with it. But this simultaneity is impossible. For if the mixture participates in being the existent is prior; and if both this mixture and that other [i.e. being] are existent, there will be need of a third over them, different from them.[1] If, then, it is necessary for the maker to be prior, why did the forms have to be in small pieces in the matter, and why did mind have to separate them out with endless trouble, when it could, as matter is without quality, extend quality and shape over the whole of it? And how is it not impossible that everything should be in everything? And as for the man who posits the unbounded [as matter],[2] let him explain what it is. And if he means that it is unbounded in the sense that one cannot get to the end of it, it is clear that there is no such thing in existence, neither an unbounded-in-itself, nor an unbounded in another nature, as an accident of some body; there is no unbounded-in-itself, because its part, too, would be necessarily unbounded, and no accidental unbounded, because that of which it was an accident would not be unbounded in itself and would not be simple and not be matter any longer. Nor will the atoms hold the position of matter—they do not exist at all; for every body is altogether divisible: and the continuity and flexibility of bodies, and the inability of individual things to exist without mind and soul, which cannot be made of atoms (and it is impossible to make out of the atoms another kind of thing besides the atoms,

he is following Peripatetic tradition here; for he himself regards matter as *ἄπειρον* (below ch. 15), though in a very different sense from Anaximander.

οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδεὶς δημιουργὸς ποιήσει τι ἐξ οὐχ ὕλης συνεχοῦς—καὶ μυρία ἂν λέγοιτο πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ εἴρηται· διὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν περιττὸν ἐν τούτοις.

8. Τίς οὖν ἡ μία αὕτη καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ἄποιος λεγομένη; Καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, εἴπερ ἄποιος, δῆλον· ἢ ποιότητα ἕξει. Λέγοντες δὲ πάντων αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ οὐ τινῶν μὲν ὕλην, πρὸς ἄλλα δὲ εἶδος οὖσαν—οἷον τὸν πηλὸν ὕλην τῷ κεραμεύοντι, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐχ ὕλην—οὐ δὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα λέγοντες, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ προσάπτοιμεν τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει, ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὁρᾶται. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις ποιότησιν, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ θερμότησι καὶ ψυχρότησιν, οὐδὲ τὸ κοῦφον οὐδὲ τὸ βάρος, οὐ πυκνόν, οὐχ ἀραιόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σχῆμα. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ μεγέθει, ἄλλο τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τὸ σχήματι, ἄλλο τὸ ἐσχηματισμένῳ. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἕν τι τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει· οὕτω γὰρ πάντων ἔρημος. Καὶ ὁ μορφὴν διδοὺς δώσει καὶ μορφὴν ἄλλην οὖσαν παρ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ πάντα ἐκ τῶν ὄντων οἷον προσφέρων· ἢ δουλεύσει τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς καὶ ποιήσει οὐχ ἡλίκον θέλει, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἡ ὕλη βούλεται· τὸ δὲ συντροχάζειν τὴν βούλησιν τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῆς πλασματῶδες. Εἰ δὲ καὶ πρότερον τῆς ὕλης τὸ

since no maker will make anything out of discontinuous material), and innumerable other objections could be, and have been, alleged against this hypothesis; so there is no need to spend more time on this question.

8. What, then, is this one matter which is also continuous and without quality? It is clear that, if in fact it is without quality, it is not a body—if it was, it would have quality. But, since we say that it is the matter of all sense-objects and not the matter of some, but form in relation to others—as clay is matter to the potter, but not matter absolutely—since we do not mean that it is matter in this sense, but matter in relation to everything, we should not attribute to its nature any of the properties which are observed in sense-objects. Now if this is so, then besides the other qualities, colours and degrees of heat and cold, we must not attribute to it lightness or heaviness, density or rarity, and indeed not even shape: and so not size either. For it is one thing to be size and another to be given a size, one thing to be shape, another to be given a shape. And matter must not be composite, but simple and one thing in its own nature; for so it will be destitute of all qualities. And the giver of its shape will give it a shape which is different from matter itself, and a size, and everything, bringing them to matter, so to speak, from its store of realities. Otherwise, it will be enslaved to the size of matter and will make something, not as large as it wills, but of the size that matter wants: the idea that the will of the maker keeps in step with the size is a fiction. But if, too, the making principle is prior to the matter, matter will

ποιοῦν, ταύτῃ ἔσται ἡ ὕλη, ᾗ πάντη τὸ ποιοῦν θέλει, καὶ εὐάγωγος εἰς ἅπαντα· καὶ εἰς μέγεθος τοίνυν. Μέγεθός τε εἰ ἔχοι, ἀνάγκη καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν· ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον δύσεργος ἔσται. Ἔπεισι τοίνυν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῇ πάντα ἐπ' αὐτὴν φέρον· τὸ δὲ εἶδος πᾶν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ὁπόσον ἂν ᾖ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου. Διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν ἑκάστων μετὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὥρισται· ἄλλο γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἄλλο ὄρνιθος καὶ ὄρνιθος τοιουτουί. Θαυμαστότερον τὸ ποσὸν τῇ ὕλῃ ἄλλο ἐπάγειν τοῦ ποιὸν αὐτῇ προστιθέναι; οὐδὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν λόγος, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ, εἶδος καὶ μέτρον καὶ ἀριθμὸς ὄν.

9. Πῶς οὖν τις λήψεταί τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ μὴ μέγεθος ἔχει; Ἢ πᾶν ὅπερ μὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ ποσῷ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ταὐτόν. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἕτερα τοῦ ποσοῦ. Ὅλως δὲ πᾶσαν ἀσώματον φύσιν ἄποσον θετέον· ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ποσότης αὐτὴ οὐ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετασχὸν αὐτῆς· ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου δῆλον, ὅτι εἶδος ἡ ποσότης. Ὡς οὖν ἐγένετό τι λευκὸν παρουσίᾳ λευκότητος, τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ χρώματα ποικίλα οὐκ ἦν ποικίλον χρῶμα, ἀλλὰ ποικίλος, εἰ βούλει,

be exactly as the making principle wills it to be in every way, tractable to everything, and so to size too. And if it had size it would necessarily have shape as well; so that it would be still harder to work. So when the form comes to the matter it brings everything with it; the form has everything, the size and all that goes with and is caused by the formative principle. Therefore, in every natural kind the dimensions are determined along with the form; the dimensions of a man are different from those of a bird, and those of different kinds of birds from one another. Is there anything more surprising in the bringing of quantity to matter as something different from itself than in the addition to it of quality? It is not the case that quality is a rational formative principle and quantity is not, since quantity is form and measure and number.

9. How, then, is one to conceive an existing thing which has not size? Everything is without size which is not identical with that which has quantity; for, certainly, that which exists is not identical with that which has quantity: and there are many other things which are different from that which has quantity. One must regard all bodiless nature as altogether without quantity; but matter is also bodiless. For quantity itself, too, is not a thing which has quantity; that which has quantity is that which participates in quantity; so it is clear from this, too, that quantity is a form. As, then something becomes white by the presence of whiteness, but that which makes the white colour in a living thing, and the other varied colours too, is not varied colour itself but a various, if you like to put it that

λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ τηλικόνδε οὐ τηλικόνδε, ἀλλ' αὖ τὸ "τι πηλίκον" ἢ πηλικότης ἢ ὁ λόγος τὸ ποιοῦν. Προσελθοῦσα οὖν ἡ πηλικότης ἐξελίττει εἰς μέγεθος τὴν ὕλην; Οὐδαμῶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγῳ συνεσπείρατο· ἀλλ' ἔδωκε μέγεθος τὸ οὐ πρότερον ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότητα τὴν οὐ πρότερον οὖσαν.

10. Τί οὖν νοήσω ἀμέγεθες ἐν ὕλῃ; Τί δὲ νοήσεις ἄποιον ὁπωσοῦν; Καὶ τίς ἡ νόησις καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ ἐπιβολή; Ἡ ἀοριστία· εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, καὶ τῷ ἀορίστῳ τὸ ἀόριστον. Λόγος μὲν οὖν γένοιτο ἂν περὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου ὡρισμένος, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιβολὴ ἀόριστος. Εἰ δ' ἕκαστον λόγῳ καὶ νοήσει γινώσκεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ μὲν λόγος λέγει, ἃ δὴ λέγει περὶ αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ βουλομένη εἶναι νόησις οὐ νόησις, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄνοια, μᾶλλον νόθον ἂν εἴη τὸ φάντασμα αὐτῆς καὶ οὐ γνήσιον, ἐκ θατέρου οὐκ ἀληθοῦς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου λόγου συγκείμενον. Καὶ τάχα εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁ Πλάτων νόθῳ λογισμῷ εἶπε ληπτὴν εἶναι. Τίς οὖν ἡ ἀοριστία τῆς ψυχῆς; Ἆρα παντελὴς ἄγνοια ὡς ἀφασία;[1] Ἢ ἐν καταφάσει τινὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, καὶ οἷον ὀρθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος ὕλη

[1] ἀφασία Heintz: ἀπουσία codd. H-S.

[1] *Timaeus* 52B2.

[2] ἐν καταφάσει in the next sentence strongly suggests that Heintz's ἀφασία is the right reading here, and I translate it. But the MSS ἀπουσία is not quite impossible; Dr. Schwyzer suggests that the antithesis to ἐν καταφάσει is to be found in

way, formative principle; so that which makes a thing a certain size is not a thing of certain size itself, but the specific magnitude, or magnitude itself, or the formative principle which makes magnitude. Does magnitude, then, come to matter and unfold it into size? By no means; for matter was not shrunk together in a small space; but the formative principle gave a size which was not there before, just as it gave a quality which was not there before.

10. "What, then, shall I conceive this sizelessness in matter to be?" What will you conceive anything whatever without quality to be? What is the act of thought, and how do you apply your mind to it? By indefiniteness; for if like is known by like, the indefinite is known by the indefinite. The concept, then, of the indefinite may be defined, but the application of the mind to it is indefinite. If, then, each thing is known by concept and thought, but in this case the concept states about matter what it does in fact state, that which wants to be a thought about it will not be a thought but a sort of thoughtlessness; or rather the mental representation of it will be spurious and not genuine, compounded of an unreal part and with the diverse kind of reasoning. And it was perhaps because he observed this that Plato said that matter was apprehended by a "spurious reasoning."[1] What, then is the indefiniteness of the soul? Is it complete ignorance amounting to inability to say anything?[2] Rather, the indefiniteness is contained in a positive statement, and, as with the eye we see

παντελὴς ἄγνοια and that ὡς introduces a comparison, "Is it complete ignorance, like an absence? Rather, the indefiniteness is contained in a positive statement . . .".

ὂν παντὸς ἀοράτου χρώματος, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οἷον φῶς τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι ὁμοιοῦται τῇ ὄψει τῇ ἐν σκότῳ ταὐτόν πως γινομένη τότε τῷ ὃ οἷον ὁρᾷ. Ἆρ' οὖν ὁρᾷ; Ἢ οὕτως ὡς ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ ὡς ἄχροιαν καὶ ὡς ἀλαμπὲς καὶ προσέτι δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰδοποιήσει ἤδη. Ὅταν οὖν μηδὲν νοῇ, οὐ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ψυχὴν πάθος; Ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν μηδέν, λέγει μηδέν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσχει οὐδέν· ὅταν δὲ τὴν ὕλην, οὕτω πάσχει πάθος οἷον τύπον τοῦ ἀμόρφου· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεμορφωμένα καὶ τὰ μεμεγεθυσμένα νοῇ, ὡς σύνθετα νοεῖ· ὡς γὰρ κεχρωσμένα καὶ ὅλως πεποιωμένα. Τὸ ὅλον οὖν νοεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω· καὶ ἐναργὴς μὲν ἡ νόησις ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν ἐπόντων, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τοῦ ἀμόρφου· οὐ γὰρ εἶδος. Ὃ οὖν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ συνθέτῳ λαμβάνει μετὰ τῶν ἐπόντων ἀναλύσασα ἐκεῖνα καὶ χωρίσασα, ὃ καταλείπει ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο νοεῖ ἀμυδρῶς ἀμυδρὸν καὶ σκοτεινῶς σκοτεινὸν καὶ νοεῖ οὐ νοοῦσα. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔμεινεν οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη ἄμορφος, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πράγμασίν ἐστι μεμορφωμένη, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εὐθέως ἐπέβαλε τὸ εἶδος τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῇ ἀλγοῦσα τῷ ἀορίστῳ, οἷον φόβῳ τοῦ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχομένη ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐπιπολὺ ἑστάναι.

darkness which is matter of every unseen colour, so, too, the soul, when it has taken away everything which corresponds to light in the objects of sense, being no longer able to define what is left, is made like sight in darkness, having become then somehow the same as what it, so to speak, sees. But does it really see? Only as if it was seeing absence of shape and absence of colour, and something lightless, and without size as well. If it does not see in this way, it will already be giving matter a form. Is not the soul, then, affected in this very same way when it thinks nothing? No, but when it thinks nothing, it says nothing, or rather is not affected at all; but when it thinks matter, it is affected in a way as if it received an impression of the shapeless; since, also when it thinks things that have received shape and size, it thinks them as composites; for it thinks them as things which have been given colour and, in general, quality. So it thinks the whole and the compound of both elements [matter and form]; and the thought or perception of the overlying elements is clear, but that of the substrate, the shapeless, is dim; for it is not form. That, then, which it apprehends in the composite whole along with the overlying elements, when it has analysed these out and separated them, that which reason leaves over, this is what it thinks, a dim thing dimly and a dark thing darkly, and it thinks it without thinking. And since matter itself does not remain shapeless, but is shaped in things, the soul, too, immediately imposes the form of the things on it because matter's indefiniteness distresses it, as if it were in fear of being outside the realm of being and could not endure to stay for long in non-being.

11. Καὶ τί δεῖ τινος ἄλλου πρὸς σύστασιν σωμάτων μετὰ μέγεθος καὶ ποιότητας ἁπάσας; Ἡ τοῦ ὑποδεξομένου πάντα. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ὄγκος· εἰ δὲ ὁ ὄγκος, μέγεθος δήπου. Εἰ δὲ ἀμέγεθες, οὐδ' ὅπου δέξεται ἔχει. Ἀμέγεθες δὲ ὂν τί ἂν συμβάλλοιτο, εἰ μήτε εἰς εἶδος καὶ τὸ ποιὸν μήτε εἰς τὴν διάστασιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ὃ δὴ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης δοκεῖ, ὅπου ἂν ᾖ, ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὰ σώματα; Ὅλως δὲ ὥσπερ πράξεις καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ χρόνοι καὶ κινήσεις ὑποβολὴν ὕλης ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔχοντα ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα ἀνάγκη ὕλην ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ὅλα ἕκαστα εἶναι ἃ ἐστι ποικιλώτερα ὄντα μίξει τῇ ἐκ πλειόνων εἰδῶν τὴν σύστασιν ἔχοντα· ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ ἀμέγεθες ὕλης ὄνομα κενὸν εἶναι. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὑποδεχόμενον ὁτιοῦν ὄγκον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ μέγεθος ἤδη αὐτῷ παρῇ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα δεχομένη ὁμοῦ ἔχει πάντα· εἰ δὲ μέγεθος αὐτῇ συμβεβηκὸς ἦν, ἔσχεν ἂν ἕκαστα ἐν μεγέθει. Ἡ δὲ ὕλη διὰ τοῦτο ἐν διαστήματι ἃ δέχεται λαμβάνει, ὅτι διαστήματός ἐστι δεκτική· ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μετὰ τοῦ μεγεθύνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἀντιπαραγόμενον ἴσχει τῷ ποσῷ καὶ συστελλομένου

[1] The objector whose point of view is put here is presumably the same as the " person who says that matter does not exist " mentioned at the beginning of I. 8. 15 (where there is a reference back to this passage). The objection was probably one that Plotinus had really encountered, made by Platonists who interpreted *Timaeus* 52A8 ff. (probably correctly) as meaning that Plato identified the " receptacle " with space, and who therefore rejected the Aristotelian conception of a

11. " And why is there any need of anything else for the composition of bodies besides size and all qualities? There is need of something to receive them all. This is, then, the mass. But if mass, then, presumably, size. But if it has no size, it will have nowhere to receive anything. If it is without size, what would it contribute, if it contributes neither to form and quality nor to extension and size, which appears, wherever it occurs, to come to bodies from their matter? But in general, just as actions and productions and times and movements exist in reality without having a foundation of matter in them, so there is no need for the primary bodies to have matter; they can each of them be what they are as wholes, with a more varied richness of content when they have their structure produced by the mixture of a greater number of forms: so that this sizelessness of matter is an empty name." [1] First of all, then, it is not necessary that what receives anything should be a mass, if size is not already present to it: since the soul which receives everything, contains everything together; but if size were one of its incidental attributes it would contain all individual things in their sizes. But matter does accept in extension what it receives, for this reason, that it is itself receptive of extension; just as animals and plants along with their growth in size have development of quality corresponding to their increase in quantity, and if the quantity decreased the quality

dimensionless ὕλη (cp. Bréhier's introduction to this treatise). The contention that there is no such thing as Aristotelian matter reappears in S. Basil *In Hexaem.* I. 21A–B(8E–9A); cp. S. Gregory of Nyssa *De Hom. Op.* 213C.

συσταλείη ἄν. Εἰ δ' ὅτι προϋπάρχει τι μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑποκείμενον τῷ μορφοῦντι, κἀκεῖ ἀπαιτεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἡ τούτου· τὴν δ' ἁπλῶς δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλου ἔχειν. Οὐ τοίνυν ὄγκον δεῖ εἶναι τὸν δεξόμενον τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ τῷ γενέσθαι ὄγκον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ποιότητα δέχεσθαι. Καὶ φάντασμα μὲν ἔχειν ὄγκου ὡς ἐπιτηδειότητα τούτου ὥσπερ πρώτην, κενὸν δὲ ὄγκον. Ὅθεν τινὲς ταὐτὸν τῷ κενῷ τὴν ὕλην εἰρήκασι. Φάντασμα δὲ ὄγκου λέγω, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα ὁρίσαι, ὅταν τῇ ὕλῃ προσομιλῇ, εἰς ἀοριστίαν χεῖ ἑαυτὴν οὔτε περιγράφουσα οὔτε εἰς σημεῖον ἰέναι δυναμένη· ἤδη γὰρ ὁρίζει. Διὸ οὔτε μέγα λεκτέον χωρὶς οὔτε σμικρὸν αὖ, ἀλλὰ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ οὕτως ὄγκος καὶ ἀμέγεθες οὕτως, ὅτι ὕλη ὄγκου καὶ συστελλόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρὸν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέγα οἷον ὄγκον διατρέχει· καὶ ἡ ἀοριστία αὐτῆς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὄγκος, ὑποδοχὴ μεγέθους ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐν δὲ φαντασίᾳ ἐκείνως. Καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀμεγέθων ὅσα εἴδη ὥρισται

[1] Cp. Aristotle *Physics* Δ. 214a13. Aristotle is here referring to Plato; cp. 209b11.

[2] Plato's term, as reported by Aristotle (*Physics* A4. 187a17, Γ4. 203a16; *Metaphysics* A7. 988a26).

would decrease too. But if, because in things like these a certain size is present beforehand underlying the shaping principle, [our opponent] demands it there too [in the case of prime matter], the demand is incorrect; for in the case of plants and animals the matter is not simply matter, but the matter of this particular thing; matter which is simply matter must receive size too from something else. So, then, that which is going to receive the form must not be a mass, but it must receive the rest of its qualities as well at the same time as it becomes a mass. And it does, indeed, have an imaginary appearance of mass because the first, so to speak, of its capacities is a capacity for mass, but the mass is void. For this reason some people have said that matter is identical with the void.[1] I say " an imaginary appearance of mass " because the soul, too, when it is keeping company with matter, having nothing to delimit, spills itself into indefiniteness, neither drawing a line round it nor able to arrive at a point; for if it did it would already be delimiting it. For this reason matter should not be called " great " separately or again " small " separately, but " great-and-small." [2] It is " mass " in this sense and " without size " in this sense, that it is the matter of mass, and when mass is contracted from the great to the small and expands from the small to the great, matter, so to speak, runs through the whole range of mass: and its indefiniteness is mass in this sense, that it has the capacity of receiving size in itself; but in imaginary representation it is mass in the sense we have described. For in the case of the other things without size, those of them that are forms are each of them

ἕκαστον· ὥστε οὐδαμῇ ἔννοια ὄγκου· ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος οὖσα καὶ μήπω στᾶσα παρ' αὑτῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶδος φερομένη δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε καὶ πάντη εὐάγωγος οὖσα πολλή τε γίνεται τῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀγωγῇ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἔσχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φύσιν ὄγκου.

12. Συμβάλλεται οὖν τὰ μέγιστα τοῖς σώμασι· τά τε γὰρ εἴδη τῶν σωμάτων ἐν μεγέθεσι. Περὶ δὲ μέγεθος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ τὸ μεμεγεθυσμένον· εἰ γὰρ περὶ μέγεθος, οὐ περὶ ὕλην, ὁμοίως ἂν ἀμεγέθη καὶ ἀνυπόστατα ἦν ἢ λόγοι μόνοι ἂν ἦσαν—οὗτοι δὲ περὶ ψυχήν—καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σώματα. Δεῖ οὖν ἐνταῦθα περί ἕν τι τὰ πολλά· τοῦτο δὲ μεμεγεθυσμένον· τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους. Ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὅσα μίγνυται τῷ ὕλην ἔχειν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἔρχεται καὶ οὐ δεῖται ἄλλου του περὶ ὅ, ὅτι ἕκαστον τῶν μιγνυμένων ἥκει φέρον τὴν αὐτοῦ ὕλην. Δεῖται δὲ [ὅμως] καὶ ὡς ἑνός τινος τοῦ δεξομένου ἢ ἀγγείου ἢ τόπου· ὁ δὲ τόπος ὕστερος τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πρότερον ἂν δέοιτο τὰ σώματα ὕλης. Οὐδέ, ὅτι αἱ ποιήσεις καὶ αἱ πράξεις ἄυλοι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σώματα· σύνθετα γὰρ τὰ σώματα, αἱ δὲ πράξεις οὔ. Καὶ τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ ὕλη ὅταν πράττωσι τὸ ὑποκείμενον δίδωσι μένουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰς τὸ πράττειν οὐχ αὑτὴν δίδωσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ πράτ-

clearly defined, so that there is no room anywhere in their case for a conception of mass. But matter is indefinite and not yet stable by itself, and is carried about here and there into every form, and since it is altogether adaptable becomes many by being brought into everything and becoming everything, and in this way acquires the nature of mass.

12. Matter, then, makes the greatest contribution to the formation of bodies; for the forms of bodies are in sizes. But these corporeal forms could not come into being in size but only in that which has been given size; for if in size, they would not come into being in matter and would be the same as before, without size and without underlying material substantiality, or they would only be rational principles—but these are in soul—and would not be bodies. So here in the material world the many forms must be in something which is one; and this is what has been given size; but this is different from size. We can see that this is so because in our present experience things that are mixed together come to identity by having matter, and there is no need for any other medium, because each constituent of the mixture comes bringing its own matter. All the same, there is need of some one kind of vessel or place to receive bodies; but place is posterior to matter and bodies, so that bodies would need matter before they need place. Nor, because actions and productions are without matter, are bodies without matter too: for bodies are composite, but actions are not. And matter does provide the substrate for those who act, whenever they act, by its continuing presence in themselves, but does not give itself to the action; nor

τοντες τοῦτο ζητοῦσι. Καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἄλλη πρᾶξις εἰς ἄλλην, ἵνα ἂν ἦν καὶ αὐταῖς ὕλη, ἀλλ' ὁ πράττων ἐπ' ἄλλην μεταβάλλει πρᾶξιν ἐξ ἄλλης· ὥστε ὕλην αὐτὸν εἶναι ταῖς πράξεσιν. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τῇ ποιότητι καὶ τῷ μεγέθει· ὥστε καὶ τοῖς σώμασι· καὶ οὐ κενὸν ὄνομα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι ὑποκείμενον κἂν ἀόρατον κἂν ἀμέγεθες ὑπάρχῃ. Ἢ οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰς ποιότητας φήσομεν οὐδὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων λέγοιτο ἂν οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μόνον λαμβανόμενον. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔστι καίπερ ἀμυδρῶς ὂν ἕκαστον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ὕλη, κἂν μὴ ἐναργὴς ὑπάρχῃ αἱρετὴ οὖσα οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὄμμασιν, ἄχρους γὰρ· οὔτε ἀκοῇ, οὐ γὰρ ψόφος· οὐδὲ χυμοί, διὸ οὐδὲ ῥῖνες οὐδὲ γλῶσσα. Ἆρ' οὖν ἁφῇ; Ἢ οὔ, ὅτι μηδὲ σῶμα· σώματος γὰρ ἡ ἁφή, ὅτι ἢ πυκνοῦ ἢ ἀραιοῦ, μαλακοῦ σκληροῦ, ὑγροῦ ξηροῦ· τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλην· ἀλλὰ λογισμῷ οὐκ ἐκ νοῦ, ἀλλὰ κενῶς· διὸ καὶ νόθος, ὡς εἴρηται. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σωματότης περὶ αὐτήν· εἰ μὲν λόγος ἡ σωματότης, ἕτερος αὐτῆς· αὕτη οὖν ἄλλο· εἰ δ' ἤδη ποιήσασα καὶ οἷον κραθεῖσα, σῶμα φανερῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐχ ὕλη μόνον.

13. Εἰ δὲ ποιότης τις τὸ ὑποκείμενον κοινή τις οὖσα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν στοιχείων, πρῶτον μὲν τίς

[1] In ch. 10 (the reference to the *Timaeus*).

do those who are acting even want it to. And one action does not change into another—if it did then actions, too, would have matter—but the person acting changes from one action to another, so that he himself is matter to his actions. So, then, matter is necessary both to quality and to size, and therefore to bodies; and it is not an empty name but it is something underlying, even if it is invisible and sizeless. If we do deny the existence of matter we shall by the same argument be prevented from asserting the existence of qualities and size; for everything of this kind could be said to be nothing taken alone by itself. But if these have an existence, though in each case an obscure one, still more would matter exist, though it is not obvious since it is not by the senses that it is apprehended: not by the eyes, for it is without colour; not by the hearing, since it makes no noise; nor has it taste or smell, so it is not nostrils or tongue that perceive it. Is it touch, then? No, because it is not a body, for touch apprehends body, because it apprehends density and rarity, hardness and softness, wetness and dryness; and none of these apply to matter. It is apprehended by a process of reasoning, which does not come from mind but works emptily; so it is spurious reasoning, as has been said.[1] But even corporeality does not belong to it; for if corporeality is a rational formative principle it is different from matter, and so matter is something else; but if corporeality has already come into action and is so to speak mixed, it would clearly be body and not matter alone.

13. If the substrate is to be some quality, a common one which exists in each and every one of the

αὕτη λεκτέον. Ἔπειτα πῶς ποιότης ὑποκείμενον ἔσται; Πῶς δὲ ἐν ἀμεγέθει ποιὸν θεωρηθήσεται μὴ ἔχον ὕλην μηδὲ μέγεθος; Ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν ὡρισμένη ἡ ποιότης, πῶς ὕλη; Εἰ δ' ἀόριστόν τι, οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ ζητουμένη ὕλη. Τί οὖν κωλύει ἄποιον μὲν εἶναι τῷ τῶν ἄλλων μηδεμιᾶς τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει μετέχειν, αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ μηδεμιᾶς μετέχειν ποιὰν εἶναι ἰδιότητα πάντως τινὰ ἔχουσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρουσαν, οἷον στέρησίν τινα ἐκείνων; Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐστερημένος ποιός· οἷον ὁ τυφλός. Εἰ οὖν στέρησις τούτων περὶ αὐτήν, πῶς οὐ ποιά; Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὅλως στέρησις περὶ αὐτήν, ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἴ γε δὴ καὶ στέρησις ποιόν τι. Ὁ δὴ ταῦτα λέγων τί ἄλλο ἢ ποιὰ καὶ ποιότητας πάντα ποιεῖ; Ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποσότης ποιότης ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ οὐσία δέ. Εἰ δὲ ποιόν, πρόσεστι ποιότης. Γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ μὴ ποιὸν ποιὸν ποιεῖν. Εἰ δ', ὅτι ἕτερον, ποιόν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοετερότης, οὐδ' ὡς ποιόν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ ποιότης ποιά· εἰ δ' ἕτερον μόνον, οὐχ ἑαυτῇ, ἀλλ' ἑτερότητι ἕτερον καὶ ταυτότητι ταὐτόν. Οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιόν, ἀλλ' ἐρημία ποιότητος ἢ ἄλλου, ὡς ἡ ἀψοφία οὐ ψόφου ἢ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου· ἄρσις γὰρ ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ

[1] I.e. you cannot classify soundlessness as a special sort of sound or any other sort of positive quality; a quality is always something positive, a privation, never.

elements, first of all it must be stated what this quality is. Next, how can a quality be a substrate? How is a quality in something without size to be conceived, when it does not have matter or size? Then, if the quality is defined, how is it matter? But if it is something indefinite, it is not a quality but the substrate and the matter we were looking for. "What, then, prevents it from being something qualified by participating, by its own nature, in none of the other qualities, but by this very fact of participating in none of them being qualified, since it has a thoroughly distinctive characteristic, different from the others, a sort of privation of those other qualities? For anyone who is deprived has a quality—a blind man, for instance. If then privation of the qualities belongs to it, how is it not qualified? But if complete privation belongs to it, it is qualified still more, if privation, too, is really something qualified." But what else is the person who says this doing than making everything qualified and qualities? So that even quantity would be a quality, and substance too. But if something is qualified, quality is present to it. But it is absurd to make qualified what is other than the qualified and so not qualified. But if it is qualified because it is other, if it is absolute otherness, it is not so as being qualified, since quality [the form] is not qualified; but if it is simply other, it is not so by itself, but other by otherness and the same by sameness. And privation is certainly not quality or qualified, but lack of quality or of something else, as soundlessness does not belong to sound or anything else [positive];[1] for privation is a taking away, but qualification is a matter of positive assertion. The

ποιὸν ἐν καταφάσει. Ἥ τε ἰδιότης τῆς ὕλης οὐ μορφή· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ποιὰ εἶναι μηδ' εἶδός τι ἔχειν· ἄτοπον δή, ὅτι μὴ ποιά, ποιὰν λέγειν καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ, ὅτι ἀμέγεθες, αὐτῷ τούτῳ μέγεθος ἔχειν. Ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἰδιότης αὐτῆς οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ οὐ πρόσκειται ἡ ἰδιότης, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτῶν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐ μόνον ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ καί τι ἕκαστον ὡς εἶδος, αὕτη δὲ πρεπόντως ἂν λέγοιτο μόνον ἄλλο· τάχα δὲ ἄλλα, ἵνα μὴ τῷ "ἄλλο" ἑνικῶς ὁρίσῃς, ἀλλὰ τῷ "ἄλλα" τὸ ἀόριστον ἐνδείξῃ.

14. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον. πότερα στέρησις, ἢ περὶ αὐτῆς ἡ στέρησις. Ὁ τοίνυν λέγων λόγος ὑποκειμένῳ μὲν ἓν ἄμφω, λόγῳ δὲ δύο, δίκαιος ἦν διδάσκειν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἑκατέρου ὄντινα δεῖ ἀποδιδόναι, τῆς μὲν ὕλης ὃς ὁριεῖται αὐτὴν οὐδὲν προσαπτόμενος τῆς στερήσεως, τῆς τε αὖ στερήσεως ὡσαύτως. Ἢ γὰρ οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἑκάτερον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ἢ θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ μόνον ὁποτερονοῦν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερον χωρὶς καὶ οὐκ ἐπιζητεῖ οὐδέτερον, δύο ἔσται ἄμφω καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕτερον στερήσεως, κἂν συμβεβήκῃ αὐτῇ ἡ στέρησις. Δεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ δυνάμει ἐνορᾶσθαι θάτερον. Εἰ δὲ ὡς ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ καὶ τὸ

[1] To say that something is "other" than something else is a way of helping to define it, to show it as a distinctive unity; this remarkable plural is an attempt to exclude all definition, to speak of matter as absolutely indefinite and incoherent with no sort of distinctive unity.

[2] Cp. for Aristotle's view here criticised *Physics* A9. 192a2 ff.

distinctive characteristic, too, of matter is not shape: for it consists in not being qualified and not having any form; it is surely fantastic to call it qualified because it has no quality; it is like saying that because it is sizeless, by this very fact it has a size. So, then, its distinctive characteristic is not something else other than what it is; it is not an addition to it but rather consists in its relationship to other things, its being other than they. Other things are not only other but each of them is something as form, but this would appropriately be called nothing but other; or perhaps others, so as not to define it as a unity by the term "other" but to show its indefiniteness by calling it "others."[1]

14. But we must investigate this further point, whether it is privation or the subject of privation. Now the argument which says that in the substrate both are one, but that in rational definition they are two,[2] is under an obligation to instruct us what rational definition of each of these two things one must give, one of matter which will define it without applying to it any term belonging to privation, and an exactly similar one of privation. For there are three possibilities; neither of them is contained in the definition of the other, or both are in each other's definitions, or one only is in the definition of the other, whichever one it is. If, then, each of the two things is separate and neither of them requires the other, the pair of them will be two distinct things and matter will be other than privation, even if privation is incidentally predicated of it. But, then, the other must not appear even potentially in the definition of one of them. But if they are related as the snub

σιμόν, καὶ οὕτω διπλοῦν ἑκάτερον καὶ δύο. Εἰ δὲ ὡς τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ θερμότης, ἐν μὲν τῷ πυρὶ τῆς θερμότητος οὔσης, ἐν δὲ τῇ θερμότητι οὐ λαμβανομένου τοῦ πυρός, καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὕτω στέρησις, ὡς τὸ πῦρ θερμόν, οἷον εἶδος αὐτῆς ἔσται ἡ στέρησις, τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο, ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι. Καὶ οὐδ' οὕτως ἕν. Ἆρα οὖν οὕτως ἓν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, δύο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τῆς στερήσεως οὐ σημαινούσης τι παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ οἷον ἀπόφασις ἡ στέρησις τῶν ὄντων; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι οὐκ ὄν, οὐ γὰρ προστίθησιν ἡ ἀπόφασις, ἀλλά φησιν οὐκ εἶναι· καὶ οὕτω στέρησις ὡς οὐκ ὄν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ὄν, ὅτι μὴ τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ὄν τί ἐστι, δύο οἱ λόγοι, ὁ μὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἁπτόμενος, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα σχέσιν δηλῶν. Ἢ ὁ μὲν τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὁ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, ὁ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως εἰ τὸ ἀόριστον αὐτῆς δηλοῖ, τάχα ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῆς ἐφάπτοιτο· πλὴν ἕν γε ἑκατέρως τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, λόγῳ δὲ δύο. Εἰ μέντοι τῷ ἀορίστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀποίῳ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ταὐτόν, πῶς ἔτι δύο οἱ λόγοι;

15. Πάλιν οὖν ζητητέον, εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ φύσει καὶ πῶς

[1] A stock Aristotelian example, cp., e.g., *Metaphysics* Z5. 1030b30–31. Was this philosophical snub nose originally Socrates's?

nose is to snubness,[1] in this way also they are each of them double and each two things. But if they are related as fire and heat, where heat is in fire but fire is not included in the definition of heat, and matter is privation in the way in which fire is hot, privation will be a sort of form of matter, and the substrate will be something else, which must be the matter. And they will not be one thing in this way either. Is, then, this unity in substrate and duality in definition to be understood in this way, that privation does not indicate that anything is there but that it is not there; privation being a kind of denial of realities? It would be just as if someone said " not being," for his denial does not make any addition but asserts that something does not exist; and it would be privation in this way, as not existing. If then it is non-existent because it is not being, but some other existing thing different from being, the definitions are two, one comprising the substrate, and that of privation making clear its relationship to the other existing things. Or perhaps the definition of matter shows its relationship to other things and that of the substrate also shows its relationship to other things, but that of privation, if it makes clear the indefiniteness of matter, might actually grasp it in itself [and not only its relationship to other things]; but in this case they are both one in substratum, but two in rational definition. But if privation, by being indefinite and unlimited and without qualities, is the same thing as matter, how do the definitions still remain two?

15. We must enquire, therefore, again whether the unlimited and indefinite are incidentally predicated

συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰ στέρησις συμβέβηκεν. Εἰ δὴ ὅσα μὲν ἀριθμοὶ καὶ λόγοι ἀπειρίας ἔξω—ὅροι γὰρ καὶ τάξεις καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρὰ τούτων, τάττει δὲ ταῦτα οὐ τὸ τεταγμένον οὐδὲ τάξις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τὸ ταττόμενον παρὰ τὸ τάττον, τάττει δὲ τὸ πέρας καὶ ὅρος καὶ λόγος—ἀνάγκη τὸ ταττόμενον καὶ ὁριζόμενον τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι. Τάττεται δὲ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὅσα δὲ μὴ ὕλη τῷ μετέχειν ἢ ὕλης λόγον ἔχειν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὴν ὕλην τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρον, ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῇ. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμβαῖνόν τῳ δεῖ λόγον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον οὐ λόγος· ἔπειτα τίνι ὄντι τὸ ἄπειρον συμβήσεται; Πέρατι καὶ πεπερασμένῳ. Ἀλλ' οὐ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ πέρας ἡ ὕλη. Καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον δὲ προσελθὸν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν· οὐ τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἄπειρον· αὐτὴ τοίνυν τὸ ἄπειρον. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ εἴη ἂν γεννηθὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπειρίας ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ ἀεί, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀπειρίας ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος. Πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; Ἢ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Καὶ τί διαφέρει; Ὡς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ εἴδωλον. Ἐλαττόνως οὖν ἄπειρον

of another nature, and how they are incidental attributes, and if privation is an incidental attribute. Now if all things that are number and proportion are outside limitlessness—for they are bounds and orders, and other things derive their being set in order from them, but it is not being ordered or order that orders them, but that which is set in order is different from that which orders it, and that which orders is limit and bound and proportion—that which is set in order and bounded must be the unlimited. But matter is set in order, as are all things which are not matter in so far as they participate in it or are reckoned as matter; so matter must be the unlimited, but not unlimited in the sense that it is so incidentally and that the unlimited is an incidental attribute of it. For, first, the incidental attribute of anything must be a rational concept; but the unlimited is not a concept. Then what will the subject be of which the unlimited is incidentally predicated? Limit and something limited. But matter is not something limited, nor is it limit. And the unlimited when it comes to that which is limited will destroy its nature. So the unlimited is not an incidental attribute of matter; matter itself, then is the unlimited. For in the intelligible world, too, matter is the unlimited, and it would be produced from the unlimitedness or the power or the everlastingness of the One; unlimitedness is not in the One, but the One produces it. How, then, is matter both there and here? The unlimited is double, too. And what is the difference between the two unlimiteds? They differ as the archetype differs from the image. Is the unlimited here, then, less unlimited? More, rather;

τοῦτο; Ἢ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γὰρ εἴδωλον πεφευγὸς τὸ εἶναι ⟨καὶ⟩[1] τὸ ἀληθές, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. Ἡ γὰρ ἀπειρία ἐν τῷ ἧττον ὁρισθέντι μᾶλλον· τὸ γὰρ ἧττον ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ κακῷ. Τὸ ἐκεῖ οὖν μᾶλλον ὂν εἴδωλον ὡς ἄπειρον, τὸ δ' ἐνταῦθα ἧττον, ὅσῳ πέφευγε τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, εἰς δὲ εἰδώλου κατερρύη φύσιν, ἀληθεστέρως ἄπειρον. Τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι; Ἢ ὅπου λόγος καὶ ὕλη ἄλλο ἑκάτερον, ὅπου δὲ ὕλη μόνον ἢ ταὐτὸν λεκτέον ἢ ὅλως, ὃ καὶ βέλτιον, οὐκ εἶναι ἐνθάδε τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι· λόγος γὰρ ἔσται, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, ἵν' ᾖ ἄπειρον. Ἄπειρον μὲν δὴ παρ' αὐτῆς τὴν ὕλην λεκτέον ἀντιτάξει τῇ πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Καὶ γάρ, ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὢν ἐστι λόγος, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀντιτεταγμένην τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσαν λεκτέον ἄπειρον.

16. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἑτερότητι ταὐτόν; Ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μορίῳ ἑτερότητος ἀντιταττομένῳ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα κυρίως, ἃ δὴ λόγοι. Διὸ καὶ μὴ ὂν οὕτω τι ὂν καὶ στερήσει ταὐτόν, εἰ ἡ στέρησις ἀντίθεσις πρὸς τὰ ἐν λόγῳ ὄντα. Οὐκοῦν φθαρήσεται ἡ στέρησις προσελθόντος τοῦ οὗ στέρησις; Οὐδαμῶς·

[1] ⟨καὶ⟩ Harder, H-S².

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Physics* Γ5. 204a23 ff.

for in so far as it is an image which has escaped from being and truth, it is more unlimited. For unlimitedness is present in a higher degree in that which is less defined; and less in the good is more in the bad. That which is there, which has a greater degree of existence, is unlimited [only] as an image, that which is here has a less degree of existence, and in proportion as it has escaped from being and truth, and sunk down into the nature of an image, it is more truly unlimited. Are, then, the unlimited and essential unlimitedness the same?[1] Where there is a formative principle and matter the two are different, but where there is only matter they must be said to be the same, or, which is better, that there is no essential unlimitedness here; for it will be a rational formative principle, the absence of which from the unlimited is the condition of its being unlimited. So matter must be called unlimited of itself, by opposition to the forming principle; and just as the forming principle is forming principle without being anything else, so the matter which is set over against the forming principle by reason of its unlimitedness must be called unlimited without being anything else.

16. Is matter, then, the same thing as otherness? No, rather it is the same thing as the part of otherness which is opposed to the things which in the full and proper sense exist, that is to say rational formative principles. Therefore, though it is non-existent, it has a certain sort of existence in this way, and is the same thing as privation, if privation is opposition to the things that exist in rational form. Will privation, then, be destroyed by the accession of that of which

ὑποδοχὴ γὰρ ἕξεως οὐχ ἕξις, ἀλλὰ στέρησις, καὶ πέρατος οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον οὐδὲ τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἄπειρον. Πῶς οὖν [οὐκ] ἀπολεῖ αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀπείρου προσελθὸν τὸ πέρας καὶ ταῦτα οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀπείρου; Ἢ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἄπειρον, ἀνῄρει· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σῴζει αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ εἶναι· ὃ γὰρ πέφυκεν, εἰς ἐνέργειαν καὶ τελείωσιν ἄγει, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄσπαρτον, ὅταν σπείρηται· καὶ ὅταν τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος † καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θηλύνεται· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν· ὅ ἐστι μᾶλλον γίγνεται. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ κακὸν ἡ ὕλη μεταλαμβάνουσα ἀγαθοῦ; Ἢ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐδεήθη· οὐ γὰρ εἶχε. Καὶ γὰρ ὃ μὲν ἂν δέηταί τινος, τὸ δ' ἔχῃ, μέσον ἂν ἴσως γίγνοιτο ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, εἰ ἰσάζοι πως ἐπ' ἄμφω· ὃ δ' ἂν μηδὲν ἔχῃ ἅτε ἐν πενίᾳ ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ πενία ὄν, ἀνάγκη κακὸν εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ πλούτου πενία τοῦτο [οὐδὲ ἰσχύος], ἀλλὰ πενία μὲν φρονήσεως, πενία δὲ ἀρετῆς, κάλλους, ἰσχύος, μορφῆς, εἴδους, ποιοῦ. Πῶς οὖν οὐ δυσειδές; Πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη αἰσχρόν; Πῶς δὲ οὐ πάντη κακόν; Ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἐκεῖ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἐπέκεινα ὄντος. Ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὄν. Οὐκ ὂν ἄρα αὐτή, ἕτερον ὄν, πρὸς τῷ καλῷ τοῦ ὄντος.

[1] L. A. Post suggests that the MSS text can be accepted here if we understand <σπέρματι σπείρηται>: this is not perhaps too much of an ellipsis for Plotinus, and is certainly the best suggestion so far.

it is privation? Not at all; for that which receives a state is not a state but a privation, and the recipient of limit is not what is limited or limit, but the unlimited and that in so far as it is unlimited. How, then, can limit, when it has come to it, possibly destroy the nature of the absolutely unlimited, especially when it is not only incidentally unlimited? If it was quantitatively unlimited, limit would do away with it; but as it is, it does not do so; on the other hand, it keeps it in being; for it brings what it naturally is to actuality and perfection, like the unsown field when it is sown, and as when the female conceives by the male,[1] and does not lose its femaleness but becomes still more female: and that is, becomes more what it is. Is matter, then, also evil because it participates in good? Rather, because it lacks it; for this means that it does not have it. Anything which lacks something, but has something else, might perhaps hold a middle position between good and evil, if its lack and its having more or less balance; but that which has nothing because it is in want, or rather is want, must necessarily be evil. For this thing is not want of wealth but want of thought, want of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, quality. Must it not then be ugly? Must it not be utterly vile, utterly evil? But the matter There is something real, for that which is before it is beyond being. Here, however, that which is before matter is real, and so matter itself is not real; it is something other, over and above the excellence of real being.

II. 5. ON WHAT EXISTS POTENTIALLY AND WHAT ACTUALLY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise (No. 25 in Porphyry's chronological order) is, like most of II. 4, concerned with the close discussion of technical Aristotelian concepts: it is less explicitly critical of Aristotle than the preceding treatise, but the conception of matter which it presents is Plotinus's own and not that of Aristotle. The main purpose of the treatise is in fact to show clearly what Plotinus means by matter in the intelligible world, and how he conceives of matter in the sense-world as potentiality which never can be actualised, essential negation, "that which is really unreal"; this paradoxical conception is stated more clearly, perhaps, in the last chapter of this treatise than anywhere else in the *Enneads*.

Synopsis

What is meant by potential and actual existence, and by potentiality and actuality; a discussion designed to bring out clearly the meaning of these Aristotelian concepts (ch. 1–2). How these concepts are to be applied to the intelligible world; there is no matter there in the sense of a principle of change, but the something like matter which our analysis detects is form, one aspect of the unchanging actuality (ch. 3). How they apply to the matter of the sense-world; it is a potentiality which never becomes or can become anything actual (chs. 4–5).

II. 5. (25) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙ

1. Λέγεται τὸ μὲν δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι· λέγεται δέ τι καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. Σκεπτέον οὖν τί τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τί τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ ἕτερον ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι; Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει, δῆλον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς, σκεπτέον. Ἢ ἐκεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον· καὶ εἰ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει, τὸ δυνάμει μόνον ἀεί, κἂν ἀεὶ ᾖ, οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι εἰς ἐνέργειαν ⟨τῷ⟩ οὐ τῷ χρόνῳ [1] ἐξείργεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει πρῶτον λεκτέον, εἰ δὴ τὸ δυνάμει δεῖ μὴ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει μηδενὸς εἶναι. Οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ μηδ' ἔμελλε μηθὲν ἔσεσθαι μεθ' ὃ ἦν μηδ' ἐνεδέχετο

[1] ⟨τῷ⟩ οὐ τῷ χρόνῳ Theiler: οὐ τῶ χρόνω codd: τῷ οὐ χρόνῳ H-S[1]: † οὐ τῷ χρόνῳ H-S[2].

[1] I accept Theiler's emendation and interpretation here: see his note *ad loc.* (Plotins Schriften II. 6. p. 431).

II. 5. ON WHAT EXISTS POTENTIALLY AND WHAT ACTUALLY

1. One speaks of potential and actual existence; and one speaks of actuality as something in the class of existing things. We must consider therefore what potential and what actual existence is. Is actuality the same as actual existence, and if anything is actuality is it also actually existent, or are the two different, and is it not necessary for that which is actually existing to be actuality? Further, it is clear that there is potential existence in the world of things perceived by the senses; but we must consider whether it is also in the intelligible world. Now, in that world there is only actual existence; even if there is potential existence, it is always only potential, and even if it always exists, it would never come to actuality because it is excluded from it by the fact that it is not in time.[1] But first we must say what potential existence is, if, as is indeed the case, we must not speak of potential existence simply; for it is not possible to exist potentially without being potentially anything. For instance, " the bronze is potentially statue ";[2] for if nothing was going to come out of a thing or come upon it, and it was not going to be anything subsequent to what it was and there was no possibility of its becoming anything,

[1] Aristotle, *Physics* Γ. 1. 201a30.

γενέσθαι, ἦν ἂν ὃ ἦν μόνον. Ὃ δὲ ἦν, ἤδη παρῆν καὶ οὐκ ἔμελλε· τί οὖν ἐδύνατο ἄλλο μετὰ τὸ παρὸν αὐτό; Οὐ τοίνυν ἦν ἂν δυνάμει. Δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ δυνάμει τι ὂν ἄλλο ἤδη τῷ τι καὶ ἄλλο μετ' αὐτὸ δύνασθαι, ἤτοι μένον μετὰ τοῦ ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖν ἢ παρέχον αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ὃ δύναται φθαρὲν αὐτό, δυνάμει λέγεσθαι· ἄλλως γὰρ τὸ "δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ὁ χαλκός," ἄλλως τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ πῦρ. Τοιοῦτον δὴ ὂν τὸ δυνάμει ἆρα καὶ δύναμις λέγοιτο ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἐσόμενον, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς δύναμις τοῦ ἀνδριάντος; Ἢ, εἰ μὲν ἡ δύναμις κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβάνοιτο, οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν λαμβανομένη λέγοιτο ἂν δυνάμει. Εἰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐνέργειαν, εἴη ἂν καὶ δύναμις δυνάμει. Βέλτιον δὲ καὶ σαφέστερον τὸ μὲν δυνάμει πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν λέγειν. Τὸ μὲν δὴ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ ὑποκείμενόν τι πάθεσι καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ εἴδεσιν, ἃ μέλλει δέχεσθαι καὶ πέφυκεν· ἢ καὶ σπεύδει ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω καὶ λυμαντικὰ αὐτῶν, ὧν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν ἄλλο.

it would be what it was alone. But what it was, was there already, and was not going to be. What other potentiality, then, would it have after what was already there? It would not be potential at all. So one must speak of anything which is potential as already potentially something else by being able to become something after what it already is, either remaining along with its production of that other thing, or giving itself up to that which it is able to become and being destroyed itself; for "the bronze is potentially statue" in one sense, the water is potentially bronze and the air, fire, in another. Well, then, if this is the sort of thing which potential existence is, can it be called potentiality in regard to that which it is going to be? For instance, is the bronze the potentiality of the statue? If potentiality is taken in the sense of being able to make, certainly not; for potentiality understood in the sense of being able to make would not be described as existing potentially. But if the term "potential existence" is used not only in relation to actual existence but also in relation to actuality, then potentiality, too, would exist potentially. But it is better and clearer to use "potential existence" in relation to "actual existence," and "potentiality" in relation to "actuality." Potential existence in this sense is like something which underlies affections and shapes and forms, which it is going to receive and naturally disposed to receive: indeed, it even strives to come to them, and attains some of them with the best results, others with worse results, spoiling the individual things, of which each is actually something other [than what it is potentially].

2. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ὕλης σκεπτέον, εἰ ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ πρὸς ἃ μορφοῦται, ἢ οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ ὅλως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ λέγομεν δυνάμει λαβόντα τὸ εἶδος καὶ μένοντα αὐτὰ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεται, ἢ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ κατὰ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος λεχθήσεται ἀντιτιθεμένου μόνον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς τὸν δυνάμει ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ κατηγορουμένου κατ' ἐκείνου, καθ' οὗ τὸ δυνάμει ἀνδριὰς ἐλέγετο. Εἰ δὴ οὕτως, οὐ τὸ δυνάμει γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος πρότερον ἐγένετο τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὕστερον. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τὸ δ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ. Καὶ τοῦτο μέν, εἰ ἑτέρα γίγνοιτο οὐσία, οἷον ἐκ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάς· ἄλλη γὰρ οὐσία ὡς τὸ συναμφότερον ὁ ἀνδριάς. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅλως οὐ μενόντων φανερόν, ὡς τὸ δυνάμει παντάπασιν ἕτερον ἦν. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁ δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται, ἐνταῦθα τὸ δυνάμει πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό; Ὁ γὰρ δυνάμει Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ σοφός. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ἐπιστήμων; Δυνάμει γὰρ ἦν ἐπιστήμων. Ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁ ἀμαθὴς ἐπιστήμων. Οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἀμαθὴς δυνάμει ἐπιστήμων,

2. We must also consider the question of matter, whether it exists potentially in relation to the things which are given shape and is something else actually, or whether it is nothing actually; and in general, whether the other things which we say exist potentially come to exist actually when they receive the form while remaining themselves, or whether actual existence will be predicated of the statue, and the actual statue only opposed to the potential statue, but the predicate " actual " will not be applied to that of which the term " potential statue " was used. If this is so, it is not that which exists potentially which comes to exist actually, but the subsequent actually existing thing comes into being out of the prior potentially existing thing. Again, the actually existing thing is the compound of matter and form, not the matter on the one side, and on the other, the form imposed upon it. This is so when a different substance comes into existence, for instance, a statue from bronze; for the statue, as being the compound of matter and form is a different substance. And in the case of things of which no trace remains, it is obvious that what existed potentially was altogether different [from the actuality]. But when the man who is potentially educated becomes actually educated, surely in this case what existed potentially is the same as what exists actually. For it is the same Socrates who is potentially and actually wise. Then, is this true when the man without knowledge becomes a man of knowledge? For he was a man of knowledge potentially. It is only incidentally that the unlearned man becomes a man of knowledge. For it was not in so far as he was unlearned that he

ἀλλὰ συμβεβήκει αὐτῷ ἀμαθεῖ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσα τὸ δυνάμει ἦν ἥπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμων. Ἔτι οὖν σῴζει τὸ δυνάμει, καὶ δυνάμει γραμματικὸς ἤδη γραμματικὸς ὤν;
Ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον· ἐκεῖ μὲν δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐχούσης τὸ εἶδος. Εἰ οὖν ἐστι τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ συναμφότερον, ὁ ἀνδριάς, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τί ἂν λέγοιτο; Ἢ οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καθ' ἣν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μόνον δυνάμει, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος λέγειν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλην ἐνέργειαν τάχα κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιμεν, τὴν ἀντίθετον τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ἐπαγούσῃ ἐνέργειαν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχειν παρ' ἄλλου, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ὃ δύναται παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἕξις καὶ ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν λεγομένη ἐνέργεια, ἀνδρία καὶ τὸ ἀνδρίζεσθαι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως.

3. Οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ταῦτα προείρηται, νῦν λεκτέον, ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς πῶς ποτε τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λέγεται καὶ εἰ ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον ἢ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον καὶ εἰ ἐνέργεια πάντα καὶ εἰ τὸ δυνάμει κἀκεῖ. Εἰ δὴ μήτε ὕλη ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾗ τὸ δυνάμει, μήτε τι μέλλει τῶν

was potentially a man of knowledge, but it was incidental to him that he was unlearned, and his soul being appropriately disposed was the potential existence, and by it he became a man of knowledge. So, then, does he still keep the potential existence, and is he potentially educated when he is already educated? There is no obstacle to this, and we can put it in a different way: before he is educated he is only potentially educated, when he is educated the potentiality has its form. If, then, the potential existence is the substratum, and the actual existence the compound, the statue, what should the form imposed on the bronze be called? It is not unreasonable to call the shape and form, by which the statue exists actually and not only potentially, the actuality, that is, not simply actuality but the actuality of this particular thing: since we might also apply the term "actuality" more properly to something else, the actuality contrasted with the potentiality that brings it to the thing. For the potential existence has its actual existence from something else, but for the potentiality what it is capable of by itself is its actuality; for instance, a moral disposition and the activity called after it, courage and courageous behaviour. So much, then, for this.

3. Now we must speak about the question to which this preliminary discussion was directed, what is really meant by actual existence in the intelligible world, and whether each individual intelligible reality is only actually existent or whether it is also actuality, and if they are all together actuality, and if there is potential existence There too. If, of course, there is no matter there in which potential existence could

ἐκεῖ, ὃ μὴ ἤδη ἐστί, μηδ' ἔτι μεταβάλλον εἰς ἄλλο ἢ μένον ἕτερόν τι γεννᾷ ἢ ἐξιστάμενον ἑαυτοῦ ἔδωκεν ἄλλῳ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, τῶν ὄντων καὶ αἰῶνα, οὐ χρόνον ἐχόντων. Εἴ τις οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν τοὺς τιθεμένους κἀκεῖ ὕλην ἔροιτο, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖ τὸ δυνάμει κατὰ τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἐκεῖ—καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλ' ἔσται ἐφ' ἑκάστου τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος, τὸ δὲ συναμφότερον—τί ἐροῦσιν; Ἢ καὶ τὸ ὡς ὕλη ἐκεῖ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος ὂν πρὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη ὕλη. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ δυνάμει; Ἢ οὔ· εἶδος γὰρ ἦν αὐτῆς καὶ οὐκ εἰς ὕστερον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὐ χωρίζεται δὲ ἀλλ' ἢ λόγῳ, καὶ οὕτως ὕλην ἔχον, ὡς διπλοῦν νοούμενον, ἄμφω δὲ μία φύσις· οἷον καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ τὸ πέμπτον σῶμα ἄυλον εἶναι. Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς πῶς ἐροῦμεν; Δυνάμει γὰρ ζῷον, ὅταν μήπω, μέλλῃ δέ, καὶ μουσικὴ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα γίνεται οὐκ ἀεὶ οὖσα· ὥστε καὶ ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ δυνάμει. Ἢ οὐ

[1] Aristotle never actually says this: it may perhaps be taken as implicit in *De Caelo* A. 3. 270a–b, where he argues that the celestial substance "the body that moves in a circle" must be ageless, impassible, without any sort of quantitative or qualitative change. Possibly Plotinus depends here on some Peripatetic commentator on this passage, who drew the conclusion that Aristotle thought that the quintessence

be, and nothing there is going to be that which it is not already, and nothing, either in the process of changing into another thing, or remaining what it is, produces anything else, or, going out of itself, gives another thing existence in its place: then there will be nothing there in which potential existence can be, among things which really exist and possess eternity, not time. If, then, anyone were to ask those who posit matter there, too, in the intelligible world, if there is not potential existence There, too, in respect of the matter There—for even if matter exists There in a different way, there will be in each thing something like matter, something like form, and the compound of the two—what will they say? The answer is that the something like matter There is form, since the soul too, which is form, can be matter to something else. Then does it exist potentially in relation to that something else? No; for then the something else would be its form, and the form does not come to it afterwards and is not separated except by rational abstraction: it has matter in the sense that it is thought of as double, but both form and matter are one nature; just as Aristotle, too, says that his quintessence is without matter.[1] But how are we to speak about the soul? For it is potentially a living being, when it is not one yet but is going to be, and is potentially musical, and so with everything else that it becomes and is not always; so that there is potential existence also in the intelligible world. No, the soul is not these things potentially,

was without matter because he states so clearly that it is absolutely unchanging, and there is therefore no need to postulate any matter in it to be the substrate of change.

δυνάμει ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ δύναμις ἡ ψυχὴ τούτων. Τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ πῶς ἐκεῖ; Ἆρα ὡς ὁ ἀνδριὰς τὸ συναμφότερον ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀπείληφεν; Ἢ ὅτι εἶδος ἕκαστον καὶ τέλειον ὅ ἐστι. Νοῦς γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ οἷόν τε νοεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοεῖν—ἄλλου γὰρ ἂν προτέρου τοῦ οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως δέοιτο—ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν. Τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει βούλεται ἑτέρου ἐπελθόντος εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγεσθαι, ἵνα ἐνεργείᾳ γίνηταί τι, ὃ δ' αὐτὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτο ἐνέργεια ἂν εἴη. Πάντα οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐνέργεια· ἔχει γὰρ ὃ δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ παρ' αὑτῶν καὶ ἀεί· καὶ ψυχὴ δὴ οὕτως ἡ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ νοητῷ. Καὶ ἡ ἐν ὕλῃ δὲ ἄλλη ἐνέργεια· οἷον ἡ φυτική· ἐνέργεια γὰρ καὶ αὕτη ὅ ἐστιν. Ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν πάντα καὶ οὕτως, ἐνέργεια δὲ πάντα; Ἢ πῶς; Εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἄγρυπνος εἶναι καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ ἀρίστη, αἱ κάλλισται ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ ἐνέργειαι. Καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα καὶ ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα καὶ ζωαὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐκεῖ τόπος ἐστὶ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ.

4. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα δυνάμει τί ἐστιν, ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἤδη ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει εἶναι λέγεται· περὶ δὲ τῆς

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 52B7. Plotinus speaks of the "sleepless light" in Intellect in his fine description of its changeless, eternal life and thought in VI. 2. 8. 7.

it is the potentiality of these things. But how are we to understand actual existence there? Is it like the way in which the statue, the compound of matter and form, exists actually, because each intelligible thing has already received its form? Rather because each of them is form and is perfectly what it is. For intellect does not move from a potentiality consisting in being able to think to an actuality of thinking—otherwise it would need another prior principle which does not move from potentiality to actuality—but the whole is in it. For potential existence wants to be brought to actuality by the coming to it of something else, so that it may become something actually, but that which has itself from itself unchanging identity, this will be actuality. So all the primary beings are actuality; for they have what they need to have from themselves and for ever: and soul is in this state too, the soul which is not in matter but in the intelligible. But the soul in matter, too, is another actuality—the growth-soul for instance; for this, too, is an actuality, what it is. But, granted that everything there exists actually in this way, is everything there actuality? Why not? Certainly, if it is well said that that nature there is sleepless,[1] and life, and the best life, the noblest actualities would be there. All things there, then, both exist actually and are actualities, and all are lives, and the region there is a region of life and the origin and spring of true soul and intellect.

4. Everything else, then, which is potentially something, has actual existence as something else; and this something else which already exists is said to exist potentially in relation to another thing.

λεγομένης εἶναι ὕλης, ἣν πάντα δυνάμει λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα, πῶς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι; Ἤδη γὰρ οὐ πάντα τὰ ὄντα δυνάμει ἂν εἴη. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων, ἀνάγκη μηδ' ὂν αὐτὴν εἶναι. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ τι εἴη μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων οὖσα; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τούτων, ἃ γίνεται ἐπ' αὐτῆς, ἄλλο δέ τι οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι, εἴπερ μηδὲ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ. Ἥι μὲν δὴ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ταῦτα δὲ ὄντα, μὴ ὂν ἂν εἴη. Οὐ μὲν δὴ ἀνείδεόν τι φανταζομένη εἶδος ἂν εἴη· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐν ἐκείνοις ἂν[1] ἀριθμηθείη. Μὴ ὂν ἄρα καὶ ταύτῃ ἔσται. Ἐπ' ἄμφω ἄρα μὴ ὂν οὖσα πλειόνως μὴ ὂν ἔσται. Εἰ δὴ πέφευγε μὲν τὴν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων φύσιν, οὐ δύναται δὲ ἐφικέσθαι οὐδὲ τῶν ψευδῶς λεγομένων εἶναι, ὅτι μηδὲ ἴνδαλμα λόγου ἐστὶν ὡς ταῦτα, ἐν τίνι τῷ εἶναι ἂν ἁλοίη; Εἰ δὲ ἐν μηδενὶ τῷ εἶναι, τί ἂν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴη;

5. Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν περὶ αὐτῆς; Πῶς δὲ τῶν ὄντων ὕλη; Ἢ ὅτι δυνάμει. Οὐκοῦν, ὅτι ἤδη δυνάμει, ἤδη οὖν ἔστι καθὸ μέλλει; Ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ μόνον τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελλόμενον· οἷον τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἀναβάλλεται, ὃ ἔσται. Τὸ τοίνυν δυνάμει οὗ τι, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει πάντα·

[1] ἂν Kirchhoff; H-S²: ὂν codd.

But as for matter, which is said to exist and which we say is all realities potentially, how is it possible to say that it is actually something real? For if it was, it would already have ceased to be potentially all realities. If, then, it is nothing real, it necessarily cannot be existent either. How could it, then, be actually something when it is nothing real? But, even if it is not any of the realities which come into being upon it, there is no obstacle to its being something else, since it is not all realities which have a material foundation. In so far, then, as it is none of these things which are founded upon it, and these are realities, it is non-existent. But certainly it could not be a form, since it is imagined as something formless; so it could not be numbered among those form-realities of the intelligible world. So it will be non-existent in this way too. If, then, it is non-existent in both these ways, it will be still more non-existent. If, then, it has made good its escape from the nature of the true realities, and cannot attain even to those which are falsely said to exist, because it is not even a phantasm of rational form as these are, in what sort of existence can it be grasped? And if in no sort of existence, how can it exist actually?

5. How, then, do we speak of it? How is it the matter of real things. Because it is they potentially. Then, because it is they already potentially, is it therefore just as it is going to be? But its being is no more than an announcement of what it is going to be: it is as if being for it was adjourned to that which it will be. So its potential existence is not being something, but being potentially everything;

μηδὲν δὲ ὂν καθ' αὑτὸ, ἀλλ' ὃ ἐστιν ὕλη ὄν, οὐδ' ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστίν. Εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη ἔσται· οὐ πάντη οὖν ὕλη, ἀλλὰ οἷον ὁ χαλκός. Εἴη ἂν οὖν τοῦτο μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος, οἷον κίνησις· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ ἐποχεῖται τῷ ὄντι οἷον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα, ἡ δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐκριφεῖσα καὶ πάντη χωρισθεῖσα καὶ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτὴν οὐ δυναμένη, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν—μὴ ὂν δὲ ἦν—οὕτως ἀεὶ ἔχουσα. Οὔτε δὲ ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνεργείᾳ τι ἀποστᾶσα πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὔτε ἐγένετο· ἃ γὰρ ὑποδῦναι ἠθέλησεν, οὐδὲ χρωσθῆναι ἀπ' αὐτῶν δεδύνηται, ἀλλὰ μένουσα πρὸς ἄλλο δυνάμει οὖσα πρὸς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τῶν δ' ὄντων ἤδη παυσαμένων ἐκείνων φανεῖσα ὑπό τε τῶν μετ' αὐτὴν γενομένων καταληφθεῖσα ἔσχατον καὶ τούτων κατέστη. Ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων οὖν καταληφθεῖσα ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν οὐδετέρων ἂν εἴη, δυνάμει δὲ μόνον ἐγκαταλέλειπται εἶναι ἀσθενές τι καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἴδωλον μορφοῦσθαι μὴ δυνάμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ εἴδωλον· οὐκοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος. Τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀληθινῶς ψεῦδος· τοῦτο δὲ ὄντως μὴ ὄν. Εἰ οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ ὄν, μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὄντως ἄρα μὴ ὄν. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ

[1] Cp. ch. 1. The bronze is already actually bronze, a formed, actually existing thing; but it is potentially the statue which can be made out of it, and so the matter of the statue.

and since it is nothing in itself—except what it is, matter—it does not exist actually at all. For, if it is to be anything actually, it will be what it is actually and not matter: so it will not be altogether matter, but only matter in the way that the bronze is.[1] So then it must be non-existent not in the sense of being different from existence, like motion:[2] for this rides on existence, as if coming from it and being in it, but matter is as if cast out and utterly separated, and unable to change itself, but always in the state it was from the beginning—and it was non-existent. It was not anything actually from the beginning, since it stood apart from all realities, and it did not become anything; it has not been able to take even a touch of colour from the things that wanted to plunge into it, but remaining directed to something else it exists potentially to what comes next; when the realities of the intelligible world had already come to an end it appeared and was caught by the things that came into being after it and took its place as the last after these too. So, being caught by both, it could belong actually to neither class of realities; it is only left for it to be potentially a sort of weak and dim phantasm unable to receive a shape. So it is actually a phantasm: so it is actually a falsity: this is the same as "that which is truly a falsity"; this is "what is really unreal."[3] That, then, which has

[2] Motion is one of the "categories of the intelligible world," cp. ch. 5 of the preceding treatise, and the note there.

[3] The phrase τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος comes from Plato, *Republic* II. 382A4, but occurs there in a quite different context (the "lie in the soul"): ὄντως μὴ ὄν comes from *Sophist* 254D1, and again certainly does not refer to ὕλη.

αὐτῷ ἐνεργείᾳ τι τῶν ὄντων εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι. Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα ἐκβεβηκὸς τοῦ ἀληθῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ μὴ εἶναι ἔχῃ τὸ εἶναι, ἐπείπερ τοῖς ψευδῶς οὖσιν, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν, ἀφεῖλες αὐτῶν ἥντινα εἶχον οὐσίαν, καὶ τοῖς δυνάμει τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν εἰσαγαγὼν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀπολώλεκας αὐτῶν τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἐν δυνάμει ἦν. Εἴπερ ἄρα δεῖ ἀνώλεθρον τὴν ὕλην τηρεῖν, ὕλην αὐτὴν δεῖ τηρεῖν· δεῖ ἄρα δυνάμει, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι λέγειν μόνον, ἵνα ᾖ ὅ ἐστιν, ἢ τούτους τοὺς λόγους ἐξελεγκτέον.

its truth in non-existence is very far from being actually any reality. If, then, it must exist, it must actually not exist, so that, having gone out of true being, it may have its being in non-being; for when you are dealing with things which exist falsely, if you take away their falsity, you have taken away what substance they have, and if you bring in actuality to things which have their being and substance in potentiality you have destroyed the ground of their existence, since their being was in their potentiality. If, then, we must keep matter as indestructible, we must keep it as matter. One must say, then, it would seem, only that it exists potentially, in order that it may be what it is, or else one must refute these arguments.

II. 6. ON SUBSTANCE, OR ON QUALITY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise (No. 17 in Porphyry's chronological order) is a highly technical, and at times extremely obscure, criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of quality: it puts forward a view which is in all essentials the same as that which Plotinus much later expounds in his great treatise *On the Categories* (VI. 1–3. 42–44 in the chronological order). This is that the category of quality cannot be used in speaking of the intelligible world, where everything is substance; and even in the sense-world its use is severely restricted; the essential quality or *differentia* is not really a quality at all but an activity of the formative principle, and even accidental qualities, though they may still be called qualities, are traces or shadows of the activities of substances in the intelligible world.

Synopsis

In the intelligible world everything is substance. What place, then, can be found there for quality? The Aristotelian distinction between essential differentiations and accidental qualities does not work—the same quality appears in one thing as a *differentia*, in another as an accident, white, for instance, in "white lead" and "white man." We must say, rather, that what is quality here is substance in the intelligible world (ch. 1). Further critical examination of the Aristotelian doctrine of quality as applied to things in the sense-world, with the conclusion that the notion of *differentia* is unsatisfactory here too,

and that essential differentiations should be regarded, not as qualities, but as activities of substance and formative principle; only non-essential, accidental qualities are to be called qualities (ch. 2). In the intelligible world the origins and archetypes of even these non-essential qualities are substantial activities, of which quality here is a trace or shadow (ch. 3).

II. 6. (17) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ

1. Ἆρα τὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὂν ἀπηρημωμένον τῶν ἄλλων, ἡ δὲ οὐσία τὸ ὂν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, κινήσεως, στάσεως, ταὐτοῦ, ἑτέρου, καὶ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα ἐκείνης; Τὸ οὖν ὅλον οὐσία, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐκείνων τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο τι. Κίνησις μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν· οὐσία δὲ ἆρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ συμπληρωτικὸν οὐσίας; Ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ [ἡ] οὐσία καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ πάντα οὐσία. Πῶς οὖν οὐ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; Ἢ ἐκεῖ, ὅτι ἓν πάντα, ἐνθάδε δὲ διαληφθέντων τῶν εἰδώλων τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ὥσπερ ἐν μὲν τῷ σπέρματι ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον πάντα καὶ οὐ χεὶρ χωρὶς καὶ χωρὶς κεφαλή, ἔνθα δὲ χωρίζεται ἀλλήλων· εἴδωλα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τὰς οὖν ποιότητας ἐκεῖ φήσομεν οὐσίας διαφορὰς περὶ οὐσίαν οὔσας ἢ περὶ ὄν, διαφορὰς δὲ ποιούσας ἑτέρας οὐσίας

[1] The "categories of the intelligible world": cp. II. 4. 5 and II. 5. 5.

II. 6. ON SUBSTANCE, OR ON QUALITY

1. Are being and substance different, and is being stripped of everything else, while substance is being along with everything else, with motion, rest, sameness, otherness,[1] and are these elements of substance? The whole, then, is substance, and each of those others is, one of them being, another motion, and another something else. So, then, motion is incidentally being: is it, then, incidentally substance, or a constituent element essential to the completion of substance? Motion is certainly itself substance, and everything in the intelligible world is substance. Why, then, is everything not substance here below too? There, in the intelligible world, everything is substance because all are one; here below the images are separated, and one is one thing, one another: just as in the seed all things are together and each is all, and there is not a hand separately and a head separately, but here and now they are separated from each other; for they are images and not true realities.

Shall we, then, say that the qualities in the intelligible world are differentiations of substance applying to substance or to being, but differentiations in that they make substances distinct from each other and so are entirely responsible for making

πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ ὅλως οὐσίας; Ἢ οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν τῇδε ποιοτήτων, ὧν αἱ μὲν διαφοραὶ οὐσιῶν, ὡς τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ τετράπουν, αἱ δὲ οὐ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον ποιότητες λέγονται. Καίτοι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ διαφορὰ γίγνεται συμπληροῦσα καὶ οὐ διαφορὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν, συμβεβηκὸς δέ· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν μὲν κύκνῳ ἢ ψιμυθίῳ συμπληροῦν, ἐν δὲ σοὶ συμβεβηκός. Ἢ τὸ λευκὸν τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συμπληροῦν καὶ οὐ ποιότης, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ποιόν. Ἢ διαιρετέον τὸ ποιόν, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσιῶδες ἰδιότης τις οὖσα τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ μόνον ποιόν, καθ' ὃ ποιὰ οὐσία, τοῦ ποιοῦ οὐ διαλλαγὴν εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ποιοῦντος οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλ' οὔσης ἤδη καὶ πεπληρωμένης διάθεσίν τινα ἔξωθεν ποιοῦντος καὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος προσθήκην, εἴτε περὶ ψυχὴν εἴτε περὶ σῶμα γίγνοιτο. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμυθίου συμπληρωτικὸν εἴη αὐτοῦ;—ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κύκνου οὐ συμπληρωτικόν· γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐ λευκός—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμυθίου· καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς δὲ ἡ θερμότης. Ἀλλ' εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν πυρότητα τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ψιμυθίου

[1] White lead appears as a stock example of whiteness already in Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* A.4. 1096b23, where it is coupled with snow. As for the swan, Plotinus's self-correction below (1. 31-32) seems to confirm the correctness of the MSS reading: cp. also Simplicius, *In Phys.* I. 3, p. 119, 16.

them substances? Now this view is not unreasonable in itself, but it is unreasonable when it is applied to the qualities here, of which some are differentiations of substance, for instance, " two-footed " and " four-footed," and some, which are not differentiations of substance are called just qualities, and nothing but qualities. And, in fact, the same thing becomes a differentiation essential to the completion of a substance, and in something else is not a differentiation and does not contribute to the completion of the substance, but is an incidental attribute: as for instance " white " is an essential completion in a swan or white lead,[1] but in you it is an incidental attribute. The white which enters into the definition is an essential completing element and not a quality, that which appears on the surface is qualitative. Perhaps we should make a distinction between two kinds of quality, the substantial kind being a distinctive particularity of substance, and the other qualitative and nothing else, that by which a substance is of a certain quality when the quality does not change the thing either into or out of its substance, but only puts it into a certain state from outside when it exists already in fullness of substantial being, and produces an addition posterior to the substance, whether this happens in the case of body or of soul. But what if the visible white in white lead was an essential completion of it?—in the swan white is not an essential completion, for there could be a swan which was not white; but our question was about white lead: and the same might be true of the heat of fire. But suppose one said that " fireness " is the substance of fire, and what corresponds to it the

τὸ ἀνάλογον; Ἀλλ' ὅμως τοῦ ὁρωμένου πυρὸς [πυρότης] ἡ θερμότης συμπληροῦσα καὶ ἡ λευκότης ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. Αἱ αὐταὶ τοίνυν συμπληρώσουσι καὶ οὐ ποιότητες, καὶ οὐ συμπληρώσουσι καὶ [οὐ] ποιότητες. Καὶ ἄτοπον ἐν μὲν οἷς συμπληροῦσι λέγειν ἄλλο εἶναι, ἐν δὲ οἷς μὴ ἄλλο, τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οὔσης. Ἀλλ' ἆρα τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς ποιήσαντας αὐτὰ οὐσιώδεις ὅλους, τὰ δὲ ἀποτελέσματα ἔχειν ἤδη τὰ ἐκεῖ τι ἐνταῦθα ποιά, οὐ τί. Ὅθεν καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ τι ἀπολισθάνοντας ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸ ποιὸν καταφερομένους. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃ λέγομεν εἰς τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορῶντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι οὐσίαν, ἃ δὲ νῦν βλέπομεν, εἰς ἃ καὶ ἀφορῶντες λέγομεν, ἀπάγειν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ τι καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι τὸ ποιόν. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εὐλόγως· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτῆς πάθη. Ὅθεν κἀκεῖνο, πῶς οὐκ ἐξ οὐσιῶν οὐσία. Ἐλέγετο μὲν οὖν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ γινόμενον εἶναι τοῖς ἐξ ὧν· νῦν δὲ λέγειν δεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ γενόμενον οὐσία. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκεῖ ἦν ἐλέγομεν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἐξ οὐσίας

[1] Cp. Plato, *Seventh Letter* 343C1–6.

substance of white lead? Even so, the heat is an essential completion of the visible fire, and the whiteness in white lead. So, then, the same distinctive features will be essential completions and not qualities, and qualities and not essential completions. And it is unreasonable to say that they are one thing in what they complete and another in what they do not, when their nature is the same. But, then, one must say rather that the rational formative principles which made them are altogether substantial, but that the things produced by them have here and now what in the intelligible world is a " something " but here below qualitative and not a " something." This is the reason why we are always making mistakes in our investigations about the " something," and slipping off it and being carried away to the qualitative.[1] For fire is not what we say it is when we concentrate our gaze on the qualitative, but its being is substance, and what we see now, that which we concentrate our gaze on when we speak of it, leads us away from the " something " and we define only the qualitative. This is reasonable procedure when we are dealing with objects of sense; for there is nothing of them which is substance, but only affections of substance. This raises that other problem, how substance can come not from substances [but from something which is not substance]. Now it has already been said that what comes into being cannot be the same as that from which it comes; we must add at this stage that what has come into being is not substance. But how, then, does there come to be in the intelligible world what we said was substance, when we said it did not come from substance?

λέγοντες; Τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν φήσομεν ἐκεῖ κυριώτερον καὶ ἀμιγέστερον ἔχουσαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι οὐσίαν—ὡς ἐν διαφοραῖς—ὄντως, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ προσθήκης ἐνεργειῶν λεγομένην οὐσίαν, τελείωσιν μὲν δοκοῦσαν εἶναι ἐκείνου, τάχα δ' ἐνδεεστέραν τῇ προσθήκῃ καὶ τῷ οὐχ ἁπλῷ, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἀφισταμένην τούτου.

2. Ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ποιότητος σκεπτέον τί ὅλως· τάχα γὰρ γνωσθὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶ μᾶλλον παύσει τὰς ἀπορίας. Πρῶτον οὖν ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ θετέον ὁτὲ μὲν ποιὸν μόνον, ὁτὲ δὲ συμπληροῦν οὐσίαν, οὐ δυσχεράναντας ποιὸν συμπληρωτικὸν οὐσίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ποιᾶς μᾶλλον οὐσίας. Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐπὶ τῆς ποιᾶς οὐσίας τὴν οὐσίαν πρὸ τοῦ ποιὰν εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι. Τί οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς πρὸ τῆς ποιᾶς οὐσίας ἡ οὐσία; Ἆρα τὸ σῶμα; Τὸ γένος τοίνυν οὐσία ἔσται, τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ πῦρ σῶμα θερμὸν καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τὸ ὅλον, ἀλλ' οὕτω τὸ θερμὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὡς καὶ ἐν σοὶ τὸ σιμόν. Ἀφαιρεθείσης τοίνυν θερμότητος καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ κούφου, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ ποιὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν καταλείπεται καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐσία. Ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος μᾶλλον οὐσία. Ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος ποιότης. Ἢ οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z3, 1029a16–19: Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh. hyp.* III. 39.

We shall assert that the substance There, because it has a more authentic and purer being, is really substance, as far as is possible in differentiations of being, or rather that when we speak of substance There we speak of it with the addition of its activities; it seems to be a perfection of That [which is its source], but is perhaps deficient in comparison with it by this addition, and by not being simple but already moving away from this original simplicity.

2. But we must enquire what in itself quality is: for perhaps the knowledge of what it is will more effectively put an end to our difficulties. First of all, then, we must enquire into the question already raised, whether we are to assume that the same thing is at one time only qualitative, and at another essentially completing substance (we must not be uneasy about what is qualitative being an essential completing element of substance, but regard it rather as a completing element of a substance of a certain quality). Now in the substance of a certain quality the substance, the specific essence, must be there before it is qualified. What then, in the case of fire, is the substance which is there before the qualified substance. Is it the body? Then the genus "body" will be the substance, and fire will be a hot body, and the whole of it will not be substance but the hot will be in it in the same way as the quality of snubnosedness is in you. So if the heat and the brightness and the lightness—these appear to be qualitative—are taken away, the three-dimensionality is left and the matter is the substance.[1] But we do not think it is: the form, rather, is substance. But the form is quality. No, the form is not

λόγος τὸ εἶδος. Τὰ οὖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τί ἐστιν; Οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ τὸ καῖον· τοῦτο δὲ ποιόν. Εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὸ καίειν ἐνέργειαν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ τὸ θερμαίνειν καὶ τὸ λευκαίνειν τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιήσεις· ὥστε τὴν ποιότητα οὐχ ἕξομεν ὅπου καταλείψομεν. Ἡ ταύτας μὲν οὐ λεκτέον ποιότητας, ὅσαι λέγονται συμπληροῦν οὐσίας, εἴπερ ἐνέργειαι αἱ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν οὐσιωδῶν ἰοῦσαι, ἃ δ' ἐστιν ἔξωθεν πάσης οὐσίας οὐ πῇ μὲν ποιότητες, ἄλλοις δὲ οὐ ποιότητες φανταζόμεναι, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσαι, οἷον καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι καὶ αἴσχη καὶ κάλλη καὶ ὑγίειαι καὶ οὕτως ἐσχηματίσθαι. Καὶ τρίγωνον μὲν καὶ τετράγωνον καθ' αὑτὸ οὐ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ τετριγωνίσθαι ἢ μεμόρφωται ποιὸν λεκτέον, καὶ οὐ τὴν τριγωνότητα, ἀλλὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν· καὶ τὰς τέχνας δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιτηδειότητας· ὥστε εἶναι τὴν ποιότητα διάθεσίν τινα ἐπὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἤδη οὔσαις εἶτ' ἐπακτὴν εἶτ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνοῦσαν, ἣ εἰ μὴ συνῆν, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον εἶχεν ἡ οὐσία. Ταύτην δὲ καὶ εὐκίνητον καὶ δυσκίνητον εἶναι· ὡς διττὸν εἶναι εἶδος, τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον, τὸ δὲ ἔμμονον αὐτῆς.

3. Τὸ οὖν λευκὸν τὸ ἐπὶ σοὶ θετέον οὐ ποιότητα, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαν δηλονότι ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς τοῦ

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Categories* 8, 10a14–16.

quality but rational formative principle. What, then, is the result of the combination of the formative principle and the underlying matter? Not what is seen and burns: for this is qualitative. Unless, perhaps, someone were to say that the burning is an activity which comes from the formative principle; then the heating, too, and the brightening and the rest would be activities of making; so we shall have no place to put quality. We ought not to call what are said to be essential completions of substance qualities, seeing that those of them which come from the formative principles and substantive powers are activities; we should call qualities only what are outside all substance and do not appear in one place as qualities but in other things as not qualities; they contain that which is extra and comes after substance, for instance, virtues and vices, and uglinesses and beauties, and states of health, and being of this and that shape. Triangularity and quadrangularity in themselves are not qualitative, but being made triangular in so far as it is being given shape must be called qualitative, not the triangularity, that is, but the shaping.[1] Arts and aptitudes should also be called qualities. So quality, we say, is a condition of substances which already exist, either brought about from outside or accompanying them from the beginning: [even in this latter case], if it was not there the substance would have nothing less. This quality can be sometimes easy to remove, sometimes hard; so that there are two kinds of it, the easily removable and the persistent.

3. The whiteness, therefore, in you must be assumed not to be a quality but an activity, obviously

λευκαίνειν, κἀκεῖ πάσας τὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας ἐνεργείας τὸ ποιὸν λαβούσας παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας δόξης τῷ ἰδιότητα εἶναι ἑκάστην οἷον διοριζούσας τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὰς ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα ἐχούσας. Τί οὖν διοίσει ποιότης ἡ ἐκεῖ; Ἐνέργειαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται. Ἢ ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τί ἐστι δηλοῦσιν οὐδὲ ἐναλλαγὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων οὐδὲ χαρακτῆρα, ἀλλ' ὅσον μόνον τὴν λεγομένην ποιότητα ἐκεῖ ἐνέργειαν οὖσαν· ὥστε τὸ μέν, ὅταν ἰδιότητα οὐσίας ἔχῃ, δῆλον αὐτόθεν ὡς οὐ ποιόν, ὅταν δὲ χωρίσῃ ὁ λόγος τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφελών, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λαβὼν καὶ γεννήσας ἄλλο, ἐγέννησε ποιὸν οἷον μέρος οὐσίας λαβὼν τὸ ἐπιπολῆς φανὲν αὐτῷ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τὴν θερμότητα τῷ σύμφυτον εἶναι τῷ πυρὶ εἶδός τι εἶναι τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἐνέργειαν καὶ οὐ ποιότητα αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὖ ἄλλως ποιότητα, μόνην δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ληφθεῖσαν οὐκέτι μορφὴν οὐσίας οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ ἴχνος μόνον καὶ σκιὰν καὶ εἰκόνα ἀπολιποῦσαν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, ἧς ἡ ἐνέργεια, ποιότητα εἶναι. Ὅσα οὖν συμβέβηκε καὶ μὴ ἐνέργειαι καὶ εἴδη οὐσιῶν μορφάς τινας παρεχόμενα, ποιὰ ταῦτα· οἷον καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἄλλαι

proceeding from the power of whitening; and in the intelligible world all qualities, as we call them, must be assumed to be activities, taking their qualitativeness from the way we think about them, because each and every one of them is an individual characteristic, that is, they mark off the substances in relation to each other and have their own individual character in relation to themselves. In what way, then, will quality in the intelligible world differ from qualities here? The qualities here are activities too. The qualities in the intelligible world do not indicate what sort of things their underlying realities are, or their alterations or their distinctive characters, but only just what we call quality, which is activity there: so that it is immediately clear that the reality there, when it possesses an individual characteristic of substance, is not qualitative, but when the process of rational thinking separates the distinctive individuality in these realities, not taking it away from the intelligible world but rather grasping it and producing something else, it produces the qualitative as a kind of part of substance, grasping what appears on the surface of the reality. If this is so, there is nothing to prevent heat, by the fact that it is inherent in fire, from being a form and activity of fire and not its quality, and again being a quality in a different way, when it is taken alone in something else and is no longer a shape of substance but only a trace, a shadow, an image, abandoning its substance, of which it was an activity, to be a quality. All, then, which is incidental and not activities and forms of substance, giving definite shapes, is qualitative. So, for instance, states and other dispositions of the

τῶν ὑποκειμένων λεκτέαι ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ ἀρχέτυπα αὐτῶν, ἐν οἷς πρώτως ἐστίν, ἐνεργείας ἐκείνων. Καὶ οὐ γίνεται ταὐτὸ ποιότης καὶ οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπηρημωμένον οὐσίας ποιόν, τὸ δὲ σὺν ταύτῃ οὐσίαν ἢ εἶδος ἢ ἐνέργειαν· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ μόνον ἐκπεσὸν τοῦ εἶδος καὶ ἐνέργεια εἶναι. Ὃ μέντοι μηδέποτε εἶδος ἄλλου, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀεί, καθαρῶς ποιότης καὶ μόνον τοῦτο.

underlying realities are to be called qualities, but their archetypal models, in which they exist primarily, are the activities of those intelligible realities. And in this way one and the same thing does not come to be quality and not quality, but that which is isolated from substance is qualitative, and that which is with substance is substance or form or activity; for nothing is the same in itself and when it is alone in something else and has fallen away from being form and activity. That, then, which is never a form of something else but always an incidental attribute, this and only this is pure quality.

II. 7. ON COMPLETE TRANSFUSION

Introductory Note

THIS little treatise (No. 37 in Porphyry's chronological order) is devoted to the discussion of the curious Stoic doctrine that two material substances when they are mixed can totally interpenetrate one another. This doctrine aroused a good deal of opposition, especially from the Peripatetics, and Plotinus begins his discussion by stating the Peripatetic objections to it. Here he closely follows the exposition given by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his *De Mixtione* and *Quaestiones et Solutiones* II. 12 (ed. Bruns, p. 57). He often seems to have found that the critical reading of the great Aristotelian expositor and commentator stimulated his own thought. Next he gives the Stoic reply to the Peripatetic arguments, and finally, in ch. 2, his own reflections on the question, which lead him to a criticism of the Peripatetic view that it is the impenetrability of matter which prevents the total interpenetration of bodies. Following up a passing admission of Alexander (cp. Bréhier's excellent introduction to this treatise) he shows that the impenetrability of a body must be due to its qualities, not to any inherent property of the matter.

Ch. 3 is an appendix or footnote on "corporeity," which Plotinus maintains against Alexander of Aphrodisias to be not just an abstract general definition but the formative principle which makes bodies corporeal—a good illustration of the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian way of thinking about universals.

Synopsis

Summary of the discussion of the question by previous philosophers. The Peripatetic objections to complete transfusion and Stoic answers to them (ch. 1). Plotinus's own discussion, leading to the conclusion that the impenetrability of a body is due to its qualities, not to the matter (ch. 2). Note on the meaning of corporeity (ch. 3).

II. 7. (37) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΔΙ' ΟΛΩΝ ΚΡΑΣΕΩΣ

1. Περὶ τῆς δι' ὅλων λεγομένης τῶν σωμάτων κράσεως ἐπισκεπτέον. Ἆρα ἐνδέχεται ὅλον δι' ὅλου ὑγρὸν ὑγρῷ συμμιχθὲν ἑκάτερον δι' ἑκατέρου ἢ θάτερον διὰ θατέρου χωρεῖν; Διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁποτερωσοῦν, εἰ γίγνοιτο. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῇ παραθέσει διδόντες ὡς μιγνύντες μᾶλλον ἢ κιρνάντες ἑαυτοῖς, εἴπερ δεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν ὁμοιομερὲς τὸ πᾶν ποιεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος τὸ σμικρότατον ἐκ τῶν κεκρᾶσθαι λεγομένων εἶναι. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰς ποιότητας μόνας κιρνάντες, τὴν δὲ ὕλην παρατιθέντες ἑκατέρου τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐπάγοντες τὰς παρ' ἑκατέρου [1] ποιότητας, πιθανοὶ ἂν εἶεν τῷ διαβάλλειν τὴν δι' ὅλων κρᾶσιν τῷ τε εἰς τομὰς τὰ μεγέθη συμβαίνειν τῶν ὄγκων ἰέναι, εἰ μηδὲν διάλειμμα μηδετέρῳ τῶν σωμάτων γίνοιτο, εἰ συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ διαίρεσις τῷ κατὰ πᾶν τὴν διάδυσιν γίνεσθαι θατέρῳ εἰς θάτερον, καὶ δή,

[1] *ἑκατέρου* Kirchhoff, H-S: *ἑκατέρας* codd.

[1] This is a reference to Anaxagoras (cp. Diels 59A54) and Democritus (referred to by Alexander in the passage on which

II. 7. ON COMPLETE TRANSFUSION

1. We must consider the question of what is called the complete transfusion of bodies. Is it possible that when one fluid body is mixed with another both penetrate each other whole through whole, or that one of them penetrates the other totally? For it makes no difference which way it happens, if it happens at all. We can leave out of account those who allow that it happens by simple juxtaposition of particles [1] because they make a mechanical mixture rather than a coalescence, if we grant that a coalescence must make the total a whole of like parts, and each smallest part must be composed of the things which are said to have coalesced. Those, then, who make the qualities only coalesce,[2] juxtaposing the matter of each body and imposing upon these matters the qualities of each, would seem to deserve belief because they disprove complete transfusion by the fact that the magnitudes of the masses will be completely cut away, if there is no interval between the divisions in either of the bodies—on the assumption that the division will be continuous because each of the bodies penetrates the other completely; and

this account is based, *De Mixtione* 2 (II. 214, 18 Bruns–Diels 68A64).

[2] The Peripatetics. Cp. Galen's account of the Peripatetic and Stoic positions, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II. 463.

ὅταν τὰ κραθέντα μείζω τόπον κατέχῃ ἢ θάτερον καὶ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον συνελθόντα τὸν ἑκατέρου τόπον. Καίτοι, εἰ δι' ὅλου ὅλον ἦν διεληλυθός, τὸν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔδει, φασί, μένειν τὸν αὐτόν, εἰς ὃ θάτερον ἐνεβλήθη. Οὗ δὲ μὴ μείζων ὁ τόπος γίνεται, ἀέρος τινὰς ἐξόδους αἰτιῶνται, ἀνθ' ὧν εἰσέδυ θάτερον. Καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ μείζονι πῶς ἂν ἐκταθὲν δι' ὅλου χωρήσειε; Καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα λέγουσιν. Οἱ δ' αὖ—οἱ τὴν δι' ὅλων κρᾶσιν εἰσάγοντες—τέμνεσθαι μὲν καὶ μὴ εἰς τομὰς ἀναλίσκεσθαι λέγειν ἂν δύναιντο καὶ δι' ὅλων τῆς κράσεως γιγνομένης, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἱδρῶτας οὐ τοῦ σώματος τομὰς ποιεῖν οὐδ' αὖ κατατετρῆσθαι φήσουσι. Καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις λέγοι μηδὲν κωλύειν τὴν φύσιν οὕτω πεποιηκέναι τοῦ διιέναι τοὺς ἱδρῶτας χάριν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν, ὅταν λεπτὰ ᾖ καὶ συνεχῆ, ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὑγρὸν δι' ὅλου δεῦον[1] αὐτὰ καὶ διαρρεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα τὸ ὑγρόν. Ἀλλὰ σωμάτων ὄντων πῶς οἷόν τε τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι; Ὡς διιέναι μὴ τέμνοντα ἐπινοῆσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον· τέμνοντα δὲ κατὰ πᾶν ἀναιρήσει ἄλληλα δηλονότι. Τὰς δὲ αὔξας ὅταν λέγωσι μὴ γίνεσθαι πολλαχοῦ, διδόασι

[1] δεῦον Creuzer: δευοντα codd.

then, too, there is the case when the bodies which have coalesced occupy a larger space than either of them, as much, in fact, as the spaces occupied by each of them put together. And yet, they say, if one had completely penetrated the other, the space of the one would have had to remain the same and the other would have been put into it. But in the case where the space occupied by the mixture does not become greater, they allege as the cause some sort of exit of air, whose place within the one body is taken by the other. And then, when a small body is mixed with a larger one, how could it be extended so as to penetrate the whole? And they have many other arguments. But then, on the other side, those who introduce the idea of complete transfusion could say that it was possible for a body to be divided without being completely used up in the cutting, even when complete transfusion occurs, since they will assert that drops of sweat do not make cuts in the body or even fill it full of holes. For even if someone were to argue that there was no objection to nature having arranged it that way so as to enable the drops of sweat to get through, yet, they could reply, in the case of artificial products, when they are of fine continuous texture, moisture is observed wetting them right through, and it flows through to the other side. But, if they are bodies, how can this happen? So it is not easy to conceive how there can be interpenetration without division; but if the bodies divide each other at every point they will obviously destroy each other. And when they say that in many cases there are no increases in size [when there is coalescence], they give the other party

τοῖς ἑτέροις ἀέρων ἐξόδους αἰτιᾶσθαι. Πρός τε τὴν τῶν τόπων αὔξην χαλεπῶς μέν, ὅμως δὲ τί κωλύει λέγειν συνεισφερομένου ἑκατέρου σώματος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὴν αὔξην γίνεσθαι; Μὴ γὰρ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ποιότητος ἄλλο εἶδος μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οὕτω καὶ μέγεθος ἄλλο, οὗ δὴ τὸ μῖγμα ποιεῖ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν μέγεθος. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἱ ἕτεροι λέγοιεν, ὡς, εἰ μὲν ἡ ὕλη τῇ ὕλῃ παράκειται, καὶ ὁ ὄγκος τῷ ὄγκῳ, ᾧ σύνεστι τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ ἡμέτερον ἂν λέγοιτε· εἰ δὲ δι' ὅλου καὶ ἡ ὕλη μετὰ τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῇ πρώτως μεγέθους, οὕτως ἂν γένοιτο οὐχ ὡς γραμμὴ γραμμῇ ἐφεξῆς ἂν κέοιτο ⟨τῷ⟩[1] κατὰ τὰ πέρατα τοῖς σημείοις ἑαυτῶν συνάψαι, οὗ δὴ αὔξη ἂν γίνοιτο, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως ὡς ἂν γραμμὴ γραμμῇ ἐφαρμοσθείη, ὥστε αὔξην μὴ γίνεσθαι. Τὸ δ' ἔλαττον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μείζονος καὶ μεγίστου τὸ μικρότατον καὶ ἐφ' ὧν φανερὸν ὅτι κίρναται. Ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων ἔξεστι λέγειν μὴ εἰς πᾶν φθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὧν γε φανερῶς συμβαίνει, λέγοιτο ἄν. Καὶ λέγοιεν ἐκτάσεις τῶν ὄγκων, οὐ σφόδρα πιθανὰ λέγοντες εἰς τοσοῦτον τὸν σμικρότατον ὄγκον ἐκτείνοντες· οὐδὲ γὰρ μετα-

[1] ⟨τῷ⟩ Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

the opportunity of alleging exits of air as the cause. And, though it is difficult to refute the argument from the increase of the spaces occupied, yet, all the same, what is the objection to saying that, as each of the two bodies brings its size along with it as well as all the other qualities, an increase must necessarily occur? For certainly size is not destroyed in the coalescence any more than the rest of the qualities, and just as in the case of the others there is another quality compounded of both, so there is another size, where the compounding [of the two sizes] produces the size which results from both. But suppose that at this point the other party replied to them, " If the matter of one body lies alongside the matter of the other, and the mass alongside the mass, with which the size goes, then you would be saying what we say; but if there is complete transfusion of the matter with the size which is primarily imposed upon it, it would come about not as when a line lies end to end with another line in that their terminal points coincide, where there certainly would be increase, but as in that arrangement where one line is made to coincide with another line, so that there is no increase in length." But as for a smaller body penetrating the whole of a larger one, and even the very smallest the very largest, this occurs in things which have manifestly coalesced. In the cases where it is not obvious it is possible to say that the smaller body does not reach every part of the larger one but in the cases where it manifestly occurs it ought to be admitted. They might allege extensions of the masses, but this is not a very plausible explanation when they extend the smallest mass so enormously; for they do not

βάλλοντες τὸ σῶμα μέγεθος αὐτῷ πλέον διδόασιν, ὥσπερ εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ γίγνοιτο.

2. Τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ζητητέον, τί συμβαίνει, ὅταν ὅσπερ ἦν ὄγκος ὕδατος ἀὴρ γίγνηται, πῶς τὸ μεῖζον ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ· νῦν δὲ τὰ μὲν εἰρήσθω πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων παρ' ἑκατέρων λεγομένων. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν σκοπῶμεν τί χρὴ λέγειν περὶ τούτου, τίς δόξα σύμφωνος τοῖς λεγομένοις ἢ καὶ τίς ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς νῦν λεγομένας φανεῖται. Ὅταν τοίνυν διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ῥέῃ τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ βίβλος ἐκστάζῃ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ὕδωρ, πῶς οὐ τὸ πᾶν ὑδάτινον σῶμα δίεισι δι' αὐτῆς; Ἢ καὶ ὅταν μὴ ῥέῃ, πῶς συνάψομεν τὴν ὕλην τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τῷ ὄγκῳ, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας μόνας ἐν συγκράσει ποιησόμεθα; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξω τῆς βίβλου ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος ὕλη παρακείσεται οὐδ' αὖ ἔν τισι διαστήμασιν αὐτῆς· πᾶσα γὰρ ὑγρά ἐστι καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὕλη κενὴ ποιότητος. Εἰ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἡ ὕλη μετὰ τῆς ποιότητος, πανταχοῦ τῆς βίβλου τὸ ὕδωρ. Ἢ οὐ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος ποιότης. Ἀλλὰ ποῦ ὄντος[1] τοῦ ὕδατος; Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ὄγκος; Ἢ ἐξέτεινε τὴν βίβλον τὸ προστεθέν· ἔλαβε γὰρ μέγεθος παρὰ τοῦ εἰσελθόντος. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἔλαβε, προσετέθη τις ὄγκος· εἰ δὲ προσετέθη, οὐ κατεπόθη ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, δεῖ οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ

[1] ὄντος F[3mg] (Ficinus:) ὄντα codd: † ὄντα H-S.

[1] I print and translate ὄντος (Ficino's suggestion in the margin of F). The corruption may have arisen through an abbreviation of ὄντος (Warmington's suggestion).

even allow a larger size to a body when it changes, as, for instance, if air comes into being out of water.

2. But this is a subject which requires separate investigation, what happens when what was a mass of water becomes air, and how the increase of volume in the air which has come into being is to be explained. Now, however, let us content ourselves with what has been said, although there is a great deal else which is said on both sides. But let us consider independently what we ought to say about this problem, what view will be in accordance with the arguments stated, or what new one will appear going beyond the present arguments. Well, then, when water runs through a fleece, or papyrus exudes the water which is in it, how can we deny that the whole body of the water goes right through the papyrus? Or even when it does not run through, how can we put matter in contact with matter and mass with mass and make the qualities alone coalesce? For surely the matter of the water will not lie outside the papyrus, nor, again, in any interstices of it; for the whole papyrus is wet and its matter is nowhere destitute of the quality [of wetness]. But if the matter is everywhere accompanied by the quality of wetness, the water is everywhere in the papyrus. But perhaps it is not the water but the quality of the water. But where is the water?[1] Why, then, does the mass not remain the same? What was added to the papyrus has extended it: for it took size from the water which entered into it. But if it took size, a mass was added to it; but if it was added, it was not absorbed in the other, and so the matter of the water and the matter of the papyrus must be in two

ἄλλῳ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι. Ἢ τί κωλύει, ὥσπερ δίδωσι τῆς ποιότητος καὶ λαμβάνει σῶμα θάτερον παρὰ θατέρου, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγέθους; Ποιότης μὲν γὰρ ποιότητι συνελθοῦσα οὐκ ἐκείνη οὖσα, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἄλλης, ἐν τῷ μετ' ἄλλης εἶναι οὐ καθαρὰ οὖσα οὐκ ἔστι παντελῶς ἐκείνη, ἀλλὰ ἠμαύρωται· μέγεθος δὲ συνελθὸν ἄλλῳ μεγέθει οὐκ ἀφανίζεται. Τὸ δὲ σῶμα χωροῦν διὰ σώματος πάντως τομὰς ποιεῖν πῶς λέγεται, ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰς ποιότητας [τὰς] διὰ τῶν σωμάτων χωρεῖν λέγομεν καὶ οὐ τομὰς ποιεῖν. Ἢ ὅτι ἀσώματοι. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ὕλη καὶ αὐτὴ ἀσώματος, διὰ τί τῆς ὕλης ἀσωμάτου οὔσης καὶ τῶν ποιοτήτων, εἰ τοιαῦται εἶεν ὡς ὀλίγαι εἶναι, οὐ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διίασι; Μὴ διιέναι δὲ τὰ στερεά, ὅτι τοιαύτας ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ὡς κωλυθῆναι διιέναι. Ἢ πολλὰς ὁμοῦ ἀδυνατεῖν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖν τοῦτο; Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ποιοτήτων τὸ πυκνὸν λεγόμενον σῶμα ποιεῖ, τὸ πλῆθος ἂν εἴη αἴτιον· εἰ δὲ πυκνότης ἰδία ποιότης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἣν λέγουσι σωματότητα, ἰδία ποιότης· ὥστε οὐχ ᾗ ποιότητες τὴν μῖξιν ποιήσονται, ἀλλ' ᾗ τοιαίδε, οὐδ' αὖ ἡ ὕλη ᾗ ὕλη οὐ μιχθήσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ μετὰ τοιάσδε ποιότητος, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ μέγεθος

different places. But what is the objection, just as one body gives and takes a share of quality from the other, to the same thing happening with the size? The objection is that when quality comes together with quality it is not that quality which it was before, but is associated with another, and, because in that association it is not pure, it is no longer perfectly what it was, but is dimmed: but when size comes together with another size it does not disappear. But one should consider carefully the sense of the assertion that when a body passes through a body it cuts it up completely: since we ourselves say that the qualities go through bodies without cutting them. The reason is that they are incorporeal. But if matter itself is incorporeal too, why then, since matter and its qualities are incorporeal, should not the qualities, if they are of such a kind that there are few of them, penetrate with the matter in the same way? We should say that they do not penetrate solid bodies because these have qualities of such a kind as to prevent their penetration. Or perhaps we might say that many qualities all together cannot penetrate with the matter? If, then, the multiplicity of qualities makes what is called a dense body, the multiplicity would be the cause of its impenetrability; but if density is a distinct quality, as is the quality they call corporeity, then this distinct quality is the cause: so that it is not in so far as they are qualities that they will blend but in so far as they are qualities of a certain kind, and it is not matter as matter that will not blend but matter in so far as it is associated with a certain quality: and particularly, if it has no size

οἰκεῖον οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἢ[1] μή ἀποβαλοῦσα τὸ μέγεθος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔστω καὶ οὕτω διηπορημένα.

3. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμνήσθημεν σωματότητος, ἐπισκεπτέον πότερα ἡ σωματότης ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων συγκείμενον ἢ εἶδός τι ἡ σωματότης καὶ λόγος τις, ὃς ἐγγενόμενος τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ποιοτήτων σὺν ὕλῃ, τοῦτο ἂν εἴη ἡ σωματότης. Καὶ εἰ λόγος δὲ εἴη ὃς προσελθὼν ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα, δηλονότι ὁ λόγος ἐμπεριλαβὼν ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ἁπάσας. Δεῖ δὲ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, εἰ μή ἐστιν ἄλλως ὥσπερ ὁρισμὸς δηλωτικὸς τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ λόγος ποιῶν πρᾶγμα, μὴ τὴν ὕλην συμπεριειληφέναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὕλην λόγον εἶναι καὶ ἐγγενόμενον ἀποτελεῖν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ εἶναι μὲν τὸ σῶμα ὕλην καὶ λόγον ἐνόντα, αὐτὸν δὲ εἶδος ὄντα ἄνευ ὕλης ψιλὸν θεωρεῖσθαι, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀχώριστος αὐτὸς ᾖ. Ὁ γὰρ χωριστὸς ἄλλος, ὁ ἐν νῷ· ἐν νῷ δέ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς νοῦς. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄλλοθι.

[1] ἢ Kirchhoff, H-S²: εἰ codd.

of its own, except in so far as it has not rejected size. So much, then for the discussion of these difficult questions.

3. But since we have mentioned corporeity, we should enquire whether corporeity is that which is composed of all a body's constituents, or whether corporeity is a form and rational formative principle which enters matter and makes it body. If, then, this is what body is, that which is composed of all the qualities with matter, this is what corporeity would be. And if corporeity was a formative principle which by its coming to matter makes body, obviously the formative principle includes and contains all the qualities. But this rational principle, on the assumption that it is not a sort of definition which declares the nature of the thing but a rational principle which makes a thing, cannot include the matter but must be a principle in relation with matter which enters matter and brings the body to perfection, and the body must be matter and a rational principle present in it, but the rational principle itself, since it is a form, must be contemplated bare, without matter, even if it is itself as inseparable as it can be from matter. For the separated form is a different one, that which is in intellect: and it is in intellect because it is intellect itself. But this we discuss elsewhere.

II. 8. ON SIGHT, OR HOW DISTANT OBJECTS APPEAR SMALL

Introductory Note

THIS very short treatise (No. 35 in Porphyry's chronological order) is the only surviving evidence of Plotinus's study of optics, mentioned by Porphyry in ch. 14 of the *Life*. It is a school discussion, based probably on the reading of Peripatetic προβλήματα (on this, and for evidence of the origin of the views put forward, see Bréhier's introduction). The question why distant objects appear smaller than they are was much discussed in the philosophical schools, and Plotinus puts forward five different views. The first is Stoic (the light is contracted in proportion to the size of the eye); the second, apparently, bad Aristotelian (we perceive the form without the matter, and so without the size—but, as Plotinus remarks in passing, size is a form); the third (necessity of seeing each part to perceive the size) is Epicurean; the fourth is Aristotelian (we perceive colour primarily, and size only incidentally). This is the solution which Plotinus prefers; he develops it at some length, with an excursus on sounds. The fifth is the mathematical explanation by the lesser angle of vision, which Plotinus seems to find more interesting than any of the first three, but which he none the less rejects.

Synopsis

Why do distant objects appear small? Four different explanations, the first three stated shortly, the fourth developed at length, with some remarks on sound (ch. 1). Rejection of a fifth explanation, from the lesser angle of vision (ch. 2).

II. 8. (35) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΡΑΣΕΩΣ Η ΠΩΣ ΤΑ ΠΟΡΡΩ ΜΙΚΡΑ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ

1. Ἆρα τὰ πόρρω φαίνεται ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ πολὺ ἀφεστηκότα ὀλίγον δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ μεταξύ, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἡλίκα ἐστὶ φαίνεται, καὶ ὅσην ἔχει τὴν ἀπόστασιν; Ἐλάττω μὲν δοκεῖ τοῖς ὁρῶσι τὰ πόρρω, ὅτι συναιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἐθέλει καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς κόρης τὸ φῶς· καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πόρρω ἡ ὕλη ἧ τοῦ ὁρωμένου, τόσῳ τὸ εἶδος οἷον μεμονωμένον ἀφικνεῖται γινομένου καὶ τοῦ πηλίκου εἴδους καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ποιοῦ, ὡς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἀφικνεῖσθαι μόνον. Ἢ καί, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μέγεθος ἐν διεξόδῳ καὶ ἐπελεύσει καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ὅσον ἐστὶν αἰσθανόμεθα· παρεῖναι οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ πλησίον εἶναι, ἵνα γνωσθῇ ὅσον. Ἢ καί, ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρᾶται τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χρώματος πρώτως θεωρουμένου· πλησίον μὲν οὖν ὅσον κέχρωσται γινώσκεται, πόρρω δὲ ὅτι κέχρωσται, τὰ δὲ μέρη κατὰ ποσὸν συναιρούμενα[1] οὐκ ἀκριβῆ δίδωσι τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ διάγνωσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτὰ ἀμυδρὰ προσέρχεται. Τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ φωναὶ ἐλάττους, ὅσῳ ἂν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν ἀμυδρὸν ἴῃ; Εἶδος γὰρ

[1] συναιρούμενα Harder: συνδιαιρούμενα codd.

II. 8. ON SIGHT, OR HOW DISTANT OBJECTS APPEAR SMALL

1. Do distant objects appear smaller, and things far apart seem to have only a small space between them, but objects which are near appear the size they are and the distance apart which they are? Distant objects seem smaller to those who look at them because the light tends to be contracted in proportion to the sight and the size of the pupil: and the farther the material of the seen object is away, the more the form comes, so to speak, bare of its matter (though size, too, itself, as well as quality, is a form), so that its rational formative principle comes alone. Or another explanation is that we perceive the size in the process of going over and surveying the thing part by part, each in its actual extent; so it must be on the spot and near at hand in order that its extent may be known. Or another explanation is that the size is seen incidentally, the primary object of contemplation being the colour: so when it is near we know how large a space is coloured, but when it is far off we know that it is coloured, but the parts being quantitatively contracted do not give an accurate determination of the extent: then, too, the colours themselves come to us blurred. Then why is it remarkable if magnitudes too, as well as sounds, are smaller in proportion as their form comes to us

κἀκεῖ ἡ ἀκοὴ ζητεῖ, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος κατὰ συμβε-
βηκὸς αἰσθάνεται. Ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, εἰ τὸ
μέγεθος κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τίνι γὰρ πρώτως τὸ
ἐν τῇ φωνῇ μέγεθος, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τῇ ἁφῇ τὸ
ὁρώμενον; Ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν μέγεθος ἡ ἀκοὴ οὐ κατὰ
τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ σφόδρα, ὡς καὶ ἡ
γεῦσις τὸ σφόδρα τοῦ γλυκέος οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
τὸ δὲ κυρίως μέγεθος φωνῆς τὸ ἐφ' ὅσον· τοῦτο δὲ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα σημήνειεν ἄν,
οὐκ ἀκριβῶς δέ. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ σφόδρα ἑκάστῳ τὸ
αὐτό, τὸ δὲ εἰς πλῆθος εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν τόπον, ὃν
ἐπέσχεν. Ἀλλ' οὐ σμικρὰ τὰ χρώματα, ἀλλ'
ἀμυδρά, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη σμικρά. Ἢ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις
κοινὸν τὸ ἧττον ὅ ἐστι· χρῶμα μὲν οὖν τὸ ἧττον
ἀμυδρόν, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ ἧττον σμικρόν, καὶ
ἑπόμενον τῷ χρώματι τὸ μέγεθος ἀνὰλόγον
ἠλάττωται. Σαφέστερον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ποικίλων
γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οἷον ὀρῶν ἐχόντων πολλὰς
οἰκήσεις καὶ δένδρων πλῆθος καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, ὧν
ἕκαστον, εἰ μὲν ὁρῷτο, δίδωσιν ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων
ἑκάστων μετρεῖν τὸ ὅλον· τοῦ δὲ εἴδους καθ'
ἕκαστον οὐκ ἰόντος ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον
εἶδος μετροῦσα τὸ ὑποκείμενον μέγεθος τὸ πᾶν
ὅσον ἐστὶ γινώσκειν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πλησίον, ὅταν

blurred? For in the case of sounds, too, it is form that the hearing seeks, and the size is incidentally perceived. (But as regards hearing, it is questionable whether size is perceived incidentally; for to what sense does the size in sound appear as its primary object, as visible size appears as the primary object to touch? The hearing perceives what seems to it the size of the sound not according to an actual quantity but according to a scale of more and less, like intensity, and not incidentally, just as taste perceives the intensity of sweetness not incidentally; but the proper size of sound is the size of the area over which it can be heard; and this would be incidentally perceptible from the intensity, but not accurately. For, on the one hand, each sound has its own intensity which remains the same, on the other, it multiplies itself by extending to the whole space which the sound occupies.) But colours are not small but blurred; it is sizes which are small. Both have in common the "less than they are": as regards colour the "less" is blurredness, as regards size the "less" is smallness, and, following the colour, the size is lessened proportionately. What happens to them becomes clearer in things of many and varied parts, for instance, hills with many houses on them and a quantity of trees and a great many other things, of which each individual one, if it is seen, enables us to measure the whole from the individual parts which we observe. But if the form does not reach us in individual detail, the possibility of knowing the dimensions of the whole by measuring its basic size according to the forms of individual parts is taken away. For this applies to things near

ποικίλα ᾖ, ἀθρόως δὲ γίνηται ἡ ἐπιβολὴ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ὁρῷτο, ἐλάττω ἂν φανείη κατὰ λόγον, ὅσον ἂν ἕκαστον κλαπῇ ἐν τῇ θέᾳ· ὅταν δὲ πάντα ὀφθῇ, ἀκριβῶς μετρηθέντα ὅσα ἐστὶ γινώσκεται. Ὅσα δὲ τῶν μεγεθῶν ὁμοειδῆ ὁμοιόχροα ὄντα, ψεύδεται καὶ ταῦτα τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῆς οὐ κατὰ μέρος πάνυ τι μετρεῖν δυναμένης τῆς ὄψεως, ὅτι ἀπολισθάνει κατὰ μέρος μετροῦσα, ὅτι μὴ ἔχει ἵστασθαι καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος τῇ διαφορᾷ. Ἐγγύθεν δὲ τὸ πόρρω, ὅτι ⟨τὸ⟩[1] μεταξὺ συναιρεῖται ὅσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλησίον αὐτοῦ, ὅσον οὐ λανθάνει, διὰ τὰ αὐτά· οὐ διεξοδεύουσα δὲ τὸ πόρρω τοῦ διαστήματος, οἷόν ἐστι κατ' εἶδος, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο οὐδ' ὅσον ἐστὶ κατὰ μέγεθος εἰπεῖν.

2. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὄψεως γωνίας ἐλάττους εἴρηται μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λέγων ἔλαττον φαίνεσθαι ἐλάττονι γωνίᾳ καταλείπει τὴν λοιπὴν ἔξωθέν τι ὁρῶσαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὄν τι ἔξωθεν ὅλως, οἷον ἀέρα. Ὅταν οὖν μηδὲν καταλείπῃ τῷ πολὺ εἶναι τὸ ὄρος, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰσάζῃ καὶ μηκέτι ἄλλο οἷόν τε ᾖ αὐτῇ ὁρᾶν, ἅτε τοῦ διαστήματος αὐτῆς συναρμόσαντος τῷ ὁρωμένῳ, ἢ καὶ ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ ὁρώμενον ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν τῆς ὄψεως προσβολήν, τί ἄν τις ἐνταῦθα λέγοι ἐλάττονος μὲν ἢ ἔστι πολλῷ

[1] ⟨τὸ⟩ Kirchhoff, H-S².

at hand too; when they have many parts, but we only take a quick glance at them as a whole and do not observe all the forms of the parts, they seem smaller in proportion as the individual details evade our observation; but when all the details are seen, we measure the objects accurately and know how large they are. And those magnitudes that are of one form and like colour throughout cheat our sight, too, because it is not very well able to measure them part by part, since it slips off them as it measures by parts because it has no firm resting-place given it in each individual part by its distinction from others. And things far off appear near because the real extent of the distance between is contracted for the same reason. The near part of the distance appears in its true extent, from the same causes; but the sight cannot go through the far part of the distance and see its forms as they really are, and so it is not able to say how great in magnitude it really is.

2. It has been said elsewhere that the explanation by lesser angle of vision does not apply; but we should now add this, that the man who says that something appears smaller because of the lesser angle of vision leaves the rest of the sight seeing something outside, either another object or something that is completely out of the angle of vision, air for instance. When, therefore, he leaves nothing outside the angle of vision because the mountain [for instance] is large, but either the eye's range is equal to the object and can see nothing beyond it, in that the dimensions of the field of vision correspond with those of the seen object, or the seen object even extends beyond the field of vision on both sides,

φαινομένου τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, πάσῃ δὲ τῇ ὄψει ὁρωμένου; Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ θεωροῖ, ἀναμφισβητήτως μάθοι ἄν τις. Πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡμισφαίριον οὐκ ἄν τις ὁρᾶν μιᾷ προσβολῇ δύναιτο, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χυθῆναι ἡ ὄψις μέχρις αὐτοῦ ἐκτεινομένη. Ἀλλ' εἴ τις βούλεται, δεδόσθω. Εἰ οὖν πᾶσα μὲν περιέλαβε πᾶν, πολλαπλάσιον δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ φαινομένου ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τοῦ ἔλαττον πολλῷ ἢ ἐστι φαίνεσθαι, πῶς ἂν ἐλάττωσιν γωνίας τοῦ ἐλάττω φαίνεσθαι τὰ πόρρω αἰτιῷτο;

what will anyone say then, when the object appears far smaller than it is but is seen with the whole sight? But certainly, if one looked at the sky one could discover the truth of this without any possibility of doubt. One could not, of course, see the whole hemisphere with one look, nor could the sight be spread out so widely, extending over the whole of it. But if anyone likes, let it be granted that this is possible. If, then, the whole sight includes the whole hemisphere, and the size of what is seen is in the actual sky many times greater than the appearance, far less than it really is, how could one make the lessening of the angle of vision responsible for distant objects appearing small?

II. 9. AGAINST THE GNOSTICS

Introductory Note

THIS treatise (No. 33 in Porphyry's chronological order) is in fact the concluding section of a single long treatise which Porphyry, in order to carry out his design of grouping his master's works, more or less according to subject, into six sets of nine treatises, hacked roughly into four parts which he put into different Enneads, the other three being III. 8 (30) V. 8 (31) and V. 5 (32). Porphyry says (*Life* ch. 16. 11) that he gave the treatise the title *Against the Gnostics* (he is presumably also responsible for the titles of the other sections of the cut-up treatise). There is an alternative title in *Life*, ch. 24. 56–57 which runs *Against those who say that the maker of the universe is evil and the universe is evil.*

The treatise as it stands in the Enneads is a most powerful protest on behalf of Hellenic philosophy against the un-Hellenic heresy (as it was from the Platonist as well as the orthodox Christian point of view) of Gnosticism. There were Gnostics among Plotinus's own friends, whom he had not succeeded in converting (ch. 10 of this treatise) and he and his pupils devoted considerable time and energy to anti-Gnostic controversy (*Life* ch. 16). He obviously considered Gnosticism an extremely dangerous influence, likely to pervert the minds even of members of his own circle. It is impossible to attempt to give an account of Gnosticism here. By far the best discussion of what the particular group of Gnostics Plotinus knew believed is M. Puech's admirable contribution to *Entretiens Hardt* V

(*Les Sources de Plotin*)[1]. But it is important for the understanding of this treatise to be clear about the reasons why Plotinus disliked them so intensely and thought their influence so harmful. The teaching of the Gnostics seems to him untraditional, irrational and immoral. They despise and revile the ancient Platonic teaching and claim to have a new and superior wisdom of their own: but in fact anything that is true in their teaching comes from Plato, and all they have done themselves is to add senseless complications and pervert the true traditional doctrine into a melodramatic, superstitious fantasy designed to feed their own delusions of grandeur. They reject the only true way of salvation through wisdom and virtue, the slow patient study of truth and pursuit of perfection by men who respect the wisdom of the ancients and know their place in the universe. They claim to be a privileged caste of beings, in whom alone God is interested, and who are saved not by their own efforts but by some dramatic and arbitrary divine proceeding; and this, Plotinus says, leads to immorality. Worst of all, they despise and hate the material universe and deny its goodness and the goodness of its maker. This for a Platonist is utter blasphemy, and all the worse because it obviously derives to some extent from the sharply other-worldly side of Plato's own teaching (e.g. in the *Phaedo*). At this point in his attack Plotinus comes very close in some ways to the orthodox Christian opponents of Gnosticism, who also insist that this world is the good work of God in his goodness. But, here as on the question of salvation, the doctrine which Plotinus is defending is as sharply opposed in other ways to orthodox Christianity as to Gnosticism: for he maintains not only the goodness of the material universe but also its eternity and its divinity. The idea that the universe could have a beginning and end is inseparably connected in his mind with the idea that the divine action

[1] Vandoeuvres 1960, pp. 161–190.

in making it is arbitrary and irrational. And to deny the divinity (though a subordinate and dependent divinity) of the World-Soul, and of those noblest of embodied living beings the heavenly bodies, seems to him both blasphemous and unreasonable.

Synopsis

Short statement of the doctrine of the three hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul; there cannot be more or fewer than these three. Criticism of attempts to multiply the hypostases, and especially of the idea of two intellects, one which thinks and the other which thinks that it thinks. (ch. 1). The true doctrine of Soul (ch. 2). The law of necessary procession and the eternity of the universe (ch. 3). Attack on the Gnostic doctrine of the making of the universe by a fallen soul, and on their despising of the universe and the heavenly bodies (chs. 4–5). The senseless jargon of the Gnostics, their plagiarism from and perversion of Plato, and their insolent arrogance (ch. 6). The true doctrine about Universal Soul and the goodness of the universe which it forms and rules (chs. 7–8). Refutation of objections from the inequalities and injustices of human life (ch. 9). Ridiculous arrogance of the Gnostics who refuse to acknowledge the hierarchy of created gods and spirits and say that they alone are sons of God and superior to the heavens (ch. 9). The absurdities of the Gnostic doctrine of the fall of " Wisdom " (Sophia) and of the generation and activities of the Demiurge, maker of the visible universe (chs. 10–12). False and melodramatic Gnostic teaching about the cosmic spheres and their influence (ch. 13). The blasphemous falsity of the Gnostic claim to control the higher powers by magic and the absurdity of their claim to cure diseases by casting out demons (ch. 14). The false other-worldliness of the Gnostics leads to immorality (ch. 15). The true Platonic other-worldliness, which loves and venerates the material

universe in all its goodness and beauty as the most perfect possible image of the intelligible, contrasted at length with the false, Gnostic, other-worldliness which hates and despises the material universe and its beauties (chs. 16–18).

II. 9. (33) ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΓΝΩΣΤΙΚΟΥΣ

1. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἁπλῆ φύσις καὶ πρώτη—πᾶν γὰρ τὸ οὐ πρῶτον οὐχ ἁπλοῦν—καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἕν τι, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς λεγομένου ἡ φύσις ἡ αὐτή—καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο, εἶτα ἀγαθόν—ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν τἀγαθόν, τὴν αὐτὴν[1] δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν φύσιν καὶ μίαν λέγειν οὐ κατηγοροῦντας ἐκείνης οὐδέν, δηλοῦντας δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οἷόν τε. Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον δὲ οὕτως, ὅτι ἁπλούστατον, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ ἀναρτηθήσεται εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν· καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ παρ' ἄλλου. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲ παρ' ἄλλου μηδὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδὲ σύνθεσις μηδεμία, ἀνάγκη μηδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προστησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν πρώτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν—αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν—μήτε πλείω τούτων τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μήτε ἐλάττω.

[1] *τὴν αὐτὴν* Heigl, H-S²: *ταύτην* codd.

[1] This is a reference back to the conclusion of what, as Plotinus wrote it, was the preceding section of the same treatise, which appears in the *Enneads* as V. 5; cp. V. 5. 13. 33–36.

II. 9. AGAINST THE GNOSTICS

1. Since, then, the simple nature of the Good appeared to us as also primal (for all that is not primal is not simple), and as something which has nothing in itself, but is some one thing;[1] and since the nature of what is called the One is the same (for this is not some other thing first and then one, nor is the Good something else first, and then good), whenever we say "the One" and whenever we say "the Good," we must think that the nature we are speaking of is the same nature, and call it "one" not as predicating anything of it but as making it clear to ourselves as far as we can. And we call it the First in the sense that it is simplest, and the Self-Sufficient, because it is not composed of a number of parts; for if it were, it would be dependent upon the things of which it was composed; and we say that it is not in something else, because everything which is in something else also comes from something else. If, then, it is not from something else or in something else or any kind of compound, it is necessary that there should be nothing above it. So we must not go after other first principles but put this first, and then after it Intellect, that which primally thinks, and then Soul after Intellect (for this is the order which corresponds to the nature of things): and we must not posit more principles than these in the intelligible world, or

Εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταὐτὸν φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, ἐδείχθη πολλαχῇ. Λοιπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τῶν τριῶν τούτων, τίνες ἂν οὖν εἶεν φύσεις παρ' αὐτάς. Τῆς τε γὰρ λεχθείσης οὕτως ἔχειν ἀρχῆς τῆς πάντων οὐδεὶς ἂν εὕροι ἁπλουστέραν οὐδ' ἐπαναβεβηκυῖαν ἡντινοῦν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν μὲν δυνάμει, τὴν δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ φήσουσι· γελοῖον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσι καὶ ἀύλοις τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ διαιρουμένους φύσεις ποιεῖσθαι πλείους. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα· οὐδ' ἐπινοεῖν τὸν μέν τινα νοῦν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ τινί, τὸν δὲ οἷον κινούμενον. Τίς γὰρ ἂν

[1] Here, and in what follows in the rest of the chapter, Plotinus is probably not only, or even primarily, concerned with explicitly Gnostic doctrines. He is attacking views which were held in the Platonic school and to which he had himself at one time been prepared to make some concessions. The idea that there were two or more Intellects seems to have arisen in the course of discussions about the meaning of Plato, *Timaeus* 39E, and the relationship of the intellect of the Demiurge to the intelligible model of the universe, which had long been discussed in the Platonic school (as it still is by modern scholars). Amelius, according to Proclus, (*In Timaeum* III. 268A, p. 103. 18 ff., Diehl), came to the conclusion that there were three Intellects, the "existing," the "possessing" and the "seeing," a view which had a considerable influence on the later developments of Neoplatonic doctrine (cp. Dodds's commentary on Proclus, *Elements of Theology* prop. 167). And in the first of the early notes collected by Porphyry in III. 9, Plotinus puts forward a distinction between an Intellect "in repose," and another which is an "activity proceeding from it" and "sees" it, very similar to the

fewer. For if people posit fewer, they will either assert that Soul and Intellect are the same, or Intellect and the First; but it has been shown in many places that they are different from each other. It remains to investigate in our present discussion, if we are to posit more than these three, whatever other natures there could be beside them. No one could find any principle simpler than the principle of all things which we have said to be as above described, or transcending it. For they will not assert that there is one principle which exists potentially and another which exists actually; for it would be ridiculous to distinguish things existing actually and potentially, and so multiply natures, in things which exist actually and are without matter. It is not even possible to do this in the things which come after these. One cannot conceive one intellect of some sort in a sort of repose and another in a kind of way in motion.[1] What would the repose of Intellect be,

distinction criticised here. This distinction seems to go back to Numenius, whose thought had affinities with Gnosticism (cp. Dodds on Proclus *El. Th.* prop. 168). Dodds also thinks that Numenius may be the author of the other distinction criticised here between the Intellect that thinks and the other which thinks that it thinks. But the passage describing Numenius's doctrine about the thinking of his three Intellects (Proclus *In Tim.* III. 268A–B, p. 103, 28 ff.; Diehl = Numenius test. 25 Leemans Fr.22 Desplaces) is too obscure for any certainty. Similar ideas were, of course current among the Gnostics, but it is important to remember that they were seriously put forward in Plotinus's own circle, by others than professed Gnostics. The Gnostics themselves, especially Valentinus, derived some of their ideas from Platonism and Neopythagoreanism, which makes it easier to understand the reciprocal influence they exercised on some Platonists and Neophythagoreans.

ἡσυχία νοῦ καὶ τίς κίνησις καὶ προφορὰ ἂν εἴη ἢ τίς ἀργία καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου τί ἔργον; Ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἔστι νοῦς ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἐνεργείᾳ κείμενος ἑστώσῃ· κίνησις δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ψυχῆς ἤδη ἔργον καὶ λόγος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς ψυχὴν ψυχὴν νοερὰν ποιῶν, οὐκ ἄλλην τινὰ μεταξὺ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσιν. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦτο πλείους νοῦς ποιεῖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁ δὲ νοεῖ ὅτι νοεῖ. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλο τὸ ἐν τούτοις νοεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ, ἀλλ' οὖν μία προσβολὴ οὐκ ἀναίσθητος τῶν ἐνεργημάτων ἑαυτῆς· γελοῖον δὲ[1] ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ νοῦ τοῦτο ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ πάντως γε ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται ὅσπερ ἐνόει ὁ νοῶν ὅτι νοεῖ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν ἔσται νοῶν μόνον, ὁ δὲ ὅτι νοεῖ νοῶν ἄλλου ὄντος, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νενοηκότος. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπινοίᾳ φήσουσι, πρῶτον μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ὑποστάσεων ἀποστήσονται· ἔπειτα δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ καὶ αἱ ἐπίνοιαι χώραν ἔχουσι λαβεῖν νοῦν νοοῦντα μόνον, μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα δὲ ἑαυτῷ ὅτι νοεῖ· ὃ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εἰ γίγνοιτο τῶν ἀεὶ ἐπισταθμούντων ταῖς ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς διανοήσεσιν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως σπουδαῖοι εἶεν, αἰτίαν ἂν ἀφροσύνης ἔχοιεν. Ὅταν δὲ δὴ ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσιν αὐτὸν νοῇ καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν ᾖ τὸ νοητὸν

[1] δὲ Harder: γὰρ codd. H-S.

and what its motion and "going forth," or what would be its inactivity, and what the work of the other intellect? Intellect is as it is, always the same, resting in a static activity. Movement towards it and around it is already the work of Soul, and a rational principle proceeding from Intellect to Soul and making Soul intellectual, not making another nature between Intellect and Soul. Again, the supposition that one intellect thinks and the other thinks that it thinks, is certainly not a reason for making several intellects. For even if on our level it is one thing for an intellect to think and another for it to think that it thinks, yet all the same its thinking is a single application of the mind not unaware of its own activities; but it would be absurd to suppose this duality to exist in the case of the true Intellect, but the intellect which thinks that it thinks will be altogether the same as the intellect which did the thinking. Otherwise one intellect will be only thinking, and the other will be thinking that it thinks, but the thinking subject will be another, and not itself. But if they are going to assert that the distinction is only in our thought, first of all they will be abandoning the idea of a plurality of hypostases. Then we must consider if we can make distinctions in thought which leave room for the assumption of an intellect which only thinks, but is not conscious of its thinking. If this happened to ourselves, who always watch over our impulses and thought processes, if we are even moderately serious people, we should be blamed for witlessness. But certainly when the true Intellect thinks itself in its thoughts and its object of thought is not outside but it is itself also its

αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἢ καὶ τὸ νοητόν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν· ὁρῶν δ' ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀνοηταίνοντα, ἀλλὰ νοοῦντα ὁρᾷ. Ὥστε ἐν τῷ πρώτως νοεῖν ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ ὡς ἓν ὄν· καὶ οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἐκεῖ διπλοῦν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῶν εἴη, ὅπερ ἔστι, τίς χώρα τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῇ χωριζούσῃ τὸ νοεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ; Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἑτέραν ἐπίνοιάν τις τρίτην ἐπεισάγοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῇ λεγούσῃ νοεῖν ὅτι νοεῖ, τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι νοεῖ ὅτι νοεῖ ὅτι νοεῖ, ἔτι μᾶλλον καταφανὲς τὸ ἄτοπον. Καὶ διὰ τί οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον οὕτω; Τὸν δὲ λόγον ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ποιῇ, εἶτα ἀπὸ τούτου γίνεσθαι ἐν ψυχῇ ἄλλον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μεταξὺ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ ἢ οὗτος, ἀποστερήσει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ κομιεῖται, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ἄλλου τοῦ μεταξύ, τὸν λόγον· καὶ εἴδωλον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγον ἕξει, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ εἰδήσει νοῦν οὐδὲ ὅλως νοήσει.

2. Οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε πλείω τούτων οὔτε ἐπινοίας περιττὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἃς οὐ δέχονται, θετέον, ἀλλ' ἕνα νοῦν τὸν αὐτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀκλινῆ πανταχῇ, μιμούμενον τὸν πατέρα καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτῷ. Ψυχῆς δὲ ἡμῶν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς

object of thought, it necessarily in its thinking possesses itself and sees itself: and when it sees itself it does so not as without intelligence but as thinking. So that in its primary thinking it would have also the thinking that it thinks, as an existent unity; and it is not double, even in thought, there in the intelligible world. And further, if it is always thinking what it is, what room is there for the distinction in thought which separates thinking from thinking that it thinks? But if one even introduced another, third, distinction in addition to the second one which said that it thinks that it thinks, one which says that it thinks that it thinks that it thinks, the absurdity would become even clearer. And why should one not go on introducing distinctions in this way to infinity? But when someone makes the rational principle proceed from Intellect, and then makes another principle come to be in the soul from the first rational principle itself, in order to make this first principle an intermediary between soul and Intellect, he will deprive soul of thinking, if it does not get its principle of thinking from Intellect but from another principle, the intermediary: and it will have an image of a rational principle, but not a principle, and it will not know Intellect at all or think at all.

2. One must not, then, posit more beings than these, nor make superfluous distinctions in the realities of the intelligible world which the nature of these realities does not admit: we must lay down that there is one intellect, unchangeably the same, without any sort of decline, imitating the Father as far as is possible to it: and that one part of our soul is

ἐκείνοις, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν, τὸ δ' ἐν μέσῳ τούτων· φύσεως γὰρ οὔσης μιᾶς ἐν δυνάμεσι πλείοσιν ὁτὲ μὲν τὴν πᾶσαν συμφέρεσθαι τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτῆς καθελκυσθὲν συνεφελκύσασθαι τὸ μέσον· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἦν θέμις καθελκύσαι. Καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ πάθος, ὅτι μὴ ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὅπου ψυχὴ μείνασα ἡ μὴ μέρος, μηδὲ ἧς ἡμεῖς ἔτι μέρος, ἔδωκε τῷ παντὶ σώματι αὐτῷ τε ἔχειν ὅσον δύναται παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχειν, μένει τε ἀπραγμόνως αὐτὴ οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας διοικοῦσα οὐδέ τι διορθουμένη, ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς θέᾳ κατακοσμοῦσα δυνάμει θαυμαστῇ. Ὅσον γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῇ ἐστι, τόσῳ καλλίων καὶ δυνατωτέρα· κἀκεῖθεν ἔχουσα δίδωσι τῷ μετ' αὐτὴν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐλλάμπουσα ἀεὶ ἐλλάμπεται.

3. Ἀεὶ οὖν ἐλλαμπομένη καὶ διηνεκὲς ἔχουσα τὸ φῶς δίδωσιν εἰς τὰ ἐφεξῆς, τὰ δ' ἀεὶ συνέχεται καὶ ἄρδεται τούτῳ τῷ φωτὶ καὶ ἀπολαύει τοῦ ζῆν καθ' ὅσον δύναται· ὥσπερ εἰ πυρὸς ἐν μέσῳ που κειμένου ἀλεαίνοιντο οἷς οἷόν τε. Καίτοι τὸ πῦρ ἐστιν ἐν μέτρῳ· ὅταν δὲ δυνάμεις μὴ μετρηθεῖσαι μὴ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὦσιν ἀνῃρημέναι, πῶς οἷόν τε εἶναι μέν, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνειν; Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον τὸ αὑτοῦ διδόναι καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, ἢ ὁ νοῦς οὐ νοῦς, ἢ ψυχὴ μὴ τοῦτο, εἰ μή τι μετὰ τοῦ πρώτως ζῆν

always directed to the intelligible realities, one to the things of this world, and one is in the middle between these; for since the soul is one nature in many powers, sometimes the whole of it is carried along with the best of itself and of real being, sometimes the worse part is dragged down and drags the middle with it; for it is not lawful for it to drag down the whole. This misfortune befalls it because it does not remain in the noblest, where the soul remains which is not a part—and at that stage we, too, are not a part of it—and grants to the whole of body to hold whatever it can hold from it, but remains itself untroubled, not managing body as a result of discursive thinking, nor setting anything right, but ordering it with a wonderful power by its contemplation of that which is before it. The more it is directed to that contemplation, the fairer and more powerful it is. It receives from there and gives to what comes after it, and is always illuminated as it illuminates.

3. Since, therefore, it is always illuminated and continually holds the light, it gives it to what comes next after it, and this is held together and fertilised by this light and enjoys its share of life as far as it can; as if there was a fire placed somewhere in the middle and those who were capable of it were warmed. Yet fire has its limited dimensions; but when powers which are not limited to precise dimensions are not separated from real being, how can they exist without anything participating in them? But each of necessity must give of its own to something else as well, or the Good will not be the Good, or Intellect Intellect, or the soul this that it is, unless with the

ζῴη[1] καὶ δευτέρως ἕως ἔστι τὸ πρώτως. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἐφεξῆς εἶναι πάντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀεί, γενητὰ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ παρ' ἄλλων εἶναι. Οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται· οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἃ· ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔχει εἰς ὅ, οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται. Εἰ δέ τις εἰς ὕλην λέγοι, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν ὕλην; Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ὕλην φήσει, τίς ἦν ἀνάγκη, φήσομεν, γενέσθαι; Εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φήσουσι παρακολουθεῖν, καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη. Εἰ δὲ μόνη καταλειφθήσεται, οὐ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένῳ τὰ θεῖα ἔσται καὶ οἷον ἀποτετειχισμένα· εἰ δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε, ἐλλαμφθήσεται.

4. Εἰ δὲ οἷον πτερορρυήσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν φήσουσι πεποιηκέναι, οὐχ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς τοῦτο πάσχει· εἰ δὲ σφαλεῖσαν αὐτοὶ φήσουσι, τοῦ σφάλματος λεγέτωσαν τὴν αἰτίαν. Πότε δὲ ἐσφάλη; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀιδίου, μένει κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον ἐσφαλμένη· εἰ δὲ ἤρξατο, διὰ τί οὐ πρὸ τοῦ; Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ νεῦσίν φαμεν τὴν ποιοῦσαν,

[1] ζῴη Perna et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ζωὴ wxy, H-S: ζωῇ Q.

[1] The phrase is taken from Plato, *Phaedrus* 246C. It is clear from what follows in Plato that the reference is only to the fall of *human* souls. But a reading of the passage will show how the Gnostics might have misinterpreted it to fit in with their own doctrines.

primal living some secondary life lives as long as the primal exists. Of necessity, then, all things must exist for ever in ordered dependence upon each other: those other than the First have come into being in the sense that they are derived from other, higher, principles. Things that are said to have come into being did not just come into being [at a particular moment] but always were and always will be in process of becoming: nor will anything be dissolved except those things which have something to be dissolved into; that which has nothing into which it can be dissolved will not perish. If anyone says that it will be dissolved into matter, why should he not also say that matter will be dissolved? But if he is going to say that, what necessity was there, we shall reply, for it to come into being? But if they are going to assert that it was necessary for it to come into being as a consequence of the existence of higher principles, the necessity is there *now* as well. But if matter is going to remain alone, the divine principles will not be everywhere but in a particular limited place; they will be, so to speak, walled off from matter; but if this is impossible, matter will be illuminated by them.

4. But if they are going to assert that the soul made the world when it had, so to speak, "shed its wings,"[1] this does not happen to the Soul of the All; but if they are going to say that it made the world as the result of a moral failure, let them tell us the cause of the failure. But when did it fail? If it was from eternity, it abides in a state of failure according to their own account. If it began to fail, why did it not begin before? But we say that the making act of the

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ νεῦσιν. Εἰ δὲ ἔνευσε, τῷ ἐπιλελῆσθαι δηλονότι τῶν ἐκεῖ· εἰ δὲ ἐπελάθετο, πῶς δημιουργεῖ; Πόθεν γὰρ ποιεῖ ἢ ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐκεῖ; Εἰ δὲ ἐκείνων μεμνημένη ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔνευσεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ ἀμυδρῶς ἔχει. Οὐ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ἀμυδρῶς ἴδῃ; Διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἔχουσα ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ἐπανελθεῖν; Τί γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἐλογίζετο γενέσθαι ἐκ τοῦ κοσμοποιῆσαι; Γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ ἵνα τιμῷτο, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα. Ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ διανοίᾳ ἐποίει καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ποιοῦσα ἦν, πῶς ἂν κόσμον τόνδε ἐποίησε; Πότε δὲ καὶ φθερεῖ αὐτόν; εἰ γὰρ μετέγνω, τί ἀναμένει; Εἰ δὲ οὔπω, οὐδ' ἂν μεταγνοίη ἔτι ἤδη εἰθισμένη καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ προσφιλεστέρα γενομένη. Εἰ δὲ τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον ψυχὰς ἀναμένει, ἤδη ἔδει μηκέτι ἐλθεῖν εἰς γένεσιν πάλιν πειραθείσας ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ γενέσει τῶν τῇδε κακῶν· ὥστε ἤδη ἂν ἐπέλιπον ἰοῦσαι. Οὐδὲ τὸ κακῶς γεγονέναι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον δοτέον τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ δυσχερῆ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀξίωμα μεῖζόν ἐστι περιτιθέντων αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ

soul is not a declination but rather a non-declination. But if it declined, it was obviously because it had forgotten the intelligible realities; but if it forgot them, how is it the craftsman of the world? For what is the source of its making, if not what it saw in the intelligible world? But if it makes in remembrance of those intelligible realities, it has not declined at all, not even if it only has them dimly present in it. Does it not rather incline to the intelligible world, in order not to see dimly? For why, if it had any memory at all, did it not want to ascend there? For whatever advantage did it think was going to result for it from making the universe? It is ridiculous to suppose that it did so in order to be honoured; the people who suppose so are transferring to it what is true of the sculptors here below. Then again, if it made the world by discursive reasoning and its making was not in its nature, and its power was not a productive power, how could it have made this particular universe? And when, too, is it going to destroy it? For if it was sorry it had made it, what is it waiting for? But if it is not sorry yet, it is not likely to be, since it has got used to the universe by now and grown more kindly disposed to it with the passage of time. But if it is waiting for the individual souls, they ought by now to have stopped coming again to birth, since they have made trial in their former birth of the evils in this world; so that they would have left off coming here by now. We cannot grant, either, that this universe had an evil origin because there are many unpleasant things in it: this is a judgement of people who rate it too highly, if they claim that it ought to be the same as

εἰκόνα ἐκείνου. Ἢ τίς ἂν ἐγένετο ἄλλη καλλίων εἰκὼν ἐκείνου; Τί γὰρ ἄλλο πῦρ βελτίων[1] τοῦ ἐκεῖ πυρὸς παρὰ τὸ ἐνταῦθα πῦρ; Ἢ τίς γῆ ἄλλη παρὰ ταύτην μετὰ τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν; Τίς δὲ σφαῖρα ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ σεμνοτέρα ἢ εὐτακτοτέρα τῇ φορᾷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκεῖ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ νοητοῦ περιοχὴν ἐν αὐτῷ; Ἄλλος δὲ ἥλιος μετ' ἐκεῖνον πρὸ τούτου τοῦ ὁρωμένου τίς;

5. Ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς μὲν σῶμα ἔχοντας, οἷον ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ λύπας καὶ ὀργὰς τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς δύναμιν μὴ ἀτιμάζειν, ἀλλ' ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγειν ἐξεῖναι, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ ταύτης ἀπαθεστέραν ἐν τάξει μᾶλλον καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοιώσει μᾶλλον οὖσαν, οὐδὲ φρόνησιν ἔχειν ἀμείνονα ἡμῶν τῶν ἄρτι γενομένων καὶ διὰ τοσούτων κωλυομένων τῶν ἀπατώντων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐλθεῖν· οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ θείαν λέγειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φαυλοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄστρα μὴ τῆς ἀθανάτου κεκοινωνηκέναι ἐκ πολλῷ καλλιόνων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ὄντα, ὁρῶντας ἐκεῖ μὲν τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ εὔσχημον καὶ εὔτακτον καὶ μάλιστα τὴν ἐνταῦθα περὶ γῆν ἀταξίαν αὐτοὺς αἰτιωμένους· ὥσπερ τῆς ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς τὸν χείρω τόπον ἐπίτηδες ἑλομένης, παραχωρῆσαι δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος τῇ θνητῇ ψυχῇ ἑλομένης. Ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἡ παρεισαγωγὴ αὐτοῖς τῆς ἑτέρας ψυχῆς

[1] *βελτίων* Heigl, H-S²: *βέλτιον* codd.

the intelligible world and not only an image of it. Surely, what other fairer image of the intelligible world could there be? For what other fire could be a better image of the intelligible fire than the fire here? Or what other earth could be better than this, after the intelligible earth? And what sphere could be more exact or more dignified or better ordered in its circuit [than the sphere of this universe] after the self-enclosed circle there of the intelligible universe? And what other sun could there be which ranked after the intelligible sun and before this visible sun here?

5. But really! For these people who have a body like men have, and desire and griefs and passions, by no means to despise their own power but to say that *they* can grasp the intelligible, but that there is no power in the sun which is freer than this power of ours from affections and more ordered and more unchangeable, and that the sun has not a better understanding than we have, who have only just come to birth and are hindered by so many things that cheat us from coming to the truth! And to say that *their* soul, and the soul of the meanest of men, is immortal and divine, but that the whole heaven and the stars there have no share given them in the immortal soul, though they are made of much fairer and purer material, though these people see the order there and the excellence of form and arrangement, and are particularly addicted to complaining about the disorder here around the earth! As if the immortal soul had taken care to choose the worse place, and chosen to retire from the better in favour of the mortal soul! Unreasonable, too, is their slipping in of this

ταύτης, ἣν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων συνιστᾶσι· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ζωὴν ἡντινοῦν ἔχοι ἡ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων σύστασις; Ἡ γὰρ τούτων κρᾶσις ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ μικτὸν ποιεῖ, ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν ἢ μῖγμα ἐκ τούτων. Πῶς δὲ συνοχὴ τῶν τεσσάρων ὑστέρα γενομένη ἐξ αὐτῶν; Ὅταν δὲ προστιθῶσι καὶ ἀντίληψιν αὐτῇ καὶ βούλευσιν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τί ἄν τις εἴποι; Ἀλλὰ οὐ τιμῶντες ταύτην τὴν δημιουργίαν οὐδὲ τήνδε τὴν γῆν καινὴν αὐτοῖς γῆν φασι γεγονέναι, εἰς ἣν δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπελεύσονται· τοῦτο δὲ λόγον εἶναι κόσμου. Καίτοι τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι ἐν παραδείγματι κόσμου, ὃν μισοῦσι; Πόθεν δὲ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦτο; Τοῦτο γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς νενευκότος ἤδη πρὸς τὰ τῇδε τοῦ τὸ παράδειγμα πεποιηκότος. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ποιήσαντι πολλὴ φροντὶς τοῦ κόσμον[1] μετὰ τὸν κόσμον τὸν νοητὸν ὃν ἔχει ἄλλον ποιῆσαι—καὶ τί ἔδει;—καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου, ἵνα τί; Ἵνα φυλάξωνται αἱ ψυχαί. Πῶς οὖν; οὐκ ἐφυλάξαντο, ὥστε μάτην ἐγένετο. Εἰ δὲ μετὰ τὸν κόσμον ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου λαβὼν ἀποσυλήσας τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶδος, ἤρκει ἡ

[1] κόσμον Kirchhoff, H-S: κόσμου codd.

[1] Cp. the Coptic Gnostic work edited by C. Schmidt (in *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften* I, Leipzig, 1905: ed. altera ed. W. Till, Berlin 1954) and by C. A. Baynes (*A Coptic Gnostic Treatise contained in the Codex Brucianus*, Cambridge, 1933).

other soul of theirs, which they compose of the elements. For how could the composition of the elements have any sort of life? For the mixture of the elements makes hot or cold or a mixture of the two, or dry or wet or a mixture of these. And how can the soul be the principle which holds the four elements together when it has come into being out of them afterwards? But what can one say when they attribute to the soul compounded of the elements perception and deliberation and innumerable other things as well? But they do not honour this creation or this earth, but say that a new earth [1] has come into existence for them, to which, say they, they will go away from this one: and that this is the rational form of the universe. And yet why do they feel the need to be there in the archetype of the universe which they hate? And where did this archetype come from? It came into existence according to them, when its maker had already inclined towards this world. Well, then, if there was in the maker himself a great concern to make a universe after the intelligible universe which he possesses—and what need was there to do so?—and if it existed before our universe, what did he make it for? To put the souls on their guard. How could that be? They were not on their guard, so there was no point in its existence. But if he made it after this universe, taking the form out of the universe and stripping it off the matter, then their testing in this world would

The new earth is spoken of at p. 352, 6–12 Schmidt, p. 136 Baynes: Nicotheos, one of the alleged authors of spurious Gnostic revelations mentioned by Porphyry in the *Life* (ch. 16) appears in this Coptic Treatise.

πεῖρα ταῖς πειραθείσαις ψυχαῖς πρὸς τὸ φυλάξασθαι. Εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς λαβεῖν ἀξιοῦσι τοῦ κόσμου τὸ εἶδος, τί τὸ καινὸν τοῦ λόγου;

6. Τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ὑποστάσεις τί χρὴ λέγειν ἃς εἰσάγουσι, παροικήσεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους καὶ μετανοίας; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ψυχῆς ταῦτα λέγουσι πάθη, ὅταν ἐν μετανοίᾳ ᾖ, καὶ ἀντιτύπους, ὅταν οἷον εἰκόνας τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτά πω τὰ ὄντα θεωρῇ, καινολογούντων ἐστὶν εἰς σύστασιν τῆς ἰδίας αἱρέσεως· ὡς γὰρ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἑλληνικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενοι ταῦτα σκευωροῦνται εἰδότων καὶ σαφῶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀτύφως λεγόντων ἀναβάσεις ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ εἰς θέαν ἀληθεστέραν μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον προιούσας. Ὅλως γὰρ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῖς παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἴληπται, τὰ δέ, ὅσα καινοτομοῦσιν, ἵνα ἰδίαν φιλοσοφίαν θῶνται, ταῦτα ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας εὕρηται. Ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ δίκαι καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ αἱ μετενσωματώσεις ἐκεῖθεν. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν δὲ πλῆθος ποιῆσαι, τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἄλλον καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ λεχθέντων εἴληπται· εἰπόντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ "ἦπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὃ ἔστι

[1] παροίκησις, μετάνοια, and ἀντίτυποι appear in the Coptic Gnostic treatise referred to in the note on ch. 5. p. 361, 35–p. 362, 3 Schmidt: p. 180 Baynes: on the extremely vague and fluctuating Gnostic meaning of these terms see the discussion in Entretiens Hardt V p. 181–2 (ἀντίτυποι) and p. 189–90 (μετάνοια and παροίκησις).

suffice to put on their guard the souls which had been tested in it. But if they claim to have received the form of the universe in their souls, what does this new way of speaking mean?

6. And what ought one to say of the other beings they introduce, their "Exiles" and "Impressions" and "Repentings"?[1] For if they say that these are affections of the soul, when it has changed its purpose, and "Impressions" when it is contemplating, in a way, images of realities and not the realities themselves, then these are the terms of people inventing a new jargon to recommend their own school: they contrive this meretricious language as if they had no connection with the ancient Hellenic school, though the Hellenes knew all this and knew it clearly, and spoke without delusive pomposity of ascents from the cave and advancing gradually closer and closer to a truer vision.[2] Generally speaking, some of these peoples' doctrines have been taken from Plato, but others, all the new ideas they have brought in to establish a philosophy of their own, are things they have found outside the truth. For the judgements too, and the rivers in Hades and the reincarnations come from Plato.[3] And the making a plurality in the intelligible world, Being, and Intellect, and the Maker different from Intellect, and Soul, is taken from the words in the *Timaeus*: for Plato says, "The maker of this universe thought that it should

[2] This, of course, refers to the simile of the Cave in Plato *Republic* VII. 514A ff.

[3] Cp. *Phaedo* 111D ff.; the mention of the "rivers in Hades" suggests that this is the one of Plato's myths of the after-life which Plotinus had particularly in mind here.

ζῷον καθορᾷ, τοσαύτας καὶ ὁ τόδε ποιῶν τὸ πᾶν διενοήθη σχεῖν." Οἱ δὲ οὐ συνέντες τὸν μὲν ἔλαβον ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἕτερον παρ' αὐτὸν θεωροῦντα, τὸν δὲ διανοούμενον—πολλάκις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ διανοουμένου ψυχή ἐστιν ἡ δημιουργοῦσα—καὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τοῦτον οἴονται εἶναι τὸν δημιουργόν ἀφεστηκότες τοῦ εἰδέναι τίς ὁ δημιουργός. Καὶ ὅλως τὸν τρόπον τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καταψεύδονται αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἕλκουσι τὰς δόξας τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν κατανενοηκότες, ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν μή. Καὶ πλῆθος νοητῶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἐξευρηκέναι δόξειν οἴονται αὐτῷ τῷ πλήθει τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ καὶ ἐλάττονι εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἄγοντες, δέον ἐκεῖ τὸ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀλίγον εἰς ἀριθμὸν διώκειν καὶ τῷ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πάντα ἀποδιδόντας ἀπηλλάχθαι, ἐκείνου τῶν πάντων ὄντος καὶ νοῦ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα καλὰ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην φύσιν. Ψυχῆς δὲ εἶδος τρίτον· διαφορὰς δὲ ψυχῶν ἐν πάθεσιν ἢ ἐν φύσει ἰχνεύειν μηδὲν τοὺς θείους ἄνδρας διασύροντας, ἀλλ' εὐμενῶς δεχομένους τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς παλαιοτέρων καὶ ἃ καλῶς λέγουσι παρ' ἐκείνων λαβόντας, ψυχῆς

[1] *Timaeus* 39E 7–9.

[2] Again, it looks as if Plotinus was thinking of "Gnosticising" Platonists, who derived their ideas to some extent from Numenius, at least as much as of Gnostics properly so called; cp. the second note on ch. 1.

contain all the forms that intelligence discerns contained in the Living Being that truly is."[1] But they did not understand, and took it to mean that there is one mind which contains in it in repose all realities, and another mind different from it which contemplates them, and another which plans—but often they have soul as the maker instead of the planning mind—and they think that this is the maker according to Plato, being a long way from knowing who the maker is.[2] And in general they falsify Plato's account of the manner of the making, and a great deal else, and degrade the great man's teachings as if they had understood the intelligible nature, but he and the other blessed philosophers had not.[3] And by giving names to a multitude of intelligible realities they think they will appear to have discovered the exact truth, though by this very multiplicity they bring the intelligible nature into the likeness of the sense-world, the inferior world, when one ought there in the intelligible to aim at the smallest possible number, and attribute everything to the reality which comes after the First and so be quit of multiplicity, since it is all things and the first intellect and substance and all the other excellences that come after the first nature. The form of soul should come third; and they should trace the differences of souls in affections or in nature, without in any way disparaging those godlike men, but receiving their teaching with a good grace since it is the teaching of more ancient authorities and they themselves have received what is good in what they

[3] Cp. what Porphyry says about the Gnostics in *Life* ch. 16, 8–9.

ἀθανασίαν, νοητὸν κόσμον, θεὸν τὸν πρῶτον, τὸ
40 τὴν ψυχὴν δεῖν φεύγειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁμιλίαν,
τὸν χωρισμὸν τὸν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ ἐκ γενέσεως
φεύγειν εἰς οὐσίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ κείμενα παρὰ τῷ
Πλάτωνι σαφῶς οὑτωσὶ λέγοντες καλῶς ποιοῦσιν.
Οἷς θέλουσι διαφωνεῖν φθόνος οὐδεὶς λεγόντων
οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τοὺς Ἕλληνας διασύρειν καὶ ὑβρίζειν
45 τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν συστάσει παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι ποιεῖν,
ἀλλ' αὐτὰ παρ' αὐτῶν δεικνύναι ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα,
ὅσα ἴδια αὐτοῖς ἔδοξε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων δόξαν
λέγειν, εὐμενῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως αὐτὰς τὰς δόξας
τιθέντας αὐτῶν καὶ οἷς ἐναντιοῦνται δικαίως, πρὸς
50 τὸ ἀληθὲς βλέποντας, οὐ τὴν εὐδοκίμησιν θηρωμέ-
νους ἐκ τοῦ [πρὸς] ἄνδρας κεκριμένους ἐκ παλαιοῦ
οὐ παρὰ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ψέγειν,
λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐκείνων ἀμείνους εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ
τά γε εἰρημένα τοῖς παλαιοῖς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν
πολλῷ ἀμείνω καὶ πεπαιδευμένως εἴρηται καὶ
55 τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπατωμένοις τὴν ἐπιθέουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώ-
πους ἀπάτην ῥᾳδίως γνωσθήσεται τάδ' [1] ὕστερον
τούτοις παρ' ἐκείνων ληφθέντα, προσθήκας δέ
τινας οὐδὲν προσηκούσας εἰληφότα, ἔν γε [2]οἷς
ἐναντιοῦσθαι θέλουσι γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς εἰσάγον-
τες παντελεῖς καὶ μεμφόμενοι τῷδε τῷ παντὶ καὶ
60 τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰτιώμενοι
καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ψέγοντες καὶ εἰς

[1] γνωσθήσεται τάδ' nunc Henry et Schwyzer: γνωσθήσεται· τὰ δ' H-S.
[2] ἔν γε Müller et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ἔν τε WXQ: ὥστε y.

say from them, the immortality of the soul, the intelligible universe, the first god, the necessity for the soul to shun fellowship with the body, the separation from the body, the escape from becoming to being. For these doctrines are there in Plato, and when they state them clearly in this way they do well. If they wish to disagree on these points, there is no unfair hostility in saying to them that they should not recommend their own opinions to their audience by ridiculing and insulting the Greeks but that they should show the correctness on their own merits of all the points of doctrine which are peculiar to them and differ from the views of the Greeks, stating their real opinions courteously, as befits philosophers, and fairly on the points where they are opposed, looking to the truth and not hunting fame by censuring men who have been judged good from ancient times by men of worth and saying that they themselves are better than the Greeks. For what was said by the ancients about the intelligible world is far better, and is put in a way appropriate to educated men, and it will be easily recognised by those who are not utterly deceived by the delusion that is rushing upon men that these teachings have been taken by the Gnostics later from the ancients, but have acquired some in no way appropriate additions; on the points, at any rate, on which they wish to oppose the ancient teachings they introduce all sorts of comings into being and passings away, and disapprove of this universe, and blame the soul for its association with the body, and censure the director of this universe, and identify its maker with the soul, and attribute to this universal soul the same

ταὐτὸν ἄγοντες τὸν δημιουργὸν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη διδόντες, ἅπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐν μέρει.

7. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε ἤρξατο οὔτε παύσεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀεὶ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, ἕως ἂν ἐκεῖνα ᾖ, εἴρηται. Τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ κοινωνίαν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πρὸ αὐτῶν εἴρηται ὡς οὐκ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας καὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λαμβάνειν ὅμοιον, ὡς εἴ τις τὸ τῶν χυτρέων ἢ χαλκέων λαβὼν γένος ἐν πόλει εὖ οἰκουμένῃ τὴν ἅπασαν ψέγοι. Δεῖ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς ὅλης ὅπως διοικεῖ, ὅτι μὴ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος μηδ' ἐνδεδεμένη. Πρὸς γὰρ αὖ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς, αἱ μυρίαι εἴρηνται ἐν ἄλλοις, κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἔδει ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος δεδέμεθα ἤδη δεσμοῦ γεγενημένου. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ πάσῃ ψυχῇ ἡ τοῦ σώματος φύσις δεδεμένη ἤδη συνδεῖ ὃ ἂν περιλάβῃ· αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν δέοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῆς δεδεμένων· ἄρχει γὰρ ἐκείνη. Διὸ καὶ ἀπαθὴς πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οὐ κύριοι· τὸ δ' ὅσον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον τὸ ὑπεράνω ἀκέραιον μένει καὶ οὐκ ἐμποδίζεται, ὅσον δὲ αὐτῆς δίδωσι τῷ σώματι ζωὴν οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτοῦ προσλαμβάνει. Ὅλως γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄλλου πάθημα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δέχεται, ὃ δ' αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτι τὸ αὐτοῦ δίδωσιν οἰκείαν ζωὴν ἔχοντι· οἷον εἰ ἐγκεντρισθέν τι εἴη ἐν ἄλλῳ, παθόντος μὲν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ συμπέπονθεν, αὐτὸ δὲ ξηρανθὲν εἴασεν ἐκεῖνο τὴν αὐτοῦ ζωὴν

affections as those which the souls in parts of the universe have.

7. It has been said already that this universe did not begin and will not come to an end but exists always as long as the intelligible realities exist. And it has been said before the Gnostics that the association of our soul with body is not to the advantage of the soul. But to apply conclusions drawn from our soul to the Soul of the All is as if somebody were to take the tribe of potters or smiths in a well-ordered city and make them a reason for blaming the whole. But one must take into account the differences between the universal soul and ours, in its management of body; it does not direct it in the same way, and is not bound to it. For, as well as all the other differences (of which we have mentioned a vast number elsewhere) this ought to have been taken into consideration, that we are bound by a body which has already become a bond. For the nature of body is already bound in the universal soul and binds whatever it grasps; but the Soul of the All could not be bound by the things it binds itself: for it is the ruler. Therefore it is unaffected by them, but we are not their masters; but that part of the universal which is directed to the divine above it remains pure, and is not hindered, but that part which gives life to the body takes no addition from it. For in general anything which is in something else is affected by what happens to it, but it does not itself give of its own to that other which has its own life. For instance, if a shoot of one tree is grafted on another, when anything happens to the stock the shoot is affected with it, but if the shoot is withered

ἔχειν. Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἀποσβεννυμένου τοῦ ἐν σοὶ πυρὸς τὸ ὅλον πῦρ ἀπέσβη· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν πῦρ ἀπόλοιτο, πάθοι ἄν τι ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος σύστασις, καὶ εἰ οἷόν τε εἴη διὰ τῶν λοιπῶν κόσμον τινὰ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν μέλοι τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ἐκεῖ. Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἡ σύστασις ὁμοίως τῷ παντὶ καὶ ζῴῳ ἑκάστῳ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οἷον ἐπιθεῖ κελεύσασα μένειν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὡς ὑπεκφεύγοντα εἰς τὴν τάξιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δέδεται δεσμῷ δευτέρῳ· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει ὅπου φύγῃ. Οὔτε οὖν ἐντὸς δεῖ κατέχειν οὔτε ἔξωθεν πιέζουσαν εἰς τὸ εἴσω ὠθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπου ἠθέλησεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις μένει. Ἐὰν δέ πού τι αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν κινηθῇ, οἷς οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, ταῦτα πάσχει, αὐτὰ δὲ καλῶς φέρεται ὡς τοῦ ὅλου· τὰ δὲ φθείρεται οὐ δυνάμενα τὴν τοῦ ὅλου τάξιν φέρειν, οἷον εἰ χοροῦ μεγάλου ἐν τάξει φερομένου ἐν μέσῃ τῇ πορείᾳ αὐτοῦ χελώνη ληφθεῖσα πατοῖτο οὐ δυνηθεῖσα φυγεῖν τὴν τάξιν τοῦ χοροῦ· εἰ μέντοι μετ' ἐκείνης τάξειεν ἑαυτήν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπὸ τούτων οὐδ' αὐτὴ πάθοι.

8. Τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἐποίησε κόσμον ταὐτὸν τῷ διὰ τί ἔστι ψυχὴ καὶ διὰ τί ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐποίησεν. Ὃ πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὴν λαμβανόντων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀεί·

up it leaves the stock to live its own life. So also, if the fire in you is quenched, the universal fire is not quenched as well: since even if the universal fire were destroyed, the soul there in the universe would not be in any way affected, but only the structure of its body, and, provided that the other elements made it possible for some sort of universe to exist, it would not in any way concern the soul there. For the structure is not the same in the All and in each living creature; but in the All soul, so to speak, runs over the surface ordering things to stay in their places, but in the individual the parts, as if they were trying to escape, are bound into their proper places by a second bond; but in the universe there is nowhere for them to escape to. Therefore soul does not have to hold them together within, or press upon them from outside and push them inwards, but its nature remains where it wished to be from the beginning. But if any of the parts of the universe is moved according to its nature, the parts with whose nature the movement is not in accord suffer, but those which are moved go on well, as parts of the whole; but the others are destroyed because they are not able to endure the order of the whole; as if when a great company of dancers was moving in order a tortoise was caught in the middle of its advance and trampled because it was not able to get out of the way of the ordered movement of the dancers: yet if it had ranged itself with that movement, even it would have taken no harm from them.

8. To ask why Soul made the universe is like asking why there is a soul and why the Maker makes. First, it is the question of people who assume a

ἔπειτα οἴονται τραπέντα ἔκ τινος εἴς τι καὶ μεταβάλλοντα αἴτιον τῆς δημιουργίας γεγονέναι. Διδακτέον οὖν αὐτούς, εἰ εὐγνωμόνως ἀνέχοιντο, τίς ἡ φύσις τούτων, ὡς αὐτοὺς παύσασθαι τῆς εἰς τὰ τίμια λοιδορίας ἣν εὐχερῶς ποιοῦνται ἀντὶ πολλῆς προσηκόντως ἂν γενομένης εὐλαβείας. Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν ὀρθῶς ἄν τις μέμψαιτο πρῶτον μὲν ἐνδεικνυμένην τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως τὸ μέγεθος. Εἰ γὰρ οὕτως εἰς τὸ ζῆν παρελήλυθεν, ὡς μὴ ζωὴν ἀδιάρθρωτον ἔχειν—ὁποῖα τὰ σμικρότερα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἃ τῇ πολλῇ ζωῇ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀεὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν γεννᾶται—ἀλλ' ἔστι συνεχὴς καὶ ἐναργὴς καὶ πολλὴ καὶ πανταχοῦ ζωὴ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ἐνδεικνυμένη, πῶς οὐκ ἄν τις ἄγαλμα ἐναργὲς καὶ καλὸν τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν εἴποι; Εἰ δὲ μιμούμενον μή ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἔτι μιμούμενον. Τὸ δὲ ἀνομοίως μεμιμῆσθαι ψεῦδος· οὐδὲν γὰρ παραλέλειπται ὧν οἷόν τε ἦν καλὴν εἰκόνα φυσικὴν ἔχειν. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν γὰρ ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας καὶ ἐπιτεχνήσεως τὸ μίμημα· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ἔσχατον τὸ νοητὸν εἶναι. Εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν ἔδει διττήν, τὴν μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὴν δὲ εἰς ἄλλο. Ἔδει οὖν εἶναί τι μετ' αὐτό· ἐκείνου γὰρ μόνου οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κάτω, ὃ τῶν πάντων ἀδυνατώτατόν ἐστι. Δύναμις δὲ θαυμαστὴ ἐκεῖ

[1] Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 37C6–7.
[2] Cp. ch. 3 for this law of necessary procession. Plotinus always insists that the eternal production of the universe is a unitary spontaneous act without any previous planning: cp. V. 8. 7.

beginning of that which always is: then they think that the cause of the making was a being who turned from one thing to another and changed. So they must be taught, if only they would endure the teaching with a good will, what is the nature of these beings, so as to stop them from abusing what are worthy of all honour, which they frivolously do instead of showing the reverent care which would be becoming. For it is not right to disapprove of the management of the All, first of all because it manifests the greatness of the intelligible nature. For if it has come into life in such a way that its life is not a disjointed one—like the smaller things in it which in its fullness of life it produces continually night and day—but coherent and clear and great and everywhere life, manifesting infinite wisdom, how should one not call it a clear and noble image of the intelligible gods?[1] If, being an image, it is not that intelligible world, this is precisely what is natural to it; if it was the intelligible world, it would not be an image of it. But it is false to say that the image is unlike the original; for nothing has been left out which it was possible for a fine natural image to have. The image has to exist, necessarily, not as the result of thought and contrivance;[2] the intelligible could not be the last, for it had to have a double activity, one in itself and one directed to something else. There had, then, to be something after it, for only that which is the most powerless of all things has nothing below it. But There a

θεῖ· ὥστε καὶ εἰργάσατο. Εἰ μὲν δὴ ἄλλος κόσμος ἔστι τούτου ἀμείνων, τίς οὗτος; Εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἄλλος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὸ μίμημα ἀποσῴζων ἐκείνου. Γῆ μὲν δὴ πᾶσα ζῴων ποικίλων πλήρης καὶ ἀθανάτων καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ μεστὰ πάντα· ἄστρα δὲ τά τε ἐν ταῖς ὑποκάτω σφαίραις τά τε ἐν τῷ ἀνωτάτω διὰ τί οὐ θεοὶ ἐν τάξει φερόμενα καὶ κόσμῳ περιόντα; Διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἀρετὴν ἕξουσιν ἢ τί κώλυμα πρὸς κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς αὐτοῖς; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐκεῖ, ἅπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ κακούς, οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος κακία ἐνοχλουμένη καὶ ἐνοχλοῦσα. Διὰ τί δὲ οὐ συνιᾶσιν ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν νῷ λαμβάνουσι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς νοητοὺς θεούς, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν σοφία βελτίων ἔσται τῶν ἐκεῖ; Ταῦτα τίς ἂν μὴ ἔκφρων γεγενημένος ἀνάσχοιτο; Ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰ μὲν βιασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἦλθον, πῶς βελτίους αἱ βιασθεῖσαι; Ἐν γὰρ ψυχαῖς τὸ κρατῆσαν κρεῖττον. Εἰ δ' ἑκοῦσαι, τί μέμφεσθε εἰς ὃν ἑκόντες ἤλθετε διδόντος καὶ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, εἴ τις μὴ ἀρέσκοιτο; Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἐξεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σοφίαν ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὄντας βιοῦν κατ' ἐκεῖνα, πῶς οὐ μαρτυρεῖ ἐξηρτῆσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ;

[1] Plotinus maintains that the celestial bodies of the astral gods (the visible heavenly bodies), though material, are altogether superior to our earthly bodies, being everlasting,

wonderful power runs, and so besides its inward activity it produces. If there is another universe better than this one, then what is this one? But if there must be a universe which preserves the image of the intelligible world, and there is no other, then this is that universe. Now certainly the whole earth is full of living creatures and immortal beings, and everything up to the sky is full of them: why, then are not the stars, both those in the lower spheres and those in the highest, gods moving in order, circling in well-arranged beauty? Why should they not possess virtue? What hindrance prevents them from acquiring it? The causes are not present there which make people bad here below, and there is no badness of body, disturbed and disturbing.[1] And why should they not have understanding, in their everlasting peace, and grasp in their intellect God and the intelligible gods? Shall our wisdom be greater than that of the gods there in the sky? Who, if he has not gone out of his mind, could tolerate the idea? Since, again, if the souls here came under compulsion by the Soul of the All, how are the souls under compulsion better? For among souls the dominant is the better. But if the souls came willingly, why do you blame the universe into which you came of your own free will, when it gives you leave, too, to get out of it, if any of you dislike it? But if this All is of such a kind that it is possible to have wisdom in it and to live according to that higher world when we are here, how does it not bear witness that it depends on the realities There?

impassible and no obstacles to the activity of soul: cp. II. 1 and IV. 4. 42. 24–30.

9. Πλούτους δὲ καὶ πενίας εἴ τις μέμφοιτο καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἴσον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἅπασι, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, ὡς ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἴσον οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐδέ τι νομίζει τοὺς πολλὰ κεκτημένους πλέον ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τοὺς δυναστεύοντας τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιαύτην σπουδὴν ἄλλους ἐᾷ ἔχειν, καὶ καταμεμάθηκεν ὡς διττὸς ὁ ἐνθάδε βίος, ὁ μὲν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὁ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον καὶ τὸ ἄνω, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρωπικωτέροις διττὸς αὖ ὢν ὁ μὲν μεμνημένος ἀρετῆς μετίσχει ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ὄχλος οἷον χειροτέχνης τῶν πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις. Εἰ δὲ φονεύει τις ἢ ἡττᾶται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπὸ ἀδυναμίας, τί θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἁμαρτίας εἶναι οὐ νῷ, ἀλλὰ ψυχαῖς ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀνήβοις; Εἰ δὲ γυμνάσιον εἴη νικώντων καὶ ἡττωμένων, πῶς οὐ καὶ ταύτῃ καλῶς ἔχει; Εἰ δ' ἀδικεῖ, τί δεινὸν τῷ ἀθανάτῳ; Καὶ εἰ φονεύει, ἔχεις ὃ θέλεις. Εἰ δὲ ἤδη μέμφῃ, πολιτεύεσθαι ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἔχεις. Ὁμολογεῖται δὲ καὶ δίκας εἶναι ἐνθάδε καὶ κολάσεις. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔχει μέμφεσθαι πόλει διδούσῃ ἑκάστῳ τὴν ἀξίαν; Οὗ καὶ ἀρετὴ τετίμηται, καὶ κακία τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀτιμίαν ἔχει, καὶ θεῶν οὐ μόνον ἀγάλματα, ἀλλὰ

[1] Cp. III. 2, [47] 8 and 15.

9. But if anyone objects to wealth and poverty and the fact that all have not an equal share in things of this kind, first, he is ignorant that the good and wise man does not look for equality in these things, and does not think that people who have acquired a great deal of them have any kind of advantage, or that those who hold power have the advantage over private persons; he leaves concern of this kind to others. He has learnt that there are two kinds of life here below, one for the good and wise and one for the mass of men, that for the good and wise being directed to the highest point and the upper region, and that for the more human sort being of two kinds again; one is mindful of virtue and has a share in some sort of good, but the common crowd is there, so to speak, to do manual work to provide for the necessities of the better sort. But if anyone commits murder, or is worsted by his passions because of his incapacity, why is it surprising that there should be sins, not in intellect but in souls that are like children which have not grown up? And if the world is like a sports-ground, where some win and others lose, what is there wrong with that?[1] If you are wronged, what is there dreadful in that to an immortal? And even if you are murdered, you have what you want. But if you have come by now to dislike the world, you are not compelled to remain a citizen of it. It is agreed that there are judgements and punishments here. How, then, is it possible rightly to disapprove of a city which gives each man his deserts? In this city [of the world] virtue is honoured and vice has its appropriate dishonour, and not merely the images of gods but gods

καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄνωθεν ἐφορῶντες, οἳ ῥηιδίως αἰτίας, φησίν, ἀποφεύξονται πρὸς ἀνθρώπων, πάντα ἄγοντες τάξει ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος μοῖραν ἑκάστῳ τὴν προσήκουσαν διδόντες κατὰ ἀμοιβὰς βίων τοῖς προϋπηργμένοις ἀκόλουθον· ἣν ὁ ἀγνοῶν προπετέστερος ἀνθρώπων περὶ πραγμάτων θείων ἀγροικιζόμενος. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι—οὕτω γὰρ οὔπω ἄριστος —ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς τούς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας κἀκεῖ βλέποντας, πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένους· οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τοῦτό ἐστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι πολλοὺς ποιῇ πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας. Καὶ ὁ κόσμος δὲ ὅδε δι' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι κἀκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου προφητεύει ἀνθρώποις καὶ χρῶσιν ἃ ἐκείνοις φίλα. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτό εἰσιν, ὃ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει. Εἰ δ' ὑπερορᾶν

[1] Plotinus may be thinking here of *Epinomis* 983E6–984A2, where the heavenly bodies are said to be either gods themselves or images made by the gods themselves.

themselves look down upon us from above,[1] who, as the saying goes, will easily acquit themselves of men's blame, leading all things in order from beginning to end, giving to each his fitting portion in changes of lives as a consequence of the deeds he did in previous existences; he who ignores this is one of the rasher sort of humans who deals boorishly with divine things.

But one ought to try to become as good as possible oneself, but not to think that only oneself can become perfectly good—for if one thinks this one is not yet perfectly good. One must rather think that there are other perfectly good men, and good spirits as well, and, still more, the gods who are in this world and look to the other, and, most of all, the ruler of this universe, the most blessed Soul. Then at this point one should go on to praise the intelligible gods, and then, above all, the great king of that other world, most especially by displaying his greatness in the multitude of the gods. It is not contracting the divine into one but showing it in that multiplicity in which God himself has shown it, which is proper to those who know the power of God, inasmuch as, abiding who he is, he makes many gods, all depending upon himself and existing through him and from him. And this universe exists through him and looks to him, the whole of it and each and every one of the gods in it, and it reveals what is his to men, and it and the gods in it declare in their oracles what is pleasing to the intelligible gods. But if they are not what that supreme God is, this in itself is according to the nature of things. But if you want to despise them,

θέλεις καὶ σεμνύνεις σαυτὸν ὡς οὐ χείρων, πρῶτον μέν, ὅσῳ τις ἄριστος, πρὸς πάντας εὐμενῶς ἔχει καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους· ἔπειτα σεμνὸν δεῖ εἰς μέτρον μετὰ οὐκ ἀγροικίας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἰόντα ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ φύσις δύναται ἡμῶν, ἀνιέναι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις νομίζειν εἶναι χώραν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν μόνον μετ' ἐκεῖνον τάξαντα ὥσπερ ὀνείρασι πέτεσθαι ἀποστεροῦντα ἑαυτὸν καὶ ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατὸν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου θεῷ γενέσθαι· δύναται δὲ εἰς ὅσον νοῦς ἄγει· τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πεσεῖν. Πείθονται δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἀνόητοι τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν λόγων ἐξαίφνης ἀκούοντες ὡς σὺ ἔσῃ βελτίων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν—πολλὴ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἡ αὐθάδεια—καὶ ὁ πρότερον ταπεινὸς καὶ μέτριος καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀνήρ, εἰ ἀκούσειε· σὺ εἶ θεοῦ παῖς, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι, οὓς ἐθαύμαζες, οὐ παῖδες οὐδ' ἃ τιμῶσιν ἐκ πατέρων λαβόντες, σὺ δὲ κρείττων καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐδὲν πονήσας—εἶτα καὶ συνεπηχῶσιν ἄλλοι; Οἷον εἰ ἐν πλείστοις ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδὼς πήχεων χιλίων εἶναι ἀκούοι, τί ἄν, εἰ χιλιόπηχυς εἶναι νομίζοι, τοὺς ἄλλους πενταπήχεις εἶναι ἀκούοι; μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας. Εἶτ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑμῶν προνοεῖ ὁ θεός, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου παντὸς ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ τί ἀμελεῖ; Εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ

[1] Cp. St. Irenaeus's equally indignant protest against the claim of the Gnostics to be superior to the Creator and his creation in *Adversus Haereses* II. 30.

[2] Cp. Plato, *Republic* IV. 426D8–E1.

and exalt yourself, alleging that you are no worse than they are, then, first of all, in proportion to a man's excellence he is graciously disposed to all, to men too. Then the man of real dignity must ascend in due measure, with an absence of boorish arrogance, going only so far as our nature is able to go, and consider that there is room for the others at God's side, and not set himself alone next after God; this is like flying in our dreams and will deprive him of becoming a god, even as far as the human soul can. It can as far as intellect leads it; but to set oneself above intellect is immediately to fall outside it. But stupid men believe this sort of talk as soon as they hear " you shall be better than all, not only men, but gods "—for there is a great deal of arrogance among men—and the man who was once meek and modest, an ordinary private person, if he hears " you are the son of God, and the others whom you used to admire are not, nor the beings they venerate according to the tradition received from their fathers; but you are better than the heaven without having taken any trouble to become so "—then are other people really going to join in the chorus?[1] It is just as if, in a great crowd of people who did not know how to count, someone who did not know how to count heard that he was a thousand cubits tall; what would happen if he thought he was a thousand cubits, and heard that the others were five cubits? He would only imagine that the " thousand " was a big number.[2] Then besides this, God in his providence cares for you; why does he neglect the whole universe in which you yourselves are? For if it is because he has no time to look at it, and it is not

αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν, οὐδὲ θέμις αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ κάτω· καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς βλέπων διὰ τί οὐκ ἔξω βλέπει καὶ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον δὲ βλέπει ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν; Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔξω, ἵνα μὴ τὸν κόσμον ἐφορᾷ, οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς βλέπει. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δέονται αὐτοῦ· ἀλλ' ὁ κόσμος δεῖται καὶ οἶδε τὴν τάξιν αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅπως ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὅπως ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἀνδρῶν οἳ ἂν θεῷ ὦσι φίλοι, πράως μὲν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ κόσμου φέροντες, εἴ τι ἐκ τῆς τῶν πάντων φορᾶς ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἑκάστῳ καταθύμιον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν δεῖ βλέπειν· τιμῶν δὲ ἑκάστους κατ' ἀξίαν, σπεύδων δ' ἀεὶ οὗ πάντα σπεύδει τὰ δυνάμενα—πολλὰ δὲ εἶναι τὰ σπεύδοντα ἐκεῖ [πάντα],[1] καὶ τὰ μὲν τυγχάνοντα μακάρια, τὰ δὲ ὡς δυνατὸν ἔχει τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτοῖς μοῖραν—οὐχ αὑτῷ μόνῳ διδοὺς τὸ δύνασθαι· οὐ γάρ, ἢ ἐπαγγέλλει, τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ λέγει τις ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ εἰδότες ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσι, λέγουσιν ἔχειν καὶ οἴονται ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ μόνοι ἔχειν, ὃ αὐτοὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἔχουσι.

10. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἄν τις ἐξετάζων ἀφθονίαν ἔχοι ἂν καθ' ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνὺς ὡς ἔχει. Αἰδὼς γάρ τις ἡμᾶς ἔχει πρός τινας τῶν φίλων, οἳ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐντυχόν-

[1] [πάντα] Kirchhoff et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: πάντα codd. H-S.

lawful for him to regard what is below him: why, when he looks at the Gnostics, does he not look outside himself and at the universe in which they are? But if he does not look outside, in order that he may not supervise the universe, he does not look at them either. But they have no need of him. But the universe does need him, and knows its station, and the beings in it know how they are in it and how they are there in that higher world, and those of men who are dear to God know this, and take kindly what comes to them from the universe, if any unavoidable necessity befalls them from the movement of all things. For one must not look at what is agreeable to the individual but at the All. A man who does this values individuals according to their worth, but presses on always to that goal to which all press on that can—he knows that there are many that press on to the higher world, and those that attain are blessed, others, according to what is possible for them, have the destiny which fits them—and he does not attribute the ability to himself alone. For if someone says he has something, having does not come by claiming it; but the Gnostics say that they have many things, even though they know they have not got them, and think they have them when they have not, and that they alone have what they alone have not.

10. There are many other points, or rather all the points of their doctrine, which if one investigated, one would have ample opportunity of showing the real state of the case in regard to each argument. [But we shall not continue this detailed refutation] for we feel a certain regard for some of our friends

τες πρότερον ἢ ἡμῖν φίλοι γενέσθαι οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐπ' αὐτοῦ μένουσι. Καίτοι αὐτοὶ οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι—τὰ αὐτῶν ἐθέλοντες δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἀξιοπίστως ἢ καὶ οἰόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν οὕτως ἔχειν—λέγειν ἃ δὴ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίμους, οὐ πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες—πλέον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν γίγνοιτο πρὸς τὸ πείθειν αὐτούς—ἵνα μὴ πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐνοχλοῖντο οὐκ ἀποδείξεις κομιζόντων—πῶς γάρ;—ἀλλὰ ἀπαυθαδιζομένων, ταῦτα εἰρήκαμεν, ἄλλου ὄντος τρόπου, καθ' ὃν ἄν τις γράφων ἠμύνατο τοὺς διασύρειν τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ θείων ἀνδρῶν καλῶς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐχομένως εἰρημένα τολμῶντας. Ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν ἐατέον ἐξετάζειν· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ταῦτα ἀκριβῶς λαβοῦσι τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα ἔσται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὅπως ἔχει εἰδέναι· ἐκεῖνο[1] δὲ εἰπόντα ἐατέον τὸν λόγον, ὃ δὴ καὶ πάντα ὑπερβέβληκεν ἀτοπίᾳ, εἰ δεῖ ἀτοπίαν τοῦτο λέγειν. Ψυχὴν γὰρ εἰπόντες νεῦσαι κάτω καὶ σοφίαν τινά, εἴτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρξάσης, εἴτε τῆς

[1] ἐκεῖνο Kirchhoff, H-S: ἐκεῖνα codd.

[1] From this point to the end of ch. 12 Plotinus is attacking a Gnostic myth known to us best at present in the form it took in the system of Valentinus. The Mother, Sophia-Achamoth, produced as a result of the complicated sequence of events which followed the fall of the higher Sophia, and her offspring the Demiurge, the inferior and ignorant maker of the material universe, are Valentinian figures; cp. Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* I.4 and 5. Valentinus had been in Rome, and there is nothing improbable in the presence of Valentinians there in the time of Plotinus. But the evidence in the *Life* ch. 16 suggests that the Gnostics in Plotinus's circle belonged

who happened upon this way of thinking before they became our friends, and, though I do not know how they manage it, continue in it. Yet they themselves do not shrink from saying what they say—either because they wish their opinions to have a plausible appearance of truth or because they think that they really are true. But we have addressed what we have said so far to our own intimate pupils, not to the Gnostics (for we could make no further progress towards convincing them), so that they may not be troubled by these latter, who do not bring forward proofs—how could they?—but make arbitrary, arrogant assertions. Another style of writing would be appropriate to repel those who have the insolence to pull to pieces what godlike men of antiquity have said nobly and in accordance with the truth. So let us leave that detailed examination; for those who have grasped precisely what we have been saying up till now will be able to know what the real state of the case is as regards all their other doctrines. But, before we leave the argument, that one point must be mentioned which surpasses all the rest of their doctrine in absurdity—if absurdity is what one ought to call it.[1] For they say that Soul declined to what was below it, and with it some sort of "Wisdom," whether

rather to the older group called Sethians or Archontics, related to the Ophites or Barbelognostics: they probably called themselves simply "Gnostics." Gnostic sects borrowed freely from each other, and it is likely that Valentinus took some of his ideas about Sophia from older Gnostic sources, and that his ideas in turn influenced other Gnostics. The probably Sethian Gnostic library discovered at Nag Hammadi includes Valentinian treatises: cp. Puech, *l.c.* pp. 162–163 and 179–180.

τοιαύτης αἰτίας γενομένης σοφίας, εἴτε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν θέλουσιν εἶναι, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ψυχὰς συγκατεληλυθέναι λέγοντες καὶ μέλη τῆς σοφίας ταύτας μὲν ἐνδῦναι λέγουσι σώματα, οἷον τὰ ἀνθρώπων· ἧς δὲ χάριν καὶ αὐταὶ κατῆλθον, ἐκείνην λέγουσι πάλιν αὖ μὴ κατελθεῖν, οἷον μὴ νεῦσαι, ἀλλ' ἐλλάμψαι μόνον τῷ σκότῳ, εἶτ' ἐκεῖθεν εἴδωλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ γεγονέναι. Εἶτα τοῦ εἰδώλου εἴδωλον πλάσαντες ἐνταῦθά που δι' ὕλης ἢ ὑλότητος ἤ ὅ τι ὀνομάζειν θέλουσι, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο λέγοντες, καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὀνόματα εἰπόντες οὗ λέγουσιν εἰς ἐπισκότησιν, τὸν λεγόμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς δημιουργὸν γεννῶσι καὶ ἀποστάντα τῆς μητρὸς ποιήσαντες τὸν κόσμον παρ' αὐτοῦ ἕλκουσιν[1] ἐπ' ἔσχατα εἰδώλων, ἵνα σφόδρα λοιδορήσηται ὁ τοῦτο γράψας.

11. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, εἰ μὴ κατῆλθεν, ἀλλ' ἐνέλαμψε τὸ σκότος, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο νενευκέναι; Οὐ γάρ, εἴ τι παρ' αὐτῆς ἔρρευσεν οἷον φῶς, ἤδη νενευκέναι αὐτὴν λέγειν προσήκει· εἰ μή που τὸ μὲν ἔκειτό που ἐν τῷ κάτω, ἡ δὲ ἦλθε τοπικῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγγὺς γενομένη ἐνέλαμψεν. Εἰ δ' ἐφ' αὑτῆς μένουσα ἐνέλαμψε μηδὲν εἰς τοῦτο ἐργασαμένη, διὰ τί μόνη αὐτὴ ἐνέλαμψεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ δυνατώτερα αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν; Εἰ δὲ τῷ λογισμὸν λαβεῖν αὐτῇ κόσμου ἠδυνήθη ἐλλάμψαι ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, διὰ τί οὐχ ἅμα ἐλλάμψασα καὶ κόσμον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἔμεινε

[1] ἕλκουσιν Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: λέγουσιν codd. H-S.

Soul started it or whether Wisdom was a cause of Soul being like this, or whether they mean both to be the same thing, and then they tell us that the other souls came down too, and as members of Wisdom put on bodies, human bodies for instance. But again they say that very being for the sake of which these souls came down did not come down itself, did not decline, so to put it, but only illumined the darkness, and so an image from it came into existence in matter. Then they form an image of the image somewhere here below, through matter or materiality or whatever they like to call it—they use now one name and now another, and say many other names just to make their meaning obscure—and produce what they call the Maker, and make him revolt from his mother and drag the universe which proceeds from him down to the ultimate limit of images. The man who wrote this just meant to be blasphemous!

11. First of all then, if it did not come down, but illumined the darkness, how can it rightly be said to have declined? For if something like light streamed from it, it is not proper to say that it declined when that happened; unless the darkness lay somewhere below it and it moved spatially towards it and illumined it when it came close to it. But if Soul remained in itself and illumined matter without taking any action to this end, why did only it illumine matter, and not the powers greater than it in the realm of existence? But if it was by forming a rational conception of the universe that it was able to illumine as a result of its rational conception, why did it not make the universe at the same time as it

τὴν τῶν εἰδώλων γένεσιν; Ἔπειτα καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ὁ τοῦ κόσμου, ἡ γῆ αὐτοῖς ἡ ξένη λεγομένη γενομένη ὑπὸ τῶν μειζόνων, ὡς λέγουσιν αὐτοί, οὐ κατήγαγεν εἰς νεῦσιν τοὺς ποιήσαντας. Ἔπειτα πῶς ἡ ὕλη φωτισθεῖσα εἴδωλα ψυχικὰ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ σωμάτων φύσιν; Ψυχῆς δὲ εἴδωλον οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο σκότους ἢ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ γενόμενον, εἰ γίνεται, παρακολουθοῖ ἂν τῷ ποιήσαντι καὶ συνηρτημένον ἔσται. Ἔπειτα πότερον οὐσία τοῦτο ἤ, ὥς φασιν, ἐννόημα; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία, τίς ἡ διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀφ' οὗ; Εἰ δ' ἄλλο εἶδος ψυχῆς, εἰ ἐκείνη λογική, τάχ' ἂν φυτικὴ καὶ γεννητικὴ αὕτη· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ἔτι, ἵνα τιμῷτο, καὶ πῶς δι' ἀλαζονείαν καὶ τόλμαν ποιεῖ; Καὶ ὅλως τὸ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῦ λογίζεσθαι ἀνῄρηται. Τί δ' ἔτι ἔδει ἐμποιεῖν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδώλου τὸν ποιήσαντα; Εἰ δ' ἐννόημα, πρῶτον τὸ ὄνομα ἐπισημαντέον ὅθεν· ἔπειτα πῶς ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἐννοήματι δώσει τὸ ποιεῖν; Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πλάσματι πῶς ἡ ποίησις; Τουτὶ μὲν πρῶτον, ἄλλο δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἐξουσίας λέγοντες. Διὰ τί δὲ πρῶτον πῦρ;

[1] This and similar ideas are common to most kinds of Gnosticism: cp. Irenaeus *Adv. Haer.* I. 29 (a non-Valentinian system) and Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* IV ch. 13, 89 (Valentinus).

illumined, instead of waiting for the production of the images? Then, too, the rational conception of the universe, "the strange land," as they call it, which was brought into being by higher powers, as they say themselves, would not have brought its makers down to declination. Then how did matter when it was illumined make images of the soul kind, instead of bodily nature? An image of soul would have no sort of use for darkness or matter, but when it had come into being, if it did come into being, would correspond to its maker and remain in close connection with it. Then is this image a substance or, as they say, a "thought"? If it is a substance, what is the difference between it and its origin? But if it is another kind of soul, then if that higher soul is the rational soul, presumably this latter is the growth-soul which is the principle of generation. But if this is what it is, how will their statements still apply that it created for the sake of being honoured, and how does it create out of arrogance and rash self-assertion?[1] In fact, all possibility of a soul of this kind creating through imagination and, still more, through rational activity, is taken away. And why was there still any need to introduce into their system the maker of the universe derived from matter and image? But if the image is a thought, first of all they must explain whence they derive this name for it; and then how it exists, unless Soul is going to give the thought power to make. But, over and above the fact that this is pure fiction, how does the making work? They say this comes first, and another after that, but they speak quite arbitrarily. And why does fire come first?

12. Καὶ ἄρτι γενόμενον πῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ; Μνήμῃ ὧν εἶδεν. Ἀλλ' ὅλως οὐκ ἦν, ἵνα ἂν καὶ εἶδεν, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ, ἣν διδόασιν αὐτῷ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοὺς μὲν οὐκ εἴδωλα ψυχῶν ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας εἰς τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ἀλλὰ ἀληθινὰς ψυχάς, μόλις καὶ ἀγαπητῶς ἕνα ἢ δύο αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου κινηθῆναι, ⟨καὶ⟩ [1] ἐλθόντας εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μόλις ἀναπόλησιν λαβεῖν ὧν ποτε εἶδον, τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἄρτι γενόμενον ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἐκεῖνα ἢ καὶ τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ, εἴδωλον ὑλικόν, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἐκεῖνα καὶ κόσμου λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν καὶ κόσμου ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ μαθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ἂν γένοιτο; Πόθεν δὴ καὶ πρῶτον πῦρ ποιῆσαι; Οἰηθέντα δεῖν τοῦτο πρῶτον; Διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο; Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν ἐνθυμηθεὶς πῦρ, διὰ τί ἐνθυμηθεὶς κόσμον—πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἔδει ἐνθυμηθῆναι τὸ ὅλον—οὐ κόσμον ἀθρόως ἐποίει; Ἐμπεριείχετο γὰρ κἀκεῖνα ἐν τῇ ἐνθυμήσει. Φυσικώτερον γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς αἱ τέχναι ἐποίει· ὕστεραι γὰρ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου αἱ τέχναι. Ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος γινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φύσεων οὐ πρῶτον πῦρ, εἶθ' ἕκαστον, εἶτα φύρασις τούτων, ἀλλὰ περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφὴ τυποῦσα ἐπὶ τοῖς καταμηνίοις παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐ κἀκεῖ ἡ ὕλη

[1] ⟨καὶ⟩ Heigl, et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

12. And how does this thought set to its task of making when it has just come into being? By memory of what it saw. But it did not exist at all so as even to see, neither it nor the mother whom they give it. Then is it not surprising that they themselves come here into this world not as images of souls but as real souls, but only one or two of them with difficulty just manage to get out of the world and, when they attain to recollection, with difficulty recapitulate what they once saw; but this image, even if dimly, as they say, yet does manage to form a conception of the intelligible realities when it has just come into being, itself or even its mother, an image in matter, and not only to conceive them and form an idea of a world, and of that world, but to learn the elements from which it could come into being? What could have been the reason why it made fire first? Because it thought that fire must come first? Why not something else? But if it was able to make fire when it conceived it, why when it conceived the world—for it must have conceived the whole first—did it not make the world straight away? For the elements, too, were included in its conception. For it made the world in every way after the manner of nature rather than as the arts make; for the arts are later than nature and the world. Even now the things which are parts of the world when they are brought into being by natural principles do not come into existence like this, first fire, then each individual constituent, and then a mixture of them, but there is an outline and sketch plan of the whole living thing impressing the form on the menstrual fluid. Why then, in the making

περιεγράφετο τύπῳ κόσμου, ἐν ᾧ τύπῳ καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα; Ἀλλ' ἴσως αὐτοὶ οὕτω κόσμον ἐποίησαν ὡς ἂν ἀληθεστέρᾳ ψυχῇ χρώμενοι, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὕτως ἠγνόει ποιῆσαι. Καίτοι προιδεῖν καὶ μέγεθος οὐρανοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοσοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ τὴν λόξωσιν τῶν ζῳδίων καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὴν φορὰν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὕτως, ὡς ἔχειν εἰπεῖν αἰτίας δι' ἃς οὕτως, οὐκ εἰδώλου ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων τῆς δυνάμεως ἐλθούσης· ὃ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄκοντες ὁμολογοῦσιν. Ἡ γὰρ ἔλλαμψις ἡ εἰς τὸ σκότος ἐξετασθεῖσα ποιήσει ὁμολογεῖν τὰς ἀληθεῖς τοῦ κόσμου αἰτίας. Τί γὰρ ἐλλάμπειν ἔδει, εἰ μὴ πάντως ἔδει; Ἢ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, ἀεὶ οὕτως· εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἔσται τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὰ κακὰ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦδε, καὶ οὐχ ὁ κόσμος αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀκεῖ τούτῳ, καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐνταῦθα· καὶ ἥξει ὁ λόγος ἀναφέρων τὸν κόσμον ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα. Εἰ δὲ δή, καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὅθεν φανείη. Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἡ νεύσασα ἤδη ὂν τὸ σκότος, φασίν, εἶδε καὶ κατέλαμψε. Πόθεν οὖν

of the world, too, was not matter marked in outline with the form of the universe, in which form earth and fire and the rest were contained? But perhaps they would have made the world like this, since they possess a more genuine soul, but that creator of theirs did not know how to. Yet to see, before it existed, the greatness of the heaven—or rather to see its exact size—and the inclination of the zodiac and the circuit of the stars below it, and the earth, in such a way that it is possible to give reasons why all these things are so—this does not belong to an image, but altogether to a power which comes from the best principles. And this even they themselves unwillingly admit. For their "illumination of the darkness," if it is investigated, will make them admit the true causes of the universe. For why was it necessary for the soul to illuminate, unless the necessity was universal? It was either according to soul's nature or against it. But if it was according to its nature, it must always be so. If, on the other hand, it was against its nature, then there will be a place for what is against nature in the higher world, and evil will exist before this universe, and the universe will not be responsible for evil, but the higher world will be the cause of evil for this world, and evil will not come from the world here to the soul, but from the soul to the world here; and the course of the argument will lead to the attribution of responsibility for the universe to the first principles: and if the universe, then also the matter, from which the universe on this hypothesis would have emerged. For the soul which declined saw, they say, and illuminated the darkness already in existence.

τοῦτο; Εἰ δ' αὐτὴν φήσουσι ποιῆσαι νεύσασαν, οὐκ ἦν δηλονότι ὅπου ἂν ἔνευσεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σκότος αἴτιον τῆς νεύσεως, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις. Τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν ταῖς προηγησαμέναις ἀνάγκαις· ὥστε ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα ἡ αἰτία.

13. Ὁ ἄρα μεμφόμενος τῇ τοῦ κόσμου φύσει οὐκ οἶδεν ὅ τι ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ὅπου τὸ θράσος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο χωρεῖ. Τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τάξιν τῶν ἐφεξῆς πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ ἀεὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, καὶ ὡς οὐ λοιδορητέον τοῖς χείροσι τῶν πρώτων, ἀλλὰ πράως συγχωρητέον τῇ πάντων φύσει αὐτὸν θέοντα πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα παυσάμενον τῆς τραγῳδίας τῶν φοβερῶν, ὡς οἴονται, ἐν ταῖς τοῦ κόσμου σφαίραις, αἳ δὴ πάντα μείλιχα τεύχουσιν αὐτοῖς· τί γὰρ φοβερὸν ἔχουσιν αὗται, ὡς φοβοῦσι τοὺς ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ πεπαιδευμένης ἀνηκόους καὶ ἐμμελοῦς γνώσεως; Οὐ γάρ, εἰ πύρινα τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν, φοβεῖσθαι δεῖ συμμέτρως πρὸς τὸ πᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἔχοντα, εἰς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν βλέπειν, αἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ δήπουθεν ἀξιοῦσι τίμιοι εἶναι. Καίτοι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει

[1] The cosmic spheres and the Archons who ruled them were for the Gnostics formidable barriers which the soul had to pass on its journey upwards to its true home. To do so it was necessary to know the correct formula with which to address

Where, then, did the darkness come from? If they are going to say that the soul made it when it declined, there was obviously nowhere for it to decline to, and the darkness itself was not responsible for the decline, but the soul's own nature. But this is the same as attributing the responsibility to pre-existing necessities; so the responsibility goes back to the first principles.

13. The man who censures the nature of the universe does not know what he is doing, and how far this rash criticism of his goes. This is so because the Gnostics do not know that there is an order of firsts, seconds and thirds in regular succession, and so on to the last, and that the things that are worse than the first should not be reviled; one should rather calmly and gently accept the nature of all things, and hurry on oneself to the first, ceasing to concern oneself with the melodrama of the terrors, as they think, in the cosmic spheres,[1] which in reality "make all things sweet and lovely"[2] for them. For what is there terrible about the spheres, which makes them terrify people who are unpractised in reasoning and have never heard anything of a cultured and harmonious "gnosis." For even if their bodies are fiery, there is no need to fear them, since they are duly proportioned to the All and the earth; but one should look at their souls—it is on their souls that the Gnostics themselves, of course, base their claim to honour. Yet their bodies, too, are outstanding in size and beauty and are partners and co-operators in

each Archon: cp. the Ophite spells in Origen *Against Celsus* VI. 31, with H. Chadwick's commentary.

[2] A reminiscence of Pindar *Olympians* I. 48.

διαφέροντα συμπράττοντα καὶ συνεργοῦντα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις, ἃ οὐκ ἂν οὐ γένοιτό ποτε ἔστ' ἂν ᾖ τὰ πρῶτα, συμπληροῦντα δὲ τὸ πᾶν καὶ μεγάλα μέρη ὄντα τοῦ παντός. Εἰ δ' ἄνθρωποι τίμιόν τι παρ' ἄλλα ζῷα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ταῦτα οὐ τυραννίδος ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ κόσμον καὶ τάξιν παρέχοντα. Ἃ δὲ λέγεται γίνεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, σημεῖα νομίζειν τῶν ἐσομένων εἶναι, γίνεσθαι δὲ τὰ γινόμενα διάφορα καὶ τύχαις—οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν ταὐτὰ περὶ ἑκάστους συμβαίνειν—καὶ καιροῖς γενέσεων καὶ τόποις πλεῖστον ἀφεστηκόσι καὶ διαθέσεσι ψυχῶν. Καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον πάλιν ἀγαθοὺς πάντας, οὐδ' ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, μέμφεσθαι προχείρως πάλιν ἀξιοῦσι μηδὲν διαφέρειν ταῦτα ἐκείνων, τό τε κακὸν μὴ νομίζειν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἐνδεέστερον εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ μικρότερον· οἷον εἴ τις τὴν φύσιν κακὸν λέγοι, ὅτι μὴ αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι μὴ λόγος. Εἰ δὲ μή, κἀκεῖ τὰ κακὰ ἀναγκασθήσονται λέγειν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ψυχὴ χεῖρον νοῦ καὶ οὗτος ἄλλου ἔλαττον.

14. Μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλως ποιοῦσιν οὐκ ἀκήρατα τὰ ἐκεῖ. Ὅταν γὰρ ἐπαοιδὰς γράφωσιν

[1] For a full exposition of Plotinus's thought about astral signs and astral influences see II. 3, especially chs. 7–8 and 10–15.

[2] Plotinus himself does sometimes come very near to saying that all procession, with its necessary falling below the highest, is an evil: cp. III. 8. 8. 35–6 (of the procession of Intellect

all that happens according to nature, and cannot ever not happen as long as the first principles exist; they are essential to the completeness of the All and are important parts of the All. And if men have a degree of honour in comparison with other living things, these are much more honourable, as they are not in the All to exercise tyrannical rule but as the givers of beauty and order. As for what is said to happen as a result of their influence, one should consider that they give signs of things to come, but that the variety of things that happen is due to chance—it was not possible that the fortune of each individual should be the same—and to reasons of birth, and places far different from each other, and the dispositions of souls.[1] And again, one should not demand that everybody should be good nor, because this is not possible, should they be ready with censure, demanding that this world should differ in no way from that higher one; nor is it right not to consider evil as anything else than a falling short in wisdom, and a lesser good, continually diminishing; as if one were to say that the growth-principle was evil because it is not perception, and the principle of perception, because it is not reason. Otherwise, they will be compelled to say that there are evils in the higher world too: for there soul is worse than intellect and intellect than Something Else.[2]

14. But they themselves most of all impair the inviolate purity of the higher powers in another way too. For when they write magic chants, intending to

from the One) and III. 7. 11. 15 ff. (of the procession of Soul from Intellect). But this cosmic pessimism is not his normal thought.

ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα λέγοντες, οὐ μόνον πρὸς ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω, τί ποιοῦσιν ἢ γοητείας καὶ θέλξεις καὶ πείσεις λέγουσι καὶ λόγῳ ὑπακούειν καὶ ἄγεσθαι, εἴ τις ἡμῶν τεχνικώτερος εἰπεῖν ταδὶ καὶ οὑτωσὶ μέλη καὶ ἤχους καὶ προσπνεύσεις καὶ σιγμοὺς τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἐκεῖ μαγεύειν γέγραπται. Εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται τοῦτο λέγειν, ἀλλὰ πῶς φωναῖς τὰ ἀσώματα; Ὥστε οἵοις [1] σεμνοτέρους αὐτῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι, τούτοις λελήθασιν αὐτοὺς τὸ σεμνὸν ἐκείνων ἀφαιρούμενοι. Καθαίρεσθαι δὲ νόσων λέγοντες αὐτούς, λέγοντες μὲν ἂν σωφροσύνῃ καὶ κοσμίᾳ διαίτῃ, ἔλεγον ἂν ὀρθῶς, καθάπερ οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι· νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὖ φρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐχ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσιν ἢ καμάτοις ἢ πλησμοναῖς ἢ ἐνδείαις ἢ σήψεσι καὶ ὅλως μεταβολαῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ ἔνδοθεν λαβούσαις. Δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπεῖαι αὐτῶν. Γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος διεχώρησε κάτω εἰς τὸ ἔξω τὸ νόσημα καὶ αἵματος ἀφῃρημένου, καὶ ἔνδεια δὲ ἰάσατο. Ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος

[1] οἵοις Heigl: οἳ A^{1s}ExUC H-S: οἷς A (in ras.) Q: εἰ S.

address them to those powers, not only to the soul but to those above it as well, what are they doing except making the powers obey the word and follow the lead of people who say spells and charms and conjurations, any one of us who is well skilled in the art of saying precisely the right things in the right way, songs and cries and aspirated and hissing sounds and everything else which their writings say has magic power in the higher world? But even if they do not want to say this, how are the incorporeal beings affected by sounds? So by the sort of statements [1] with which they give an appearance of majesty to their own words, they, without realising it, take away the majesty of the higher powers. But when they say they free themselves from diseases, if they meant that they did so by temperance and orderly living, they would speak well, just as the philosophers do; but in fact they assume that the diseases are evil spirits, and claim to be able to drive them out by their word; by this claim they might make themselves more impressive in the eyes of the masses, who wonder at the powers of magicians, but would not persuade sensible people that diseases do not have their origin in strain or excess or deficiency or decay, and in general in changes which have their origin outside or inside. The cures of diseases make this clear too. With a vigorous motion of the bowels or the giving of a drug the illness goes through the downward passage and out, and it goes out too with blood-letting; and fasting also heals. Does the evil spirit starve, and does the drug make it waste away,

[1] I read here οἵοις (Heigl), not οἳ (Henry–Schwyzer with most MSS).

τήκεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀθρόως ἐξελθόντος, ἢ μένοντος ἔνδον; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔτι μένοντος, πῶς ἔνδον ὄντος οὐ νοσεῖ ἔτι; Εἰ δὲ ἐξελήλυθε, διὰ τί; Τί γὰρ αὐτὸ πέπονθεν; Ἢ ὅτι ἐτρέφετο ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου. Ἦν ἄρα ἡ νόσος ἑτέρα οὖσα τοῦ δαίμονος. Ἔπειτα, εἰ οὐδενὸς ὄντος αἰτίου εἴσεισι, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ νοσεῖ; Εἰ δὲ γενομένου αἰτίου, τί δεῖ τοῦ δαίμονος πρὸς τὸ νοσεῖν; Τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τὸν πυρετὸν αὔταρκές ἐστιν ἐργάσασθαι. Γελοῖον δὲ τὸ ἅμα τὸ αἴτιον γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθέως ὥσπερ παρυποστῆναι τῷ αἰτίῳ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἕτοιμον ὄν. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅπως καὶ ταῦτα εἴρηται αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅτου χάριν, δῆλον· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα οὐχ ἧττον καὶ τούτων τῶν δαιμονίων ἐμνήσθημεν. Τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὑμῖν καταλείπω ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν ἐκεῖνο πανταχοῦ, ὡς τὸ μὲν παρ' ἡμῶν εἶδος φιλοσοφίας μεταδιωκόμενον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν ἁπλότητα τοῦ ἤθους μετὰ τοῦ φρονεῖν καθαρῶς ἐνδείκνυται, τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ τὸ αὐθαδες μεταδιώκουσα, τὸ θαρραλέον μετὰ λόγου καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας πολλῆς καὶ εὐλαβείας καὶ πλείστης περιωπῆς ἔχουσα· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῷ τοιούτῳ παραβάλλειν. Τὸ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντιώτατα κατεσκεύασται διὰ πάντων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πλέον· οὕτω γὰρ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν ἡμῖν ἂν πρέποι.

15. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ μάλιστα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς, τί ποτε ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν

and does it sometimes come out all at once, or stay inside? But if it continues to stay, how does the patient not continue to be ill while it is still inside him? But if it went out, why did it go? What happened to it? Presumably because it was fed by the disease. So then the disease was different from the spirit. Then, if it came into the man without any cause of disease, why is he not always ill? But if there was a cause, what need is there of the spirit to produce the illness? For the cause is sufficient by itself to produce the fever. It is ridiculous to suppose that as soon as the cause occurs the evil spirit, all ready and waiting, immediately takes up its position in support of it. But it is clear how they say this and also why they say it; it was for this reason, too, that we mentioned these evil spirits. The rest of their teachings I leave to you to investigate by reading their books, and to observe throughout that the kind of philosophy which we pursue, besides all its other excellences, displays simplicity and straightforwardness of character along with clear thinking, and aims at dignity, not rash arrogance, and combines its confident boldness with reason and much safeguarding and caution and a great deal of circumspection: you are to use philosophy of this kind as a standard of comparison for the rest. But the system of the others [the Gnostics] is in every part constructed on entirely opposed principles—for I would not like to say more; this is the way in which it would be suitable for us to speak about them.

15. But there is one point which we must be particularly careful not to let escape us, and that is what these arguments do to the souls of those who

ἀκουόντων καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καταφρονεῖν πεισθέντων. Δυοῖν γὰρ οὐσῶν αἱρέσεων τοῦ τυχεῖν τοῦ τέλους, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς ἡδονὴν τὴν τοῦ σώματος τέλος τιθεμένης, ἑτέρας δὲ τῆς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἱρουμένης, οἷς καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ εἰς θεὸν ἀνήρτηται ἡ ὄρεξις, ὡς δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις [1] θεωρητέον, ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀνελὼν τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, ὅπερ ἦν λοιπόν, τοῦτο διώκειν παρακελεύεται· ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἔτι νεανικώτερον τὸν τῆς προνοίας κύριον καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρόνοιαν μεμψάμενος καὶ πάντας νόμους τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἀνηυρημένην τό τε σωφρονεῖν τοῦτο ἐν γέλωτι θέμενος, ἵνα μηδὲν καλὸν ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὀφθείη ὑπάρχον, ἀνεῖλε τὸ σωφρονεῖν [2] καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι σύμφυτον δικαιοσύνην τὴν τελειουμένην ἐκ λόγου καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ ὅλως καθ' ἃ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο. Ὥστε αὐτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ οὐ κοινὸν πρὸς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸ τῆς χρείας μόνον, εἰ μή τις τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτοῦ κρείττων εἴη τῶν λόγων τούτων· τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς καλόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι, ὅ ποτε μεταδιώξουσι. Καίτοι ἐχρῆν τοὺς ἤδη ἐγνωκότας ἐντεῦθεν διώκειν,

[1] ὡς δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ὡς δέ, ἐν ἄλλοις H-S.

[2] τὸ σωφρονεῖν A et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: τε τὸ σωφρονεῖν Exy: τότε σωφρονεῖν Q.

hear them and are persuaded by them to despise the universe and the beings in it. For there are two schools of thought about attaining the end, one which puts forward the pleasure of the body as the end, and another which chooses nobility and virtue, for whose members desire depends on God and leads back to God (as must be studied elsewhere): Epicurus, who abolishes providence, exhorts to pursue pleasure and its enjoyment, which is what is left; but this doctrine censures the lord of providence and providence itself still more crudely, and despises all the laws of this world and the virtue whose winning extends back through all time, and makes self-control here something to laugh at, that nothing noble may be seen existing here below, and abolishes self-control and the righteousness which comes to birth with men's characters and is perfected by reason and training, and altogether everything by which a man could become nobly good.[1] So pleasure is left for them, and what concerns themselves alone, and what other men have no share in, and what is nothing but a matter of their needs—unless one of them is by nature better than these teachings of theirs: for nothing here is of value for them, but something else is, which they will go after one day. Yet those who already have the *gnosis* [2] should start

[1] On the question of how far the charges of immorality brought against the Gnostics by their opponents were justified, see the discussion in *Entretiens Hardt* V, pp. 186–189.

[2] I have translated ἐγνωκότας in this way, following Harder and Cilento, as it seems clear that Plotinus is referring to the distinctive Gnostic claim to possess a *gnosis*, not, that is, just ordinary knowledge but a special secret knowledge which had power to save.

διώκοντας δὲ πρῶτα κατορθοῦν ταῦτα ἐκ θείας φύσεως ἥκοντας· ἐκείνης γὰρ τῆς φύσεως καλοῦ ἐπαίειν, τὴν ἡδονὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀτιμαζούσης. Οἷς δὲ ἀρετῆς μὴ μέτεστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν τὸ παράπαν κινηθέντες πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τόδε τὸ μηδένα λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς πεποιῆσθαι, ἐκλελοιπέναι δὲ παντάπασι τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον, καὶ μήτε τί ἐστιν εἰπεῖν μήτε πόσα μήτε ὅσα τεθεώρηται πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ τοῖς τῶν παλαιῶν λόγοις, μήτε ἐξ ὧν περιέσται καὶ κτήσεται, μήτε ὡς θεραπεύεται ψυχὴ μήτε ὡς καθαίρεται. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ εἰπεῖν "βλέπε πρὸς θεόν" προὔργου τι ἐργάζεται, ἐὰν μὴ πῶς καὶ βλέψῃ διδάξῃ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, εἴποι τις ἄν, βλέπειν καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπέχεσθαι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ εἶναι μεμνημένον μὲν ὀνόματος τοῦ "θεός," συνεχόμενον δὲ ἅπασι πάθεσι, μηδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν πειρώμενον ἐξαιρεῖν; Ἀρετὴ μὲν οὖν εἰς τέλος προιοῦσα καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγγενομένη μετὰ φρονήσεως θεὸν δείκνυσιν· ἄνευ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς θεὸς λεγόμενος ὄνομά ἐστιν.

16. Οὐδ' αὖ τὸ καταφρονῆσαι κόσμου καὶ θεῶν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλῶν ἀγαθόν ἐστι γενέσθαι. Καὶ γὰρ πᾶς κακὸς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καταφρονήσειεν ἂν θεῶν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον πάγκακος [1] καταφρονήσας, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἄλλα μὴ πάντα κακὸς εἴη, αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἂν γεγονὼς εἴη. Καὶ γὰρ

[1] πάγκακος Heigl, H-S² (sed nunc protulerint Henry et Schwyzer [πᾶς κακὸς] Kirchhoff): πᾶς κακὸς codd.

going after it here and now, and in their pursuit should first of all set right their conduct here below, as they come from a divine nature; for that nature is aware of nobility and despises the pleasure of the body. But those who have no share of virtue would not be moved at all towards that higher world. This, too, is evidence of their indifference to virtue, that they have never made any treatise about virtue, but have altogether left out the treatment of these subjects; they do not tell us what kind of thing virtue is, nor how many parts it has, nor about all the many noble studies of the subject to be found in the treatises of the ancients, nor from what virtue results and how it is to be attained, nor how the soul is tended, nor how it is purified. For it does no good at all to say "Look to God," unless one also teaches how one is to look. For someone could say, "What prevents me from looking and refraining from no pleasure, or from having no control over my emotions and from remembering the name 'God' and at the same time being in the grip of all the passions and making no attempt to get rid of any of them." In reality it is virtue which goes before us to the goal and, when it comes to exist in the soul along with wisdom, shows God; but God, if you talk about him without true virtue, is only a name.

16. Again, despising the universe and the gods in it and the other noble things is certainly not becoming good. Every wicked man, in former times too, was capable of despising the gods, and even if he was not altogether wicked before, when he despised them he became so by this very fact, even if he was not wicked in everything else. Then again the honour which

ἂν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς λεγομένη αὐτοῖς τιμὴ ἀσυμπαθὴς ἂν γένοιτο· ὁ γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν πρός ὁτιοῦν ἔχων καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς πᾶν οὗ φιλεῖ ἀσπάζεται καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὧν τὸν πατέρα ἀγαπᾷ· ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα πατρὸς ἐκείνου. Ψυχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις καὶ νοεραὶ καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ συναφεῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ ἡμῶν. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀποτμηθεὶς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐκείνου ἦν; πῶς δὲ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοί; Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ πρότερον· νῦν δέ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν ἐκείνοις καταφρονοῦντες, [ὅτι][1] μηδὲ ἐκεῖνα ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ἢ λόγῳ. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πρόνοιαν μὴ διικνεῖσθαι εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἢ εἰς ὁτιοῦν, πῶς εὐσεβές; Πῶς δὲ σύμφωνον ἑαυτοῖς; Λέγουσι γὰρ αὐτῶν προνοεῖν αὖ μόνων. Πότερα δὲ ἐκεῖ γενομένων ἢ καὶ ἐνθάδε ὄντων; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ, πῶς ἦλθον; Εἰ δὲ ἐνθάδε, πῶς ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε; Πῶς δὲ οὐ καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐνθάδε; Πόθεν γὰρ γνώσεται, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐνθάδε; Πῶς δέ, ὅτι ἐνθάδε ὄντες οὐκ ἐπελάθοντο αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐγένοντο κακοί; Εἰ δὲ γινώσκει τοὺς μὴ γενομένους κακούς, καὶ τοὺς γενομένους γινώσκει, ἵνα διακρίνῃ ἀπ' ἐκείνων αὐτούς. Πᾶσιν οὖν παρέσται καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε, ὅστις ὁ τρόπος· ὥστε καὶ

[1] [ὅτι] Kirchhoff et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ὅτι codd. H-S.

these people say they give to the intelligible gods would be of a very unfeeling sort. For anyone who feels affection for anything at all shows kindness to all that is akin to the object of his affection, and to the children of the father he loves. But every soul is a child of That Father. And there are souls in these [the heavenly bodies] too, and intelligent and good ones, much more closely in touch with the beings of the higher world than our souls are. How could this universe exist if it was cut off from that other world? How could the gods in it? But we spoke of this before, too: our point now is that because they despise the kindred of those higher realities, also, they do not know the higher beings either but only talk as if they did. Then, another point, what piety is there in denying that providence extends to this world and to anything and everything? And how are they consistent with themselves in this denial? For they say that God does care providentially for them, and them alone. Did he care for them only when they were in the higher world, or does he care for them when they are here, too? If he cared for them when they were there, how did they come here? But if he cares for them here, why are they here still? And how is it possible that God is not here, too? For from what source does he know that they are here? And how does he know that while they have been here they have not forgotten him and become wicked? But if he knows those who have not become wicked, he knows those who have become wicked too, in order to be able to separate the good from them. So he will be present to all and will be in this universe, whatever the manner of his presence; so that the universe

μεθέξει αὐτοῦ ὁ κόσμος. Εἰ δ' ἄπεστι τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὑμῶν ἀπέσται, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοιτέ τι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ τῶν μετ' αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' εἴτε ὑμῖν πρόνοιά τις ἔρχεται ἐκεῖθεν, εἴτε ὅ τι βούλεσθε, ἀλλ' ὅ γε κόσμος ἐκεῖθεν ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται οὐδ' ἀπολειφθήσεται. Πολὺ γὰρ μᾶλλον τῶν ὅλων ἢ τῶν μερῶν ἡ πρόνοια καὶ ἡ μέθεξις κἀκείνης τῆς ψυχῆς πολὺ μᾶλλον· δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμφρόνως εἶναι. Τίς γὰρ οὕτω τεταγμένος ἢ ἔμφρων τῶν ὑπερφρονούντων ἀφρόνως, ὡς τὸ πᾶν; Ἢ παραβάλλειν καὶ γελοῖον καὶ πολλὴν τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἔχει, καὶ ὅ γε μὴ τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα παραβάλλων οὐκ ἔξω ἂν τοῦ ἀσεβεῖν γένοιτο· οὐδὲ τὸ ζητεῖν περὶ τούτων ἔμφρονος, ἀλλὰ τυφλοῦ τινος καὶ παντάπασιν οὔτε αἴσθησιν οὔτε νοῦν ἔχοντος καὶ πόρρω τοῦ νοητὸν κόσμον ἰδεῖν ὄντος, ὃς τοῦτον οὐ βλέπει. Τίς γὰρ ἂν μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴη, ὃς τὴν ἐν νοητῷ ἁρμονίαν ἰδὼν οὐ κινήσεται τῆς ἐν φθόγγοις αἰσθητοῖς ἀκούων; Ἢ τίς γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀριθμῶν ἔμπειρος, ὃς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἀνάλογον καὶ τεταγμένον ἰδὼν δι' ὀμμάτων οὐχ ἡσθήσεται; Εἴπερ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὰ αὐτὰ βλέπουσιν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς οἱ δι' ὀμμάτων τὰ [1] τῆς τέχνης βλέποντες, ἀλλ' ἐπιγινώσκοντες μίμημα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τοῦ ἐν νοήσει κειμένου οἷον θορυβοῦνται καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἔρχονται τοῦ

[1] τὰ Kirchhoff H-S: τῶν codd.

will participate in him. But if he is absent from the universe, he will be absent from you, and then you would have nothing to say about him or the beings which come after him. But whether a providence comes to you from the higher world or—whatever you like, the universe anyhow has providential care from that world; it has not been abandoned and it will not be abandoned. For providential care is much more of wholes than of parts, and the participation in God of that universal soul, too, is much greater. Its existence, and its intelligent existence, make this clear. For who of those who are so mindlessly high-minded in looking down on it is as well ordered or has as intelligent a mind as the All? The comparison is ridiculous and very much out of place; anyone who made it except for the sake of argument would not be able to avoid impiety. It is not the part of an intelligent man even to enquire about this but of someone who is blind, utterly without perception or intelligence, and far from seeing the intelligible universe, since he does not even see this one here. For how could there be a musician who sees the melody in the intelligible world and will not be stirred when he hears the melody in sensible sounds? Or how could there be anyone skilled in geometry and numbers who will not be pleased when he sees right relation, proportion and order with his eyes? For, indeed, even in pictures those who look at the works of art with their eyes do not see the same things in the same way, but when they recognise an imitation on the level of sense of someone who has a place in their thought they feel a kind of disturbance and come to a recollection of the truth; this is the

ἀληθοῦς· ἐξ οὗ δὴ πάθους καὶ κινοῦνται οἱ ἔρωτες. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰδὼν κάλλος ἐν προσώπῳ εὖ μεμιμημένον[1] φέρεται ἐκεῖ, ἀργὸς δὲ τίς οὕτως ἔσται τὴν γνώμην καὶ εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο κινήσεται, ὥστε ὁρῶν σύμπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ κάλλη, σύμπασαν δὲ συμμετρίαν καὶ τὴν μεγάλην εὐταξίαν ταύτην καὶ τὸ ἐμφαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις εἶδος καὶ πόρρωθεν οὖσιν οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμεῖται, καὶ σέβας αὐτὸν λαμβάνει, οἷα ἀφ' οἵων; Οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ταῦτα κατενόησεν, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα εἶδεν.

17. Καίτοι, εἰ καὶ μισεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπῄει τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, διότι ἀκηκόασι Πλάτωνος πολλὰ μεμψαμένου τῷ σώματι οἷα ἐμπόδια παρέχει τῇ ψυχῇ—καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν εἶπε χείρονα—ἐχρῆν ταύτην περιελόντας τῇ διανοίᾳ ἰδεῖν τὸ λοιπόν, σφαῖραν νοητὴν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ κόσμῳ εἶδος ἐμπεριέχουσαν, ψυχὰς ἐν τάξει, ἄνευ τῶν σωμάτων μέγεθος δούσας κατὰ τὸ νοητὸν εἰς διάστασιν προαγαγούσας, ὡς τῷ μεγέθει τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ἀμερεῖ τῷ[2] τοῦ παραδείγματος εἰς δύναμιν ἐξισωθῆναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μέγα ἐν δυνάμει ἐνταῦθα ἐν ὄγκῳ. Καὶ εἴτε κινουμένην ταύτην

[1] μεμιμημένον Creuzer, H-S: μεμιγμένον codd.
[2] τό γενόμενον τῷ ἀμερεῖ τῷ Kirchhoff: τοῦ γενομένου τω ἀμερεῖ τὸ (τῶA) codd: † τοῦ γενομένου τῶ ἀμερεῖ τὸ † H-S².

[1] Cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 251A2–3.
[2] E.g. *Phaedo* 66B.

experience from which passionate loves arise. But if someone who sees beauty excellently represented in a face is carried to that higher world,[1] will anyone be so sluggish in mind and so immovable that, when he sees all the beauties in the world of sense, all its good proportion and the mighty excellence of its order, and the splendour of form which is manifested in the stars, for all their remoteness, he will not thereupon think, seized with reverence, "What wonders, and from what a source?" If he did not, he would neither have understood this world here nor seen that higher world.

17. And yet, even if it occurred to them to hate the nature of body because they have heard Plato often reproaching the body for the kind of hindrances it puts in the way of the soul[2]—and he said that all bodily nature was inferior—they should have stripped off this bodily nature in their thought and seen what remained, an intelligible sphere embracing the form imposed upon the universe, souls in their order which without bodies give magnitude and advance to dimension according to the intelligible pattern, so that what has come into being may become equal, to the extent of its power, by its magnitude to the partlessness of its archetype:[3] for greatness in the intelligible world is in power, here below in bulk. And, whether they wish to think of this sphere as moved,

[3] It seems impossible (as Henry and Schwyzer now agree) to extract any tolerable sense from the MSS readings here. I read τὸ γενόμενον (Kirchhoff) for τοῦ γενομένου and τῷ τοῦ παραδείγματος for τὸ τοῦ παραδείγματος (this τῷ has no real MS authority, the τω of A being a manifest error, but is required by the sense).

τὴν σφαῖραν ἐβούλοντο νοεῖν περιαγομένην ὑπὸ θεοῦ δυνάμεως ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος τῆς πάσης ἔχοντος, εἴτε ἑστῶσαν ὡς οὔπω καὶ ἄλλο τι διοικούσης, καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν εἰς ἔννοιαν τῆς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ψυχῆς διοικούσης. Ἐνθέντας δὲ ἤδη καὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἂν παθούσης, δούσης δὲ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι μὴ θέμις φθόνον ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι, ἔχειν, εἴ τι δύναται λαμβάνειν ἕκαστα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς διανοεῖσθαι κατὰ κόσμον, τοσούτῳ διδόντας τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ δυνάμεως, ὅσῳ τὴν σώματος φύσιν οὐ καλὴν οὖσαν ἐποίησεν, ὅσον ἦν αὐτῇ καλλύνεσθαι, μετέχειν κάλλους· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τὰς ψυχὰς θείας οὔσας κινεῖ. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτοὶ φαῖεν μὴ κινεῖσθαι, μηδὲ διαφόρως αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ὁρᾶν σώματα· ἀλλ' οὕτως οὐδὲ διαφόρως αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐδὲ καλὰ μαθήματα, οὐδὲ θεωρίας τοίνυν· οὐδὲ θεὸν τοίνυν. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὰ πρῶτα ταῦτα. Εἰ οὖν μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα· μετ' ἐκεῖνα τοίνυν ταῦτα καλά. Ἀλλ' ὅταν λέγωσι καταφρονεῖν τοῦ τῇδε κάλλους, καλῶς ἂν ποιοῖεν τοῦ ἐν παισὶ καὶ γυναιξὶ καταφρονοῦντες, ὡς μὴ εἰς ἀκολασίαν ἡττᾶσθαι. Ἀλλ' εἰδέναι δεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν σεμνύνοιντο, εἰ αἰσχροῦ καταφρονοῖεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καταφρονοῦσι πρότερον εἰπόντες καλόν· καὶ πῶς διατιθέντες; Ἔπειτα, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν κάλλος ἐπὶ μέρει καὶ ὅλῳ καὶ πᾶσι

[1] Cp. Plato, *Phaedrus* 247A7, and *Timaeus* 29E1–2.
[2] Cp. Plato, *Symposium* 211C4–8.

carried round by the power of God who holds the beginning and the middle and the end of the whole of its power, or standing still because it is not yet also directing something else, it would be well adapted to give an idea of the soul which directs this universe. And if they already put a body into it, they should think about the universe in this way, that soul would not be affected by body but would give to something else (since it is not lawful for there to be envy among the gods) [1] to possess whatever each and every thing can take; they should grant to the soul of the universe that amount of power with which it made the nature of body, not beautiful in itself, to share in beauty as far as it was possible for it to be beautified: it is this very beauty which moves souls, which are godlike. But perhaps they may say that they are not moved, and do not look any differently at ugly or beautiful bodies; but if this is so, they do not look any differently at ugly or beautiful ways of life, or beautiful subjects of study; [2] they have no contemplation, then, and hence no God. For the beauties here exist because of the first beauties. If, then, these here do not exist, neither do those; so these are beautiful in their order after those. But when they say they despise the beauty here, they would do well if they despised the beauty in boys and women, to avoid being overcome by it to the point of abandoned wickedness. But one should notice that they would not give themselves airs if they despised something ugly; they do so because they despise something which they begin by calling beautiful: and what sort of a way of managing is that? Then one should be aware that there is not the same beauty in part and

καὶ παντί· εἶθ' ὅτι ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα κάλλη καὶ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐν μέρει, οἷα δαιμόνων, ὡς θαυμάσαι τὸν πεποιηκότα καὶ πιστεῦσαι, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀμήχανον τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐχόμενον τούτων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα, μὴ λοιδορούμενον δὲ τούτοις· καὶ εἰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἔνδον καλά, σύμφωνα ἀλλήλοις εἶναι λέγειν· εἰ δὲ τἄνδον φαῦλα, τοῖς βελτίοσιν ἠλαττῶσθαι. Μήποτε δὲ οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄντως τι καλὸν ὃν τὰ ἔξω αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τἄνδον· οὗ γὰρ τὸ ἔξω πᾶν καλόν, κρατήσαντός ἐστι τοῦ ἔνδον. Οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι καλοὶ τἄνδον αἰσχροὶ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἔξω κάλλος ἔχουσιν. Εἰ δέ τις φήσει ἑωρακέναι καλοὺς ὄντως ὄντας, αἰσχροὺς δὲ τἄνδον, οἶμαι μὲν αὐτὸν μὴ ἑωρακέναι, ἀλλ' ἄλλους εἶναι νομίζειν τοὺς καλούς· εἰ δ' ἄρα, τὸ αἰσχρὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπίκτητον εἶναι καλοῖς τὴν φύσιν οὖσι· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐνθάδε τὰ κωλύματα εἶναι ἐλθεῖν εἰς τέλος. Τῷ δὲ παντὶ καλῷ ὄντι τί ἐμπόδιον ἦν εἶναι καλῷ καὶ τἄνδον; Καὶ μὴν οἷς μὴ τὸ τέλειον ἀπέδωκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡ φύσις, τούτοις τάχ' ἂν οὐκ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τέλος γένοιτο, ὥστε καὶ φαύλοις ἐνδέχεσθαι γενέσθαι, τῷ δὲ παντὶ οὐκ ἦν ποτε παιδὶ ὡς ἀτελεῖ εἶναι οὐδὲ

[1] Plotinus is probably thinking of Plato, *Republic* VI. 509A6, where the word is used, though half-jokingly, of τὸ ἀγαθόν, rather than of *Symposium* 218E2, where it is used in a much less serious context of the beauty Alcibiades sees in Socrates.

whole and in all individual things and the All: and then that there are such beauties in things perceived by the senses and in partial things (the beauties of spirits, for instance) that one admires their maker, and believes that they come from the higher world, and, judging from them, says that the beauty there is overwhelming;[1] one does not cling to them, but goes on from them to the beauties of the higher world, but without insulting these beauties here; and if their inward parts are beautiful, one acknowledges the harmony of inward and outward; but if their inward parts are bad, they are deficient in the better part. But perhaps it is not really possible for anything to be beautiful outwardly but ugly inwardly; for if the outside of anything is wholly beautiful, it is so by the domination of what is within. Those who are called beautiful and are ugly within have an outward beauty, too, which is not genuine. But if anyone is going to say that he has seen people who are really beautiful but are ugly within, I think that he has not really seen them, but thinks that beautiful people are other than who they are. But if he has really seen them, then their ugliness was something superadded, not really belonging to people who were beautiful by nature: for there are many hindrances here below to arriving at perfection. But what was there to hinder the All, which is beautiful, from being also beautiful within? It might, perhaps, happen to beings to whom nature has not given perfection from the beginning not to arrive at their completion, so that it is possible for them even to become bad; but it never happened to the All to be incomplete like a child, nor does any

προσεγίνετο αὐτῷ προσιόν[1] τι καὶ προσετίθετο εἰς σῶμα. Πόθεν γάρ; Πάντα γὰρ εἶχεν. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εἰς ψυχὴν πλάσειεν ἄν τις. Εἰ δ' ἄρα τοῦτό τις αὐτοῖς χαρίσαιτο, ἀλλ' οὐ κακόν τι.

18. Ἀλλ' ἴσως φήσουσιν ἐκείνους μὲν τοὺς λόγους φεύγειν τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν πόρρωθεν μισοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ ἡμετέρους κατέχειν τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς αὐτῷ. Τοῦτο δὲ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δύο οἶκον καλὸν τὸν αὐτὸν οἰκούντων, τοῦ μὲν ψέγοντος τὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα καὶ μένοντος οὐχ ἧττον ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ μὴ ψέγοντος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιήσαντα τεχνικώτατα πεποιηκέναι λέγοντος, τὸν δὲ χρόνον ἀναμένοντος ἕως ἂν ἥκῃ, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαλλάξεται, οὗ μηκέτι οἴκου δεήσοιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφώτερος οἴοιτο εἶναι καὶ ἑτοιμότερος ἐξελθεῖν, ὅτι οἶδε λέγειν ἐκ λίθων ἀψύχων τοὺς τοίχους καὶ ξύλων συνεστάναι καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖν τῆς ἀληθινῆς οἰκήσεως, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τῷ μὴ φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα διαφέρει, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ ποιεῖται δυσχεραίνειν ἀγαπῶν ἡσυχῇ τὸ κάλλος τῶν λίθων. Δεῖ δὲ μένειν μὲν ἐν οἴκοις σῶμα ἔχοντας κατασκευασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀγαθῆς πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ δημιουργεῖν ἀπόνως ἐχούσης. Ἢ ἀδελφοὺς μὲν καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους ἀξιοῦσι προσεννέπειν,

[1] προσιόν nunc Henry et Schwyzer: προιόν codd. H-S.

[1] Theiler defends the MSS text (marked as corrupt, μὴ † ποιεῖται in H-S[1] and [2]) and cites passages (Synesius,

kind of addition come to it and add anything to its body. For where could it come from? The universe includes everything. Nor could one imagine any addition to its soul. But even if one granted to them that there could be an addition, it would not be anything bad.

18. But perhaps they will assert that those arguments of theirs make men fly from the body since they hate it from a distance, but ours hold the soul down to it. This would be like two people living in the same fine house, one of whom reviles the structure and the builder, but stays there none the less, while the other does not revile, but says the builder has built it with the utmost skill, and waits for the time to come in which he will go away, when he will not need a house any longer: the first might think he was wiser and readier to depart because he knows how to say that the walls are built of soulless stones and timber and are far inferior to the true dwelling-place, not knowing that he is only distinguished by not bearing what he must—unless he affirms that he is discontented while having a secret affection for the beauty of the stones.[1] While we have bodies we must stay in our houses, which have been built for us by a good sister soul which has great power to work without any toil or trouble. Or do the Gnostics think it right to call the lowest of men brothers,

Dion. 248. 2 and 270. 6 Terzaghi and [Plato] *Theages* 128B5) to show that ποιεῖσθαι can have the same meaning as προσποιεῖσθαι, "pretend." Henry and Schwyzer now agree that the text is sound, but point out that in the passages cited by Theiler ποιεῖσθαι means "affirm" rather than "pretend."

ἥλιον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἀπαξιοῦσιν ἀδελφοὺς λέγειν οὐδὲ τὴν κόσμου ψυχὴν στόματι μαινομένῳ; Φαύλους μὲν οὖν ὄντας οὐ θεμιτὸν εἰς συγγένειαν συνάπτειν, ἀγαθοὺς δὲ γενομένους καὶ μὴ σώματα ὄντας, ἀλλὰ ψυχὰς ἐν σώμασι καὶ οὕτως οἰκεῖν δυναμένους ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἐγγυτάτω εἶναι οἰκήσεως ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἐν σώματι τῷ ὅλῳ. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ κρούειν, μηδὲ ὑπακούειν τοῖς ἔξωθεν προσπίπτουσιν ἡδέσιν ἢ ὁρωμένοις, μηδ' εἴ τι σκληρόν, ταράττεσθαι. Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐ πλήττεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ὑπὸ τοῦ· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐνθάδε ὄντες ἀρετῇ τὰς πληγὰς ἀπωθοίμεθ' ἂν ἤδη ὑπὸ μεγέθους γνώμης τὰς μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰς δὲ οὐδὲ πληττούσας ὑπὸ ἰσχύος γενομένας. Ἐγγὺς δὲ γενόμενοι τοῦ ἀπλήκτου μιμοίμεθ' ἂν τὴν τοῦ σύμπαντος ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων, εἰς ἐγγύτητα δὲ ὁμοιότητος ἐλθόντες σπεύδοιμεν ἂν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν θέᾳ καὶ ἡμῖν εἴη ἅτε καλῶς καὶ αὐτοῖς παρεσκευασμένοις φύσεσι καὶ ἐπιμελείαις· τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει. Οὐ δή, εἰ μόνοι λέγοιεν θεωρεῖν δύνασθαι, πλέον ἂν θεωρεῖν αὐτοῖς γίνοιτο, οὐδ' ὅτι αὐτοῖς φασιν εἶναι ἐξελθεῖν ἀποθανοῦσι, τοῖς δὲ μή, ἀεὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν κοσμοῦσιν· ἀπειρίᾳ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἔξω ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο ἂν λέγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ὂν τρόπον

[1] The phrase is taken from Heraclitus's description of the Sibyl's prophesying (Diels, 22B92), which seems to have been intended to be complimentary. Plotinus, as often, cares nothing for the context of the phrase he quotes—if, indeed, he knew it.

but refuse, in their "raving talk," [1] to call the sun and the gods in the sky brothers and the soul of the universe sister? It is not lawful to include the bad in the bonds of kinship but only those who have become good and are not bodies but souls in bodies, and able to live in them in such a way that they are very close to the dwelling of the soul of the All in the universal body. This means no clashing with, nor yielding to the pleasures or sights which hurl themselves upon us from outside,[2] and not being disturbed by any hardship. The soul of the universe is not troubled; it has nothing that it can be troubled by. We, while we are here, can already repel the strokes of fortune by virtue, and make some of them become less by greatness of mind and others not even troubles because of our strength. As we draw near to the completely untroubled state we can imitate the soul of the universe and of the stars, and, coming to a closeness of resemblance to them hasten on to the same goal and have the same objects of contemplation, being ourselves, too, well prepared for them by nature and training (but they have their contemplation from the beginning). Even if the Gnostics say that they alone can contemplate, that does not make them any more contemplative, nor are they so because they claim to be able to go out of the universe when they die while the stars are not, since they adorn the sky for ever. They would say this through complete lack of understanding of what "being outside" really means,

[2] Cp. Plato, *Timaeus* 43B7–C1.

ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται ἡ ὅλη τοῦ ἀψύχου. Ἔξεστιν οὖν καὶ μὴ φιλοσωματεῖν καὶ καθαροῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ θανάτου καταφρονεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀμείνω εἰδέναι κἀκεῖνα διώκειν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δυναμένοις διώκειν καὶ διώκουσιν ἀεὶ μὴ φθονεῖν ὡς οὐ διώκουσι, μηδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν τοῖς οἰομένοις τὰ ἄστρα μὴ θεῖν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἡ αἴσθησις ἑστάναι αὐτὰ λέγει. Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ οἴονται τὰ ἔξω βλέπειν τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἔξωθεν οὖσαν.

and of how " universal soul cares for all that is soulless." [1] So we can be without affection for the body and pure, and despise death, and know what is better and pursue it, and not show ill-feeling against others who can and do always pursue it, as if they did not: and not suffer from the same illusion as those who think the stars do not move because their senses tell them they stand still. In the same way the Gnostics, too, do not think that the nature of the stars sees what is outside the material universe, because they do not see that their souls come from outside.

[1] Plato, *Phaedrus* 246B6.

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SIX VOLUMES

III

ENNEADS
III. 1–9

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III. 1. ON DESTINY

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise (No. 3 in Porphyry's chronological order) is very much a conventional Platonic school discussion of its period. After a formal scholastic statement of the question to be discussed, the views of opponents of the Platonic position, Epicureans, Stoics and astrological determinists, are stated and refuted on conventional lines, and the treatise ends with a brief statement of the Platonic doctrine, with its discrimination of the parts played in the causation of human action by universal and individual souls which leaves room for human freedom within the universal order. Bréhier, in his introduction to the treatise, cites a number of parallels which show the conventional nature of the contents, and he and Harder, in the introduction to the notes on it in his second edition, have some interesting suggestions about particular opponents at whom some of the arguments may be directed. But, though the subject was well worn and the arguments here are hackneyed, the problem of reconciling human freedom with the universal divine order was an important one for Plotinus, and he treated different aspects of it more fully and originally later, in the work *On Providence* which comes next in the Third Ennead (III. 2 and 3), in the treatise on astrology (II. 3) and in his writings on the soul (especially IV. 3, 8 and 9).

Synopsis

Formal statement of the problem to be discussed, that of causation. All things have a cause except the first prin-

ciples. The Peripatetic account of the immediate causes of events accepted as true as far as it goes (ch. 1). But it is lazy and superficial not to look for higher and remoter causes, and philosophers have in fact done so. The principal non-Platonic explanations; all things, even human thought and action are caused by (*a*) atoms (the Epicureans) or (*b*) the world-soul (Stoics or stoicising Platonists; see note to ch. 4) or (*c*) the stars (astrologers) or (*d*) the universal chain of causation (Stoics) (ch. 2). Refutation of these in the same order (*a*) ch. 3, (*b*) ch. 4, (*c*) chs. 5–6, (*d*) ch. 7. Brief statement of the true Platonic doctrine; universal soul and individual souls; freedom of rational and virtuous action (chs. 8–10).

III. 1. (3) ΠΕΡΙ ΕΙΜΑΡΜΕΝΗΣ

1. Ἅπαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι κατ' αἰτίας γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ἔστι τὰ ὄντα, ἢ ἄνευ αἰτίας ἄμφω· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ αἰτίας, τὰ δὲ μετ' αἰτίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἢ τὰ μὲν γινόμενα μετ' αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ ὄντα τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι μετ' αἰτίας, τὰ δ' ἄνευ αἰτίας, ἢ οὐδὲν μετ' αἰτίας· ἢ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ὄντα μετ' αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μετ' αἰτίας. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀιδίων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἰς ἄλλα αἴτια ἀνάγειν οὐχ οἷόν τε πρῶτα ὄντα· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἤρτηται, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι ἐχέτω. Τάς τε ἐνεργείας ἑκάστων ἀποδιδούς τις ἐπὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναγέτω· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ, τὸ τοιάνδε ἐνέργειαν ἀποδιδόναι. Περὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ἢ ὄντων μὲν ἀεί, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ποιουμένων ἀεὶ κατ' αἰτίας ἅπαντα λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἀναίτιον οὐ παραδεκτέον, οὔτε παρεγκλίσεσι κεναῖς χώραν διδόντα

[1] An interesting variation and expansion of *Timaeus* 28A 4–5. Plato merely says that all things that come into being must have a cause. Plotinus also takes into account the eternal realities, because for him even the Forms in Intellect have a cause, the One, as he indicates in the next sentence.

III. 1. ON DESTINY

1. All things that come into being and all things that really exist either have a cause for their coming into being (those that come to be) or for their existence (those that really exist), or have no cause:[1] or else, in both classes, some have a cause and some have not: or all things which come into being have a cause, but things which really exist have some of them a cause and some not, or none of them has a cause: or it is the other way round; all things that really exist have a cause, but things that come into being do so some this way, or some that way, or none of them has a cause. Well, then, among the eternal realities it is not possible to refer the first of them to other things which are responsible for their existence, just because they are first; but it must be admitted that all those which depend on the first realities have their being from them. And in giving an account of the activities of each of them one should refer them to their essences; for this is their being, the due output of a particular kind of activity. But as for things which come into being, or which always really exist but do not always act in the same way, we must say that all always have a cause for coming to be; nothing uncaused can be admitted; we must leave

οὔτε κινήσει σωμάτων τῇ ἐξαίφνης, ἢ οὐδενὸς προηγησαμένου ὑπέστη, οὔτε ψυχῆς ὁρμῇ ἐμπλήκτῳ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος αὐτὴν εἰς τό τι πρᾶξαι ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐποίει. Ἡ αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ μείζων[1] ἄν τις ἔχοι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη τὸ μὴ αὐτῆς εἶναι, φέρεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας φορὰς ἀβουλήτους τε καὶ ἀναιτίους οὔσας. Ἢ γὰρ τὸ βουλητόν—τοῦτο δὲ ἢ ἔξω ἢ εἴσω—ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητὸν ἐκίνησεν· ἤ, εἰ μηδὲν ὀρεκτὸν ἐκίνησεν, [ἢ] οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως ἐκινήθη. Γιγνομένων δὲ πάντων κατ' αἰτίας τὰς μὲν προσεχεῖς ἑκάστῳ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν καὶ εἰς ταύτας ἀνάγειν· οἷον τοῦ βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγορὰν τὸ οἰηθῆναι δεῖν τινα ἰδεῖν ἢ χρέος ἀπολαβεῖν· καὶ ὅλως τοῦ τάδε ἢ τάδε ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τάδε[2] τὸ φανῆναι ἑκάστῳ ταδὶ ποιεῖν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας ἀνάγειν· τοῦ ὑγιάσαι ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρός. Καὶ τοῦ πλουτῆσαι θησαυρὸς εὑρεθεὶς ἢ δόσις παρά του ἢ ἐκ πόνων ἢ τέχνης χρηματίσασθαι. Καὶ τοῦ τέκνου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ εἴ τι συνεργὸν ἔξωθεν εἰς παιδοποιίαν ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου ἦκον· οἷον σιτία τοιάδε ἢ καὶ ὀλίγῳ προσώτερα

[1] μείζων edd.: μείζον codd.
[2] ἐπ τάδε Harder, H–S: ἔπειτα δὲ codd.

[1] The famous uncaused atomic "slant" or "swerve" of Epicurus, the *clinamen* of Lucretius (II. 292; cp. Bailey's commentary on 11. 216–293 in his edition). Cicero refers to it equally impolitely in *De Fato* 23 (*commenticia declinatio*) and *De Finibus* I. 19 (*res commenticia*).

[2] Cp. Aristotle, *Physics* II. 5. 196b 33-34.

[3] Theiler's excellent emendation (⟨γονὴ⟩ ἢ γυνὴ for the MSS

no room for vain "slants"[1] or the sudden movement of bodies which happens without any preceding causation, or a senseless impulse of soul when nothing has moved it to do anything which it did not do before. Because of this very absence of motive a greater compulsion would hold the soul, that of not belonging to itself but being carried about by movements of this kind which would be unwilled and causeless. For either that which it willed—which could be within or outside it—or that which it desired moved the soul; or, if nothing which attracted it moved it, it would not have been moved at all. If all things have a cause for their happening it is easy to apprehend the causes which are immediately relevant to each happening and to trace it back to them: for instance, the cause of going to the market-place is that one thinks one ought to see someone or to collect a debt:[2] and in general the cause of choosing this or that or going after that is that it seemed good to the particular person involved to do that. And there are some things whose causes should be assigned to the arts; the cause of getting well is the medical art and the doctor: and the cause of getting rich is a treasure which has been found or a gift from someone, or making money by labour or skill. And the cause of the child is the father, and perhaps some external influences coming from various sources which cooperate towards the production of a child; for instance, a particular kind of diet, or, slightly remoter, seed, which flows easily for begetting, or a wife well[3]

ἡ γυνή, adopted here, is supported by the fact that it gives a verbal reminiscence of Plato, *Laws* 740D 6–7, οἷς ἂν εὔρους ᾖ γένεσις (though the context there is different).

εὔρους εἰς παιδοποιίαν ⟨γονὴ⟩[1] ἢ γυνὴ ἐπιτήδειος εἰς τόκους. Καὶ ὅλως εἰς φύσιν.

2. Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐλθόντα ἀναπαύσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω μὴ ἐθελῆσαι χωρεῖν ῥᾳθύμου ἴσως καὶ οὐ κατακούοντος τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αἴτια ἀνιόντων. Διὰ τί γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν γενομένων, οἷον τῆς σελήνης φανείσης, ὁ μὲν ἥρπασεν, ὁ δ' οὔ; Καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡκόντων ὁ μὲν ἐνόσησεν, ὁ δ' οὔ; Καὶ πλούσιος, ὁ δὲ πένης ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων; Καὶ τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη διάφορα καὶ τύχαι ἐπὶ τὰ πόρρω ἀξιοῦσιν ἰέναι· καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ οὐχ ἱστάμενοι οἱ μὲν ἀρχὰς σωματικὰς θέμενοι, οἷον ἀτόμους, τῇ τούτων φορᾷ καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ συμπλοκαῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἕκαστα ποιοῦντες καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐκεῖνα συνέστη ποιεῖ τε καὶ πάσχει, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις ταύτῃ ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖναι ποιῶσιν, ἀνάγκην[2] ταύτην καὶ τὴν παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὄντα εἰσάγουσι. Κἂν ἄλλα δέ τις σώματα ἀρχὰς διδῷ καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι, τῇ παρὰ τούτων ἀνάγκῃ δουλεύειν ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα. Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς κατάγουσι πάντα, διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν καὶ ταύτην οὐ μόνον[3] κινοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν

[1] ⟨γονὴ⟩ ἢ γυνὴ Theiler, H–S²: ἢ J^pcC: ἡ wBRJ^acUSQ, H–S¹.
[2] ἀνάγκην A^pc, edd.: ἀνάγκη codd.
[3] οὐ μόνον A^pc, edd.: μόνον οὐ codd.

adapted to bearing children: and in general, one traces the cause of the child back to Nature.

2. But to come to a halt when one has reached these causes and not to want to go higher is characteristic, perhaps, of a lazy person who pays no attention to those who have ascended to the first and the transcendent causes. For why in the same circumstances, for instance when the moon shines, does one man steal and another not? And when the influences which come from the environment are similar, why does one fall ill and another not? And why does one become rich, another poor from the same activities? And different ways of behaving and characters and fortunes require us to go on to the remoter causes. So philosophers have never come to a standstill [when they have discovered the immediate causes]: some of them posit corporeal principles, for instance, atoms; they make both the way individual things exist, and the fact of their existence, depend on the movements of these, their clashings and interlockings with one another, the way in which they combine and act and are acted upon; even our own impulses and dispositions, they say, are as the atoms make them; so they introduce this compulsion which comes from the atoms into reality. And if anyone gives other bodies as principles, and says that everything comes into being from them, he makes reality the slave of the compulsion which comes from them. Others go back to the principle of the universe and derive everything from it, saying that it is a cause which penetrates all things, and one which does not only move but also makes each single thing; they posit it as fate and the

θέμενοι, αὐτὴν οὖσαν τὰ πάντα· οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας διανοήσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνης ἰέναι κινημάτων, οἷον ζῴου μορίων κινουμένων ἑκάστων οὐκ ἐξ αὑτῶν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεμονοῦντος ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων. Ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν περιέχουσαν καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσαν τῇ κινήσει καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄστρων πλανωμένων τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν σχέσεσι καὶ σχηματισμοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ τούτων προρρήσεως πιστούμενοι, ἕκαστα ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῦσι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἀεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἀνιέναι δι' αὐτῶν γενόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γενόμενα, δουλεύειν δὲ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα, ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγοι, εἱμαρμένην ἕτερον τρόπον εἰσάγων φανεῖται. Διττοὺς δ' ἄν τις θέμενος καὶ τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐχ οὕτω. Λεχθήσεται δὲ περὶ τούτων. Νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πρώτους ἰτέον τῷ λόγῳ· εἶτ' ἐφεξῆς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκεπτέον.

3. Σώμασι μὲν οὖν ἐπιτρέψαι τὰ πάντα εἴτε ἀτόμοις εἴτε τοῖς στοιχείοις καλουμένοις καὶ τῇ ἐκ τούτων ἀτάκτως φορᾷ τάξιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡγουμένην γεννᾶν ἀμφοτέρως μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδυνατώτερον δέ, εἰ οἷόν τε [1] λέγειν, τὸ ἐξ ἀτόμων. Καὶ περὶ τούτων πολλοὶ

[1] οἷόν τε A[pc], edd.: οἵονται codd.

[1] In ch. 7.

supremely dominant cause, which is itself all things; they say that not only the other things which come into being but also our own thoughts come from its movements, as when the individual parts of a living creature are not moved by themselves but by the ruling principle in each living thing. Others claim that each and every thing comes to be from the universal circuit, which embraces everything and makes everything by its movement and by the positions and mutual aspects of the planets and fixed stars, relying upon the prediction which comes from them. Then, too, anyone who speaks of the mutual interweaving of causes and the chain of causation which reaches down from above, and the fact that consequents always follow antecedents and go back to them, since they come to be because of them and would not have done so without them, and says that what comes after is always enslaved to what is before, will obviously bring in fate by another way. But if one divided these philosophers, too, into two groups, one would be in accordance with the truth. For some of them make everything depend on a single principle, but others do not. We shall speak about these; [1] but now we must discuss those we mentioned first, and then consider the opinions of the others in order.

3. Well, then, to hand over the universe to bodies, whether to atoms or to what are called elements, and to generate order and reason and the ruling soul from the disorderly motion which they produce, is absurd and impossible on either view, but the more impossible, if one can say so, is the production from atoms. About these atoms many true arguments

εἴρηνται λόγοι ἀληθεῖς. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θεῖτό τις τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον οὔτε τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνάγκην οὔτε τὴν ἄλλως εἱμαρμένην ἕπεσθαι. Φέρε γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι. Αὗται τοίνυν κινήσονται τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ κάτω—ἔστω γάρ τι κάτω—τὴν δ' ἐκ πλαγίων, ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλαι κατ' ἄλλα. Οὐδὲν δὴ τακτῶς[1] τάξεώς γε οὐκ οὔσης, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον τοῦτο, ὅτε γέγονε, πάντως. Ὥστε οὔτε πρόρρησις οὔτε μαντικὴ τὸ παράπαν ἂν εἴη, οὔτε ἥτις ἐκ τέχνης—πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτάκτοις τέχνη;—οὔτε ἥτις ἐξ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἐπιπνοίας· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡρισμένον τὸ μέλλον εἶναι. Καὶ σώμασι μὲν ἔσται παρὰ τῶν ἀτόμων πάσχειν πληττομένοις, ἅπερ ἂν ἐκεῖναι φέρωσιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δὲ δὴ ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη τίσι κινήσεσι τῶν ἀτόμων ἀναθήσει τις; Ποίᾳ γὰρ πληγῇ[2] ἢ κάτω φερομένης ἢ ὁπουοῦν προσκρουούσης ἐν λογισμοῖς τοιοῖσδε ἢ ὁρμαῖς τοιαῖσδε ἢ ὅλως ἐν λογισμοῖς ἢ ὁρμαῖς ἢ κινήσεσιν ἀναγκαίαις εἶναι ἢ ὅλως εἶναι; Ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐναντιῶται ψυχὴ τοῖς τοῦ σώματος παθήμασι; Κατὰ ποίας δὲ φορὰς ἀτόμων ὁ μὲν γεωμετρικὸς ἀναγκασθήσεται εἶναι, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ἐπισκέψεται, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἔσται; Ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον καὶ τὸ ζῴοις εἶναι ἀπολεῖται φερομένων ᾗ τὰ σώματα

[1] τακτῶς Orelli, H–S: πάντως codd.
[2] ποίᾳ γὰρ πληγῇ Harder, H–S²: ποία γὰρ πληγὴ codd.

have been brought forward. But even if one did posit principles of this kind, they would not even so necessarily entail universal compulsion or fate of a different kind. Let us start by admitting that atoms exist. Then they will be moved, some with a downward motion—let us grant that there is really a "down"—some with a sideways, just as it chances, others in other ways. Nothing will be ordered—there *is* no order—but this world which comes into existence, when it has come to be, is completely ordered. So [on the atomic theory] there would be no foretelling or divination, neither that which comes from art—for how could there be an art which deals with things without order?—nor that which comes from divine possession and inspiration;[1] for here, too, the future must be determined. And bodies will suffer, compulsorily, when they are struck by atoms, whatever the atoms may bring; but to what movements of atoms will one be able to attribute what soul does and suffers? For by what sort of atomic blow, whether the movement goes downwards or strikes against it from any direction, will the soul be engaged in reasonings or impulses of a particular kind, or any sort of reasonings or impulses or movements, necessary or not? And when the soul opposes the affections of the body? By what movements of atoms will one man be compelled to be a geometer, another study arithmetic and astronomy, and another be a philosopher? Our human activity, and our nature as living beings, will be altogether done away with if we are carried about where the [primary] bodies take

[1] This distinction between the two kinds of divination is taken from *Phaedrus* 244D.

ἄγει ὠθοῦντα ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ ἄψυχα σώματα. Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕτερα σώματα αἴτια τῶν πάντων τιθεμένους, καὶ ὅτι θερμαίνειν μὲν καὶ ψύχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ φθείρειν δὲ τὰ ἀσθενέστερα δύναται ταῦτα, ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα ψυχὴ ἐργάζεται παρὰ τούτων ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑτέρας δεῖ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς ἰέναι.

4. Ἀλλ' ἆρα μία τις ψυχὴ διὰ παντὸς διήκουσα περαίνει τὰ πάντα ἑκάστου ταύτῃ κινουμένου ὡς μέρους, ἢ τὸ ὅλον ἄγει, φερομένων δὲ ἐκεῖθεν τῶν αἰτίων ἀκολούθων ἀνάγκη τὴν τούτων ἐφεξῆς συνέχειαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν εἱμαρμένην, οἷον εἰ φυτοῦ ἐκ ῥίζης τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ πάντα διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκήν, ποίησίν τε καὶ πεῖσιν, διοίκησιν μίαν καὶ οἷον εἱμαρμένην τοῦ φυτοῦ τις εἶναι λέγοι; Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εἱμαρμένης αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν εἱμαρμένην καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τὸν εἱρμὸν καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀναιρεῖ. Ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν κινουμένοις ἄλογον τὸ

[1] This section (chs. 4–7 incl.) directed against the determinists has a good deal in common with the long discussion of fate in the commentary of Calcidius on the *Timaeus* (chs. 142–190), which Waszink gives quite good reasons for supposing to derive ultimately from Numenius (cp. the preface to his edition pp. lviii–lxiii). So the immediate source of Plotinus here may well be Numenius. The opponents envisaged throughout may be Stoics: there is nothing necessarily un-Stoic in this chapter,

us, as they push us along like lifeless bodies. The same objections apply against those who posit other bodies as causes of all things; and also say that these bodies can make us hot or cold and even destroy the weaker part of us; but no one of all the activities of soul can come from them, but these must come from another principle.

4. But, then, does one soul, permeating the universe, accomplish everything, each individual thing being moved as a part in the way in which the whole directs it?[1] And must we, as the consequent causes are brought into action from that one source, call their continuous ordered interweaving "destiny," as if, when a plant has its principle in the root, one were to call the direction which extends from there over all its parts and their mutual interrelation, acting and being acted upon, a single direction and, so to speak, destiny of the plant? But, first of all, this excess of necessity and of destiny so understood itself does away with destiny and the chain of causes and their interweaving. For just as with our own parts when they are moved by our ruling principle the statement

and the philosophical background of the astrological determinism criticised in 5 and 6 is Stoic. But it is odd, in this case, that Plotinus makes so clear a distinction between those who hold that all things are determined by the world-soul and those who hold that they are determined by the universal chain of causation (2. 15–26 and 31–36; 7. 5–9). There was a Platonic view which identified fate as a substantial reality with the world-soul (Ps.—Plutarch, *De Fato* 568e: Calcidius *In Tim.*, ch. 144, p. 182, 16 Waszink). And it is possible that some Platonists who held this (though not Numenius) may have adopted a Stoic-type determinism, and it is against them that Plotinus is arguing here (cp. Bréhier in his introduction to this treatise).

καθ' εἱμαρμένην λέγειν κινεῖσθαι—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν τὸ ἐνδεδωκὸς τὴν κίνησιν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ παραδεξάμενον καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁρμῇ κεχρημένον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό ἐστι πρῶτον τὸ κινῆσαν τὸ σκέλος—τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἓν ἔσται τὸ πᾶν ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου κατ' αἰτίας τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἐφ' ἕτερον ἐχούσας, οὐ δὴ ἀληθὲς κατ' αἰτίας τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἓν ἔσται τὰ πάντα. Ὥστε οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμεῖς οὔτε τι ἡμέτερον ἔργον· οὐδὲ λογιζόμεθα αὐτοί, ἀλλ' ἑτέρου λογισμοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλεύματα· οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ πόδες λακτίζουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς διὰ μερῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλάς τε καὶ αἰσχρὰς πράξεις παρ' αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τὴν γοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθέναι.

5. Ἀλλ' ἴσως μὲν οὐχ οὕτως ἕκαστα περαίνεται, ἡ δὲ φορὰ διοικοῦσα πάντα καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄστρων κίνησις οὕτως ἕκαστα τίθησιν, ὡς ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσεως ἔχῃ μαρτυρίαις καὶ ἀνατολαῖς, δύσεσί τε καὶ παραβολαῖς. Ἀπὸ τούτων γοῦν μαντευόμενοι προλέγουσι περί τε τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐσομένων περί τε ἑκάστου, ὅπως τε τύχης καὶ διανοίας οὐχ ἥκιστα ἕξει. Ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων συμπαθείας αὐξόμενά τε καὶ μειούμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα παρ' αὐτῶν πάσχοντα· τούς

that they are moved according to fate is unreasonable—for there is not one thing which imparts the movement and another which receives it and takes its impulse from it, but the ruling principle itself is what immediately moves the leg—in the same way if in the All the All is one thing acting and being acted upon, and one thing does not come from another according to causes which always lead back to something else, it is certainly not true that everything happens according to causes but everything will be one. So, on this assumption, we are not ourselves, nor is there any act which is our own. We do not reason, but our considered decisions are the reasonings of another. Nor do we act, any more than our feet kick; it is we who kick through parts of ourselves. But, really, each separate thing must be a separate thing; there must be actions and thoughts that are our own; each one's good and bad actions must come from himself, and we must not attribute the doing of bad actions at least to the All.

5. But perhaps particular things are not brought about in this way, but the heavenly circuit, directing everything, and the movement of the planets, arranges each and every thing according to the relative positions of the planets in their aspects and rising, settings and conjunctions. The evidence for this is that by divination from the planets people foretell what is going to happen in the All and about each individual, what sort of fortune and, in particular, what sort of thoughts he is going to have. And they say that one can see that the other animals and plants grow and diminish under the sympathetic influence of the planets, and are affected by them in other ways; and

τε τόπους τοὺς ἐπὶ γῆς διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων εἶναι κατά τε τὴν πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σχέσιν καὶ πρὸς ἥλιον μάλιστα· ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τοῖς τόποις οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ χρόας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἐπιτηδεύματά τε καὶ ἤθη. Κυρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πάντων φορά. Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο ῥητέον, ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἕτερον τρόπον ἐκείνοις ἀνατίθησι τὰ ἡμέτερα, βουλὰς καὶ πάθη, κακίας τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδὲν διδοὺς λίθοις φερομένοις καταλείπει εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώποις ἔχουσι παρ' αὑτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν φύσεως ἔργον. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ διδόναι μὲν τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῖν, ἥκειν δὲ εἰς τὰ ἡμέτερα ἤδη τινὰ ὄντα καὶ οἰκεῖα ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἄττα, καὶ διαιρούμενον, τίνα μὲν ἡμεῖς ἐργαζόμεθα, τίνα δὲ πάσχομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάντα ἐκείνοις ἀνατιθέναι· καὶ ἰέναι μὲν παρὰ τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ περιέχοντος εἰς ἡμᾶς οἷον θερμότητας ἢ ψύξεις ἐν τῇ κράσει, ἰέναι δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν γειναμένων·[1] τοῖς γοῦν γονεῦσιν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καί τινα τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοίων ὄντων τοῖς εἴδεσι παρὰ τοὺς τόπους ἔν γε τοῖς ἤθεσι πλείστη παραλλαγὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις ἐνορᾶται, ὡς ἂν ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς τῶν τοιούτων ἰόντων. Αἵ τε πρὸς τὰς κράσεις τῶν σωμάτων καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐναντιώσεις καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρεπόντως λέγοιντο ἄν.

the regions of the earth differ from each other according to their position in relation to the All, and particularly to the sun; and not only do the other animals and plants correspond to the regions but also the forms and sizes and colours, the tempers and desires and ways of life and characters of human beings. So the universal circuit rules all things. In answer to this we must say, first, that this man too, in a different way, attributes to those principles what is ours, acts of will and affections, vices and impulses, but gives us nothing and leaves us to be stones set rolling, but not men who have a work to do of ourselves and from our own nature. But one must give to us what is ours (though there must come to what is ours, already something and our own, a certain amount from the All), and make a distinction between what we do ourselves and what we experience of necessity and not attribute everything to those principles. And something certainly must come to us from the regions and the difference of the surrounding atmosphere, for instance, heat or coldness in our temperaments, but something also comes from our parents; at any rate, we are generally like our parents in our appearance and some of the irrational affections of our soul. Yet all the same, even when people are alike in appearance, corresponding to their regions, the greatest difference is observed in their characters and thoughts, so that things of this kind would come from another principle. Our resistances, also, to our bodily temperaments and our lusts could appropriately be mentioned here. But if, because,

[1] *γειναμένων* Sleeman, H–S: *γι(γ)νομένων* codd.

Εἰ δ' ὅτι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν ὁρῶντες περὶ ἑκάστων λέγουσι τὰ γινόμενα, παρ' ἐκείνων ποιεῖσθαι τεκμαίρονται, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ οἱ ὄρνεις ποιητικοὶ ὧν σημαίνουσιν εἶεν καὶ πάντα, εἰς ἃ βλέποντες οἱ μάντεις προλέγουσιν. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε ἀκριβέστερον ἄν τις περὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψαιτο. Ἅ τις ἂν ἰδὼν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν, ἣν εἶχον ὅτε ἕκαστος ἐγίνετο, προείποι, ταῦτά φασι καὶ γίνεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν οὐ σημαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιούντων. Ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ εὐγενείας λέγωσιν ὡς ἐξ ἐνδόξων τῶν πατέρων καὶ μητέρων, πῶς ἔνι ποιεῖσθαι λέγειν ταῦτα, ἃ προυπάρχει περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς πρὶν τὴν σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτην τῶν ἄστρων ἀφ' ἧς προλέγουσι; Καὶ μὴν καὶ γονέων τύχας ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων τῆς γενέσεως καὶ παίδων διαθέσεις οἵαι ἔσονται καὶ ὁποίαις συνέσονται τύχαις ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων περὶ τῶν οὔπω γεγονότων λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν θανάτους καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνάπαλίν τε ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνα. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἡ ἐπὶ ἑκάστου σχέσις[1] τῶν ἄστρων ποιοῖ, ἃ ἤδη ἐκ πατέρων οὕτως ἔξειν λέγεται; Ἢ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερα ἔσται τὰ ποιοῦντα, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνα ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι πρὸς τοὺς γονέας

[1] ἐπὶ ἑκάστου σχέσις Kirchhoff, H–S²: ἑκάστου σχέσις ἐπὶ codd.

looking at the position of the stars they announce what has happened to particular people, they adduce this as evidence that the happenings were caused by the stars, then in the same way birds would be the causes of what they indicate, and so would everything at which the soothsayers look when they foretell. Further, one could investigate these matters more exactly starting from the following observations. Whatever someone foretold, looking at the position which the stars held when a particular man was born, this, they say, was brought about by the stars, which did not only indicate but also caused the happenings. But when they talk about peoples' noble birth, that is that they come of illustrious fathers and mothers, how is it possible that the stars caused what the parents had already before the position of the stars came about from which they foretell? And they tell, too, the fortunes of parents from the nativity of their children, and what the children's dispositions are going to be and what fortunes they will meet with from the nativity of their parents speaking of children who are yet unborn, and they tell of the death of brothers from the horoscopes of their brothers, of what concerns husbands from the horoscopes of their wives and, the other way round, of wives from the horoscopes of their husbands. How, then, could the position of the stars over an individual cause what is already stated as going to occur on the evidence of the horoscope of the parents? Either those former astrological circumstances are the cause, or, if they are not, neither are those at the birth of the individual. Again, too, people's likeness in appearance to their parents declares that beauty

οἰκοθέν φησι καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος ἰέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ φορᾶς ἄστρων. Εὔλογόν τε κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ ἅμα ζῷά τε παντοδαπὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἅμα γίνεσθαι· οἷς ἅπασιν ἐχρῆν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷς ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις. Πῶς οὖν ἅμα μὲν ἀνθρώπους, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τῶν σχημάτων;

6. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ γίγνεται μὲν ἕκαστα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις, ἵππος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἵππου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιόσδε, ὅτι ἐκ τοιοῦδε. Ἔστω δὲ συνεργὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορὰ συγχωροῦσα τὸ πολὺ τοῖς γειναμένοις,[1] ἔστωσαν δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ σωματικῶς διδόντες, θερμότητας καὶ ψύξεις καὶ σωμάτων κράσεις ἐπακολουθούσας, πῶς οὖν τὰ ἤθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ μάλιστα οὐχ ὅσα δοκεῖ κράσει σωμάτων δουλεύειν, οἷον γραμματικὸς τίς καὶ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κυβευτικὸς καὶ τῶνδε τίς εὑρετής; πονηρία δὲ ἤθους παρὰ θεῶν ὄντων πῶς ἂν δοθείη; καὶ ὅλως ὅσα λέγονται διδόναι κακὰ κακούμενοι, ὅτι δύνουσι καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ γῆν φέρονται, ὥσπερ διάφορόν τι πασχόντων, εἰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δύνοιεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ σφαίρας οὐρανίας φερομένων, καὶ

[1] γειναμένοις Sleeman: γινομένοις codd, H–S.

[1] I read here γειναμένοις (Sleeman, Class. Quart. 20, 1926, 152), for the MSS γινομένοις, because it gives a much better sense (it is difficult, indeed, to see how "the things which

and ugliness come from the family, and not from the movements of stars. It is reasonable, too, to suppose that at the same time both all sorts of living creatures and men are born together; and all of them, since they have the same position of the stars, ought to have the same destiny. How, then, are at one and the same time both men and other living creatures produced by the arrangements of the stars?

6. But, in fact, all individual things come into being according to their own natures, a horse because it comes from a horse, and a man from a man, and a being of a particular kind because it comes from a being of a particular kind. Admitted that the universal circuit co-operates (conceding the main part to the parents),[1] and admitted that the stars contribute a great deal corporeally to the constituents of the body, heat and cooling and the consequent bodily temperaments; how, then, are they responsible for characters and ways of life, and especially for what is not obviously dominated by bodily temperament—becoming a man of letters, for instance, or a geometer, or a dice-player, and a discoverer in these fields? And how could a wicked character be given by the stars, who are gods? And in general, how could all the evils be given by them which they are said to give when they are brought into an evil state because they are setting and passing under the earth—as if anything extraordinary happened to them if they set from our point of view, and they were not always moving in the heavenly sphere

come into being," makes any sense at all here) and is consistent with the whole argument of the preceding lines.

πρὸς τὴν γῆν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχόντων σχέσιν; Οὐδὲ λεκτέον, ὡς ἄλλος ἄλλον ἰδὼν τῶν θεῶν κατ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην στάσιν χείρων ἢ κρείττων γίνεται· ὥστε εὐπαθοῦντας μὲν ἡμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν, κακοῦν δέ, εἰ τἀναντία· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὡς φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χρείαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον· ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὁ ὄρνις, σημαίνει ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις.

7. Λοιπὸν δὲ ἰδεῖν τὴν ἐπιπλέκουσαν καὶ οἷον συνείρουσαν ἀλλήλοις πάντα καὶ τὸ πῶς ἑφ' ἑκάστου ἐπιφέρουσαν ἀρχὴν τιθεμένην μίαν, ἀφ' ἧς πάντα κατὰ λόγους σπερματικοὺς περαίνεται. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐγγὺς ἐκείνης τῆς πᾶσαν καὶ σχέσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἡμετέραν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἥκειν λεγούσης, εἰ καὶ βούλεταί τι ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκάστοις χαρίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ποιεῖν τι. Ἔχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκην, καὶ πάντων εἱλημμένων τῶν αἰτίων οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον μὴ οὐ γίνεσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ κωλῦσον ἢ ἄλλως γενέσθαι ποιῆσον, εἰ πάντα εἴληπται ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὄντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ὡρμημένα ἡμῖν οὐδὲν καταλείψει, ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὠθῇ. Αἵ τε γὰρ φαντασίαι τοῖς προηγησαμένοις αἵ τε ὁρμαὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἔσονται, ὄνομά τε μόνον

and holding the same position in relation to the earth? Nor must it be said that when one of the gods sees another in this or that position he becomes better or worse so that when they are in a good state they do good to us, but harm us when the opposite. We must rather say that the movement of the stars is for the preservation of the universe, but that they perform in addition another service; this is that those who know how to read this sort of writing can, by looking at them as if they were letters, read the future from their patterns, discovering what is signified by the systematic use of analogy—for instance, if one said that when the bird flies high it signifies some high heroic deeds.

7. It remains to look at the [theory of the] principle which interweaves and, so to speak, chains everything to everything else, and makes each individual thing be the way it is, a principle assumed to be one, from which all things come about by seminal formative principles. This opinion is close to that which says that all states and movements, both our own and all others, come from the soul of the universe, even if it does allow us, even as individuals, some room for action of our own. It certainly has in it absolute universal necessity, and when all the causes are included it is impossible for each individual thing not to happen: for there is nothing left which will hinder it or make it happen otherwise if all causes are included in fate. If they are like this, starting from a single principle, they will leave nothing for us except to move wherever they push us. For our mental images will depend on pre-existing circumstances and our impulses will follow our mental

τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ὁρμῶμεν ἡμεῖς, ταύτῃ τι πλέον ἔσται τῆς ὁρμῆς κατ' ἐκεῖνα γεννωμένης· τοιοῦτόν τε τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔσται, οἷον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τὸ τῶν νηπίων καθ' ὁρμὰς τυφλὰς ἰόντων καὶ τὸ τῶν μαινομένων· ὁρμῶσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι· καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ [1] πυρὸς ὁρμαὶ καὶ πάντων ὅσα δουλεύοντα τῇ αὐτῶν κατασκευῇ φέρεται κατὰ ταύτην. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πάντες ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς ταύτης ἄλλας αἰτίας ζητοῦντες οὐχ ἵστανται ὡς ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ταύτης.

8. Τίς οὖν ἄλλη αἰτία παρὰ ταύτας ἐπελθοῦσα ἀναίτιόν τε οὐδὲν καταλείψει ἀκολουθίαν τε τηρήσει καὶ τάξιν ἡμᾶς τέ τι εἶναι συγχωρήσει προρρήσεις τε καὶ μαντείας οὐκ ἀναιρήσει; Ψυχὴν δὴ δεῖ ἀρχὴν οὖσαν ἄλλην ἐπεισφέροντας εἰς τὰ ὄντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστου μετὰ ταύτης, ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐ σμικρᾶς οὔσης, πλέκειν τὰ πάντα, οὐ γινομένης καὶ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ σπερμάτων, ἀλλὰ πρωτουργοῦ αἰτίας οὔσης. Ἄνευ μὲν οὖν σώματος οὖσα κυριωτάτη τε αὐτῆς καὶ ἐλευθέρα καὶ κοσμικῆς αἰτίας ἔξω· ἐνεχθεῖσα δὲ εἰς σῶμα οὐκέτι πάντα κυρία, ὡς ἂν μεθ' ἑτέρων ταχθεῖσα. Τύχαι δὲ τὰ κύκλῳ πάντα, οἷς συνέπεσεν ἐλθοῦσα εἰς μέσον, τὰ πολλὰ ἤγαγον, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν διὰ ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ κρατοῦσαν αὐτὴν ταῦτα ὅπῃ ἐθέλει ἄγειν. Πλείω δὲ κρατεῖ ἡ ἀμείνων, ἐλάττω δὲ ἡ χείρων. Ἡ [2] γὰρ κράσει σώματός τι ἐνδιδοῦσα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ὀργίζεσθαι

[1] καὶ Harder, H–S²: αἱ codd.
[2] ἡ Orelli H–S: ἤ codd.

images, and " what is in our power " will be a mere word; it will not exist any more just because it is we who have the impulses, if the impulse is produced in accordance with those pre-existing causes; our part will be like that of animals and babies, which go on blind impulses, and madmen, for these also have impulses—yes, by Zeus, fire has impulses too, and everything which is enslaved to its structure and moves according to it. Everyone else sees this and does not dispute it; but they look for other causes of this impulse of ours, and do not stop at this universal principle.

8. What other cause, then, occurs to us, besides these, which will leave nothing causeless, and will preserve sequence and order, and allow us to be something, and not do away with prophecies and divinations? Soul, surely, is another principle which we must bring into reality—not only the Soul of the All but also the individual soul along with it as a principle of no small importance; with this we must weave all things together, which does not itself come, like other things, from seeds but is a cause which initiates activity. Now when the soul is without body it is in absolute control of itself and free, and outside the causation of the physical universe; but when it is brought into body it is no longer in all ways in control, as it forms part of an order with other things. Chances direct, for the most part, all the things round it, among which it has fallen when it comes to this middle point, so that it does some things because of these, but sometimes it masters them itself and leads them where it wishes. The better soul has power over more, the worse over less. For the soul that gives in at all to the temperament of the body, is

ἠνάγκασται ἢ πενίαις ταπεινὴ ἢ πλούτοις χαῦνος ἢ δυνάμεσι τύραννος· ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀντέσχεν, ἡ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἠλλοίωσεν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἠλλοιώθη, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἑτεροιῶσαι, τοῖς δὲ συγχωρῆσαι μὴ μετὰ κάκης.

9. Ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ὅσα προαιρέσει καὶ τύχαις κραθέντα γίνεται· τί γὰρ ἂν ἔτι καὶ ἄλλο εἴη; Πάντων δὲ ληφθέντων τῶν αἰτίων πάντα πάντως γίνεται· ἐν τοῖς ἔξωθεν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ τῆς φορᾶς συντελεῖται. Ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀλλοιωθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχὴ πράττῃ τι καὶ ὁρμᾷ οἷον τυφλῇ τῇ φορᾷ χρωμένη, οὐχὶ ἑκούσιον τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐδὲ τὴν διάθεσιν λεκτέον· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ παρ' αὑτῆς χείρων οὖσα οὐκ ὀρθαῖς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ ἡγεμονούσαις ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ᾖ χρωμένη. Λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμόνα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἔχουσα ὁρμᾷ, ταύτην μόνην τὴν ὁρμὴν φατέον εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἦλθεν, ἀλλ' ἔνδοθεν ἀπὸ καθαρᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρώτης ἡγουμένης καὶ κυρίας, ἀλλ' οὐ πλάνην ἐξ ἀγνοίας παθούσης ἢ ἧττον ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἳ προσελθοῦσαι ἄγουσι καὶ ἕλκουσι καὶ οὐκέτι ἔργα ἐῶσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα παρ' ἡμῶν.

10. Τέλος δή φησιν ὁ λόγος πάντα μὲν σημαίνεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι κατ' αἰτίας μὲν πάντα, διττὰς δὲ ταύτας· καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας

compelled to feel lust or anger, either abject in poverty or puffed up by wealth or tyrannical in power; but the other soul, the one which is good by nature, holds its own in these very same circumstances, and changes them rather than is changed by them; so it alters some of them and yields to others if there is no vice in yielding.

9. So all is necessary that comes about by a mixture of choice and chance; for what else could there be besides? But when all the causes are included, everything happens with complete necessity; if anything from the universal circuit makes its contribution, that, too, is counted among the external causes. When therefore, the soul is altered by the external causes, and so does something and drives on in a sort of blind rush, neither its action nor its disposition is to be called free; this applies, too, when it is worse from itself and does not altogether have its impulses right or in control. When, however, in its impulse it has as director its own pure and untroubled reason, then this impulse alone is to be said to be in our own power and free; this is our own act, which does not come from somewhere else but from within from our soul when it is pure, from a primary principle which directs and is in control, not suffering error from ignorance or defeat from the violence of the passions, which come upon it and drive and drag it about, and do not allow any acts to come from us any more but only passive responses.

10. To sum up, the argument says that all things are indicated [by the stars] and all things happen according to causes, but there are two kinds of these; and some happenings are brought about by the soul,

αἰτίας τὰς κύκλῳ. Πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθὸν παρ' αὐτῶν πράττειν, ὅταν πράττωσι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐμποδιζομένας τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν, πάσχειν τε μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν. Ὥστε τοῦ μὲν μὴ φρονεῖν ἄλλα αἴτια εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως ὀρθὸν καθ' εἱμαρμένην λέγειν πράττειν, οἷς γε καὶ δοκεῖ ἔξωθεν τὴν εἱμαρμένην αἴτιον εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἄριστα παρ' ἡμῶν· ταύτης γὰρ καὶ τῆς φύσεώς ἐσμεν, ὅταν μόνοι ὦμεν· καὶ τούς γε σπουδαίους πράττειν, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀναπνεύσωσι συγχωρηθέντες τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν λαβόντας τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅταν φρονῶσι, μόνον δὲ οὐ κωλυθέντας.

others through other causes, those round about it. And souls, in all that they do, when they do it according to right reason, act of themselves, whenever they do act, but in everything else are hindered in their own action and are passive rather than active. So other things [not the soul] are responsible for not thinking; and it is perhaps correct to say that the soul acts unthinkingly according to destiny, at least for people who think that destiny is an external cause; but the best actions come from ourselves; for this is the nature we are of, when we are alone; good and wise men do act, and do noble actions by their own will; but the others do their noble actions in so far as they have a breathing space and are allowed to do so, not getting their thinking from somewhere else, when they do think, but only not being hindered.

III. 2 and 3. ON PROVIDENCE

Introductory Note

THESE treatises (Nos. 47 and 48 in the chronological order) are Porphyry's divisions of a single long work on Providence which Plotinus wrote towards the end of his life. The subject was a traditional one: many Stoics and Middle Platonists had written on Providence before him: but this austere, honest and profound work is the finest of all Greek contributions to theodicy. The object of Plotinus is to explain how belief in the existence and goodness of divine providence can be justified in the face of all the apparent evils in the world: the opponents he has in view are the Epicureans, who denied providence, the Peripatetics, who denied that it extended to the world below the moon, and perhaps most of all his intimate enemies the Gnostics, who held that the material universe was the work of an evil maker. Many of the arguments he uses are traditional, taken over from the Stoics, or developed from Plato's great theodicy in Book X of the *Laws* (cp. Bréhier's introduction to the treatises). But there is much that is original in his use and elaboration of them. The work is not a systematic one: themes and arguments recur and are handled in different ways from different points of view, not always without some inconsistency. It is one of the works in which we have most vividly the impression of Plotinus thinking aloud, discussing the subject with himself as he writes.

A notable feature of the work is that Plotinus speaks in it, and it alone, of a *logos*, a rational forming principle, of the whole universe, which looks at first sight like a distinct

hypostasis, incompatible with the normal hierarchy of three and three only, the One, Intellect and Soul, on which he insists so strongly elsewhere. But Bréhier, in his introduction (pp. 18–22), is almost certainly right in understanding *logos* here, not as a distinct hypostasis, but as a way of speaking of the living formative and directive pattern, derived from Intellect through Soul in the usual way, which keeps the material universe in the best possible order and brings it into a unity-in-diversity of contrasting and clashing forces which, though far inferior to the unity of the intelligible world, is its best possible image in the sharply divided world of space and time.

Synopsis

III. 2

It is unreasonable to suppose that the world is produced by chance, but there are difficulties about universal providence which ought to be discussed. This universe is the everlasting product of the true, eternal universe of Intellect, which is at unity and peace with itself (ch. 1). This universe is not truly one: there is separation in it, and therefore conflict. It is not the result of any kind of planning or decision, but the natural product of Intellect, necessarily inferior because of its material element but with its own kind of harmony dominating its conflicts (ch. 2). It is good as a whole, and everything in it is good and seeks the Good, each in its degree (ch. 3). The destruction of one thing by another is necessary, and leads to new life. Disorder and lawlessness result from failure to attain the good, and lead inevitably and justly to punishment (ch. 4). Evils often lead to good, for the whole or the individual (ch. 5). How can we reconcile the obvious injustices of human life with providence? (ch. 6). This is a second-rate world, after all. Individual souls, too, must take their share of responsibility. But providence does

really extend to the earth (ch. 7). Man is not the best kind of creature in the universe, but midway between gods and beasts. Men get what they deserve at the hands of the wicked through their own slackness and folly. Divine providence must leave room for human initiative. Men cannot expect the gods to help them if they do not do what is necessary for their own well-being (chs. 8–9). Free-will and necessity (ch. 10). There must be inequalities in the All (chs. 11–12). It is important to take previous incarnations into account in estimating the justice of men's fates (ch. 13). The wonderful order of the universe, and man's place in it (chs. 13–14). The endless wars among animals and men (which do not affect man's true inner self) are part of the great game, incidents in the plot of the play, movements in the dance, notes in the melody of the universe, which must be as it is because it is necessarily secondary, imperfect, not fully unified (chs. 15–16). This universe is less one than its rational formative principle, the *logos*. In its clashing disunity "each man kills the thing he loves." The *logos*, in producing its play, gives human souls parts in it according to the characters they have already (ch. 17). But there are still difficulties. We must not think of the actors in our cosmic drama as improvising to fill in gaps in the play. If we take away responsibility for evil from the *logos* we shall take away responsibility for good as well. But if we give it all responsibility, even the diviner souls will count for nothing in the universe (ch. 18).

III. 3

The universal *logos* includes the *logoi* of all souls, good and bad, and each of them, while remaining itself, forms part of a complex living unity, within which strife and opposition have their place (ch. 1). The *logos* is like a general who commands the enemy's army as well as his own (ch. 2). Man's individuality and his acts of choice

are taken account of in the universal plan. It is absurd to complain because man is not better than he is: he is as good as he can be given his place in the order of things, in this universe which itself follows upon, and is less perfect than, Intellect and Soul (ch. 3). Man is not simple, but double, with a higher, free principle besides his lower self. Higher and lower providence, and higher and lower principles in man: the lower depend on and are caused by the higher. Again, we must take previous lives into account (ch. 4). The inequalities of the providential order; each individual thing in its place contributes in its own way to the single result. Fate (lower providence) and higher providence. Evil actions are not done by providence but their results are worked into the universal order. The differences in men's reactions. Their good actions are done by themselves, but according to providence (ch. 5). Divination is possible because of the universal harmony and correspondence of all things (ch. 6). Diversity, inequality and evil are necessary if there is to be any universal order at all: all things in their multiplicity grow from a single root (ch. 7).

III. 2. (47) ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὸ μὲν τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ διδόναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ σύστασιν ὡς ἄλογον καὶ ἀνδρὸς οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε αἴσθησιν κεκτημένου, δῆλόν που καὶ πρὸ λόγου καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἱκανοὶ καταβέβληνται δεικνύντες τοῦτο λόγοι· τὸ δὲ τίς ὁ τρόπος τοῦ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἕκαστα καὶ πεποιῆσθαι, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐνίων ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινομένων ἀπορεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς προνοίας συμβαίνει, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπῆλθε μηδὲ εἶναι εἰπεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ κακοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐστι γεγενημένος, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸν λόγον λαβόντας. Πρόνοιαν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ, ἥ ἐστι λόγος πρὸ ἔργου ὅπως δεῖ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι τι τῶν οὐ δεόντων πραχθῆναι ἢ ὅπως τι εἴη ἢ μὴ εἴη ἡμῖν, ἀφείσθω· ἣν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς λέγομεν πρόνοιαν εἶναι, ταύτην ὑποθέμενοι τὰ ἐφεξῆς συνάπτωμεν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπό τινος χρόνου πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα τὸν κόσμον [1] ἐλέγομεν γεγονέναι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐτιθέμεθα, οἵαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος

[1] *κόσμον* Ficinus, H–S: *χρόνον* codd.

[1] The Epicureans: cp. e.g. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I. 8. 18 and 20, 54–56.

[2] The Gnostics: cp. II. 9 [33], of which the title is given by Porphyry in *Life*, ch. 24, 56–57, as "Against those who say that the maker of the universe is evil, and the universe is evil."

III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)

1. To attribute the being and structure of this All to accident and chance is unreasonable and belongs to a man without intelligence or perception; this is obvious even before demonstration, and many adequate demonstrations have been set down which show it. But the way in which all these individual things here come into being and are made, some of which, on the ground that they have not rightly come into being, produce difficulties about universal providence (and it has occurred to some people to say that it does not exist at all,[1] and to others that the universe has been made by an evil maker),[2] this we ought to consider, starting our discussion from the very beginning. Let us leave out that providence [or foresight] which belongs to the individual, which is a calculation before action how something should happen, or not happen in the case of things which ought not to be done, or how we may have something, or not have it. Let us postulate what we call universal providence and connect up with it what comes after. If, then, we said that after a certain time the universe, which did not previously exist, came into being, we should in our discussion lay down that providence in the All was the same as we said it was in partial things, a

ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, προόρασίν τινα καὶ λογισμὸν θεοῦ, ὡς ἂν γένοιτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ὡς ἂν ἄριστα κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἴη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ οὔποτε μὴ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδέ φαμεν παρεῖναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ ἀκολούθως λέγοιμεν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι τὸ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτὸν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος καὶ αἴτιος τούτου ἀρχέτυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος τούτου ὄντος καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεί, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθινὸς καὶ πρῶτος, οὐ διαστὰς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ἀσθενὴς τῷ μερισμῷ οὐδὲ ἐλλιπὴς οὐδὲ τοῖς μέρεσι γενόμενος ἅτε ἑκάστου μὴ ἀποσπασθέντος τοῦ ὅλου· ἀλλ' ἡ πᾶσα ζωὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ἐν ἑνὶ ζῶσα καὶ νοοῦσα ὁμοῦ καὶ τὸ μέρος παρέχεται ὅλον καὶ πᾶν αὐτῷ φίλον οὐ χωρισθὲν ἄλλο ἀπ' ἄλλου οὐδὲ ἕτερον γεγενημένον μόνον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεξενωμένον· ὅθεν οὐδὲ ἀδικεῖ ἄλλο ἄλλο οὐδ' ἂν ᾖ ἐναντίον. Πανταχοῦ δὲ ὂν ἓν καὶ τέλειον ὁπουοῦν ἕστηκέ τε καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν οὐκ ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο. Τίνος γὰρ ἂν ἕνεκα ποιοῖ ἐλλεῖπον οὐδενί; Τί δ' ἂν λόγος λόγον ἐργάσαιτο

[1] Plotinus frequently attacks the idea that God first planned the universe and then created it, and insists that it is everlasting and not the result of divine deliberation and choice

foreseeing and calculation of God about how this All might come into existence, and how things might be as good as possible. But since we affirm that this universe is everlasting and has never not existed,[1] we should be correct and consistent in saying that providence for the All is its being according to Intellect, and that Intellect is before it, not in the sense that it is prior in time but because the universe comes from Intellect and Intellect is prior in nature, and the cause of the universe as a kind of archetype and model, the universe being an image of it and existing by means of it and everlastingly coming into existence, in this way; the nature of Intellect and Being is the true and first universe, which does not stand apart from itself and is not weakened by division and is not incomplete even in its parts, since each part is not cut off from the whole; but the whole life of it and the whole intellect lives and thinks all together in one, and makes the part the whole and all bound in friendship with itself, since one part is not separated from another and has not become merely other, estranged from the rest; and, therefore, one does not wrong another, even if they are opposites. And since it is everywhere one and complete at every point it stays still and knows no alteration; for it does not make as one thing acting upon another. For what reason could it have for making, since it is deficient in nothing? Why should a rational principle make another rational principle,

but of a spontaneous outflow of creative power without beginning or end. For a particularly notable statement of his reasons for rejecting divine planning and subsequent creation, cp. V. 8 [31] 7.

ἢ νοῦς νοῦν ἄλλον; Ἀλλὰ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαί τι ποιεῖν ἦν ἄρα οὐκ εὖ ἔχοντος πάντη, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ ποιοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου, καθ' ὅ τι καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ πάντη μακαρίοις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἑστάναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὅπερ εἰσί, μόνον ἀρκεῖ, τὸ δὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἑαυτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν παρακινοῦσιν. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτω μακάριον κἀκεῖνο, ὡς ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιεῖν μεγάλα αὖ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν οὐ σμικρὰ ποιεῖν.

2. Ὑφίσταται γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἑνὸς κόσμος οὗτος οὐχ εἷς ἀληθῶς· πολὺς γοῦν καὶ εἰς πλῆθος μεμερισμένος καὶ ἄλλο ἀπ' ἄλλου ἀφεστηκὸς καὶ ἀλλότριον γεγενημένον καὶ οὐκέτι φιλία μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔχθρα τῇ διαστάσει καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλλείψει ἐξ ἀνάγκης πολέμιον ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ αὐτῷ τὸ μέρος, ἀλλὰ σῳζόμενον τῷ ἄλλῳ πολέμιόν ἐστιν ὑφ' οὗ σῴζεται. Γέγονε δὲ οὐ λογισμῷ τοῦ δεῖν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ φύσεως δευτέρας ἀνάγκῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο οἷον ἔσχατον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. Πρῶτον γὰρ ἦν καὶ πολλὴν δύναμιν ἔχον καὶ πᾶσαν· καὶ ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἄνευ τοῦ ζητεῖν ποιῆσαι. Ἤδη γὰρ ἂν αὐτόθεν οὐκ εἶχεν, εἰ ἐζήτει, οὐδ' ἂν ἦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ἦν οἷον τεχνίτης ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἐπακτόν, ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν λαβὼν τοῦτο. Νοῦς τοίνυν δούς τι ἑαυτοῦ εἰς ὕλην ἀτρεμὴς καὶ

or an intellect another intellect? Being able to make something by itself is the characteristic of something which is not altogether in a good state but makes and moves in the direction in which it is inferior. For altogether blessed beings it is alone enough to stay still in themselves and be what they are; restless activity is unsafe for those who in it violently move themselves out of themselves. But that true All is blessed in such a way that in not making it accomplishes great works and in remaining in itself makes no small things.

2. For from that true universe which is one this universe comes into existence, which is not truly one; for it is many and divided into a multiplicity, and one part stands away from another and is alien to it, and there is not only friendship but also enmity because of the separation, and in their deficiency one part is of necessity at war with another. For the part is not self-sufficient, but in being preserved is at war with the other by which it is preserved. This universe has come into existence, not as the result of a process of reasoning that it ought to exist but because it was necessary that there should be a second nature; for that true All was not of a kind to be the last of realities. For it was the first, and had much power, indeed all power; and this is the power to produce something else without seeking to produce it. For if it had sought, it would not have had it of itself, nor would it have been of its own substance, but it would have been like a craftsman who does not have the ability to produce from himself, but as something acquired, and gets it from learning. So Intellect, by giving something of itself to matter, made all

ἥσυχος τὰ πάντα εἰργάζετο· οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥυείς. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορρεῖ, ἕως ἂν ᾖ παρὼν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι νοῦς. Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν λόγῳ τῷ ἐν σπέρματι ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντων καὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδενὶ μαχομένου οὐδὲ διαφερομένου οὐδὲ ἐμποδίου ὄντος, γίνεταί τι ἤδη ἐν ὄγκῳ καὶ ἄλλο μέρος ἀλλαχοῦ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐμποδίσειεν ἂν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἀπαναλώσειεν ἄλλο ἄλλο, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν καὶ διέστη καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν ἐγένετο φίλα καὶ προσηνῆ, τὰ δὲ ἐχθρὰ καὶ πολέμια, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑκόντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄκοντα ἀλλήλοις ἐλυμήνατο καὶ φθειρόμενα θάτερα γένεσιν ἄλλοις εἰργάσατο, καὶ μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοιαῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν ὅμως ἁρμονίαν ἐνεστήσατο φθεγγομένων μὲν ἑκάστων τὰ αὑτῶν, τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου. Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ πᾶν τόδε οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον νοῦ καὶ λόγου. Διὸ καὶ ἐδεήθη ἁρμονίας συνελθόντος νοῦ καὶ ἀνάγκης, τῆς μὲν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἑλκούσης καὶ εἰς ἀλογίαν φερούσης ἅτε οὐκ οὔσης λόγου, ἄρχοντος δὲ νοῦ ὅμως ἀνάγκης. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοητὸς μόνον λόγος, καὶ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄλλος

[1] The analogy of the seed (which in his way of thinking is superior in its concentrated unity to the full-grown plant) is a favourite one with Plotinus: cp., e.g., III. 7 [45] 11. 23–27.
[2] Plato, *Timaeus* 48A2.

things in unperturbed quietness; this something of itself is the rational formative principle flowing from Intellect. For that which flows out from Intellect is formative principle, and it flows out always, as long as Intellect is present among realities. But just as in the formative principle in a seed all the parts are together and in the same place, and none of them fights with any other or is at odds with it or gets in its way; then something comes to be in bulk, and the different parts are in different places, and then one really could get in another's way and even consume it;[1] so from Intellect which is one, and the formative principle which proceeds from it, this All has arisen and separated into parts, and of necessity some became friendly and gentle, others hostile and at war, and some did harm to each other willingly, some, too, unwillingly, and some by their destruction brought about the coming into being of others, and over them all as they acted and were acted upon in these kinds of ways they began a single melody, each of them uttering their own sounds, and the forming principle over them producing the melody and the single ordering of all together to the whole. This All of ours is not intellect and rational principle, like the All There, but participates in intellect and rational principle. Therefore, there was need of a concord in which "intellect and necessity" came together, in which necessity drags it down to what is worse and carries it away to unreason, because it is not a rational principle itself, but, all the same, "intellect controls necessity."[2] It is the intelligible universe that is nothing but rational principle, and there could not be another which is nothing but rational

μόνον λόγος· εἰ δέ τι ἐγένετο ἄλλο, ἔδει ἔλαττον ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ λόγον, μηδ' αὖ ὕλην τινά· ἄκοσμον γάρ· μικτὸν ἄρα. Καὶ εἰς ἃ μὲν λήγει, ὕλη καὶ λόγος, ὅθεν δὲ ἄρχεται, ψυχὴ ἐφεστῶσα τῷ μεμιγμένῳ, ἣν οὐ κακοπαθεῖν δεῖ νομίζειν ῥᾷστα διοικοῦσαν τόδε τὸ πᾶν τῇ οἷον παρουσίᾳ.

3. Καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότως οὐδὲ τούτῳ μέμψαιτο ὡς οὐ καλῷ οὐδὲ τῶν μετὰ σώματος οὐκ ἀρίστῳ, οὐδ' αὖ τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ αἰτιάσαιτο πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐκ λογισμοῦ γενομένου, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀμείνονος γεννώσης κατὰ φύσιν ὅμοιον ἑαυτῇ· ἔπειτα οὐδ' εἰ λογισμὸς εἴη ὁ ποιήσας, αἰσχυνεῖται τῷ ποιηθέντι· ὅλον γάρ τι ἐποίησε πάγκαλον καὶ αὐτάρκες καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσαύτως προσφόροις. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τά τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, τό τε ὅλον σκοπούμενον μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν. Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου, ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντος, οἷον εἰ παντὸς ζῴου τρίχα ἢ τῶν χαμαὶ δάκτυλον [1] ἀμελήσας τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον, δαιμονίαν τινὰ ὄψιν βλέπειν, ἢ νὴ Δία

[1] 14 λαβόντος Kirchhoff (accipientis Ficinus): λαβόντα codd. 15 δάκτυλον Kirchhoff: δακτύλων codd.

principle; but if something else did come into existence, it had to be less than that other universe, and not rational principle, nor yet some kind of matter, for that would be without beauty and order; so it had to be a mixture [of both]. Its terminal points are matter and rational principle; its starting-point is Soul presiding over the mixture, Soul which we must not think suffers any harm as it directs this All with the utmost ease by a sort of presence.

3. And it is not proper for anyone to speak ill of even this universe as not being beautiful or the best of all things which have body; nor to blame the cause of its existence when, first of all, it exists of necessity and not as the result of any process of reasoning, but of a better nature naturally producing a likeness of itself; then, even if it had been a process of reasoning which had produced it, there will be nothing to be ashamed of in its product; for it produced a whole, all beautiful and self-sufficient and friends with itself and with its parts, both the more important and the lesser, which are all equally well adapted to it. So he who blamed the whole because of the parts would be quite unreasonable in his blame; one must consider the parts in relation to the whole, to see if they are harmonious and in concord with it; and when one considers the whole one must not look at a few little parts.[1] This is not blaming the universe but taking some of its parts separately, as if one were to take a hair of a whole living being, or a toe, and neglect the whole man, a wonderful sight to see; or, really, to ignore the rest

[1] Cp. Plato, *Laws* X. 903B–C.

τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀφεὶς τὸ εὐτελέστατον λαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸ ὅλον γένος παρείς, οἷον τὸ ἀνθρώπου, Θερσίτην εἰς μέσον ἄγοι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ γενόμενον ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ σύμπας, τοῦτον θεωρῶν τάχα ἂν ἀκούσαις παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς «ἐμὲ πεποίηκε θεὸς κἀγὼ ἐκεῖθεν ἐγενόμην τέλειος ἐκ πάντων ζῴων καὶ ἱκανὸς ἐμαυτῷ καὶ αὐτάρκης οὐδενὸς δεόμενος, ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα καὶ συμπάντων τῶν γενητῶν φύσις καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ δαιμόνων δῆμοι καὶ ψυχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀρετῇ εὐδαίμονες. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ γῇ μὲν κεκόσμηται φυτοῖς τε πᾶσι καὶ ζῴοις παντοδαποῖς καὶ μέχρι θαλάττης ψυχῆς ἦλθε δύναμις, ἀὴρ δὲ πᾶς καὶ αἰθὴρ καὶ οὐρανὸς σύμπας ψυχῆς ἄμοιρος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ ψυχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι, ἄστροις ζῆν διδοῦσαι καὶ τῇ εὐτάκτῳ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἀιδίῳ περιφορᾷ νοῦ μιμήσει κύκλῳ φερομένῃ ἐμφρόνως περὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεί· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω ζητεῖ. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐφίεται μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τυγχάνει δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα· ἐξήρτηται γὰρ πᾶς μὲν οὐρανὸς ἐκείνου, πᾶσα δὲ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ καὶ οἱ ἐν μέρεσιν ἐμοῖς θεοί, καὶ τὰ ζῷα δὲ πάντα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ εἴ τι ἄψυχον δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐν ἐμοί. Καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν δοκεῖ μόνον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἤδη λόγον ἔχει, τὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ζωήν. Οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἴσα ἀπαιτεῖν δεῖ τοῖς μὴ ἴσοις·

of living beings and pick out the meanest; or to pass over the whole race, say, of men and bring forward Thersites. Since, then, what has come into being is the whole universe, if you contemplate this, you might hear it say, "A god made me, and I came from him perfect above all living things, and complete in myself and self-sufficient, lacking nothing, because all things are in me, plants and animals and the nature of all things that have come into being, and many gods, and populations of spirits, and good souls and men who are happy in their virtue. It is not true that the earth is adorned with all plants and every sort of animal, and the power of soul has reached to the sea, but all the air and aether and the whole heaven is without a share of soul; but up there are all good souls, giving life to the stars and to the well-ordered everlasting circuit of the heaven, which in imitation of Intellect wisely circles round the same centre for ever; for it seeks nothing outside itself.[1] Everything in me seeks after the Good, but each attains it in proportion to its own power; for the whole heaven depends on it, and the whole of my soul, and the gods in my parts, and all animals and plants and whatever there is in me (if there is anything) which is thought to be without life. And some things appear to participate only in being, others in life, others more fully in life in that they have sense-perception, others at the next stage have reason, and others the fullness of life. One must not demand equal gifts in things which are not equal. It is not the finger's

[1] Cp. *Laws* X. 898 (especially 898A5–B3 on the likeness of the circular motion of the heavens to the activity of intellect) and XII. 967A–D.

οὐδὲ γὰρ δακτύλῳ τὸ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμῷ τοῦτο, δακτύλῳ δὲ ἄλλο, τὸ εἶναι οἷμαι δακτύλῳ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν.»

4. Πῦρ δὲ εἰ ὑπὸ ὕδατος σβέννυται καὶ ἕτερον ὑπὸ πυρὸς φθείρεται, μὴ θαυμάσῃς. Καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν, οὐκ ἀχθὲν ὑφ' αὑτοῦ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐφθάρη, καὶ ἦλθε δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ' ἄλλου φθορᾶς, καὶ ἡ φθορὰ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἂν ἡ οὕτω δεινὸν φέροι, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ φθαρέντος πυρὸς πῦρ ἄλλο. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωμάτῳ οὐρανῷ ἕκαστον μένει, ἐν δὲ τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ πᾶν μὲν ἀεὶ ζῇ καὶ ὅσα τίμια καὶ κύρια μέρη, αἱ δὲ ἀμείβουσαι ψυχαὶ σώματα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλῳ εἴδει γίγνονται, καὶ ὅταν δὲ δύνηται, ἔξω γενέσεως στᾶσα ψυχὴ μετὰ τῆς πάσης ἐστὶ ψυχῆς. Σώματα δὲ ζῇ κατ' εἶδος καὶ καθ' ὅλα ἕκαστα, εἴπερ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ζῷα ἔσται καὶ τραφήσεται· ζωὴ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένη, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος. Ἔδει δὲ κίνησιν ἐξ ἀκινησίας εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ζωῆς τὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς γεγονέναι ἄλλην, οἷον ἐμπνέουσαν καὶ οὐκ ἀτρεμοῦσαν ζωὴν ἀναπνοὴν τῆς ἠρεμούσης οὖσαν. Ζῴων δὲ εἰς ἄλληλα ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ ἐπιθέσεις καὶ φθοραί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀΐδια ἐγίνετο. Ἐγίνετο δέ, ὅτι λόγος πᾶσαν ὕλην κατελάμβανε καὶ εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ

[1] These individual bodies are probably the elements, earth, air, etc., which are alive and communicate their life to the living beings in them: cp. IV. 4 [28] 27, where stones are said to grow as long as they are part of the living continuous

business to see, but this is the eye's function, and the finger's is something else, to be essentially finger and to have what belongs to it."

4. But do not be surprised if fire is extinguished by water and something else is destroyed by fire. For something else brought it into existence; it did not bring itself and was then destroyed by something else; and it came to being by the destruction of something else, and its own corresponding destruction, if it comes, would bring nothing terrible to it, and there is another fire in place of the fire which was destroyed. For the incorporeal heaven, each individual part persists, but in this heaven here the whole lives for ever and all the noble and important parts, but the souls, changing their bodies, appear now in one form and now in another, and also, when it can, a soul takes its place outside the process of becoming and is with the universal soul. Bodies live by species, and individual bodies as far as they are wholes,[1] if living things both come from them and are to be nourished by them; for life is in motion here, but unmoved There. Motion had to come from stillness, and from the life which remains in itself there had to come the life which proceeds from it, which is different, like a life breathing and stirring which is the respiration of that life at rest. The attacks of living beings on each other, and their destruction of each other, are necessary; they did not come into existence to live for ever. They came into existence because the formative principle took hold of the whole of matter and had in itself all

structure of the earth, but to stop growing when they are cut away from it.

πάντα ὄντων αὐτῶν ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω οὐρανῷ· πόθεν γὰρ ἂν ἦλθε μὴ ὄντων ἐκεῖ; Ἀνθρώπων δὲ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀδικίαι ἔχοιεν μὲν ἂν αἰτίαν ἔφεσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀδυναμίᾳ δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν σφαλλόμενοι ἐπ' ἄλλους τρέπονται. Ἰσχουσι δὲ ἀδικοῦντες δίκας κακυνόμενοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐνεργείαις κακίας τάττονταί τε εἰς τόπον χείρονα· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε ἐκφύγῃ μηδὲν τὸ ταχθὲν ἐν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς νόμῳ. Ἔστι δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν τάξις οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀνομίαν νόμος, ὥς τις οἴεται, ἵνα γένοιτο ἐκεῖνα διὰ τὰ χείρω καὶ ἵνα φαίνοιτο, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἐπακτὸν οὖσαν. καὶ ὅτι τάξις, ἀταξία, καὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὅτι λόγος, παρανομία καὶ ἄνοια οὐ τῶν βελτιόνων τὰ χείρω πεποιηκότων, ἀλλὰ τῶν δέχεσθαι δεομένων τὰ ἀμείνω φύσει τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἢ συντυχίᾳ καὶ κωλύσει ἄλλων δέξασθαι οὐ δεδυνημένων. Τὸ γὰρ ἐπακτῷ χρώμενον τάξει τοῦτο ἂν οὐ τύχοι ἢ δι' αὐτὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου· πολλὰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων πάσχει καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ἰεμένων. Τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα [1] κίνησιν αὐτεξούσιον ζῷα ῥέποι ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὰ βελτίω, ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω. Τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὰ χείρω τροπὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν ἴσως οὐκ ἄξιον· ὀλίγη γὰρ

[1] ἔχοντα Theodoretus: ἐχόντων codd.

[1] I.e. Epicurus (cp. Usener, *Epicurea* 530 ff.).

living things, because they all exist There, in the upper heaven; for where could they have come from if they did not exist There? The cause of the wrongs men do to one another might be their effort towards the Good; when they fail through their impotence to attain it, they turn against other men. But the wrongdoers pay the penalty, being corrupted in their souls by their works of wickedness, and are set in a lower place; for nothing can ever escape that which is ordained in the law of the All. But order does not exist because of disorder or law because of lawlessness, as someone thinks,[1] that these good things may exist and be manifested because of the worse ones; but disorder and lawlessness exist because of order, which is imposed from outside. It is because there is order that disorder exists, and on account of the law and formative reason, just because it is reason, that there is transgression of the law and folly; not that the better things produce the worse, but the things which ought to receive the better are unable to do so because of their own nature or because of some chance circumstance or hindrance from others. For when something has its order from outside it may fail to correspond to it either of its own accord and from itself or because of and impelled by something else; and many things are affected by others when those which act on them do not intend to do so and are aiming at something else. But living beings which have of themselves a movement under their own control might incline sometimes to what is better, sometimes to what is worse. It is probably not worth enquiring into the reason for this self-caused turning towards the worse;

τροπὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς γενομένη προϊοῦσα ταύτῃ πλέον καὶ μεῖζον τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον ἀεὶ ποιεῖ· καὶ σῶμα δὲ σύνεστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπιθυμία· καὶ παροφθὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ μὴ ἀναληφθὲν αὐτίκα καὶ αἵρεσιν εἰς ὅ τις ἐξέπεσεν εἰργάσατο. Ἔπεταί γε μὴν δίκη· καὶ οὐκ ἄδικον τοιόνδε γενόμενον ἀκόλουθα πάσχειν τῇ διαθέσει, οὐδ' ἀπαιτητέον τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια. Οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ μόνοι εὐδαίμονες· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ εὐδαίμονες.

5. Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἔξεστιν εὐδαίμοσιν εἶναι, εἴ τινες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀδυναμίας οὐ δυνηθείσας καλῶς ἐναγωνίσασθαι, οὗ δὴ ἆθλα ἀρετῆς πρόκειται. Καὶ μὴ θείους δὲ γενομένους θεῖον βίον μὴ ἔχειν τί δεινόν; Πενίαι δὲ καὶ νόσοι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς οὐδέν, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς σύμφορα·[1] καὶ ἀνάγκη νοσεῖν σώματα ἔχουσι. Καὶ οὐκ ἀχρεῖα δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα παντάπασιν εἰς σύνταξιν καὶ συμπλήρωσιν τοῦ ὅλου. Ὡς γὰρ φθαρέντων τινῶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κατεχρήσατο τοῖς φθαρεῖσιν εἰς γένεσιν ἄλλων—οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδαμῇ ἐκφεύγει τὸ ὑπὸ τούτου καταλαμβάνεσθαι—οὕτω καὶ κακωθέντος σώματος καὶ μαλακισθείσης δὲ ψυχῆς τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πασχούσης τὰ[2] νόσοις καὶ κακίᾳ καταληφθέντα ὑπεβλήθη ἄλλῳ εἱρμῷ καὶ ἄλλῃ τάξει. Καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκε τοῖς παθοῦσιν, οἷον πενία καὶ νόσος, ἡ δὲ κακία

[1] σύμφορα Creuzer (utilia Ficinus): συμφορά codd.
[2] τα[2] A[pc], H–S: καὶ codd.

for a deviation which is slight to begin with, as it goes on in this way continually makes the fault wider and graver; and the body is there too, and, necessarily, its lust. And the first beginning, the sudden impulse, if it is overlooked and not immediately corrected, even produces a settled choice of that into which one has fallen. Punishment certainly follows; and it is not unjust that someone who has come to be this sort of person should suffer the consequences of his condition; people must not demand to be well off who have not done what deserves well-being. Only the good are well off; that, too, is what gives the gods their well-being.

5. If, then, it is possible for souls to be well off in this All, we must not blame the place if some are not well off, but their own incapacity, in that they have not been able to take a noble part in the contest for which the prizes of virtue are offered. Why is it disconcerting if men who have not become godlike do not have a godlike life? And poverty, too, and sickness, are nothing to the good, but advantageous to the bad; and men must fall sick if they have bodies. And even these troubles are not altogether without usefulness for the co-ordination and completion of the whole. For, just as when some things are destroyed the formative principle of the All uses them for the generation of others—for nothing anywhere escapes its grip—so, when a body is damaged, and a soul enfeebled by suffering something of this kind, what has been seized upon by sicknesses and vice is subjected to another chain of causation and another ordering. And some troubles are profitable to the sufferers themselves, poverty and sickness for

εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγρηγορότας ἐποίησε καὶ νοῦν καὶ σύνεσιν ἐγείρει[1] πονηρίας ὁδοῖς ἀντιτατ-
20 τομένων, καὶ μανθάνειν δὲ ποιεῖ οἷον ἀγαθὸν ἀρετὴ παραθέσει κακῶν ὧν οἱ πονηροὶ ἔχουσι. Καὶ οὐ γέγονε τὰ κακὰ διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὅτι χρῆται καὶ αὐτοῖς εἰς δέον, ἐπείπερ ἐγένετο, εἴρηται. Τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης, καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀμόρφοις
25 γενομένοις εἰς ἑτέρας μορφὰς χρῆσθαι ἱκανὴν εἶναι. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἔλλειψιν ἀγαθοῦ θετέον· ἀνάγκη δὲ ἔλλειψιν εἶναι ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. Τὸ οὖν ἄλλο, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕτερον ἀγαθοῦ ὂν ποιεῖ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἦν. Διὸ οὔτε ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά, ὅτι
30 τε ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐλάττω πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ἕτερά τε τἆλλα[2] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐκεῖθεν λαβόντα, τοιαῦτα δὴ γενόμενα τῷ πόρρω.

6. Τὸ δὲ παρ' ἀξίαν, ὅταν ἀγαθοὶ κακὰ ἔχωσι, φαῦλοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγεται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν
5 τούτῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πονηρῷ; Πῶς γὰρ καλῶς νέμειν οὕτω; Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οὐ

[1] ἐγείρει Theodoretus: ἐγεῖραι codd.
[2] τἆλλα Theiler: ἄλλα codd.

[1] The often-repeated quotation from Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A5, one of the cardinal texts of Plotinian Neoplatonism.

instance, and vice works something useful to the whole by becoming an example of just punishment; and also of itself it offers much that is of use. For it makes men awake and wakes up the intelligence and understanding of those who are opposed to the ways of wickedness, and makes us learn what a good virtue is by comparison with the evils of which the wicked have a share. And evils did not come into existence for these reasons, but we have explained that, when they have come into existence, the formative principle uses even them to meet a need. This belongs to the greatest power, to be able to use even the evil nobly and to be strong enough to use things which have become shapeless for making other shapes. In general, we must define evil as a falling short of good; and there must be a falling short of good here below, because the good is in something else. This something else, then, in which the good is, since it is other than good, produces the falling short; for it is not good. Therefore "evils will not be done away with,"[1] because some things are less than others in comparison with the nature of good, and the other things which have the cause of their existence from the Good are different from the Good and have certainly become the sort of things they are because of their distance from it.

6. As for people getting what they do not deserve, when the good get what is bad and the bad the opposite, it is correct to say that nothing is bad for the good man and nothing, correspondingly, good for the bad one; but why do things against nature come to the good, and things according to nature to the wicked? How can this be right distribution? But

ποιεῖ προσθήκην πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ κακοῦ τοῦ ἐν φαύλοις, τί διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως; Ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὁ μὲν καλὸς τὸ σῶμα, ὁ δὲ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἀγαθός. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκείνως ἂν ἦν, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι· προνοίας δὲ ἀρίστης ἐκεῖνο ἦν. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δούλους, τοὺς δὲ δεσπότας εἶναι, καὶ ἄρχοντας τῶν πόλεων τοὺς κακούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς δούλους εἶναι, οὐ πρέποντα ἦν, οὐδ' εἰ προσθήκην ταῦτα μὴ φέρει εἰς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ κτῆσιν. Καίτοι τὰ ἀνομώτατα ἂν πράξειεν ἄρχων πονηρός· καὶ κρατοῦσι δ' ἐν πολέμοις οἱ κακοὶ καὶ οἷα αἰσχρὰ δρῶσιν αἰχμαλώτους λαβόντες. Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, ὅπως προνοίας οὔσης γίνεται. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν ὁτιοῦν μέλλοντα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μέρη ὀρθῶς ἔχει τάττειν ἐν δέοντι αὐτῷ καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἔμψυχα ᾖ καὶ ζωὴν ἔχῃ ἢ καὶ λογικὰ ᾖ, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς τοῦτ' εἶναι, τὸ μηδενὸς ἠμεληκέναι. Εἰ οὖν φαμεν ἐκ νοῦ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἠρτῆσθαι καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα ἐληλυθέναι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ δεικνύναι, ὅπῃ ἕκαστα τούτων καλῶς ἔχει.

7. Πρῶτον τοίνυν ληπτέον ὡς τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ ζητοῦντας χρὴ μὴ πάντη ἀπαιτεῖν ὅσον τὸ καλῶς ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ ἔχει, μηδ' ἐν δευτέροις

if what is according to nature brings no addition to well-being, nor, correspondingly, does that which is contrary to nature take away anything of the evil which is in the bad, what does it matter whether it is this way or that? Just as it does not matter if the bad man is beautiful in body and the other, the good man, is ugly. But that other way, which is not the way things are now, would be proper and proportionate and according to merit; and that would be the way of the best providence. Then, again, it is not proper that the good should be slaves and the others masters, and that the wicked should be rulers of cities and decent men their slaves, even if these circumstances add nothing to the possession of good or evil. Then, too, a wicked ruler might do the most lawless things; and the bad get the upper hand in wars, and what crimes they commit when they have taken prisoners! All these things cause perplexity about how they can happen if there is a providence. For even if someone who is intending to make something must look to the whole, yet all the same it is right for him to set the parts where they ought to be, especially when they are beings with souls, and have life, or are even rational; and providence ought to reach everything, and its task ought to be just this, to leave nothing neglected. If, then, we say this All depends on Intellect, and that the power of intellect has extended to all things, we must try to show in what way each of them is excellently disposed.

7. First, then, we must understand that those who are looking for excellence in what is mixed must not demand all that excellence has in the unmixed, nor look for things of the first order among those of the

ζητεῖν τὰ πρῶτα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ σῶμα ἔχει, συγχωρεῖν καὶ παρὰ τούτου ἰέναι εἰς τὸ πᾶν, ἀπαιτεῖν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ λόγου, ὅσον ἐδύνατο δέξασθαι τὸ μῖγμα, εἰ μηδὲν τούτου ἐλλείπει· οἷον, εἴ τις ἐσκόπει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν αἰσθητὸν ὅστις κάλλιστος, οὐκ ἂν δήπου τῷ ἐν νῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἠξίωσε τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀποδεδέχθαι τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ ὅμως ἐν σαρξὶ καὶ νεύροις καὶ ὀστέοις ὄντα κατέλαβε τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ταῦτα καλλῦναι καὶ τὸν λόγον δυνηθῆναι ἐπανθεῖν[1] τῇ ὕλῃ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν ὑποθέμενον χρὴ προιέναι τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα· τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἐν τούτοις τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἀνεύροιμεν τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, παρ' οὗ ὑπέστη τὸ πᾶν τόδε. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔργα ψυχῶν, ἃ δὴ ἐν αὐταῖς ἵσταται ταῖς ἐργαζομέναις τὰ χείρω, οἷον ὅσα κακαὶ ψυχαὶ ἄλλας ἔβλαψαν καὶ ὅσα ἀλλήλας αἱ κακαί, εἰ μὴ καὶ τοῦ κακὰς ὅλως αὐτὰς εἶναι τὸ προνοοῦν αἰτιῷτο, ἀπαιτεῖν λόγον οὐδὲ εὐθύνας προσήκει « αἰτία ἑλομένου » διδόντας· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς κινήσεις οἰκείας ἔχειν καὶ ὅτι οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ζῷα ἤδη, καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν οὔσας ὅ εἰσιν ἀκόλουθον βίον ἔχειν· οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅτι κόσμος ἦν, ἐληλύθασιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ κόσμου τὸ κόσμου εἶναι εἶχον καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι

[1] ἐπανθεῖν Theiler: ἐπανελθεῖν codd.

[1] From the myth of Er in *Republic* X. 617E4–5 (the soul's choice of lives).

second, but, since they also have a body, one must admit that something comes from it to the All, and demand from the rational forming principle only as much as the mixture can receive, if nothing of it is deficient: for instance, if someone was looking for the most beautiful man that we can perceive by our senses he would not, presumably, expect him to be the same as the man in Intellect, but would be satisfied with what his maker had done if he had so dominated him, even though he was held in flesh and sinews and bones, by the formative principle, that he made these material things beautiful, and the formative principle was able to come into flower upon the matter. So, then, we must take these principles as the basis of our discussion, and go on from there to our enquiries; for perhaps we may discover in them the wonder of providence and of the power from which this All came into existence. Now, as far as all the works of souls are concerned, those, that is, which remain within the souls which do wrong, for instance, the harm evil souls do to others and the harm they do to each other, unless one is to blame the providential power for their being bad at all, one has no proper reason for demanding an account or a reckoning from it, as one admits that " the blame lies with the chooser ":[1] for it has already been said that souls must have their own movements, and that they are not only souls but also already [composite] living beings, and that there is nothing surprising if, being what they are, they have a life corresponding with their nature; for they have not come into the universe because it existed but before the universe they had it in them to belong to the universe, and to care

καὶ ὑφιστάναι καὶ διοικεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ὅστις τρόπος, εἴτε ἐφεστῶσαι καὶ διδοῦσαί τι παρ' αὐτῶν εἴτε κατιοῦσαι εἴτε αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δ' οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ νῦν περὶ τούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι, ὅπως πότ' ἂν ᾖ, τήν γε πρόνοιαν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐ μεμπτέον. Ἀλλ' ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τὴν παράθεσιν τῶν κακῶν τις θεωρῇ, πένητας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ πλεονεκτοῦντας ἐν οἷς ἔχειν δεῖ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας τοὺς χείρους καὶ κρατοῦντας, καὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τὰς πόλεις; Ἆρ' οὖν, ὅτι μὴ μέχρι γῆς φθάνει; Ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων γινομένων λόγῳ μαρτύριον τοῦτο καὶ μέχρι γῆς ἰέναι· καὶ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ λόγου καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ζωῆς μεταλαμβάνει. Ἀλλὰ φθάνουσα οὐ κρατεῖ; Ἀλλὰ ζῴου ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ὅμοιον ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις κεφαλὴν μὲν ἀνθρώπου καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ λόγου γίνεσθαι λέγοι κρατοῦντος, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄλλαις ἀναθείη αἰτίαις, τύχαις ἢ ἀνάγκαις, καὶ φαῦλα διὰ τοῦτο ἢ δι' ἀδυναμίαν φύσεως γεγονέναι. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅσιον οὐδ' εὐσεβὲς ἐνδόντας τῷ μὴ καλῶς ταῦτα ἔχειν καταμέμφεσθαι τῷ ποιήματι.

8. Λοιπὸν δὴ ζητεῖν ὅπῃ καλῶς ταῦτα, καὶ ὡς τάξεως μετέχει, ἢ ὅπῃ μή. Ἢ οὐ κακῶς. Παντὸς δὴ ζῴου τὰ μὲν ἄνω, πρόσωπα καὶ

for it and bring it into existence and direct it, and, in one way or another, to make it, either by staying above it and giving something of themselves or by coming down, or some in this way and some in that; for we are not concerned with this in our present discussion; what concerns us is that, however this may be, providence ought not to be blamed for the doings of souls. But what if one considers the comparative distribution of evils to men of opposite character, that the good are poor and the wicked are rich, and the bad have more than their share of the things which those who are human beings must have, and are masters, and peoples and cities belong to them? Is it, then, because providence does not reach as far as the earth? But the fact that the other things happen in a rational pattern is evidence that it reaches the earth too; for animals and plants share in reason and soul and life. Does it, then, reach the earth, but not have full control here? But, since the All is a single living being, this would be as if someone were to say that a man's head and face had been produced by nature and a rational forming principle in full control, but should attribute the rest of the body to other causes—chances or necessities—and should say that they were inferior productions either because of this or because of the incompetence of nature. But it is neither pious or reverent to censure the work by admitting that these lower parts are not excellently disposed.

8. So it remains to enquire in what way these are excellently arranged, and how they have a share in order, and in what way not. Certainly they are not arranged badly. The upper parts of every living

κεφαλή, καλλίω, τὰ δὲ μέσα καὶ κάτω οὐκ ἴσα· ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω, ἄνω δὲ οὐρανὸς καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοί· καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ κόσμου θεοὶ καὶ οὐρανὸς πᾶς κύκλῳ, γῆ δὲ οἷα κέντρον καὶ πρὸς ἕν τι τῶν ἄστρων. Θαυμάζεται δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικία, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὸ τίμιον εἶναι ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος σοφωτέρου. Τὸ δὲ κεῖται ἄνθρωπος ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων καὶ ῥέπει ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ ὁμοιοῦνται οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οἱ δὲ μεταξύ εἰσιν, οἱ πολλοί. Οἱ δὴ κακυνθέντες εἰς τὸ ἐγγὺς ζῴων ἀλόγων καὶ θηρίων ἰέναι ἕλκουσι τοὺς μέσους καὶ βιάζονται· οἱ δὲ βελτίους μέν εἰσι τῶν βιαζομένων, κρατοῦνταί γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν χειρόνων, ᾗ[1] εἰσι χείρους καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδὲ παρεσκεύασαν αὑτοὺς μὴ παθεῖν. Εἰ οὖν παῖδες ἀσκήσαντες μὲν τὰ σώματα, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ὑπ' ἀπαιδευσίας τούτου χείρους γενόμενοι ἐν πάλῃ κρατοῖεν τῶν μήτε τὰ σώματα μήτε τὰς ψυχὰς πεπαιδευμένων καὶ τὰ σιτία αὐτῶν ἁρπάζοιεν καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτῶν τὰ ἁβρὰ λαμβάνοιεν, τί ἂν τὸ

[1] ᾗ A^{pc}, H–S^2: ἤ codd.

[1] Plotinus is insisting here on the smallness and unimportance of the earth in language customary among astronomers from Aristarchus of Samos onwards: cp. his *On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon* Hypothesis 2 *τὴν γῆν σημείου τε καὶ κέντρου λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν τῆς σελήνης σφαῖραν*. For its use as a theme of moral and religious exhortation, to bring home the insignificance of man and the worthlessness of fame see Marcus Aurelius IV. 3. 3. (A. S. L. Farquharson in his commentary, Vol. II, p. 595, has collected a number of

thing, the face and head, are more beautiful, and the middle and lower parts are not equal to them; but men are in the middle and below, and above are heaven and the gods in it; and the greatest part of the universe is gods and all the heaven round about it; but the earth is like a central point even in comparison with only one of the stars.[1] Unrighteousness in men causes surprise, because people expect man to be the really valuable part in the All, because there is nothing wiser. But the fact is that man has the middle place between gods and beasts, and inclines now one way, now the other, and some men become like gods and others like beasts, and some, the majority, are in between. Those, then, who are corrupted, so that they come near to irrational animals and wild beasts, pull down those in the middle and do them violence; these are certainly better than those who assault them, but all the same they are mastered by the worse men, in so far as they are worse themselves too, and are not [really] good, and have not prepared themselves not to suffer wrongs. If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good training, but are inferior in soul to their bodily condition because of lack of education, win a wrestle with others who are trained neither in body or soul and grab their food and their dainty clothes, would

parallels. Cicero *Somnium Scipionis* 8 and 12 may also be compared, though the earth here is only insignificantly small, not "a point"). Geocentric cosmology did not lead the ancient astronomers and philosophers to a man-centred view of the universe, an exaggerated view of man's importance in the scheme of things. It led them rather to stress his smallness, insignificance and lowly position in the cosmic order, as Plotinus does here.

πρᾶγμα ἢ γέλως εἴη; Ἢ πῶς οὐκ ὀρθὸν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην συγχωρεῖν ταῦτα μὲν πάσχειν ἐκείνους δίκην ἀργίας καὶ τρυφῆς διδόντας, οἳ ἀποδεδειγμένων γυμνασίων αὐτοῖς οἷδ' ὑπ' ἀργίας καὶ τοῦ ζῆν μαλακῶς καὶ ἀνειμένως περιεῖδον ἑαυτοὺς ἄρνας καταπιανθέντας λύκων ἁρπαγὰς εἶναι; Τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ποιοῦσι πρώτη μὲν δίκη τὸ λύκοις εἶναι καὶ κακοδαίμοσιν ἀνθρώποις· εἶτα αὐτοῖς καὶ κεῖται ἃ παθεῖν χρεὼν τοὺς τοιούτους· οὐ γὰρ ἔστη ἐνταῦθα κακοῖς γενομένοις ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀεὶ προτέροις ἕπεται ὅσα κατὰ λόγον καὶ φύσιν, χείρω τοῖς χείροσι, τοῖς δὲ ἀμείνοσι τὰ ἀμείνω. Ἀλλ' οὐ παλαίστραι τὰ τοιαῦτα· παιδιὰ γὰρ ἐκεῖ. Ἔδει γὰρ μειζόνων τῶν παίδων μετὰ ἀνοίας ἀμφοτέρων γινομένων ἀμφοτέρους μὲν ζώννυσθαι ἤδη καὶ ὅπλα ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θέα καλλίων ἢ κατὰ πάλας γυμνάζοντι· νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν ἄοπλοι, οἱ δὲ ὁπλισθέντες κρατοῦσιν. Ἔνθα οὐ θεὸν ἔδει ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπολέμων αὐτὸν μάχεσθαι· σῴζεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ πολέμων φησὶ δεῖν ὁ νόμος ἀνδριζομένους, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐχομένους· οὐδὲ γὰρ κομίζεσθαι καρποὺς εὐχομένους ἀλλὰ γῆς ἐπιμελουμένους, οὐδέ γε ὑγιαίνειν μὴ ὑγείας ἐπιμελουμένους· οὐδ' ἀγανακτεῖν δέ, εἰ τοῖς φαύλοις πλείους γίνοιντο καρποὶ ἢ ὅλως αὐτοῖς γεωργοῦσιν εἴη ἄμεινον. Ἔπειτα γελοῖον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον γνώμῃ τῇ ἑαυτῶν πράττειν, κἂν μὴ ταύτῃ

[1] For the thought, cp. Plato, *Theaetetus* 176D–177A: "wolves" from *Republic* 566A4; Epictetus's version of this

the affair be anything but a joke? Or would it not be right for even the lawgiver to allow them to suffer this as a penalty for their laziness and luxury, these boys, who, though they were assigned training-grounds, because of laziness and soft and slack living allowed themselves to become fattened lambs, the prey of wolves? But those who do these things are punished, first by being wolves and ill-fated men; and then as well there lies before them what people like this are destined to suffer; it does not come to a stop when they have become bad here and die;[1] every time the rational and natural consequences follow what has gone before, worse for the worse, but better for the better. But this sort of thing has nothing to do with wrestling-schools; what happens there is play. For if both our sets of boys grew bigger with their folly, then they would have to gird themselves and take weapons, and it would be a finer sight than if one gave them wrestling exercise; but as things are, one set are unarmed, and those who are armed get the mastery. Here it would not be right for a god to fight in person for the unwarlike; the law says that those who fight bravely, not those who pray, are to come safe out of wars; for, in just the same way, it is not those who pray but those who look after their land who are to get in a harvest, and those who do not look after their health are not to be healthy; and we are not to be vexed if the bad get larger harvests, or if their farming generally goes better. Then again, it is ridiculous for people to do everything else in life according to their own ideas,

commonplace (IV. 1. 127) is, however, closer to the present passage than anything in Plato.

πράττωσιν, ἢ θεοῖς φίλα, σῴζεσθαι δὲ μόνον παρὰ θεῶν οὐδὲ ταῦτα ποιήσαντας, δι' ὧν κελεύουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ θεοὶ σῴζεσθαι. Καὶ τοίνυν οἱ θάνατοι αὐτοῖς βελτίους ἢ τὸ οὕτω ζῶντας εἶναι ὅπως ζῆν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νόμοι· ὥστε τῶν ἐναντίων γινομένων, εἰρήνης ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ κακίαις πάσαις φυλαττομένης, ἀμελῶς ἂν ἔσχε τὰ προνοίας ἐώσης κρατεῖν ὄντως τὰ χείρω. Ἄρχουσι δὲ κακοὶ ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρίᾳ· τοῦτο γὰρ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο.

9. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὕτω τὴν πρόνοιαν εἶναι δεῖ, ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι. Πάντα δὲ οὔσης προνοίας καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς οὐδ' ἂν εἴη· τίνος γὰρ ἂν ἔτι εἴη; Ἀλλὰ μόνον ἂν εἴη τὸ θεῖον. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐστι· καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐχ ἵνα ἀνέλῃ τὸ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἐπιόντι οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τηροῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι νόμῳ προνοίας ζῶντα, ὃ δή ἐστι πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει. Λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι καὶ κεῖσθαι καὶ εἰς ὕστερον, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία. Κακοὺς δὲ γενομένους ἀξιοῦν ἄλλους αὐτῶν σωτῆρας εἶναι ἑαυτοὺς προεμένους οὐ θεμιτὸν εὐχὴν ποιουμένων·

[1] Cp. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* I. 6. 6. As this comparison suggests, this whole passage (8. 36–9. 19) should not be taken as directed primarily against the Christians (though Plotinus may possibly have them in mind at 9. 10–12). It is a general condemnation of the unintelligent and cowardly religiosity of

even if they are not doing it in the way which the gods like, and then be merely saved by the gods without even doing the things by means of which the gods command them to save themselves.[1] And certainly death is better for them than to stay living in a way in which the universal laws do not want them to live; so that if the opposite happened, and peace was preserved in every sort of folly and vice, providence would be neglecting its duty in allowing the worse really to get the upper hand. But the wicked rule by the cowardice of the ruled; for this is just, and the opposite is not.

9. Providence ought not to exist in such a way as to make us nothing. If everything was providence and nothing but providence, then providence would not exist; for what would it have to provide for? There would be nothing but the divine. But the divine exists also as things are; and has come to something other than itself, not to destroy the other but, when a man, for instance, comes to it, it stands over him and sees to it that he is man; that is, that he lives by the law of providence, which means doing everything that its law says. But it says that those who have become good shall have a good life, now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, and the wicked the opposite. But it is not lawful for those who have become wicked to demand others to be their saviours and to sacrifice themselves in answer to

people who expect the gods to intervene to get them out of troubles into which they have got themselves by ignoring the divinely established laws of nature and of human life; an intelligent Christian would have no difficulty in agreeing with it.

οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ θεοὺς αὐτῶν ἄρχειν τὰ καθέκαστα ἀφέντας τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οὐδέ γε τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀγαθούς, ἄλλον βίον ζῶντας τὸν ἀρχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀμείνω, τούτους αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας εἶναι· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπεμελήθησάν ποτε, ὅπως ἄρχοντες ἀγαθοὶ γένοιντο τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ⟨εὖ⟩[1] ᾖ ἐπιμελούμενοι, ἀλλὰ φθονοῦσιν, ἐάν τις ἀγαθὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ φύηται· ἐπεὶ πλείους ἂν ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοί, εἰ τούτους ἐποιοῦντο προστάτας. Γενόμενοι τοίνυν ζῷον οὐκ ἄριστον, ἀλλὰ μέσην τάξιν ἔχον καὶ ἑλόμενον, ὅμως ἐν ᾧ κεῖται τόπῳ ὑπὸ προνοίας οὐκ ἐώμενον ἀπολέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀναφερόμενον ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄνω παντοίαις μηχαναῖς, αἷς τὸ θεῖον χρῆται ἐπικρατεστέραν ἀρετὴν ποιοῦν, οὐκ ἀπώλεσε τὸ λογικὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, ἀλλὰ μετέχον, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἄκρως, ἐστὶ καὶ σοφίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ τέχνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, τῆς γοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕκαστοι· καὶ οὓς ἀδικοῦσι δέ, οἴονται δικαίως ταῦτα ποιεῖν· εἶναι γὰρ ἀξίους. Οὕτω καλόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ποίημα, ὅσον δύναται καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ συνυφανθὲν εἰς τὸ πᾶν μοῖραν ἔχει τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅσα ἐπὶ

[1] ⟨εὖ⟩ Beutler.

[1] See note on previous chapter.

[2] This may seem at first sight to contradict Plato's teaching about the duty of the philosopher to "go down again into the cave" and rule the city (*Republic* VII. 519C–521A). But, in fact, Plato makes it quite clear that philosophers in ordinary unreformed states have no such duty (520A–B). It is only in

their prayers,[1] nor, furthermore, to require gods to direct their affairs in detail, laying aside their own life, or, for that matter, good men, who live another life better than human rule, to be their rulers; for they themselves have never taken any trouble to see that there should be good rulers of the rest of mankind, who would care that it should be well with them, but they are envious if anyone naturally becomes good by himself; for more people would have become good if they had made the good their leaders.[2] Since, then, men are not the best of living creatures but the human species occupies a middle position, and has chosen it, yet all the same is not allowed by providence to perish in the place where it is set but is always being lifted up to the higher regions by all sorts of devices which the divine uses to give virtue the greater power, mankind has not lost its character of being rational but is a participant, even if not to the highest degree, in wisdom and intellect and skill, and righteousness—each and all have a share at least in the righteousness that governs their dealings with each other; and those whom they wrong, they think that they wrong rightly, because they deserve it. In this way man is a noble creation, as far as he can be noble, and, being woven into the All, has a part which is better than that of other living things, of

the ideal state, where they have been carefully trained precisely in order to be its rulers, that they have the obligation to rule. Plotinus does not advert here to the possibility of an ideal state but otherwise his thought here is quite in accordance with Plato's and he probably has this passage of the *Republic* in mind (cp. 1. 14–15, with 520E4–5, and perhaps 18, *ἐάν τις ἀγαθὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ φύηται*, with 520B2, *αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται*).

γῆς βελτίονα. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα ἐλάττω ζῷα αὐτοῦ κόσμον γῇ φέροντα μέμφεται οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων. Γελοῖον γάρ, εἴ τις μέμφοιτο, ὅτι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δάκνοι, ὡς δέον αὐτοὺς ζῆν κοιμωμένους. Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι· καὶ αἱ μὲν πρόδηλοι παρ' αὐτῶν ὠφέλειαι, τὰς δὲ οὐ φανερὰς ἀνεῦρε πολλὰς ὁ χρόνος· ὥστε μηδὲν αὐτῶν [1] μάτην μηδὲ ἀνθρώποις εἶναι. Γελοῖον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄγρια πολλὰ αὐτῶν μέμφεσθαι γινομένων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀγρίων· εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπίστευκεν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ ἀπιστοῦντα ἀμύνεται, τί θαυμαστόν ἐστιν;

10. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἄνθρωποι ἄκοντές εἰσι κακοὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐχ ἑκόντες, οὔτ' ἄν τις τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας αἰτιάσαιτο, οὔτε τοὺς πάσχοντας ὡς δι' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα πάσχοντας. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτω κακοὺς γίνεσθαι εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς φορᾶς εἴτε τῆς ἀρχῆς διδούσης τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐντεῦθεν, φυσικῶς οὕτως. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἄδικα οὕτως; Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκοντες, ὅτι ἁμαρτία ἀκούσιον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πράττοντας παρ' αὐτῶν εἶναι, ἀλλ'

[1] αὐτῶν Theodoretus Graec. affect. cur. vi. 71, H–S²: αὐτοῖς codd.

[1] The reference to Plato, *Laws* V. 731C, given by Henry-Schwyzer, Bréhier, and Beutler-Theiler can be misleading here. The *Laws* passage is stating the familiar Socratic–Platonic doctrine, πᾶς ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄδικος (C2–3): wrongdoing is error because nobody who knew what he was doing would deliberately choose the worst of evils for his most valuable

all, that is, which live on the earth. And besides, no one of any intelligence complains of all the other creatures, lower than himself, which ornament the earth. It would be ridiculous if someone complained of their biting men, as if men ought to pass their lives asleep. No, it is necessary that these, too, should exist; and some of the benefits which come from them are obvious, and those which are not evident, many of them time discovers; so that none of them exist without good purpose, even for men. But it is absurd, too, to complain that many of them are savage, when there are savage men as well; and if they do not trust men but in their distrust attack to keep them off, what is there surprising in that?

10. But if men are unwillingly wicked,[1] and are the sort of people they are, not by their own free will, one could neither blame the wrongdoers nor those who suffer wrong because they suffer it by their agency. But if there is a necessity that they should become wicked in this way, brought about either by the heavenly circuit or by the first principle determining the consequences that necessarily follow it, then their being wicked in this way is natural. But then surely, if it is the rational forming principle itself which makes them wicked, things are unjust in this way? But " unwilling " means that the error is unwilling; and this does not do away with the fact that it is men themselves who act of themselves

part, the soul. Plotinus, no doubt, has the Platonic formula in mind here; but what he is really concerned with is not to maintain that wrongdoing is error but that the control and ordering of all things by Providence still leaves room for human moral responsibility.

ὅτι αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως ἥμαρτον μὴ αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ὄντες. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντως. Τὸ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς οὐχ ὥστε μηδὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔξωθεν τὸ πᾶν, οὕτως ἂν ἦν, ὡς αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐβούλοντο· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐναντία ἐτίθεντο ἄνθρωποι οὐδ' ἂν ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. Νῦν δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τοῦτο. Ἀρχῆς δὲ δοθείσης τὸ ἐφεξῆς περαίνεται συμπαραλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τῶν ὅσαι εἰσὶν ἀρχαί· ἀρχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι. Κινοῦνται γοῦν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ οἰκείᾳ φύσει καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη αὐτεξούσιος.

11. Πότερα δὲ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις οὕτως ἕκαστα καὶ ἀκολουθίαις καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατὸν καλῶς; Ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖ ἄρχων καὶ οὕτω βούλεται καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα κακὰ αὐτὸς κατὰ λόγον ποιεῖ οὐ βουλόμενος πάντα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ· οὕτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζετο, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεούς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας, δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι. Ἡμεῖς δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα

but it is because they themselves do the deed that they themselves err; if they were not themselves the doers, they would not have erred at all. But as for the necessity, this does not mean that it comes in from outside but only that it is universally so. And as for the heavenly circuit, it does not work so that nothing is in our power; for if the All was external to us, it would be just as its makers wished, so that, if it was gods who made it, men, even impious ones, would do nothing opposed to them. But as it is, this [the power of free action] originates in men. Given a first principle, it accomplishes what follows with the inclusion in the chain of causation of all the principles there are; but men, too, are principles; at any rate, they are moved to noble actions by their own nature, and this is an independent principle.

11. But are all individual things as they are by natural necessities and causal sequences, and excellently disposed in every way that can be? No, but the rational forming principle makes all these things as their sovereign, and wishes them to be as they are, and makes the things which are called bad according to reason, because it does not wish that all should be good, just like a craftsman who does not make everything eyes in his picture; in the same way the formative principle did not make everything gods but some gods, some spirits (a nature of the second rank), then men and animals after them in order, not out of grudging meanness but by a reason containing all the rich variety of the intelligible world. But we are like people who know nothing about the art of painting and criticise the painter because the colours are not beautiful everywhere, though he has

ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ· καὶ αἱ πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἴσων, καὶ αἱ εὐνομίᾳ [1] χρῶνται· ἢ εἴ τις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκέτης καί τις ἀγροῖκος καὶ φαύλως φθεγγόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐ καλόν ἐστιν, εἴ τις τοὺς χείρους ἐξέλοι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συμπληρούμενον.

12. Εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐναρμόσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ὕλην ταῦτα εἰργάσατο τοῦτο ὢν οἷός ἐστιν, ἀνόμοιος τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἐκ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ὤν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γενόμενον οὕτω γενόμενον μὴ ἂν ἔσχε κάλλιον ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐκ πάντων ὁμοίων καὶ παραπλησίων οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος μεμπτός· πάντα ὄντος κατὰ μέρος ἕκαστον ἄλλος. Εἰ δὲ ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλα εἰσήγαγεν, οἷον ψυχάς, καὶ ἐβιάσατο παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐναρμόσαι τῷ ποιήματι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον πολλάς, πῶς ὀρθῶς; Ἀλλὰ φατέον καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οἷον μέρη αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ χείρους ποιοῦντα ἐναρμόττειν, ἀλλ' ὅπου προσῆκον αὐταῖς καταχωρίζειν κατ' ἀξίαν.

13. Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτέ φησι βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ

[1] καὶ αἱ εὐνομίᾳ Theiler, H–S²: καὶ αἱ εὐνομίαι A^{ac}ExyQ: ταῖς εὐνομίαις A^{pc}.

[1] Cp. Plato, *Republic* IV. 420C–D. The ignorant critic in Plato does not blame the painter for not making "everything

really distributed the appropriate colours to every place; [1] and cities are not composed of citizens with equal rights, even those which have good laws and constitutions; or we are like someone who censures a play because all the characters in it are not heroes but there is a servant and a yokel who speaks in a vulgar way; but the play is not a good one if one expels the inferior characters, because they too help to complete it.

12. If, then, the rational formative principle itself has, by fitting itself into matter, done these works, being the thing that it is, unlike in its parts, and deriving its being this from the principle before it, then this that has come into existence, since it has come into existence in this way, would have nothing else nobler than itself. If the rational formative principle had been composed of parts which were all alike and equal, it would not have come into existence and [if it had] this manner of construction would be worthy of blame; since it is all things, it is different in every part. But if it brought in other things outside itself, souls for instance, and forced them, against their own nature, to fit into its creation, making many of them worse in doing so, how is this rightly done? But we must say that the souls, too, are in a way parts of it, and it does not fit them in by making them worse but puts them in places appropriate to them according to their worth.

13. Then we must not discard that argument, either, which says that the rational principle does not

eyes" but for painting the eyes ugly black instead of beautiful crimson. So the reference is better placed here than where Henry-Schwyzer placed it at l. 5–6.

πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν τάττειν τὴν ἀξίαν καὶ μετατιθέναι ἐκ δεσποτῶν τῶν πρόσθεν δούλους ποιοῦντα, εἰ ἐγένοντο κακοὶ δεσπόται, καὶ ὅτι σύμφορον αὐτοῖς οὕτω, καὶ εἰ κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο πλούτῳ, πένητας—καὶ ἀγαθοῖς οὐκ ἀσύμφορον[1] πένησιν εἶναι—καὶ φονεύσαντας ἀδίκως φονευθῆναι ἀδίκως μὲν τῷ ποιήσαντι, αὐτῷ δὲ δικαίως τῷ παθόντι, καὶ τὸ πεισόμενον συναγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐπιτηδείῳ ποιῆσαι, ἃ παθεῖν ἐχρῆν ἐκεῖνον. Μὴ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν δοῦλον μηδὲ αἰχμάλωτον ὡς ἔτυχε μηδὲ ὑβρισθῆναι εἰς σῶμα εἰκῇ, ἀλλ' ἣν ποτε ταῦτα ποιήσας, ἃ νῦν ἐστι πάσχων· καὶ μητέρα τις ἀνελὼν ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀναιρεθήσεται γενόμενος γυνή, καὶ βιασάμενος γυναῖκα ἔσται, ἵνα βιασθῇ. Ὅθεν καὶ θείᾳ φήμῃ Ἀδράστεια· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ διάταξις Ἀδράστεια ὄντως καὶ ὄντως Δίκη καὶ σοφία θαυμαστή. Τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ δεῖ τοιαύτην τινὰ εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ἀεὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἐν τῷ παντί, ὡς εἰς ἅπαν χωρεῖ καὶ ὅ τι μικρότατον, καὶ ἡ τέχνη θαυμαστὴ οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς θείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπενόησε καταφρονῆσαι ὡς μικρῶν τὴν πρόνοιαν, οἷα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τυχοῦσι

[1] ἀσύμφορον A^{pc}, H–S: ἀσύμφοροι codd.

[1] The thought here follows Plato closely. For the reincarnation of the matricide cp. *Laws* IX. 872E; for the "law of Adrasteia" applied to reincarnation, cp. *Phaedrus* 248C2.

look only at the present on each occasion but at the cycles of time before, and also at the future, so as to determine men's worth from these, and to change their positions, making slaves out of those who were masters before, if they were bad masters (and also because it is good for them this way); and, if men have used wealth badly, making them poor (and for the good, too, it is not without advantage to be poor); and causing those who have killed unjustly to be killed in their turn, unjustly as far as the doer of the deed is concerned, but justly as far as concerns the victim; and it brings that which is to suffer together to the same point with that which is fit and ready to execute what that unjust killer is fated to endure. There is certainly no accident in a man's becoming a slave, nor is he taken prisoner in war by chance, nor is outrage done on his body without due cause, but he was once the doer of that which he now suffers; and a man who made away with his mother will be made away with by a son when he has become a woman, and one who has raped a woman will be a woman in order to be raped. Hence comes, by divine declaration, the name Adrasteia: for this world-order is truly Adrasteia [the Inescapable] and truly Justice and wonderful wisdom.[1] We must conclude that the universal order is for ever something of this kind from the evidence of what we see in the All, how this order extends to everything, even to the smallest, and the art is wonderful which appears, not only in the divine beings but also in the things which one might have supposed providence would have despised for their smallness, for example, the workmanship which produces wonders in rich variety in ordinary animals,

ζῴοις ἡ ποικίλη θαυματουργία καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῶν ἐμφύτων καρποῖς καὶ ἔτι φύλλοις τὸ εὐειδὲς καὶ τὸ ῥᾷστα εὐανθὲς καὶ ῥαδινὸν καὶ ποικίλον, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πεποίηται ἅπαξ καὶ ἐπαύσατο, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ποιεῖται τῶν ὑπεράνω φερομένων κατὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὡσαύτως. Μετατίθεται τοίνυν τὰ μετατιθέμενα οὐκ εἰκῇ μετατιθέμενα οὐδ' ἄλλα σχήματα λαμβάνοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς καλόν, καὶ ὡς πρέποι ἂν δυνάμεσι θείαις ποιεῖν. Ποιεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε· πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν· οὐσία δὲ αὐτῷ, ἣ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἴη;

14. Ἔχει τοίνυν ἡ διάταξις οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν, ὡς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω δὲ εἶναι, ὡς, εἴ τις ἄριστα δύναιτο λογισμῷ χρῆσθαι, θαυμάσαι, ὅτι μὴ ἂν ἄλλως εὗρε λογισμὸς ποιῆσαι, ὁποῖόν τι γινώσκεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ἕκαστα φύσεσι, γινομένων εἰς ἀεὶ νοερώτερον ἢ κατὰ λογισμοῦ διάταξιν. Ἐφ' ἑκάστου μὲν οὖν τῶν γινομένων ἀεὶ γενῶν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸν ποιοῦντα λόγον, εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἕκαστον οὕτω γενονέναι χρῆναι, ὡς τὰ μὴ γεγονότα, ἀίδια δέ, ἔν τε νοητοῖς ἔν τε αἰσθητοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ [1] ὄντα, προσθήκην αἰτῶν

[1] κατὰ ταὐτὰ Dodds, H–S²: καὶ αὐτὰ codd.

and the beauty of appearance which extends to the fruits and even the leaves of plants, and their beauty of flower which comes so effortlessly, and their delicacy and variety, and that all this has not been made once and come to an end but is always being made as the powers above move in different ways over this world. So the things which are changing change, not changing and taking new shapes without due cause but in a way which is excellent and appropriate to their making by divine powers. For all that is divine makes according to its nature; but its nature corresponds to its substance, and its substance is that which brings forth together beauty and justice in its workings; for if beauty and justice are not in it, where could they be?

14. The ordering of the universe, then, corresponds with Intellect in such a way that it exists without rational planning,[1] but exists so that if anyone could plan rationally as well as possible, he would wonder at it because planning could not have found out another way to make it; something of this is observed even in individual natures, which come into being continually more conformed to Intellect than they could be by an ordering which depended on rational planning. With each, therefore, of the kinds of things which continually come into existence it is not possible to blame the rational principle which makes them, unless someone should demand that they ought to have come into existence just like the things which have not come into existence, but are eternal, existing always in the same way both in the intelligible world and in the world of sense, asking for a further

[1] Cp. note on ch. 1. 1. 20–21.

ἀγαθοῦ πλείονα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοθὲν ἑκάστῳ εἶδος αὔταρκες ἡγούμενος, οἷον τῷδε, ὅτι μὴ καὶ κέρατα, οὐ σκοπούμενος ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἦν λόγον μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔδει ἐν τῷ μείζονι τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὰ μέρη καὶ οὐκ ἴσα δυνατὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μέρη. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνω πᾶν πάντα, τὰ δὲ κάτω οὐ πάντα ἕκαστον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος δή, καθ' ὅσον μέρος, ἕκαστος,[1] οὐ πᾶς. Εἰ δέ που ἐν μέρεσί τισι καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ οὐ μέρος, τούτῳ κἀκεῖνο πᾶν. Ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα, ᾗ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀπαιτητέος τέλεος εἶναι εἰς ἀρετῆς ἄκρον· ἤδη γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἂν μέρος. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος κοσμηθὲν εἰς μείζονα ἀξίαν ἐφθόνηται· καὶ γὰρ κάλλιον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ κοσμηθὲν ἀξίᾳ μείζονι. Καὶ γὰρ γίνεται τοιοῦτον ἀφομοιωθὲν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ οἷον συγχωρηθὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ συνταχθὲν οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀνθρώπου τόπον ἐκλάμπῃ τι ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷον καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον οὐρανὸν τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ ᾗ[2] ἐντεῦθεν ἀντίληψις οἷον ἀγάλματος μεγάλου καὶ καλοῦ εἴτε ἐμψύχου εἴτε καὶ τέχνῃ Ἡφαίστου γενομένου, ᾧ ⟨εἰ⟩σι[3] μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπιστίλβοντες ἀστέρες

[1] ἕκαστος A^{pc}, H–S²: ἕκαστον codd.
[2] ᾗ Dodds, H–S: ἡ codd.

addition of good, but not thinking the form given to each thing sufficient, for instance, thinking that the form given to this particular animal is insufficient because it has not horns as well, and not considering that it was impossible for the formative principle not to reach to all things, but that there must be lesser things in the greater and parts in the whole and that they cannot be equal to the whole or they would not be parts. In the world above every thing is all things, but the things below are not each of them all things. Even man, in so far as he is a part, is an individual, not all. But if somewhere among parts there is something else which is not a part, in virtue of this that thing below, too, is all. But man in his individuality, in so far as he is an individual being, cannot be required to be perfect to the point of reaching the summit of virtue; for if he did he would no longer be a part. But there would certainly not be any grudging by the whole if the part did gain in beauty and order so as to make it of greater worth; for it makes the whole more beautiful when it has become of greater value by its gain in beauty and order. For it becomes of this kind by being made like the whole and, so to speak, being allowed to be like this and given such a place that in the region of man, too, something may shine in him as the stars shine in the heaven of the gods; a place from which there may be a perception of something like a great and beautiful image of a god—whether a living one or one made by the art of Hephaestus—in which there are stars flashing on the face, and in the

[3] ᾧ ⟨εἰ⟩σι Theiler, H–S: ὥσι codd.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς στήθεσι δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ ᾗ[1] ἔμελλεν ἐπιπρέψειν ἄστρων θέσις κειμένων.

15. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστα αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν θεωρούμενα οὕτως· ἡ συμπλοκὴ δὲ ἡ τούτων γεννηθέντων καὶ ἀεὶ γεννωμένων ἔχοι ἂν τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ ἀπορίαν κατά τε τὴν ἀλληλοφαγίαν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλλήλους ἐπιθέσεις, καὶ ὅτι πόλεμος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ μήποτε παῦλαν οὐδ' ἂν ἀνοχὴν λάβοι, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ λόγος πεποίηκεν οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ οὕτω λέγεται καλῶς ἔχειν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνος ὁ λόγος βοηθεῖ, ὡς καλῶς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔχειν, αἰτίᾳ ὕλης οὕτως ἐχόντων ὡς ἐλαττόνως ἔχειν, καὶ ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν τὰ κακὰ ἀπολέσθαι εἴπερ οὕτως ἐχρῆν ἔχειν, καὶ καλῶς οὕτω, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ὕλη παρελθοῦσα κρατεῖ, ἀλλὰ παρήχθη, ἵνα οὕτω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἦν καὶ αὐτὴ αἰτίᾳ λόγου οὕτως. Ἀρχὴ οὖν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος καὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ συνταττόμενα ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει πάντως οὕτως. Τίς οὖν ἡ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ ἀκηρύκτου ἐν ζῴοις καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνάγκη; Ἢ ἀλληλοφαγίαι μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀμοιβαὶ ζῴων οὖσαι οὐ δυναμένων, οὐδ' εἴ τις μὴ κτιννύοι αὐτά,

[1] ᾗ F^{3mg} (= Ficinus), H–S^2: εἰ codd.

[1] The thought seems to be: the physical universe is the great star-decked image of the intelligible divinity (cp. Plato, *Timaeus* 37C 6–7); and because man can contemplate it he gains in beauty and order; he is conformed by his contemplation to the starry heaven, and something of its splendour shines in him.

breast others, and a setting of stars placed where it will be clearly seen.[1]

15. So it is, then, with individual things when they are considered separately. But the weaving together into a pattern of these things which have been and are always being produced might hold obstacles and difficulties, because the other animals eat each other, and men attack each other, and there is always war with never a pause or armistice; and this is particularly difficult if it is the rational forming principle of the world which has brought it about that this is so, and if it is said to be well that it is so. That argument is no longer any help to the people who say this which maintains that all is as well as it can be, and that it is the fault of matter when things are so disposed as to be less than good, and that " evils cannot be done away with "; [2] if, that is, it is really true that things had to be so, and that it is well that they should be so, and matter does not come along and dominate but was brought along so that things should be in this state, or rather is itself, too, caused to be as it is by the rational principle. The rational principle, then, is the origin, and all things are reason, both those which are brought into being according to the principle and those which, in their coming to birth, are altogether ranged in this common order. What, then, is the necessity of the undeclared war among animals and among men? It is necessary that animals should eat each other; these eatings are transformations into each other of animals which could not stay as they are for ever, even if no one

[2] The familiar quotation, repeated again and again by Plotinus, from Plato, *Theaetetus* 176A5.

οὕτω μένειν εἰς ἀεί. Εἰ δὲ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν οὕτως ἀπελθεῖν ἔδει, ὡς ἄλλοις γενέσθαι χρείαν παρ' αὐτῶν, τί φθονεῖν ἔδει; Τί δ' εἰ βρωθέντα ἄλλα ἐφύετο; Οἷον εἰ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ὁ πεφονευμένος ἀλλαξάμενος τὸ σχῆμα ἀναλαβὼν πάλιν εἰσίοι ἄλλου πρόσωπον. Ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν ἀληθῶς οὗτος. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ἀλλαγή ἐστι σώματος, ὥσπερ ἐσθῆτος ἐκεῖ, ἢ καί τισιν ἀποθέσεις σώματος, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἔξοδος ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς παντελὴς τότε, εἰσύστερον πάλιν ἥξοντος ἐναγωνίσασθαι, τί ἂν δεινὸν εἴη ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν ζώων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴ πολὺ βελτίων οὖσα τοῦ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὰ γενέσθαι; Ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἐρημία ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔσης ἀδυναμία· νῦν δὲ πολλὴ οὖσα ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζωὴ πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ ποικίλλει ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται μὴ ποιοῦσα ἀεὶ καλὰ καὶ εὐειδῆ ζῶντα παίγνια. Ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ὅπλα θνητῶν ὄντων ἐν τάξει εὐσχήμονι μαχομένων, οἷα ἐν πυρρίχαις παίζοντες ἐργάζονται, δηλοῦσι τάς τε

[1] The comparison of life to a play was a commonplace of Cynic, Stoic and Stoic-influenced moralists from Bion of Borysthenes and Teles onwards (cp. *Teles* 16, 4 Hense). The finest example is Marcus Aurelius XII. 36.

[2] Plotinus, here and in what follows, probably has Plato's description of man as God's toy, playing to please him, in mind (*Laws* VII. 803C–D; *θεοῦ τι παίγνιον* (C4–5)). But there is an important difference in the thought. For Plato, in this passage at least, man is wholly and entirely God's toy, and his "play" is the most serious and important thing in his life—though he is not really worth taking seriously at all; only

killed them. And if, at the time when they had to depart, they had to depart in such a way that they were useful to others, why do we have to make a grievance out of their usefulness? And what does it matter if, when they are eaten, they come alive again as different animals? It is like on the stage, when the actor who has been murdered changes his costume and comes on again in another character.[1] But [in real life, not on the stage,] the man is really dead. If, then, death is a changing of body, like changing of clothes on the stage, or, for some of us, a putting off of body, like in the theatre the final exit, in that performance, of an actor who will on a later occasion come in again to play, what would there be that is terrible in a change of this kind, of living beings into each other? It is far better than if they had never come into existence at all. For that way there would be a barren absence of life and no possibility of a life which exists in something else; but as it is a manifold life exists in the All and makes all things, and in its living embroiders a rich variety and does not rest from ceaselessly making beautiful and shapely living toys.[2] And when men, mortal as they are, direct their weapons against each other, fighting in orderly ranks, doing what they do in sport in their

God is *πάσης μακαρίου σπουδῆς ἄξιον* (C2–3). For Plotinus, as the rest of this chapter shows clearly, it is only man's lower, external life which is "play." His true, inner self is serious and important. For Plato man's best game is the religious dance, at once play, worship and education, in which he attains all the seriousness he is capable of. For Plotinus man's game is the grim one of killing and being killed, which the wise man will not take seriously and cry over like a child, because it only affects his unimportant lower self.

ἀνθρωπίνας σπουδὰς ἁπάσας παιδιὰς οὔσας τούς τε θανάτους μηνύουσιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν εἶναι, ἀποθνῄσκειν δ' ἐν πολέμοις καὶ ἐν μάχαις ὀλίγον προλαβόντας τοῦ γινομένου ἐν γήρᾳ θᾶττον ἀπιόντας καὶ πάλιν ἰόντας. Εἰ δ' ἀφαιροῖντο ζῶντες χρημάτων, γινώσκοιεν ἂν μηδὲ πρότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἁρπάζουσιν αὐτοῖς γελοίαν εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν ἀφαιρουμένων αὐτοὺς ἄλλων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀφαιρεθεῖσι χεῖρον γίνεσθαι τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν κτῆσιν. Ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς σκηναῖς, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τοὺς φόνους θεᾶσθαι καὶ πάντας θανάτους καὶ πόλεων ἁλώσεις καὶ ἁρπαγάς, μεταθέσεις πάντα καὶ μετασχηματίσεις καὶ θρήνων καὶ οἰμωγῶν ὑποκρίσεις. Καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκάστων οὐχ ἡ ἔνδον ψυχή, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου σκιὰ καὶ οἰμώζει καὶ ὀδύρεται καὶ πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν σκηνῇ τῇ ὅλῃ γῇ πολλαχοῦ σκηνὰς ποιησαμένων. Τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἔργα ἀνθρώπου τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνα ζῆν εἰδότος καὶ ἐν δακρύοις καὶ σπουδαίοις ὅτι παίζων ἐστὶν ἠγνοηκότος. Μόνῳ γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ σπουδαστέον ἐν σπουδαίοις τοῖς ἔργοις, ὁ δ' ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος παίγνιον. Σπουδάζεται δὲ καὶ τὰ παίγνια τοῖς σπουδάζειν οὐκ εἰδόσι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὖσι παιγνίοις. Εἰ δέ τις συμπαίζων αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθοι, ἴστω παραπεσὼν παίδων παιδιᾷ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἀποθέμενος παίγνιον. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ παίζοι

war-dances, their battles show that all human concerns are children's games, and tell us that deaths are nothing terrible, and that those who die in wars and battles anticipate only a little the death which comes in old age—they go away and come back quicker. But if their property is taken away while they are still alive, they may recognise that it was not theirs before either, and that its possession is a mockery to the robbers themselves when others take it away from them; for even to those who do not have it taken away, to have it is worse than being deprived of it. We should be spectators of murders, and all deaths, and takings and sackings of cities, as if they were on the stages of theatres, all changes of scenery and costume and acted wailings and weepings. For really here in the events of our life it is not the soul within but the outside shadow of man which cries and moans and carries on in every sort of way on a stage which is the whole earth where men have in many places set up their stages. Doings like these belong to a man who knows how to live only the lower and external life and is not aware that he is playing in his tears, even when they are serious tears. For only the seriously good part of man is capable of taking serious doings seriously; the rest of man is a toy. But toys, too, are taken seriously by those who do not know how to be serious and are toys themselves. But if anyone joins in their play and suffers their sort of sufferings, he must know that he has tumbled into a children's game and put off the play-costume in which he was dressed.[1] And even if Socrates, too,

[1] I.e. if he is killed it is all part of the game, and the body which he puts off is only a toy.

Σωκράτης, παίζει τῷ ἔξω Σωκράτει. Δεῖ δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τεκμήρια τοῦ κακὰ εἶναι τὸ δακρύειν καὶ θρηνεῖν τίθεσθαι, ὅτι δὴ καὶ παῖδες ἐπὶ οὐ κακοῖς καὶ δακρύουσι καὶ ὀδύρονται.

16. Ἀλλ' εἰ καλῶς ταῦτα λέγεται, πῶς ἂν ἔτι πονηρία; Ποῦ δ' ἀδικία; Ἁμαρτία δὲ ποῦ; Πῶς γὰρ ἔστι καλῶς γινομένων ἁπάντων ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς ποιοῦντας; Κακοδαίμονες δὲ πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἁμαρτάνοιεν μηδὲ ἀδικοῖεν; Πῶς δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν φήσομεν εἶναι, τῶν γινομένων ἁπάντων καὶ δρωμένων κατὰ φύσιν ὄντων; Πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀσέβειά τις εἴη τοιούτου ὄντος τοῦ ποιουμένου; Οἷον εἴ τις ἐν δράμασι λοιδορούμενον ποιητὴς ὑποκριτὴν ποιήσαιτο καὶ κατατρέχοντα τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ δράματος. Πάλιν οὖν σαφέστερον λέγωμεν τίς ὁ λόγος καὶ ὡς εἰκότως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν. Ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος—τετολμήσθω γάρ· τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ τύχοιμεν—ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος, ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ζωὴν λόγον τινὰ ἡσυχῇ ἔχουσαν. Πᾶσα δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη· ἐνέργεια δὲ οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, κἂν μὴ αἴσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῇ. Οἷς γοῦν ἐὰν μὴ παρῇ καὶ μετάσχῃ ὁπωσοῦν ὁτιοῦν, εὐθὺς λελόγωται, τοῦτο

may play sometimes, it is by the outer Socrates that he plays. But we must consider this further point, too, that one must not take weeping and lamenting as evidence of the presence of evils, for children, too, weep and wail over things that are not evils.

16. But if this is well said, how can there still be wickedness? Where is injustice? Where is error? For how, if all things are well done, can the doers act unjustly or err? And how can they be ill-fated, if they do not err or act unjustly? And how can we assert that some things are according to nature, but others against nature, if all things that happen and are done are according to nature? And how could there be any blasphemy against the divine when that which is made is made like this? It is just as if a poet in his plays wrote a part for an actor insulting and depreciating the author of the play. Let us, then, again, and more clearly, explain what the rational forming principle of our universe is and that it is reasonable for it to be like this. This rational principle, then, is—let us take the risk! We might even, perhaps succeed [in describing it]—it is not pure intellect or absolute intellect; it is not even of the kind of pure soul but depends on soul, and is a sort of outshining of both; intellect and soul (that is, soul disposed according to intellect) generated this rational principle as a life which quietly contains a rationality. All life, even worthless life, is activity; activity not in the way that fire acts; but its activity, even if there is no perception there, is a movement which is not random. For with living things when there is no perception present and any one of them has any share in life, it is immediately enreasoned, that

δέ ἐστι μεμόρφωται, ὡς τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν μορφοῦν δυναμένης καὶ κινούσης οὕτως ὡς μορφοῦν. Ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνική, ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος κινούμενος εἴη· ὁ γὰρ ὀρχηστὴς τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτὸς καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πως οὔσης. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω τοῦ οἵαν δεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡντινοῦν ζωὴν ἡγεῖσθαι ἕνεκα. Ἥκων τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ζωῆς μιᾶς πλήρους ὄντος ἑκατέρου οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ζωὴ μία οὔτε νοῦς τις εἷς οὔτε ἑκασταχοῦ πλήρης οὐδὲ διδοὺς ἑαυτὸν οἷς δίδωσιν ὅλον τε καὶ πάντα. Ἀντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ πολέμου καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη. Γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον οὕτως ἕν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος· εἷς ὁ τοῦ δράματος ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δρᾶμα τὰ μεμαχημένα οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἄγει σύμφωνον οἷον διήγησιν τὴν πᾶσαν τῶν μαχομένων ποιούμενος· ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου ἡ τῶν διαστατῶν μάχη· ὥστε μᾶλλον ἄν τις τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τῇ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε, καὶ ζητήσει διὰ τί τὰ μαχόμενα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὀξὺ καὶ βαρὺ ποιοῦσι

is informed, since the activity which is proper to life is able to form it and moves it in such way that its movement is a forming. So the activity of life is an artistic activity, like the way in which one who is dancing is moved; for the dancer himself is like the life which is artistic in this way and his art moves him, and moves in such a way that the actual life is somehow of this [artistic] kind. This, then, should be enough to show how we should think of any sort of life. Now the rational forming principle of this universe, which comes from a single Intellect and a single life, both of them complete, is not a single life nor any kind of single intellect, and is not at every point complete, nor does it at every point give itself whole and entire to the things to which it does give itself. But by setting the parts against each other and making them deficient it generates and maintains war and battle, and so it is one as a whole even if it is not one single thing. For though it is at war with itself in its parts it is one thing and on good terms with itself in the same way that the plot of a play might be; the plot of the play is one though it contains in itself many battles. Of course, the play brings the conflicting elements into a kind of harmonious concordance, by composing the complete story of the persons in conflict; but in the universe the battle of conflicting elements springs from a single rational principle; so that it would be better for one to compare it to the melody which results from conflicting sounds, and one will then enquire why there are the conflicting sounds in the rational proportions [of musical scales]. If, then, in music the laws of rational proportion make high and low notes

λόγοι καὶ συνίασιν εἰς ἕν, ὄντες ἁρμονίας λόγοι, εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἄλλον λόγον μείζονα, ὄντες ἐλάττους αὐτοὶ καὶ μέρη, ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, καὶ δὴ πτερωτὸν ἄπτερον, ἄπουν ὑπόπουν, λογικὸν ἄλογον, πάντα δὲ ζῴου ἑνὸς τοῦ σύμπαντος μέρη, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁμολογεῖ ἑαυτῷ τῶν μερῶν πολλαχοῦ μαχομένων, κατὰ λόγον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον λόγον ἐξ ἐναντίων λόγον εἶναι ἕνα, τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῷ [1] καὶ οἷον οὐσίαν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐναντιώσεως φερούσης. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ πολὺς ἦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἦν πᾶς, οὐδ' ἂν λόγος· λόγος δὲ ὢν διάφορός τε πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ μάλιστα διαφορὰ ἐναντίωσίς ἐστιν· ὥστε εἰ ἕτερον ὅλως, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ποιεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα ἕτερον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον ἕτερον ποιήσει· ὥστε ἄκρως ἕτερον ποιῶν καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιήσει ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τέλεος ἔσται, οὐκ εἰ διάφορα μόνον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐναντία ποιοῖ εἶναι ἑαυτόν.

17. Ὢν δὴ τοιοῦτος οἷος καὶ πάντως ποιεῖ, πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰ ποιούμενα ποιήσει ἐναντία, ὅσῳ καὶ διέστηκε μᾶλλον· καὶ ἧττον ἓν ὁ κόσμος ὁ αἰσθητὸς ἢ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ πολὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης μᾶλλον καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἔφεσις μᾶλλον ἑκάστῳ καὶ ὁ ἔρως τοῦ εἰς ἓν μᾶλλον.

[1] αὐτῷ A^{pc}, H–S^2: αὐτῶν codd.

and come together into a unity—being the proportional laws of melody they come together into the melody itself, which is another greater law of proportion, while they are lesser ones and part of it; in the universe, too, we see the opposites, for instance, white-black, hot-cold, and, too, winged-wingless, footless-footed, rational-irrational, but all are parts of the single universal living being, and the All agrees with itself; the parts are in conflict in many places, but the All is in accordance with its rational formative pattern, and it is necessary that this one formative pattern should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposition of this kind which gives it its structure, and, we might say, its existence. For certainly, if it was not many it would not be all, and would not therefore be rational pattern [of the universe]; but, since it is rational pattern it has distinctions in itself, and the extreme distinction is opposition; so that if in general it makes one thing different from another, it will also make them different in the extreme, and not different in a lesser degree; so by making one thing different from another in the highest degree it will necessarily make the opposites, and will be complete if it makes itself not only into different things but into opposite things.

17. Since its nature corresponds to its whole productive activity, the more it is differentiated the more opposed will it make the things it makes; and the universe perceived by the senses is less of a unity than its rational formative principle, so that it is more of a manifold and there is more opposition in it, and each individual in it has a greater urge to live, and there is a greater passion for unification.

Φθείρει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐρῶντα τὰ ἐρώμενα πολλάκις εἰς τὸ αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα, ὅταν φθαρτὰ ᾖ, καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἕλκει εἰς αὐτὸ ὃ δύναται. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί, ὥσπερ παρὰ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης ὀρχουμένου τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι μέρος ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν φήσομεν, καὶ οὕτω καλῶς ἔχει. Καίτοι οὐδὲ κακοὶ ἔτι. Ἢ τὸ μὲν κακοὺς εἶναι οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ὅτι μὴ παρ' αὐτῶν τοιοῦτοι. Ἀλλὰ ἴσως συγγνώμη τοῖς κακοῖς, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς συγγνώμης καὶ μὴ ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ· ποιεῖ δὲ ὁ λόγος μηδὲ συγγνώμονας ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μὲν μέρος αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πονηρός, καὶ πλείω μέρη ὁ πονηρός, ὥσπερ ἐν δράμασι τὰ μὲν τάττει αὐτοῖς ὁ ποιητής, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται οἷσιν ἤδη· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πρωταγωνιστὴν οὐδὲ δεύτερον οὐδὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ διδοὺς ἑκάστῳ τοὺς προσήκοντας λόγους ἤδη ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ εἰς ὃ τετάχθαι δέον· οὕτω τοι καὶ ἔστι τόπος ἑκάστῳ ὁ μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ τῷ κακῷ πρέπων. Ἑκάτερος οὖν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ λόγον εἰς ἑκάτερον καὶ τὸν πρέποντα χωρεῖ τὸν τόπον ἔχων, ὃν εἵλετο. Εἶτα φθέγγεται καὶ

But those that love passionately often destroy the objects of their passion, when they are perishable, in the pursuit of their own good; and the urgent straining of the part towards the whole draws to itself what it can. So, then, there are good men and wicked men, like the opposed movements of a dancer inspired by one and the same art; and we shall call one part of his performance "good" and another "wicked," and in this way it is a good performance.[1] But, then, the wicked are no longer wicked. No, their being wicked is not done away with, only their being like that does not originate with themselves. But there might perhaps be some sympathy for the wicked, except that it is the rational formative principle which is responsible for our sympathising or not; and the rational principle does not make us disposed to sympathise with people of this sort. But if one part of it is a good man, and another a villain—and villainous humanity forms the larger class—it is like in the production of a play; the author gives each actor a part, but makes use of their characteristics which are there already. He does not himself rank them as leading actor or second or third, but gives each man suitable words and so assigns him to the position which is proper to him. So there is a place for every man, one to fit the good and one to fit the bad. Each kind of man, then goes according to nature and the rational principle to the place that suits him, and holds the position he has chosen. There one speaks blasphemies and does

[1] The dancer is a *pantomimus*, who represents different characters, good and bad, in the course of his one-man ballet or mime, as Harder saw (cp. his note *ad loc.*).

ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀσεβεῖς λόγους καὶ ἔργα πονηρῶν,[1] ὁ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία· ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δράματος οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑποκριταὶ διδόντες ἑαυτοὺς τῷ δράματι. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις δράμασιν ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς ἔδωκε τοὺς λόγους, οἱ δὲ ἔχουσι παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τό τε καλῶς καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἕκαστος—ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἔργον αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὰς ῥήσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀληθεστέρῳ ποιήματι, ὅ τι μιμοῦνται κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι ποιητικὴν ἔχοντες φύσιν, ψυχὴ μὲν ὑποκρίνεται, ἃ δ' ὑποκρίνεται λαβοῦσα παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ οἱ τῇδε ὑποκριταὶ τὰ προσωπεῖα, τὴν ἐσθῆτα, τοὺς κροκωτοὺς καὶ τὰ ῥάκη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ αὐτὴ τὰς τύχας οὐ λαβοῦσα εἰκῇ· κατὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ αὗται· καὶ ἐναρμοσαμένη ταύτας σύμφωνος γίνεται καὶ συνέταξεν ἑαυτὴν τῷ δράματι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ παντί· εἶτα οἷον φθέγγεται τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἂν ψυχὴ κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἑαυτῆς ποιήσειεν, ὥσπερ τινὰ ᾠδήν. Καὶ ὡς ὁ φθόγγος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα παρ' αὐτοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κόσμον προσέθηκεν, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, εἰς τὸ ποίημα ἢ προσθεὶς τὴν αὐτοῦ τῆς φωνῆς κάκην οὐκ ἐποίησε μὲν τὸ δρᾶμα ἕτερον ἢ οἷον ἦν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀσχήμων ἐφάνη, ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς τοῦ δράματος ἀπέπεμψε κατ' ἀξίαν ἀτιμάσας καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ποιῶν ἀγαθοῦ κριτοῦ, τὸν δὲ ἤγαγεν εἰς μείζους τιμὰς καί, εἰ ἔχοι, ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω δράματα, τὸν δ' ἕτερον, εἴ που εἶχε χείρονα, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἰσελθοῦσα εἰς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ποίημα καὶ μέρος ἑαυτὴν ποιησαμένη τοῦ δράματος εἰς

[1] πονηρῶν Theiler, H–S²: ποιῶν codd.

crimes, the other speaks and acts the opposite; for the actors, good and bad, existed before the play and bring their own selves to it. Now in human plays the author provides the words, but the actors, each and every one of them, are responsible by themselves and from themselves for the good or bad acting of their parts—for there is action, too, which is their business, following from the speeches written by the author; but in the truer poetic creation, which men who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the soul acts, receiving the part which it acts from the poet creator; just as the actors here get their parts and their costumes, the saffron robes and the rags, so the soul, too, itself gets its fortunes, and not by random chance; these fortunes, too, are according to the rational principle; and by fitting these into the pattern it becomes in tune itself and puts itself into its proper place in the play and the universal rational pattern; then it makes its actions sound out, we may say, and everything else that a soul might produce according to its character, like a song. And as the sound of the voice and the gestures of the actor are beautiful or ugly as he makes them, and either adorn the poet's creation further, as one might think, or by adding the badness of the actor's own voice, do not make the play other than what it was, but the actor makes a grotesque exhibition of himself, and the author of the play sends him off in deserved disgrace, behaving in this like a good judge of acting, but promotes the good actor to higher rank, and, if he has any, to finer plays, but puts the bad actor into any worse play that he has; in this way the soul, coming on the stage in this universal poetic creation and

ὑπόκρισιν τὸ εὖ ἢ τὸ κακῶς εἰσενεγκαμένη παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τῇ εἰσόδῳ συνταχθεῖσα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα χωρὶς ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς λαβοῦσα δίκας τε καὶ τιμὰς αὖ ἔχει. Πρόσεστι δέ τι τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς ἅτε ἐν μείζονι τόπῳ ἢ κατὰ σκηνῆς μέτρον ὑποκρινομένοις, καὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ παντὸς τούτους ποιοῦντος κυρίους, καὶ δυνάμεως οὔσης μείζονος ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰέναι εἴδη τόπων τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁρίζουσι, κατὰ[1] τὸ συνεπιλαμβάνειν καὶ αὐτοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ ἀτιμίαις, ἁρμόζοντος ἑκάστου τόπου τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ὡς συμφωνεῖν τῷ τοῦ παντὸς λόγῳ, ἐναρμοζομένου κατὰ δίκην ἑκάστου τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς δεξομένοις, ὥσπερ χορδῆς ἑκάστης εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ προσήκοντα τόπον ταττομένης κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ φθέγγεσθαι, ὁποῖόν ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τοῦτο. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ καλόν, εἰ ἕκαστος οὗ δεῖ τετάξεται φθεγγόμενος κακὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ ταρτάρῳ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ καλὸν τὸ οὕτω φθέγγεσθαι· καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο καλόν, οὐκ εἰ Λίνος[2] εἴη ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν φθόγγον τὸν αὑτοῦ εἰσφερόμενος συντελεῖ εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν ζωὴν καὶ αὐτὸς φωνῶν, ἐλάττω

[1] κατὰ Harder, H–S²: καὶ codd.
[2] Λίνος Sleeman, H–S: λίθος codd.

[1] I accept, with Henry-Schwyzer and Beutler-Theiler, the brilliant emendation of Sleeman (C. Q. 20, 1926, 153) Λίνος

making itself a part of the play, supplies of itself the good or the bad in its acting; it is put in its proper place on its entrance and receives everything except itself and its own works, and so is given punishments or rewards. But the actors [in the universal drama] have something extra, in that they act in a greater space than that within the limits of a stage, and the author makes them masters of the All, and they have a greater possibility of going to many kinds of places and determining honours and dishonours, as they contribute themselves to their honours and dishonours; for each place is fitted to their characters, so as to be in tune with the rational principle of the universe, since each individual is fitted in, according to justice, in the parts of the universe designed to receive him; just as each string is set in its own proper place according to the rational proportion which governs the sounding of notes, of whatever quality its power of producing a note is. For there is fitness and beauty in the whole only if each individual is stationed where he ought to be—the one who utters evil sounds in darkness and Tartarus: for there to make these sounds is beautiful; and this whole is beautiful, not if each is Linus[1] but if each by contributing his own sound helps towards the perfection of a single melody, himself, too, sounding the note of

for λίθος because it seems to fit the context better. The idea is, clearly, that the universal melody needs bad singers who make horrible noises, as well as good ones, like the mythical Linus, for its completion (contrast I. 6 [1] 1, 26–30). But, as Cilento points out (see his note *ad loc.*), Plotinus is fond of the image of the "dead stone" (cp. VI. 2 [43] 6, 6; VI. 5 [23] 11, 5–14) and λίθος (all MSS, and cp. Aeneas of Gaza, *Theophrastus*, p. 23, Boiss.) may be right.

δὲ καὶ χείρω καὶ ἀτελεστέραν· ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν σύριγγι φωνὴ μία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλάττων τις οὖσα καὶ ἀμυδρὰ πρὸς ἁρμονίαν τῆς πάσης σύριγγος συντελεῖ, ὅτι μεμέρισται ἡ ἁρμονία εἰς οὐκ ἴσα μέρη καὶ ἄνισοι μὲν οἱ φθόγγοι πάντες, ὁ δὲ τέλεος εἷς ἐκ πάντων. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ πᾶς εἷς, μεμέρισται δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἴσα· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς διάφοροι τόποι, βελτίους καὶ χείρους, καὶ ψυχαὶ οὐκ ἴσαι ἐναρμόττουσιν οὕτω τοῖς οὐκ ἴσοις, καὶ οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀνομοίους καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὐ τὰς αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀνίσους οὔσας καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς τόπους ἐχούσας, οἷον κατὰ σύριγγος ἤ τινος ἄλλου ὀργάνου ἀνομοιότητας, ἐν τόποις [τε][1] πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφέρουσιν εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον τόπον τὰ αὐτῶν συμφώνως καὶ τοῖς τόποις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ φθεγγομένας. Καὶ τὸ κακῶς αὐταῖς ἐν καλῷ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν κείσεται καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ παντὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον φθόγγος ἐλάττων. Ἀλλ' οὐ χεῖρον πεποίηκε τὸ ὅλον οὕτω φθεγγομένη, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ δήμιος πονηρὸς ὢν χείρω πεποίηκε τὴν εὐνομουμένην πόλιν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἄλλῃ χρῆσθαι εἰκόνι. Δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τούτου ἐν πόλει—δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου τοιούτου πολλάκις—καὶ καλῶς καὶ οὗτος κεῖται.

18. Χείρους δὲ καὶ βελτίους ψυχαὶ αἱ μὲν καὶ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, αἱ δὲ οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐ πᾶσαι ἴσαι· ἀνὰ λόγον γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ λόγῳ μέρη οὐκ ἴσα,

[1] τε del. Theiler.

life, but a lesser, worse, and more incomplete life; just as in a pan-pipe there is not one note only but a note which is weaker and duller contributes to the melody of the whole pan-pipe, because the melody is divided into parts which are not equal, and all the notes of the pipe are unequal, but the melody is complete, made up of all. So, too, the universal rational principle is one, but is divided into parts which are not equal; for this reason there are different regions of the universe, better and worse ones, and souls which are not equal fit in this way into unequal places; and so in the universe, too, it happens that there are places which are unlike each other and souls which are not the same but are unequal and occupy the unlike places, just like the unlikenesses of a pan-pipe or any other instrument, and are in places which differ from each other and in each place utter their own sounds in harmony with the places and with the whole. And their evil-sounding singing will be beautifully disposed from the point of view of the All, and their unnatural sounds will be for the All according to nature, and none the less, the sound itself will be worse. But it does not make the whole worse by making a sound like this, just as (if we should use another image as well) the public executioner, who is a scoundrel, does not make his well governed city worse. For the executioner is needed in a city—and a man of his kind is often needed [for other purposes]—and so he, too, is well placed.

18. But souls are better or worse, some from other causes and some because they were not all equal, as we may say, from the beginning; for they, too, in the same way as the rational principle, are unequal parts

ἐπείπερ διέστησαν. Χρὴ δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τὰ τρίτα καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ μέρεσι ψυχήν. Ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ καὶ ὧδε λεκτέον· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐπιποθεῖ εἰς σαφήνειαν ὁ λόγος. Μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ ἐπεισάγειν τοιούτους ὑποκριτάς, οἳ ἄλλο τι φθέγγονται ἢ τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀτελοῦς παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ δράματος ὄντος αὐτοὶ ἀποπληροῦντες τὸ ἐλλεῖπον καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος διὰ μέσου κενοὺς ποιήσαντος [τοὺς][1] τόπους, ὡς τῶν ὑποκριτῶν οὐχ ὑποκριτῶν ἐσομένων, ἀλλὰ μέρος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, καὶ προειδότος ἃ φθέγξονται, ἵν' οὕτω τὰ λοιπὰ συνείρων καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς οἷός τε ᾖ. Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ ἑπόμενα τοῖς κακοῖς τῶν ἔργων οἱ λόγοι καὶ κατὰ λόγον· οἷον ἐκ μοιχείας καὶ αἰχμαλώτου ἀγωγῆς παῖδες κατὰ φύσιν καὶ βελτίους ἄνδρες, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ πόλεις ἄλλαι ἀμείνους τῶν πεπορθημένων ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν πονηρῶν. Εἰ οὖν ἄτοπος ἡ εἰσαγωγὴ τῶν ψυχῶν, αἳ δὴ[2] τὰ πονηρά, αἳ δὲ τὰ χρηστὰ ἐργάσονται—ἀποστερήσομεν γὰρ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν χρηστῶν ἀφαιροῦντες αὐτοῦ τὰ πονηρά—τί κωλύει καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἔργα μέρη ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ τοῦ δράματος ἐκεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ παντὶ λόγου, καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὥστε εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκριτῶν οὕτω παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ὅσῳ τελειότερον τοῦτο τὸ

[1] τοὺς in A expunctum del. Volkmann.
[2] δὴ Kirchhoff, H–S: δὲ codd.

as a consequence of their separation. But one must consider, too, the second and third parts of the soul, and the fact that soul is not always active in the same parts. But, again, on the other side we must say this too—the argument still needs a great deal more before it attains clearness. We ought certainly not to introduce actors of a kind who say something else besides the words of the author, as if the play was incomplete in itself and they filled in what was wanting, and the writer had left blank spaces in the middle; the actors, then, would not be just actors but a part of the author, and an author who foreknew what they were going to say, so that he might in this way be able to bring the rest of the play and the consequences of their interventions into a coherent whole. For certainly in the All the rational principles bring into a connected whole the consequences and results which follow upon those deeds which are evil, and do so rationally; for instance, from adultery, or the carrying off of a captive, children may come according to nature and better men, it may happen, and other better cities than those sacked by wicked men. If, then, it is absurd to bring in souls, some of which do the wicked deeds in the world, and some the good—for we shall deprive the rational principle of the good deeds, too, if we take the wicked ones away from it—what prevents us from making the deeds of the actors parts, as they are of the play in our example, so also of the rational principle in the universe, and attributing good performance and the opposite to it, so that in this way it comes to each individual actor from the rational principle itself—and all the more in proportion as this play is more perfect, and every-

δρᾶμα καὶ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ; Ἀλλὰ τὸ κακὸν ποιῆσαι ἵνα τί; καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν τῷ παντὶ αἱ θειότεραι, ἀλλὰ μέρη λόγου πᾶσαι; καὶ ἢ οἱ λόγοι πάντες ψυχαί, ἢ διὰ τί οἱ μὲν ψυχαί, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μόνον παντὸς ψυχῆς τινος ὄντος;

thing comes from it? But what is the point of doing evil? And do the diviner souls count for nothing any more in the universe, but are all of them parts of the rational principle? And are all rational principles souls, or why are some souls and some only rational principles, when every one of them belongs to some soul?

III. 3. (48) ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Τί τοίνυν δοκεῖ περὶ τούτων; Ἢ καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ λόγος περιείληφεν ὁ πᾶς, οὗ μέρη καὶ ταῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς λόγος γεννᾷ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὁ πᾶς ἐστι μετὰ τούτων. Ψυχῆς γάρ τινος πάσης ἐνέργεια οἱ λόγοι, τῶν δὲ μερῶν τὰ μέρη· μιᾶς δὲ διάφορα ἐχούσης μέρη ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἔσχατα ὄντα γεννήματα. Σύμφωνοι δὲ αἵ τε ψυχαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τά τε ἔργα· σύμφωνα δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἐναντίων. Ἐκ γὰρ ἑνός τινος ὁρμηθέντα πάντα εἰς ἓν συνέρχεται φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ, ὥστε καὶ διάφορα ἐκφύντα καὶ ἐναντία γενόμενα τῷ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι συνέλκεται ὅμως εἰς σύνταξιν μίαν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστων ζῴων· ἓν ἵππων γένος,[1] κἂν μάχωνται κἂν δάκνωσιν ἀλλήλους κἂν φιλονεικῶσι κἂν ζήλῳ θυμῶνται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καθ' ἓν γένη ὡσαύτως· καὶ δὴ οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπους θετέον. Συναπτέον τοίνυν αὖ πάλιν πάντα τὰ εἴδη ταῦτα εἰς ἓν « τὸ ζῷον » γένος· εἶτα καὶ τὰ

[1] ἓν ἵππων γένος MacKenna, Cilento, H–S²: ἐν ἵπποις γένει codd.

III. 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)

1. What, then, do we think about these questions? Now the universal rational principle includes both good and evil things; evil things are parts of it too. It is not that the universal rational principle produces them but that it is the universal principle with them included. The rational principles are an activity of an universal soul, and their parts of soul-parts; but, as the one soul has differing parts, so correspondingly do the rational principles differ, with the result that the works also differ which are their ultimate products. The souls and the works are in harmony with each other; in harmony in such a way that a unity comes from them, even if it is a unity produced from opposites. For all things sprung from a unity come together into a unity by natural necessity, so that, though they grow out different and come into being as opposites they are, all the same, drawn together into a single common order by the fact that they come from a unity. For, just as in the case of particular kinds of living creatures there is one genus of horses, even if they fight and bite each other, and are pugnacious and furiously jealous, and the same applies to all the other individual genera, so, certainly, men must be considered like this too. Then, again, all these kinds must be brought together under the one genus " living creature "; then also the things which are not living creatures must be

μὴ ζῷα κατ' εἴδη αὖ· εἶτα εἰς ἓν « τὸ μὴ ζῷον »· εἶτα ὁμοῦ, εἰ βούλει, εἰς τὸ εἶναι· εἶτα εἰς τὸ παρέχον τὸ εἶναι. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐκδήσας κατάβαινε διαιρῶν καὶ σκιδνάμενον τὸ ἓν ὁρῶν τῷ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ ὁμοῦ περιλαμβάνειν συντάξει μιᾷ, ὡς διακεκριμένον ἓν εἶναι ζῷον πολὺ ἑκάστου πράττοντος τῶν[1] ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅλῳ ὁμοῦ ὄντος, οἷον πυρὸς μὲν καίοντος, ἵππου τὰ ἵππου ἔργα, ἄνθρωποι δὲ τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ᾗ πεφύκασι καὶ διάφορα οἱ διάφοροι. Καὶ ἕπεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸ ζῆν τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς.

2. Αἱ δὲ συντυχίαι οὐ κύριαι τοῦ εὖ, ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὗται συμφώνως τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴασιν ἀκολουθίᾳ[2] ἐμπλεκεῖσαι. Συμπλέκει δὲ πάντα τὸ ἡγούμενον συμφερομένων τῶν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα κατὰ φύσιν, οἷον ἐν στρατηγίαις ἡγουμένου μὲν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, συμπνεόντων δὲ τῶν συντεταγμένων. Ἐτάχθη δὲ τὸ πᾶν προνοίᾳ στρατηγικῇ ὁρώσῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἃ δεῖ παρεῖναι, σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅπλα πάντα καὶ μηχανήματα, καὶ ὅσα ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπλεκομένων προεώραται, ἵνα τὸ ἐκ τούτων συμβαῖνον ἔχῃ χώραν τοῦ

[1] τῶν Creuzer: τὴν codd.
[2] ἀκολουθίᾳ Kirchhoff, H–S²: ἀκολουθίαι codd.

classed by their kinds, and then included in the one genus " non-living "; then both together, if you like, must be included in being; and then in that which makes being possible. Then, having attached everything to this, go down again, dividing and seeing the one dispersed by reaching to all things and including them together in a single common order, so that it is a single multiplex living thing with distinct parts, and each of the things in it acts according to its own nature while being all the same in the whole, for instance, fire burns, a horse does the things which belong to a horse, and individual men do their own things in the way in which they have been disposed by nature, and different men different things. And what is done, and living well or badly, follows according to their natures.

2. Chance circumstances are not responsible for the good life, but they, too, follow harmoniously on the causes before them, and proceed woven into the chain of causation by so following. The ruling principle weaves all things together, while individual things co-operate on one side or the other according to their nature, as in military commands the general gives the lead and his subordinates work in unity with him.[1] The universe is ordered by the generalship of providence which sees the actions and experiences and what must be ready to hand, food and drink, and all weapons and devices as well; everything which results from their interweaving is foreseen, in order that this result may have room to be

[1] The source of this military analogy for the cosmic order is Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Λ 1075a, 13 ff.; cp. the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* 399b, 3 ff., for a rhetorical elaboration of it.

τεθῆναι εὖ, καὶ ἐλήλυθε πάντα τρόπον τινὰ εὐμήχανον παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, καίτοι ἔξωθεν ἦν ὅσα ἔμελλον δράσειν οἱ ἐναντίοι. Εἰ δὲ οἷόν τε ἦν κἀκείνου ἄρχειν τοῦ στρατοπέδου, εἰ δὲ δὴ ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν εἴη, ὑφ' ᾧ πάντα, τί ἂν ἀσύντακτον, τί δὲ οὐκ ἂν συνηρμοσμένον εἴη;

3. Καὶ γὰρ « εἰ ἐγὼ κύριος τοῦ τάδε ἐλέσθαι ἢ τάδε »; Ἀλλ' ἆ[1] αἱρήσει συντέτακται, ὅτι μὴ ἐπεισόδιον τὸ σὸν τῷ παντί, ἀλλ' ἠρίθμησαι ὁ τοιόσδε. Ἀλλὰ πόθεν ὁ τοιόσδε; Ἔστι δὴ δύο, ἆ ὁ λόγος ζητεῖ, τὸ μέν, εἰ ἐπὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα, εἴ τις ἐστίν, ἀνενεγκεῖν δεῖ τοῦ ποιοῦ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἑκάστου τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον αὐτό· ἢ ὅλως οὐκ αἰτιατέον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ φυτῶν γενέσεως, ὅτι μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἢ ἐπὶ ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσι· ταὐτὸν γὰρ τούτῳ « διὰ τί ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ὅπερ θεοί; » Διὰ τί γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οὔτε αὐτὰ οὔτε τὸν ποιήσαντα εὐλόγως αἰτιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ κρεῖττον ἢ τοῦτο; Εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἐδύνατο τοῦτο κάλλιον εἶναι, εἰ μὲν παρ' αὐτοῦ προστιθέντος τι

[1] ἀλλ' ἆ Harder, H-S: ἀλλὰ codd.

[1] Plato, *Phaedrus* 246E4.

[2] Cp. Plato's treatment of the same question in *Laws* X. 904B–C. Plotinus here, at the end of the chapter, gives the same answer as Plato, that the blame should fall upon individual men, not on their Maker; but he shows himself, here as elsewhere, a good deal more conscious of the difficulties

well placed, and all things come in a well-planned way from the general—though what his enemies planned to do is out of his control. But if it was possible for him to command the enemy force as well, if he was really " the great leader "[1] to whom all things are subject, what would be unordered, what would not be fitted into his plan?

3. Suppose you say " I have power to choose this or that "? But the things that you will choose are included in the universal order, because your part is not a mere casual interlude in the All but you are counted in as just the person you are. But for what reason is a man the sort of person he is? There are two questions which the argument seeks to settle here, one, whether the blame should rest on the maker, if there is one, who determined the moral character of the individual, or on the being which has come into existence itself:[2] rather, we should not attribute blame at all, just as there is no blame attaching to the production of plants because they have no sense-perception, nor in the case of the other animals because they are not like men; to blame anyone for this would be the same as asking, " Why are men not what gods are? " Why then, where plants and animals are concerned, is it unreasonable for us to blame them or their creator, but reasonable in the case of men, because man is not a better thing than he is? For if it is because he was able to be something nobler than he is, if he was able to add

raised by the presence of bad men in a divinely ordered universe than Plato is; this is no doubt because of the centuries of debate about Providence which came between him and his master.

εἰς τὸ κρεῖττον, αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἑαυτῷ ὁ μὴ ποιήσας· εἰ δὲ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔδει ἔξωθεν προσεῖναι παρὰ τοῦ γεννητοῦ, ἄτοπος ὁ τὸ πλέον ἀπαιτῶν τοῦ δοθέντος, ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἀπαιτοῖ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν. Δεῖ γὰρ οὐ ζητεῖν, εἰ ἔλαττον ἄλλου, ἀλλ' εἰ ὡς αὐτὸ αὐτάρκως· οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἴσα ἔδει. Ἆρ' οὖν μετρήσαντος αὐτοῦ προαιρέσει τοῦ μὴ δεῖν πάντα ἴσα; Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν εἶχε γενέσθαι. Ἀκόλουθος γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ψυχῇ ἄλλῃ, ἀκόλουθος δὲ ψυχὴ αὕτη νῷ, νοῦς δὲ οὐ τούτων τι ἕν, ἀλλὰ πάντα· τὰ δὲ πάντα πολλά· πολλὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ ἔμελλεν εἶναι. Καὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ζῷα οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ψυχῶν ἐλαττώσεις, οἷον ἐξίτηλον ἤδη προιόντων. Ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου λόγος, κἂν ἔμψυχος ᾖ, ἑτέρα ψυχή, οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἀφ' ἧς ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὗτος ἐλάττων δὴ γίνεται σπεύδων εἰς ὕλην, καὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερον. Σκόπει δὴ ὅσον ἀφέστηκε τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ὅμως ἐστὶ θαῦμα. Οὐ τοίνυν, εἰ τοιοῦτον τὸ γενόμενον, καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον·

something to make himself better, he is responsible to himself for not doing it; but if it was not from himself that the addition had to come but it was necessary for it to come from outside, from his producer, then it is absurd to ask for more than was given, as it would be in the case of the other animals and of plants. For one ought not to enquire whether one thing is less than another but whether it is, as itself, sufficient; for all things ought not to have been equal. Is this then so, because the creator measured them out with the deliberate intention that all things ought not to be equal? Not at all; but it was according to nature for things to come about so. For the rational forming principle of this universe follows upon another soul, and this soul follows upon Intellect, and Intellect is not some one of the things here but all things; but all things means many things; but if there are many things, and not the same, some of them were going to be first, some second, and some of successive lower ranks, in value too. Then, again, the living creatures which have come into being are not only souls but diminutions of souls, a kind of fading away as the living things move on further from their origins. For the formative principle of the living thing, even if it is ensouled, is another soul, not that from which the formative principle comes, and this whole principle becomes less as it hastens to matter, and that which comes into being from it is more deficient. See how far what has come into being stands from its origin, and yet, it is a wonder! If, then, that which has come into being is of a particular kind, it does not follow that what is before it is also of that kind: for

ἔστι γὰρ παντὸς κρεῖττον τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἔξω αἰτίας καὶ μᾶλλον θαυμάσαι, ὅτι ἔδωκέ τι μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἴχνη αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πλέον ἔδωκεν ἢ ὅσον ἔχουσι κτήσασθαι, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀποδεκτέον· ὥστε κινδυνεύειν τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς γενομένους ἰέναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας μειζόνως ἔχειν.

4. Ἁπλοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου—λέγω δὲ ἁπλοῦ ὡς τοῦτο ὃ πεποίηται μόνον ὄντος καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος—ἀπῆν αἰτία ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων. Νῦν δὲ ἄνθρωπος μόνον ἐν ψόγῳ ὁ κακὸς καὶ τοῦτο ἴσως εὐλόγως. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὃ πεποίηται ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ἐλευθέραν οὐκ ἔξω τῆς προνοίας οὖσαν οὐδὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὅλου· οὐ γὰρ ἀπήρτηται ἐκεῖνα τούτων, ἀλλ' ἐπιλάμπει τὰ κρείττω τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἡ τελεία πρόνοια τοῦτο· καὶ λόγος ὁ μὲν ποιητικός, ὁ δὲ συνάπτων τὰ κρείττω τοῖς γενομένοις, κἀκεῖνα πρόνοια ἡ ἄνωθεν, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄνω, ὁ ἕτερος λόγος συνημμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ γίνεται ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πᾶν πλέγμα καὶ πρόνοια ἡ πᾶσα. Ἀρχὴν μὲν οὖν ἔχουσιν ἄλλην ἄνθρωποι, οὐ πάντες δὲ πᾶσιν οἷς ἔχουσι χρῶνται, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, οἱ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ἢ ταῖς ἑτέραις ταῖς χείροσι χρῶνται. Πάρεισι δὲ

it is better than all that has come into being, and beyond blame; one should rather wonder at it because it has given something [to what comes] after it and its traces are of such a quality. But if indeed it has given more than they are able to appropriate, it ought to be approved still more; so that it seems likely that blame should fall upon the men who have come into being, and that what belongs to providence is on a higher level.

4. For if man was simple—I mean, simple in the sense that he was nothing but what he was made and his actions and experiences corresponded to this—there would be no blame in the sense of moral reproach, just as there is none in the case of other living creatures. But, as it is, man, the bad man, is uniquely subject to blame, perhaps reasonably. For he is not only what he was made but has another free principle, which is not outside providence or the rational principle of the whole; for those higher principles are not separated from these here but the better illuminate the worse, and this is perfect providence; and there is one rational principle which is creative, and another which connects the better principles with the things which have come into being, and those higher principles are providence which acts from above, but there is another providence derived from that which is above, the other rational principle connected with that higher one, and the whole interweaving and total providence results from both. So then, men have another principle, but not all men use all that they have but some use one principle, some the other, or rather a number of others, the worse ones. But those higher

κἀκεῖναι οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσαι εἰς αὐτούς, οὗ τι γε αὐταὶ ἀργοῦσαι· πράττει γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Ἀλλ' εἰς τούτους οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσιν αἰτίᾳ τίνος, εἴποι τις ἄν, παροῦσαι; Ἢ οὐ πάρεισι; Καίτοι πάντη φαμὲν παρεῖναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἔρημον. Ἢ οὐ τούτοις, ἐν οἷς μὴ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐνεργεῖ. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ εἰς πάντας, εἴπερ μέρη καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῶν; Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐκ αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων οὐ μόνον ἥδε; Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐ μόνη; Ἐφ' ὧν δὲ μόνη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὸ ζῆν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅσον ἀνάγκη. Εἴτε γὰρ ἡ σύστασις τοιαύτη, ὡς οἷον εἰς θολερὸν ἐμβάλλειν, εἴτε ἐπιθυμίαι κρατοῦσιν, ὅμως ἀνάγκη λέγειν ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ αἴτιον εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν δόξει οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ ἡ ὕλη, οὐχ ὁ λόγος κρατήσει, εἶτα τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὡς πέπλασται. Ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου γενόμενον καὶ ὂν κατὰ τὸν λόγον· ὥστε οὐχ ἡ ὕλη κρατήσει, εἶτα ἡ πλάσις. Καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν προτέραν

[1] This brings out clearly an important point in the psychology of Plotinus, that the duality or cleavage in man is for him not between matter and spirit, or even body and soul, but between higher and lower self: cp. I. 1 [53] 10; II. 9 [33] 2; IV. 4 [28] 18; VI. 4 [22] 14–15. Free will can only be exercised by the true, higher self in so far as it transcends and makes itself independent of the lower "composite" self, which is part

principles are there, but not acting upon them, though certainly not inactive in themselves; for each one of them does its own work. But, someone might say, what is to blame for their not working on these men when they are present? Or are they not present? But we assert that they are present everywhere and nothing is deprived of them. Surely they are not present in those people on whom they do not act. Why, then, do they not act upon all, if these, too, are parts of them?—I mean the principle of this higher kind. As far as the other living creatures are concerned, this principle is not their own; as for men, it does not act on all of them. Is this then not the only principle which does not act on all? But why should it not be the only one? But in those in whom it is the only one, their life is conformed to it, and the other forces only enter into it as far as necessity requires. For whether the man's constitution is of a kind to plunge him, so to speak, into troubled waters, or his lusts dominate him, it is alike necessary to say that the cause lies in the substratum. But at first this would appear to mean that the cause is no more in the rational principle, but rather in the matter, and the matter, not the rational principle will be dominant, and the substrate in so far as it is formed will come second to it. In fact, the substrate to the free principle is the rational form, and that which has come into existence from the rational form and exists according to it; so that the matter will not be dominant and the formation come second.[1] Further, one might refer the being

of and dominated by the order of the physical universe; cp. II. 3 [52] 15. 17 ff.

βιοτὴν ἀνάγοι τις, οἷον γινομένου ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἀμυδροῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, οἷον ψυχῆς ἀσθενεστέρας γενομένης· ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐκλάμψει. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ λεγέσθω ἔχειν καὶ τὸν λόγον αὖ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ὕλης, ἣν αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται ποιώσας καθ' αὑτὸν τὴν ὕλην ἢ σύμφωνον εὑρών. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βοὸς λόγος ἐπ' ἄλλης ἢ βοὸς ὕλης· ὅθεν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά φησιν εἰσκρίνεσθαι οἷον ἄλλης τῆς ψυχῆς γενομένης καὶ ἑτεροιωθέντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα γένηται ψυχὴ βοός, ἢ πρότερον ἦν ἄνθρωπος· ὥστε κατὰ δίκην ὁ χείρων. Ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ τί ὁ χείρων ἐγένετο καὶ πῶς ἐσφάλη; Πολλάκις εἴρηται, ὡς οὐ πρῶτα πάντα, ἀλλ' ὅσα δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα ἐλάττω τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἔχει, καὶ σμικρὰ ῥοπὴ ἀρκεῖ εἰς ἔκβασιν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ. Καὶ ἡ συμπλοκὴ δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλου ὥσπερ τις σύγκρασίς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γενομένου, καὶ οὐκ ὄντος ἠλάττωσεν· ἀλλὰ ἐγένετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαττον τὸ ἔλαττον καὶ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγένετο κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἔλαττον, καί, εἰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον πάσχει, πάσχει τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. Καὶ εἰς τὰ προβεβιωμένα δὲ ἀναπέμπειν δεῖ τὸν λογισμὸν ὡς κἀκεῖθεν ἠρτημένων τῶν ἐφεξῆς.

5. Γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ πρόνοια ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος κατιοῦσα ἄνωθεν οὐκ ἴση οἷον κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ

[1] *Timaeus* 42C 3.

this or that kind of man to the previous life, as if the rational principle became dim in comparison to that prior to it as the result of previous happenings, as if the soul had become weaker; but it will shine out again later. And the rational principle must be said to contain within itself the rational principle of the matter as well, the matter which it will make suitable for itself, either giving it qualities corresponding to itself or finding it already consonant. For the rational principle of an ox does not impose itself on any other matter than that of an ox. Hence, Plato says[1] that the soul enters into other living beings, in the sense that the soul becomes different and the rational principle is altered, in order that what was formerly the soul of a man may become the soul of an ox; so that the worse being is justly dealt with. But how did he originally become worse, and how did he fall? It has often been said that all things are not of the first rank but all things which are second and third class have a lesser nature than those before them, and a light tilting of the balance is enough to turn them out of the right way. And the interweaving of one thing with another is like a sort of mixture; another thing results from both, and the interweaving does not diminish a thing's being; but the inferior became inferior from its beginning, and is what it became, inferior by its nature, and, if it suffers the consequences of its inferiority, it suffers what it deserves. And one must carry back the reckoning to what happened in previous lives, because what happens afterwards depends on that too.

5. Providence, then, which in its descent from above reaches from the beginning to the end, is not

κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἄλλη ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζῴου ἑνὸς εἰς ἔσχατον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρτημένου, ἑκάστου τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος, τοῦ μὲν βελτίονος τὸ βέλτιον τῆς ἐνεργείας, τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω ἤδη ἐνεργοῦντος τε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος τὰ ὅσα αὐτῷ οἰκεῖα παθήματα πρὸς αὐτό τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν σύνταξιν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλο. Καὶ δὴ καὶ οὕτωσὶ πληγέντα οὕτως ἐφθέγξατο τὰ φωνήεντα, τὰ δὲ σιωπῇ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται τὰ ἀκόλουθα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων ἁπάντων καὶ ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων μία τοῦ ζῴου οἷον φωνὴ καὶ ζωὴ καὶ βίος· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μόρια διάφορα ὄντα καὶ διάφορον τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντα· ἄλλο γὰρ ποιοῦσι πόδες, ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' ἄλλο, διάνοια δὲ ἄλλο καὶ νοῦς ἄλλο. Ἓν δὲ ἐκ πάντων καὶ πρόνοια μία· εἱμαρμένη δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἀρξαμένη, τὸ δὲ ὑπεράνω πρόνοια μόνον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ πάντα λόγος καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον· νοῦς γὰρ καὶ ψυχὴ καθαρά· τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ὅσον μὲν ἔρχεται ἐκεῖθεν, πρόνοια, καὶ ὅσον ἐν ψυχῇ καθαρᾷ καὶ ὅσον ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ ζῷα. Ἔρχεται δὲ μεριζόμενος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἴσα· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἴσα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ζῴῳ ἑκάστῳ. Τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀκόλουθα μὲν τὰ δρώμενα καὶ προνοίᾳ ἑπόμενα, εἴ τις δρᾴη θεοῖς φίλα· ἦν γὰρ θεοφιλὴς ὁ λόγος

[1] This distinction between higher providence and lower fate is common in Middle Platonism; cp. Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Fato* 9. 572F–573B; Apuleius, *De Platone* I. 12; and C. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* III. 1279d (p. 343).

equal as in a numerical distribution but differs in different places according to a law of correspondence, just as in a single living creature, which is dependent on its principle down to its last and lowest part, each part having its own, the better part having the better part of the activity, and that which is at the lower limit still active in its own way and undergoing the experiences which are proper to it as regards its own nature and its co-ordination with anything else. Yes, and if the parts are struck in a particular way, the speaking parts give out a corresponding sound, and others receive the blow in silence and make the movements which result from it; and from all the sounds and passive experiences and activities come a kind of single voice of the living creature, a single life and way of living; for the organs are different and have activities which are different; for the feet do one thing, the eyes another, the discursive reason one thing and the intuitive intellect another. But one thing results from all, and there is one providence; but it is "fate" beginning from the lower level; the upper is providence alone.[1] For in the intelligible world all things are rational principle and above rational principle; for all are intellect and pure soul; what comes from there, all that comes from intellect, is providence, both all that is in pure soul and all that comes from it to living things. But the rational principle as it comes is divided into unequal parts; hence the things it does are not equal either, as also in each individual living creature. From this point the things which are done are consequences, and follow upon providence if a man does things which are pleasing to the gods; for the rational forming

ὁ προνοίας. Συνείρεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
25 τῶν ἔργων, πεποίηται δὲ οὐ προνοίᾳ, ἀλλὰ γενόμενα
ἢ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων τὰ γενόμενα ἢ παρ' ὁτουοῦν
ἢ ζῴου ἢ ἀψύχου, εἴ τι ἐφεξῆς τούτοις χρηστόν,
πάλιν κατείληπται προνοίᾳ, ὡς πανταχοῦ ἀρετὴν
κρατεῖν καὶ μετατιθεμένων καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχα-
νόντων τῶν ἡμαρτημένων, οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι
30 ὑγιείας δοθείσης κατὰ πρόνοιαν τοῦ ζῴου, γενομέ-
νης τομῆς[1] καὶ ὅλως τραύματος, πάλιν ἐφεξῆς ὁ
λόγος ὁ διοικῶν συνάπτοι καὶ συνάγοι καὶ ἰᾶτο
καὶ διορθοῖτο τὸ πονῆσαν. Ὥστε τὰ κακὰ ἑπόμενα
εἶναι, ἐξ ἀνάγκης δέ· καὶ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν κατ'
35 αἰτίας οὐχ ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας ἠναγκασμένων, ἀλλ'
ἐξ αὐτῶν συναψάντων μὲν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας καὶ
ἀπὸ προνοίας ἔργοις, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς συνεῖραι κατὰ
βούλησιν ἐκείνης οὐ δυνηθέντων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
τῶν πραξάντων ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐν τῷ παντί,
μηδ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόνοιαν πεπραχότος ἢ πεποιηκό-
40 τος τι ἐν ἡμῖν πάθος. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πᾶν
προσελθὸν παντί, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο· οἷον καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης κάλλος
πρὸς μὲν τὸν Πάριν ἄλλο εἰργάζετο, Ἰδομενεὺς
δὲ ἔπαθεν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ἀκόλαστος ἀκολάστῳ

[1] τομῆς Creuzer, H–S: τόλμης codd.

[1] For Idomeneus, a frequent visitor to the house of Menelaus who did not seduce Helen, see *Iliad* III. 230–233.

principle of providence is dear to the gods. Then, too, these kind of actions [the kind which cause our difficulties about providence, i.e. evil actions] are linked up with the good ones, but they are not done by providence but the things which have happened, whether they have happened as a result of human action or of the action of anything else, living or lifeless, if anything which follows from them is good, are taken up again by providence, so that virtue has everywhere the mastery, and the things which have gone wrong are changed and corrected, as in a single body, where health is given by the providence of the living thing, when a cut or injury of any kind occurs, the directing rational principle again afterwards joins it and closes the wound and heals and sets right the suffering part. So the evil deeds are consequences, but follow from necessity; they come from us (i.e. we cause them), and we are not compelled by providence but we connect them, of our own accord, with the works of providence or works derived from providence, but are not able to link up what follows according to the will of providence but do so according to the will of the people who act or according to something else in the universe, which itself is acting or producing some effect in us in a way not according to the will of providence. For everything does not always produce the same effect when it encounters everything else, but it produces the same effect when it encounters one thing and a different effect when it encounters another; as, for instance, the beauty of Helen produced one effect on Paris, but Idomeneus[1] was not affected in the same way; and when one thoroughly dissolute man happens upon

καλὸς καλῷ συμπεσὼν ἄλλο, ὁ δὲ σώφρων καλὸς ἄλλο πρὸς σώφρονα τοιοῦτον· ἢ πρὸς ἀκόλαστον ἄλλο ὁ αὐτός, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλο. Καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ ἀκολάστου τὸ πραχθὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ προνοίας οὔτε κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔργον οὐχ ὑπὸ προνοίας μέν, ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, κατὰ πρόνοιαν δέ· σύμφωνον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὃ ὑγιεινῶς πράξειεν ἄν τις αὐτὸς πράξας κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ ἰατροῦ. Τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς παρὰ τῆς τέχνης ἐδίδου εἴς τε τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἴς τε τὸ κάμνον. Ὃ δ' ἄν τις μὴ ὑγιαῖνον ποιῇ, αὐτός τε ποιεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τοῦ ἰατροῦ εἰργάσατο.

6. Πόθεν οὖν καὶ τὰ χείρω μάντεις προλέγουσι καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν ὁρῶντες πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις μαντείαις προλέγουσι ταῦτα; Ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ συμπεπλέχθαι πάντα τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὴν ὕλην· οἷον ἐπὶ ζῴου συνθέτου ὄντος ὅ τι τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον θεωρῶν καὶ τὸ μεμορφωμένον θεωρεῖ. Οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ζῷον νοητὸν καὶ ζῷον σύνθετον θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ λόγον ζῴου ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ μορφοῦντα τὰ χείρω. Ζῴου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα

another, and both are beautiful, the effect is different from what follows when one chaste beauty meets another; and something different again happens to the chaste beauty when he meets the dissolute man, and again something different to the dissolute one when he meets the chaste. And the action which proceeds from the dissolute man is done neither by providence nor according to providence, but what is done by the chaste man is not done by providence, because it is done by the man himself, but is done according to providence; for it is in tune with the rational principle, just as, too, what a man might do to promote his health would be his own action according to the rational plan of his doctor. For this is what the doctor prescribed, from the resources of his skill, both in health and sickness. But whatever anyone does that is unhealthy, he does it himself and it is an act which goes against the providence of the doctor.

6. What is the reason, then, that diviners foretell the worse sort of actions, and by looking at the circuit of the heavens foretell these as well as their other prophecies? Obviously because all opposites are entwined together, form and matter, for instance; as, for example, in the case of a living thing which is composite, one who in any way contemplates the form and the rational principle also contemplates the formed thing. For he does not contemplate an intelligible living thing and a composite living thing in the same way, but in the composite he contemplates the rational principle of the living thing forming what is worse. Now, since the universe is a living thing, one who contemplates the things which come to be

θεωρῶν θεωρεῖ ἅμα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐστι καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ· τέταται δὴ ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα· τὰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷα καὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν καὶ διαθέσεις κραθεῖσαι, λόγῳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ μεμιγμέναι· μεμιγμένα οὖν θεωρεῖ καὶ διηνεκῶς μιγνύμενα· καὶ διακρίνειν μὲν αὐτὸς οὐ δύναται πρόνοιαν καὶ τὸ κατὰ πρόνοιαν χωρὶς καὶ αὖ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὅσα δίδωσιν εἰς τὸ [ὑποκείμενον] [1] παρ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ σοφοῦ τινος καὶ θείου· ἢ θεὸς ἂν ἔχοι, φαίη τις ἄν, τοῦτο τὸ γέρας. Καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ μάντεως τὸ διότι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅτι μόνον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἀνάγνωσις φυσικῶν γραμμάτων καὶ τάξιν δηλούντων καὶ οὐδαμοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄτακτον ἀποκλινόντων, μᾶλλον δὲ καταμαρτυρούσης τῆς φορᾶς καὶ εἰς φῶς ἀγούσης καὶ πρὶν παρ' αὐτῶν φανῆναι, οἷος ἕκαστος καὶ ὅσα. Συμφέρεται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις κἀκεῖνα τούτοις συντελοῦντα ἅμα πρὸς σύστασιν καὶ ἀιδιότητα κόσμου, ἀναλογίᾳ δὲ σημαίνοντα τὰ ἄλλα τῷ τετηρηκότι· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι μαντικαὶ τῷ ἀναλόγῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔδει ἀπηρτῆσθαι ἀλλήλων τὰ πάντα, ὡμοιῶσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀμηγέπη. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν ἴσως εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς συνέχει τὰ πάντα ἀναλογία. Ἔστι

[1] ὑποκείμενον del. Bréhier, H–S².

[1] Plato, *Timaeus* 47E5–48A1.
[2] Simonides, quoted by Plato *Protagoras* 341E3.
[3] Cp. II. 3 [52] 7. 4–6.
[4] Cp. *Timaeus* 31C3 and 32C2. But Plato's ἀναλογία is

in it contemplates at the same time its origins and the providence which watches over it; this certainly extends over all things, including the things which come to be; and these are both living things and their actions and mixed dispositions, "compounded of reason and necessity": [1] so he contemplates things which are mixed and continually go on being mixed; and he cannot himself distinguish providence and what is according to providence clearly on the one side, and on the other the substrate and all that it gives to what results from it. This discrimination is not for a man, except a wise and godlike man: or one might say that "a god alone could have this privilege." [2] In fact, it is not for the diviner to tell the "because" but only the "that"; his art is a reading of letters written in nature,[3] declaring an order and never deviating into disorder, or rather of the heavenly circuit which proclaims and brings to light what each individual is like and all his characteristics even before they appear in the people themselves. For these things here below are carried along with those things in heaven, and those in heaven with these on earth, and both together contribute to the consistency and everlastingness of the universe, and by correspondence indicate the others to the observer; for other forms of divination, too, work by correspondence. For it would not have been right for all things to be cut off from each other but they had to be made like each other, in some way at least. Perhaps this might be the meaning of the saying that correspondence holds all things together.[4] And

mathematical proportion. As usual, Plotinus pays little attention to the mathematical side of Plato's thought.

δὲ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀναλογία, ὥστε καὶ τὸ χεῖρον πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ὡς τὸ βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ὡς ὄμμα πρὸς ὄμμα καὶ ποὺς πρὸς πόδα, θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον, καί, εἰ βούλει, ὡς ἀρετὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ κακία πρὸς ἀδικίαν. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀναλογία ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ προειπεῖν ἔνι· καὶ εἰ ποιεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνα εἰς ταῦτα, οὕτω ποιεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἐν παντὶ ζῴῳ εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ὡς θάτερον γεννᾷ θάτερον—ἅμα γὰρ γεννᾶται—ἀλλ' ὡς, ᾗ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον, οὕτω καὶ πάσχει τὸ πρόσφορον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῦτο· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λόγος εἷς.

7. Καὶ ὅτι δὲ τὰ βελτίω, καὶ τὰ χείρω. Ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν εἴη τι χεῖρον ἐν πολυειδεῖ μὴ ὄντος βελτίονος, ἢ πῶς τὸ βέλτιον μὴ χείρονος; Ὥστε οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ βελτίονι, ἀλλὰ ἀποδεκτέον τὸ βέλτιον, ὅτι ἔδωκεν ἑαυτοῦ τῷ χείρονι. Ὅλως δὲ οἱ ἀναιρεῖν ἀξιοῦντες τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀναιροῦσι πρόνοιαν αὐτήν. Τίνος γὰρ ἔσται; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ἄνω πρόνοιαν ὀνομάζοντες πρὸς τὸ κάτω λέγομεν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα ἀρχή, ἐν ᾗ ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ὅλον πάντα. Πρόεισι δὲ ἤδη ἐκ ταύτης ἕκαστα μενούσης ἐκείνης ἔνδον οἷον ἐκ ῥίζης μιᾶς ἑστώσης αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῇ· τὰ δὲ ἐξήνθησεν εἰς

[1] For the plant-image applied to the physical universe; cp. IV. 4 [28] 11. 9–11.

correspondence is of this kind, that the worse is related to the worse as the better is to the better, for instance, as eye is to eye, so is foot to foot, the one to the other; or, if you like, as virtue is to justice, so is vice to injustice. If, then, there is correspondence in the All, prediction is possible; and if the heavenly bodies act on the things here below, they act in the way in which the parts in every living thing work on each other, not that one thing produces another—they are produced together—but that each thing in accordance with what it naturally is experiences what is suitable to its own nature; because this thing is of this kind, this experience is of this kind too; for so the formative pattern remains one.

7. And because there are better things, there must be worse as well. Or how could there be anything worse in a multiform thing if there was not something better, and how could there be anything better if there was not something worse? So one should not blame the worse when one finds it in the better but approve the better because it has given something of itself to the worse. And altogether, those who make the demand to abolish evil in the All are abolishing providence itself. For what would it be providence of? Certainly not of itself or of the better; for when we speak of providence above, we are using the term of its relation to what is below. For the gathering together of all things into one is the principle, in which all are together and all make a whole. And individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come from it as from a single root which remains static in itself,[1] but they flower out into a divided multiplicity, each

πλῆθος μεμερισμένον εἴδωλον ἕκαστον ἐκείνου φέρον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐγίγνετο καὶ ἦν τὰ μὲν πλησίον τῆς ῥίζης, τὰ δὲ προιόντα εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἐσχίζετο καὶ μέχρις οἷον κλάδων καὶ ἄκρων καὶ καρπῶν καὶ φύλλων· καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔμενεν ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ἐγίνετο ἀεί, οἱ καρποὶ καὶ τὰ φύλλα· καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀεὶ εἶχε τοὺς τῶν ἐπάνω λόγους ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον μικρὰ δένδρα βουληθέντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ἐγέννησε πρὶν φθαρῆναι, τὸ ἐγγὺς ἐγέννα μόνον. Τὰ δὲ διάκενα οἷον τῶν κλάδων ἐπληροῦτο ἐκ τῶν αὖ ἐκ τῆς ῥίζης καὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλον τρόπον πεφυκότων, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἔπασχε τὰ ἄκρα τῶν κλάδων, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πλησίον οἴεσθαι τὸ πάθος ἰέναι μόνον· τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὖ τὸ μὲν ἔπασχε, τὸ δὲ ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀνήρτητο καὶ αὐτή. Πόρρωθεν μὲν γὰρ ἐλθόντα ἄλλα τὰ ποιοῦντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον εἰ ἀδελφοὶ δρῷέν τι ἀλλήλους ὅμοιοι γενόμενοι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁρμηθέντες τῶν πεποιηκότων.

one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when they reach this lower world one comes to be in one place and one in another, and some are close to the root and others advance farther and split up to the point of becoming, so to speak, branches and twigs and fruits and leaves; and those that are closer to the root remain for ever, and the others come into being for ever, the fruits and the leaves; and those which come into being for ever have in them the rational forming principles of those above them, as if they wanted to be little trees; and if they produce before they pass away, they only produce what is near to them. And what are like empty spaces between the branches are filled with shoots which also grow from the root, these, too, in a different way; and the twigs on the branches are also affected by these, so that they think the effect on them is only produced by what is close to them; but in fact the acting and being acted upon are in the principle, and the principle itself, too, is dependent.[1] The principles which act on each other are different because they come from a far-off origin, but in the beginning they come from the same source, as if brothers were to do something to each other who are alike because they originate from the same parents.

[1] The imagery in this sentence is remarkably obscure, but perhaps Plotinus is thinking of apparently disorderly and unplanned shoots which grow between the spaced branches of a well-pruned fruit tree and affect them adversely; these, too, grow from the root and are produced by the growth-principle of the whole tree.

III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 15 in the chronological order: it was written, therefore, before Porphyry came to Rome (*Life* ch. 4). Porphyry seems to think that its writing was connected (his language is, perhaps deliberately, vague) with an incident which he records in ch. 10 of the *Life*. An Egyptian priest offered to conjure up the guardian spirit of Plotinus; when the conjuration took place in the temple of Isis at Rome, a god appeared instead of a spirit (on this episode see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Appendix II, iii, pp. 289–291). But, whatever the connection between this and the writing of the treatise may have been, the doctrine which Plotinus expounds here has little to do with the superstitions of his time or even with the theology of spirits which is to be found in his Platonist predecessors and successors (Proclus criticises Plotinus's interpretation of Plato in his *Commentary on the Alcibiades*, pp. 383–385 Cousin, paras. 75–76 Westerink). Plotinus is concerned to reconcile the various statements which Plato makes about guardian spirits in the myths of the *Phaedo*, *Republic* X and *Timaeus*, and to interpret them in a way which fits his own version of Platonism. He does this by means of his doctrine that each soul is a " universe " (chs. 3 and 6) containing many different levels of reality, on any one of which we may choose to live; the principle, then, on the level above that on which we choose to live, next above the principle which is dominant in us in any particular life, is our " guardian spirit ": if we live

well we may rise to its level in our next life, and so have an even higher being for our " spirit." So the perfectly good and wise man, who lives entirely on the level of Intellect, will have that which is above Intellect, the Good, for his guardian (ch. 6).

Synopsis

Soul has the power of growth, present in us too, but dominant, because isolated, in plants; it gives form to body, its last expression in the world below (ch. 1). The human soul has all powers down to the lowest, and can live on the level of any one of them; its life in its next incarnation, plant, animal or man, will depend on the level it chooses to live on in this one (ch. 2). Man's spirit is the principle on the level above that on which he lives; each of us is an " intelligible universe " (ch. 3). Universal soul and body; the universe has no perceptions or sensations (ch. 4). The " choice of lives " in *Republic* X; the individual is responsible for choosing: the guardian spirit is " ours and not ours ": explanation of *Timaeus* 90A (ch. 5). The good man, who lives on the level of Intellect, has the God beyond Intellect for his guardian spirit. Spirits stay with their souls during the intervals between incarnations; at their next incarnation the souls get a new spirit, bad or good according to their deserts. Some souls may ascend to the stars, and these have star-gods for their guardian spirits; we are not only an intelligible universe but have powers in us akin to those of the world-soul, and go to the star appropriate to the power which worked in us. Some go outside the visible world altogether, taking with them the lower soul which desires birth; in what sense this lower soul is divisible. When the soul comes again to the lower world it embarks in it with its spirit as in a ship, and the circuit of the universe carries it on the voyage of life; what happens to it then depends partly on the motion of the universe, partly on itself (ch. 6).

III. 4. (15) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΛΗΧΟΤΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΟΣ

1. Τῶν μὲν αἱ ὑποστάσεις γίνονται μενόντων ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ κινουμένη ἐλέγετο γεννᾶν καὶ αἴσθησιν τὴν ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ φύσιν καὶ μέχρι φυτῶν. Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα, κρατεῖ δὲ μέρος οὖσαν·[1] ὅταν δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς γένηται, αὕτη κρατεῖ οἷον μόνη γενομένη. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν γεννᾷ; Γεννᾷ πάντη ἕτερον αὐτῆς· οὐκέτι γὰρ ζωὴ μετὰ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὸ γεννώμενον ἄζων. Τί οὖν; Ἡ, ὥσπερ πᾶν, ὅσον πρὸ τούτου ἐγεννᾶτο, ἀμόρφωτον ἐγεννᾶτο, εἰδοποιεῖτο δὲ τῷ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν οἷον ἐκτρεφόμενον, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννηθὲν οὐ ψυχῆς ἔτι εἶδος—οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ζῇ—ἀλλ' ἀοριστίαν εἶναι παντελῆ. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ κἀν τοῖς προτέροις ἡ ἀοριστία, ἀλλ' ἐν εἴδει· οὐ γὰρ πάντη ἀόριστον, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντη. Τελειούμενον δὲ γίνεται σῶμα μορφὴν λαβὸν τὴν τῇ δυνάμει

[1] οὖσαν Kirchhoff: οὖσα codd.

[1] Cp. Plato, *Phaedo* 107D6–7 . . . τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ . . .

[2] The reference is to V. 2 [11] 1. 18–21.

III. 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT [1]

1. The expressions of some realities come into existence while the realities themselves remain unmoved, but soul has been already said to be in motion when it generates the sense-perception which is its expressed form and the power of growth which extends also to plants.[2] For soul has the power of growth when it exists in us, too, but it dominates it because it is only a part; but when it comes to be in plants, this power of growth dominates because it has, so to speak, become isolated. Does this power of growth, then, produce nothing? It produces a thing altogether different from itself; for after it there is no more life, but what is produced is lifeless. What is it then? Just as everything which was produced before this was produced shapeless, but was formed by turning towards its producer and being, so to speak, reared to maturity by it, so here, too, that which is produced is not any more a form of soul—for it is not alive—but absolute indefiniteness. For even if there is indefiniteness in the things before it, it is nevertheless indefiniteness within form; the thing is not absolutely indefinite but only in relation to its perfection; but what we are dealing with now is absolutely indefinite. When it is perfected it becomes a body, receiving the form appropriate to its

πρόσφορον, ὑποδοχὴ[1] τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ ἐκθρέψαντος· καὶ μόνον τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ἔσχατον τῶν ἄνω ἐν ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ κάτω.

2. Καὶ τὸ «ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου» ἐπὶ ταύτης μάλιστα· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἄλλως. Πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν, ἢ ἐν αἰσθητικῷ εἴδει ἢ ἐν λογικῷ ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φυτικῷ. Τὸ γὰρ κρατοῦν αὐτῆς μόριον τὸ ἑαυτῷ πρόσφορον ποιεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀργεῖ· ἔξω γάρ. Ἐν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ κρατεῖ τὰ χείρω, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν· οὐδέ γε τὸ κρεῖττον ἀεί· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα χώραν τινὰ ἔχοντα. Διὸ καὶ ὡς αἰσθητικοί· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὄργανα αἰσθήσεως· καὶ πολλὰ ὡς φυτά· ἔστι γὰρ σῶμα αὐξόμενον καὶ γεννῶν· ὥστε πάντα συνεργεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ ὅλον εἶδος ἄνθρωπος. Ἐξελθοῦσα δέ, ὅ τι περ ἐπλεόνασε, τοῦτο γίνεται. Διὸ φεύγειν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἐπακολουθοῦντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἰδώλοις, μηδὲ εἰς τὴν φυτικὴν ἐπακολουθοῦντες τῇ ἐφέσει τοῦ γεννᾶν καὶ ἐδωδῶν λιχνείαις, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ θεόν. Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐτήρησαν, πάλιν ἄνθρωποι. Ὅσοι δὲ αἰσθήσει μόνον ἔζησαν, ζῷα· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αἰσθήσεις μετὰ

[1] ὑποδοχὴ Kirchhoff: ὑποδοχὴν codd.

[1] These two quotations are from Plato, *Phaedrus* 246B6–7.
[2] Again the favourite passage from Plato, *Theaetetus*, 176A8–B1.
[3] The phrase is taken from *Republic* VII. 519B1–2.

potentiality, a receiver for the principle which produced it and brought it to maturity. And only this form in body is the last representative of the powers above in the last depth of the world below.

2. And the text "All soul cares for that which is without soul" applies to this [the power of growth] in particular; other kinds of soul [care for the inanimate] in other ways. "It traverses the whole universe in different forms at different times,"[1] either in the perceptive form or the rational or in this very growth-form. For the dominant part of it makes the thing appropriate to itself, but the other parts do nothing, for they are outside. In man, however, the inferior parts are not dominant but they are also present; and in fact the better part does not always dominate; the other parts exist and have a certain place. Therefore we also live like beings characterised by sense-perception, for we, too, have sense-organs; and in many ways we live like plants, for we have a body which grows and produces; so that all things work together, but the whole form is man in virtue of its better part. But when it goes out of the body it becomes what there was most of in it. Therefore one must "escape"[2] to the upper world, that we may not sink to the level of sense-perception by pursuing the images of sense, or to the level of the growth-principle by following the urge for generation and the "gluttonous love of good eating,"[3] but may rise to the intelligible and intellect and God. Those, then, who guarded the man in them, become men again. Those who lived by sense alone become animals; but if their sense-perceptions have been accompanied by passionate

θυμοῦ, τὰ ἄγρια, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ ἐν τούτοις τὸ διάφορον τῶν τοιούτων ποιεῖ· ὅσοι δὲ μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος, τὰ ἀκόλαστα τῶν ζῴων καὶ γαστρίμαργα. Εἰ δὲ μηδ' αἰσθήσει μετὰ τούτων, ἀλλὰ νωθείᾳ αἰσθήσεως μετ' αὐτῶν, καὶ φυτά· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο ἦ μάλιστα ἐνήργει τὸ φυτικόν, καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς μελέτη δενδρωθῆναι. Τοὺς δὲ φιλομούσους μέν, καθαρίους δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰς τὰ ᾠδικά· τοὺς δὲ ἀλόγως βασιλέας αἰετούς, εἰ μὴ ἄλλη κακία παρείη· μετεωρολόγους δὲ ἄνευ φρονήσεως εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀεὶ αἰρομένους εἰς ὄρνεις μετεώρους ταῖς πτήσεσιν. Ὁ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἄνθρωπος· ὁ δ' ἧττον ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς μετέχων πολιτικὸν ζῷον, μέλιττα ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

3. Τίς οὖν δαίμων; ὁ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. Τίς δὲ θεός; ἢ ὁ ἐνταῦθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργῆσαν τοῦτο ἕκαστον[1] ἄγει, ἅτε καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγούμενον. Ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτό

[1] ἕκαστον AB Harder: ἑκάστου ERJ y Q.

[1] For reincarnation in appropriate animal forms see Plato, *Phaedo* 81E–82B, *Republic* X. 620, and *Timaeus* 91–92. The lowest form of life to which a human soul can sink in Plato is that of an oyster (*Timaeus* 92B6–7), but reincarnation as a plant appears in Empedocles (Frs. 117, 127 Diels-Kranz). In spite of the somewhat light-hearted way in which Plotinus (following Plato) touches on the future of stupid kings (is there perhaps a disrespectful allusion here to the formality of releasing an eagle from the imperial pyre?) and unphilosophic

temper they become wild animals, and the difference in temper in them makes the differences between the animals of this kind; those whose sense-perceptions went with desires of the flesh and the delight of the desiring part of the soul become lustful and gluttonous animals.[1] But if they did not even live by sense along with their desires but coupled them with dullness of perception, they even turn into plants; for it was this, the growth-principle which worked in them, alone or predominantly, and they were taking care to turn themselves into trees. Those who loved music but were in other ways respectable turn into song-birds; kings who ruled stupidly into eagles, if they had no other vices; astronomers who were always raising themselves to the sky without philosophic reflection turn into birds which fly high. The man who practised community virtue becomes a man again; but one who has a lesser share of it a creature that lives in community, a bee or something of the sort.

3. Who, then, becomes a spirit? He who was one here too. And who a god? Certainly he who was one here. For what worked in a man leads him[2] [after death], since it was his ruler and guide here

astronomers, there is no doubt that he took Plato's statements about animal reincarnation literally and seriously; cp. e.g., VI. 7 [38] 6. 20 ff. Porphyry disagreed with his master on this point (Augustine *De Civ. Dei* X. 30). On the differing opinions held by Platonists on animal reincarnation see H. Dörrie *Kontroverse um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus*, *Hermes* 85. 4 (Dec. 1957), pp. 414–435.

[2] ἑκάστου printed by Henry-Schwyzer here, seems to me impossible. I adopt ἕκαστον which appears in the MSS A and B, and which Dr. Schwyzer now considers necessary.

ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει; Ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφέστηκεν ἀργοῦν, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτόν. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐνεργοῦν ἦ αἰσθητικοί, καὶ ὁ δαίμων τὸ λογικόν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῴημεν, ὁ δαίμων τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἐφεστὼς ἀργὸς συγχωρῶν τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ. Ὀρθῶς οὖν λέγεται ἡμᾶς αἱρήσεσθαι. Τὸν γὰρ ὑπερκείμενον κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν αἱρούμεθα. Διὰ τί οὖν αὐτὸς ἄγει; Ἢ τὸν βιοτεύσαντα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ἄγειν, ὅτε ἔζη, παυσάμενον δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἄλλῳ παραχωρεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τεθνηκότα τὴν αὐτοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ζωήν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐθέλει ἄγειν καὶ κρατήσας ζῇ αὐτὸς ἄλλον καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων δαίμονα· εἰ δὲ βαρύνοιτο τῇ ῥώσει τοῦ χείρονος ἤθους, ἔχει ἐκεῖνο τὴν δίκην. Ταύτῃ καὶ ὁ κακὸς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον βρίσαντος πρὸς τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος ἐν τῇ ζωῇ εἰς βίον θήρειον. Εἰ δὲ ἕπεσθαι δύναιτο τῷ δαίμονι τῷ ἄνω αὐτοῦ, ἄνω γίνεται ἐκεῖνον ζῶν καὶ ἐφ' ὃ ἄγεται κρεῖττον μέρος αὐτοῦ ἐν προστασίᾳ θέμενος καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἄλλον ἕως ἄνω. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πολλὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω αὖ μέχρι πάσης

[1] See note on title of this treatise.
[2] *Republic* X. 617E1. [3] *Phaedo* 107D7.

too. Is this, then, "the spirit to whom he was allotted while he lived"?[1] No, but that which is before the working principle; for this presides inactive over the man, but that which comes after it acts. If the working principle is that by which we have sense-perception, the spirit is the rational principle; but if we live by the rational principle, the spirit is what is above this, presiding inactive and giving its consent to the principle which works. So it is rightly said that "we shall choose."[2] For we choose the principle which stands above us according to our choice of life. Why, then, does the spirit "lead"[3] us? It is not possible for the principle which led the man in life to lead [after death], but only before, when the man lived; when he ceases to live the principle must hand over its activity to another, since he has died in the life which corresponded to that spirit's activity. This [other principle], then, wants to lead, and when it has become dominant lives itself and has itself, too, a different spirit; but if it is weighed down by the force of its bad character, this weighing down contains in itself the penalty. In this way, too, the wicked man, since the principle which worked in him during his life has pressed him down to the worse, towards what is like itself, enters into the life of a beast. But if a man is able to follow the spirit which is above him, he comes to be himself above, living that spirit's life, and giving the pre-eminence to that better part of himself to which he is being led; and after that spirit he rises to another, until he reaches the heights. For the soul is many things, and all things, both the things above and the things below down to the limits

ζωῆς, καὶ ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός, τοῖς μὲν κάτω συνάπτοντες τῷδε, τοῖς δὲ ἄνω καὶ τοῖς κόσμου τῷ νοητῷ, καὶ μένομεν τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ παντὶ νοητῷ ἄνω, τῷ δὲ ἐσχάτῳ αὐτοῦ πεπεδήμεθα τῷ κάτω οἷον ἀπόρροιαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου διδόντες εἰς τὸ κάτω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνέργειαν, ἐκείνου οὐκ ἐλαττουμένου.

4. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι τοῦτο; Ἢ οὔ· ἐὰν γὰρ στραφῶμεν, συνεπιστρέφεται καὶ τοῦτο. Τί οὖν ἡ τοῦ παντός; Ἀποστήσεται καὶ τὸ αὐτῆς μέρος στραφείσης; Ἢ οὐδὲ συνένευσε τῷ μέρει αὐτῆς τῷ ἐσχάτῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦλθεν οὐδὲ κατῆλθεν, ἀλλὰ μενούσης προσάπτεται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἷον καταλάμπεται, οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦν οὐδὲ [1] παρέχον μερίμνας, ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ τοῦ κόσμου κειμένου. Τί οὖν; Οὐκ αἰσθάνεταί τινα αἴσθησιν; Ὅρασιν οὐκ ἔχει, φησίν, ὅτι μηδὲ ὀφθαλμούς· οὐδὲ ὦτα οὐδὲ ῥῖνας δηλονότι οὐδὲ γλῶτταν. Τί οὖν; Συναίσθησιν ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; Ἢ ὁμοίως κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων ἠρέμησις. Οὐδὲ ἡδονή. Πάρεστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν οὐ παρὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ὡσαύτως. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ

[1] οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦν οὐδὲ Müller, H–S²: οὐκ ἐνοχλουμένου δὲ codd.

[1] This sentence shows very clearly how Plotinus thinks of soul as a rich, complex unity capable of existing on many levels and operating in many ways, which can be distinguished but must not be separated. This was a way of thinking which was quite unacceptable to the later Neoplatonists, with their

of all life, and we are each one of us an intelligible universe, making contact with this lower world by the powers of soul below, but with the intelligible world by its powers above and the powers of the universe; and we remain with all the rest of our intelligible part above, but by its ultimate fringe we are tied to the world below, giving a kind of outflow from it to what is below, or rather an activity, by which that intelligible part is not itself lessened.[1]

4. Is this lower part, then, always in body? No; if we turn, this, too, turns with us to the upper world. What, then, about the soul of the universe? Will its [lower] part leave the body when it turns? No; it has not even inclined with its lower part to the last depth; for it did not come or come down but as it abides the body of the universe attaches itself to it and is, as it were, illumined, not annoying the soul or causing it any worries, for the universe lies in safety. What, has it then no kind of perception? Plato says that it has no sight, because it has no eyes either; nor ears nor nostrils either, obviously, nor tongue.[2] Well, then, has it an immanent sensation as we have of what goes on inside us? No, for things which are uniformly in accord with nature are quiet. It has no pleasure either. So the principle of growth is present in it without being present, and the principle of sense in the same way. But we deal with the universe in

passion for sharp distinction and separation, and desire to put and keep man in his proper place low down in the elaborate hierarchy of being. Proclus sharply criticises this passage of Plotinus in his Commentary on *Parmenides* 134A (V, p. 948, 14–20; ed. Cousin 1864); see P. Henry *États du Texte de Plotin*, pp. 220–221.

[2] Cp. *Timaeus* 33C.

κόσμου ἐν ἄλλοις· νῦν δὲ ὅσον ἐφήπτετο ἡ ἀπορία αὐτοῦ εἴρηται.

5. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκεῖ αἱρεῖται τὸν δαίμονα καὶ εἰ τὸν βίον, πῶς ἔτι τινὸς κύριοι; Ἢ καὶ ἡ αἵρεσις ἐκεῖ ἡ λεγομένη τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς προαίρεσιν καὶ διάθεσιν καθόλου καὶ πανταχοῦ αἰνίττεται. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ προαίρεσις τῆς ψυχῆς κυρία καὶ τοῦτο κρατεῖ, ὃ ἂν πρόχειρον ἔχῃ μέρος ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, οὐκέτι τὸ σῶμα αἴτιον οὐδενὸς κακοῦ αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ προτερεῖ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχει, ὃ εἵλετο, καὶ τὸν δαίμονα, φησίν, οὐκ ἀλλάττεται, οὐδὲ ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐνταῦθα γίγνεται οὐδ' ὁ φαῦλος. Ἆρ' οὖν δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ γίγνεται; Τί οὖν, εἰ φαύλου σώματος ὁ τὸ ἦθος σπουδαῖος τύχοι, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία; Ἢ δύναται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάτερα ἑκάτερα τὰ σώματα παρέχεσθαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἔξωθεν τύχαι τὴν ὅλην προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἐκβιβάζουσιν. Ὅταν δὲ λέγηται, ὡς πρῶτον οἱ κλῆροι, εἶτα τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα, † ἔπειτα ταῖς τύχαις †[1] καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων τοὺς βίους,

[1] ἔπειτα ⟨τὰ ἐν⟩ ταῖς τύχαις Creuzer, sed locus nondum sanatus.

[1] Cp. *Republic* X. 620D8–E1.

[2] The text here is clearly corrupt. Plotinus is commenting on the description of the choice of lives in *Republic* X. 617E–620D. If Creuzer's insertion ἔπειτα ⟨τὰ ἐν⟩ ταῖς τύχαις is accepted, it is just possible to see in these words an obscure allusion to 619B–C, the case of the man who chose the biggest tyranny he could find, neglecting to observe that there was contained in it the fate that he should eat his children and suffer many other evils, and the remarks that follow on the

other treatises; now we have said as much about it as is relevant to our problem.

5. But if the soul chooses its guardian spirit and chooses its life there in the other world, how have we still [in this world] any power of decision? The choice in the other world which Plato speaks of is really a riddling representation of the soul's universal and permanent purpose and disposition. But if the soul's purpose is decisive, and that part of it dominates which lies ready to hand as the result of its previous lives, the body is no longer responsible for any evil which may affect the man. For if the soul's character exists before the body, and has what it chose, and, Plato says, does not change its guardian spirit,[1] then the good man does not come into existence here below, and neither does the worthless one. Is man, then, one or the other potentially [in the other world] and does he become actually good or bad [in this world]? What, then, if a man who is good in character happens to get a bad body, and a bad man meets the opposite fortune? The powers of either kind of soul, can, more or less, make their bodies of either kind, since other external chances, too, cannot turn aside the whole purpose of the soul. But when it is said that first come the " lots," then " the examples of lives," then what lies in the fortunes of the lives,[2] then that they choose their lives from those

mistakes in choosing made by the inexperienced and unintelligently virtuous: there does seem here a distinction implicit in Plato's text between the " examples of lives " and " what lies in the fortunes of the lives," between the general type of life and the particular fortunes or misfortunes contained in it. I have translated Creuzer's text on this assumption, but am not at all certain that this is the right solution.

κατὰ τὰ ἤθη τὸ κύριον μᾶλλον δίδωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς διατιθείσαις τὰ δοθέντα πρὸς τὰ αὐτῶν ἤθη. Ὅτι γὰρ ὁ δαίμων οὗτος οὐ παντάπασιν ἔξω—ἀλλ' οὕτως ὡς μὴ συνδεδεμένος—οὐδ' ἐνεργῶν, ἡμέτερος δέ, ὡς ψυχῆς πέρι εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὁ ἡμέτερος δέ, εἰ ὡς ἄνθρωποι τοιοίδε τὴν ὑπ' αὐτὸν ζωὴν ἔχοντες, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· ἃ εἰ μὲν οὕτω ληφθείη, οὐδεμίαν ἕξει μάχην σχόντα ἄν τινα ἀσυμφωνίαν, εἰ ἄλλως ὁ δαίμων ληφθείη. Τὸ δὲ ἀποπληρωτὴν ὧν τις εἵλετο καὶ αὐτὸ σύμφωνον. Οὔτε γὰρ πολὺ κατωτέρω ἐᾷ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ὑπερκαθήμενος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐνεργεῖ μόνον τὸ ὑπ' αὐτόν, οὔτε ὑπεράνω αὐτοῦ οὔτε εἰς ἴσον· οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο γενέσθαι ἢ ᾗ ἐστι.

6. Τί οὖν ὁ σπουδαῖος; Ἢ ὁ τῷ βελτίονι ἐνεργῶν. Ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σπουδαῖος συνεργοῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὸν δαίμονα ἔχων. Νοῦς γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τούτῳ. Ἢ οὖν δαίμων αὐτὸς ἢ κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ δαίμων τούτῳ θεός. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; Εἰ τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν δαίμων αὐτῷ, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς; Ἢ διὰ τὸν θόρυβον τὸν ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως. Ὑπάρχει δὲ ὅμως καὶ πρὸ λόγου ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἔνδοθεν ὀρεγομένη τῶν αὐτῆς. Πάντως οὖν κατορθοῖ;

[1] *Timaeus* 90A, the passage where the δαίμων is identified with the highest part of our soul, the immortal reason.
[2] *Republic* X. 620E1.
[3] Cp. *Timaeus* 43A6–44B7.

presented to them according to their characters, Plato gives the power of decision rather to the souls, which adapt what is given to them to their own characters. For that this guardian spirit is not entirely outside but only in the sense that he is not bound to us, and is not active in us but is ours, to speak in terms of soul, but not ours if we are considered as men of a particular kind who have a life which is subject to him, is shown by what is said in the *Timaeus*;[1] if the passage is taken in this way it will contain no contradiction, but it would have some disaccord if the spirit was understood otherwise. And the " fulfiller of what one has chosen " [2] is also in accord. For the spirit sits above us, and does not let us go down much lower into evil, but that alone acts in us which is under the spirit, not above him or on a level with him; for it is impossible for the spirit to become something else than [a being appropriate to the place] where he is.

6. What, then, is the nobly good man? He is the man who acts by his better part. He would not have been a good man if he had the guardian spirit as a partner in his own activity. For intellect is active in the good man. He is, then, himself a spirit or on the level of a spirit, and his guardian spirit is God. Is it, then, even above intellect? If that which is above intellect is his guardian spirit, why, then, is he not a man of noble goodness from the beginning? It is because of the " disturbance " which comes from birth.[3] But all the same, even before reason there is in him the inward movement which reaches out towards its own. Does the spirit, then, always and in every way accomplish its task successfully? Not

Ἢ οὐ πάντως, εἴπερ οὕτως ἡ ψυχὴ διαθέσεως ἔχει, ὡς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τοιοῖσδε τοιάδε οὖσα τοῦτον ἔχειν βίον καὶ ταύτην προαίρεσιν. Ὁ μέντοι δαίμων οὗτος, ὃν λέγομεν, ἀγαγὼν λέγεται εἰς Ἅιδου οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς μένειν, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἕληται πάλιν. Πρὸ δὲ τοῦ πῶς; Τὸ δὴ ἀγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν τὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἐλθεῖν μετὰ τὴν ἀπογένεσιν, ὃ εἶχε πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως· εἶτα ὥσπερ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄλλης τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕστερον γενέσεως χρόνον ταῖς κολαζομέναις πάρεστιν. Ἢ οὐδὲ βίος αὐταῖς, ἀλλὰ δίκη. Τί δὲ ταῖς εἰς θήρεια σώματα εἰσιούσαις; Ἔλαττον ἢ δαίμων; Ἢ πονηρός γε ἢ εὐήθης. Ταῖς δὲ ἄνω; Ἢ τῶν ἄνω αἱ μὲν ἐν αἰσθητῷ, αἱ δὲ ἔξω. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἢ ἐν ἡλίῳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῶν πλανωμένων, αἱ δ' ἐν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ, ἑκάστη καθὸ λογικῶς ἐνήργησεν ἐνταῦθα· χρὴ γὰρ οἴεσθαι καὶ κόσμον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν μὴ μόνον νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς τῆς κόσμου ὁμοειδῆ διάθεσιν· νενεμημένης οὖν κἀκείνης εἴς τε τὴν ἀπλανῆ καὶ τὰς πλανωμένας κατὰ δυνάμεις διαφόρους ὁμοειδεῖς ταύταις ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ τὰς παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι παρ' ἑκάστης καὶ ἀπαλλαγείσας ἐκεῖ γίνεσθαι

[1] Cp. *Phaedo* 107D7–E4.

[2] Here, and in what follows, Plotinus is basing his thought on *Timaeus* 41D6–42D1, where the Demiurge at his original making of souls which are to be born into this word allots each of them to a star, and promises them that they will each return to their appropriate star if they overcome the disturbances and temptations of mortal life.

[3] Cp. *Timaeus* 41D4–7.

altogether, since the soul is of such a disposition that it is of a particular kind in particular circumstances and so has a life and a purpose corresponding to its kind and circumstances. Now this spirit of whom we are speaking is said, when it has led the soul to Hades,[1] no longer to remain the same, unless the soul chooses again the same type of life. But what happens before [the choice of lives]? The leading to judgement means that the spirit comes to the same form after the soul's departure from this life as it had before the soul's birth; then, as if from a different starting-point, it is present to the souls which are being punished during the time which intervenes before their next birth—this is not a life for them, but an expiation. But what about the souls which enter into the bodies of brutes? Is their guardian something less than a spirit? It *is* a spirit, a wicked or stupid one. And what about those in the upper world? Of those in the upper world, some are in the visible region and some outside. Those, then, in the visible region are in the sun or in another of the moving stars, and some of them in the sphere of the fixed stars, each according to his rational activity here:[2] for one must think that there is a universe in our soul, not only an intelligible one but an arrangement like in form to that of the soul of the world:[3] so, as that, too, is distributed according to its diverse powers into the sphere of the fixed stars and those of the moving stars,[4] the powers in our soul also are of like form to these powers, and there is an activity proceeding from each power, and when the souls are

[4] Cp. *Timaeus* 38C–40B.

πρὸς ἄστρον τὸ σύμφωνον τῷ ἐνεργήσαντι καὶ ζήσαντι ἦθει καὶ δυνάμει· καὶ τοιούτῳ θεῷ καὶ δαίμονί γε ἢ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χρήσεται ἢ τῷ ὑπὲρ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν· σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο βέλτιον. Τὰς δ' ἔξω γενομένας τὴν δαιμονίαν φύσιν ὑπερβεβηκέναι καὶ πᾶσαν εἱμαρμένην γενέσεως καὶ ὅλως ⟨τὸ⟩[1] ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὁρατῷ, ἕως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, συνανενεχθείσης καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ φιλογενέσεως οὐσίας, ἣν εἴ τις λέγοι ταύτην εἶναι τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένην μεριστὴν συμπληθύουσαν ἑαυτὴν καὶ συμμερίζουσαν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὀρθῶς λέξει. Μερίζεται δὲ οὐ μεγέθει· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλον καὶ πάλιν ἕν· καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἀεὶ πολλὰ γεννᾶται ταύτης μεριζομένης οὕτως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν φυτῶν· περὶ τὰ σώματα γὰρ καὶ αὕτη μεριστή. Καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν μένουσα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ὅπου δὲ ἀπελθοῦσα πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν ἔδωκεν, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνῃρημένοις φυτοῖς ἢ ἐν ζῴοις ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐκ σήψεως πολλῶν ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννηθέντων. Συνεργεῖν δὲ καὶ [τὴν][2] ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν.

Πάλιν δὲ ἐὰν ἴῃ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνταῦθα, ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ

[1] ⟨τὸ⟩ Kirchhoff, H–S.
[2] τὴν del. Kirchhoff, H–S².

[1] Plotinus may be thinking here of Plato, *Laws* X. 898E–899A, where Plato leaves it open whether the soul which

set free they come there to the star which is in harmony with the character and power which lived and worked in them; and each will have a god of this kind as its guardian spirit, either the star itself or the god set above this power; but this requires more accurate investigation.[1] But those which have come to be outside have transcended the nature of spirits and the whole destiny of birth, and altogether what is in this visible world; as long as the soul is there, the substance in it which desires birth is taken up with it; if anyone should say that this substance is "the soul which has come to be among bodies and is divisible,"[2] multiplying and dividing itself with its bodies, he will speak correctly. But it is not divided quantitatively, for it is the same thing in all, a whole and again one; and since this soul is in process of division in this way, many animals are always produced from one, as happens also with plants, for this [the plant-soul], too, is also divisible among bodies. And sometimes the soul remains in the same living thing and gives [life to others], like the soul in plants; but sometimes when it goes away it gives before it goes, as with plants which have been pulled up or dead animals, when from their corruption many are generated from one. And the soul-power from the All co-operates, the particular power which is the same here too.

But if the soul comes here again, it has either the same or another guardian spirit according to the life

governs the sun is related to it as our soul is to our body, or directs it in some quite different way.

[2] *Timaeus* 35 A 2–3; cp. the fuller discussions of the "divisibility" of the soul, with reference to this passage of the *Timaeus* in IV. 9 [8] and IV. 3 [27] 19.

ἄλλον ἔχει δαίμονα κατὰ τὴν ζωήν, ἣν ποιήσεται. Ἐπιβαίνει οὖν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δαίμονος ὥσπερ σκάφους τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς πρῶτον, εἶτα παραλαβοῦσα ἡ τοῦ ἀτράκτου λεγομένη φύσις κατέταξεν ὥσπερ ἐν νηὶ εἴς τινα ἕδραν τύχης. Περιαγούσης δὲ τῆς περιφορᾶς ὥσπερ πνεύματος τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς νεὼς καθήμενον ἢ καὶ φερόμενον πολλαὶ καὶ ποικίλαι γίνονται καὶ θέαι καὶ μεταθέσεις καὶ συμπτώματα, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νηὶ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ σάλου τῆς νεὼς ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος ὁρμῇ οἰκείᾳ, ἣν ἂν σχοίη τῷ ἐπὶ νεὼς εἶναι παρὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον. Οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς πᾶς κινεῖται ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐνεργεῖ. Γίνεται οὖν διάφορα διαφόροις ἢ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ διαφόρων προσπεσόντων, ἢ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄλλοις, κἂν διάφορα τὰ προσπεσόντα· τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ εἱμαρμένη.

which it is going to make for itself. It embarks, then, with this spirit first of all in this universe as if in a boat, then the nature which has the name of the "Spindle"[1] takes it over and sets it, just as in a ship, in some seat of fortune. And as the circuit of heaven, like a wind, carries round the man sitting, or even moving about, on the ship, there occur many and various sights and changes and incidents, and, just as in the actual ship, [they occur because] he is moved either by the tossing of the ship or by himself, of his own impulse, whatever it may be, which he has because he is on the ship precisely in his own way. For everyone is not moved and does not will or act alike in the same circumstances. So different things happen to different people as a result of the same or different occurrences, or the same things to others even if the circumstances they encounter are different; for that is what destiny is like.

[1] Cp. *Republic* X. 616C4 ff.

III. 5. ON LOVE

Introductory Note

THIS late treatise (No. 50 in Porphyry's chronological order) is concerned more than any other in the Enneads with the allegorical interpretation of myth, though with Platonic rather than traditional myth: the story to which Plotinus devotes most of his attention is that of the birth of Eros in the *Symposium* (203B ff.). Plotinus often alludes to details of the Platonic myths and interprets them to suit his own philosophical purposes. He explains the principles to be applied in the interpretation of myths in the last chapter of this treatise (9. 24–29). But he does not seem to consider this kind of intellectual activity very interesting or important, and is extremely casual about the details of his interpretation. He does not really care whether Aphrodite is to be represented as the daughter of Ouranos, Kronos or Zeus (chs. 2 and 8), or identified with Zeus's wife Hera (8. 22–23). He obviously finds it difficult to give an allegorical interpretation of the Symposium myth which will fit his own system, and his explanation of it (ch. 6 ff.) is sometimes obscure and confusing. Plotinus's teaching about the nature of Love in this treatise follows Plato closely in essentials (with an important variation mentioned in the notes to ch. 1). The *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* are reconciled by distinguishing the Love who is a god from the Love who is a daimon (ch. 4, 23–25).

Synopsis

Is love a god, a spirit, or an affection of the soul? Discussion of love as an affection of the soul (ch. 1). Love

as a god. Is he born from or with Aphrodite? The two Aphrodites, the heavenly one and the goddess of marriage: the heavenly Aphrodite is the most divine kind of soul and produces the appropriate Love (ch. 2). Love is a substantial reality; how he comes into existence from the soul's seeing. The lower Aphrodite is the soul of the universe, and produces her own Love (ch. 3). Each individual soul has its own love, related to the universal Love as individual souls are to universal Soul: the higher Love is a god, the lower a spirit (ch. 4). The Love who is a spirit is not the physical universe, as some think (ch. 5). Interpretation of the myth of the birth of Love in the *Symposium:* first, how spirits (*daimones*) differ from gods, being subject to affections and passions through participating in intelligible matter (ch. 6). The parents of Love: Plenty is an intelligible reality, Poverty is intelligible matter, indefinite and so giving unbounded desire to Love. All spirits have this double origin: perverse loves, like false thoughts, are not substantial realities but passive affections of the soul (ch. 7). Zeus and Aphrodite are Intellect and Soul (ch. 8). Plenty, his drunkenness with nectar, and the "garden," all represent in different ways the glorifying outflow of *Logoi* from Intellect into Soul. Principles for the interpretation of myths: their application to this one (ch. 9).

III. 5. (50) ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΩΤΟΣ

1. Περὶ ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ ὁ μὲν θεός τις ἢ δαίμων, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πάθος, καὶ ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον, ἐπισκέψασθαι ἄξιον τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοίας ἐπιόντας, καὶ ὅσαι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἐγένοντο περὶ τούτων, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα ὑπολαμβάνει ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, ὃς δὴ καὶ πολλὰ πολλαχῇ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ περὶ ἔρωτος ἔγραψεν· ὃς δὴ οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγιγνόμενόν τι πάθος εἴρηκεν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δαίμονά φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ γενέσεως αὐτοῦ διεξῆλθεν, ὅπως καὶ ὅθεν ἐστὶ γεγενημένος. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πάθους οὗ τὸν ἔρωτα αἰτιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγγίνεται ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐφιεμέναις καλῷ τινι συμπλακῆναι, καὶ ὡς ἡ ἔφεσις αὕτη ἡ μέν ἐστι παρὰ σωφρόνων αὐτῷ τῷ κάλλει οἰκειωθέντων, ἡ δὲ καὶ τελευτᾶν ἐθέλει εἰς αἰσχροῦ τινος πρᾶξιν, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ δήπου· ὅθεν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἑκάτερος, τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπισκοπεῖν διὰ φιλοσοφίας προσήκει. Ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴ τις θεῖτο τὴν αὐτοῦ κάλλους πρότερον

III. 5. ON LOVE

1. Our enquiry concerns love, whether it is a god or a spirit or an affection of the soul, or whether one kind is a god or spirit and another also an affection, and what sort of god or spirit or affection each of these is; it is worth while considering the ideas about it which have occurred to the rest of mankind and all the teachings of philosophy on this subject, and in particular all the opinions of that godlike man Plato, who has, of course, written much about love in many places in his works. He has said that love is not only an affection occurring in souls but asserts that it is also a spirit, and has described its origin, how and from what source it came to be. Now about the affection of soul for which we make love responsible,[1] there is no one, I suppose, who does not know that it occurs in souls which desire to embrace some beauty, and that this desire has two forms, one which comes from the chaste who are akin to absolute beauty, and one which wants to find its fulfilment in the doing of some ugly act; but it is appropriate to go on from there to a philosophical consideration of the source from which each of them originates. And if someone assumed that the origin of love was the longing for beauty itself which was there before in men's souls, and their recog-

[1] That is Love as a substantial superhuman reality, a god or a spirit, who is responsible for producing the affection of love in the human soul.

ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ συγγένειαν καὶ οἰκειότητος ἄλογον σύνεσιν, τυγχάνοι ἄν, οἶμαι, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τῆς αἰτίας. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἐναντίον καὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῷ θεῷ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπουσα ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον βλέπει, ὅ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ συστοιχίᾳ· τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον αἰσχρὸν καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας συστοιχίας. Τῇ δὲ φύσει γένεσις ἐκεῖθεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δηλονότι τοῦ καλοῦ. Ὅτῳ δέ τις ἄγαται καὶ ἐστι συγγενής, τούτου ᾠκείωται καὶ πρὸς τὰς εἰκόνας. Εἰ δέ τις ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνέλοι, ὅπῃ τὸ πάθος γίνεται καὶ δι' ἃς αἰτίας οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν οὐδ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν διὰ μῖξιν ἐρώντων.[1] Καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τίκτειν βούλονται ἐν καλῷ· ἐπείπερ ἄτοπον βουλομένην τὴν φύσιν καλὰ ποιεῖν ἐν αἰσχρῷ γεννᾶν βούλεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τῇδε γεννᾶν κινουμένοις ἀρκεῖ τὸ τῇδε καλὸν ἔχειν, ὅπερ πάρεστιν ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ σώμασιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον αὐτοῖς τοῦ καὶ τοῦδε ἐρᾶν. Καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μὲν ἐκείνου ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐλθοῦσιν ἀγαπᾶται τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών, μὴ ἀναμνησθεῖσι δὲ ὑπ' ἀγνοίας τοῦ πάθους ἀληθὲς τοῦτο φαντάζεται.

[1] ἐρώντων Harder: ἐρώτων codd.

[1] For this thoroughly Hellenic notion of the natural affinity of the soul to beauty and its natural repulsion from ugliness; cp. I. 6 [1] 2. 1–6. Both passages derive from Plato, *Symposium* 206D 1–2.

[2] The phrase is taken, with a slight but significant alteration (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ singular for τῶν ἀγαθῶν plural) from Aristotle,

nition of it and kinship with it and unreasoned awareness that it is something of their own, he would hit, I think, on the truth about its cause. For the ugly is opposed to nature and to God.[1] For nature when it creates looks towards beauty, and it looks towards the definite, which is " in the column of the good "; [2] but the indefinite is ugly and belongs to the other column. And nature has its origin from above, from the Good and, obviously, from Beauty. But if anyone delights in something and is akin to it, he has an affinity also with its images. But if anyone rejects this cause, he will be unable to say how and for what reasons the emotion of love occurs even in those lovers who aim at sexual intercourse. For these certainly want to " bring forth in beauty ": [3] for it would be absurd for nature, when it wants to create beautiful things, to want to generate in ugliness. It is true, certainly, that those who are moved to generation here below are content to have the beauty here below, the beauty which is present in images and bodies, since the archetype is not present to them which is responsible for their loving even this beauty here below. And if they come from this beauty here to the recollection of that archetype, this earthly beauty still satisfies them as an image; but if they do not recollect, then, because they do not know what is happening to them, they fancy this is the true

Nicomachean Ethics A6 1096b6; cp. *Metaphysics* A5. 986a22–26. The reference is to the columns or tables of ten pairs of basic opposites which some Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle drew up, which included πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον and ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἀόριστον (for ἄπειρον) is a Platonic rather than a Pythagorean term.

[3] *Symposium* 206C 4–5.

Καὶ σώφροσι μὲν οὖσιν ἀναμάρτητος ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῇδε καλὸν οἰκείωσις, ἡ δὲ πρὸς μῖξιν ἔκπτωσις ἁμαρτία. Καὶ ὅτῳ μὲν καθαρὸς ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔρως, ἀγαπητὸν τὸ κάλλος μόνον εἴτε ἀνα-
40 μνησθέντι εἴτε καὶ μή, ὅτῳ δὲ μέμικται καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ὡς ἐν θνητῷ ἐπιθυμία, οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀειγενεῖ καὶ ἀιδίῳ τὸ καλὸν ζητεῖ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἰὼν σπείρει καὶ γεννᾷ ἐν καλῷ, σπείρων μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀεί, ἐν καλῷ δὲ διὰ συγγένειαν τοῦ καλοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀίδιον συγγενὲς τῷ
45 καλῷ καὶ ἡ ἀίδιος φύσις τὸ πρώτως τοιοῦτον καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα πάντα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν ἐθέλον μᾶλλον αὐταρκέστερον τῷ καλῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐφιέμενον ποιῆσαι καλόν τε ἐθέλει ποιεῖν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ οὐκ αὔταρκες· καί, εἴπερ τοιοῦτον
50 ποιήσει, οἴεται, εἰ ἐν καλῷ γεννήσεται. Οἱ δ' ἂν ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐθέλωσι γεννᾶν, ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν πορείας ποιησάμενοι τὰς ἀρχὰς γενόμενοι παράφοροι ἐκ ταύτης οἷον ὁδοῦ ὀλισθήσαντες κεῖνται πεσόντες οὔτε ἔρωτα γνόντες ἐφ' ὃ ἦγεν αὐτοὺς οὔτε ἔφεσιν γεννήσεως οὔτε χρῆσιν
55 κάλλους εἰκόνος οὔτε ὅ τι ἐστὶ κάλλος αὐτό. Ἀλλ' οὖν οἵ τε σωμάτων καλῶν καὶ διὰ μῖξιν ἐρῶντες, ὅτι καλά ἐστιν ἐρῶσιν, οἵ τε τὸν λεγόμενον μικτὸν

[1] Throughout this passage Plotinus is trying to follow closely the doctrine of Plato (*Symposium* 206C ff.), but he has, in fact, introduced an important change by distinguishing so sharply between the pure love of beauty which does not desire to generate and that which is mixed with desire for perpetuity and so seeks to generate, which he regards as inferior. In

beauty. If they remain chaste there is no error in their intimacy with the beauty here below, but it is error to fall away into sexual intercourse. And the man whose love of the beautiful is pure will be satisfied with beauty alone, if he recollects the archetype or even if he does not, but the man whose love is mixed with another desire of "being immortal as far as a mortal may," seeks the beautiful in that which is everlasting and eternal; and as he goes the way of nature he sows and generates in beauty, sowing for perpetuity, and in beauty because of the kinship of perpetuity and beauty. The eternal is certainly akin to the beautiful, and the eternal nature is that which is primarily beautiful and the things which spring from it are all beautiful too. That, therefore, which does not want to generate suffices more to itself in beauty, but that which desires to create wants to create beauty because of a lack and is not self-sufficient; and, if it does create something of the sort, it thinks it is self-sufficient if it generates in beauty.[1] But those who want to generate unlawfully and against nature take their starting-point from the course which accords with nature but diverge from it and slip, as we may say, out of the way and lie fallen, having failed to recognise where love was leading them, or the impulse of generating, or the right use of an image of beauty, or what absolute beauty is. But to return to the main point; those who love beautiful bodies, also with a view to sexual intercourse, love them because they are beautiful, and so do those who love with the mixed love of which

Plato all love up to the highest is essentially productive (cp. *Symposium* 212A). In Plotinus it is not.

ἔρωτα, γυναικῶν μέν, ἵνα καὶ τὸ ἀεί, μὴ τοιούτων δέ, σφαλλόμενοι· οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους· σωφρονοῦσι μὲν ἄμφω. Ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν καὶ τὸ τῇδε κάλλος σέβουσιν ἀρκούμενοι, οἱ δὲ κἀκεῖνο, ὅσοι ἀνεμνήσθησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀτιμάζουσιν οὐδὲ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν καὶ ἀποτέλεσμά τι ὂν ἐκείνου καὶ παίγνιον. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸ καλὸν αἰσχροῦ ἄνευ, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ καλὸν εἰς αἰσχρὸν πεσόντες· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις ἔχει εἰς κακὸν τὴν ἔκπτωσιν πολλάκις. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ παθήματα.

2. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὂν θεὸν τίθενται οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολόγοι καὶ Πλάτων πολλαχοῦ Ἀφροδίτης Ἔρωτα λέγων καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ εἶναι καλῶν τε ἔφορον παίδων καὶ κινητικὸν τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος, ἢ καὶ ἐπαύξειν τὴν ἤδη γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ ὁρμήν, περὶ τούτου μάλιστα φιλοσοφητέον· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅσα ἐν Συμποσίῳ εἴρηται παραληπτέον, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ⟨Ἀφροδίτης φησὶν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν⟩[1] Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ Πόρου. Ἔοικε δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀπαιτήσειν τι εἰπεῖν, εἴτ' οὖν ἐξ ἐκείνης εἴτε μετ' ἐκείνης γεγονέναι λέγεται ὁ Ἔρως. Πρῶτον

[1] ⟨Ἀφροδίτης . . . ἐν⟩ Kirchhoff.

[1] *Phaedrus* 242D9.
[2] *Phaedrus* 265C2–3.
[3] *Symposium* 203B–C.

we have spoken; they love women in order to perpetuate themselves, but if the women are not beautiful they fail in their purpose [of " generating in beauty "]; but the first group [those who love without thought of self-perpetuation, with a pure love of beauty] are better; both are chaste. But some lovers even worship earthly beauty, and it is enough for them, but others, those who have recollected the archetype, venerate that higher beauty too, and do not treat this earthly beauty, either, with disrespect, since they see in it the creation and plaything of that other. These lovers, then, are concerned about beauty without any ugliness, but there are others who fall into ugliness and they too do so because of beauty; for in fact the desire of good often involves the fall into evil. So much, then, for the affections of the soul [produced by love].

2. But the Love whom we ought to make the main object of our philosophical discourse is the one whom not only the rest of mankind but those also who give accounts of the gods, and especially Plato, make a god; Plato in many places speaks of " Love son of Aphrodite," [1] and says that his work is to be " guardian of beautiful boys " [2] and mover of the soul towards the beauty of the higher world, or also to increase the impulse towards that world which is already there; we must also take into account all that is said in the *Banquet*, in which he says that Love is not born of Aphrodite but " from Poverty and Plenty at Aphrodite's birthday party." [3] But our discussion seems to require us to say something about Aphrodite, whether Love is said to have been born from her or with her. First, then, who is Aphrodite?

οὖν τίς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη; Εἶτα πῶς ἢ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ σὺν αὐτῇ ἢ τίνα τρόπον ἔχει τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς τε ἅμα καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ. Λέγομεν δὴ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι διττήν, τὴν μὲν οὐρανίαν Οὐρανοῦ λέγοντες εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, τὴν τῶν τῇδε ἐφαπτομένην ἔφορον γάμων· ἀμήτορα δὲ ἐκείνην καὶ ἐπέκεινα γάμων, ὅτι μηδ' ἐν οὐρανῷ γάμοι. Τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου μείνασαν ἄνω, ὡς μηδὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν μήτε ἐθελήσασαν μήτε δυναμένην [ὅτι ἦν φύσεως] [1] μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν—ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ἠνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι—ἣν δὴ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι ἄμικτον οὖσαν καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν. Τὸ γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐκ νοῦ πεφυκὸς καθαρὸν καὶ αὐτό, ἅτε ἰσχύον καθ' ἑαυτὸ τῷ ἐγγύθεν, ἅτε καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὔσης αὐτῇ καὶ τῆς ἱδρύσεως πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν ἱκανὸν ὂν κατέχειν ἄνω· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι ψυχὴ νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον. Ἐφεπο-

[1] ὅτι ἦν φύσεως del. Volkmann, H–S.

[1] This allegorisation of the cult-titles Οὐρανία and Πάνδημος and the different mythical accounts of the birth of Aphrodite (which has no basis in actual Greek religious practice), appears in the speech of Pausanias in the *Symposium* (180D) and in Xenophon's *Symposium* viii, 9–10. Plato himself does not appear to take it very seriously, and it plays no important part

Next, we must ask how Love is either born from her or with her, or in what way it applies to the same Love that he is at the same time from her and with her. Now we say that Aphrodite is double; one, the heavenly, we say is the "daughter of Heaven," and the other, the one "born of Zeus and Dione," takes charge of earthly marriages as their guardian; but that other is "motherless" and above marriages, because there are no marriages in heaven.[1] The heavenly one, since she is said to be the child of Kronos, and he is Intellect, must be the most divine kind of soul, springing directly from him, pure from the pure, remaining above, as neither wanting nor being able to descend to the world here below, since it is not according to her nature to come down, since she is a separate reality and a substance without part in matter—for which reason they spoke of her riddlingly in this way, that she was "motherless"; one would be right in speaking of her as a goddess, not as a spirit, since she is unmixed and remains pure by herself. For that which derives its nature immediately from Intellect is itself, too, pure, since it is strong in itself by its nearness, since, too, Soul's desire and its abiding-place are close to its parent principle which is strong enough to hold it above; for which reason Soul which is immediately dependent on Intellect could not fall away; it is much more firmly held than the sun holds the light which shines out from himself around him, which comes from him and is closely joined to him. Now since Aphrodite follows upon Kronos—

in the development of his thought about Love in the *Symposium*. Plotinus finds it useful because it can be made to fit his distinction between higher and lower Soul.

μένη δὴ τῷ Κρόνῳ ἤ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου Οὐρανῷ ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ὡκειώθη καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα Ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἄμφω ἐκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ ἡ γειναμένη καὶ ὁ καλὸς Ἔρως ὁ γεγενημένος ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχουσα μεταξὺ ὥσπερ ποθοῦντος καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὁ τοῦ ποθοῦντος παρέχων μὲν τῷ ἐρῶντι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὁρᾶν τὸ ποθούμενον, προτρέχων δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνῳ παρασχεῖν τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δι' ὀργάνου δύναμιν αὐτὸς πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος, πρότερος μέν, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐνστηρίζειν μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὅραμα, αὐτὸν δὲ καρποῦσθαι τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτὸν παραθέουσαν.

3. Ὑπόστασιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσίας ἐλάττω μὲν τῆς ποιησαμένης, οὖσαν δὲ ὅμως, ἀπιστεῖν οὐ προσήκει. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη οὐσία ἦν γενομένη ἐξ ἐνεργείας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς [καὶ ζῶσα] καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ὁρῶσα, ὃ πρώτη ἦν οὐσία, καὶ σφόδρα ὁρῶσα.[1]

[1] καὶ ζῶσα (glossa) del. Theiler. ὁρῶσα Bréhier: ὁρώσης codd.

[1] This shows clearly how little real importance Plotinus attached to myths and their allegorical interpretation. According to Hesiod (*Theogony* 188 ff.) Aphrodite sprang from the foam round the severed genitals of Ouranos when they fell into the sea after his castration by Kronos—a story which Plato particularly disliked (cp. *Republic* II 377E–378A, and

or, if you like, the father of Kronos, Heaven [1]—she directed her activity towards him and felt affinity with him, and filled with passionate love for him brought forth Love, and with this child of hers she looks towards him; her activity has made a real substance, and the two of them look on high, the mother who bore him and the beautiful Love who has come into existence as a reality always ordered towards something else beautiful, and having its being in this, that it is a kind of intermediary between desiring and desired, the eye of the desiring which through its power gives to the lover the sight of the object desired; but Love himself runs on ahead and, before he gives the lover the power of seeing through the organ [of bodily sight], he fills himself with gazing, seeing before the lover but certainly not in the same way, because he fixes the sight firmly in the lover, but himself plucks the fruit of the vision of beauty as it speeds past him.

3. We ought not to disbelieve that Love is a reality and a substance sprung from a substance, less than that which made it, but all the same substantially existent. For that higher soul was, certainly, a substance, which came into being from the activity which existed before it, and from the substance of the world of real beings, which also looks towards that which was the first substance, and looks towards it with great intensity. This was its first vision, and

Euthyphro 6A–B), which may be one reason why Plotinus shifts the parentage of Aphrodite here: his main reason, however, is that Kronos is his normal mythical equivalent for Intellect (cp. V. 1 [10] 4), on which Aphrodite as divine Soul must follow immediately.

Καὶ πρῶτον ἦν ὅραμα αὐτῇ τοῦτο καὶ ἑώρα ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἔχαιρεν ὁρῶσα, καὶ τὸ ὅραμα τοιοῦτον ἦν, ὡς μὴ πάρεργον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν θέαν τὸ ὁρῶν, ὡς τῇ οἷον ἡδονῇ καὶ τάσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σφοδρότητι τῆς θέας γεννῆσαί τι παρ' αὐτῆς ἄξιον αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὁράματος. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνως περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οἷον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου ὅμμα πληρωθέν, οἷον μετ' εἰδώλου ὅρασις, Ἔρως ἐγένετο τάχα που καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον αὐτῷ γεγενημένης, ὅτι ἐξ ὁράσεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει· ἐπεὶ τό γε πάθος ἀπὸ τούτου ἔχοι ἂν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν,[1] εἴπερ πρότερον οὐσία μὴ οὐσίας—καίτοι τό γε πάθος « ἐρᾶν » λέγεται—καὶ εἴπερ « ἔρως αὐτὸν ἔχει τοῦδε », ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιτο ἔρως. Ὁ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἄνω ψυχῆς Ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ὁρῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνω, ἅτε ὀπαδὸς ὢν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ παρ' ἐκείνης γεγενημένος καὶ θεῶν ἀρκούμενος θέᾳ. Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα—εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα οὐρανίαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἴπομεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν λέγοντες τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄριστον εἶναι χωριστὸν ὅμως τιθέμεθα αὐτὸ εἶναι—

[1] ἐπωνυμίαν Creuzer, H–S: ἐπιθυμίαν codd.

[1] Ἔρως from ὅρασις.

[2] The higher soul is called "Heavenly" because it "illuminates" (i.e. is the immediate source of the forms in) the visible heaven, but it is not immanent in heaven but transcends the material universe altogether. In the same way the highest, intellectual, element in us is not really "we" but separate and transcendent; cp. the nearly contemporary treatise V. 3 [49] 3.

it looked towards it as to its own good, and rejoiced in its looking, and the vision was of a kind which made it impossible for the visionary to make its gaze a secondary activity; so that the soul by a kind of delight and intense concentration on the vision and by the passion of its gazing generates something from itself which is worthy of itself and of the vision. So from the power which is intensely active about the object of vision, and from a kind of outflow from that object, Love came to be as an eye filled with its vision, like a seeing that has its image with it; and, I suppose, his name most likely came to him from this, because he derives his real existence from seeing;[1] for the emotion of love must take its name from him, on the assumption that substance is prior to non-substance—after all it is an emotion that is called "falling in love"—and if we say "love for this particular person possesses him," but love would not be spoken of without any particular qualification. The Love which belongs to the higher soul, then, would be of this kind, himself, too, looking on high, since he is that soul's follower and has come into being from her and by her, and satisfies himself with the contemplation of the gods. But since we say that that higher soul which primarily illuminates heaven is separate, we shall also make this Love separate—however much we call this soul "heavenly": for, though we say, too, that the best in us men is "in" us, all the same we give it a separate existence.[2]

μόνον ἐκεῖ ἔστω, οὗ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀκήρατος. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν εἶναι ἔδει, ὑπέστη μετὰ ταύτης ἤδη καὶ ὁ ἄλλος Ἔρως ὅμμα καὶ ταύτης, ἐξ ὀρέξεως καὶ αὐτὸς[1] γεγενημένος. Τοῦ δὲ κόσμου οὔσα ἡ Ἀφροδίτη αὕτη καὶ οὐ μόνον ψυχὴ οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς ψυχὴ καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ Ἔρωτα ἐγεννήσατο ἐφαπτόμενον ἤδη καὶ αὐτὸν γάμων καί, καθ' ὅσον ἐφάπτεται καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς ὀρέξεως τῆς ἄνω, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινοῦντα καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ᾗ συντέτακται ἀναστρέφοντα, καθ' ὅσον καὶ αὐτὴ εἰς μνήμην ἐκείνων πέφυκεν ἰέναι. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἡ μεμιγμένη καὶ ἡ τινὸς γενομένη· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης.

4. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἑκάστη ψυχὴ ἔχει ἔρωτα τοιοῦτον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει; Ἢ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἕξει καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποστατὸν ἔρωτα, ἡ δὲ ἑκάστου ἡμῶν οὔ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἅπασι; Καὶ ἆρα ὁ ἔρως οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὃν φασιν ἑκάστῳ συνέπεσθαι, ὁ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἔρως; Οὗτος γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ ἐμποιῶν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς ὁριγνωμένης ἀνάλογον ἑκάστης πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα γεννώσης εἴς τε ἀξίαν καὶ πρὸς οὐσίαν. Ἐχέτω δὴ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ὅλον, αἱ δ' ἐν μέρει τὸν αὐτῆς ἑκάστη. Καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἑκάστη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἔχει οὐκ ἀποτετμημένην, ἐμπεριεχομένη δέ, ὡς εἶναι πάσας μίαν, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕκαστος

[1] αὐτὸς Creuzer: αὐτῆς codd.

So he must exist only there above, where the soul which is pure abides. But since this universe, too, had to have a soul, the other Love came to be at once along with it, and is also the eye of this soul, himself, too, produced from desire. And because this Aphrodite belongs to the universe and is not only soul or simply soul, she produced the Love in this universe, who himself, too, immediately takes charge of marriages and, in so far as he, too, possesses the desire for what is above, in the same degree moves the souls of the young, and turns the soul with which he is ranked to higher things, in so far as it, too, is naturally able to come to remembrance of them. For every soul seeks the good, the mixed soul, too, and the individual soul: since it, too, follows upon that higher soul and derives from it.

4. Does, then, each individual soul have a love like itself which has a real substantial existence? Now why should the universal soul and the soul of the All have a real love, but not the soul of each of us, and the soul in all other living things as well? And is this love the spirit which, they say, accompanies each of us, the love, that is, that belongs to each of us? For this would be the love which implants the desires appropriate to the nature of each individual soul; the individual soul longs for what corresponds to its own nature, and produces a love which accords with its value and is proportioned to its being. Let us grant, then, that the universal soul has a universal love, and each of the partial souls its own particular love. But in so far as each individual soul in its relation to the whole is not in a state of being completely cut off, but of inclusion in it so that all souls

πρὸς τὸν πάντα ἂν ἔχοι· συνεῖναι δ' αὖ καὶ τὸν ἐν μέρει τῇ ἐν μέρει καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ τὸν μέγαν ἐκεῖνον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τῷ παντὶ πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ· καὶ πολλοὺς αὖ τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον γίνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι, φαινόμενον πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὗ ἂν θέλῃ, σχηματιζόμενον μέρεσιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φανταζόμενον, εἰ θέλοι. Οἴεσθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ Ἀφροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ' Ἔρωτος, ῥυείσας ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης τινὸς ὅλης, ἐν μέρει πολλὰς ἐκείνης ἐξηρτημένας μετὰ ἰδίων ἐρώτων, εἴπερ ψυχὴ μήτηρ ἔρωτος, Ἀφροδίτη δὲ ψυχή, ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης. Ἄγων τοίνυν ἑκάστην οὗτος ὁ ἔρως πρὸς τὴν ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὁ μὲν τῆς ἄνω θεὸς ἂν εἴη, ὃς ἀεὶ ψυχὴν ἐκείνῳ συνάπτει, δαίμων δ' ὁ τῆς μεμιγμένης.

5. Ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ δαίμονος καὶ ὅλως ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις, περὶ ἧς καὶ ἐν Συμποσίῳ λέγεται, ἥ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, ὡς ἐκ Πενίας καὶ Πόρου Μήτιδός ἐστι γεγενημένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀφροδίτης γενεθλίοις; Τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν κόσμον ὑπονοεῖν λέγεσθαι τόνδε τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἀλλὰ μὴ

[1] For the unity of individual souls in the one soul, see IV. 3 [27] 8, IV. 9 [8], VI. 4 [22] 14.

[2] By this distinction Plotinus reconciles the *Phaedrus*, where Eros is a god, with the *Symposium*, where he is a daemon: and also keeps Plato's insight that ἔρως is not just desire (which must disappear with satisfaction) but something which persists when the lover attains to full fruition and union with the beloved.

[3] The identification of the god Eros with the whole universe is found in Cornutus (*Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, ch. 25 (p. 48, 5–9 Lang)): it may be Stoic. Plutarch applies it

are one,[1] so the individual love, too, is related to the universal love; so, then, the partial love accompanies the partial soul, and that great Love accompanies the universal soul, and the love in the All accompanies the All, and is everywhere in it; and, again, this one love becomes and is many loves, appearing everywhere that he wishes in the All, taking shape and assuming appearances in its parts if he wants to. But one must think that there are many Aphrodites in the All, which have come into being in it as spirits along with Love, flowing from an universal Aphrodite, many partial ones depending from that universal one, with their own particular loves—if one assumes, that is, that soul is the mother of love, and Aphrodite is soul, and love is the activity of soul reaching out after good. So this love here leads each individual soul to the Good, and the love which belongs to the higher soul is a god, who always keeps the soul joined to the Good, but the love of the mixed soul is a spirit.[2]

5. But what is the nature of this spirit, and of spirits in general, about which Plato speaks also in the *Banquet*, the nature of the other spirits, and of Love himself; how is he born of Poverty and Plenty, son of Cunning, at Aphrodite's birthday party? The interpretation that Plato means this universe by Love,[3] but not a part of the universe, the Love that

to the interpretation of the *Symposium* myth in *De Iside et Osiride*, ch. 57, 374D–E, where he identifies the parents of Love, Plenty and Poverty, with intelligible reality and matter, which unite to form the universe, and assimilates the three to the Egyptian triad Osiris, Isis, and Horus. Plotinus, though rejecting the identification of Love with the universe, retains something from this older allegorical interpretation of his parents.

τοῦ κόσμου τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκφύντα Ἔρωτα, πολλὰ τὰ ἐναντιούμενα τῇ δόξῃ ἔχει, τοῦ μὲν κόσμου λεγομένου εὐδαίμονος θεοῦ καὶ αὐτάρκους εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ Ἔρωτος τούτου ὁμολογουμένου τῷ ἀνδρὶ οὔτε θεοῦ οὔτε αὐτάρκους, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐνδεοῦς εἶναι. Εἶτα ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, μέρος τὸ κύριον τοῦ Ἔρωτος τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι· ἤ, εἰ κόσμος ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή, τὸν Ἔρωτα τὴν Ἀφροδίτην εἶναι. Εἶτα διὰ τί οὗτος μὲν δαίμων ὢν ὁ κόσμος ἔσται, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι δαίμονες—δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας εἰσίν—οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται; Καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔσται σύστασις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ δαιμόνων. Ὁ δὲ ἔφορος καλῶν παίδων λεχθεὶς εἶναι πῶς ἂν ὁ κόσμος εἴη; Τὸ δὲ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄοικον πῶς ἂν ἐφαρμόσειε μὴ οὐ γλίσχρως καὶ ἀπᾳδόντως;

6. Ἀλλὰ τί δὴ χρὴ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ Ἔρωτος καὶ τῆς λεγομένης γενέσεως αὐτοῦ; Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δεῖ λαβεῖν τίς ἡ Πενία καὶ τίς ὁ Πόρος, καὶ πῶς ἁρμόσουσιν οὗτοι γονεῖς εἶναι αὐτῷ. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δαίμοσι τούτους ἁρμόσαι, εἴπερ δεῖ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν μίαν καθὸ δαίμονες δαιμόνων, εἰ μὴ κοινὸν ὄνομα ἔξουσι μόνον. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν πῇ ποτε διορίζομεν θεοὺς δαιμόνων, καὶ εἰ πολλάκις καὶ δαίμονας θεοὺς λέγομεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅταν γε τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον

grows up naturally within it, contains in itself many contradictions; Plato says that the universe is a "blessed god" and self-sufficient, but he admits that this Love is not a god and not self-sufficient, but always in need. Then again it is necessary, if the universe is composed of soul and body, and Aphrodite is for Plato the soul of the universe, that Aphrodite should be the most important part of Love, or, if its soul is the universe, as man's soul is man, that Love must be Aphrodite. Then again, why should he, who is a spirit, be the universe, but the other spirits—for it is obvious that they are of the same substance—not be the universe, themselves too? And the universe then would be nothing but a conglomeration of spirits. And how could a being who is called "guardian of beautiful boys" be the universe? And how would Plato's "bedless" and "shoeless" and "houseless"[1] fit this interpretation without being mean and inharmonious?

6. But what, then, are we to say about Love and the account of his birth? It is obvious that we must understand who Poverty is, and who Plenty is, and how they will be appropriate parents for him. It is obvious, too, that these must be appropriate for the other spirits, assuming that spirits as spirits have one single nature and substance—otherwise they will merely have the name in common. Let us, then, understand how we distinguish gods from spirits (even if we do often call spirits gods), at any rate on the occasions when we do speak of each kind of being as

[1] *Symposium* 203D 1–2.

λέγωμεν αὐτῶν εἶναι γένος. Τὸ μὲν δὴ θεῶν ἀπαθὲς λέγομεν καὶ νομίζομεν γένος, δαίμοσι δὲ προστίθεμεν πάθη, ἀιδίους λέγοντες ἐφεξῆς τοῖς θεοῖς, ἤδη πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μεταξὺ θεῶν τε καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους. Πῇ δὴ οὖν οὐκ ἔμειναν ἀπαθεῖς οὗτοι, πῇ δὲ κατέβησαν τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον; Καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερα δαίμων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐδὲ εἷς καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε δαίμονες μόνον, θεὸς δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀφορίζεται, ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος καὶ οἱ μέχρι σελήνης ἕκαστος θεός. Βέλτιον δὲ μηδένα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ δαίμονα λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ αὐτοδαίμων, θεὸν καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ αὐ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τοὺς μέχρι σελήνης θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς δευτέρους μετ' ἐκείνους καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς νοητούς, ἐξηρτημένους ἐκείνων, ὥσπερ αἴγλην περὶ ἕκαστον ἄστρον. Τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας τί; Ἆρά γε ψυχῆς ἐν κόσμῳ γενομένης τὸ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἴχνος; Διὰ τί δὲ τῆς ἐν κόσμῳ; Ὅτι ἡ καθαρὰ θεὸν γεννᾷ, καὶ θεὸν ἔφαμεν τὸν ταύτης ἔρωτα. Πρῶτον δὴ διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ δαίμονες ἔρωτες; Εἶτα πῶς οὐ καθαροὶ καὶ οὗτοι ὕλης; Ἢ ἔρωτες μέν, οἳ γεννῶνται ψυχῆς ἐφιεμένης τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ, καὶ

[1] The use of the name δαίμονες for supernatural beings of inferior rank to the gods goes back to Hesiod (*Works and Days* 122–126). But it was Plato, and still more Xenocrates and the Middle Platonists taking up and developing his ideas, who defined the characteristics of these intermediate beings and worked out a regular daemonology, whose main lines Plotinus follows in this chapter.

different from the other.[1] Now we speak and think of the race of gods as without affections or passions, but we attribute affections and passions to the spirits; we say that they are eternal next after the gods, but already inclining towards us, between the gods and our race. In what way, then, did they not stay passionless, and in what way did they come down in their nature to a lower level? Then, too, we must consider this question whether there is no spirit at all in the intelligible world, and, on the other hand, nothing but spirits in this universe, whether godhead is confined to the intelligible world, or "there are gods here too" and the universe is, as we are used to say, a "third god,"[2] and each of the beings down to the moon is a god. But it is better not to call any being in the intelligible world a spirit, but, even if there is an Idea of spirit, to call this a god, and, on the other side, to say that the gods in the universe of sense down to the moon, the visible ones, are secondary gods which come after and correspond to those higher intelligible gods and depend upon them, like the radiance around every star. But what are the spirits? Are they the trace left by each soul when it enters the universe? But why only of the soul in the universe? Because the pure soul produces a god, and we have affirmed already that its love is a god. Well, then, first of all why are not all spirits loves? Then how does it happen that they, too, are not undefiled by matter? Those are loves who are produced by the soul desiring the good and beautiful, and all the souls in the universe produce this

[2] The phrase comes from Numenius (Test. 24 Leemans = Proclus, *In Tim.* 303, 27–304, 1).

γεννῶσι πᾶσαι τοῦτον τὸν δαίμονα αἱ ἐν τῷδε· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἀπὸ ψυχῆς μὲν καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοῦ παντός, δυνάμεσι δὲ ἑτέραις γεννώμενοι κατὰ χρείαν τοῦ ὅλου συμπληροῦσι καὶ συνδιοικοῦσι [1] τῷ παντὶ ἕκαστα. Ἔδει γὰρ ἀρκεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντὸς τῷ παντὶ γεννήσασαν δυνάμεις δαιμόνων καὶ προσφόρους τῷ ἑαυτῆς ὅλῳ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς καὶ τίνος ὕλης μετέχουσιν; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς σωματικῆς, ἢ ζῷα αἰσθητὰ ἔσται. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ σώματα προσλαμβάνουσιν ἀέρινα ἢ πύρινα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ γε πρότερον διάφορον αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ μετάσχωσι σώματος· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς τὸ καθαρὸν πάντη σώματι μίγνυται· καίτοι πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ δαίμονος καθ' ὅσον δαίμων μετά τινος σώματος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ πυρὸς εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν σώματι μίγνυται, ἡ δὲ οὔ, εἰ μή τις εἴη τῇ μιγνυμένῃ αἰτία; Τίς οὖν ἡ αἰτία; Ὕλην δεῖ νοητὴν ὑποθέσθαι, ἵνα τὸ κοινωνῆσαν ἐκείνης ἥκῃ καὶ εἰς ταύτην τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δι' αὐτῆς.

7. Διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ Ἔρωτος ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν Πόρον τὴν μέθην ἔχειν τοῦ νέκταρος οἴνου οὔπω ὄντος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ

[1] συμπληροῦσι καὶ συνδιοικοῦσι Kirchhoff: συμπληροῦσαν καὶ συνδιοικοῦσαν codd.

[1] For daemonic bodies made of the very best air, see Apuleius, *De Deo Socratis*, ch. 11 (the whole treatise is one of the best examples of vulgar Platonic daemonology); also Porphyry, *De Abstinentia* II. 39. Belief in these bodies was general among Platonists of the 2nd century A.D. and later, and may ultimately derive from Posidonius.

spirit. But the other spirits come, they, too, from the soul of the All, but are produced by other powers according to the need of the All; they help to complete it, and along with the All govern individual things. For the soul of the All had to provide adequately for the All by producing powers which are those of spirits and beneficial to its totality. But how do they participate in matter, of any sort at all? Obviously not in bodily matter, or they will be perceptible living creatures. Even if they do take as well bodies of air or fire,[1] their nature must certainly have been different before, to give them any possibility of participating in body. For that which is altogether pure does not directly combine with body; though many people think that a body of air or fire is included in the substantial nature of a spirit in so far as it is a spirit. But why does one substance combine with body and another not, unless there is something responsible for the combination in the case of one that combines? What, then, is responsible? One must suppose an intelligible matter, in order that a being which has a share in it may come to this matter here of bodies by means of it.[2]

7. Therefore, too, in the story of the birth of Love Plato says that Plenty "was drunk with nectar, as wine did not yet exist," meaning that Love came

[2] This idea that participation in "intelligible matter" is an intermediate stage between complete incorporeality and material embodiment is unparalleled in Plotinus. For his normal thought on the subject see especially II. 4 [12] 3–5 and 15.

τοῦ Ἔρωτος γενομένου καὶ τῆς Πενίας μετεχούσης
φύσεως νοητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλου νοητοῦ οὐδ'
ἐκεῖθεν ἐμφαντασθέντος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ γενομένης καὶ
συμμιχθείσης ὡς ἐξ εἴδους καὶ ἀοριστίας, ἣν ⟨ἦν⟩ [1]
ἔχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μαντευ-
ομένη δέ τι εἶναι κατὰ ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον
φάντασμα, τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ Ἔρωτος τεκούσης.
Λόγος οὖν γενόμενος ἐν οὐ λόγῳ, ἀορίστῳ δὲ
ἐφέσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἀμυδρᾷ, ἐποίησε τὸ γενόμενον
οὐ τέλεον οὐδὲ ἱκανόν, ἐλλιπὲς δέ, ἅτε ἐξ ἐφέσεως
ἀορίστου καὶ λόγου ἱκανοῦ γεγενημένον. Καὶ ἔστι
λόγος οὗτος οὐ καθαρός, ἅτε ἔχων ἐν αὑτῷ ἔφεσιν
ἀόριστον καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ μήποτε
πληρώσεται ἕως ἂν ἔχῃ ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἀορίστου
φύσιν. Ἐξήρτηται δὲ ψυχῆς ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνης μὲν
γενόμενος ὡς ἀρχῆς, μίγμα δὲ ὢν ἐκ λόγου οὐ
μείναντος ἐν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ μιχθέντος ἀοριστίᾳ, οὐκ
αὐτοῦ ἀνακραθέντος ἐκείνῃ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
ἐκείνῃ. Καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἔρως οἷον οἶστρος ἄπορος
τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· διὸ καὶ τυγχάνων ἄπορος
πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει πληροῦσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν

[1] ⟨ἦν⟩ H–S².

[1] The conception of intelligible matter here is much closer to Plotinus's normal thought than that remarked on in the last chapter. The idea that the soul's Love has a radical incompleteness, a permanent incapacity to be satisfied, because of the "material" element in it goes rather beyond anything else in the *Enneads* (it is, of course, unavoidable if the *Symposium* is to be interpreted in this way). It has, however, something in common with the account of the "restless power" in soul which produces time in III. 7 [45] 11.

into existence before the world of sense, and that Poverty had intercourse with an intelligible nature, not merely with an image of the intelligible or an imagination derived from it, but she was there in the intelligible and united with it, and bore the substance of Love made from form and indefiniteness, the indefiniteness which the soul had before it attained the Good, while it was divining that there was something there by an indefinite, unlimited imagination. Therefore, since a rational principle came to be in something which was not rational, but an indefinite impulse and an obscure expression, what it produced was something not complete or sufficient, but defective, since it came into being from an indefinite impulse and a sufficient rational principle. So Love is not a pure rational principle, since he has in himself an indefinite, irrational, unbounded impulse; for he will never be satisfied, as long as he has in him the nature of the indefinite.[1] He depends on soul in such a way that he comes from it as his origin, but is a mixture of a rational principle which did not stay in itself but was mingled with indefiniteness—it was not the rational principle itself which was mixed with it but that which came from it. And Love is like a "sting," [2] without resources in his own nature; therefore, even when he attains his object he is without resources again; [3] he cannot be satisfied because

[2] *Phaedrus* 240D 1.

[3] Intellect, on the other hand, "always desires and always attains"; and the One neither desires, for it has nothing to desire, nor attains (*ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ νῷ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὔτε ἐφιέμενος—τίνος γάρ; οὔτε τυγχάνων*, III. 8 [30] 11, 23–25).

τὸ μῖγμα· μόνον γὰρ πληροῦται ἀληθῶς, ὅτιπερ καὶ πεπλήρωται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν συνοῦσαν ἔνδειαν ἐφίεται, κἂν παραχρῆμα πληρωθῇ, οὐ στέγει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀμήχανον[1] αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, τὸ δὲ πορι στικὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν.

Δεῖ δὲ καὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον τοιοῦτον νομίζειν καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων· καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται πορι στικὸν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου καὶ συγγενὲς καὶ ταύτῃ τῷ Ἔρωτι καὶ οὐ πλῆρες οὐδ' αὐτό, ἐφιέμενον δέ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει ὡς ἀγαθῶν. Ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθούς, ὃν ἔχουσιν ἔρωτα, τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ἔχειν οὐκ ἐρωτά τινα ἔχοντας· τοὺς δὲ κατ' ἄλλους δαίμονας τεταγμένους κατ' ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον δαίμονα τετάχθαι ὃν ἁπλῶς εἶχον ἀργὸν ἀφέντας, ἐνεργοῦντας δὲ κατ' ἄλλον δαίμονα, ὃν εἵλοντο κατὰ τὸ σύμφωνον μέρος τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν αὐτοῖς, ψυχῆς. Οἱ δὲ κακῶν ἐφιέμενοι ταῖς κακαῖς ἐγγενομέναις ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπέδησαν πάντας τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔρωτας, ὥσπερ καὶ λόγον τὸν ὀρθόν, ὅστις σύμφυτος, κακαῖς ταῖς ἐπιγενομέναις δόξαις. Οἱ μὲν οὖν φύσει ἔρωτες καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καλοί· καὶ οἱ μὲν

[1] ἀμήχανον Kirchhoff: εὐμήχανον codd, H–S.

[1] I read here ἀμήχανον with Kirchhoff and other editors, including Harder[2] (see Theiler's note *ad loc.*). Henry-Schwyzer retain the MSS εὐμήχανον and remark *sollertem, non inhabilem facit indigentia.* But this would make both parents provide Love with essentially the same quality, ability to get what he wanted, instead of with two opposed qualities, as the sense requires; and in the allusion to the myth in III. 6 [26] 14, it is Plenty who is πρᾶγμα εὐμήχανον (l. 17). (Dr. Schwyzer now agrees.)

the mixed thing cannot be; only that is truly satisfied which has already attained full satisfaction in its own nature; but Love because of his intimate deficiency is impelled to longing, and even if he is for the moment satisfied, he does not hold what he has received, since his powerlessness comes from his deficiency,[1] but his ability to provide for himself from his rational nature.

But one must consider that the whole race of spirits is like this and comes from parents of this kind; for every spirit is able to provide himself with that to which he is ordered, and impelled by desire for it, and akin to Love in this way too, and is like him, too, in not being satisfied but impelled by desire for one of the partial things which he regards as goods. For this reason we must consider, too, that the love which good men in this world have is a love for that which is simply and really good, not just any kind of love; but that those who are ordered under other spirits are ordered under different ones at different times, leaving their love of the simply good inoperative, but acting under the control of other spirits, whom they chose according to the corresponding part of that which is active in them, the soul. But those who are impelled by desire for evil things have fettered all the loves in them with the evil passions that have grown up in their souls, just as they have fettered their right reason, which is inborn in them, with the evil opinions which have grown upon them. So, then, the loves which are natural and according to nature are fair and good; and the

ἐλάττονος ψυχῆς ἐλάττους εἰς ἀξίαν καὶ δύναμιν, οἱ δὲ κρείττους, πάντες ἐν οὐσίᾳ. Οἱ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν σφαλέντων πάθη ταῦτα καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐσία οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις οὐ παρὰ ψυχῆς ἔτι γεννώμενα, ἀλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα κακίᾳ ψυχῆς ὅμοια γεννώσης ἐν διαθέσεσι καὶ ἕξεσιν ἤδη. Καὶ γὰρ ὅλως κινδυνεύει τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης ἐν ὡρισμένοις οὐσία εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲν δ' ἄλλο ἢ πάθη εἶναι· ὥσπερ ψευδῆ νοήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰς ὑπ' αὐτὰ οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὰ ἀληθῆ ὄντως καὶ ἀίδια καὶ ὡρισμένα ὁμοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ νοητὸν ὄντως καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ, εἰ δεῖ[1] καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τίθεσθαι καθαρῶς νόησιν καὶ νοητόν—καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς—ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ ἔρως· καὶ γὰρ αἱ νοήσεις· καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ, εἰ τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον, δύο ὀρθὰς θεωρεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον.

8. Ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ Ζεύς, οὗ τὸν κῆπον λέγει, εἰς ὃν εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Πόρος, καὶ τίς ὁ κῆπος οὗτος;

[1] εἰ δεῖ Dodds, H–S²: εἴδει codd.

[1] This example is taken from Aristotle, who uses it frequently, e.g. *Metaphysics* Δ 30. 1025a, 32.

[2] *Symposium* 203B 5–6.

loves of a lesser soul are less in worth and power, but those [of a better soul] are more; both are real substantial loves. But the loves which are against nature, these are passive affections of the perverted and are not in any way substance or expressions of substantial realities, and are not any longer products of the soul but have come into existence together with the vice of a soul which now produces things like itself in its dispositions and states. For it is likely in general that the true goods, which are in accordance with the nature of a soul active among things defined and limited, are substance, but the others [evils] are not acts which the soul produces from itself but are nothing else but passive affections; they are like false thoughts which have no substantial realities as their bases, as really true thoughts which are everlasting and definite have thinking and object of thought and existence all together, not only in the act of thought taken simply and absolutely, but in each individual act concerned with the real object of thought and the mind in each individual; if, indeed, we are to assume that in each one of us thinking and object of thought exist in a pure state—and yet they are not together and this state [of unity of thought and object of thought] does not belong to us and our thinking is not simple: hence our love is of simple realities, for so are our thoughts; and if we love one of the partial things this is incidental, just as, if according to the theorem this particular triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, it is in so far as it is simply a triangle.[1]

8. But who is Zeus, whose "garden" Plato says it is "into which Plenty came,"[2] and what is this

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ἀφροδίτη ψυχὴ ἦν ἡμῖν, λόγος δὲ ἐλέγετο τῶν πάντων ὁ Πόρος. Ταῦτα δὲ τί δεῖ τίθεσθαι, τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κῆπον αὐτοῦ; Οὐδὲ γὰρ ψυχὴν δεῖ τίθεσθαι τὸν Δία τὴν Ἀφροδίτην τοῦτο θέντας. Δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δία ἐκ μὲν Φαίδρου ἡγεμόνα μέγαν λέγοντος αὐτοῦ τοῦτον τὸν θεόν, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ τρίτον, οἶμαι, τοῦτον· σαφέστερον δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ, ἡνίκ' ἂν φῇ ἐν τῷ Διὶ εἶναι βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχήν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν. Εἰ οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς νοῦς ἐστι μέγας καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις τάττεται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον δεῖ τάττειν διά τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι αἴτιον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὁ μὲν ἔσται κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, ἡ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τετάξεται κατὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἁγλαὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄκακον καὶ ἁβρὸν Ἀφροδίτη λεχθεῖσα. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸν νοῦν τοὺς ἄρρενας τάττομεν τῶν θεῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τὰς θηλείας λέγομεν, ὡς νῷ ἑκάστῳ ψυχῆς συνούσης, εἴη ἂν καὶ ταύτῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Διὸς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη πάλιν μαρτυρούντων τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἱερέων καὶ θεολόγων, οἳ εἰς ταὐτὸν Ἥραν καὶ Ἀφροδίτην ἄγουσι καὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀστέρα ἐν οὐρανῷ Ἥρας λέγουσιν.

[1] *Phaedrus* 246E4.

[2] *Letter* II. 312E4 (this passage, one of the foundations of Plotinus's interpretation of Plato, is quoted in full in the next treatise in the chronological order, I. 8 [51] 2. 28–32).

[3] *Philebus* 30D 1–2.

garden? Now Aphrodite was for us the soul, and we said that Plenty was the rational principle of all things. But what are we to make of these, Zeus and his garden? For we must not make Zeus the soul, since this is what we have made Aphrodite. Here too, certainly, we must take our understanding of Zeus from Plato, from the *Phaedrus* where he says that this god is a "great leader," [1] but elsewhere he says, I think, that Zeus is the third: [2] but he is clearer in the *Philebus*, when he says that there is in Zeus "a royal soul and a royal intellect." [3] If, then, Zeus is a great intellect and soul and is ranked among the causes, and we must rank him on the higher level, for other reasons and particularly because the epithets "royal" and "leading" mean "cause," he will be on the level of Intellect,[4] and Aphrodite, who is his daughter and comes from him and is with him, will be ranked on the level of soul, being called Aphrodite because of the beauty and brightness and innocence and delicacy of soul. And, then, if we rank the male gods on the level of Intellect, and speak of the female gods as being their souls, since each intellect is accompanied by a soul, in this way, too, Aphrodite would be the soul of Zeus; and, again, priests and theologians bear witness to this interpretation, who make Hera and Aphrodite one and the same and call the star of Aphrodite in heaven the star of Hera.[5]

[4] In ch. 2 of this treatise, and elsewhere, Kronos is Intellect. This passage shows again how little real importance Plotinus attaches to the interpretation of myths, and also how closely, at times, he is prepared to assimilate higher Soul to Intellect.

[5] Cp. [Aristotle], *De Mundo* 392a 27–28.

9. Ὁ οὖν Πόρος λόγος ὢν τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ νῷ καὶ μᾶλλον κεχυμένος καὶ οἷον ἁπλωθεὶς περὶ ψυχὴν ἂν γένοιτο καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν νῷ συνεσπειραμένον, καὶ οὐ παρὰ ἄλλου εἰς αὐτόν, τούτῳ δὲ μεθύοντι ἐπακτὸν τὸ τῆς πληρώσεως. Τὸ δ' ἐκεῖ πληρούμενον[1] τοῦ νέκταρος τί ἂν εἴη ἢ λόγος ἀπὸ κρείττονος ἀρχῆς πεσὼν εἰς ἐλάττονα; Ἐν οὖν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὅτε ἡ Ἀφροδίτη λέγεται γεγονέναι, εἰσρυεὶς εἰς τὸν κῆπον αὐτοῦ. Κῆπος δὲ πᾶς ἀγλάισμα καὶ πλούτου ἐγκαλλώπισμα. Ἀγλαίζεται δὲ τὰ τοῦ Διὸς λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα αὐτοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθόντα ἀγλαίσματα. Ἢ τί ἂν εἴη ὁ κῆπος τοῦ Διὸς ἢ τὰ ἀγάλματα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀγλαίσματα; Τί δ' ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγλαίσματα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ κοσμήματα ἢ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ ῥυέντες; Ὁμοῦ δὲ οἱ λόγοι ὁ Πόρος, ἡ εὐπορία καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τῶν καλῶν, ἐν ἐκφάνσει ἤδη· καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν τῷ νέκταρι. Τί γὰρ θεοῖς νέκταρ ἢ ὃ τὸ θεῖον κομίζεται; Κομίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑποβεβηκὸς νοῦ λόγον· νοῦς δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει

[1] πληρούμενον Kirchhoff: πληροῦν codd. H–S.

[1] For the "contraction" or concentrated unity of Intellect as contrasted with the relative diffusion of Soul or the λόγος in Soul cp. III. 7 [45] 11. 23 ff., and III. 2 [47] 2. 17 ff. In this passage Plotinus shows the same care to distinguish between pure Intellect and the intellectual in Soul that he does in the nearly contemporary treatise V. 3 [49].

9. Plenty, then, since he is a rational principle in the intelligible world and in Intellect, and since he is more diffused and, as it were, spread out, would be concerned with soul and in soul. For that which is in Intellect is contracted together,[1] and nothing comes to it from anything else, but when Plenty was drunk his state of being filled was brought about from outside. But what could that which is filled[2] with nectar in the higher world be except a rational principle which has fallen from a higher origin to a lesser one? So this principle is in Soul and comes from Intellect, flowing into his garden when Aphrodite is said to have been born. And every garden is a glory and decoration of wealth; and the property of Zeus is glorified by rational principle, and his decorations are the glories that come from Intellect itself into the soul. Or what could the garden of Zeus be but his images in which he takes delight and his glories? And what could his glories and adornments be but the rational principles which flow from him? The rational principles all together are Plenty, the plenitude and wealth of beauties, already manifested; and this is the being drunk with nectar. For what is nectar for the gods but that which the divinity acquires? And that which is on the level below Intellect acquires rational principle; but Intellect

[2] I read here Kirchhoff's πληρούμενον (adopted by Cilento and Harder[2]) which the sense plainly seems to require. Henry-Schwyzer retain the MSS πληροῦν which the free paraphrase in Ambrose (*De Bono Mortis* 5. 19, *divitiis horti in quo repletus potu iaceret Porus qui nectar effunderet*), on the whole seems to support. It is just possible that πληροῦν may have been a slip by Plotinus himself.

ἐν κόρῳ καὶ οὐ μεθύει ἔχων. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπακτόν τι ἔχει. Ὁ δὲ λόγος νοῦ γέννημα καὶ ὑπόστασις μετὰ νοῦν καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτοῦ ὤν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς κήπῳ λέγεται κεῖσθαι τότε κείμενος, ὅτε ἡ Ἀφροδίτη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑποστῆναι λέγεται.

Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ μερίζειν χρόνοις ἃ λέγουσι, καὶ διαιρεῖν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάμεσι διεστῶτα, ὅπου καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ἀγεννήτων ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διαιροῦσι, καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς δύνανται τῷ νοήσαντι ἤδη συγχωροῦσι συναιρεῖν. Ἡ δὲ συναίρεσις· ψυχὴ νῷ συνοῦσα καὶ παρὰ νοῦ ὑποστᾶσα καὶ αὖ λόγων πληρωθεῖσα καὶ καλὴ καλοῖς κοσμηθεῖσα καὶ εὐπορίας πληρωθεῖσα, ὡς εἶναι ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρᾶν πολλὰ ἀγλαίσματα καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων εἰκόνας, Ἀφροδίτη μέν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, οἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοι πάντες εὐπορία καὶ Πόρος ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ῥυέντος[1] τοῦ ἐκεῖ νέκταρος· τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀγλαίσματα ὡς ἂν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενα κῆπος Διὸς λέγεται, καὶ εὕδειν ἐκεῖ ὁ Πόρος οἷς ἐπληρώθη βεβαρημένος. Ζωῆς δὲ φανείσης καὶ

[1] ῥυέντος Kirchhoff, H–S²: ῥυέντες codd.

[1] Plotinus is prepared to apply this penetrating observation of the closeness of metaphysical and mythical discourses

possesses itself in satiety and is not drunk with the possession. For it does not possess anything from outside. But the rational principle, the product and expression of Intellect, coming after Intellect and no longer belonging to it, but being in something else, is said to lie in the garden of Zeus, lying there at the time when it is said that Aphrodite came into existence in the realm of being.

But myths, if they are really going to be myths, must separate in time the things of which they tell, and set apart from each other many realities which are together, but distinct in rank or powers, at points where rational discussions, also, make generations of things ungenerated, and themselves, too, separate things which are together;[1] the myths, when they have taught us as well as they can, allow the man who has understood them to put together again that which they have separated. Here is the putting together [of the myth of Eros]: Soul, which is with Intellect and has come into existence from Intellect, and then again been filled with rational principles and, itself beautiful, adorned with beauties and filled with plenitude, so that there are in it many glories and images of all beautiful things, is as a whole Aphrodite, and the rational principles in it are all plenitude and Plenty, as the nectar there flows from the regions above; and the glories in it, since they are set in life, are called the "garden of Zeus," and it is said[2] that Plenty "sleeps" there, "weighed down" by the principles with which he was filled.

(λόγοι and μῦθοι) to each other to his own metaphysical discussions: cp. VI. 7 [38] 35, 27–30.

[2] *Symposium* 203B 5–7.

οὔσης ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑστιᾶσθαι οἱ θεοὶ λέγονται ὡς ἂν ἐν τοιαύτῃ μακαριότητι ὄντες. 'Αεὶ δὲ οὕτως ὑπέστη ὅδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφέσεως πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἦν ἀεί, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ ψυχή, Ἔρως. Ἔστι δ' οὗτος μικτόν τι χρῆμα μετέχον μὲν ἐνδείας, ᾗ πληροῦσθαι θέλει, οὐκ ἄμοιρον δὲ εὐπορίας, ᾗ οὗ ἔχει τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ζητεῖ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάμπαν ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄν ποτε ζητήσειεν. Ἐκ Πόρου οὖν καὶ Πενίας λέγεται εἶναι, ᾗ ἡ ἔλλειψις καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ τῶν λόγων ἡ μνήμη ὁμοῦ συνελθόντα ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγέννησε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον ὄντα. Ἡ δὲ μήτηρ αὐτῷ Πενία, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ ἔφεσις ἐνδεοῦς. Ὕλη δὲ ἡ Πενία, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐνδεὴς τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας—οὐ γὰρ μορφή τις οὐδὲ λόγος ἐν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ τούτου—ὑλικώτερον τὸ ἐφιέμενον καθ' ὅσον ἐφίεται ποιεῖ. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶδός ἐστι μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ μένον· καὶ δέξασθαι δὲ ἐφιέμενον ὕλην τῷ ἐπιόντι τὸ δεξόμενον παρασκευάζει. Οὕτω τοι ὁ Ἔρως ὑλικός τίς ἐστι, καὶ δαίμων οὗτός ἐστιν ἐκ ψυχῆς, καθ' ὅσον ἐλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ, γεγενημένος.

And since life has appeared, and is always there, in the world of realities, the gods are said to "feast"[1] since they are in a state of blessedness appropriate to the word. And so this being, Love, has from everlasting come into existence from the soul's aspiration towards the higher and the good, and he was there always, as long as Soul, too, existed. And he is a mixed thing, having a part of need, in that he wishes to be filled, but not without a share of plenitude, in that he seeks what is wanting to that which he already has; for certainly that which is altogether without a share in the good would not ever seek the good. So he is said to be born of Plenty and Poverty, in that the lack and the aspiration and the memory of the rational principles coming together in the soul, produced the activity directed towards the good, and this is Love. But his mother is Poverty, because aspiration belongs to that which is in need. And Poverty is matter, because matter, too, is in every way in need, and because the indefiniteness of the desire for the good—for there is no shape or rational forming principle in that which desires it—makes the aspiring thing more like matter in so far as it aspires. But the good, in relation to that which aspires to it, is form only, remaining in itself; and that which aspires to receive it prepares its receptive capacity as matter for the form which is to come upon it. So Love is a material kind of being, and he is a spirit produced from soul in so far as soul falls short of the good but aspires to it.

[1] *Symposium* 203B 2.

III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THINGS WITHOUT BODY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 26 in Porphyry's chronological order, and so comes immediately before the great treatise *On The Problems of the Soul* (divided by Porphyry into two, IV. 3 [27] and IV. 4 [28].) Plotinus was, it seems, at this time much concerned with questions of psychology, and in the first part of the treatise (chs. 1–5) he sets out to show that the soul is not subject to affections or modifications. In the second part (chs. 6–19), he turns to consider a very different kind of impassibility, that of matter. The two parts of the treatise appear at first sight to have little connection with each other. But there is no doubt that Plotinus himself composed them as parts of a single work, as he refers back to the first part in the second (9. 6). And there is more connection between them than may appear at first sight. What Plotinus is primarily concerned with in this treatise is to work out and display the implications of incorporeality, to exclude from philosophy ways of speaking and thinking about incorporeal things as subject to impressions, modifications or contaminations which really imply that they are corporeal (like the Stoic God and soul). And matter, for both Platonists and Aristotelians, is, of course, incorporeal. In the first part, where Plotinus is concerned to show that soul is impassible because incorporeal, he is able to use Aristotelian ideas in combating Stoic corporealism. But in the second part he differs sharply from Aristotle and goes, as far as we can tell, well beyond any earlier Platonists (and certainly beyond his own earlier discussion of matter in II. 4 [12]) in

his assertion that matter is absolutely impassible in the sense that it is not affected, modified or changed in any way by the forms which enter it, which are themselves, he maintains, mere ghosts of form, powerless to act on it. Here again there is a connection of thought with the first part of the treatise. Plotinus's assertion of the impassibility of incorporeal soul is an essential part of his general assertion of the primacy and radical independence of soul, his insistence that it is solely responsible for such reality as there is in this world, and is always active in and never passive to and affected by bodies; this is fundamental to his whole way of thinking about man and how he ought to live. And the presentation of matter as radically impassible, totally unaffected by form, carries with it the converse, that matter is utterly powerless in any way to affect or capture form. And the picture of the physical world as a world of ghosts in a vacuum, where phantoms of form flit in and out like reflections in a non-existent mirror serves to emphasise its inability to affect soul in any way. (Soul and matter are several times compared and contrasted in the second part of the treatise.) Some readers may feel, by the time they reach the end of the treatise, that Plotinus has made matter not only impassible but impossible; that is, that his elimination of even the idea of positive potency has left the concept without any content at all, has made " matter " only a meaningless word. But not only in this treatise but to the end of his life (see the treatise *On What are and Whence Come Evils* I. 8 [51]) he insists on the necessity of postulating matter, mainly in order that, by its utter negativity and total incapacity to receive any degree of good, it may provide an explanation of evil.

Synopsis

A. The impassibility of soul. General statement of the position to be maintained: soul, being incorporeal, cannot

be affected or modified like a body, though difficulties arise about vice and error (ch. 1). Discussion of vice: rejection of the theory that virtue and vice are just harmony and disharmony of the different parts of the soul: each part must have its own virtue, which is, essentially, seeing reason: the passage from virtue to vice and vice to virtue involves no intrinsic alteration in the soul-parts (ch. 2). Discussion of emotions: distinction between the body-element and the soul-element; the soul moves itself, but is not moved or affected by the emotions (ch. 3). The part of the soul subject to affections: relation between opinions, mental images and bodily disturbances: soul is form, and form is not affected or disturbed by what goes on in that which it informs (ch. 4). What, then, is meant by philosophical purification, freeing the soul from affections? Waking up the soul from its bad dreams, freeing it from distracting mental pictures and turning from the things below to those above (ch. 5).

B. The impassibility of matter. Matter, too, is something incorporeal. Real being is immaterial, eternal, unchanging, living intellect. Resistance, obstruction, hardness, aggressive corporeality are signs of lack of being and life: and the more a thing is a body, the more it is affected. To think that bodies are real is an illusion, a dream from which we should wake up (ch. 6). Matter is truly non-being, nothing but a ghost; and the forms which pass through it are ghosts too; they cannot act, and it is not acted on (ch. 7). Things which are affected are affected by their opposites, and affection is the way to destruction: but matter is indestructible (ch. 8). If a thing is present in or to something else it does not necessarily affect it: matter has no opposite, and is therefore not affected by anything (ch. 9). If matter was altered or affected it would no longer be able to receive all forms (ch. 10). Exegesis of *Timaeus* 50 B–C. How the forms are in matter without altering it and making it beautiful and

good instead of ugly and bad (ch. 11). Plato's real thought, rather cursorily expressed, is that matter is not affected by form in any way at all, receives neither shape nor size nor anything else, because it is not a body (ch. 12). What is meant by saying that matter "tries to escape" from form, and that it is "the receptacle and nurse of all becoming." The ghostly forms in the falsity of matter are like reflections in an invisible and formless mirror (ch. 13). Matter is the medium in which images of real being quasi-exist, the "Poverty" of the *Symposium*, always begging for what it can never really have, like a reflecting surface which concentrates rays on its outside (ch. 14). Analogies, and differences, between the mental pictures in soul and the phantoms in matter; soul is something, and has its own power to deal with its images, matter is nothing and has no power (ch. 15). Matter and size: size comes with form and is form; matter has only false size, not true size (chs. 16–18). Matter like soul contains all forms, but not all together, like soul, but divided (ch. 18). The forms do matter neither harm nor good. Matter is only a "mother" in a manner of speaking, for it brings forth nothing and is only a passive receptacle (as the mother is according to one theory). The ithyphallic Hermes is a symbol of the generative power of the *logos*; the eunuchs who accompany the Great Mother symbolise the sterility of matter (ch. 19).

III. 6. (26) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΣΩΜΑΤΩΝ

1. Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθους οὔσης—ἔδει γὰρ αὖ ἄλλην κρίσιν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειν ἀεὶ εἰς ἄπειρον—εἴχομεν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ κρίσις οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου. Ἦ, εἰ τύπον ἔχοι, πέπονθεν. Ἦν δ' ὅμως λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν καλουμένων τυπώσεων, ὡς ὁ τρόπος ὅλως ἕτερος ἢ ὡς ὑπείληπται, ὁποῖος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοήσεων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τούτων οὐσῶν γινώσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ παθεῖν τι δυναμένων· καὶ ὅλως ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ βούλημα μὴ ὑποβαλεῖν [1] τροπαῖς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεσι τὴν ψυχὴν τοιαύταις, ὁποῖαι αἱ θερμάνσεις καὶ ψύξεις σωμάτων. Καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν δὲ λεγόμενον αὐτῆς ἔδει ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερα καὶ

[1] ὑποβαλεῖν Ficinus, H–S: ὑπολαβεῖν codd.

[1] By the Stoics: cp., e.g., *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* I. 141 and 484; II. 55.

III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THINGS WITHOUT BODY

1. We say that sense-perceptions are not affections but activities and judgements concerned with affections; affections belong to something else, say, for instance, to the body qualified in a particular way, but the judgement belongs to the soul, and the judgement is not an affection—for if it was, there would have to be yet another judgement, and we should have to go back for ever to infinity. None the less we had a problem at this point, whether the judgement in so far as it is a judgement has nothing in it of what is judged. If it has an impression of it, then it has been affected. But it would, all the same, be possible to say also about what are called the impressions, that their character is quite different from what has been supposed,[1] and is like that which is also found in acts of thought; these, too, are activities which are able to know without being affected in any way; and in general our reasoned intention is not to subject the soul to changes and alterations of the same kind as heatings and coolings of bodies.[2] And we ought to survey the part of the soul which is said to be subject to affections, and consider whether we shall grant this, too, to be unchangeable,

[2] This again is an allusion to the Stoic view: cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* I. 234 and III. 459.

τοῦτο ἄτρεπτον δώσομεν, ἢ τούτῳ μόνῳ τὸ πάσχειν συγχωρήσομεν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὕστερον, περὶ δὲ τῶν προτέρων τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπισκεπτέον. Πῶς γὰρ ἄτρεπτον καὶ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ πρὸ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὅλως ψυχῆς ὁτιοῦν κακίας περὶ αὐτὴν ἐγγινομένης καὶ δοξῶν ψευδῶν καὶ ἀνοίας; Οἰκειώσεις δὲ καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεις ἡδομένης καὶ λυπουμένης, ὀργιζομένης, φθονούσης, ζηλούσης, ἐπιθυμούσης, ὅλως οὐδαμῇ ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τῶν προσπιπτόντων κινουμένης καὶ μεταβαλλούσης. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ μέγεθος ἔχει, οὐ ῥᾴδιον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως ἀδύνατον, ἀπαθῆ αὐτὴν καὶ ἄτρεπτον δεικνύναι ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν λεγομένων γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτήν· εἰ δέ ἐστιν οὐσία ἀμεγέθης καὶ δεῖ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον αὐτῇ παρεῖναι, εὐλαβητέον αὐτῇ πάθη διδόναι τοιαῦτα, μὴ καὶ λάθωμεν αὐτὴν φθαρτὴν εἶναι διδόντες. Καὶ δὴ εἴτε ἀριθμὸς εἴτε λόγος, ὥς φαμεν, ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆς, πῶς ἂν πάθος ἐγγένοιτο ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἢ λόγῳ; Ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λόγους ἀλόγους καὶ ἀπαθῆ πάθη δεῖ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῇ οἴεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων μετενηνεγμένα

[1] The view of Plotinus on the alleged "movements" and "changes" in the soul is very close to that of Aristotle, on whom he depends very much in this section of the treatise; cp. *De Anima* A.4. 408b1 ff. and B.5. 417b5 ff.

[2] That the soul is not a body, which would prevent it from being immortal and incorruptible, is argued at length in IV. 7 [2].

or whether we shall admit that this alone can be affected. But we will discuss this later; now we must consider the difficulties which arise about the higher parts of the soul. For how can the part which comes before that subject to affections, and the part before sense-perception, and in general any part of the soul, be unchangeable when vice and false opinions and stupidity occur in the soul? And the soul accepts things as its own or rejects them as alien when it feels pleasure and pain, anger, envy, jealousy, lust, and in general is never quiet but always moved and changed by every casual contact.[1] But if the soul is a body and has magnitude, it is not easy but rather altogether impossible, to show it as unaffected and unchangeable in any one of the occurrences which are said to take place in it. But if it is a substance without magnitude and must necessarily possess incorruptibility, we must be careful not to give it affections of this kind, so as to avoid making it corruptible without noticing that we have done so.[2] Then again, whether its substance is a number[3] or whether it is a rational formative principle, as we say it is, how can an affection occur in a number or a rational principle? But we must rather think that irrational reasons and unaffected affections come upon it; and it must be understood that these, which are transferred from bodies, are each and all of them there

[3] For the history of the doctrine that the soul is a number, which goes back to Xenocrates (Aristotle, *De Anima* I. 2. 404b27; cp. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* II. 759), see P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* chs. I and II. It does not play an important part in the thought of Plotinus, but he recognises it as orthodox Platonism: cp. V. 1 [10] 5. 9; VI. 5 [23] 9. 13–14.

ἀντικειμένως ληπτέον ἕκαστα καὶ κατ' ἀναλογίαν μετενηνεγμένα, καὶ ἔχουσαν οὐκ ἔχειν καὶ πάσχουσαν οὐ πάσχειν. Καὶ ὅστις ὁ τρόπος τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπισκεπτέον.

2. Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς λεκτέον, τί γίγνεται τότε, ὅταν κακία λέγηται παρεῖναι· καὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεῖν δεῖν φαμεν ὥς τινος ὄντος ἐν αὐτῇ κακοῦ καὶ ἐνθεῖναι ἀρετὴν καὶ κοσμῆσαι καὶ κάλλος ἐμποιῆσαι ἀντὶ αἴσχους τοῦ πρόσθεν. Ἆρ' οὖν λέγοντες ἀρετὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι, ἀναρμοστίαν δὲ τὴν κακίαν, λέγοιμεν ἂν δόξαν δοκοῦσαν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καί τι πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον οὐ μικρὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνύσειεν; Εἰ γὰρ συναρμοσθέντα μὲν φύσιν τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀρετή ἐστι, μὴ συναρμοσθέντα δὲ κακία, ἐπακτὸν οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδὲ ἑτέρωθεν γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ἥκοι ἂν οἷόν ἐστιν εἰς τὴν ἁρμογὴν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἥκοι ἐν τῇ ἀναρμοστίᾳ τοιοῦτον ὄν, οἷον καὶ χορευταὶ χορεύοντες καὶ συνᾴδοντες ἀλλήλοις, εἰ καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι, καὶ μόνος τις ᾄδων τῶν ἄλλων μὴ ᾀδόντων, καὶ ἑκάστου καθ' ἑαυτὸν ᾄδοντος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον δεῖ συνᾴδειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον καλῶς τὸ αὐτοῦ ᾄδοντα οἰκείᾳ μουσικῇ· ὥστε κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἁρμονίαν εἶναι ἑκάστου μέρους τὸ αὐτῷ προσῆκον ποιοῦντος. Δεῖ δὴ πρὸ τῆς ἁρμονίας

[1] The Pythagoreans; cp. Plato, *Phaedo* 93C.

in an opposed sense and are transferred in so far as something corresponds to them in the soul, and that in possessing them it does not possess and in being affected by them it is not affected. And we must consider how happenings of this sort come about.

2. First we must explain about virtue and vice, what happens at any time when vice is said to be present; for we assert that one must "take away," as if there was some evil in the soul, and "put in" virtue, and set the soul in order and produce beauty in it instead of the ugliness which was there before. Now if we say that "virtue is harmony" and vice lack of harmony, should we be expressing an opinion that accords with the views of the ancients,[1] and would the statement contribute something of no small value to our investigation? For if the natural harmony of the parts of the soul with each other is virtue, and their disharmony, vice, then there would be nothing brought in from outside, or from another source, but each part would enter into the harmony just as it is, or would not enter in, and remain in disharmony, because it was the sort of thing it was; just as dancers dance, and sing in accord with each other, even if it is not [always] the same ones who sing, and [sometimes] one sings when the others do not, and each sings in his own way, for they must not only sing together but each one, as they sing together, must also sing his own part beautifully by his own personal art of music;[2] so there, too, in the soul there is a harmony when each part does what is proper to it. It is certainly necessary that before

[2] The thought here is the same as in I. 6 [1] 1. 26–30. Contrast III. 2 [47] 17. 64 ff. (see notes *ad locc.*).

ταύτης ἄλλην ἑκάστου εἶναι ἀρετήν, καὶ κακίαν δὲ ἑκάστου πρὸ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀναρμοστίας. Τίνος οὖν παρόντος ἕκαστον μέρος κακόν; Ἡ κακίας. Καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὖ; Ἡ ἀρετῆς. Τῷ μὲν οὖν λογιστικῷ τάχ' ἄν τις λέγων ἄνοιαν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν καὶ ἄνοιαν τὴν κατὰ ἀπόφασιν οὐ παρουσίαν τινὸς ἂν λέγοι. Ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξαι ἐνῶσιν, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα τὴν κακίαν ποιεῖ, πῶς οὐκ ἐγγίνεσθαι φήσει καὶ ἀλλοῖον ταύτῃ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον γίνεσθαι; Τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν ἔχει δειλαῖνον, ἀνδρεῖον δὲ ὂν ἄλλως; Τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀκόλαστον μὲν ὂν οὐκ ἄλλως, σωφρονοῦν δὲ ἄλλως; ἢ πέπονθεν. Ἡ ὅταν μὲν ἐν ἀρετῇ ἕκαστον ᾖ, ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ᾗ[1] ἐστιν ἕκαστον ἐπαίον λόγου φήσομεν· καὶ τὸ μὲν λογιζόμενον παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα παρὰ τούτου. Ἡ τὸ ἐπαίειν λόγου ὥσπερ ὁρᾶν ἐστιν οὐ σχηματιζόμενον, ἀλλ' ὁρῶν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, ὅτε ὁρᾷ. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις καὶ δυνάμει οὖσα καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν οὐκ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ' ἅμα προσῆλθε πρὸς ὃ ἔχει [τὴν οὐσίαν][2] καὶ ἔστιν εἰδυῖα καὶ ἔγνω ἀπαθῶς, καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον οὕτω πρὸς τὸν νοῦν ἔχει καὶ ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ νοεῖν τοῦτο, οὐ σφραγῖδος ἔνδον

[1] ᾗ Vitringa, H–S²: ἣν codd.
[2] τὴν οὐσίαν del. Theiler, H–S².

[1] Heraclitus may well be in Plotinus's mind here: cp. fragments, DK, B1 and 112.

this harmony there should be another virtue of each part, and a vice of each before their disharmony with each other. What is it then, by the presence of which each part is evil? Vice. And, again, by the presence of what is it good? Virtue. Now perhaps one might say that the vice of the reasoning part was unintelligence, and unintelligence in the negative sense, and would not be asserting the presence of anything. But when false opinions are there in the soul (and this is what most of all produces vice), how will one be able to assert that they have not come in and that this part of the soul has not in this way become different? And is not the spirited part in one state when it is cowardly and in another when it is brave? And is not the desiring part when it is unrestrainedly lustful in one state, and in another when it is under control? Well, then, it has been affected. Now we shall say in answer that when each part is in a state of virtue, it is active according to its real substantial being, by which each part listens to reason;[1] and the reasoning part receives its reason from Intellect and the other parts from the reasoning part. Now listening to reason is like seeing, not receiving a shape but seeing and existing actually when seeing takes place. For just as sight, which has both a potential and an actual existence, remains essentially the same [when it is potential and when it is actual], and its actuality is not an alteration but it simultaneously approaches what it has, and is it in knowing it and knows without being affected; in the same way, too, the reasoning part is related to Intellect and sees, and this is the power of intellection; there is no stamp impressed on it

γενομένης, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὃ εἶδε καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἔχει· ἔχει μὲν τῷ γινώσκειν, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀποκεῖσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ ὁράματος, ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ μορφήν. Μεμνῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ, ὅτι καὶ τὰς μνήμας οὐκ ἐναποκειμένων τινῶν ἐλέγετο εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω τὴν δύναμιν ἐγειράσης, ὥστε καὶ ὃ μὴ ἔχει ἔχει. Τί οὖν; Οὐκ ἄλλη ἦν πρὶν οὕτω μνημονεύειν καὶ ὕστερον, ὅτε μνημονεύει; ἢ βούλει ἄλλην; οὔκουν ἀλλοιωθεῖσά γε, πλὴν εἰ μή τις τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ἀλλοίωσιν λέγοι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐδὲν προσγενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἥπερ ἦν πεφυκυῖα τοῦτο ποιοῦσα. Ὅλως γὰρ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τῶν ἀύλων οὐ συναλλοιουμένων γίνονται· ἢ φθαρεῖεν ἄν· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μενόντων, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τοῦτο τῶν μεθ' ὕλης. Εἰ δὲ ἄυλον ὂν πείσεται, οὐκ ἔχει ᾧ μένει· ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως τῆς ὁράσεως ἐνεργούσης τὸ πάσχον ὁ ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ δόξαι ὥσπερ ὁράματα. Τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς πῶς δειλόν; πῶς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; Ἢ δειλὸν μὲν τῷ ἢ μὴ ὁρᾶν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἢ πρὸς φαῦλον ὄντα τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν ἢ ὀργάνων ἐλλείψει, οἷον ἀπορίᾳ ἢ σαθρότητι ὅπλων σωματι-

[1] Plotinus seems to be thinking here of a famous Stoic dispute about "impressions." Chrysippus had corrected the too simple-minded view of Cleanthes that a mental image was a stamp like that made by a seal in wax, and had pointed out that this would make memory impossible: cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* II. 55–56.

internally, but it has what it sees and in another way does not have it; it has it by knowing it, but does not have it in that something is not put away in it from the seeing, like a shape in wax.[1] And we must remember that memories too, in our account of them, do not exist because things are put away in our minds but the soul awakes the power [of memory] in such a way as to have what it does not have.[2] Well, then, is not the soul different before it remembers in this way, and afterwards, when it remembers? Would you like to call it different? Very well, then, as long as you do not say that it is intrinsically altered, unless one is to call the passage from potentiality to actuality alteration, but nothing is added to it but it simply does what it is by nature.[3] For in general the actualisations of immaterial things take place without any accompanying alteration, otherwise they would perish; it is much truer to say that they remain unaltered when they become actual, and that being affected in actualisation belongs to things which have matter. But if a thing which is immaterial is going to be affected, it has no ground of permanence; just as in the case of sight, when the seeing faculty is active it is the eye which is affected, and opinions are like acts of seeing. But how is the spirited part cowardly and then again brave? It is cowardly either by not looking to the reason, or by looking to the reason when it is in a bad state, or else there will be a failure in its instruments, as when it is without its bodily weapons or they are decayed, or it is hindered from action,

[2] For Plotinus's doctrine of memory, see IV. 3 [27]. 26–31.
[3] Cp. Aristotle, *De Anima* B.5. 417b5–9.

κῶν, ἢ ἐνεργεῖν κωλυόμενον ἢ μὴ κινηθὲν οἷον ἐρεθισθέν· ἀνδρεῖον δέ, εἰ τὰ ἐναντία. Ἐν οἷς οὐδεμία ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ πάθος. Τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐνεργοῦν μὲν μόνον τὴν λεγομένην ἀκολασίαν παρέχεσθαι· πάντα γὰρ μόνον πράττει καὶ οὐ πάρεστι τὰ ἄλλα, οἷς ἂν ᾖ ἐν μέρει τὸ κρατεῖν παροῦσι καὶ δεικνύναι αὐτῷ. Τὸ δ' ὁρῶν ἦν ἂν ἄλλο, πράττον οὐ πάντα, ἀλλά που καὶ σχολάζον τῷ ὁρᾶν ὡς οἷόν τε τὰ ἄλλα. Τάχα δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ σώματος καχεξία ἡ τούτου λεγομένη κακία, ἀρετὴ δὲ τἀναντία· ὥστ' οὐδεμία ἐφ' ἑκάτερα προσθήκη τῇ ψυχῇ.

3. Τὰς δ' οἰκειώσεις καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεις πῶς; Καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ φόβοι πῶς οὐ τροπαὶ καὶ πάθη ἐνόντα καὶ κινούμενα; Δεῖ δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων ὧδε διαλαβεῖν. Ὅτι γὰρ ἐγγίγνονται ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ σφοδραὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις μὴ οὐ λέγειν ἐναντία λέγοντός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναργέσιν. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ συγχωροῦντας ζητεῖν ὅ τι ἐστὶ τὸ τρεπόμενον. Κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ περὶ ψυχὴν ταῦτα λέγοντες ὅμοιόν τι ὑπολαμβάνειν, ὡς εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγομεν ἐρυθριᾶν ἢ αὖ ἐν ὠχριάσει γίγνεσθαι, μὴ λογιζόμενοι, ὡς διὰ ψυχὴν μὲν ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην σύστασίν ἐστι γιγνό-

[1] The thought and language here and in what follows show some Stoic influence; cp. especially Posidonius quoted by Plutarch in *De Libidine et Aegritudine* 6 (p. 5; 14–23 Bernadakis). Posidonius here speaks of *περὶ σῶμα ψυχικά* of which he gives *ὠχριάσεις* as an example, and *περὶ ψυχὴν σωματικὰ* of which one example is *διαχύσεις* (cp. l. 17 below). Plotinus

or it is not really stirred to action, but as if it was only lightly touched; and it is brave when the opposite happens. In these circumstances there is no intrinsic alteration or affection. And the desiring part when it acts by itself produces what is called unrestrained lust, for it does everything by itself and the other parts of the soul are not present to it, whose function it would be, if they were present, to master and direct it. If it saw the other parts it would be different, and would not do everything but might perhaps take a rest by looking, as far as it could, at the other parts. But perhaps most often what we call the vice of this part is a bad state of the body, and virtue the opposite, so that in either case nothing is added to the soul.

3. But what about the soul's accepting things as its own or rejecting them as alien? And, surely, feelings of grief and anger, pleasures, desires and fears, are changes and affections present in the soul and moving there. About these, too, one must certainly make a distinction, in this way. To deny that alterations in the soul, and intense perceptions of them, do occur is to contradict the obvious facts. But when we accept this we ought to enquire what it is that is changed. For we run the risk, when we say this of the soul, of understanding it in the same sort of way as if we say that the soul blushes or turns pale again, not taking into account that these affections are brought about by the soul but occur in the other structure [the body].[1] But the shame is in

accepts the first, but will not admit that any feeling or affection can pass from body to soul; so he makes *διάχυσις* something entirely bodily.

μενα. Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν αἰσχύνη ἐν ψυχῇ δόξης αἰσχροῦ γενομένης· τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἐκείνης τοῦτο οἷον σχούσης, ἵνα μὴ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πλανώμεθα, ὑπὸ τῇ ψυχῇ ὂν καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀψύχῳ ἐτράπη κατὰ τὸ αἷμα εὐκίνητον ὄν. Τά τε τοῦ λεγομένου φόβου ἐν μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ' ὠχρὸν ἀναχωρήσαντος τοῦ αἵματος εἴσω. Καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ τὸ τῆς διαχύσεως τοῦτο καὶ εἰς αἴσθησιν ἧκον περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκέτι πάθος. Καὶ τὸ τῆς λύπης ὡσαύτως. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς οὔσης τοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν λανθάνον ἐστίν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τὸ προελθὸν ἡ αἴσθησις ἔγνω. Καὶ γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, ἐν λογισμοῖς, ἐν δόξαις, οὐ σαλευομένην αὐτὴν λέγομεν ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς γίγνεσθαι τὰς κινήσεις. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ζῆν κίνησιν λέγοντες οὐκ ἀλλοίου μέν, ἑκάστου δὲ μορίου ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ οὐκ ἐξιστᾶσα. Κεφάλαιον δὲ ἱκανόν· εἰ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς ζωὰς καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις συγχωροῦμεν καὶ μνήμας οὐ τύπους ἐναποσφραγιζομένους οὐδὲ τὰς φαντασίας ὡς ἐν κηρῷ τυπώσεις, συγχωρητέον πανταχοῦ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις πάθεσι καὶ κινήσεσι τὴν ψυχὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν μὴ ὡς τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν περὶ σῶμα γίγνεσθαι ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλ' ὃν εἴρηται τρόπον ἐπ' ἄμφω περὶ πάνθ' ὅλως τὰ ἐναντία γίγνεσθαι.

the soul, when the idea of something disgraceful arises in it; but the body, which the soul in a way possesses—not to be led astray by words—being subject to the soul and not the same thing as a lifeless body, is changed by way of the blood, which is easy to move. As for what is called fear, the beginning is in the soul, but the paleness comes from the blood withdrawing within. So with pleasure, the happy, relaxed feeling, which penetrates to sense-perception, belongs to the body, but the part of pleasure which belongs to the soul is no longer an affection. And the same is true of pain. For with lust, too, as long as its starting-point remains in the soul, it is unperceived; it is what comes out from there that sense-perception knows. In fact, when we say that the soul moves itself in lusts or reasonings or opinions, we are not saying that it does this because it is being shaken about by them, but that the movements originate from itself. For when we say that its life is movement, we do not mean that it is movement of something different, but the activity of each part is its natural life which does not go outside it. The sufficient conclusion is: if we agree that activities and lives and impulses are not alterations, and that memories are not stamps imprinted on the soul or mental pictures like impressions on wax, we must agree that everywhere, in all affections and movements, as they are called, the soul remains the same in substrate and essence, and that virtue and vice do not come into being like black and white or hot and cold in the body, but in the way which has been described, in both directions and in all respects, what happens in the soul is the opposite of what happens in the body.

4. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ λεγομένου παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπισκεπτέον. Ἤδη μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τρόπον τινὰ καὶ περὶ τούτου ἐν οἷς περὶ τῶν παθῶν ἁπάντων ἐλέγετο τῶν περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν γινομένων ὅπως ἕκαστα· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔτι λεκτέον περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον λαβόντας, ὅ τι ποτὲ τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λέγεται εἶναι. Λέγεται δὴ πάντως περὶ ὃ τὰ πάθη δοκεῖ συνίστασθαι· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. Τῶν δὲ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ δόξαις συνίσταται, ὡς ὅταν δοξάσας τις μέλλειν τελευτᾶν ἴσχῃ φόβον, ἢ οἰηθεὶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ τι ἔσεσθαι ἡσθῇ, τῆς μὲν δόξης ἐν ἄλλῳ, τοῦ δὲ πάθους κινηθέντος ἐν ἄλλῳ· τὰ δέ ἐστιν ὡς ἡγησάμενα αὐτὰ ἀπροαιρέτως ἐμποιεῖν ἐν τῷ πεφυκότι δοξάζειν τὴν δόξαν. Ἡ μὲν δὴ δόξα ὅτι ἄτρεπτον ἐᾷ τὸ δοξάζειν εἴρηται· ὁ δ' ἐκ τῆς δόξης φόβος ἐλθὼν ἄνωθεν αὖ ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης οἷον σύνεσίν τινα παρασχὼν τῷ λεγομένῳ τῆς ψυχῆς φοβεῖσθαι. Τί ποτε ποιεῖ τοῦτο τὸ φοβεῖσθαι; Ταραχὴν καὶ ἔκπληξίν, φασιν, ἐπὶ προσδοκωμένῳ κακῷ. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φαντασία ἐν ψυχῇ, ἥ τε

[1] At the end of ch. 2.

[2] The Stoics; cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* III. 386. In this chapter Plotinus is critically revising Stoic doctrine in accordance with his own ideas about the nature of the soul which derive from Plato and Aristotle. He accepts the Stoic idea that emotions arise from opinions (cp. *Stoic Vet. Fragm.* III. 385). But he insists on keeping the opinions and the emotions in watertight compartments; the disturbance and upset which accompanies certain opinions in the soul is strictly confined to the body; for the Stoic it was a diseased affection of the soul.

4. But we must now investigate that part of the soul which is said to be subject to affections. We have, of course, already discussed this, in a way, in what we have said about all the affections that occur in the spirited and desiring parts and how each of them arises:[1] but all the same there is something still to say about it, and we must first grasp whatever sort of thing it is that the part of the soul subject to affections is said to be. It is said in any case to be that about which affections appear to gather; the affections, that is, on which pleasure and pain follow. Some of the affections arise as the result of opinions, as when someone, being of the opinion that he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that some good is going to come to him, is pleased; the opinion is in one part, and the affection is stirred up in another; but some of them are of a sort to take the lead and, without any act of choice, to produce the opinion in the part of the soul whose natural function it is to have opinions. Now it has been said that the opinion leaves the opining [part] unmoved; but the fear which originates from the opinion, coming down from above, in its turn, from the opinion, in a way gives a kind of understanding to the part of the soul which is said to fear. What does this fear produce? Disturbance and shock, they say,[2] over the evil which is expected. It should, then, be obvious to anyone that the mental picture is in the soul, both the first

πρώτη, ἣν δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν, ἥ τε ἀπὸ ταύτης οὐκέτι δόξα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ κάτω ἀμυδρὰ οἷον δόξα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτος φαντασία, οἷα τῇ λεγομένῃ φύσει ἐνυπάρχει ἐνέργεια καθ' ἃ ποιεῖ ἕκαστα, ὥς φασιν, ἀφαντάστως, δῆλον ἂν τῳ γένοιτο. Τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων ἤδη αἰσθητὴ ἡ ταραχὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα γινομένη ὅ τε τρόμος καὶ ὁ σεισμὸς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ ὠχρὸν καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία τοῦ λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ ψυχικῷ μέρει ταῦτα· ἢ σωματικὸν φήσομεν αὐτὸ εἶναι, αὐτό τε εἴπερ ἦν παθὸν [1] ταῦτα, οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα ταῦτα ἀφίκετο τοῦ πέμποντος οὐκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ πέμπειν διὰ τὸ κατέχεσθαι τῷ πάθει καὶ ἐξίστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος τὸ παθητικὸν οὐ σῶμα μέν, εἶδος δέ τι. Ἐν ὕλῃ μέντοι καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ τό γε θρεπτικόν τε καὶ αὐξητικὸν καὶ γεννητικόν, ὅ ἐστι ῥίζα καὶ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος καὶ παθητικοῦ εἴδους. Εἴδει δὲ οὐδενὶ δεῖ παρεῖναι ταραχὴν ἢ ὅλως πάθος, ἀλλ' ἑστηκέναι μὲν αὐτό, τὴν δὲ ὕλην αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ πάθει γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γίγνηται, ἐκείνου τῇ παρουσίᾳ κινοῦντος. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ φυτικόν, ὅταν φύῃ, φύεται, οὐδ', ὅταν αὔξῃ, αὔξεται, οὐδ' ὅλως, ὅταν κινῇ, κινεῖται ἐκείνην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως, ἢ ἄλλος

[1] *παθὸν* Kirchhoff (*pateretur* Ficinus), H–S: *παθόντα* codd.

[1] The Stoics again. Plants are called *ἀφάνταστα* in *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* II. 458 (p. 150, 12).

one, which we call opinion, and that which derives from it, which is no longer opinion, but an obscure quasi-opinion and an uncriticised mental picture, like the activity inherent in what is called nature in so far as it produces individual things, as they say,[1] without a mental image. That which results from these mental images is the disturbance in the body, which has already reached the level of perception, the trembling and shaking of the body and the pallor and inability to speak. These are certainly not in the part of soul [which we are discussing]; otherwise we shall say that it is corporeal, if it was really it which was affected in these ways; and these affections would not have reached the body if that which sent them no longer worked the sending because it was in the grip of the affection and beside itself. But this part of the soul which is subject to affections is not a body but a form. Certainly the desiring part is in matter, and so, too, is the part which governs nutrition, growth and generation,[2] which is the root and principle of the desiring and affective form. But it is not proper to any form to be disturbed or in any way affected, but it remains static itself, and its matter enters into the state of being affected, when it does so enter, and the form stirs up the affection by its presence. For, of course, the growth-principle does not grow when it causes growth, nor increase when it causes increase, nor in general, when it causes motion, is it moved by that particular kind of motion which it causes, but either it is not moved at all, or it is a

[2] Plotinus is here combining the Platonic desiring part of the soul and the Aristotelian growth-principle: cp. IV. 3 [27] 23. 40–42.

τρόπος κινήσεως ἢ ἐνεργείας. Αὐτὴν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν τοῦ εἴδους φύσιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ ποιεῖν, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἁρμονία ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰς χορδὰς ἐκίνει. Ἔσται τοίνυν τὸ παθητικὸν πάθους μὲν αἴτιον ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ γενομένου τοῦ κινήματος ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ καὶ ἄνευ φαντασίας· ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο, εἰ τῆς δόξης ἄνωθεν ἀρξάσης· αὐτὸ δὲ μένον ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει. Τὰ δὲ αἴτια τοῦ κινῆσαι ἀνάλογον τῷ μουσικῷ· τὰ δὲ πληγέντα διὰ πάθος πρὸς τὰς χορδὰς ἂν τὸν λόγον ἔχοι. Καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖ οὐχ ἡ ἁρμονία πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἡ χορδή· οὐ μὴν ἐκινήθη ἂν ἡ χορδή, εἰ καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς ἐβούλετο, μὴ τῆς ἁρμονίας τοῦτο λεγούσης.

5. Τί οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσαν; Ἢ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου παθητικοῦ οἷον φάντασμα τὸ ἐφεξῆς πάθημα ποιεῖ, τὴν ταραχήν, καὶ συνέζευκται τῇ ταραχῇ ἡ τοῦ προσδοκωμένου κακοῦ εἰκών, πάθος τὸ τοιοῦτον λεγόμενον ἠξίου ὁ λόγος ὅλως ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ μὴ

[1] Plotinus is here using against the Stoics the Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is a form and as such causes bodily movement and changes while remaining itself unmoved. He does not advert to the fact that Aristotle worked out his own doctrine in conscious opposition to Plato's conception of soul as, not unmoved, but self-moved. Cp. the long discussion in *De Anima* A.3–4. 405b 31 ff.

[2] This sentence shows clearly how conscious Plotinus was of the central moral problem presented by his philosophical

different kind of motion and activity.[1] So, then, the actual nature of the form must be an activity, and produce by its presence, as if the melody proceeding from it plucked the strings. The part subject to affections, then, will be the cause of the affection, either because the movement starts from it, from the mental picture produced by sense-impressions, or even without a mental picture (we have to consider the question whether the affection is produced by the opinion starting from a higher level); but the part itself stays still in the manner of a melody. The causes of the movement are like the player, and the parts on which the affection makes its impact might correspond to the strings. For in the case of playing an instrument, too, it is not the tune which is affected, but the string; the string, however, would not be plucked [in tune] even if the player wished it, unless the tune said that it should be.

5. Why, then, ought we to seek to make the soul free from affections by means of philosophy when it is not affected to begin with?[2] Now, since the mental image (so to call it) which penetrates it at the part which is said to be subject to affections produces the consequent affection, disturbance, and the likeness of the expected evil is coupled with the disturbance, this kind of situation was called an affection and reason thought it right to do away with it altogether

anthropology. Why should we be obliged to strive to attain ἀπάθεια when the soul is ἀπαθής by nature already (a problem which did not arise for the Stoics, or for Plato himself)? His solution, sketched in this chapter, is that the attainment of ἀπάθεια involves no real change in the soul. It is simply a matter of "waking up" from illusion, turning one's attention from the lower and concentrating it on the higher.

ἐὰν ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὡς γιγνομένου μὲν οὔπω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης εὖ, μὴ γιγνομένου δὲ ἀπαθῶς[1] ἰσχούσης τοῦ αἰτίου τοῦ πάθους τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν ὁράματος οὐκέτι ἐγγιγνομένου, οἷον εἴ τις τὰς τῶν ὀνειράτων φαντασίας ἀναιρεῖν ἐθέλων ἐν ἐγρηγόρσει τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν φανταζομένην ποιοίη, εἰ[2] τὰ πάθη λέγοι πεποιηκέναι, τὰ ἔξωθεν οἷον ὁράματα παθήματα λέγων τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κάθαρσις ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς εἴη μηδαμῆ μεμολυσμένης ἢ τί τὸ χωρίζειν αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος; Ἡ ἡ μὲν κάθαρσις ἂν εἴη καταλιπεῖν μόνην καὶ μὴ μετ' ἄλλων ἢ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπουσαν μηδ' αὖ δόξας ἀλλοτρίας ἔχουσαν, ὅστις ὁ τρόπος τῶν δοξῶν, ἢ τῶν παθῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, μήτε ὁρᾶν τὰ εἴδωλα μήτε ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐργάζεσθαι πάθη. Εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα τὰ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, πῶς οὐ κάθαρσις καὶ χωρισμός γε πρὸς τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς μηκέτι ἐν σώματι γιγνομένης ὡς ἐκείνου εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ φῶς μὴ ἐν θολερῷ; Καίτοι ἀπαθὲς ὅμως ὂ καὶ ἐν θολερῷ. Τοῦ δὲ παθητικοῦ ἡ μὲν κάθαρσις ἡ ἔγερσις ἐκ τῶν ἀτόπων εἰδώλων καὶ μὴ ὅρασις, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι τῇ μὴ πολλῇ νεύσει καὶ τῇ περὶ τὰ κάτω μὴ φαντασίᾳ. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκεῖνα ἀφαιρεῖν ὧν τοῦτο χωρίζεται, ὅταν μὴ ἐπὶ πνεύματος θολεροῦ ἐκ γαστριμαργίας καὶ πλήθους οὐ καθαρῶν ἢ σαρκῶν,

[1] ἀπαθῶς Kirchhoff, H–S: ἀπαθοῦς codd.
[2] ποιοίη εἰ H–S²: ποιοῖ ἢ εἰ xy: ποιεῖ ἢ εἰ w: ποιοῖ ἢ Q.

[1] Plato, *Phaedo* 67C, 5–6.

and not to allow it to occur in the soul, on the ground that if it does occur the soul is not yet in a good state, but if it does not the soul is in a state of freedom from affections since the cause of the affection, the seeing in the soul, is no longer present in it; it is as if someone who wanted to take away the mental pictures seen in dreams were to bring the soul which was picturing them to wakefulness, if he said that the soul had caused the affections, meaning that the visions as if from outside were the affections of the soul. But what could the " purification " of the soul be, if it had not been stained at all, or what its " separation " [1] from the body? The purification would be leaving it alone, and not with others, or not looking at something else or, again, having opinions which do not belong to it—whatever is the character of the opinions, or the affections, as has been said—and not seeing the images nor constructing affections out of them. But if there is turning in the other direction, to the things above, away from those below, it is surely (is it not?) purification, and separation too, when it is the act of a soul which is no longer in body as if it belonged to it, and is being like a light which is not in turbid obscurity. And yet even the light which is in obscurity remains unaffected. But the purification of the part subject to affections is the waking up from inappropriate images and not seeing them, and its separation is effected by not inclining much downwards and not having a mental picture of the things below. But separating it could also mean taking away the things from which it is separated when it is not standing over a vital breath turbid from gluttony and sated with impure meats,

ἀλλ' ἢ ἰσχνὸν τὸ ἐν ᾧ, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ὀχεῖσθαι ἡσυχῇ.

6. Τὴν μὲν δὴ οὐσίαν τὴν νοητὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπασαν τεταγμένην ὡς ἀπαθῆ δεῖ εἶναι δοκεῖν εἴρηται. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἔν τι τῶν ἀσωμάτων, εἰ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καὶ περὶ ταύτης τίνα τρόπον ἔχει, πότερα παθητή, ὡς λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρεπτή, ἢ καὶ ταύτην δεῖ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι οἴεσθαι, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀπαθείας. Πρῶτον δὲ ληπτέον ἐπὶ τοῦτο στελλομένοις καὶ περὶ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ὁποία τις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐ ταύτῃ ἔχει, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἄν τις εἴποι ὄν, ὄντως ὄν· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ὃ πάντη ἐστὶν ὄν· τοῦτο δέ, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀποστατεῖ τοῦ εἶναι. Τελέως δὲ ὂν οὐδενὸς δεῖται ἵνα σῴζοιτο καὶ ᾖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐν ζωῇ

[1] This is one of the few passages in which Plotinus refers to the "pneumatic" or "astral" body, in the existence of which he believed, but which he found of little philosophical importance or interest: cp. IV. 3 [27] 15. 1–4; II. 2 [14] 2. 21–2. For the history of the belief in astral bodies before and after Plotinus, see E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Appendix II.*

[2] That matter is bodiless was contemporary Peripatetic doctrine, clearly stated by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the introductory section of his *De Anima* (cp. especially p. 5; 19–22 Bruns). Pre-Plotinian Platonists preferred the formula "neither body nor bodiless, but potentially body" (Albinus, *Eisagoge* VIII, p. 163, 6–7 Hermann; Apuleius,

but that in which it resides is so fine that it can ride on it in peace.[1]

6. It has already been said that the intelligible reality, which is all of the order of form, must be thought to be free from affections. But since matter, too, is one of the things without body,[2] even if it is so in a different sense, we must enquire about this too, and see what character it has, whether it is, as it is said to be, subject to affections and pliable in every way, or whether one must think that this, too, is free from affections, and what kind of freedom from affection it has. But first, as we address ourselves to this and state what sort of a nature it has, we must grasp that the nature of being and substance and existence are not as most people think they are. For being, what one could truly call being, is real being;[3] and this is that which has nothing lacking to its existence. Since it is completely it has no need of anything for its preservation and existence but is cause to the other things, which seem to exist, of their seeming existence. If this is a correct statement, it must necessarily be in life, and in perfect life; or,

De Platone I. V, p. 87, 11–15 Thomas). The Stoic doctrine is stated immediately below: matter for them was a body without qualities "subject to affections and pliable in every way"; cp. *Stoic Vet. Fragm.* II. 309, 482.

[3] The real being which Plotinus briefly describes here is of course his Second Hypostasis, Νοῦς. For the description of it as at once being, intelligence and life: cp. V. 1 [10] 4; V. 5 [32] 1. Brehier, perhaps rightly, sees this part of the chapter as a commentary on Plato, *Sophist* 248E, the famous passage, whose meaning is still much disputed, in which Plato insists that motion and life and soul and intelligence must be present to absolute being: the word ἀποστατεῖ occurs in Plato *Parmenides* 144B2, but the context is different.

καὶ ἐν τελείᾳ ζωῇ εἶναι· ἢ ἐλλεῖπον οὐ μᾶλλον ὂν
ἢ μὴ ὂν ἔσται. Τοῦτο δὲ νοῦς καὶ πάντη φρόνησις.
Καὶ ὡρισμένον ἄρα καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ τῇ
δυνάμει οὐδὲν ὅ τι μή, οὐδὲ τοσῇδε· ἐπιλείποι
γὰρ ἄν. Διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ
ἄδεκτον παντὸς καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς αὐτό· εἰ γάρ τι
δέχοιτο, παρ' αὐτὸ ἄν τι δέχοιτο· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὄν.
Δεῖ δ' αὐτὸ πάντη ὂν εἶναι· ἥκειν οὖν δεῖ παρ'
αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔχον εἰς τὸ εἶναι· καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα
καὶ ἓν πάντα. Εἰ δὴ τούτοις ὁρίζομεν τὸ ὄν—δεῖ
δέ, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἥκοι νοῦς, καὶ ζωή,
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἐπακτὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ (ἐξ οὐκ
ὄντος) ἔσται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὂν ἄζων καὶ ἄνουν ἔσται,
ὃ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν ἀληθῶς ταῦτα ἕξει, ὡς ἐν τοῖς
χείροσι δέον ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις τοῦ
ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος χορηγὸν μὲν τούτων
εἰς τὸ ὄν, οὐ δεόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τούτων·—εἰ οὖν
τοιοῦτον τὸ ὄν, ἀνάγκη μήτε τι σῶμα αὐτὸ μήτε τὸ
ὑποκείμενον τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι τούτοις
τὸ εἶναι τὸ μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι.

Καὶ πῶς ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις μὴ οὖσα, πῶς
δὲ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς ταῦτα, ὄρη καὶ πέτραι καὶ πᾶσα
γῆ στερεά; Καὶ πάντα ἀντίτυπα καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς

[1] Real Being or Intellect is limited for Plotinus in the sense that the number of Forms in it is finite, but unlimited in that it is eternal, its power is infinite and it has nothing outside to bound or measure it but is all-inclusive and so unincluded and is itself the absolute standard of measurement: cp. V. 7 [18] 1; VI. 5 [23] 12; VI. 6 [34] 18.

if it falls short of this, it will be no more existent than non-existent. But this means that it must be intellect, and wisdom in its fullness. And it must therefore be defined and limited, and there must be nothing to which its power does not extend, nor must its power be quantitatively limited; otherwise it would be defective.[1] And so, too, it must be eternal and always the same, and unreceptive of anything, and nothing must come into it, for if it received anything, it would have to receive something different from itself; but this would be non-existent. But real being must be being in every way; it must therefore come having everything for existence from itself: and it must be all things together, and all of them one. Now if we define being in these ways—and we must do so, or intellect and life would not come from being, but would be external additions to it and (as coming from the non-existent) will not exist, and being will be lifeless and devoid of intellect, and that which is not really being will have these [life and intellect] as if these ought to exist in inferior things and those posterior to being, for that which is prior to being conducts these into being but has no need of them itself; if then being is of this kind, it necessarily cannot be a body or what underlies bodies but the being of these is the being of things which do not exist.

And how can the nature of bodies, and the matter on which they are founded, be non-existent, mountains and rocks and all the earth in its solidity?[2] All things that offer resistance, and compel by their

[2] Plotinus may possibly be thinking here of Plato's materialists in *Sophist* 246A–B.

βιαζόμενα τὰ πληττόμενα ὁμολογεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. Εἰ οὖν τις λέγοι· πῶς δὲ τὰ μὴ θλίβοντα καὶ μὴ βιαζόμενα μηδὲ ἀντίτυπα μηδ' ὅλως ὁρώμενα, ψυχὴ καὶ νοῦς, ὄντα καὶ ὄντως ὄντα; καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον γῆς ἑστώσης τὸ μᾶλλον κινούμενον καὶ ἐμβριθὲς ἧττον, καὶ τούτου τὸ ἄνω; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πῦρ φεῦγον ἤδη τὴν σώματος φύσιν; Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, τὰ μὲν αὐταρκέστερα αὐτοῖς ἧττον ἐνοχλεῖ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ἀλυπότερα τοῖς ἄλλοις, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα καὶ γεωδέστερα, ὅσῳ ἐλλιπῆ καὶ πίπτοντα καὶ αἴρειν αὐτὰ οὐ δυνάμενα, ταῦτα πίπτοντα ὑπὸ ἀσθενείας τῇ καταφορᾷ καὶ νωθείᾳ πληγὰς ἔχει. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἀηδέστερα προσπεσεῖν, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τῆς πληγῆς καὶ τὸ βλάπτειν ἔχει· τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μετέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος, ὅσῳ τούτου μέτεστιν αὐτοῖς, εὐχαριτώτερα τοῖς πέλας. Ἡ δὲ κίνησις ὥσπερ τις ζωὴ οὖσα ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἦν· καὶ μίμησιν ἔχουσα ταύτης μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῖς ἧττον σώματος ἔχουσιν, ὡς τῆς ἀπολείψεως τοῦ ὄντος ὃ καταλείπει μᾶλλον τοῦτο σῶμα ποιούσης. Καὶ ἐκ τῶν δὲ λεγομένων παθημάτων μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἴδοι τὸ μᾶλλον σῶμα μᾶλλον παθητὸν ὄν, γῆν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· τὰ

[1] For the special status of fire among other bodies, see I. 6 [1] 3. 19–26, where it is said to "hold the rank of form in

impacts the things struck by them, attest their existence. Suppose someone were to say: "How can things which exercise no pressure or force and offer no resistance, and are not even visible, be existent, and really existent? And among bodies, how can the element which moves more and has less weight be more existent than the stable earth, and the element above be more real than this? And how can fire [be the most real of all the elements] which is now at the point of escaping from bodily nature?"[1] But, I think, the bodies which are more sufficient to themselves get less in the way of the other things and cause them less pain, but the heavier, more earthy bodies, in proportion as they are defective and fall and are unable to lift themselves up, when they fall because of their weakness, by their downward movement and heavy slowness cause collisions. Then, too, it is the dead ones among bodies which are more unpleasant to fall against, and are responsible for extremely hard blows and for hurting; but ensouled bodies, which have a share in being, are more agreeable to their neighbours the more of it they have. And movement is like a kind of life in bodies, and keeps an image of it, and there is more of it in the things which have less of body, as if it was the deficiency of being which made the thing which is deficient in it more a body. And one could see this more clearly from what are called the affections; the more a thing is a body the more it is affected, earth more than other things, and the other elements in the same proportion, for the other

relation to the other elements" (cp. Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 8. 335a18–20) and to be "near to the bodiless."

μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα σύνεισι διαιρούμενα μὴ κωλύοντος μηδενὸς εἰς ἓν πάλιν, τμηθὲν δὲ γεηρὸν ἅπαν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἀεί· ὥσπερ τὰ ἀπαγορεύοντα τῇ φύσει, ἃ δὴ μικρᾶς πληγῆς γενομένης οὕτως ἔχει ὡς πέπληκται καὶ ἐφθάρη, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μάλιστα σῶμα γενόμενον ὡς μάλιστα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἦκον ἀναλαβεῖν αὑτὸ εἰς τὸ ἓν ἀσθενεῖ. Πτῶμα οὖν αἱ βαρεῖαι καὶ σφοδραὶ πληγαί, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν εἰς ἄλληλα· ἀσθενὲς δὲ ἀσθενεῖ προσπῖπτον ἰσχυρόν ἐστι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄντι.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴρηται πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τιθεμένους τὰ ὄντα τῇ τῶν ὠθισμῶν μαρτυρίᾳ καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντάσμασι πίστιν τῆς ἀληθείας λαμβάνοντας, οἳ παραπλήσιον τοῖς ὀνειρώττουσι ποιοῦσι ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖν νομίζουσιν, ἃ ὁρῶσιν εἶναι ἐνύπνια ὄντα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστιν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὕδει· ἡ δ' ἀληθινὴ ἐγρήγορσις ἀληθινὴ ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος, ἀνάστασις. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετὰ σώματος μετάστασίς ἐστιν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, οἷον ἐξ ἑτέρων δεμνίων· ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς ὅλως ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων, ἃ τῆς φύσεως ὄντα τῆς ἐναντίας ψυχῇ τὸ ἐναντίον εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχει. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ῥοὴ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ οὐ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως οὖσα.

7. Ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπί τε τὴν ὕλην τὴν ὑποκειμέ-

elements come together into one again when they are parted, if there is no obstacle in the way, but when every kind of earthy body is cut, each part stays separate for ever; just as with things of which the natural powers are failing, which if they receive a small blow stay in the state to which the blow has reduced them and perish, so the thing which has most completely become body, since it has approached most nearly to non-being, is too weak to collect itself again into a unity. So heavy and severe blows bring about the mutual ruin of bodies; a weak body falling against [another] weak one is strong against it, and a non-existent thing against [another] non-existent thing.

This, then, is our argument against those who place real beings in the class of bodies and find their guarantee of truth in the evidence of pushings and strikings and the apparitions which come by way of sense-perception; they act like people dreaming, who think that the things they see as real actually exist, when they are only dreams. For the activity of sense-perception is that of the soul asleep; for it is the part of the soul that is in the body that sleeps; but the true wakening is a true getting up from the body, not with the body. Getting up with the body is only getting out of one sleep into another, like getting out of one bed into another; but the true rising is a rising altogether away from bodies, which are of the opposite nature to soul and opposed in respect of reality. Their coming into being and flux and perishing, which does not belong to the nature of reality, are evidence of this.

7. But we must come back to matter, the underly-

νην ἢ τὰ [1] ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι λεγόμενα, ἐξ ὧν τό τε μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀπαθὲς γνωσθήσεται. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος, ἐπείπερ τὸ σῶμα ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον καὶ αὐτὴ μετ' ἄλλου ποιεῖ σῶμα. Οὕτω γὰρ τοῦ ὀνόματος τετύχηκε τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτι ἑκάτερον τό τε ὂν ἥ τε ὕλη ἕτερα τῶν σωμάτων. Οὔτε δὲ ψυχὴ οὖσα οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε λόγος οὔτε πέρας—ἀπειρία γάρ—οὔτε δύναμις—τί γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ;—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὑπερεκπεσοῦσα πάντα οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος προσηγορίαν ὀρθῶς ἂν δέχοιτο, μὴ ὂν δ' ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιτο, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ κίνησις μὴ ὂν ἢ στάσις μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὄν, εἴδωλον καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου καὶ ὑποστάσεως ἔφεσις καὶ ἑστηκὸς οὐκ ἐν στάσει καὶ ἀόρατον καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ φεῦγον τὸ βουλόμενον ἰδεῖν, καὶ ὅταν τις μὴ ἴδῃ γιγνόμενον, ἀτενίσαντι δὲ οὐχ ὁρώμενον, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀεὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ φανταζόμενον, μικρὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον, ἐλλεῖπόν τε καὶ ὑπερέχον, εἴδωλον οὐ μένον οὐδ' αὖ φεύγειν δυνάμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἰσχύει ἅτε μὴ ἰσχὺν παρὰ νοῦ λαβόν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐλλείψει τοῦ ὄντος παντὸς γενόμενον. Διὸ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἐπαγγέλληται ψεύδεται, κἂν μέγα φαντασθῇ, μικρόν

[1] ἢ τὰ Jʏpmg: εἶτα codd.

[1] The εἶτα of most MSS will not do here, as a τὰ is required. Henry and Schwyzer think that the ἢ τὰ of a marginal note in J may represent a genuine tradition and " means practically

ing substrate and the things which are said to be based upon matter,[1] from which we shall acquire a knowledge of matter's non-existence and freedom from affections. Matter, then, is incorporeal, since body is posterior and a composite, and matter with something else produces body. In this way it has acquired the same name [as being] in respect of its incorporeality, because both being and matter are other than bodies. It is not soul or intellect or life or form or rational formative principle or limit—for it is unlimitedness [2]—or power—for what does it make?—but, falling outside all these, it could not properly receive the title of being but would appropriately be called non-being, not in the sense in which motion is not being or rest not being [3] but truly not-being; it is a ghostly image of bulk, a tendency towards substantial existence; it is static without being stable; it is invisible in itself and escapes any attempt to see it, and occurs when one is not looking, but even if you look closely you cannot see it. It always presents opposite appearances on its surface, small and great,[4] less and more, deficient and superabundant, a phantom which does not remain and cannot get away either, for it has no strength for this, since it has not received strength from intellect but is lacking in all being. Whatever announcement it makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it

the same " as Volkmann's καὶ τὰ. I translate, with some slight doubt, on this assumption.

[2] On matter as the unlimited, cp. II. 4 [12] 15.

[3] Cp. *Sophist* 256D–E.

[4] Cp. II. 4 [12] 11. 33 ff., for this Platonic way of describing matter.

ἐστι, κἂν μᾶλλον, ἧττόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ ἐν φαντάσει οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν, οἷον παίγνιον φεῦγον· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγγίγνεσθαι δοκοῦντα παίγνια, εἴδωλα ἐν εἰδώλῳ ἀτεχνῶς, ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὸ ἀλλαχοῦ ἱδρυμένον ἀλλαχοῦ φανταζόμενον· καὶ πιμπλάμενον, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔχον οὐδὲν καὶ δοκοῦν τὰ πάντα. Τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων μιμήματα καὶ εἴδωλα εἰς εἴδωλον ἄμορφον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄμορφον αὐτῆς ἐνορώμενα ποιεῖν μὲν δοκεῖ εἰς αὐτήν, ποιεῖ δὲ οὐδέν· ἀμενηνὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀντερεῖδον οὐκ ἔχοντα· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκείνης ἐχούσης δίεισιν οὐ τέμνοντα οἷον δι' ὕδατος ἢ εἴ τις ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ κενῷ μορφὰς οἷον εἰσπέμποι. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ, εἰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ ἐνορώμενα, οἷα τὰ ἀφ' ὧν ἦλθεν εἰς αὐτήν, τάχ' ἄν τις διδοὺς αὐτοῖς δύναμίν τινα τῶν πεμψάντων τὴν εἰς αὐτὴν γενομένην πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἂν ὑπέλαβε· νῦν δ' ἄλλων μὲν ὄντων τῶν ἐμφανταζομένων, ἀλλοίων δὲ τῶν ἐνορωμένων, κἀκ τούτων μαθεῖν ἔστι τὸ τῆς πείσεως ψεῦδος ψευδοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ἐνορωμένου καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἔχοντος ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαν. Ἀσθενὲς δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ὂν καὶ εἰς ψεῦδος ἐμπῖπτον, οἷα ἐν ὀνείρῳ ἢ ὕδατι ἢ κατόπτρῳ, ἀπαθῆ αὐτὴν εἶασεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι· καίτοι ἔν γε τοῖς προειρημένοις ὁμοίωσις τοῖς ἐνορωμένοις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐνορῶντα.

8. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ πάσχον δεῖ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις εἶναι δυνάμεσι καὶ ποιότησι τῶν

[1] *Timaeus* 50C 4–5.

appears great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of fleeting frivolity; hence the things which seem to come to be in it are frivolities, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in a mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another; it seems to be filled, and holds nothing; it is all seeming. "Imitations of real beings pass into and out of it," [1] ghosts into a formless ghost, visible because of its formlessness. They seem to act on it, but do nothing, for they are wraith-like and feeble and have no thrust; nor does matter thrust against them, but they go through without making a cut, as if through water, or as if someone in a way projected shapes in the void people talk about. And again, if the things seen in matter were of the same kind as those from which they came to it, perhaps one might give them a power derived from those which sent them and, as this power reached matter, one might assume that it was affected by them; but, as it is, the producers of the appearances are different from the things seen in matter, and we can learn from this the falsity of the affection, since what is seen in matter is false and has no sort of likeness to what produced it. Certainly, then, since it is weak and false, and falling into falsity, like things in a dream or water or a mirror, it necessarily leaves matter unaffected; though in the examples just mentioned there is a likeness between the things seen [in water, etc.], and the things which are the causes of the appearances.

8. But in general that which is affected must be of such a kind that it is possessed of powers and qualities opposed to those of the things which come upon it

ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐμποιούντων. Τῷ γὰρ ἐνόντι θερμῷ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ψύχοντος καὶ τῷ ἐνόντι ὑγρῷ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ξηραίνοντος, καὶ ἠλλοιῶσθαι λέγομεν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅταν ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν ἢ ἐκ ξηροῦ ὑγρὸν γίγνηται. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ λεγομένη πυρὸς φθορὰ μεταβολῆς γενομένης εἰς στοιχεῖον ἄλλο· τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἐφθάρη, φαμέν, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη· ὥστε καὶ τὰ πάθη περὶ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ καὶ ἡ φθορά· ὁδὸς γὰρ εἰς φθορὰν ἡ παραδοχὴ τοῦ πάθους· καὶ τούτῳ τὸ φθείρεσθαι, ᾧ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. Τὴν δὲ ὕλην φθείρεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε· εἰς τί γὰρ καὶ πῶς; Πῶς οὖν λαβοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ θερμότητας, ψυχρότητας, μυρίας καὶ ἀπείρους ὅλως ποιότητας καὶ ταύταις διαληφθεῖσα καὶ οἷον συμφύτους αὐτὰς ἔχουσα καὶ συγκεκραμένας ἀλλήλαις, οὐ γὰρ ἕκαστα χωρίς, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ ἀποληφθεῖσα πασχουσῶν τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων μίξει οὐχὶ συμπάσχει καὶ αὐτή; Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἔξω τις αὐτὴν θήσεται αὐτῶν παντάπασιν· ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ πᾶν οὕτω πάρεστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ὡς αὐτῷ τι παρ' αὐτοῦ διδόναι.

9. Ληπτέον δὴ τὸ παρεῖναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ πρῶτον ὡς οὐ καθ' ἕνα τρόπον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἐστιν οἷον μετὰ τοῦ παρεῖναι ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον ποιεῖν ἐκεῖνο μετὰ τοῦ τρέπειν,

[1] This is Aristotelian doctrine: cp. *De Generatione et Corruptione* A.7. 323b6 ff.

and produce affections in it.[1] For it is from that which cools it that the change comes to the heat in a thing, and from that which dries it that the change comes to the moistness in it, and we say that the substrate is changed when it becomes cold instead of hot or moist instead of dry. And what is called the destruction of fire is evidence of this; there is a change into another element, for, we assert, the fire is destroyed, not the matter; so that the affections belong to that which it belongs to be destroyed, for receiving affections is the way to destruction; and being destroyed is brought about by that which is also the cause of being affected. But it is impossible for matter to be destroyed, for into what could it [be changed when it is] destroyed, and how? How then, when matter receives in itself heats and coldnesses, and thousands, in fact, an infinite number, of qualities, and is divided by them and holds them, so to speak, grown together and mixed up with each other (for individual qualities are not separate in it), can it, set apart in the middle of them, not be itself affected along with them when the qualities are affected by their interaction on each other in their mixture with each other? Unless, of course, one is to put it quite outside the qualities; but everything which is present in a substrate is present in such a way as to give something from itself to the substrate.

9. One must, of course, understand first of all that there is not only one way in which one thing is present to another or in another; but there is one way in which the presence of the thing goes with an improvement or deterioration in the other which

οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὁρᾶται ἐπί γε τῶν ζῴων, τὸ δ' οἷον ποιεῖν βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον ἄνευ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλέγετο, τὸ δ' οἷον ὅταν τις σχῆμα κηρῷ προσαγάγῃ, ἔνθα οὔτε τι πάθος, ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῆσαι τὸν κηρὸν εἶναι, ὅταν παρῇ τὸ σχῆμα, οὔτε ἐλλείψεις [ἐκεῖνο][1] ἀπεληλυθότος ἐκείνου. Τὸ δὲ δὴ φῶς οὐδὲ σχήματος ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὸ φωτιζόμενον ποιεῖ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ λίθος ψυχρὸς γενόμενος τί παρὰ τῆς ψυχρότητος μένων λίθος ἔχει; Τί δ' ἂν γραμμὴ πάθοι ὑπὸ χρώματος; Οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἐπίπεδον, οἶμαι. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἴσως σῶμα; Καίτοι ὑπὸ χρώματος τί ἂν πάθοι; Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸ παθεῖν λέγειν τὸ παρεῖναι οὐδὲ τὸ μορφὴν περιθεῖναι. Εἰ δέ τις καὶ τὰ κάτοπτρα λέγοι καὶ ὅλως τὰ διαφανῆ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνορωμένων εἰδώλων μηδὲν πάσχειν, οὐκ ἀνόμοιον ἂν τὸ παράδειγμα φέροι. Εἴδωλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ αὕτη ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπαθέστερον ἢ τὰ κάτοπτρα. Ἐγγίγνονται μὲν δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ θερμότητες καὶ ψυχρότητες, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὴν θερμαίνουσαι· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ψύχεσθαι ποιότητος ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀγούσης. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχρότητος μήποτε ἀπουσία καὶ στέρησις. Συνελθοῦσαι δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν αἱ ποιότητες εἰς ἀλλήλας μὲν αἱ πολλαὶ αὐτῶν ποιήσουσι, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱ ἐναντίως

[1] ἐλλείψεις H–S²: ἔλλειψιν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ExC, H–S¹: ἔλλειψιν ἐκεῖνο US: εἰς ἔλλειψιν εἰς ἐκεῖνο A: ἀλείψειν εἰς ἐκεῖνο Q.

involves change; this is the kind of presence which is observed in bodies, living ones at any rate; and there is another which brings about improvement or deterioration without the other being affected; this is what we have said happens in the case of the soul. There is another way, too, which is like what happens when someone impresses a shape on wax, where there is no affection, so as to make the wax into something else when the shape is there, and there are no deficiencies when the shape is gone. And light, certainly, does not even produce an alteration of shape in the thing illuminated. And when a stone becomes cold, what does it get from the coldness, since it remains a stone? And in what way could a line be affected by colour?[1] I do not think that even a surface could be. But, perhaps, the body underlying it could? Yet how could it be affected by colour? For one must not call presence or putting on a shape "being affected." If one said that mirrors and transparent things generally were in no way affected by the images seen in them, he would be giving a not inappropriate example. For the things in matter are images too, and matter is still less liable to affections than are mirrors. For certainly heats and coldnesses occur in it, but they do not heat it; for heating and cooling belong to quality, which brings the substrate from one state to another. (But we should consider whether coldness is not an absence and a privation.) But when the qualities come together in matter most of them will act upon each other, or, rather, those will which are opposed to

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* A.7. 323b25–6.

ἔχουσαι. Τί γὰρ ἂν εὐωδία γλυκύτητα ἐργάσαιτο ἢ χρῶμα σχῆμα ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους ἄλλο; Ὅθεν ἄν τις καὶ μάλιστα πιστεύσειεν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἄλυπον ὂν τῇ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ ᾧ ἢ ἐν ᾧ πάρεστιν. Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὸ βλαπτόμενον οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ τρεπόμενον καὶ πάσχον ὑφ' ὁτουοῦν ἂν πάθοι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ πεῖσις, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὑπ' ἄλλων ἄτρεπτα. Οἷς δὴ μηδεμία ἐναντιότης ὑπάρχει, ταῦτα ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐναντίου πάθοι. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τι πάσχοι, μὴ ὕλην, ἀλλά τι συναμφότερον ἢ ὅλως πολλὰ ὁμοῦ εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ παντάπασιν ἁπλοῦν ἀπαθὲς ἂν εἴη πάντων καὶ ἐν μέσοις ἅπασιν ἀπειλημμένον [ἢ] [1] τοῖς εἰς ἄλληλα ποιοῦσιν· οἷον ἐν οἴκῳ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀλλήλους παιόντων ὁ οἶκος ἀπαθὴς καὶ ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀήρ. Συνιόντα δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης ἄλληλα ποιείτω, ὅσα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, αὐτὴ δ' ἀπαθὴς ἔστω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅσαι ποιότητες ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ μὴ ἐναντίαι εἶναι ἀπαθεῖς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων εἰσίν.

10. Ἔπειτα, εἰ πάσχει ἡ ὕλη, δεῖ τι ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἢ ἑτέρως διακεῖσθαι ἢ πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ πάθος. Ἐπιούσης τοίνυν ἄλλης μετ' ἐκείνην ποιότητος οὐκέτι ὕλη ἔσται τὸ δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ ποιὰ ὕλη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ

[1] ἢ del. Kirchhoff.

[1] The phrase comes from Plato, *Philebus* 63B6–7, but the context there is quite different.

each other. For what could fragrance do to sweetness or colour to shape, or a thing which belongs to one kind to a thing of another kind? This would very much confirm one's belief that it is possible for one thing to be in the same place as another, or in another, without troubling by its presence that with which or in which it is. So then, just as a thing does not suffer injury from any and every chance encounter, so that which is changed and affected is not affected by anything and everything, but it is opposites which affect opposites, and other things remain unchanged by each other. Those, then, in which there is no opposition could not be affected by any opposite. So that, if anything is affected, it cannot be matter but must be a composite or in general a multiplicity of things all together. But that which is " single and set apart " [1] from all other things and in every way simple would be unaffected by everything and set apart in the midst of all the things which act on each other; just as when people are hitting each other in the same house the house is unaffected, and so is the air in it. So let the things which have matter as their substrate act on each other as it is their nature to do, but let matter itself be unaffected, much more so than those qualities in it which are unaffected by each other because they are not opposed.

10. Then further, if matter is affected, it must retain something from the affection, either the affection itself, or the being in a different state from that in which it was before the affection came to it. Now, if another quality comes to it after that [first one which affected it], what receives it will no longer be matter but qualified matter. But if this quality,

αὕτη[1] ἡ ποιότης ἀποσταίη καταλιποῦσά τι αὐτῆς τῷ ποιῆσαι, ἄλλο ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνοιτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Καὶ προιοῦσα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄλλο τι ἢ ὕλη ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, πολύτροπον δὲ καὶ πολυειδές· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι πανδεχὲς γένοιτο ἐμπόδιον πολλοῖς τοῖς ἐπεισιοῦσι γιγνόμενον, ἥ τε ὕλη οὐκέτι μένει· οὐδὲ ἄφθαρτος τοίνυν· ὥστε, εἰ δεῖ ὕλην εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν, οὕτως ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν· ὡς τό γε ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν ὕλην τηροῦντων. Ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ ὅλως τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον πᾶν δεῖ μένον ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκότα ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' αὑτά· εἰ δεῖ μένειν τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον καὶ οὐ τὸ μένον ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὸ πάσχον, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀνάγκη, ἢ ἀλλοιουμένην τὴν ὕλην αὐτῆς ἐξίστασθαι, ἢ μὴ ἐξισταμένην αὐτῆς μὴ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ καθ' ὅσον ὕλη ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τί ἀλλοιώσεται οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν, ἔπειτα ὁμολογήσει καὶ οὕτω τὴν ὕλην αὐτὴν μὴ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν οὖσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἐν τούτῳ οὔσης, οὕτως, ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ἢ ὕλη, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καθ' ὅ τι ὕλη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μένειν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἀναλλοίωτον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναλλοίωτον αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην.

[1] αὕτη Kirchhoff, H–S²: αὐτὴ codd.

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 50B7–8.

too, goes away leaving something of itself behind as the result of its action, the substrate will become still more different. And if it went on in this way the substrate would become something other than matter, something existing in many modes and many shapes; so that it would not be able to receive everything but would obstruct the entry of many of the things which came to it—and then there is no more matter, so it is not indestructible; so, if there must be matter, as there was from the beginning, it must consequently always be the same, so that it is not possible to keep matter and speak of it as being altered. Then again, if, speaking generally, everything which is altered must retain the same essential form in the alteration, and be altered only accidentally, not intrinsically; if that which is altered must really remain, and it is not that of it which remains which is affected, then one of two consequences must necessarily follow; either matter will be altered and pass out of its own nature, or it will not pass out of its own nature and will not be altered.[1] But if anyone should say that it is not altered in so far as it is matter, first of all he will not be able to say in what respect it is going to be altered, and then he will admit, this way too, that matter itself is not altered. For, just as other things, which are forms, cannot be altered in their essential being, since their essential being consists in this, since existing, for matter, is existing precisely as matter, it is not possible for it to be altered in so far as it is matter, but it must stay as it is, and, just as in the case of things which are forms the form itself must remain unaltered, so here too matter itself must remain unaltered.

11. Ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὕτω διανοούμενον ὀρθῶς εἰρηκέναι νομίζω, τὰ δ' εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων μιμήματα μὴ μάτην εἰσιέναι καὶ ἐξιέναι εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενον ἡμᾶς συνεῖναι ἐπιστήσαντας τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς μεταλήψεως, καὶ κινδυνεύει τὸ ἄπορον ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅπως ἡ ὕλη τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει μὴ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὠήθησαν τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν, τὸ πῶς ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πῶς ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ. Ὄντως γὰρ θαυμαστὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ, πῶς τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν παρόντων αὐτῇ μένει ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπαθὴς αὐτῶν οὖσα καὶ προσέτι αὐτῶν τῶν εἰσιόντων πασχόντων ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. Ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ εἰσιόντα ἐξωθεῖν τὰ πρότερα ἕκαστα, καὶ εἶναι τὸ παθεῖν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν παντὶ συνθέτῳ, ἀλλ' ᾧ χρεία τοῦ προσελθόντος ἢ ἀπελθόντος καὶ ὃ ἐλλιπὲς μὲν τῇ συστάσει ἀπουσίᾳ τινός, τέλειον δὲ τῇ παρουσίᾳ. Τῇ δὲ ὕλῃ οὔτε τι πλέον εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς σύστασιν προσελθόντος ὁτουοῦν· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τότε ὅ ἐστι προσελθόντος, οὔτε ἔλαττον ἀπελθόντος· μένει γὰρ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἦν. Τοῦ δὲ κεκοσμῆσθαι τοῖς μὲν κόσμου καὶ τάξεως δεομένοις εἴη ἂν χρεία, καὶ ὁ κόσμος δὲ γένοιτο ἂν ἄνευ μεταλλοιώσεως, οἷον οἷς περιτίθεμεν· εἰ δὲ οὕτω τις κοσμηθείη ὡς σύμφυτον εἶναι, δεήσει ἀλλοιωθὲν ὃ πρότερον αἰσχρὸν ἦν καὶ ἕτερον

[1] *Timaeus* 50C4–5: cp. ch. 7.

11. This I think was Plato's opinion, which led him to say, correctly, "The things that enter and leave it are copies of the real things";[1] he spoke of entering and leaving with deliberate purpose, wishing us to understand and apply our minds to the manner of the participation; and it seems that the well-known difficulty about how matter participates in forms is not what most of our predecessors thought it was, how the forms come into matter, but rather how they are in matter. For it really does appear remarkable how, when these forms are present to it, matter remains the same and is unaffected by them, and still more so since the very forms which enter it are affected by each other. But it is remarkable, too, that the things which enter push out on each occasion the things which were there before them, and that being affected occurs in the composite thing, and not in every composite but only in that which has a need for something to come to it or go away from it, and which has a defect in its composition if something is not there, but is complete if it is present. But matter gains nothing towards its composition if anything whatever comes to it, for it does not become what it is at the time when something comes, or become less when it goes away; for it remains what it was from the beginning. But as for being beautified and set in order, there could be a need for it in those things which need decoration and ordering, and the beautifying and ordering could take place without alteration, as when we dress people up; but if someone is to be so beautified and set in order that the beauty and order are a part of his nature, there will be need of an alteration in what

γενόμενον ἐκεῖνο τὸ κεκοσμημένον οὕτω καλὸν ἐξ αἰσχροῦ εἶναι. Εἰ τοίνυν αἰσχρὰ οὖσα ἡ ὕλη καλὴ ἐγένετο, ὃ ἦν πρότερον τῷ[1] αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐκέτ' ἐστίν· ὥστε ἐν τῷ οὕτω κεκοσμῆσθαι ἀπολεῖ τὸ ὕλην εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσχρά· εἰ δ' οὕτως αἰσχρὰ ὡς αἶσχος εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν μεταλάβοι κόσμου, καὶ εἰ οὕτω κακὴ ὡς κακὸν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν μεταλάβοι ἀγαθοῦ· ὥστε οὐχ οὕτως ἡ μετάληψις ὡς οἴονται[2] παθούσης, ἀλλ' ἕτερος τρόπος οἷον δοκεῖν. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λύοιτο ἂν τὸ ἄπορον, πῶς οὖσα κακὴ ἐφίοιτο ἂν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς μὴ μεταλήψει ἀπολυμένης ὃ ἦν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡ λεγομένη μετάληψις, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν μένειν μὴ ἀλλοιουμένην, ὡς λέγομεν, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀεὶ ὅ ἐστιν, οὐκέτι θαυμαστὸν γίνεται τὸ πῶς οὖσα κακὴ μεταλαμβάνει. Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μεταλαμβάνειν ἀμηγέπη μεταλαμβάνει ἕως ἂν ᾖ, τῷ δ' εἶναι ὅ ἐστι τρόπῳ μεταλήψεως τηροῦντι αὐτὴν οὐ βλάπτεται εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ οὕτω διδόντος, καὶ κινδυνεύει διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἧττον εἶναι κακή, ὅτι ἀεὶ μένει τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι. Μεταλαμβάνουσα γὰρ ὄντως καὶ ἀλλοιουμένη ὄντως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὴν φύσιν κακή. Ὥστε εἴ τις τὴν ὕλην λέγει κακήν, οὕτως ἂν ἀληθεύοι, εἰ

[1] τῷ Kirchhoff; τὸ codd. H–S.
[2] οἴονται Cizensis e corr: οἷόν τε codd.

[1] Henry-Schwyzer retain the MSS τὸ here and explain that τὸ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι is in apposition to ὃ ἦν πρότερον. But what matter was before was αἰσχρά, not τὸ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι (this does not mean the same as αἶσχος εἶναι below, which in any case should not be anticipated here). I therefore print and translate Kirchhoff's correction τῷ.

was ugly before, and what is beautified and ordered must become different and so be beautiful instead of ugly. Now, if matter was ugly and became beautiful, it is no longer what it was before by the fact of being ugly;[1] so that by being beautified and set in order in this way it will stop being matter, particularly if it is not only accidentally ugly; but if it is ugly in such a way that it is ugliness, it could have no part in beauty and order, and if it is bad in such a way that it is badness, it could have no part in good; so that its participation would not be, as people think, by being affected, but of another kind, so that it only seems to be affected. Perhaps in this way the difficulty can be resolved how, though it is evil, it can reach towards the good, in that it does not by its participation lose what it was before, for if, as we say, its so-called participation is of this kind, so that it remains the same and is not altered but is always what it is, it becomes no longer remarkable how it participates [in the good] though it is evil. For it does not abandon itself but, since it must participate, it participates in a kind of way as long as it is there; but, as the manner of participation keeps it what it is, it receives no damage which extends to its being from that which gives it [form] in this way, and because of this it is, so it seems, no less evil, because it always remains what it is. For if it really participated and was really altered by the good it would not be evil by nature. So that if someone calls matter evil, he would speak the truth if he meant that it was

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαθῆ λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ὅλως ἀπαθῆ εἶναι.

12. Ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων τοῦτο νοῶν περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν μετάληψιν οὐχ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἴδους γενομένου καὶ μορφὴν διδόντος ὥστε ἓν σύνθετον γενέσθαι συντραπέντων καὶ οἷον συγκραθέντων καὶ συμπαθόντων τιθέμενος, ὅτι μὴ οὕτω λέγει παραστῆσαι βουλόμενος, καὶ πῶς ἂν αὐτὴ ἀπαθὴς μένουσα ἔχοι τὰ εἴδη ἀπαθοῦς μεταλήψεως ζητῶν[1] παράδειγμα—ἄλλον τρόπον οὐ ῥᾴδιον διδάξαι ἃ μάλιστα παρόντα σῴζει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταὐτὸν εἶναι—ὑπέστη πολλὰς ἀπορίας σπεύδων ἐφ' ὃ βούλεται καὶ προσέτι παραστῆσαι θέλων τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς κενὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ εἰκότος οὖσαν πολλήν. Τὴν οὖν ὕλην σχήμασιν ὑποθέμενος τὰ πάθη ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις σώμασιν οὐδὲν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τὸ μένον ταύτης [ταύτην][2] ἐνδείκνυται διδοὺς συλλογίζεσθαι, ὡς οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν σχημάτων ἔχει τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὴ καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ σώμασι τούτοις ἐξ ἑτέρου σχήματος ἕτερον σχῆμα δεχομένοις τάχα ἄν τις ἀλλοίωσιν λέγοι γίγνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ σχήματος μεταβολὴν ὁμώνυμον

[1] ζητῶν Cizensis e corr., Kirchhoff: ζητοῦσα codd., H.–S.
[2] ταύτην del. H–S.

[1] Plotinus seems to be considering here the whole passage dealing with the "third kind" in the *Timaeus* (47E–53C) rather than any particular part of it.

unaffected by the good; but this is the same as being totally incapable of being affected.

12. This is Plato's thought about matter;[1] he does not suppose that its participation was like that in which a form becomes present in a substrate and gives it shape so that one composite thing comes into existence, with form and substrate combined, and so to speak mixed up and mutually affected; he wants to show that he does not mean this, and how matter could remain unaffected and receive the forms, looking for an example of participation without affection[2]—in any other way it would not be easy to explain what things precisely, when they are present, keep the substrate unaltered, so he raised many difficulties in hurrying on to express what he wants, and, further, wishing to show the emptiness of substantial being in the things of sense and the great area which there is of mere appearance. So when he makes it his initial supposition that matter by its shapes produces the affections in ensouled bodies, he demonstrates its persistence, and enables us to conclude that it does not itself experience any affection or alteration even from the shapes. For one might perhaps say that alteration occurs in these bodies which receive one shape after another, meaning that the equivocal term "alteration"

[2] Henry-Schwyzer here keep the MSS ζητοῦσα. But it does not seem to make any sort of reasonable sense to say that *matter* looks for an example of unaffected participation, whereas it makes excellent sense to say that *Plato* does; and it is easy to see how a scribe could have written ζητοῦσα for ζητῶν under the influence of the immediately preceding μένουσα. I therefore, with Kirchhoff and other editors (including Beutler-Theiler), print and translate ζητῶν. (Dr. Schwyzer now agrees.)

τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι λέγων· τῆς δὲ ὕλης οὐδὲν σχῆμα ἐχούσης οὐδὲ μέγεθος πῶς ἄν τις τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὁπωσοῦν παρουσίαν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι κἂν ὁμωνύμως λέγοι; Εἴ τις οὖν ἐνταῦθα τὸ νόμῳ χροιὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νόμῳ λέγοι τῷ τὴν φύσιν τὴν ὑποκειμένην μηδὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς νομίζεται, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴη τοῦ λόγου. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἔχει, εἰ μηδὲ τὸ ὡς σχήματα ἀρέσκει; Ἀλλ' ἔχει ἔνδειξιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις ὡς οἷόν τε τῆς ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς οἷον εἰδώλων οὐ παρόντων δοκούσης παρουσίας.

Ἢ πρότερον ἔτι περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας αὐτῆς λεκτέον διδάσκοντας ὡς χρὴ ταῖς συνηθείαις τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὴν φέρεσθαι, οἷον ὅταν [ξηραινομένην][1] τὴν αὐτὴν πυρουμένην καὶ ὑγραινομένην ἐνθυμουμένους καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς « καὶ τὰς ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος μορφὰς δεχομένην ». Τὸ γὰρ « καὶ τὰς ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος μορφὰς δεχομένην » ἀπαμβλύνει μὲν τὸ « πυρουμένην καὶ ὑγραινομένην », δηλοῖ τε ἐν τῷ « μορφὰς δεχομένην » οὐ τὸ μεμορφῶσθαι αὐτήν, ἀλλ' εἶναι τὰς μορφὰς ὡς εἰσῆλθον, τό τε « πυρουμένην » οὐ κυρίως εἰρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πῦρ γινομένην· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πῦρ γίνεσθαι καὶ πυροῦσθαι· ὑπ' ἄλλου μὲν γὰρ τὸ πυροῦσθαι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν· ὃ δ' αὐτὸ μέρος ἐστὶ πυρὸς

[1] *ξηραινομένην* del. Page, H–S².

[1] Democritus, fr. DK, B9.

[2] *Timaeus* 52D5–6. [*ξηραινομένην*] "drying up" is a gloss on *πυρουμένην*.

includes the sense of "change of shape"; but, since matter has not shape or size, how could one say that any sort of presence of shape in it was alteration, even using the word in this equivocal sense? If, then, anyone at this point should quote "colour by convention and other things by convention,"[1] because the underlying nature has nothing in the way in which it is conventionally supposed to, his quotation would not be out of place. But how does it have the forms, if not even the statement that it has them as shapes satisfies us? But Plato's supposition does at least indicate as clearly as possible the impassibility of matter and the seeming presence in it of a kind of phantasms which are not really present.

We must still make another preliminary point about its impassibility, that it is inevitable that we should be led by our customary way of speaking to suppose that it is affected, as, for instance, when we think of the same matter as being [as Plato says] set on fire and moistened, and, what follows this "receiving the shapes of air and water."[2] This phrase too, "receiving the shapes of air and water," takes away the force of the "being set on fire" and "moistened," and makes clear that in the phrase "receiving shapes" Plato is not speaking of matter itself having been shaped but that the shapes are there in the way in which they entered it, and that "being set on fire" is not used in its proper sense, but means that matter has become fire, for it is not the same thing to become fire and to be set on fire; being set on fire is due to the agency of another thing, and this also implies being affected; but how could that which is itself a part of fire be set on fire? It

πῶς ἂν πυροῖτο; Τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, οἷον εἴ τις διὰ τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν ἀνδριάντα λέγοι πεφοιτηκέναι, εἰ τὸ πῦρ διὰ τῆς ὕλης λέγοι κεχωρηκέναι καὶ προσέτι πυρῶσαι. Ἔτι, εἰ λόγος ὁ προσιών, πῶς ἂν πυρώσειεν; Ἢ εἰ σχῆμα; Ἀλλὰ τὸ πυρού-
45 μενον ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν ἤδη. Πῶς οὖν ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν γενομένου; Ἢ, κἂν ἓν ᾖ γενόμενον, οὐκ ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάθη ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλα ποιούντων. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀμφοτέρων ποιούντων; Ἢ θατέρου θάτερον παρέχοντος μὴ φυγεῖν. Ἀλλ' ὅταν διαιρεθῇ τι σῶμα, πῶς οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ διῄρηται;
50 Καὶ πεπονθότος ἐκείνου τῷ διῃρῆσθαι πῶς οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παθήματι πέπονθεν; Ἢ τί κωλύει τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καὶ φθεῖραι λέγοντας πῶς φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔφθαρται; Ἔτι λεκτέον τοσόνδε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μέγεθος εἶναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ μεγέθει οὐδὲ τὰ μεγέθους πάθη ἐγγίγνεσθαι
55 καὶ ὅλως δὴ τῷ μὴ σώματι μηδὲ τὰ σώματος πάθη γίγνεσθαι· ὥστε ὅσοι παθητὴν ποιοῦσι καὶ σῶμα συγχωρείτωσαν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

13. Ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστῆσαι αὐτοὺς προσήκει, πῶς λέγουσι φεύγειν αὐτὴν τὸ εἶδος· πῶς γὰρ ἂν λίθους—τὰ περιλαβόντα αὐτήν—καὶ πέτρας φύγοι;

[1] The bronze and the statue provide an example which Aristotle frequently uses in his discussions of matter and its formation: cp., e.g., *Physics* B.3 194b2 ff. The point which Plotinus is making here is the absurdity of thinking of the relationship of form and matter in terms of one body entering and acting on another.

[2] Plotinus is clearly arguing here and in the next chapter against Platonists who quote the *Timaeus* as an authority for

would be the same sort of thing as saying that the statue took regular walks through the bronze,[1] if one said that the fire passed through the matter and, besides that, set it on fire! Besides, if what comes to matter is a rational forming principle, how could it set it on fire? Or if it is a shape? But that which is set on fire is kindled by what is already a composite of both [matter and form]. How, then, is it kindled by both if one thing has not come into existence from both? Even if one thing has come into existence, its two components do not have reciprocal affections but a common action on other things. Do they then both act? Rather, one prevents the other from getting away. But when a body is divided, how is the matter not divided too? And when the body is affected by being divided, how is the matter, too, not affected with the very same affection? Now, what prevents us by this very same line of argument from asserting its destruction, asking how when the body is destroyed the matter is not destroyed too? Besides, it must be pointed out that body is quantitatively determined and is size, but that which is not size is not subject to the affections of size, and in general what is not body is not subject to the affections of body, so that all those who make matter subject to affections must admit also that it is a body.[2]

13. But there is this further question which they ought to give their minds to, what they mean by saying that it tries to escape from form, for how could it escape from stones and rocks—things which

their view that matter is subject to affections, not against Stoics, who were quite certain that matter was a body (cp. note to ch. 6 above).

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν φεύγειν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ φεύγειν φήσουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ βουλήσει αὐτῆς φεύγει, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεί; Εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκῃ μένει, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἐν εἴδει τινί ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἴσχειν ἑκάστην ὕλην ζητητέον τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς εἰσιοῦσι μᾶλλον. Πῶς οὖν λέγεται φεύγειν; ἢ τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει καὶ ἀεί· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ μηδέποτε αὐτῆς ἐξισταμένην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸ εἶδος ὡς μηδέποτε ἔχειν; ἢ ὅ τι χρήσονται τῷ ὑφ' αὑτῶν λεγομένῳ οὐχ ἕξουσιν· ἡ δὲ ὑποδοχὴ καὶ τιθήνη γενέσεως ἁπάσης· εἰ γὰρ ὑποδοχὴ καὶ τιθήνη, ἡ δὲ γένεσις ἄλλο αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀλλοιούμενον ἐν τῇ γενέσει, πρὸ γενέσεως οὖσα εἴη ἄν καὶ πρὸ ἀλλοιώσεως· ἥ τε «ὑποδοχὴ» καὶ ἔτι «ἡ τιθήνη» τηρεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγινόμενον ἕκαστον φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἔξεισι καὶ χώραν εἶναι καὶ ἕδραν. Καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ καὶ εὐθυνόμενον ὡς τόπον εἰδῶν λέγοντος οὐ πάθος λέγει περὶ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ τρόπον ἕτερον ζητεῖ. Τίς οὖν οὗτος; Ἐπειδὴ τὴν λεγομένην ταύτην φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἅπασαν ἐκπεφευγέναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 49E2.
[2] Cp. *Timaeus* 49A5–6. I punctuate here as Beutler-Theiler, not as Henry-Schwyzer.
[3] *Timaeus* 49E7–8; but the last word in Plato is ἀπόλλυται, not ἔξεισι.

encompass and contain it? They will not, certainly, assert that it tries to escape at some times and not at others. For if it tries to escape by its own wish, why does it not always do it? But if it remains by necessity, there is never a time when it is not in some form. But, then, we must try to find the reason why each matter does not always have the same form but is rather in the [always different] forms which enter into it. In what way, then, is it said to "try to escape"?[1] By its own nature, and always. But what can this mean except that it never departs from itself and has the form in such a way that it never has it? On any other interpretation they will be able to do nothing with the phrase which they themselves use, "The receptacle and nurse of all becoming."[2] For if it is receptacle and nurse, becoming is other than it, but that which is altered is in becoming, so matter would be existent before becoming, and before alteration; and the words "receptacle" and also "nurse" imply its maintenance in the state in which it is free from affections; and so does "that in which each thing appears on its entrance, and again goes out from it"[3] and the statements that it is "space" and "seat."[4] And the statement which has been criticised as speaking of a "place of the forms"[5] does not mean an affection of the substrate, but is trying to find another way [of participation]. What is this way, then? Since this nature of which we are speaking must not be any real thing, but must have escaped altogether from the reality of real beings, and be altogether

[4] Cp. *Timaeus* 52A8–B1.
[5] Cp. *Timaeus* 52B4–5.

οὐσίαν καὶ πάντη ἑτέραν—λόγοι γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ ὄντως ὄντες—, ἀνάγκη δὴ αὐτὴν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτῳ φυλάττουσαν αὑτῆς ἣν εἴληχε σωτηρίαν—ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἄδεκτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καί, εἴ τι μίμημα αὐτῶν, καὶ τούτου ἄμοιρον εἰς οἰκείωσιν εἶναι. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἑτέρα πάντη· ἢ εἶδός τι εἰσοικισαμένη μετ' ἐκείνου ἄλλο γενομένη ἀπώλεσε τὸ ἑτέρα εἶναι καὶ χώρα πάντων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχ[1] ὑποδοχή. Ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ εἰσιόντων τὴν αὐτὴν μένειν καὶ ἐξιόντων ἀπαθῆ, ἵνα καὶ εἰσίῃ τι ἀεὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἐξίῃ. Εἴσεισι δὴ τὸ εἰσιὸν εἴδωλον ὂν καὶ εἰς οὐκ ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἀληθές. Ἆρ' οὖν ἀληθῶς; Καὶ πῶς, ᾧ μηδαμῶς θέμις ἀληθείας μετέχειν διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι; Ἆρα οὖν ψευδῶς εἰς ψεῦδος ἔρχεται καὶ παραπλήσιον γίνεται οἷον καὶ εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον, εἰ ὁρῷτο[2] τὰ εἴδωλα τῶν ἐνορωμένων καὶ ἕως ἐνορᾷ ἐκεῖνα; Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐνταῦθα ἀνέλοις τὰ ὄντα, οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδένα χρόνον φανείη τῶν νῦν ἐν αἰσθητῷ ὁρωμένων. Τὸ μὲν οὖν κάτοπτρον ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸ [ἐν][3] ὁρᾶται· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ εἶδός τι· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν εἶδος ὂν αὐτὸ μὲν οὐχ ὁρᾶται· ἔδει γὰρ αὐτὸ πρότερον καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρᾶσθαι· ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν

[1] ὅτου οὐχ Kirchhoff, H–S²: ὁτουοῦν codd.
[2] εἰ ὁρῷτο H–S: ἐνορῶτο codd.
[3] ὁρᾶται Vitringa, H–S: ἐνορᾶται codd.

[1] The English here is intended to represent the probable general sense: the text is obscure and uncertain. Theiler wishes to delete the MSS ἐνορῶτο (H–S εἰ ὁρῷτο) and, (following E. R. Dodds, *Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism* 39)

different—for those real beings are rational principles and really real—it is necessary for it by this difference to guard its own proper self-preservation; it is necessary for it not only to be irreceptive of real beings but as well, if there is [in it] some imitation of them, to have no share in it which will really make it its own. In this way it would be altogether different; otherwise, if it took any form to itself it would in conjunction with it become something else and would cease to be different and space for all things, and the receptacle of absolutely everything. But it must remain the same when the forms come into it and stay unaffected when they leave it, so that something may always be coming into it and leaving it. So certainly what comes into it comes as a phantasm, untrue into the untrue. Does it, then, truly come? How could it, to that which is utterly forbidden to have any part in truth because it is falsehood? Does it, then, come falsely into falsehood, and is what happens very much like the way in which the images of the faces seen in a mirror are perceived there as long as people look into it?[1] For if here below you took away the real beings, none of the things which we now see in the world perceived by the senses would ever at any time appear. Here, certainly, the mirror itself is seen, for it, too, is a form; but in the case of matter, since it is in no way a form, it is not itself seen, for [if it was] it would have to be seen by itself, before the forms come to it; but what happens to it is like the way in which

to read ἐνορώντων for ἐνορωμένων; these corrections would make the text rather easier to understand, but cannot be regarded as certain.

τι πάσχει, οἷον καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ φωτισθεὶς ἀφανής ἐστι καὶ τότε, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ φωτισθῆναι οὐχ ἑωρᾶτο. Ταύτῃ οὖν τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις οὐ πιστεύεται εἶναι ἢ ἧττον, ὅτι ὁρᾶται τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι καὶ μένει μὲν αὐτό, τὰ δὲ ἀπέρχεται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐχ ὁρᾶται αὐτὴ οὔτε ἔχουσα οὔτε ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Εἰ δέ γε ἦν μένειν τὰ ἀφ' ὧν πληροῦται τὰ κάτοπτρα καὶ αὐτὰ μὴ ἑωρᾶτο, οὐκ ἂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθινὰ ἠπιστήθη τὰ ἐνορώμενα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ οὕτω τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἔστω· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι, κἀκεῖ φατέον φαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης αἰτιωμένους τῆς φαντάσεως τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν, ἧς τὰ μὲν ὄντα ὄντως ἀεὶ μεταλαμβάνει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα μὴ ὄντως, ἐπείπερ οὐ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτὰ ὡς εἶχεν ἂν τοῦ ὄντως μὴ ὄντος, εἰ ἦν αὐτά.

14. Τί οὖν; Μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν ὑπέστη ἄν; Ἢ οὐδὲ εἴδωλον κατόπτρου μὴ ὄντος ἤ τινος τοιούτου. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ πεφυκὸς γίνεσθαι ἐκείνου μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις εἰκόνος τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ. Εἰ μὲν γάρ τι ἀπῄει ἀπὸ τῶν ποιούντων, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἦν ἄν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μένει ἐκεῖνα, εἰ ἐμφαντασθήσεται ἐν ἄλλῳ, δεῖ τὸ ἄλλο

the air is invisible even when it is illuminated, because it was unseen without the illumination. So in this way the images in mirrors are not believed or are less believed to be real, because that in which they are is seen, and it remains but they go away; but in matter, it itself is not seen either when it has the images or without them. But if it was possible for the images with which the mirrors are filled to remain, and the mirrors themselves were not seen, we should not disbelieve that the reflections seen in mirrors were real. If, then, there really is something in mirrors, let there really be objects of sense in matter in the same way; but if there is not, but only appears to be something, then we must admit, too, that things only appear on matter, and make the reason for their appearance the existence of the real beings, an existence in which the real beings always really participate, but the beings which are not real, not really; since they cannot be in the same state as they would be if real beings did not really exist and they did.

14. Well, then, if matter did not exist, would nothing come into existence? No, and there would be no image, either, if a mirror or something of the sort did not exist. For that whose nature is to come into existence in something else would not come into existence if that something else did not exist, for this is the nature of an image, being in something else. If, of course, something came away from the productive powers, it would exist without being in something else. But since these remain unmoved, if an image of them is going to appear in another thing, the other thing must exist, offering a base to

εἶναι ἔδραν παρέχον τῷ οὐκ ἐλθόντι, τῇ δ' αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ καὶ τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ οἷον προσαιτήσει καὶ πενίᾳ οἷον βιασάμενον λαβεῖν καὶ ἀπατηθὲν τῇ οὐ λήψει, ἵνα μένῃ ἡ πενία καὶ ἀεὶ προσαιτῇ. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἅρπαξ [1] ὑπέστη, ὁ μὲν μῦθος αὐτὴν ποιεῖ προσαιτοῦσαν ἐνδεικνύμενος αὐτῆς τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἔρημος. Αἰτεῖ τε ὁ προσαιτῶν οὐχ ἃ ἔχει ὁ διδούς, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾷ ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃ· ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς ἕτερον τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ φανταζόμενον. Τό τε ὄνομα ὡς οὐ πληρουμένης. Τὸ δὲ τῷ Πόρῳ συγγίνεσθαι οὐ τῷ ὄντι δηλοῦντός ἐστι συγγίνεσθαι οὐδὲ τῷ κόρῳ, ἀλλά τινι πράγματι εὐμηχάνῳ· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ φαντάσματος. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦ ὄντος πάντη μὴ μετέχειν ὅ τι περ ὁπωσοῦν ἔξω ὂν αὐτοῦ ἐστιν —αὕτη γὰρ ὄντος φύσις ⟨εἰς⟩ [2] τὰ ὄντα ποιεῖν—τὸ δὲ πάντη μὴ ὂν ἄμικτον τῷ ὄντι, θαῦμα τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, πῶς μὴ μετέχον μετέχει, καὶ πῶς οἷον παρὰ τῆς γειτνιάσεως ἔχει τι καίπερ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει μὲν οἷον κολλᾶσθαι ἀδυνατοῦν. Ἀπολισθάνει οὖν ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ φύσεως ἀλλοτρίας ὃ ἔλαβεν ἄν, οἷον ἠχὼ ἀπὸ τόπων λείων καὶ ὁμαλῶν· ὅτι μὴ μένει ἐκεῖ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐφαντάσθη ἐκεῖ κἀκεῖθεν

[1] ἅρπαξ Harder, H–S: ἅπαξ codd.
[2] ⟨εἰς⟩ Harder, H–S².

[1] The interpretation of the beggar-woman Poverty in Plato's myth of the birth of Love (*Symposium* 203B ff.) as matter is pre-Plotinian (see note to ch. 5 of III. 5 [50]). Plotinus uses it differently in different places to suit his philosophical purposes. In his full-length interpretation of the

that which does not come to it; this other thing by its presence and its self-assertion and a kind of begging and its poverty makes a sort of violent attempt to grasp, and is cheated by not grasping, so that its poverty may remain and it may be always begging. For since it is a rapacious thing, the myth makes it a beggar woman to show its nature, that it is destitute of the good. And the beggar does not ask for what the giver has but is satisfied with what he gets, so that this, too, shows that what is imaged in matter is other [than real being]. And the name [Poverty] shows that matter is not satisfied. And by its union with "Resource" Plato makes clear that it is not united with real being or with plenitude but with a resourceful thing, that is, with the cleverness of the apparition.[1] For, since it is impossible for anything whatever, which in any sort of way exists outside it, to have altogether no share in being—for this is the nature of being, to work on beings—and since, on the other hand, the altogether non-existent cannot combine with being, what happens is a wonder; how does the non-participant participate, and how does it have something as if from being next door, although by its own nature it is incapable of being, so to speak, stuck on to it? What it might have grasped, then, slips away from it as if from an alien nature, like an echo from smooth flat surfaces; because it does not stay there, by this very fact the illusion is created that

myth in III. 5. 6–9, Poverty is intelligible matter. Here, and in the verbal allusion (*προσαιτεῖ*) to the myth at I. 8 [51] 14. 35, she is the matter of the sense-world. The idea that the name Πόρος (Resource) indicates something tricky, illusory, phantasmal, occurs only here.

εἶναι. Εἰ δ' ἦν μετασχοῦσα καὶ οὕτω δεξαμένη, ὥσπερ τις ἀξιοῖ, καταποθὲν ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ προσελθὸν ἔδυ. Νῦν δὲ φαίνεται, ὅτι μὴ κατεπόθη, ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἡ αὐτὴ οὐδὲν δεξαμένη, ἀλλ' ἐπισχοῦσα τὴν πρόσοδον [1] ὡς ἕδρα ἀπωθουμένη καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν προσιόντων κἀκεῖ μιγνυμένων ὑποδοχή, οἷον ὅσα πρὸς ἥλιον πῦρ ζητοῦντες λαβεῖν ἱστᾶσι λεῖα, τὰ δὲ καὶ πληροῦντες ὕδατος, ἵνα μὴ διέλθῃ κωλυομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔνδον ἐναντίου ἡ φλόξ, ἔξω δὲ συνίσταιτο. Γίνεται οὖν αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ συνιστάμενα τοιοῦτον συνίσταται τρόπον.

15. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τὸ πῦρ ἐξ ἡλίου περὶ αὐτὰ συναγόντων ἅτε παρὰ αἰσθητοῦ πυρὸς λαμβανόντων τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ γινομένην ἔξαψιν τὸ αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει· διὸ καὶ φαίνεται, ὅτι ἔξω τὰ συνιστάμενα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ πλησίον καὶ ἅπτεται καὶ πέρατα δύο· ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης λόγος ἄλλον ἔχει τρόπον τὸ ἔξω. Ἡ γὰρ ἑτερότης τῆς φύσεως ἀρκεῖ οὐδὲν πέρατος διπλοῦ δεομένη, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον παντὸς πέρατος ἀλλοτρία [2] τῇ ἑτερότητι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ οὐδαμῇ συγγενείᾳ τὸ ἀμιγὲς ἔχουσα· καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ μένειν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τοῦτο, ὅτι μή τι τὸ εἰσιὸν

[1] *πρόσοδον* Creuzer, H–S²: *πρόοδον* codd.
[2] *ἀλλοτρία* Kirchhoff, H–S: *ἀλλοτρίου* wxy: *ἀλλοτριουμένη* Q.

[1] This is a striking example of the way in which Plotinus suggests the true nature and relationship of immaterial realities

it is there and comes from there. But if matter really was participant and received being in the way one thinks it does, what came to it would be swallowed and sink into it. But as things are, it is apparent that it is not swallowed but matter remains the same and receives nothing, but checks the approach as a repellent base and a receptacle for the things which come to the same point and there mingle; it is like the polished objects which people set against the sun when they want to get fire (and they fill some of them with water), so that the ray, being hindered by the resistance within, may not pass through, but be concentrated on the outside. So matter becomes in this way the cause of coming into being, and the things that are constructed in it are constructed in this way.

15. In the case of the things which collect around them the fire from the sun, since they receive the lighting up which occurs around them from a perceptible fire, they themselves have the property of being perceptible; therefore it is clear, too, that the rays which come together on them are outside them and next and close to them, and touch them, and there are two edges; but the formative principle on matter is outside in a different way. The difference of its nature is enough, with no need of a pair of edges; but it is, rather, completely incompatible with any sort of edge,[1] and owes its freedom from mixture with matter to the difference of its being and its having no sort of kinship with it; and this is the reason why matter remains by itself, that neither does that which

by taking an analogy from the material world and "dematerialising" it; cp. the remarkable use of this method to describe spiritual omnipresence in VI. 4 [22] 7.

ἀπολαύει αὐτῆς, οὐδ' αὐτὴ τοῦ εἰσιόντος· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι ἐν ψυχῇ οὐ κέκρανται, ἀλλ' ἄπεισι πάλιν ἑκάστη ὡς οὖσα ὅ ἐστι μόνη οὐδὲν ἐφέλκουσα οὐδὲ καταλείπουσα, ὅτι μὴ ἐμέμικτο· καὶ τὸ ἔξω, οὐχ ὅτι ἐπέκειτο, καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἐστιν οὐχ ὁράσει ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος φησίν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν εἴδωλον ὂν ἡ φαντασία οὐκ εἰδώλου τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς ψυχῆς, καίπερ πολλὰ δοκοῦσα ἄγειν καὶ ὅπῃ θέλει ἄγειν, χρῆται μὲν αὐτῇ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὡς ὕλῃ ἢ ἀνάλογον, οὐ μέντοι ἔκρυψε ταῖς παρ' αὐτῆς ἐνεργείαις πολλάκις ἐξωθουμένη οὐδὲ ἐποίησεν αὐτήν, οὐδ' εἰ μετὰ πάσης ἔλθοι, κεκρύφθαι καί τι αὐτὴν φαντάζεσθαι· ἔχει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεργείας καὶ λόγους ἐναντίους, οἷς ἀπωθεῖται τὰ προσιόντα. Ἡ δὲ—ἀσθενεστέρα γάρ ἐστιν [ἢ][1] ὡς πρὸς δύναμιν πολλῷ ψυχῆς καὶ ἔχει οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων οὔτ' ἀληθὲς οὔτ' αὖ οἰκεῖον ψεῦδος—οὐκ ἔχει δὲ δι' ὅτου φανῇ ἐρημία πάντων οὖσα, ἀλλὰ γίνεται μὲν αἰτία ἄλλοις τοῦ φαίνεσθαι, οὐ δύναται δὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς « ἐγὼ ἐνταῦθα », ἀλλ' εἴ ποτε ἐξεύροι αὐτὴν λόγος βαθύς τις ἐξ ἄλλων ὄντων, ὡς ἄρα ἐστί τι ἀπολελειμμένον πάντων τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὕστερον δοξάντων

[1] ἢ del. Kirchhoff, H–S².

enters it get anything from it, nor does it get anything from what comes into it; but it is like what happens with opinions and mental pictures in the soul, which are not blended with it, but each one goes away again, as being what it is alone, carrying nothing off with it and leaving nothing behind, because it was not mixed with soul; and being outside does not mean that the form rests upon the matter, and that upon which it is, is not visibly other, but reason declares that it is. Now in the soul the mental picture is a phantasm, while the nature of the soul is not phantasmal; and although the mental picture in many ways seems to lead the soul and take it wherever it wants to, the soul none the less uses it as if it was matter or something like it, and certainly the mental picture does not conceal it, since it is often expelled by the activities springing from it, and it does not, even if it comes with all its pictorial power, make the soul to be completely concealed and to appear in any way to be the picture itself, for the soul has in it activities and rational principles which are in opposition, with which it repels the things which attack it. But matter—for it is much weaker, as far as any exercise of power goes, than soul, and has none of the things that exist, neither a true one nor a falsity which is really its own—has nothing by means of which it can appear since it is destitution of everything, but it becomes the cause for other things of their appearing but is not even able to say " Here I am "; but if some deep research should discover it and distinguish it from other existing things [it would appear] that it is something abandoned by all existing things and by the things which come after

εἶναι, ἑλκόμενον εἰς πάντα καὶ ἀκολουθοῦν ὡς δόξαι καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἀκολουθοῦν.

16. Καὶ μέν τις ἐλθὼν λόγος ἀγαγὼν εἰς ὅσον αὐτὸς ἤθελεν ἐποίησεν αὐτὴν μέγα παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ μέγα περιθεὶς αὐτῇ οὐκ οὔσῃ, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ γενομένῃ· τὸ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῇ μέγα μέγεθος ἦν. Ἐὰν οὖν τις τοῦτο ἀφέλῃ τὸ εἶδος, οὐκέτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον μέγα, ἀλλ' εἰ ἦν τὸ γενόμενον μέγα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἵππου τὸ μέγα τοῦ ἵππου ἐπελθόν, ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἵππου καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἀπέρχεται. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὡς ὁ ἵππος ἐπὶ μεγάλου τινὸς ὄγκου καὶ τοσοῦδε γίνεται καὶ μένει τὸ μέγα, φήσομεν μὴ τὸ τοῦ ἵππου μέγα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ὄγκου μέγα μένειν ἐκεῖ. Εἰ μέντοι ὁ ὄγκος οὗτος πῦρ ἐστιν ἢ γῆ, ἀπελθόντος τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπέρχεται ἢ τὸ τῆς γῆς μέγα. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ σχήματος οὐδὲ τοῦ μεγέθους ἀπολαύσειεν ἄν· ἢ οὐκ ἐκ πυρὸς ἄλλο τι ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μένουσα πῦρ οὐ πῦρ γενήσεται. Ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν τοσαύτη γενομένη, ὡς δοκεῖ, ὅσον τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἰ παύσαιτο ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα, σὺν πᾶσι[1] τούτοις καὶ τὸ μέγεθος πᾶν οἰχήσεται ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι δηλονότι ὁμοῦ ποιότητες, καὶ καταλειφθήσεται ὅπερ ἦν σῴζουσα οὐδὲν τῶν πρότερον περὶ αὐτὴν οὕτως ὄντων. Καίτοι ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ πεπονθέναι

[1] σὺν πᾶσι Creuzer: σύμπασι codd.

them that seem to exist, dragged into all things and corresponding to them as far as seeming goes, and again not [really] corresponding.

16. And further, when some rational formative principle comes upon it and brings it to the size which the principle itself wishes, it makes it a size by imposing the size from itself on matter, which is not the size and does not in this way become it; for [if it did] the size imposed on it would be [real] magnitude. If, then, one were to take away this form, what underlies it neither is any longer nor appears a thing of size, but if the thing of size which came to be was a man or a horse, and with the horse the size of the horse came upon the matter, when the horse goes away its size goes too. But if someone were to say that the basis of the horse is a mass of a certain size, and the size remains, our answer is that what remains in the matter is not the size of the horse but the size of the mass. If, then, this mass is fire or earth, when the fire goes away the size of fire (or of earth) goes away too. So, then, matter will not profit by either shape or size; otherwise it will not be something else after being fire, but will remain fire while becoming something which is not fire. Since, even now, when matter, as it seems, has become so great that it is the size of this universe, if the heaven and all within it had a stop, with all these the magnitude, all of it, would go away from matter and, obviously, all the other qualities as well, and matter would be left what it was and keep none of the qualifications which previously existed in it. Certainly, in the things which have the property of being affected by the presence of certain other things, even when those

παρουσίᾳ τινῶν, καὶ ἀπελθόντων ἔστι τι ἔτι ἐν τοῖς λαβοῦσιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ παθοῦσιν οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος φωτὸς περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντος καὶ ἀπελθόντος τούτου. Ἐὰν δέ τις θαυμάζῃ, πῶς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος μέγα ἔσται, πῶς δ' οὐκ ἔχον θερμότητα θερμὸν ἔσται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῇ καὶ μεγέθει εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἄυλον μέγεθός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄυλον σχῆμα. Καὶ εἰ τηροῦμεν τὴν ὕλην, μεταλήψει πάντα· ἓν δὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς σώμασι συνθέτοις οὖσιν ἔστι καὶ μέγεθος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μὴν ἀφωρισμένον, ἐπειδὴ ἐν σώματος λόγῳ ἔγκειται καὶ μέγεθος· ἐν δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐδὲ τὸ οὐκ ἀφωρισμένον· οὐ γὰρ σῶμα.

17. Οὐδ' αὖ μέγεθος αὐτὸ ἔσται. Εἶδος γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ' οὐ δεκτικόν· καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος [ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τι μίμημα αὐτῶν καὶ τούτου ἄμοιρον εἰς οἰκείωσιν εἶναι],[1] οὐχ οὕτω μέγεθος. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ βούλεται ἐν νῷ ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ κείμενον μέγα εἶναι, ἔδωκε τοῖς οἷον ἐθέλουσι μιμεῖσθαι ἐφέσει αὐτοῦ ἢ κινήσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτῶν πάθος ἐνσείσασθαι εἰς ἄλλο. Τὸ οὖν μέγα ἐν προόδῳ φαντάσεως θέον εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ μέγα συνθεῖν ποιῆσαν τὸ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης, πεποίη-

[1] ἀλλὰ . . . εἶναι del. Kirchhoff, H–S.

[1] The words bracketed here in the Greek text are a repetition of ch. 13. 26–27: they do not fit here, and are omitted in the translation.

other things have gone away there is something still remaining in the things which have received them; but in things which are not affected there is nothing any more, in the air, for instance, when light has been in it and gone away. But suppose someone wondered how, without having magnitude, matter could be a size —well, how, without having heat, will it be hot? For certainly it is not the same thing for it to exist and to exist in magnitude, granted that magnitude is immaterial, just as shape is immaterial. And if we are to keep matter as matter, it will be all things [only] by participation; but magnitude, too, is one of all the things it will be. So, then, in composite bodies magnitude is present along with their other determinations (certainly not separated from them), since magnitude, too, is included in the definition of body; but in matter not even this non-separated magnitude is present, for it is not a body.

17. Nor, again, will it be absolute magnitude. For magnitude is a form but not something receptive; and magnitude is something which is by itself,[1] and not magnitude in this particular relation. But since, while it is at rest in intellect or in soul, it wants to be large,[2] it gives to the things which, in a way, want to imitate it by an aspiration for it or a movement towards it the ability to insert their affection into something else. So, then, size, running on in its image-making progression, and making the littleness of matter run with it towards this very size, has made

[2] Cp. the account of the origin of time in III. 7 [45] 11. 20 ff. These two chapters show very well Plotinus's dynamic conception of form. Even so abstract (to our way of thinking) a form as that of size is for him a living active reality.

κεν αὐτὸ τῇ παρατάσει οὐ πληρούμενον δοκεῖν εἶναι μέγα. Τὸ γὰρ ψευδῶς μέγα τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅταν τῷ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ μέγα εἶναι ἐκτεινόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο παραταθῇ τῇ ἐκτάσει. Ποιούντων γὰρ πάντων ὄντων εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ἢ τὸ ἄλλο τὴν αὐτῶν ἐνόπτρισιν ἕκαστόν τε τῶν ποιούντων ὡς αὐτὸ ἦν μέγα, τό τε πᾶν ἦν ἐκείνως μέγα. Συνῄει οὖν τὸ ἑκάστου λόγου μετὰ τό τι μέγα, οἷον ἵππου καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου, καὶ τὸ μέγα[1] αὐτό· καὶ ἐγίγνετο πᾶσα μὲν μέγα πρὸς αὐτόμεγα ἐλλαμπομένη, καὶ ἑκάστη δὲ μοῖρα μέγα τι· καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐφαίνετο ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους, οὗ τὸ μέγα, καὶ ἐξ ἑκάστου· καὶ οἷον παρετέτατο καὶ πρὸς πᾶν καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἐν εἴδει τοῦτο ἀναγκασθεῖσα εἶναι καὶ ἐν ὄγκῳ, ὅσον ἡ δύναμις πεποίηκε τὸ μηδὲν ὂν αὐτὸ πάντα εἶναι· οἷον αὐτῷ τῷ φαίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τὸ ἐξ οὐ χρώματος καὶ ἡ ποιότης ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐξ οὐ ποιότητος ἔσχε τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνων, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἐξ οὐ μεγέθους ἢ ὁμωνύμου μεταξὺ θεωρουμένων ἐκείνων καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους αὐτοῦ. Καὶ φαίνεται μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, ψεύδεται δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ᾧ φαίνεται. Μεγεθύνεται δὲ ἕκαστα ἑλκόμενα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν

[1] μέγα Vitringa, H–S²: μὲν codd.

it by extension, though it is not filled, appear to be large. For this is what false size is, when, because it does not possess real size, being stretched out towards it, it is extended by the stretching out. For, since all real beings produce upon other things, or the other thing, a mirroring of themselves, as each one of the beings that act had size, in that way the totality of them had size. So the size of each individual forming principle which is the consequence of its distinctive character, of a horse, for instance, or anything else, came together, and also absolute size; and matter as a whole became a size, illumined by absolute size, and each part of it became a particular size; and all the sizes appeared together, from the whole form, to which the size belonged, and from each individual [partial] form; and it was as if extended to the whole form and all the forms, and was compelled to be this size in form and in bulk, in so far as the power [of form] made what was nothing in itself to be everything, as, then, by the very fact of appearing the colour which comes from that which is not colour, and the quality here which comes from that which is not quality, have a name which is the same as and derives from their intelligible principles, so also magnitude comes from that which is not magnitude, or [only] has the same name, since those [form-appearances in matter] present themselves to our contemplation in the middle between matter itself and form itself. They appear because they come from the higher world, but their appearance is false because that in which they appear does not exist. Individual things acquire magnitude by being drawn out by the power of the

ἐνορωμένων καὶ χώραν ἑαυτοῖς ποιούντων, ἕλκεται δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα οὐ βίᾳ τῷ ὕλῃ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι. Ἕλκει δὲ ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ ἐκεῖθεν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν μέγα τὴν ὕλην, ὡς δοκεῖ, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμφαντάσεως τοῦ μέγα καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἐμφανταθέν, τὸ ἐνταῦθα μέγα· ἡ δὲ ὕλη, ἐφ' ἧς ἀναγκάζεται συνθεῖν, ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πανταχοῦ παρέχει ἑαυτήν· ὕλη γάρ ἐστι καὶ τούτου καὶ οὐ τουτί· ὃ δὲ μή ἐστί τι παρ' αὐτοῦ, δύναται γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δι' ἄλλο καὶ γενόμενον τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν· ἔστη γὰρ ἄν.

18. Ὁ τοίνυν νόησιν μεγάλου ἔχων, εἰ αὐτοῦ ἡ νόησις δύναμιν ἔχοι μὴ μόνον ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷον πρὸς τὸ ἔξω ὑπὸ δυνάμεως φέροιτο, λάβοι ἂν φύσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι, οὐδέ τι ἔχουσαν εἶδος οὐδέ τι ἴχνος τοῦ μεγάλου, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οὐδενός του[1] ἄλλου. Τί ἂν ποιήσειε ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει; Οὐχ ἵππον, οὐ βοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄλλοι ποιήσουσιν. Ἢ, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ μεγάλου πατρὸς ἔρχεται, οὐ δύναται τὸ ἄλλο χωρῆσαι μέγα, τοῦτο δ' ἕξει ἐμφανταζόμενον. Τῷ δὴ μὴ οὕτως εὐτυχήσαντι τοῦ μεγάλου ὡς αὐτὸ μέγα εἶναι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε μεγάλῳ φαίνεσθαι λοιπόν ἐστι. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ μὴ ἐλλείπειν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ συγγενῆ ἔχειν μέρη καὶ ἀπολείπεσθαι μηδενός. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠνείχετο ἐν σμικρῷ ὄγκῳ [τὸ][2] ἴσον ἔτι τὸ τοῦ μεγάλου εἴδωλον εἶναι μεγάλου ὄν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ἐφίετο τῆς ἐλπίδος

[1] του Kirchhoff, H–S: τε codd.
[2] τὸ del. Müller, H–S².

forms which are visible in matter and make a place for themselves, and they are drawn out to everything without violence because the universe exists by matter. Each form draws out by its own power which it has; and it has it from the higher world. And that which makes matter large (as it seems) comes from the imaging in it of size, and that which is imaged in it is size in this world; and the matter on which it is imaged is compelled to keep pace with it, and submits itself to it all together and everywhere, for it is matter and belongs to this size and is not this size; but what is nothing of itself can become the opposite, too, by means of something else, and when it has become the opposite is not that either, for if it was it would be static.

18. Suppose that someone had a thought of size, if his thought had power not only to exist in itself but was taken outside, so to speak, by its power, it would take hold of a nature which did not exist in the thinker, and had no form and no trace of size, or of anything else either. What, then, would it make with this power? Not a horse or an ox; others will make these. Since it comes from a father of size, the other thing cannot attain to size but will have it imaged in it. Certainly, for a thing which has not the good fortune to be so well endowed with size as to be a size itself, what is left is to appear to have size in its parts as much as is possible for it. But this means not being deficient, and not being scattered all over the place, and having related parts in itself, and not falling short in anything. For the image of size, since it is an image of size, cannot endure to be equal still in a small mass, but in proportion as it

ἐκείνου προσῆλθέ τε ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ συνθέοντος αὐτῷ ἀπολειφθῆναι οὐ δυναμένου, καὶ πεποίηκε μέγα τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ μὴ μέγα μηδ' οὕτω δόξαι καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον ἐν ὄγκῳ μέγα. Ἡ δ' ὅμως φυλάττει τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀποχρωμένη τούτῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ οἷον ἀμφιέσματι, ὃ συνδραμοῦσα αὐτῷ ὅτε θέον αὐτὴν ἦγεν ἀμπέσχετο· ὃ εἰ ὁ ἀμφιέσας ἀφέλοιτο, μενεῖ πάλιν ἡ αὐτή, οἵαπερ παρ' αὐτῆς ἦν ἢ[1] τοσαύτη, ὅσον ἂν τὸ παρὸν εἶδος αὐτὴν ποιῇ. Ἡ μέν γε ψυχὴ τὰ τῶν ὄντων εἴδη ἔχουσα εἶδος οὖσα καὶ αὐτὴ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἔχει καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ἑκάστου ὁμοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ, τά τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἴδη οἷον ἀναστρέφοντα πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ προσιόντα ὁρῶσα οὐκ ἀνέχεται μετὰ πλήθους δέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀποθέμενα τὸν ὄγκον ὁρᾷ· οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅ ἐστι γενέσθαι. Ἡ δὲ ὕλη οὐδὲν ἔχουσα τὸ ἀντικόπτον, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἐνέργειαν, οὖσα δὲ σκιά, ἀναμένει παθεῖν ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τὸ ποιῆσον. Τό τε οὖν προιὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λόγου ἤδη ἴχνος ἔχει τοῦ μέλλοντος γενήσεσθαι· οἷον γὰρ ἐν φαντασίᾳ εἰκονικῇ κινούμενος ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου μερισμός ἐστιν· ἤ, εἰ ταὐτὸν εἴη ἕν, οὐδὲ ἐκινήθη, ἀλλὰ μένει· ἥ τε ὕλη πάντα ὁμοῦ ὥσπερ

[1] ἢ CQ; ἡ wxUS, H–S.

aspires to the hope of reaching [real] size, it advances as far as it can with that which runs along with it and cannot be left behind, and gives size to that which has not got it and does not appear to have it, and to the size which appears in mass. But matter, all the same, keeps its own nature and makes use of this size as a kind of garment, which it put on when it ran with it as the size in its course led it along; but if what put this garment on takes it off, matter remains again the same as it is of itself, or the size which the form present to it makes it.[1] Now the soul which holds the forms of real beings, and is itself, too, a form, holds them all gathered together, and each individual form is gathered together in itself; and when it sees the forms of things perceived by the senses as it were turning back towards it and approaching it, it does not endure to receive them with their multiplicity, but sees them stripped of their mass; for it cannot become anything else than what it is. But matter, which has no resistance, for it has no activity, but is a shadow, waits passively to endure whatever that which acts upon it wishes. So therefore, both that which proceeds from the rational principle in the higher world has already a trace of what is going to come into being, for when the rational principle is moved in a sort of picture-making imagination, either the movement which comes from it is a division, or, if it did remain one and the same, it would not be moved, but stay as it was; and matter, too, is not able to harbour all things gathered

[1] I adopt here with Beutler-Theiler and other editors the reading ἤ, which seems to me to give a better sense: Henry-Schwyzer prefer ἡ.

ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δύναται εἰσοικίσασθαι· ἢ ἦν ἄν τι ἐκείνων· αὐτήν τε αὖ δεῖ τὰ πάντα δέξασθαι, μὴ ἀμερῶς δὲ δέξασθαι. Δεῖ τοίνυν πᾶσι τόπον οὖσαν ἐπὶ πάντα αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ἀπαντῆσαι καὶ πρὸς πᾶν διάστημα ἀρκέσαι, ὅτι μὴ κατείληπται διαστήματι αὐτή, ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκκειμένη τῷ μέλλοντι. Πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰσελθὸν ἕν τι ἐκώλυσε τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις εἶναι; Ἢ οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν πρῶτον· εἰ δ' ἄρα, τὸ τοῦ παντὸς εἶδος· ὥστε πάντα μὲν ἅμα, ἐν μέρει δὲ ἕκαστον· ζῴου γὰρ ὕλη μερισθεῖσα σὺν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου μερισμῷ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

19. Τὰ μὲν δὴ εἰσελθόντα εἰς τὴν ὕλην ὥσπερ μητέρα ἀδικεῖ οὐδὲν οὐδ' αὖ ὠφελεῖ. Οὐδέ γε αἱ πληγαὶ αἱ τούτων πρὸς αὐτήν, πρὸς ἄλληλα δέ, ὅτι αἱ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ πρὸς τὰ ὑποκείμενα, εἰ μή τις συνειλημμένα θεωρεῖ τοῖς ἐπεισιοῦσι· θερμὸν γὰρ ἔπαυσε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν τὸ λευκὸν ἢ συγκραθέντα ἄλλην ποιότητα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐποίησε. Τὰ παθόντα οὖν τὰ κρατηθέντα,[1] τὸ δὲ παθεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅπερ ἦσαν. Καὶ

[1] *κρατηθέντα* Harder, H–S²: *κραθέντα* codd.

[1] For the contrast here between soul which contains all forms non-spatially and so undivided and matter, which must necessarily receive them as dimensional and divided, cp. II. 4 [12] 11. 15 ff.

[2] Cp. *Timaeus* 52B4.

together, as soul is; if it could, it would belong to the higher world; it must certainly receive all things, but not receive them undivided.[1] It must then, since it is a place for all things,[2] come to all of them itself and meet them and be sufficient for every dimension, because it is not itself captured by dimension but lies open to that which is going to come to it. How, then, when one particular form enters it, does it not hinder the others, which cannot be [present in it] one upon another? The answer is that there is no first form, unless perhaps it is the form of the universe, so that all forms will be present together, and each individual one in its own part, for the matter of a living thing is divided along with the division of the living thing;[3] otherwise, there would be nothing besides the forming principle.

19. The forms which enter into matter as their "mother"[4] do it no wrong, nor again do they do it any good. Their blows are not for it, but for each other, because their powers are directed towards their opposites, not their substrates (unless one considers these as included with the entering forms), for cold puts a stop to heat and white to black, or they are mixed together and make another quality out of themselves. The things which are affected, then, are the things which are overcome, and their being affected consists in their not being what they

[3] The universe is, of course, for Plotinus a single living organism, so this is not a mere analogy.

[4] Cp. *Timaeus* 50D3 and 51A4–5. Plotinus has to accept the name "mother" on the authority of Plato, but finds it an embarrassing one, as it conflicts with his conviction of the essential barrenness of matter, and does his best to explain it away; see below.

ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις δὲ αἱ μὲν πείσεις περὶ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς ἐνυπαρχούσας τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως γινομένης, λυομένων δὲ τῶν συστάσεων ἢ συνιουσῶν ἢ μετατιθεμένων παρὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν σύστασιν τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, ταῖς δὲ ψυχαῖς αἱ γνώσεις συνημμέναις τῶν σφοδροτέρων· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ γινώσκουσιν. Ἡ δὲ ὕλη μένει· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπελθόντος μὲν πέπονθε τοῦ ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ θερμοῦ ἐπελθόντος· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οὔτε φίλον αὐτῇ οὔτε ἀλλότριον ὁποτερονοῦν. Ὥστε οἰκειότερον αὐτῇ ἡ ὑποδοχὴ καὶ τιθήνη· ἡ δὲ μήτηρ οἷον εἴρηται· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὕτη γεννᾷ. Ἀλλ' ἐοίκασι μητέρα αὐτὴν λέγειν ὅσοι καὶ τὴν μητέρα τάξιν ὕλης πρὸς τὰ γεννώμενα ἀξιοῦσιν ἔχειν, ὡς ὑποδεχομένης μόνον, οὐδὲν δὲ εἰς τὰ γεννώμενα διδούσης· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅσον σῶμα τοῦ γινομένου ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς. Εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν ἡ μήτηρ τι τῷ γεννωμένῳ, οὐ καθ' ὅσον ὕλη, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ εἶδος· μόνον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος γόνιμον, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα φύσις ἄγονος. Ὅθεν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ πάλαι σοφοὶ μυστικῶς καὶ ἐν τελεταῖς αἰνιττόμενοι Ἑρμῆν μὲν ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀρχαῖον τὸ τῆς γενέσεως ὄργανον ἀεὶ ἔχοντα πρὸς ἐργασίαν τὸν γεννῶντα τὰ ἐν αἰσθήσει δηλοῦντες εἶναι τὸν νοητὸν λόγον,

[1] This view was current in Greece in the 5th century B.C.: it was held by Anaxagoras and others (Aristotle *De Gen. An.* Δ 1. 763b32–34). Aeschylus makes Apollo bring it forward in defence of Orestes (*Eumenides* 658–661). Aristotle himself accepted it with some refinements and modifications (perhaps

were. And in beings endowed with soul the affections are in their bodies, when alteration takes place according to their qualities and immanent powers; and when the unions of their constituent parts are dissolved, or when they come together, or are changed against their natural constitution, it is only knowledge of the more extreme changes which reaches their associated souls; if the changes are not extreme, they know nothing of them. But matter abides, for it was affected in no way when the cold went away and the heat came to it; for neither of them was in friendly association with it or alien to it. So that " receptacle " and " nurse " are more proper terms for it; but " mother " is only used in a manner of speaking, for matter itself brings forth nothing. But those people seem to call it " mother " who claim that the mother holds the position of matter in respect to her children, in that she only receives [the seed] and contributes nothing to the children,[1] since all the body of the child which is born, too, comes from the food. But if the mother does contribute something to the child, it is not in so far as she is matter, but because she is also form, for only form can produce offspring, but the other nature is sterile. It was for this reason, I think, that the ancient sages, speaking in riddles secretly and in the mystery rites, make the ancient Hermes always have the organ of generation ready for its work, revealing that the intelligible formative principle is the generator of the things in the sense-world, but revealing, too, the

alluded to by Plotinus in the next sentence): cp. *De Gen. An.* A.20 729a10 ff., with A. L. Peck's comments in the introduction to his Loeb edition, p. xi ff.

τὸ δὲ ἄγονον τῆς ὕλης μενούσης τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἀγόνων δηλοῦντες. Μητέρα γὰρ πάντων ποιήσαντες, ἣν δὴ οὕτως ἐπιφημίζουσι τὴν κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχὴν λαβόντες καὶ ὄνομα τοῦτο θέμενοι, ἵνα δηλοῖεν ὃ βούλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα οὐχ ὅμοιον πάντη ἐνδείκνυσθαι θέλοντες, τοῖς ὅστις ὁ τρόπος βουλομένοις ἀκριβέστερον λαβεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιπολῆς ζητοῦσι πόρρωθεν μέν, ὅμως δὲ ὡς ἐδύναντο, ἐνεδείξαντο ὡς ἄγονός τε καὶ οὐδὲ πάντη θῆλυς, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν θῆλυς, ὅσον ὑποδέξασθαι, ὅσον δὲ γεννᾶν οὐκέτι, τῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν κεχωρηκὸς πρὸς αὐτὴν μήτε θῆλυ εἶναι, μήτε γεννᾶν δύνασθαι, ἀποτετμημένον δὲ πάσης τῆς τοῦ γεννᾶν δυνάμεως, ἣ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει τῷ μένοντι ἄρρενι.

[1] This allegorical interpretation of the ithyphallic Hermes is Stoic in origin, though, as always, Plotinus adapts it to his own philosophical system: for the original Stoic form, cp. Cornutus, *Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, p. 23, 16–22 Lang. The allegorical interpretation of the eunuchs who surround the Great Mother given here seems to have no parallel (Cp. Lucretius II. 614–617 and Augustine *De Civitate Dei* VII. chs. 24–25 for other interpretations). It is so far-fetched (as Plotinus admits, cp. l. 36 below) and so exactly adapted to Plotinus's own distinctive doctrine of the absolute sterility of matter that it may well be his own invention.

sterility of matter which always remains the same through the eunuchs who accompany her [the Great Mother].[1] For when they make matter the mother of all things, they apply this title to it taking it in the sense of the principle which has the function of substrate; they give it this name in order to declare what they wish, not wishing to make matter in every way exactly like the mother; to those who want to know more accurately in what way [it is a mother] and do not make a merely superficial investigation, they show, by a far-fetched analogy, but all the same as best they could, that matter is sterile and not in every way female but only female as far as receiving goes, but no longer when it comes to generation; they show this by making that which approaches it neither female nor able to generate, but cut off from all power of generation, which only that which remains male has.

III. 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 45 in Porphyry's chronological order. It is one of the two major discussions of time in the surviving works of ancient philosophers, the other being that by Aristotle (*Physics* IV. 10–14. 217b–224a) which Plotinus criticises in chs. 9 and 12–13. There do not seem to have been any changes or developments of great importance in philosophical thought about time between Aristotle and Plotinus. Though Stoic and Epicurean views are dealt with in the critical part of the treatise (chs. 7–10), Plotinus is mainly concerned with ways of thinking about time which were already current in the early Academy, which linked time very closely with the movement of the heavens, and with Aristotle's view of time as the number or measure of motion.

As a Platonist, Plotinus bases his discussion of eternity and time on the passage of the *Timaeus* (37D–38B) where Plato speaks of the making of time as a " moving image of eternity." It is this conception of time as the image of eternity which is the starting-point of his own thought about both. They are for him essentially two kinds of life, the life of the divine Intellect and the life of Soul. In the first part of the treatise (chs. 1–6) he develops his profound conception of eternity as " the life which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval " (ch. 3. 36–38), which deeply influenced Christian patristic and medieval thought: cp. the classical definition of Boethius, *interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio* (*De Consolatione Philosophiae* V. Prosa 6). And in ch. 11, one of his

liveliest and most original passages of philosophical exposition, after criticising the views of his predecessors on time in the preceding chapters, he explains his own idea of it as the life of the soul in movement. This certainly influenced the thought of St. Augustine on time (cp. especially *Confessions* XI. 14–28), though the two differ in accordance with their different conceptions of soul. The later Neoplatonists are further removed from Plotinus than the Christians are in their conceptions of eternity and time, because of their insistence on making both into substantive principles, divine beings with their own proper places in the hierarchy of reality (cp. Proclus, *Elements of Theology* Prop. 53, with the commentary of E. R. Dodds).

Synopsis

The starting-point of our thought about eternity and time is our own experience of both; but when we concentrate on this and try to arrive at full understanding of it we meet difficulties which can be cleared up by a close and discriminating study of the opinions of the ancient philosophers. We will begin with eternity of which time is the image, though it would be possible also to go the other way, from image to archetype (ch. 1). What is eternity? Not the intelligible universe itself, nor the rest in it (ch. 2). It is the life of that which exists completely and simultaneously, without before and after (ch. 3). Eternity and the wholeness of real being; duration and movement in time are essential to the existence of things which come into being (ch. 4). We contemplate eternity by the eternal in ourselves; it is the self-manifestation of divinity, a total life (ch. 5). Eternity and unity; it is the life of real being around the One; "always existing" really means "truly existing"; that which exists in time is deficient in existence (ch. 6). We are in some way both in eternity and in time. What is time? Classification of the accounts of earlier philosophers:

(i) time is movement, (ii) it is what is moved, (iii) it is something belonging to movement (ch. 7). Refutation of (i) and (ii); time cannot be either all movement, or ordered movement or the particular ordered movement of the sphere of heaven, nor can it be the sphere itself. Refutation of the Stoic form of (iii); time cannot be the distance covered by any movement, the movement of the universe included (ch. 8). Refutation of the Aristotelian form of (iii); time cannot be the number or measure of movement (ch. 9). Brief refutation of the Epicurean form of (iii); time cannot be an accompaniment of movement (ch. 10). Plotinus's own view of the origin and nature of time; it is the life of the soul in the restless movement from one thing to another which characterises it when it separates itself from the quiet unity of Intellect; the universe is in time because soul has put itself into time (ch. 11). If soul turned back altogether to the intelligible world and its eternity, time would have a stop. How we measure time by regular recurrences in the movements of the universe. How time and the movement of the universe in different ways measure each other (ch. 12). The universe is in time and shows time; the Aristotelians have got the relationship the wrong way round. Superiority of Plato's account, understood as meaning that time is the life of soul (ch. 13).

III. 7. (45) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΩΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ

1. Τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἕτερον λέγοντες ἑκάτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν περὶ τὴν ἀίδιον εἶναι φύσιν, τὸν δὲ χρόνον περὶ τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, αὐτόθεν μὲν καὶ ὥσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ἁθροωτέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἐναργές τι παρ' αὐτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἔχειν πάθος νομίζομεν λέγοντές τε ἀεὶ καὶ παρ' ἅπαντα ὀνομάζοντες. Πειρώμενοι μὴν εἰς ἐπίστασιν αὐτῶν ἰέναι καὶ οἷον ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν πάλιν αὖ ταῖς γνώμαις ἀποροῦντες τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀποφάσεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλος ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς λαβόντες ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναπαυσάμενοι καὶ αὐτάρκες νομίσαντες, εἰ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκείνοις λέγειν, ἀγαπήσαντες ἀπαλλαττόμεθα τοῦ ζητεῖν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν. Εὑρηκέναι μὲν οὖν τινας τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθὲς δεῖ νομίζειν· τίνες δ' οἱ τυχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ πῶς ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει. Καὶ πρότερον περὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος

[1] This passage gives a clearer idea of Plotinus's way of philosophising than any other in the *Enneads*. He starts by reflecting on his own experience and trying to clarify it. In doing this his respect for tradition leads him naturally to seek help from the ancient philosophers, but he is never satisfied simply to repeat their statements; they are for him helps to

III. 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME

1. Eternity and time, we say, are two different things, the one belonging to the sphere of the nature which lasts for ever, the other to that of becoming and of this universe; and at once, and as if by a fairly continuous application of our concept of them, we think that we have a clear and distinct experience of them in our own souls, as we are always speaking of them and using their names on every occasion. Of course, when we try to concentrate on them and, so to speak, to get close to them, we find again that our thought runs into difficulties; we consider the statements of the ancient philosophers about them, who differ one from the other, and perhaps also different interpretations of the same statements, and we set our minds at rest about them and think it sufficient if we are able, when we are asked, to state the opinion of the ancients, and so we are satisfied to be freed from the need of further research about them. Now we must consider that some of the blessed philosophers of ancient times have found out the truth; but it is proper to investigate which of them have attained it most completely, and how we too could reach an understanding about these things.[1] And first we should enquire about eternity, what sort of

further reflection leading to clearer understanding. It is, of course, Plato, here and elsewhere, who has "attained the truth most completely" (l. 15).

ζητεῖν, τί ποτε νομίζουσιν εἶναι αὐτὸν οἱ ἕτερον τοῦ χρόνου τιθέντες εἶναι· γνωσθέντος γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ἑστῶτος καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, ὃν δὴ χρόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι, τάχ' ἂν σαφὲς γένοιτο. Εἰ δέ τις πρὸ τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα θεάσασθαι τὸν χρόνον ὅς ἐστι φαντασθείη, γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ τούτῳ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν ἐλθόντι ᾧ ἄρα ὡμοίωτο ὁ χρόνος θεάσασθαι, εἴπερ ὁμοιότητα οὗτος πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχοι.

2. Τίνα οὖν ποτε χρὴ φάναι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι; Ἆρά γε τὴν νοητὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸν χρόνον τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον εἶναι; Καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔσχον τινές, φασι, περὶ τοῦ χρόνου. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ σεμνότατόν τι τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι φανταζόμεθα καὶ νοοῦμεν, σεμνότατον δὲ τὸ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι σεμνότερον ὁποτερονοῦν—τοῦ δ' ἐπέκεινα οὐδὲ τοῦτο κατηγορητέον—εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄν τις οὕτω συνάγοι. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ὅ τε κόσμος ὁ νοητὸς ὅ τε αἰὼν περιεκτικὰ ἄμφω καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Ἀλλ' ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν θατέρῳ λέγωμεν—ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι—κεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅταν τὸ αἰώνιον κατηγορῶμεν αὐτῶν—ἡ μὲν γάρ, φησι, τοῦ παραδείγματος φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, —ἄλλο τὸν αἰῶνα πάλιν αὖ λέγομεν, εἶναι μέντοι

[1] Cp. Plato, *Timaeus* 37D7.
[2] The Pythagoreans: cp. Aristotle, *Physics* Δ 10. 218b1–2,

thing those who make it different from time consider it to be, for when we know that which holds the position of archetype, it will perhaps become clear how it is with its image, which the philosophers say time is.[1] But if someone, before contemplating eternity, should form a picture in his mind of what time is, it would be possible for him, too, to go from this world to the other by recollection and contemplate that of which time is a likeness, if time really has a likeness to eternity.

2. What sort of thing, then, ought we to say that eternity is? Should we say that it is the intelligible substance itself, as if one were to say that time is the whole heaven and universal order? For, so people say, some philosophers have held just this opinion about time.[2] For, since we picture and think of eternity as something most majestic, and the highest degree of majesty belongs to the intelligible nature, and it is impossible to mention anything at all which is more majestic—not even majesty can be predicated of that which lies beyond it—one could in this way come to the conclusion that eternity and the intelligible nature are one and the same. Then, again, the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive, and include the same things. But when we say that one set of things [the intelligible realities] lies in the other—in eternity—and when we predicate eternal existence of the intelligible realities—for, Plato says, the nature of the archetype was eternal[3]—we are again making eternity something

with the comment of Simplicius (*In Phys.* IV. 10, p. 700, 19–20.)
[3] *Timaeus* 37D3.

περὶ ἐκείνην ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ παρεῖναι ἐκείνῃ φαμέν. Τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν ἑκάτερον εἶναι ταὐτότητα οὐ δηλοῖ· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ σεμνὸν γίνοιτο. Ἥ τε περιοχὴ τῷ μὲν ὡς μερῶν ἔσται, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον οὐχ ὡς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα αἰώνια κατ' αὐτόν.

'Αλλ' ἆρα κατὰ τὴν στάσιν φατέον τὴν ἐκεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα τὸν χρόνον κατὰ τὴν κίνησίν φασιν; 'Αλλ' εἰκότως ἄν τις τὸν αἰῶνα[1] ζητήσειε πότερα ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει λέγοντες ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τῇ στάσει τῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῇ στάσει ταὐτόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἐροῦμεν αἰώνιον τὴν στάσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα αἰώνιον· τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον τὸ μετέχον αἰῶνος. Ἔπειτα ἡ κίνησις πῶς αἰώνιον; Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ στάσιμον εἴη. Εἶτα πῶς ἔχει ἡ τῆς στάσεως ἔννοια ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀεί; Λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ οἷον νοοῦμεν, ὅταν τὸ ἀίδιον λέγωμεν. Εἰ δὲ τῇ τῆς οὐσίας στάσει, ἔξω πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἄλλα γένη τοῦ αἰῶνος ποιήσομεν. Εἶτα τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ μόνον ἐν στάσει δεῖ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑνί· εἶτα καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἵνα μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ χρόνῳ· ἡ δὲ στάσις οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἓν οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ἀδιαστάτου ἔχει ἔννοιαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ στάσις. Εἶτα τοῦ μὲν

[1] αἰῶνα A[pc] Creuzer, H–S: χρόνον A[ac]ExyQL.

[1] Rest and motion here are the Platonic "categories of the intelligible world": cp. V. 1 [10] 4; VI. 2 [43] 8.

different, but are saying that it has something to do with the intelligible nature, or is in it, or is present to it. That both are majestic does not make their identity clear, for perhaps majesty might come to one of them from the other. And as for inclusiveness, the intelligible world has it in the way in which a whole includes its parts, but eternity includes the whole all at once, not as a part, but in the sense that all things which are of such a kind as to be eternal are so by conforming to it.

But should eternity, perhaps, be said to correspond to the rest there as people say that time corresponds to motion?[1] But one might reasonably enquire whether, when people say this, they mean that eternity is the same as rest or, not simply as rest, but as the rest which belongs to substance. Now if it is the same as rest, first of all we shall not call rest eternal, just as we do not call eternity eternal, for the eternal is that which participates in eternity. Then, how is motion to be something eternal? For, on this assumption, it would also be at rest. Then again, how does the idea of rest contain in itself the "always"? I mean, not the "always" in time, but the kind of "always" we have in mind when we are speaking of what is eternal. But if eternity is the same as the rest which belongs to substance, then again, we shall put the other kinds of substance outside eternity. Then again, we must think of eternity not only in terms of rest but of unity; then, too, it must be thought of as without extension or interval, that it may not be the same as time; but rest in so far as it is rest, does not include in itself the idea of one nor of the unextended. Then

αἰῶνος κατηγοροῦμεν τὸ μένειν ἐν ἑνί· μετέχοι ἂν οὖν στάσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοστάσις εἴη.

3. Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ τὸν κόσμον πάντα τὸν ἐκεῖ αἰώνιον λέγομεν καὶ ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τί ἡ ἀιδιότης, εἴτε ταὐτὸν καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ αἰῶνι, εἴτε κατ' αὐτὴν ὁ αἰών; Ἆρά γε[1] καθ' ἕν τι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πολλῶν συνηθροισμένην τινὰ νόησιν, ἢ καὶ φύσιν εἶτ' ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἐκεῖ εἴτε συνοῦσαν εἶτ' ἐνορωμένην, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνην μίαν μὲν οὖσαν, πολλὰ δὲ δυναμένην καὶ πολλὰ οὖσαν; Καὶ ὅ γε τὴν πολλὴν δύναμιν εἰσαθρήσας κατὰ μὲν τοδὶ τὸ οἷον ὑποκείμενον λέγει οὐσίαν, εἶτα κίνησιν τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ ζωὴν ὁρᾷ, εἶτα στάσιν τὸ πάντη ὡσαύτως, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ταὐτόν, ᾗ ταῦτα ὁμοῦ ἕν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ συνθεὶς πάλιν αὖ εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ ⟨ὥστε⟩[2] εἶναι ζωὴν μόνην, ἐν τούτοις τὴν ἑτερότητα συστείλας, καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἄπαυστον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο νόησιν ἢ ζωήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀεὶ ἀδιαστάτως, ταῦτα πάντα ἰδὼν αἰῶνα εἶδεν ἰδὼν ζωὴν μένουσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ παρὸν τὸ πᾶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ νῦν μὲν τόδε, αὖθις δ' ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐ νῦν

[1] ἆρά γε Kirchhoff, H–S²: ἆρα γὰρ codd.
[2] ⟨ὥστε⟩ Theiler.

[1] *Timaeus* 37D6.
[2] The complete list of the "Platonic categories," taken from *Sophist* 254D–E. For passages in which Plotinus explains his application of them to the intelligible world more fully, see note on previous chapter.

again we predicate "abiding in one" of eternity;[1] so, then, it would participate in rest, but not be absolute rest.

3. What, then, would this be by reason of which we call the whole universe There eternal and everlasting, and what is everlastingness? Is it the same thing as, and identical with eternity, or is eternity in conformity with it? Should we then think of it as an idea corresponding to some one thing, but gathered together into a unity from many sources, or even a nature either consequent upon the beings of that other world or existing along with them or perceived in them? Are all these beings that nature, which is one, but has many powers and is many things? And when one looks closely into this manifold power, then according as one sees it as a subject, a kind of substrate, one calls it "substance"; then one calls it "motion," according as one sees it as life; then "rest" in so far as it is always in every way unchangingly itself; "the other" and "the same" in that these [different] realities are all together one.[2] So, too, one puts it all together again into one, so as to be only life, compressing the otherness in these intelligible realities, and seeing the unceasingness and self-identity of their activity, and that it is never other and is not a thinking or life that goes from one thing to another but is always the selfsame without extension or interval; seeing all this one sees eternity in seeing a life that abides in the same, and always has the all present to it, not now this, and then again that, but all things at once, and not

μὲν ἕτερα, αὖθις δ' ἕτερα, ἀλλὰ τέλος ἀμερές, οἷον ἐν σημείῳ ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ οὔποτε εἰς ῥύσιν προιόντων, ἀλλὰ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ μὴ μεταβάλλοντος, ὄντος δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀεί, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν οὐδ' αὖ γενήσεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστι, τοῦτο καὶ ὄντος· ὥστε εἶναι τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οἷον ἐκλάμπον κατὰ τὴν [τοῦ][1] ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται περὶ τοῦ μὴ μέλλοντος, ἀλλὰ ἤδη ὄντος, ταυτότητα, ὡς ἄρα οὕτως καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὕστερον αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἐστι; Μηδ' αὖ ὕστερον ἐσομένου, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἤδη· οὔτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ' οὗ εἰς τὸ νῦν ἥξει· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἦν οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. Οὔτε μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, ὃ μὴ νῦν ἔχει. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε τὸ ἦν ἕξει περὶ αὐτό· τί γὰρ ἔστιν, ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ παρελήλυθεν; οὔτε τὸ ἔσται· τί γὰρ ἔσται αὐτῷ; Λείπεται δὴ ἐν τῷ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν εἶναι. Ὃ οὖν μήτε ἦν, μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἔστι μόνον, τοῦτο ἑστὼς ἔχον τὸ εἶναι τῷ μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ ἔσται μηδ' αὖ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐστὶν ὁ αἰών. Γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ περὶ τὸ ὂν ἐν τῷ εἶναι ζωὴ ὁμοῦ πᾶσα καὶ πλήρης ἀδιάστατος παντὶ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν, αἰών.

4. Οὐκ ἔξωθεν δὲ δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι νομίζειν τοῦτον ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνῃ. Ἐνορᾶται γὰρ ἐνοῦσα παρ'

[1] τὴν A[pc] Kirchhoff, H–S: τὴν τοῦ A[ac]ExyQL.

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 37E6–38A2.

now some things, and then again others, but a partless completion, as if they were all together in a point, and had not yet begun to go out and flow into lines; it is something which abides in the same in itself and does not change at all but is always in the present, because nothing of it has passed away, nor again is there anything to come into being, but that which it is, it *is*; so that eternity is not the substrate but something which, as it were, shines out from the substrate itself in respect of what is called its sameness, in speaking about the fact that it is not going to be but is already, that it is as it is and not otherwise, for what could come to be for it afterwards, which it is not already? Nor again will it be afterwards what it is not already. For there is nothing starting from which it will arrive at the present moment, for that could be nothing else but what is [now]. Nor is it going to be what it does not now contain in itself. Necessarily there will be no "was" about it, for what is there that was for it and has passed away? Nor any "will be," for what will be for it? So there remains for it only to be in its being just what it is. That, then, which was not, and will not be, but *is* only,[1] which has being which is static by not changing to the "will be," nor ever having changed, this is eternity. The life, then, which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval, is that which we are looking for, eternity.

4. But one must not think that eternity has come to that [intelligible] nature accidentally, from outside, but it is that nature, and from it and with it. For the nature of eternity is contemplated in the

αὐτῆς, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν ἐκεῖ εἶναι ἐνυπάρχοντα ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἅπαντα καὶ σὺν τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Τὰ γὰρ πρώτως ὄντα συνόντα δεῖ τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτοῖς. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος, τὰ δ' ἐν παντί, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πᾶν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ἠθροισμένον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη γεννῆσαν αὐτό, ἵνα καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς ἀληθῶς πᾶν ᾖ. Καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια δὲ οὐ συμφωνία πρὸς ἄλλο ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου οὗπερ ἀλήθεια. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἀληθινόν, εἴπερ ἔσται πᾶν ὄντως, μὴ μόνον εἶναι πᾶν ᾗ ἐστι τὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔχειν οὕτως ὡς μηδενὶ ἐλλείπειν. Εἰ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἔσται τι αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται, ἐλλεῖπον ἦν τούτῳ· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν πᾶν. Παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τί ἂν αὐτῷ γένοιτο; Πάσχει γὰρ οὐδέν. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αὐτῷ γένοιτο, οὐδὲ μέλλει οὐδὲ ἔσται οὐδ' ἐγένετο. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν γενητοῖς, εἰ ἀφέλοις τὸ ἔσται, ἅτε ἐπικτωμένοις ἀεὶ εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει μὴ εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοιούτοις, εἰ προσθείης τὸ ἔσται, ὑπάρχει τὸ ἔρρειν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἶναι ἕδρας· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἦν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι οὐ σύμφυτον, εἰ γίγνοιτο ἐν τῷ

[1] There is a verbal reminiscence here of Plato, *Philebus* 24D2, but no real connection of thought.

intelligible nature, existing in it as originated from it, because we see all the other things, too, which we say are There existing in it, and say that they all come from its substance and are with its substance. For the things which have primary existence must have a common existence with the primaries and be among them; since beauty, too, is among them and originates from them, and truth is among them. And some of these are as if in a part of the existent whole, others in the whole, just as this which is really a whole has not been put together out of its parts, but has produced its parts itself, in order that it may truly be a whole in this way too. And There the truth is not correspondence with something else, but really belongs to each individual thing of which it is the truth. Now this true whole, if it really is a whole, must not only be whole in the sense that it is all things, but it must have its wholeness in such a way that it is deficient in nothing. If this is so, there is nothing that is going to be for it, for if something is going to be, it was lacking to it before; so it was not whole. But what could happen to it contrary to its nature? For it is not affected in any way. If, then, nothing could happen to it, there is no postponement of being, and it is not going to be, nor did it come to be. Now with things which have come to be, if you take away the " will be " what happens is that they immediately cease to exist, as they are continually acquiring being; but with things which are not of this kind, if you add to them the " will be," what happens is that they fall from the seat of being,[1] for it is clear that their being was not connatural to them, if they came to be in a state of putting off

μέλλειν καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι εἰς ὕστερον. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ τοῖς μὲν γενητοῖς ἡ οὐσία εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τῆς γενέσεως, μέχριπερ ἂν εἰς ἔσχατον ἥκῃ τοῦ χρόνου, ἐν ᾧ μηκέτ' ἐστί· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἔστιν εἶναι, καί, εἴ τις τοῦτο παρέλοιτο, ἠλαττῶσθαι ὁ βίος· ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶναι. Καὶ τῷ παντὶ δεῖ, εἰς ὅπερ οὕτως ἔσται. Διὸ καὶ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εἶναι καὶ στῆναι οὐ θέλει ἕλκον τὸ εἶναι αὑτῷ ἐν τῷ τι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ποιεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κύκλῳ ἐφέσει τινὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε εἶναι ἡμῖν εὑρημένον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως τῆς οὕτω σπευδούσης ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι τῷ μέλλοντι. Τοῖς δὲ πρώτοις καὶ μακαρίοις οὐδὲ ἔφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος· ἤδη γάρ εἰσι τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς οἷον ὀφείλεται ζῆν ἔχουσι πᾶν· ὥστε οὐδὲν ζητοῦσι, διότι τὸ μέλλον αὐτοῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέλλον. Ἡ οὖν τοῦ ὄντος παντελὴς οὐσία καὶ ὅλη, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ μηδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐλλείψειν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἂν μὴ ὂν αὐτῇ προσγενέσθαι —οὐ γὰρ μόνα τὰ ὄντα πάντα δεῖ παρεῖναι τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδὲν τοῦ ποτε μὴ ὄντος—αὕτη ἡ διάθεσις αὐτοῦ καὶ φύσις εἴη ἂν αἰών· αἰὼν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος.

[1] For a fuller discussion of the circular motion of the universe and its cause, cp. II. 2 [14].

being and having come to be and going to be afterwards. For the substantial existence of things that have come into being seems to be their existing from their point of origin, their coming to be, until they reach the end of their time, in which they cease to exist; this is their "is," and if anyone takes this away, their life-span is lessened, and so also their being. And the universe, too, must have a future, in moving towards which it "will be" in this way. This is why it, too, hastens towards what is going to be, and does not want to stand still, as it draws being to itself in doing one thing after another and moving in a circle in a sort of aspiration to substance. So we have found, incidentally, the cause of the movement of the universe, which hastens in this way to everlasting existence by means of what is going to be.[1] But the primal, blessed beings have not even an aspiration to what is going to be, for they are already the whole, and they have all the life which is, so to speak, owed to them; so they seek nothing, because there is nothing which is going to be for them, nor, indeed, that in which what is going to be can develop. So, then, the complete and whole substance of reality, not that in the parts only but that which consists in the impossibility of any future diminution and the fact that nothing non-existent could be added to it—for the all and whole must not only have all real beings present in it, but must not have anything that is at any time non-existent—this state and nature of complete reality would be eternity: for "eternity" [*aion*] is derived from "always existing" [*aei on*].[2]

[2] For this derivation of *αἰών*, cp. Aristotle, *De Caelo* A.9. 279a25–28.

5. Τοῦτο δέ, ὅταν τινὶ προσβαλὼν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁρᾶν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον μηδὲν περὶ αὐτὸ ὅλως γεγονέναι—εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἢ οὐκ ἀεί τι ὅλον ὄν—ἆρ' οὖν ἤδη ἀίδιον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχοι αὐτῷ τοιαύτη φύσις, ὡς πίστιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὕτω καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ἔτι, ὡς, εἰ πάλιν προσβάλοις, εὑρεῖν τοιοῦτον; Τί οὖν, εἰ μηδὲ ἀφίσταιτό τις αὐτοῦ τῆς θέας, ἀλλὰ συνὼν εἴη τῆς φύσεως ἀγασθεὶς καὶ δυνατὸς τοῦτο πράττειν ἀτρύτῳ φύσει; Ἢ δραμὼν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς αἰῶνα ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἀποκλίνων οὐδαμῇ, ἵν' ᾖ ὅμοιος καὶ αἰώνιος, τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ αἰωνίῳ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ τὸ αἰώνιον θεώμενος. Εἰ οὖν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον αἰώνιον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν, τὸ μὴ ἀποκλῖνον εἰς ἑτέραν φύσιν κατὰ μηδέν, ζωὴν ἔχον, ἣν ἔχει πᾶσαν ἤδη, οὐ προσλαβὸν οὐδὲ προσλαμβάνον ἢ προσληψόμενον, εἴη ἂν ἀίδιον μὲν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον, ἀιδιότης δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, αἰὼν δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐμφαινομένης. Ὅθεν σεμνὸν ὁ αἰών, καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἔννοια λέγει· λέγει δὲ τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ. Καὶ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν θεὸς ἐμφαίνων καὶ προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν οἷός ἐστι, τὸ εἶναι ὡς ἀτρεμὲς καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ οὕτως καὶ τὸ

[1] The god is Intellect or Real Being, the Second Hypostasis.

5. But now, whenever, concentrating the attention of my soul on something, I am able to say this about it, or rather to see it as a thing of such a kind that nothing at all about it has ever come into being—for if it has, it is not always existing, or not always existing as a whole—is it, therefore, already eternal, if there is not also in it a nature of such a kind as to give an assurance about it that it will stay as it is and never become different, so that, if you look attentively at it again, you will find it as it was? What then, if one does not depart at all from one's contemplation of it but stays in its company, wondering at its nature, and able to do so by a natural power which never fails? Surely one would be (would one not?), oneself on the move towards eternity and never falling away from it at all, that one might be like it and eternal, contemplating eternity and the eternal by the eternal in oneself. If, then, what is in this state is eternal and always existing, that which does not fall away in any respect into another nature, which has life which it possesses already as a whole, which has not received any addition and is not now receiving any and will not receive any, then that which is in this state would be eternal, and everlastingness would be the corresponding condition of the substrate, existing from it and in it, and eternity the substrate with the corresponding condition appearing in it. Hence eternity is a majestic thing, and thought declares it identical with the god;[1] it declares it identical with this god [whom we have been describing]. And eternity could be well described as a god proclaiming and manifesting himself as he is, that is, as being which is unshakeable and self-identical, and

βεβαίως ἐν ζωῇ. Εἰ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ μὴ ἂν ἐπιλείπειν, καὶ τοῦτο κυρίως, ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτοῦ ἀναλίσκει. Καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι ζωὴν ἄπειρον ἤδη τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν αὐτῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ' αὖ μέλλειν—ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶσα—ἐγγὺς ἂν εἴη τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι. [Τὸ γὰρ ἑξῆς « τῷ πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν » ἐξήγησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ « ἄπειρον ἤδη εἶναι. »] [1]

6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις οὕτω παγκάλη καὶ ἀίδιος περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἐκβαίνουσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μένουσα δὲ ἀεὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ ζῶσα κατ' ἐκεῖνο, εἴρηταί τε, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, τοῦτο τῷ Πλάτωνι καλῶς καὶ βαθείᾳ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ᾖ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰς ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄγων, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ζωὴ ὡσαύτως, τοῦτο ὃ δὴ ζητοῦμεν· καὶ τὸ οὕτω μένειν [2] αἰὼν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ οὕτω μένον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μένον ὅ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ζωῆς μενούσης παρ' αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ οὔτε τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ψευδομένη ἔχοι ἂν τὸ αἰὼν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶναί ἐστι τὸ οὐδέποτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδ' ἄλλως εἶναι·

[1] τὸ . . . εἶναι del. Heinemann, Dodds.
[2] μένειν Dodds: μένον codd., H–S: καὶ . . . εἶναι del. Theiler.

[1] The sentence bracketed here is clearly a rather unintelligent gloss on the one before it.
[2] *Timaeus* 376D.

[always] as it is, and firmly grounded in life. But if we say that it is made up of many parts, there is no need to be surprised, for each of the beings There is many through its unending power, since endlessness, too, is not having any possibility of failing, and eternity is endless in the strict and proper sense, because it never expends anything of itself. And if someone were in this way to speak of eternity as a life which is here and now endless because it is total and expends nothing of itself, since it has no past or future—for if it had, it would not now be a total life—he would be near to defining it. [For that which comes next " because it is total and expends nothing " would be an explanation of the phrase " here and now endless."] [1]

6. Now since the nature which is of this kind, altogether beautiful and everlasting in this way, is around the One and comes from it and is directed towards it, in no way going out from it but always abiding around it and in it, and living according to it; and since this was stated by Plato, as I think finely and with deep meaning and not to no purpose, in these words of his " as eternity remains in one," [2] the intention of which is not merely that eternity brings itself into unity with relation to itself, but that it is the life, always the same, of real being around the One; this, then, is what we are seeking; and abiding like this is being eternity. For that which is this and abides like this and abides what it is, an activity of life abiding of itself directed to the One and in the One, with no falsehood in its being or its life, this would possess the reality of eternity. For true being is never not being, or being otherwise; and this is being

τοῦτο δὲ ὡσαύτως εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδιαφόρως εἶναι. Οὐκ ἔχει οὖν ὁτιοῦν [τὸ][1] ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐδ' ἄρα διαστήσεις, οὐδ' ἐξελίξεις, οὐδὲ προάξεις, οὐδὲ παρατενεῖς, οὐδ' ἄρα οὐδὲ πρότερον αὐτοῦ οὐδέ τι ὕστερον λαβεῖν ἔχεις. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον περὶ αὐτό, τὸ δ' « ἔστιν » ἀληθέστατον τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὕτω δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὡς οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῷ ζῆν, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ λέγομεν, ὁ αἰών. Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ λέγωμεν καὶ τὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἡμῶν ἕνεκα [τῆς σαφηνείας][2] δεῖ νομίζειν λέγεσθαι· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀεὶ τάχ' ἂν οὐ κυρίως λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ ληφθὲν εἰς δήλωσιν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πλανῷ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἔκτασιν[3] τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἔτι ὡς μὴ ἐπιλείψοντός ποτε. Τὸ δὲ ἴσως βέλτιον ἦν μόνον τὸ « ὢν » λέγειν. Ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν ἀρκοῦν ὄνομα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἐνόμιζον, ἐδεήθησαν πρὸς τὸ μαθεῖν καὶ προσθήκης τοῦ ἀεί. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μέν ἐστιν ὄν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μὲν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ ἀληθινός· ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ὑποδυόμενον ἦν φιλοσοφίαν, ἡ προσθήκη τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐγένετο. Οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τῷ « ὢν » τὸ ἀεί, ὥστε λέγεσθαι « ἀεὶ ὤν ». διὸ ληπτέον τὸ ἀεὶ οἷον « ἀληθῶς ὢν » λέγεσθαι καὶ συναιρετέον τὸ ἀεὶ εἰς ἀδιάστατον δύναμιν τὴν οὐδὲν δεομένην οὐδενὸς μεθ' ὃ ἤδη ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

[1] τὸ del. Volkmann.
[2] τῆς σαφηνείας ut glossam ad ἡμῶν del. Dodds.
[3] ἔκτασιν Bury: ἔκβασιν codd.

always the same; and this is being without any difference. So it does not have any " this and that "; nor, therefore, will you be able to separate it out or unroll it or prolong it or stretch it; nor, then, can you apprehend anything of it as before or after. If, then, there is no before or after about it, but its " is " is the truest thing about it, and itself, and this in the sense that it is by its essence or its life, then again there has come to us what we are talking about, eternity. But when we use the word " always " and say that it does not exist at one time but not at another, we must be thought to be putting it this way for our own sake; for the " always " was perhaps not being used in its strict sense, but, taken as explaining the incorruptible, might mislead the soul into imagining an expansion of something becoming more, and again, of something which is never going to fail. It would perhaps have been better only to use the word " existing." But, as " existing " is an adequate word for substance, since, however, people thought becoming was substance, they required the addition of " always " in order to understand [what " existing " really meant]. For existing is not one thing and always existing another, just as a philosopher is not one thing and the true philosopher another, but because there was such a thing as putting on a pretence of philosophy, the addition of " true " was made. So, too, " always " is applied to " existing," that is " *aei* " to " *on*," so that we say " *aei on* [*aion*]," so the " always " must be taken as saying " truly existing "; it must be included in the undivided power which in no way needs anything beyond what it already possesses; but it possesses the whole.

Πᾶν οὖν καὶ ὂν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν οὐκ ἐνδεὲς καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ μὲν πλῆρες, ἄλλῃ δὲ ἐλλεῖπον ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ, κἂν τέλειον ᾖ, ὡς δοκεῖ, οἷον σῶμά τι ἱκανὸν ψυχῇ τέλειον, δεόμενον καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, ἐλλεῖπον τῷ χρόνῳ, οὗ δεῖται, ἅτε σὺν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ παρείη αὐτῷ καὶ συνθέοι, ὂν ἀτελές· ταύτῃ ὂν ὁμωνύμως ἂν τέλειον λέγοιτο. Ὅτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει μηδὲ τοῦ ἔπειτα δεῖσθαι μήτε εἰς χρόνον ἄλλον μεμετρημένον μήτε τὸν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀπείρως ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ' ὅπερ δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἔχει, τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἡ ἔννοια ἐπορέγεται, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τοσοῦδε, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ τοσοῦδε. Ἔπρεπε γὰρ αὐτῷ μηδὲ τοσῷδε ὄντι πάντη μηδενὸς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοσοῦδε, ἵνα μὴ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ μερισθεῖσα τὸ καθαρῶς ἀμερὲς αὐτοῦ ἀνέλῃ, ἀλλ' ᾖ καὶ τῇ ζωῇ ἀμερὲς καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Τὸ δ' « ἀγαθὸς ἦν » ἀναφέρει εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ παντὸς σημαίνων τῷ ἐπέκεινα παντὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ χρόνου τινός· ὥστε μηδὲ τὸν κόσμον ἀρχήν τινα χρονικὴν εἰληφέναι τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸ πρότερον παρεχούσης. Ἀλλ' ὅμως δηλώσεως χάριν τοῦτο εἰπὼν μέμφεται ὕστερον καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς οὐδ' αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς πάντη λεγομένου ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν λεγόμενον καὶ νοούμενον αἰῶνα εἰληχότων.

[1] *Timaeus* 29E1.

[2] "The point is that the cosmos has indeed a prior (as it must have), but only in the sense of having a cause" (E. R. Dodds in a letter to H.-R. Schwyzer).

[3] Plotinus goes back here, rather abruptly, to the description of eternal being as "always" existing, and points out

The nature which is of this kind, then, is all, and existent, and not deficient in its wholeness, and not full at one point and deficient at another. For that which is in time, even if it is perfect, as it seems, in the way in which a body which is adequate for a soul is perfect, needs also time to come, being deficient in time, which it needs because it is with it, if time is present to and runs along with it, and so it is incomplete; and, existing in this way, it could only be called perfect by amere coincidence of name. But that which has no need of time to come, which is not measured by another time or by an unlimited time which will be without end, but possesses what it ought to be, this is what our thought stretches out to, that whose being does not come from a certain extent [of time], but exists before extent [of time]. For, since it is not of any temporal extent itself, it was not right for it to have contact in any way with anything temporally extended, so that its life might not be divided into parts and destroy its pure partlessness, but it might be partless in life and substance. But Plato's "He was good"[1] takes us back to the thought of the All [the physical universe]; he indicates that by virtue of the transcendent All it has no beginning in time; so that the universe, too, did not have a temporal beginning because the cause of its being provides what is prior to it.[2] But all the same, after saying this for the sake of explanation, he objects to this expression, too, afterwards, as not being entirely correctly used about things which have a part in what we speak and think of as eternity.[3]

that Plato, too, objected to the use of expressions implying duration in time when referring to it (cp. *Timaeus* 37E).

7. Ταῦτα οὖν λέγομεν ἆρά γε μαρτυροῦντες ἑτέροις καὶ ὡς περὶ ἀλλοτρίων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεθα; Καὶ πῶς; Τίς γὰρ ἂν σύνεσις γένοιτο μὴ ἐφαπτομένοις; Πῶς δ' ἂν ἐφαψαίμεθα τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις; Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἡμῖν μετεῖναι τοῦ αἰῶνος. Ἀλλὰ ἐν χρόνῳ οὖσι πῶς; Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ πῶς ἐν αἰῶνι ἔστιν εἶναι, γνωσθείη ἂν εὑρεθέντος πρότερον τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ τοίνυν καταβατέον ἡμῖν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸν χρόνον· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡ πορεία πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν ἤδη οὐ πάντη καταβάντες, ἀλλ' οὕτως, ὥσπερ κατέβη χρόνος. Εἰ μὲν περὶ χρόνου εἰρημένον μηδὲν ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ μακαρίοις ἀνδράσιν, ἐχρῆν τῷ αἰῶνι ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνείραντας τὸ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, πειρωμένους τῇ ἐννοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἣν κεκτήμεθα ἐφαρμόζειν τὴν λεγομένην ὑφ' ἡμῶν δόξαν· νῦν δ' ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον λαβεῖν τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα σκοποῦντας, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν συμφώνως ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ἕξει λόγος. Τριχῇ δ' ἴσως διαιρετέον τοὺς λεγομένους περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγους τὴν πρώτην. Ἢ γὰρ κίνησις ἡ λεγομένη, ἢ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοι ἄν, ἢ κινήσεώς τι τὸν χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ στάσιν ἢ τὸ ἑστηκὸς ἢ στάσεώς τι λέγειν παντά-

[1] The view that time was the movement of the universe (or one of its important parts) was current in the early Academy; cp. the Platonic Ὅροι 411B: *χρόνος ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον φορᾶς*; Aristotle, *Physics* Δ 10, 218b1–2; that it was the heavenly sphere (cp. l. 24–25) was a Pythagorean

7. Are we, then, saying this as if we were giving evidence on others' behalf and talking about what is not our own? How could we be? For what understanding could there be [of eternity] if we were not in contact with it? But how could we be in contact with what was not our own? We too, then, must have a share in eternity. But how can we, when we are in time? But what it means to be in time and what it means to be in eternity may become known to us when we have discovered time. So, then, we must go down from eternity to the enquiry into time, and to time, for there our way led us upwards, but now we must come down in our discourse, not altogether, but in the way in which time came down. Now if the blessed men of ancient times had said nothing about time, we should have to take eternity as our starting-point and link up our subsequent account of time with it, stating what we think about it and trying to make the opinion we express accord with the interior awareness of time which we have; but, as it is, we must first take the most important statements about it and consider whether our own account will agree with any of them. Perhaps we can, in the first instance, make a threefold division of the accounts of time which have been given, for either time is movement, as it is called, or one might say that it is what is moved, or something belonging to movement,[1] for to say that it is rest, or what is at rest, or something belonging to rest, would be quite

view; cp. note on ch. 2, and Pseudo-Plutarch, *Plac.* I. 884B 5. That it was something belonging to movement was held in different senses by some Academics, Aristotle, Stoics and Epicureans: see notes below.

πασι πόρρω τῆς ἐννοίας ἂν εἴη τοῦ χρόνου οὐδαμῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. Τῶν δὲ κίνησιν λεγόντων οἱ μὲν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἂν λέγοιεν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντός· οἱ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοντες τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἂν σφαῖραν λέγοιεν· οἱ δὲ κινήσεώς τι ἢ διάστημα κινήσεως, οἱ δὲ μέτρον, οἱ δ' ὅλως παρακολουθοῦν αὐτῇ· καὶ ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τεταγμένης.

8. Κίνησιν μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε οὔτε τὰς συμπάσας λαμβάνοντι κινήσεις καὶ οἷον μίαν ἐκ πασῶν ποιοῦντι, οὔτε τὴν τεταγμένην· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἑκατέρα ἡ λεγομένη—εἰ δέ τις μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀπείη τοῦ χρόνος εἶναι—ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, ἄλλου τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῆς οὔσης. Καὶ ἄλλων λεγομένων καὶ λεχθέντων ἂν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὅτι κίνησις μὲν ἂν καὶ παύσαιτο καὶ διαλίποι, χρόνος δὲ οὔ. Εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν μὴ διαλείπειν τις λέγοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη, εἴπερ τὴν περιφορὰν λέγοι, ἐν χρόνῳ τινί· καὶ αὕτη περιφέροιτο ἂν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἥμισυ ἤνυσται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν εἴη ἥμισυς, ὁ δὲ διπλάσιος, κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς

[1] Some Stoics: cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* II. 514.

[2] Stoics (Zeno and Chrysippus): cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* II. 509–510.

[3] An Academic view taken up and developed by Aristotle: cp. Ὅροι l.c. Aristotle, *Physics* Δ 10 ff.

[4] Epicureans: cp. *Stobaeus Ecl.* I. 8 [I] 103. 6; Wachsmuth = Usener 294).

[5] Cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* II. 509–510. It is only among Stoics that the distinction between all movement and ordered movement (the movement of the universe) appears. Zeno

remote from our interior awareness of time, which is never in any way the same. Now of those who say it is movement, some seem to mean that it is all movement,[1] others the movement of the universe; those who say that it is what is moved seem to mean that it is the sphere of the universe; those who say that it is something belonging to movement, that it is the distance covered by the movement [2] or (others of them) the measure,[3] or (others again) that it is in a general way a consequence of movement; [4] and either of all movement or only of ordered movement.[5]

8. It is not possible for it to be movement, whether one takes all movements together and makes a kind of single movement out of them, or whether one takes it as ordered movement, for what we call movement, of either kind, is in time; but if someone says that it is not in time, then it would be still further from being time, since that in which movement is, is something different from movement itself. And, though other arguments can be brought, and have been brought, against this position, this one is enough, and also that movement can stop altogether or be interrupted, but time cannot. But, if someone says that the movement of the universe is not interrupted, this, too (if he means the circuit of the heavens), is in a period of time; and it would go round to the same point not in the time in which half its course was finished, and one would be half, the other double time; each movement would be movement of the

said time was πάσης κινήσεως διάστημα, Chrysippus that it was διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως (*Stoic. Vet. Fr.* II. 510); other Stoics simply that time was movement (*Stoic. Vet. Fr.* II. 514).

οὔσης ἑκατέρας, τῆς τε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἥμισυ ἡκούσης. Καὶ τὸ ὀξυτάτην δὲ καὶ ταχίστην λέγειν τὴν τῆς ἐξωτάτης σφαίρας κίνησιν μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἕτερον ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ χρόνος. Ταχίστη γὰρ πασῶν δηλονότι τῷ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ μέγιστον διάστημα ἀνύειν· τὰ δ' ἄλλα βραδύτερα τῷ ἐν πλείονι ἂν καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ.

Εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲ ἡ κίνησις τῆς σφαίρας ὁ χρόνος, σχολῇ γ' ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτή, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὑπενοήθη χρόνος εἶναι.

Ἆρ' οὖν κινήσεώς τι; Εἰ μὲν διάστημα, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς· θᾶττον γὰρ καὶ βραδύτερον ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἐν τόπῳ. Καὶ εἶεν ἂν ἄμφω μετρούμεναι αἱ διαστάσεις ἑνὶ ἑτέρῳ, ὃ δὴ ὀρθότερον ἄν τις εἴποι χρόνον. Ποτέρας δὴ αὐτῶν τὸ διάστημα χρόνος, μᾶλλον δὲ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν; Εἰ δὲ τῆς τεταγμένης, οὐ πάσης μὲν οὐδὲ τῆς τοιαύτης· πολλαὶ γὰρ αὗται· ὥστε καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα ἔσονται. Εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διάστημα, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κινήσει διάστημα, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἂν εἴη; Τοσήδε μέντοι· τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε

universe, one going from the same place to the same place again, and the other reaching the half-way point. And the statement that the movement of the outermost sphere is the most vigorous and quickest is evidence for our argument that its movement is something different from time. For it is, obviously, the quickest of all the spheres because it covers a greater distance than the others, in fact, the greatest distance, in less time; the others are slower because they cover only a part of the distance [covered by the outermost sphere] in a longer time. If, then, time is not the movement of the sphere, it can hardly be the sphere itself, which was supposed to be time because it is in motion.

Is it, then, something belonging to movement? If it is the distance covered by the movement, first, this is not the same for all movement, not even uniform movement, for movement is quicker and slower, even movement in space. And both these distances covered [by the quicker and the slower movement] would be measured by some one other thing, which would more correctly be called time. Well then, of which of the two of them is the distance covered time, or rather of which of all the movements, which are infinite in number? But if it is the distance covered by the ordered movement, then not by all ordered movement, or by one particular kind of ordered movement, for there are many of these; so that there will be many times at once. But if it is the distance covered by the movement of the universe, if the distance in the movement itself is meant, what would this be other than the movement? The movement, certainly is quantitatively

τοῦτο ἤτοι τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι τοσόσδε ὂν διεξῆλθε, μετρηθήσεται, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἔσται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τόπος· ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τῇ συνεχείᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῷ μὴ εὐθὺς πεπαῦσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνειν ἀεί, τὸ διάστημα ἕξει. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ πολὺ τῆς κινήσεως ἂν εἴη· καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς αὐτήν τις βλέπων ἀποφανεῖται πολλήν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις πολὺ τὸ θερμὸν λέγοι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα χρόνος φανεῖται οὐδὲ προσπίπτει, ἀλλὰ κίνησις πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, ὡσπερεὶ ὕδωρ ῥέον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ διάστημα θεωρούμενον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν πάλιν καὶ πάλιν ἔσται ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ δυὰς ἢ τριάς, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦ ὄγκου. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ πλῆθος κινήσεως ὡς δεκάς, ἢ ὡς τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον τῷ οἷον ὄγκῳ τῆς κινήσεως διάστημα, ὃ οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν χρόνου, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦτο γενόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ ὁ χρόνος οὐκ ἔσται πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῇ κινήσει, συμβαίνει τε πάλιν αὖ κίνησιν τὸν χρόνον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτῆς τὸ διάστημα, ἀλλὰ κίνησις οὐκ ἀθρόα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀθρόα εἰς τὸ ἀθρόον ἐν χρόνῳ. Τὸ μὴ ἀθρόον τίνι διοίσει τοῦ ἀθρόως; ἢ τῷ ἐν χρόνῳ, ὥστε ἡ διεστῶσα κίνησις καὶ τὸ διάστημα αὐτῆς οὐκ αὐτὸ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ.

determined; but this definite quantity will either be measured by the space, because the space which it has traversed is a certain amount of space, and this will be the distance covered; but this is not time but space; or the movement itself, by its continuity and the fact that it does not stop at once but keeps on for ever, will contain the distance. But this would be the multiplicity of movement; and if one, looking at movement, shows that it is multiple (as if one were to say there was a great deal of heat), time will not appear or come into one's mind but movement which keeps on coming again and again, just like water flowing which keeps on coming again and again, and the distance observed in it. And the " again and again " will be a number, like the number two or three, but distance belongs to magnitude. So the amplitude of movement will be like the number ten or the distance from end to end which appears on what you might call the bulk of the movement, and this does not contain our idea of time, but this definite quantity will be something which came to be in time; otherwise time will not be everywhere but in movement as its substrate, and we are back again at the statement that time is movement, for the distance covered is not outside movement but is movement which does not happen all at once; but the comparison of movement which does not happen all at once with what is all at once [the instantaneous] can only be made in time. In what way will the non-instantaneous differ from the instantaneous? By being in time, so that movement which extends over a distance and the distance covered by it are not the actual thing, time, but are in time. But if someone

Εἰ δὲ τὸ διάστημα τῆς κινήσεως λέγοι τις χρόνον, οὐ τὸ αὐτῆς τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλὰ παρ' ὃ αὐτὴ ἡ κίνησις τὴν παράτασιν ἔχοι οἷον συμπαραθέουσα ἐκείνῳ, τί δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ εἴρηται. Δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ γέγονεν ἡ κίνησις. Τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζήτει ὁ λόγος, τί ὤν ἐστι χρόνος· ἐπεὶ ὅμοιόν τε γίνεται καὶ ταὐτὸν οἷον εἴ τις ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστι χρόνος, λέγοι κινήσεως διάστημα ἐν χρόνῳ. Τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα, ὃ δὴ χρόνον καλεῖς τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ οἰκείου διαστήματος ἔξω τιθέμενος; Καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ τιθέμενος τῇ κινήσει τὸ διάστημα τὴν τῆς ἠρεμίας διάστασιν ποῖ θήσεται, ἄπορος ἔσται. Ὅσον γὰρ κινεῖταί τι, τοσοῦτον ἂν σταίη καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ εἴποις ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἑκατέρου τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλον δηλονότι ἀμφοῖν ὄντα. Τί οὖν ἐστι καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ διάστημα; Ἐπείπερ τοπικὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἔξωθέν ἐστιν.

9. Ἀριθμὸς δὲ κινήσεως ἢ μέτρον—βέλτιον γὰρ οὕτω συνεχοῦς οὔσης [1]—πῶς, σκεπτέον. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πάσης ὁμοίως ἀπορητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαστήματος τῆς κινήσεως, εἴ τις τῆς πάσης εἶναι ἐλέγετο. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις ἀριθμήσειε τὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἀνώμαλον; ἢ τίς ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ κατὰ τί τὸ μέτρον; Εἰ δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέραν καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν, ταχεῖαν,

[1] συνεχοῦς οὔσης J[img]: συνεχούσης codd.

[1] Aristotle uses both terms (ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως, *Physics* Δ 11. 219b2; μέτρον κινήσεως, 12. 221a1) without distinction.

were to say that the distance of movement is time, not in the sense of the distance of movement itself, but that in relation to which the movement has its extension, as if it was running along with it, what this is has not been stated. For it is obvious that time is that in which the movement has occurred. But this was what our discussion was trying to find from the beginning, what time essentially is; since this is like, in fact, the same as, an answer to the question "What is time?" which says that it is distance of movement in time. What, then, is this distance which you call time and put outside the proper distance of the movement? Then, again, on the other side, the person who puts the distance in the movement itself, will be hopelessly perplexed about where to put the interval of rest. For something else could rest for the same space as something was moved, and you would say that the time in each case was the same, as being, obviously, different from both. What, then, is this distance, and what is its nature? For it cannot be spatial, since this also lies outside movement.

9. We must now enquire in what sense it is number of movement or measure [1]—for it is better to call it measure of movement, since movement is continuous. First of all, then, a doubt must arise here, too, about its being the measure of all movement alike, just as it did with the distance of movement, if there was said to be a number or measure of all movement. For how could one number disordered and irregular movement? What would its number or measure be, or what its scale of measurement? But if one uses the same measure for both kinds of movement

βραδεῖαν, ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ μέτρον τοιοῦτον, οἷον εἰ δεκὰς εἴη μετροῦσα καὶ ἵππους καὶ βοῦς, ἢ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέτρον καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν εἴη. Εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτον μέτρον, τίνων μέν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος εἴρηται, ὅτι κινήσεων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὅ ἐστιν οὔπω εἴρηται. Εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ δεκάδος ληφθείσης καὶ ἄνευ ἵππων ἔστι νοεῖν τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸ μέτρον μέτρον ἐστὶ φύσιν ἔχον τινά, κἂν μήπω μετρῇ, οὕτω δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὸν χρόνον μέτρον ὄντα· εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οἷον ἀριθμός, τί ἂν τοῦδε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δεκάδα ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν διαφέροι μοναδικοῦ; Εἰ δὲ συνεχὲς μέτρον ἐστί, ποσόν τι ὂν μέτρον ἔσται, οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον μέγεθος. Μέγεθος τοίνυν ἔσται, οἷον γραμμὴ συνθέουσα δηλονότι κινήσει. Ἀλλ' αὕτη συνθέουσα πῶς μετρήσει τὸ ᾧ συνθεῖ; Τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁποτερονοῦν θάτερον; Καὶ βέλτιον τίθεσθαι καὶ πιθανώτερον οὐκ ἐπὶ πάσης, ἀλλ' ᾗ συνθεῖ. Τοῦτο δὲ συνεχὲς δεῖ εἶναι, ἢ ἐφέξει ἡ συνθέουσα. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ χωρίς, ἀλλὰ ὁμοῦ κίνησιν μεμετρημένην. Καὶ τί τὸ μετροῦν ἔσται; Ἡ μεμετρημένη μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἔσται, μεμετρηκὸς δ' ἔσται μέγεθος. Καὶ ποῖον αὐτῶν ὁ χρόνος ἔσται; Ἡ κίνησις ἡ μεμετρημένη,

[regular and irregular] and in general for all movement, quick and slow, the number and measure will be like the ten which counts both horses and cows, or like the same measure for liquids and solids. Now, if it is a measure of this kind, then it has been said what time is a measure of, that it is a measure of movements, but we have not yet been told what it is itself. But if, just as when one takes the ten even without the horses it is possible to think of the number, and the measure is a measure, with a certain nature, even if it is not yet measuring, so time, too, must have its own nature since it is a measure, and if it is a thing of this kind on its own like number, how can it differ from this number we were considering in the case of the ten, or from any other number made up of abstract units? But if it is a continuous measure, then it will be a measure because it is of a certain size, like a length of one cubit. It will be a magnitude, then, like a line which will obviously run along with movement. But how will this line running along measure that with which it runs? Why should one of them measure the other rather than the other the one? And it is better and more plausible to assume that it is not the measure of all movement but of the movement it runs along with. But this must be something continuous, or the line which runs with it will stop. But one ought not to take what measures as something coming from outside or separate but to consider the measured movement as a whole. And what will the measurer be? Movement will be measured, and the measurer will be magnitude. And which of them will be time? The measured movement or the measuring magnitude?

ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν; Ἡ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἔσται ἡ μεμετρημένη ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους ὁ χρόνος, ἢ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ μετρῆσαν, ἢ τὸ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον, ὥσπερ τῷ πήχει πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι ὅση ἡ κίνησις. Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν πάντων τούτων ὑποθέσθαι, ὅπερ εἴπομεν πιθανώτερον εἶναι, τὴν ὁμαλὴν κίνησιν· ἄνευ γὰρ ὁμαλότητος καὶ προσέτι μιᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ἀπορώτερον τὸ τοῦ λόγου τῷ θεμένῳ ὁπωσοῦν μέτρον γίνεται. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεμετρημένη κίνησις ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ μεμετρημένη, ὥσπερ τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ ἔδει μεμετρῆσθαι, οὐχὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἔδει μεμετρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ, οὕτως ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ μέτρον ἕξει ἄλλο ἡ κίνησις παρ' αὐτήν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐδεήθημεν τοῦ συνεχοῦς μέτρου εἰς μέτρησιν αὐτῆς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῷ μέτρου, ἵν' [ᾗ] ἡ[1] κίνησις, τοσοῦδε γεγενημένου τοῦ καθ' ὃ μετρεῖται ὅση, μετρηθῇ. Καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ μεγέθους ἔσται τῇ κινήσει παρομαρτοῦντος ἐκεῖνος ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ συνθέον τῇ κινήσει. Οὗτος δὲ τίς ἂν εἴη ἢ ὁ μοναδικός; Ὃς ὅπως μετρήσει ἀπορεῖν ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεί, κἂν τις ἐξεύρῃ ὅπως, οὐ χρόνον εὑρήσει μετροῦντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸν χρόνῳ. Ἕτερον γὰρ

[1] ἡ Kirchhoff: ᾗ ᾗ wxy: ἡ Q.

[1] Aristotle points out that only a uniform movement can be considered a single movement in *Physics* E4. 228b15 ff.; but for him time is the measure of absolutely any kind of movement (*Physics* Δ 14, 223a20 ff.); though the most uniform

For either the movement which is measured by the magnitude will be time, or the magnitude which measures, or what uses the magnitude, as one uses the cubit to measure how much the movement is. But in all these cases one must assume (which we said was more plausible), uniform movement, for unless there is uniformity, and, besides that, the movement is single, and a movement of the whole thing,[1] the way of proof becomes still more obstructed for whoever holds that time is in any sense a measure. But now, if time is a measured movement, and one measured by quantity; just as the movement, if it had to be measured, could not be measured by itself but by something else, so it is necessary, if the movement is to have another measure besides itself, and this was the reason why we needed the continuous measure for measuring it—in the same way there is need of a measure for the magnitude itself, in order that the movement, by the fixing at a certain length of that by which it is measured as being a certain length, may itself be measured. And the number of the magnitude which accompanies the movement, but not the magnitude which runs along with the movement, will be that time which we were looking for. But what could this be except number made up of abstract units? And here the problem must arise of how this abstract number is going to measure. Then, even if one does discover how it can, one will not discover time measuring but a certain length of time; and this is not the same thing as time. It is

movement, the circular movement of the heavens, is the standard by which in fact we measure other movements and time itself (223b).

εἰπεῖν χρόνον, ἕτερον δὲ τοσόνδε χρόνον· πρὸ γὰρ
50 τοῦ τοσόνδε δεῖ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τοσόνδε ἐστίν. Ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μετρήσας τὴν κίνησιν ἔξωθεν τῆς κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος, οἷον ἡ δεκὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων οὐ μετὰ τῶν ἵππων λαμβανόμενος. Τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, οὐκ εἴρηται, ὃς πρὸ τοῦ
55 μετρεῖν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡ δεκάς. Ἢ οὗτος, ὃς κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς κινήσεως παραθέων ἐμέτρησεν. Ἀλλ' οὗτος ὁ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον οὔπω δῆλος ὅστις ἐστίν. Ἀλλ' οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετρῶν εἴτε σημείῳ εἴθ' ὁτῳοῦν ἄλλῳ πάντως κατὰ χρόνον μετρήσει. Ἔσται οὖν ὁ χρόνος οὗτος
60 ὁ μετρῶν τὴν κίνησιν τῷ προτέρῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ἐχόμενος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος, ἵνα μετρῇ. Ἢ γὰρ τὸ τοπικὸν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οἷον ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ σταδίου, λαμβάνει, ἢ ἀνάγκη τὸ χρονικὸν λαμβάνειν. Ἔστι γὰρ ὅλως τὸ πρότερον καὶ
65 ὕστερον τὸ μὲν χρόνος ὁ εἰς τὸ νῦν λήγων, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον ὃς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἄρχεται. Ἄλλο[1] τοίνυν ἀριθμοῦ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον μετροῦντος τὴν κίνησιν οὐ μόνον ἡντινοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τεταγμένην, ὁ χρόνος. Ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν προσγεγενημένου εἴτε κατὰ τὸ
70 μεμετρημένον εἴτε κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν· ἔστι γὰρ αὖ[2]

[1] ἄλλο A^{pc} aliud Ficinus, ἄλλο H–S: ἀλλὰ A^{ac}ExyQ.
[2] ἔστι γὰρ αὖ H–S: ἔστι γὰρ ἂν codd.

[1] Plotinus assumes here his own view that number has a separate substantial existence prior to the things which it numbers: see VI. 6 [34] 5.

one thing to say " time " and another to say " a certain length of time "; for before saying " a certain length of time " one ought to say what it is that is of a certain length. But perhaps the number which measures the movement from outside the movement is time, like the ten which counted the horses taken apart from the horses. Well, then, in this version it has not been said what this number is which is what it is before it begins to measure, like the ten.[1] Perhaps it is the number which runs beside the movement and measures it by the sequence of " before " and " after." [2] But it is not yet clear what this number which measures by the sequence of " before " and " after " is. And then, too, anyone who measures by " before " and " after," either with a point or with anything else, will in any case be measuring according to time. So, then, this time of theirs which measures movement by " before " and " after " is bound to time and in contact with time in order to measure. For one either takes " before " and " after " in a spatial sense, like " the beginning of the race-track," or else one must take them in a temporal sense. For in general, " before " and " after " mean, " before," the time which stops at the " now," and " after," the time which begins from the " now." Time, then, is something different from the number which measures by " before " and " after " not only any kind of movement but even ordered movement. Then, why, when number is added to movement, either on the measured or the measuring side—for there is the

[2] Aristotle defines time as *ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον* (*Physics* Δ 4. 219b2–3).

τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μετροῦντα καὶ μεμετρημένον εἶναι—ἀλλ' οὖν διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μὲν γενομένου χρόνος ἔσται, κινήσεως δὲ οὔσης καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πάντως ὑπάρχοντος περὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος; Ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μέγεθος μὴ εἶναι ὅσον ἐστίν, εἰ μή τις τὸ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτο λάβοι. Ἀπείρου δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ὄντος καὶ λεγομένου πῶς ἂν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸς εἴη; Εἰ μή τις ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι αὐτοῦ μετροῖ, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνει εἶναι καὶ πρὶν μετρηθῆναι. Διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἔσται πρὶν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μετροῦσαν εἶναι; Εἰ μή τις τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ ψυχῆς λέγοι γίνεσθαι. Ἐπεὶ διά γε τὸ μετρεῖν οὐδαμῶς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ὅσον ἐστί, κἂν μή τις μετρῇ. Τὸ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον πρὸς τὸ μετρῆσαι[1] τὴν ψυχὴν ἄν τις λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἔννοιαν χρόνου;

10. Τὸ δὲ παρακολούθημα λέγειν τῆς κινήσεως, τί ποτε τοῦτό ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστι διδάσκοντος οὐδὲ εἰρηκέ τι,[2] πρὶν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρακολουθοῦν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν ἴσως εἴη ὁ χρόνος. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τὸ παρακολούθημα τοῦτο εἴτε ὕστερον εἴτε ἅμα εἴτε πρότερον, εἴπερ τι ἔστι τοιοῦτον παρακολούθημα· ὅπως γὰρ ἂν λέγηται, ἐν χρόνῳ λέγεται. Εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος παρακολούθημα κινήσεως ἐν χρόνῳ.

Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐ τί μή ἐστι ζητοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τί

possibility that the same number could be both measured and measuring—why should time result from its presence, though when movement exists and, certainly, has a "before" and "after" belonging to it, there will be no time? This is like saying that a magnitude would not be the size it is unless someone understood that it was that size. But again, since time is, and is said to be, unbounded, how could it have a number? Unless, of course, someone took off a piece of it and measured it, but time would be in the piece before it was measured, too. But why can time not exist before the soul which measures it? Unless perhaps one is going to say that it originated from soul. But this is not in any way necessary because of measuring it, for it exists in its full length, even if no one measures it. One might say that the soul is what uses magnitude to measure time; but how could this help us to form the concept of time?

10. As for calling it an accompaniment of movement, this does not explain at all what it is, nor has the statement any content before it is said what this accompanying thing is, for perhaps just this might turn out to be time. But we must consider whether this accompaniment comes after movement, or at the same time as it, or before it—if there is any kind of accompaniment which comes before, for whichever may be said, it is said to be in time. If this is so, time will be an accompaniment of movement in time.

But, since we are not trying to find what time is not

[1] *μετρῆσαι* Kirchhoff, H-3: *μετρῆσαν* codd.
[2] *εἰρηκέ τι* Page, H–S²: *εἰρηκέναι* codd.

ἐστιν, εἴρηταί τε πολλὰ πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν καθ' ἑκάστην θέσιν, ἃ εἴ τις διεξίοι, ἱστορίαν μᾶλλον ἂν ποιοῖτο, ὅσον τε ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς εἴρηταί τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μέτρον κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς ἐκ τῶν ἤδη εἰρημένων ἀντιλέγειν τά τε ἄλλα ὅσα νῦν περὶ μέτρου κινήσεως εἴρηται—χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ πρὸς αὐτούς, ἁρμόσει—εἴη ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν χρόνον εἶναι.

11. Δεῖ δὴ ἀναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν διάθεσιν ἣν ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, τὴν ἀτρεμῆ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη ζωὴν καὶ ἀκλινῆ πάντη καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἑστῶσαν. Χρόνος δὲ οὔπω ἦν, ἢ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἦν, γεννήσομεν δὲ χρόνον λόγῳ καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου. Τούτων δὴ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον ἐξέπεσε χρόνος, τὰς μὲν Μούσας οὔπω τότε οὔσας οὐκ ἄν τις ἴσως καλοῖ εἰπεῖν τοῦτο· ἀλλ' ἴσως, εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε, αὐτὸν δ' ἄν τις τάχα τὸν γενόμενον χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν ἐκφανεὶς καὶ γενόμενος. Λέγοι δ' ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὧδέ πως· ὡς πρότερον, πρὶν τὸ πρότερον δὴ τοῦτο γεννῆσαι καὶ τοῦ

[1] I.e. those who say simply that time is the measure of movement.

[2] One of the most curious examples of adaptation of a Homeric tag to Platonic purposes. In *Iliad* XVI. 112–113 we have

> ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
> ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.

but what it is, and since a great deal has been said by a great many of our predecessors on every theory of its nature, and if one went through it all one would be making a historical rather than a philosophical enquiry; and since we have already made a cursory survey of some of their arguments, and it is possible from what has been said already to refute the philosopher who says that time is the measure of the movement of the All by using all our arguments about the measure of movement—for apart from the argument from irregularity all the others, which we used against them [1] too, will fit his case—it would be in order to say what one ought to think time is.

11. We must take ourselves back to the disposition which we said existed in eternity, to that quiet life, all a single whole, still unbounded, altogether without declination, resting in and directed towards eternity. Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the beings of that world; we shall produce time by means of the form and nature of what comes after. If, then, these beings were at rest in themselves, one could hardly, perhaps, call on the Muses, who did not then yet exist, to tell us "how time first came out": [2] but one might perhaps (even if the Muses did exist then after all) ask time when it has come into being to tell us how it did come into being and appear. It might say something like this about itself; that before, when it had not yet, in fact, produced this

In *Republic* VIII. (545D8E1), Plato, about to describe the decadence of the ideal states, says ἡ βούλει ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε; from this, rather than directly from Homer, Plotinus's playful variation is derived.

ὑστέρου δεηθῆναι, σὺν αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο χρόνος οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡσυχίαν ἦγε. Φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγμονος καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ παρόντος ζητεῖν ἑλομένης ἐκινήθη μὲν αὐτή, ἐκινήθη δὲ καὶ αὐτός, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶθ' ἕτερον κινούμενοι, μῆκός τι τῆς πορείας ποιησάμενοι αἰῶνος εἰκόνα τὸν χρόνον εἰργάσμεθα. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς ἦν τις δύναμις οὐχ ἡσυχος, τὸ δ' ἐκεῖ ὁρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρειν εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένης, τὸ μὲν ἀθρόον αὐτῇ πᾶν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἤθελεν· ὥσπερ δ' ἐκ σπέρματος ἡσύχου ἐξελίττων αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος διέξοδον εἰς πολύ, ὡς οἴεται, ποιεῖ, ἀφανίζων τὸ πολὺ τῷ μερισμῷ, καὶ ἀνθ' ἑνὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἓν δαπανῶν εἰς μῆκος ἀσθενέστερον πρόεισιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιοῦσα αἰσθητὸν μιμήσει ἐκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ τὴν ἐκεῖ, ὁμοίαν δὲ τῇ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσεν ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸν πάντα ποιήσασα εἶναι, τὰς τούτου διεξόδους ἁπάσας ἐν αὐτῷ περιλαβοῦσα· ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ

[1] " We," because it is soul which moves and produces time, and we are souls, parts of universal soul and already present in it as it moves out from eternity. This may possibly be the

" before " or felt the need of the " after," it was at rest with eternity in real being; it was not yet time, but itself, too, kept quiet in that. But since there was a restlessly active nature which wanted to control itself and be on its own, and chose to seek for more than its present state, this moved, and time moved with it; and so, always moving on to the " next " and the " after," and what is not the same, but one thing after another, we [1] made a long stretch of our journey and constructed time as an image of eternity. For because soul had an unquiet power, which wanted to keep on transferring what it saw there to something else, it did not want the whole to be present to it all together; and, as from a quiet seed the formative principle, unfolding itself, advances, as it thinks, to largeness, but does away with the largeness by division and, instead of keeping its unity in itself, squanders it outside itself and so goes forward to a weaker extension; [2] in the same way Soul, making the world of sense in imitation of that other world, moving with a motion which is not that which exists There, but like it, and intending to be an image of it, first of all put itself into time, which it made instead of eternity, and then handed over that which came into being as a slave to time, by making the whole of it exist in time and encompassing all its ways with time. For since the world of sense moves in Soul—

significance of the first person in *γεννήσομεν* above (l. 5); but this may be simply the lecturer's " we."

[2] One of the most vivid expressions in the *Enneads* of the deep and constant conviction of Plotinus that the beginning of a process of development is more perfect than the end, that simplicity, concentration and rest is better than large-scale expansion into a multiplicity of activities.

κινούμενος—οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς
35 τόπος ἢ[1] ψυχή—καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνης αὖ ἐκινεῖτο
χρόνῳ. Τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς παρεχομένη
ἄλλην μετ' ἄλλην, εἶθ' ἑτέραν πάλιν ἐφεξῆς,
ἐγέννα τε μετὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ
συμπροήει μετὰ διανοίας ἑτέρας μετ' ἐκείνην τὸ
μὴ πρότερον ὄν, ὅτι οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργηθεῖσα
40 ἦν οὐδ' ἡ νῦν ζωὴ ὁμοία τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς. Ἅμα οὖν
ζωὴ ἄλλη καὶ τὸ «ἄλλη» χρόνον εἶχεν ἄλλον.
Διάστασις οὖν ζωῆς χρόνον εἶχε καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἀεὶ
τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον ἔχει ἀεὶ καὶ ἡ παρελθοῦσα ζωὴ
χρόνον ἔχει παρεληλυθότα. Εἰ οὖν χρόνον τις
λέγοι ψυχῆς ἐν κινήσει μεταβατικῇ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς
45 ἄλλον βίον ζωὴν εἶναι, ἆρ' ἂν δοκοῖ τι λέγειν; Εἰ
γὰρ αἰών ἐστι ζωὴ ἐν στάσει καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ
ὡσαύτως καὶ ἄπειρος ἤδη, εἰκόνα δὲ δεῖ τοῦ
αἰῶνος τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν
ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἀντὶ μὲν ζωῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ ἄλλην
δεῖ ζωὴν τὴν τῆσδε τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ψυχῆς
50 ὥσπερ ὁμώνυμον λέγειν εἶναι καὶ ἀντὶ κινήσεως
νοερᾶς ψυχῆς τινος μέρους κίνησιν, ἀντὶ δὲ
ταὐτότητος καὶ τοῦ ὡσαύτως καὶ μένοντος τὸ μὴ
μένον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργοῦν,
ἀντὶ δὲ ἀδιαστάτου καὶ ἑνὸς εἴδωλον τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ

[1] ἢ Ficinus: ἡ codd.

[1] The juxtaposition of *αὐτοῦ* and *τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς* here is extremely odd. Kirchhoff and Dodds would read *αὐτῷ* (sc. *τῷ* Πλάτωνι) "there is no other place of this universe for Plato than soul," which is an attractive emendation. Alternatively, *τοῦδε τοῦ παντός* may be bracketed as a gloss. (This was tentatively suggested in H–S², and has now been done by Theiler, with Schwyzer's agreement.) But there remains the possibility that it may be a carelessly added amplification or explanation of *αὐτοῦ* by Plotinus himself; and therefore, with Henry-Schwyzer, I print and translate the MSS text.

there is no other place of it (this universe)[1] than Soul —it moves also in the time of Soul. For as Soul presents one activity after another, and then again another in ordered succession, it produces the succession along with activity, and goes on with another thought coming after that which it had before, to that which did not previously exist because discursive thought was not in action, and Soul's present life is not like that which came before it. So at the same time the life is different and this "different" involves a different time. So the spreading out of life involves time; life's continual progress involves continuity of time, and life which is past involves past time. So would it be sense to say that time is the life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another? Yes, for if eternity is life at rest, unchanging and identical and already unbounded, and time must exist as an image of eternity (in the same relation as that in which this All stands to the intelligible All), then we must say that there is, instead of the life There, another life having, in a way of speaking, the same name as this power of the soul, and instead of intelligible motion that there is the motion of a part of Soul; and, instead of sameness and self-identity and abiding, that which does not abide in the same but does one act after another, and, instead of that which is one without distance or separation, an image of

ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἕν, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀπείρου ἤδη καὶ ὅλου τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀεί, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀθρόου ὅλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐσόμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενον ὅλον. Οὕτω γὰρ μιμήσεται τὸ ἤδη ὅλον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ ἄπειρον ἤδη, εἰ ἐθελήσει ἀεὶ προσκτώμενον εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι οὕτω τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται. Δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος, οὐδ' αὖ παρακολούθημα οὐδ' ὕστερον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐνορώμενον καὶ ἐνόντα καὶ συνόντα, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖ ὁ αἰών.

12. Νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ φύσις αὕτη χρόνος, τὸ τοιούτου μῆκος βίου ἐν μεταβολαῖς προιὸν ὁμαλαῖς τε καὶ ὁμοίαις ἀψοφητὶ προιούσαις, συνεχὲς τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχον. Εἰ δὴ πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἀναστρέψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην καὶ παύσαιμεν τοῦδε τοῦ βίου, ὃν νῦν ἔχει ἄπαυστον ὄντα καὶ οὔποτε λήξοντα, ὅτι ψυχῆς τινος ἀεὶ οὔσης ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν ποιήσει καὶ γενέσει—εἰ οὖν ὑποθοίμεθα μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ παυσαμένην ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐπιστραφὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μένον, τί ἂν ἔτι μετὰ αἰῶνα εἴη; Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πάντων ἐν ἑνὶ μεινάντων; Τί δ' ἂν ἔτι πρότερον; Τί δ' ἂν ὕστερον ἢ μέλλον;[1] Ποῦ δ'

[1] μέλλον Page, H–S: μᾶλλον codd.

unity, that which is one in continuity; and instead of a complete unbounded whole, a continuous unbounded succession, and instead of a whole all together a whole which is, and always will be, going to come into being part by part. For this is the way in which it will imitate that which is already a whole, already all together and unbounded, by intending to be always making an increase in its being, for this is how its being will imitate the being of the intelligible world. But one must not conceive time as outside Soul, any more than eternity There as outside real being. It is not an accompaniment of Soul nor something that comes after (any more than eternity There) but something which is seen along with it and exists in it and with it, as eternity does There [with real being].

12. We must understand, too, from this that this nature is time, the extent of life of this kind which goes forward in even and uniform changes progressing quietly, and which possesses continuity of activity. Now if in our thought we were to make this power turn back again, and put a stop to this life which it now has without stop and never-ending, because it is the activity of an always existing soul, whose activity is not directed to itself or in itself, but lies in making and production—if, then we were to suppose that it was no longer active, but stopped this activity, and that this part of the soul turned back to the intelligible world and to eternity, and rested quietly there, what would there still be except eternity? What would "one thing after another" mean when all things remained in unity? What sense would "before" still have, and what "after" or "future"? Where could the soul now fix its

ἂν ἔτι ψυχὴ ἐπιβάλλοι εἰς ἄλλο ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι; Μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ· ἀφεστήκοι γὰρ ἂν πρότερον, ἵνα ἐπιβάλῃ. Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτὴ εἴη, ἢ οὐ πρώτως ὑπάρχει· [χρόνος][1] ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη καὶ ἔστι καὶ κινεῖται, κἂν στῇ, ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης, ὅση ἡ στάσις αὐτῆς, μετρήσομεν, ἕως ἐκείνη τοῦ αἰῶνός ἐστιν ἔξω. Εἰ οὖν ἀποστάσης ἐκείνης καὶ ἑνωθείσης ἀνῄρηται χρόνος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ταύτης ἀρχὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κινήσεως καὶ οὗτος ὁ βίος τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ. Διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἅμα τῷδε τῷ παντὶ γεγονέναι, ὅτι ψυχὴ αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἐγέννησεν. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ τόδε γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν· καὶ ἡ μὲν χρόνος, ὁ δὲ ἐν χρόνῳ. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι χρόνους λέγεσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φοράς, ἀναμνησθήτω, ὅτι ταῦτά φησι γεγονέναι πρὸς δήλωσιν καὶ διορισμὸν χρόνου καὶ τὸ ἵνα ᾖ μέτρον ἐναργές. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἦν τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁρίσαι οὐδὲ μετρεῖν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀοράτου ὄντος καὶ οὐ ληπτοῦ καὶ μάλιστα ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ εἰδόσιν, ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ποιεῖ, δι' ὧν ἦν δύο τῇ ἑτερότητι λαβεῖν, ἀφ' οὗ ἔννοιά, φησιν, ἀριθμοῦ. Εἶθ' ὅσον τὸ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς εἰς τὸ πάλιν λαμβάνουσιν ἦν ὅσον χρόνου διάστημα, ὁμαλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ τῆς κινήσεως εἴδους ὅτῳ ἐπερειδόμεθα, ἔχειν καὶ οἷον μέτρῳ

[1] χρόνος del. H–S.

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 38B6. [2] Cp. *Timaeus* 38C6.
[3] Cp. *Timaeus* 39B2. [4] Cp. *Epinomis* 978D1–6.

gaze on something other than that in which it is? Rather, it could not even fix its gaze on this, for it would have to stand away from it first in order to do so. For the heavenly sphere itself would not be there, since its existence is not primary, for it exists and moves in time, and, if it comes to a stop we shall measure the duration of its stop by the activity of soul, as long as soul is outside eternity. If, then, when soul leaves this activity and returns to unity time is abolished, it is clear that the beginning of this movement in this direction, and this form of the life of soul, generates time. This is why it is said that time came into existence simultaneously with this universe,[1] because soul generated it along with this universe. For it is in activity of this kind that this universe has come into being; and the activity is time and the universe is in time. But if someone wants to say that Plato also calls the courses of the stars " times " he should remember that he says that they have come into existence for the declaring and " division of time," [2] and his " that there might be an obvious measure." [3] For since it was not possible for the soul to delimit time itself, or for men by themselves to measure each part of it since it was invisible and ungraspable, particularly as they did not know how to count, the god made day and night, by means of which, in virtue of their difference, it was possible to grasp the idea of two, and from this Plato says, came the concept of number.[4] Then, by taking the length of the interval between one sunrise and the next, since the kind of movement on which we base our calculations is even, we can have an interval of time of a certain length, and we use this kind of

χρώμεθα τῷ τοιούτῳ· μέτρῳ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οὐ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς μέτρον. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ μετροῖ καὶ τί ἂν λέγοι μετρῶν τοσοῦτον εἶναι, ὅσον ἐγὼ τοσόνδε; Τίς οὖν ὁ « ἐγώ »; Ἡ κ..θ' ὃν ἡ μέτρησις. Οὐκοῦν ὧν, ἵνα μετρῇ, καὶ μὴ μέτρον; Ἡ οὖν κίνησις ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετρουμένη κατὰ χρόνον ἔσται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος οὐ μέτρον ἔσται κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὢν ἄλλο τι πρότερον παρέξει δήλωσιν τοῦ ὁπόση ἡ κίνησις. Καὶ ἡ κίνησις δὲ ληφθεῖσα ἡ μία ἐν τοσῷδε χρόνῳ πολλάκις ἀριθμουμένη εἰς ἔννοιαν ἄξει τοῦ ὁπόσος παρελήλυθεν· ὥστε τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν περιφορὰν εἴ τις λέγοι τρόπον τινὰ μετρεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ὅσον οἷόν τε, ὡς δηλοῦσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς τοσῷδε τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ χρόνου, οὐκ ὂν λαβεῖν οὐδὲ συνεῖναι ἄλλως, οὐκ ἄτοπος τῆς δηλώσεως. Τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς—τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ δηλούμενον—ὁ χρόνος ἔσται, οὐ γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ δηλωθείς· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως τὸ μετρηθὲν ὑπὸ κινήσεως ὡρισμένης, καὶ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ ταύτης ἄλλο ὂν αὐτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μετροῦν ἄλλο ἦν, καὶ ᾗ[1] μετρούμενον ἕτερον, μετρούμενον δὲ κατὰ[2] συμβεβηκός. Καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἐλέγετο, ὡς εἰ τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ πήχεως λέγοι

[1] ᾗ Kirchhoff, H–S²: εἰ codd.
[2] κατὰ Kirchhoff, H–S²: καὶ codd.

interval as a measure;[1] but a measure of time, for time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure, and what could it say while it was measuring? "This is as large as such and such a part of myself?" Who, then, is the "I" here? Presumably, that by which the measuring is being done. Then surely, if it is going to measure, it is not a measure? So, then, it will be the movement of the universe which will be measured by time, and time will not be a measure of movement essentially, but it will incidentally, being something else first, afford a clear indication of how long the movement is. And by taking one movement in a certain length of time and counting it again and again we shall arrive at an idea of how much time has passed; so that if one were to say that the movement and the heavenly circuit in a way measure time, as far as possible, in that the circuit shows by its extent the extent of time, which it would not be possible to grasp or understand otherwise, his explanation would not be out of place. So what is measured by the circuit—that is, what is shown—will be time, which is not produced by the circuit but manifested; and so the measure of motion is that which is measured by a limited motion, and since it is measured by this, is other than it, since, even if it was measuring it would be something else, and in so far as it is measured it is different (but it is [only] measured incidentally). This would have the same meaning as if one said that what is measured

[1] Here Plotinus uses some observations of Aristotle on the way in which, in fact, we measure time as the basis of an argument against Aristotle's own definition of time: cp. *Physics* Δ 12. 220b13–221a9.

τις τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο μὴ λέγων, μέγεθος ὁριζόμενος, καὶ οἷον εἴ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτὴν οὐ δυνάμενος τῷ ἀόριστον εἶναι δηλῶσαι λέγοι τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τόπου· λαβὼν γὰρ τόπον τις, ὃν ἐπεξῆλθεν ἡ κίνησις, τοσαύτην ἂν εἶπεν εἶναι, ὅσος ὁ τόπος.

13. Χρόνον οὖν ἡ περιφορὰ δηλοῖ, ἐν ᾧ αὕτη. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν χρόνον μηκέτι τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον αὐτὸν εἶναι ὅς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα κινεῖται καὶ ἕστηκεν ὁμαλῶς καὶ τεταγμένως, καὶ παρὰ μέν τινος τεταγμένου ἐμφαίνεσθαι καὶ προφαίνεσθαι εἰς ἔννοιαν, οὐ μέντοι γίνεσθαι, εἴτε ἑστῶτος εἴτε κινουμένου, μᾶλλον μέντοι κινουμένου· μᾶλλον γὰρ κινεῖ εἰς γνώρισιν καὶ μετάβασιν ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἡ κίνησις ἤπερ ἡ στάσις καὶ γνωριμώτερον τὸ ὁπόσον κεκίνηταί τι ἢ ὅσον ἕστηκε. Διὸ καὶ κινήσεως ἠνέχθησαν εἰς τὸ εἰπεῖν μέτρον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν κινήσει μετρούμενον, εἶτα προσθεῖναι τί ὂν κινήσει μετρεῖται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινόμενον περί τι αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐνηλλαγμένως. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἐνηλλαγμένως, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ συνίεμεν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς λεγόντων μέτρον κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐτυγχάνομεν τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης. Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ συνιέναι ἡμᾶς, ὅτι τί ὂν εἴτε μετροῦν εἴτε μετρούμενον οὐκ ἐδήλουν[1] διὰ τῶν συγγραμμάτων

[1] ἐδήλουν H–S: ἐκδηλοῦν A^{ac}Exy: ἐκδηλοῦσι A^{pc}.

by a cubit was the length, not saying what length was in itself but simply determining how long it was, and if one was not able to explain what movement itself was because of its indefiniteness and said it was what is measured by space, for one could take a space through which the movement went and say that the movement was as long as the space.

13. The heavenly circuit, therefore, shows time, in which it is. But time itself cannot have something in which it is, but it must first of all be itself what it is, that in which the other things move and stand still evenly and regularly; it can be manifested to us by something set in order, and exhibited to our minds so that we form a concept of it, but it cannot be brought into existence by the ordered thing, whether it is at rest or in motion; but a thing in motion will give a better idea of it, for motion more effectively moves our minds to get to know time and to form a concept of it by analogy than rest, and it is easier to know how long something has been moving than how long it has stood still. This is why people were brought to call time the measure of movement, instead of saying that it was measured by movement and then adding what it is that is measured by movement, and not only mentioning something which applies incidentally to a part of it, and getting that the wrong way round. But perhaps they did not get it the wrong way round but we do not understand them, but, when they clearly meant "measure" in the sense of "what is measured," we missed the point of their thought. The reason why we do not understand is that they did not make clear what it is that either measures or is measured in their

ὡς εἰδόσι καὶ ἠκροαμένοις αὐτῶν γράφοντες. Ὁ μέντοι Πλάτων οὔτε μετροῦν εἴρηκεν οὔτε μετρούμενον ὑπό τινος τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ εἰς δήλωσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν περιφορὰν ἐλάχιστόν τι εἰληφθαι πρὸς ἐλάχιστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν γινώσκειν δύνασθαι, οἷον καὶ ὅσον ὁ χρόνος. Τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ δηλῶσαι θέλων ἅμα οὐρανῷ φησι γεγονέναι κατὰ[1] παράδειγμα αἰῶνος καὶ εἰκόνα κινητήν, ὅτι μὴ μένει μηδ' ὁ χρόνος τῆς ζωῆς οὐ μενούσης, ᾗ συνθεῖ καὶ συντρέχει· ἅμα οὐρανῷ δέ, ὅτι ζωὴ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ καὶ μία ζωὴ οὐρανὸν καὶ χρόνον ἐργάζεται. Ἐπιστραφείσης οὖν ζωῆς ταύτης εἰς ἕν, εἰ δύναιτο, ὁμοῦ καὶ χρόνος πέπαυται ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ὢν ταύτῃ καὶ οὐρανὸς τὴν ζωὴν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχων. Εἰ δέ τις τῆσδε μὲν τῆς κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λαμβάνων χρόνον λέγοι—εἶναι γάρ τι τοῦτο—τῆς δ' ἀληθεστέρας κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐχούσης μὴ λέγοι τι εἶναι, ἀτοπώτατος ἂν εἴη, κινήσει μὲν ἀψύχῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον καὶ χρόνον παρ' αὐτήν, κινήσει δέ, καθ' ἣν καὶ αὕτη ὑφέστηκε κατὰ μίμησιν, μὴ διδοὺς τοῦτο, παρ' ἧς καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον πρώτως ὑπέστη αὐτουργοῦ οὔσης κινήσεως καὶ ὥσπερ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς ἑκάστας

[1] κατὰ Kirchhoff, H–S²: καὶ codd.

[1] Cp. *Timaeus* 39B–C.

writings, since they were writing for those who knew and had heard their lectures. Plato, however, has neither described the essential nature of time as measuring nor as measured by something else, but has said that, to show time, the heavenly circuit has put a least part of itself in relation with a least part of time, so that from this we can come to know the quality and quantity of time.[1] But when he wants to declare its essential nature he says that it came into existence along with heaven according to the pattern of eternity,[2] and as its moving image,[3] because time does not stand still since the life with which it keeps pace in its course does not stand still; it comes into existence with heaven because this kind of life makes heaven, too, and one life produces heaven and time. So when this life—if it could—turned back to unity, time would come to a stop with it, since it exists in this life, and so would heaven, if it did not have this life. But if someone were to take the " before " and " after " of this movement here and call it time—on the ground that this is something real—but though the truer movement [of soul] has a " before " and " after," were to deny this any reality, he would be quite unreasonable, in that he would be granting that soulless movement has " before " and " after " and time accompanying it, but denying this to the movement in imitation of which this [soulless] movement has come into existence, to the movement from which " before " and " after " first came into existence, since it is spontaneous and, as it generates its own individual activities,

[2] *Timaeus* 38B6–C2.
[3] *Timaeus* 37D4–C7.

γεννώσης, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ ἅμα τῇ γεννήσει καὶ τὴν μετάβασιν αὐτῶν. Διὰ τί οὖν ταύτην μὲν τὴν κίνησιν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀνάγομεν εἰς περιοχὴν ἐκείνης καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ φαμέν, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ οὖσαν ἀιδίῳ; Ἢ ὅτι τὸ πρὸ ταύτης ἐστὶν αἰὼν οὐ συμπαραθέων οὐδὲ συμπαρατείνων αὐτῇ. Πρώτη οὖν αὕτη εἰς χρόνον καὶ χρόνον ἐγέννησε καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὑτῆς ἔχει. Πῶς οὖν πανταχοῦ; Ὅτι κἀκείνη οὐδενὸς ἀφέστηκε τοῦ κόσμου μέρους, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐδενὸς ἡμῶν[1] μέρους. Εἰ δέ τις ἐν οὐχ ὑποστάσει ἢ ἐν οὐχ ὑπάρξει τὸν χρόνον λέγοι, δηλονότι ψεύδεσθαι καταθετέον,[2] ὅταν λέγῃ « ἦν » καὶ « ἔσται »· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἦν, ὡς τὸ ἐν ᾧ λέγει αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄλλος τρόπος λόγων. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἅπασι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὡς, ὅταν τις τὸν κινούμενον ἄνθρωπον λαμβάνῃ ὅσον προελήλυθε,[3] καὶ τὴν κίνησιν λαμβάνει ὅση, καὶ ὅταν τὴν κίνησιν οἷον τὴν διὰ σκελῶν, ὁράτω[4] καὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς κινήσεως ταύτης ἐν αὐτῷ κίνημα ὅτι τοσοῦτον ἦν, εἴ γε ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον συνεῖχε τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σώματος. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα τὸ κινούμενον τὸν τοσόνδε χρόνον ἀνάξει ἐπὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν τοσήνδε—αὕτη γὰρ αἰτία—καὶ τὸν χρόνον ταύτης, ταύτην δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν

[1] ἡμῶν Kirchhoff, H–S²: ἡμῖν wBJy: om.R.
[2] καταθετέον nunc Schwyzer: καὶ τὸ θεὸν αὐτὸν codd, H–S.
[3] προελήλυθε Kirchhoff, H–S²: προσελήλυθε codd.
[4] ὁράτω Dodds, H–S²: ὁρᾷ τῷ codd.

so it generates their succession, and, along with their generation, the transition from one of them to another. Why, then, do we trace back the origin of this movement of the All to that which encompasses it, and say that it is in time, but do not say that the movement of soul, which goes on in it in everlasting progression, is in time? It is because what is before the movement of soul is eternity, which does not run along with it or stretch out with it. This movement of soul was the first to enter time, and generated time, and possesses it along with its own activity. How, then, is time everywhere? Because Soul, too, is not absent from any part of the Universe, just as the soul in us is not absent from any part of us. But if someone were to say that time is in something insubstantial or unreal, it must be stated that he is telling an untruth whenever he says that he "was" or "will be"; for he "will be" and "was" in the same sense as that in which he says he "will be." But against people like this we need another style of argument.

But, besides all that has been said, one must consider this further point, that, when one observes the distance that a moving man has advanced, he also observes the quantity of his movement, and when he observes the movement, for instance, made by his legs, let him notice also that the movement in the man himself which preceded this movement was of a certain quantity, on the assumption that he kept the movement of his body within certain limits. Now the body moved for a certain time will take us back to a certain extent—for this is the cause—and its time, and this to the movement of the soul, which is

τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησιν, ἥτις τὰ ἴσα διειστήκει. Τὴν οὖν κίνησιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τί; Εἰς ὃ γὰρ ἐθελήσει, ἀδιάστατον ἤδη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ τὰ ἄλλα· αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκέτι ἔν τῳ·[1] οὐ γὰρ ἕξει [τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως].[2] Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ὡσαύτως. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν χρόνος; Ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πάσῃ καὶ ὁμοειδῶς ἐν πάσῃ καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι μία. Διὸ οὐ διασπασθήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὁ αἰὼν ὁ κατ' ἄλλο ἐν τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι πᾶσιν.

[1] ἔν τῳ Dodds, H–S²: ἐν ᾧ codd.
[2] τοῦτο . . . πρώτως del. Kirchhoff, H–S.

divided into equal intervals. To what, then, will the movement of soul take us back? For that to which one will want to take it back is already without intervals. This, then [the movement of soul] is that which exists primarily and in which the others are; but it is not any more in anything, for it will have nothing to be in. And the same is true also of the Soul of the All. Is time, then, also in us? It is in every soul of this kind, and in the same form in every one of them, and all are one. So time will not be split up, any more than eternity, which, in a different way, is in all the [eternal] beings of the same form.

III. 8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION AND THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise (No. 30 in the chronological order) is in fact the first part of a major work of Plotinus, including also Nos. 31–33 (V8, V5 and II9), the four sections of which Porphyry arbitrarily separated and placed in three different Enneads according to his own too rigidly systematic principles of arrangement.[1] The doctrine of contemplation which it contains is the very heart of the philosophy of Plotinus. He shows contemplation as the source and goal of all action and production at every level: all life for him is essentially contemplation. And in showing this he leads our minds up from the lowest level of contemplative life, that of Nature, the last phase of Soul which is the immanent principle of growth, through Soul to share in Intellect's contemplation of the One or Good, which he demonstrates must lie beyond it as source of contemplation and life. In the next two parts into which Porphyry has divided the work (V8 and V5) he develops his thought about first the beauty, and then the truth of Intellect, and again leads our minds back from it to the Good. In the first three chapters of II9 he sums up his thought about the One, Intellect and Soul; then he adds a polemical appendix, directed against Gnostic members of his circle, which occupies the rest of the treatise (cp. Introductory Note to II9).

[1] See R. Harder, "Eine Neue Schrift Plotins" in *Kleine Schriften* (Beck, Munich, 1960), pp. 303–313.

Synopsis

Let us play with the idea that all things contemplate, even plants and the earth from which they grow (ch. 1). How Nature makes things, and how contemplation underlies its making (chs. 2–3). Plotinus makes Nature speak and comments on what it says, showing how its dreamlike contemplation is the last and weakest, and how weak contemplation leads to action (ch. 4). Contemplation, action and production on the level of Soul, and in human life (chs. 5–6). Contemplation is always the goal of action (ch. 7). The perfect identity of contemplation and object contemplated in Intellect; all life is a kind of thought and the truest life is the truest thought, that of Intellect (ch. 8). Why Intellect is many and not one, and being many cannot be the first, but must have something beyond it, the absolutely simple Good, which we know by immediate awareness of its presence to us (chs. 8–9). The Good is the one productive power of all things (ch. 10). Intellect needs the Good, always desiring it and always attaining; but the Good needs nothing (ch. 11).

III. 8. (30) ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Παίζοντες δὴ τὴν πρώτην πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν πάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, οὐ μόνον ἔλλογα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ τὴν ἐν φυτοῖς φύσιν καὶ τὴν ταῦτα γεννῶσαν γῆν, καὶ πάντα τυγχάνειν καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλως καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ τυγχάνειν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῶς, τὰ δὲ μίμησιν καὶ εἰκόνα τούτου λαμβάνοντα—ἆρ' ἄν τις ἀνάσχοιτο τὸ παράδοξον τοῦ λόγου; Ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ γινομένου κίνδυνος οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ παίζειν τὰ αὐτῶν γενήσεται. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς παίζοντες ἐν τῷ παρόντι θεωροῦμεν; Ἢ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ πάντες ὅσοι παίζουσι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν ἢ τούτου[1] γε παίζουσιν ἐφιέμενοι. Καὶ κινδυνεύει, εἴτε τις παῖς εἴτε ἀνὴρ παίζει ἢ σπου-

[1] ἢ τούτου H–S²: ἢ τοῦτο A^ac Exy: καὶ τούτου Ficinus, A^pc.

[1] Perhaps there is a reminiscence in this introduction of Plato, *Laws* IV. 712B1–2 (where the old gentlemen imagining their city are called παῖδες πρεσβῦται), and VII 803C–D (where man is a plaything of god and his highest and most serious activity is to play before him: for another reminiscence of this passage, see III. 2[47]15). In any case, the tone of humorous half-apology in which a doctrine which Plotinus takes extremely seriously is introduced is entirely in the spirit of Plato.

III. 8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION AND THE ONE

1. Suppose we said, playing[1] at first before we set out to be serious, that all things aspire to contemplation, and direct their gaze to this end—not only rational but irrational living things,[2] and the power of growth in plants, and the earth which brings them forth—and that all attain to it as far as possible for them in their natural state, but different things contemplate and attain their end in different ways, some truly, and some only having an imitation and image of this true end—could anyone endure the oddity of this line of thought? Well, as this discussion has arisen among ourselves, there will be no risk in playing with our own ideas. Then are we now contemplating as we play? Yes, we and all who play are doing this, or at any rate this is what they aspire to as they play. And it is likely that, whether a child or a man is playing or being serious, one plays and

[2] Cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* K.2 1172b10 (Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the good because all things, rational and irrational, aspired to it). Plotinus is taking Aristotle's conception of θεωρία (K.6 and K.7) as the starting-point of his discussion, and is perhaps deliberately indicating by this phrase that his own conception of it is much more universal than Aristotle's.

δάζει, θεωρίας ἕνεκεν ὁ μὲν παίζειν, ὁ δὲ σπουδάζειν, καὶ πρᾶξις πᾶσα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχειν, ἡ μὲν ἀναγκαία καὶ ἐπιπλέον τὴν θεωρίαν ἕλκουσα πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἡ δὲ ἑκούσιος λεγομένη ἐπ' ἔλαττον μέν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐφέσει θεωρίας γινομένη. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν περί τε γῆς αὐτῆς καὶ δένδρων καὶ ὅλως φυτῶν τίς αὐτῶν ἡ θεωρία, καὶ πῶς τὰ παρ' αὐτῆς ποιούμενα καὶ γεννώμενα ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς θεωρίας ἀνάξομεν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ πῶς ἡ φύσις, ἣν ἀφάνταστόν φασι καὶ ἄλογον εἶναι, θεωρίαν τε ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει καὶ ἃ ποιεῖ διὰ θεωρίαν ποιεῖ, ἣν οὐκ ἔχει, [καὶ πῶς].[1]

2. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα οὔτε πόδες οὔτε τι ὄργανον ἐπακτὸν ἢ σύμφυτον, ὕλης δὲ δεῖ, ἐφ' ἧς ποιήσει, καὶ ἣν ἐνειδοποιεῖ,[2] παντί που δῆλον. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεύειν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιήσεως. Ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμὸς ἢ τίς μοχλεία χρώματα ποικίλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ σχήματα ποιεῖ; Ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ οἱ κηροπλάσται [ἢ κοροπλάθαι],[3] εἰς οὓς δὴ καὶ βλέποντες ᾠήθησαν τὴν τῆς φύσεως δημιουργίαν τοιαύτην εἶναι,

[1] καὶ πῶς del. Müller, H–S².

[2] ἐνειδοποιεῖ nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ἐν εἴδει ποιεῖ codd, H–S.

[3] ἢ κοροπλάθαι del. Müller, H–S².

[1] The Stoics used the terms *φύσις ἀφάνταστος* and *νοερὰ φύσις* to distinguish between "nature" in the sense of the Aristotelian growth-principle and in their own sense of the all-pervading divine reason: cp. *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* II. 1016.

the other is serious for the sake of contemplation, and every action is a serious effort towards contemplation; compulsory action drags contemplation more towards the outer world, and what we call voluntary, less, but, all the same, voluntary action, too, springs from the desire of contemplation. But we will discuss this later: but now let us talk about the earth itself, and trees, and plants in general, and ask what their contemplation is, and how we can relate what the earth makes and produces to its activity of contemplation, and how nature, which people say has no power of forming mental images [1] or reasoning, has contemplation in itself and makes what it makes by contemplation, which it does not have.

2. Well, then, it is clear, I suppose, to everyone that there are no hands here or feet, and no instrument either acquired or of natural growth, but there is need of matter on which nature can work and which it forms. But we must also exclude levering from the operation of nature. For what kind of thrusting or levering can produce this rich variety of colours and shapes of every kind? [2] For the wax-modellers—people have actually looked at them and thought that nature's workmanship was like

[2] Cp. V. 8 [31] 7. 10–11, and V. 9 [5] 6. 22, 23. It is part of Plotinus's consistent effort to eliminate materialistic and spatial conceptions from our ideas of spiritual existence and activity that he insists frequently that soul and nature are not to be thought of as forming the material world with hands and tools and machines. He seems to have in mind the sort of crude Epicurean criticism of Plato which we find in Cicero *De Natura Deorum* I. 8.19 *quae molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae?*

χρώματα δύνανται ποιεῖν μὴ χρώματα ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπάγοντες οἷς ποιοῦσιν. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐχρῆν συννοοῦντας, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὰς τέχνας τὰς τοιαύτας μετιόντων, [ὅτι][1] δεῖ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς μένειν, καθ' ὃ μένον διὰ χειρῶν ποιήσουσιν ἃ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνελθεῖν τῆς φύσεως καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεῖναι, ὡς μένειν δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν δύναμιν τὴν οὐ διὰ χειρῶν ποιοῦσαν καὶ πᾶσαν μένειν. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖται τῶν μὲν ὡς μενόντων, τῶν δὲ ὡς κινουμένων—ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ κινούμενον, αὐτῆς δὲ οὐδὲν κινούμενον—ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔσται τὸ κινοῦν πρώτως, οὐδὲ ἡ φύσις τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀκίνητον τὸ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. Ὁ μὲν δὴ λόγος, φαίη ἄν τις, ἀκίνητος, αὕτη δὲ ἄλλη παρὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ κινουμένη. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσαν φήσουσι, καὶ ὁ λόγος· εἰ δέ τι αὐτῆς ἀκίνητον, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ λόγος. Καὶ γὰρ εἶδος αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους· τί γὰρ δεῖ αὐτῇ ὕλης θερμῆς ἢ ψυχρᾶς; Ἡ γὰρ ὑποκειμένη καὶ δημιουργουμένη ὕλη ἥκει τοῦτο φέρουσα, ἢ γίνεται τοιαύτη ἡ μὴ ποιότητα ἔχουσα λογωθεῖσα. Οὐ γὰρ πῦρ δεῖ προσελθεῖν, ἵνα πῦρ ἡ ὕλη γένηται, ἀλλὰ λόγον· ὃ καὶ σημεῖον οὐ μικρὸν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς ποιοῦντας καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἶναι λόγον, ὃς ποιεῖ λόγον ἄλλον

[1] ὅτι del. Ficinus, H–S².

theirs—cannot make colours unless they bring colours from elsewhere to the things they make. But those who make this comparison ought to have considered also that even with those who practise crafts of this kind there must be something in themselves, something which stays unmoved, according to which they will make their works with their hands; they should have brought their minds back to the same kind of thing in nature, and understood that here, too, the power, all of it, which makes without hands, must stay unmoved. For it certainly has no need to have some unmoving and some moving parts—matter is what is in motion, and no part of nature is in motion—otherwise its unmoving part will not be the primary mover, nor will nature be this, but that which is unmoved in the universe as a whole. But someone might say that the rational forming principle is unmoved, but nature is different from the forming principle and is in motion. But if they are going to say that nature as a whole is in motion, then so will the forming principle be; but if any part of it is unmoved, this, too, will be the forming principle. In fact, of course, nature must be a form, and not composed of matter and form; for why should it need hot or cold matter? For matter which underlies it and is worked on by it comes to it bringing this [heat or cold] or rather becomes of this quality (though it has no quality itself) by being given form by a rational principle. For it is not fire which has to come to matter in order that it may become fire, but a forming principle; and this is a strong indication that in animals and plants the forming principles are the makers and nature is a forming principle, which

γέννημα αὐτοῦ δόντα μέν τι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, μένοντα δ' αὐτόν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος ὁ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἔσχατος ἤδη καὶ νεκρὸς καὶ οὐκέτι ποιεῖν δύναται ἄλλον, ὁ δὲ ζωὴν ἔχων ὁ τοῦ ποιήσαντος τὴν μορφὴν ἀδελφὸς ὢν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχων ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ.

3. Πῶς οὖν ποιῶν καὶ οὕτω ποιῶν θεωρίας τινὸς ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο; Ἢ, εἰ μένων ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένων καί ἐστι λόγος, εἴη ἂν αὐτὸς θεωρία. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξις γένοιτ' ἂν κατὰ λόγον ἑτέρα οὖσα δηλονότι τοῦ λόγου· ὁ μέντοι λόγος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ συνὼν τῇ πράξει καὶ ἐπιστατῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρᾶξις. Εἰ οὖν μὴ πρᾶξις ἀλλὰ λόγος, θεωρία· καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς λόγου ὁ μὲν ἔσχατος ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ θεωρία οὕτως ὡς τεθεωρημένος, ὁ δὲ πρὸ τούτου πᾶς ὁ μὲν ἄλλος ἄλλως, ὁ μὴ ὡς φύσις ἀλλὰ ψυχή, ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἡ φύσις. Ἆρά γε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ θεωρίας; Πάντως μὲν ἐκ θεωρίας. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς τεθεωρηκὼς αὑτόν; ἢ πῶς; ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἀποτέλεσμα θεωρίας καὶ θεωρήσαντός τινος. Πῶς δὲ αὕτη ἔχει θεωρίαν; Τὴν μὲν δὴ ἐκ λόγου οὐκ ἔχει· λέγω δ' ἐκ λόγου τὸ σκοπεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ. Διὰ τί οὖν ζωή τις οὖσα καὶ λόγος καὶ

[1] This is a good example of the variety of meaning which the word λόγος can have in Plotinus. The logical subject of the sentence is λόγος in the special sense which it often bears in the *Enneads*, combining the ideas of intelligence, intelligibility and formative activity, which I translate by "rational principle" or "rational formative principle"; it is a λόγος in this sense which does not have contemplation ἐκ λόγου in the ordinary sense of "reasoning," "discursive thinking."

makes another principle, its own product, which gives something to the substrate, but stays unmoved itself. This forming principle, then, which operates in the visible shape, is the last, and is dead and no longer able to make another, but that which has life is the brother of that which makes the shape, and has the same power itself, and makes in that which comes into being.

3. How then, when it makes, and makes in this way, can it attain to any sort of contemplation? If it stays unmoved as it makes, and stays in itself, and is a forming principle, it must itself be contemplation. For action must take place according to a rational principle, and is obviously different from the principle; but the principle itself, which accompanies and supervises the action, cannot be action. If, then, it is not action but rational principle, it is contemplation; and in every rational principle its last and lowest manifestation springs from contemplation, and is contemplation in the sense of being contemplated; but the manifestation of the principle before this is universal, one part in a different way, the part which is not nature but soul; the other is the rational principle in nature, and is nature. Then is this itself, too, the result of contemplation? Yes, it is altogether the result of contemplation. But is it so because it has itself contemplated itself, or how? For it is a result of contemplation, and something has been contemplating. But how does this, nature, possess contemplation? It certainly does not have the contemplation that comes from reasoning:[1] I mean by "reasoning" the research into what it has in itself. But why [should it not have it] when it is a

δύναμις ποιοῦσα; Ἆρ' ὅτι τὸ σκοπεῖσθαί ἐστι τὸ μήπω ἔχειν; Ἡ δὲ ἔχει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ποιεῖ. Τὸ οὖν εἶναι αὐτῇ ὅ ἐστι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῇ καὶ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν. Ἔστι δὲ θεωρία καὶ θεώρημα, λόγος γάρ. Τῷ οὖν εἶναι θεωρία καὶ θεώρημα καὶ λόγος τούτῳ καὶ ποιεῖ ᾗ ταῦτά ἐστιν. Ἡ ποίησις ἄρα θεωρία ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται· ἔστι γὰρ ἀποτέλεσμα θεωρίας μενούσης θεωρίας οὐκ ἄλλο τι πραξάσης, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι θεωρία ποιησάσης.

4. Καὶ εἴ τις δὲ αὐτὴν ἔροιτο τίνος ἕνεκα ποιεῖ, εἰ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος ἐθέλοι ἐπαίειν καὶ λέγειν, εἴποι ἄν· « Ἐχρῆν μὲν μὴ ἐρωτᾶν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σιωπῇ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σιωπῶ καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι λέγειν. Τί οὖν συνιέναι; Ὅτι τὸ γενόμενόν ἐστι θέαμα ἐμόν, σιωπώσης,[1] καὶ φύσει γενόμενον θεώρημα, καί μοι γενομένῃ ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ὡδὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μου θεώρημα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν· ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ μὴ γραφούσης, θεωρούσης δέ, ὑφίστανται αἱ τῶν σωμάτων γραμμαὶ ὥσπερ ἐκπίπτουσαι. Καί μοι τὸ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῶν γειναμένων ὑπάρχει πάθος· καὶ

[1] σιωπώσης Coleridge (secundum Dodds) et nuno Henry et Schwyzer: σιώπησις codd., H–S.

[1] Though this is not a precise allusion to anything in Plato, Plotinus is thinking in terms of something like the construction of the regular solids which are the figures of the

life and a rational principle and a power which makes? Is it because research means not yet possessing? But nature possesses, and just because it possesses, it also makes. Making, for it, means being what it is, and its making power is coextensive with what it is. But it is contemplation and object of contemplation, for it is a rational principle. So by being contemplation and object of contemplation and rational principle, it makes in so far as it is these things. So its making has been revealed to us as contemplation, for it is a result of contemplation, and the contemplation stays unchanged and does not do anything else but makes by being contemplation.

4. And if anyone were to ask nature why it makes, if it cared to hear and answer the questioner it would say: " You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence, you, too, just as I am silent and not in the habit of talking. Understand what, then? That what comes into being is what I see in my silence, an object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from this sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their figures while they contemplate. But I do not draw, but as I contemplate, the lines which bound bodies come to be as if they fell from my contemplation.[1] What happens to me is what happens to my mother and the beings that

primary bodies in *Timaeus* 53C–55C. But the intuitive spontaneity of the process here, as contrasted with the careful and deliberate mathematical planning in Plato's symbolical description, brings out clearly an important difference in the mentality of the two philosophers.

γὰρ ἐκεῖνοί εἰσιν ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ ἐμὴ ἐκείνων οὐδὲν πραξάντων, ἀλλ' ὄντων μειζόνων λόγων καὶ θεωρούντων αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ γεγέννημαι.»

Τί οὖν ταῦτα βούλεται; Ὡς ἡ μὲν λεγομένη φύσις ψυχὴ οὖσα, γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυνατώτερον ζώσης, ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ θεωρίαν ἔχουσα οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω οὐδ' αὖ ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κάτω, στᾶσα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς στάσει καὶ οἷον συναισθήσει, τῇ συνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ συναισθήσει τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν εἶδεν ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτῇ καὶ οὐκέτι ἐζήτησεν ἄλλα θεώρημα ἀποτελέσασα ἀγλαὸν καὶ χάριεν. Καὶ εἴτε τις βούλεται σύνεσίν τινα ἢ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἵαν λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνεσιν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἴ τις τὴν καθύπνου[1] τῇ[2] ἐγρηγορότος προσεικάσειε. Θεωροῦσα γὰρ θεώρημα αὐτῆς ἀναπαύεται γενόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ μένειν καὶ θεώρημα εἶναι· καὶ θεωρία ἄψοφος, ἀμυδροτέρα δέ. Ἑτέρα γὰρ αὐτῆς εἰς θέαν ἐναργεστέρα, ἡ δὲ εἴδωλον θεωρίας ἄλλης. Ταύτῃ δὴ καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀσθενὲς παντάπασιν, ὅτι ἀσθενοῦσα θεωρία ἀσθενὲς θεώρημα ποιεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν ἀσθενήσωσιν εἰς τὸ θεωρεῖν, σκιὰν θεωρίας καὶ λόγου τὴν πρᾶξιν ποιοῦνται. Ὅτι γὰρ μὴ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς θεωρίας ὑπ' ἀσθενείας ψυχῆς,

[1] καθύπνου nunc Henry et Schwyzer: τοῦ ὕπνου codd., H–S.
[2] τῇ H–S: τοῦ wxUS: om. C.

generated me,[1] for they, too, derive from contemplation, and it is no action of theirs which brings about my birth; they are greater rational principles, and as they contemplate themselves I come to be."

What does this mean? That what is called nature is a soul, the offspring of a prior soul with a stronger life; that it quietly holds contemplation in itself, not directed upwards or even downwards, but at rest in what it is, in its own repose and a kind of self-perception, and in this consciousness and self-perception it sees what comes after it, as far as it can, and seeks other things no longer, having accomplished a vision of splendour and delight. If anyone wants to attribute to it understanding or perception, it will not be the understanding or perception we speak of in other beings; it will be like comparing the consciousness of someone fast asleep to the consciousness of someone awake. Nature is at rest in contemplation of the vision of itself, a vision which comes to it from its abiding in and with itself and being itself a vision; and its contemplation is silent but somewhat blurred. For there is another, clearer for sight, and nature is the image of another contemplation. For this reason what is produced by it is weak in every way, because a weak contemplation produces a weak object. Men, too, when their power of contemplation weakens, make action a shadow of contemplation and reasoning. Because contemplation is not enough for them, since their souls are weak and they are not able to grasp the

[1] "my mother" = the higher soul: "the beings that generated me" = the λόγοι in soul which are the immediate expressions of the Forms in Intellect.

λαβεῖν οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸ θέαμα ἱκανῶς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ πληρούμενοι, ἐφιέμενοι δὲ αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν, εἰς πρᾶξιν φέρονται, ἵνα ἴδωσιν, ὃ μὴ νῷ ἐδύναντο. Ὅταν γοῦν ποιῶσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρᾶν βούλονται αὐτὸ καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν ἡ πρόθεσις αὐτοῖς ὡς οἷόν τε πρᾶξις ᾖ. Πανταχοῦ δὴ ἀνευρήσομεν τὴν ποίησιν καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ ἀσθένειαν θεωρίας ἢ παρακολούθημα· ἀσθένειαν μέν, εἰ μηδέν τις ἔχοι μετὰ τὸ πραχθέν, παρακολούθημα δέ, εἰ ἔχοι ἄλλο πρὸ τούτου κρεῖττον τοῦ ποιηθέντος θεωρεῖν. τίς[1] γὰρ θεωρεῖν τὸ ἀληθινὸν δυνάμενος προηγουμένως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ εἴδωλον τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ; Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ νωθέστεροι τῶν παίδων, οἳ πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ θεωρίας ἀδυνάτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐργασίας καταφέρονται.

5. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν φύσεως εἰπόντες ὃν τρόπον θεωρία ἡ γένεσις, ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρὸ ταύτης ἐλθόντες λέγωμεν, ὡς ἡ ταύτης θεωρία καὶ τὸ φιλομαθὲς καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν καὶ ἡ ἐξ ὧν ἐγνώκει ὠδὶς καὶ τὸ πλῆρες πεποίηκεν αὐτὴν θεώρημα πᾶν γενομένην ἄλλο θεώρημα ποιῆσαι· οἷον ἡ

[1] τίς A[pc] et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: τί A[ac]Exy, H–S.

[1] This distinction between the action which is a substitute for contemplation and that which naturally issues from it is a valuable one, and the description of the way in which weakness in contemplation leads through dissatisfaction to substitute activities (ll. 33–36) is a good piece of psychological observation. But there is a certain confusion of thought in the passage. There is no real reason why the kind of action

vision sufficiently, and therefore are not filled with it, but still long to see it, they are carried into action, so as to see what they cannot see with their intellect. When they make something, then, it is because they want to see their object themselves and also because they want others to be aware of it and contemplate it, when their project is realised in practice as well as possible. Everywhere we shall find that making and action are either a weakening or a consequence of contemplation;[1] a weakening, if the doer or maker had nothing in view beyond the thing done, a consequence if he had another prior object of contemplation better than what he made. For who, if he is able to contemplate what is truly real will deliberately go after its image? The duller children, too, are evidence of this, who are incapable of learning and contemplative studies and turn to crafts and manual work.

5. But, now that we have said, in speaking of nature, in what way coming into being is contemplation, we must go on to the soul prior to nature and say how its contemplation, its love of learning and spirit of enquiry, its birth-pangs from the knowledge it attains and its fullness, make it, when it has itself become all a vision, produce another vision; it is

which is a consequence of contemplation should imply any weakness in the contemplation itself (however imperfectly it may represent it); and the activity of nature in forming the material world is an activity of this sort. But Plotinus is so deeply convinced of the inferiority of the material world that he has to represent the activity of soul in forming material things as an activity of the lowest form of soul and due to its weakness in contemplation; hence the comparison with the substitute activities of uncontemplative men.

τέχνη ποιεῖ· ὅταν ἑκάστη πλήρης ᾖ, ἄλλην οἵαν μικρὰν τέχνην ποιεῖ ἐν παιγνίῳ[1] ἴνδαλμα ἔχοντι ἁπάντων· ἄλλως μέντοι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἀμυδρὰ καὶ οὐ δυνάμενα βοηθεῖν ἑαυτοῖς θεάματα καὶ θεωρήματα· τὸ πρῶτον [τὸ λογιστικὸν][2] οὖν αὐτῆς ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀεὶ πληρούμενον καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενον μένει ἐκεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῇ τοῦ μεταλαβόντος πρώτῃ μεταλήψει μεταλαμβάνον πρόεισι· ⟨πρόεισι⟩[3] γὰρ ἀεὶ ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς· ἐνέργεια[4] γὰρ πανταχοῦ φθάνει καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτου ἀποστατεῖ. Προιοῦσα μέντοι ἐᾷ τὸ πρότερον [τὸ ἑαυτῆς πρόσθεν] μέρος[5] οὗ καταλέλοιπε μένειν· ἀπολιποῦσα γὰρ τὸ πρόσθεν οὐκέτι ἔσται πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τελευτᾷ μόνον. Οὐκ ἴσον δὲ τὸ προιὸν τῷ μείναντι. Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ὅπου μὴ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεί τε τὸ πρότερον ἕτερον τοῦ ὑστέρου, ἥκει δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐκ θεωρίας ἢ πράξεως, πρᾶξις δὲ οὔπω ἦν—οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πρὸ θεωρίας—ἀνάγκη ἀσθενεστέραν μὲν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας εἶναι, πᾶσαν δὲ θεωρίαν· ὥστε τὴν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν πρᾶξιν δοκοῦσαν εἶναι τὴν ἀσθενεστάτην θεωρίαν εἶναι·

[1] *παιγνίῳ* Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: *παιδίῳ* codd., H–S.
[2] *τὸ λογιστικὸν* del. Kirchhoff et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.
[3] ⟨*πρόεισι*⟩ Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.
[4] *ἐνέργεια* wy et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: *ἐνεργεία*: *ἐνεργείᾳ* H–S.
[5] *τὸ ἑαυτῆς πρόσθεν*, del. Dodds.

[1] The argument of Dodds (in his *Notes on Ennead III viii*, *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica Vol. xxvii–viii*, Florence 1956, p. 109) against the received text here, though not accepted by

like the way in which art produces; when a particular art is complete, it produces a kind of another little art in a toy which possesses a trace of everything in it. But, all the same, these visions, these objects of contemplation, are dim and helpless sorts of things. The first part of soul, then, that which is above and always filled and illuminated by the reality above, remains There; but another part, participating by the first participation of the participant goes forth, for soul goes forth always, life from life; for actuality reaches everywhere, and there is no point where it fails. But in going forth it lets its prior part remain where it left it,[1] for if it abandoned what is before it, it would no longer be everywhere, but only at the last point it reached. But what goes forth is not equal to what remains. If, then, it must come to be everywhere, and there must be nowhere without its activity; and if the prior must always be different from that which comes after; and if activity originates from contemplation or action, and action did not exist at this stage—for it cannot come before contemplation—then all activity of soul must be contemplation, but one stage weaker than another. So what appears to be action according to contemplation is really the weaker form

Henry-Schwyzer, seems to me irrefutable. As the text stands, it makes Plotinus say that the soul allows its higher part to remain where it left it (in the intelligible world), *for* if it left its higher part the soul would lose its omnipresence (which it does not do). This does not really make sense. I therefore follow Dodds in bracketing *τὸ ἑαυτῆς πρόσθεν*, as a gloss on *τὸ πρότερον*, designed to show that the priority is in the order of being, not tempora] *τὸ πρόσθεν* (l. 16) can then refer, as it should, to Intellect.

ὁμογενὲς γὰρ ἀεὶ δεῖ τὸ γεννώμενον εἶναι, ἀσθενέστερον μὴν τῷ ἐξίτηλον καταβαῖνον γίγνεσθαι. Ἀψοφητὶ μὲν δὴ πάντα, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐμφανοῦς καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν θεωρίας ἢ πράξεως δεῖται, καὶ ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ θεωροῦσα καὶ τὸ οὕτω θεωρῆσαν ἄτε ἐξωτέρω καὶ οὐχ ὡσαύτως τῷ πρὸ αὐτῆς τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ· καὶ θεωρία τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖ. Καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πέρας ἡ θεωρία οὐδὲ τὸ θεώρημα. Διὰ τοῦτο δὲ [ἢ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο][1] πανταχοῦ· ποῦ γὰρ οὐχί; Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ψυχῇ τὸ αὐτό. Οὐ γὰρ περιγέγραπται μεγέθει. Οὐ μὴν ὡσαύτως ἐν πᾶσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐν παντὶ μέρει ψυχῆς ὁμοίως. Διὸ ὁ ἡνίοχος τοῖς ἵπποις δίδωσιν ὧν εἶδεν, οἱ δὲ λαβόντες δῆλον ὅτι ὀρέγοιντο ἂν ὧν εἶδον· ἔλαβον γὰρ οὐ πᾶν. Ὀρεγόμενοι δὲ εἰ πράττοιεν, οὗ ὀρέγονται ἕνεκα πράττουσιν. Ἦν δὲ θεώρημα καὶ θεωρία ἐκεῖνο.

6. Ἡ ἄρα πρᾶξις ἕνεκα θεωρίας καὶ θεωρήματος· ὥστε καὶ τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ θεωρία τέλος, καὶ οἷον ἐξ εὐθείας ὃ μὴ ἠδυνήθησαν λαβεῖν τοῦτο περιπλανώμενοι ἐλεῖν ζητοῦσι. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ὅταν τύχωσιν οὗ βούλονται, ὃ γενέσθαι ἠθέλησαν, οὐχ

[1] ἢ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο del. Kirchhoff et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

[1] *θεωρία* has now received its full extension of meaning, going far beyond the Aristotelian conception from which the treatise started. It is for Plotinus the whole activity of soul,

of contemplation, for that which is produced must always be of the same kind as its producer, but weaker through losing its virtue as it comes down. All goes on noiselessly, for there is no need of any obvious and external contemplation or action; it is soul which contemplates, and makes that which comes after it, that which contemplates in a more external way and not like that which precedes it: and contemplation makes contemplation. Contemplation and vision have no limits.[1] This is why soul makes everywhere, for where does it not? Since the same vision is in every soul. For it is not spatially limited. It is, of course, not present in the same way in every soul, since it is not even in a like way in every part of the soul. That is why the charioteer gives the horses a share of what he sees;[2] and they in taking it obviously would have desired what they saw, for they did not get it all. And if in their longing they act, they act for the sake of what they long for; and that was vision and contemplation.

6. Action, then, is for the sake of contemplation and vision, so that for men of action, too, contemplation is the goal, and what they cannot get by going straight to it, so to speak, they seek to obtain by going round about. For, again, when they reach what they want, the thing which they wished to exist, not so that they should not know it but so that they

of which production is the inseparable other side: and for Plotinus, as for Plato, nothing exists which is not the product of soul's activity.

[2] The ambrosia and nectar with which the charioteer feeds his horses in the *Phaedrus* myth (247E5–6) are interpreted as the share which the lower parts of the soul can receive of the divine vision of the higher.

ἵνα μὴ γνῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἵνα γνῶσι καὶ παρὸν ἴδωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, δῆλον ὅτι κείμενον θεατόν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πράττουσι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ ἵνα ἔξω αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ἵνα μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἔχωσι τὸ ἐκ τῆς πράξεως ἀγαθόν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποῦ; Ἐν ψυχῇ. Ἀνέκαμψεν οὖν πάλιν ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς θεωρίαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐν ψυχῇ λαμβάνει λόγῳ οὔσῃ, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ λόγος σιωπῶν εἴη; Καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον. Τότε γὰρ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγει καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ ὡς πληρωθεῖσα, καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἡ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῷ πιστεύειν ἔχειν εἴσω κεῖται. Καὶ ὅσῳ ἐναργεστέρα ἡ πίστις, ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ ἡ θεωρία, ᾗ μᾶλλον εἰς ἓν ἄγει, καὶ τὸ γινῶσκον ὅσῳ γινώσκει—ἤδη γὰρ σπουδαστέον—εἰς ἓν τῷ γνωσθέντι ἔρχεται. Εἰ γὰρ δύο, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἔσται· ὥστε οἷον παράκειται, καὶ τὸ διπλοῦν τοῦτο οὔπω ᾠκείωσεν, οἷον ὅταν ἐνόντες λόγοι ἐν [1] ψυχῇ μηδὲν ποιῶσι. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ ἔξωθεν τὸν λόγον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἑνωθῆναι τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος, ἕως ἂν οἰκεῖον εὕρῃ. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ψυχή, ὅταν οἰκειωθῇ καὶ διατεθῇ, ὅμως προφέρει καὶ προχειρίζεται—οὐ γὰρ πρώτως εἶχε—καὶ καταμανθάνει, καὶ τῇ προχειρίσει οἷον ἑτέρα αὐτοῦ γίνεται, καὶ διανοουμένη βλέπει ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλο· καίτοι καὶ αὕτη λόγος ἦν καὶ οἷον νοῦς, ἀλλ' ὁρῶν ἄλλο. Ἔστι

[1] λόγοι ἐν A^{pc}, H–S: λέγοιεν A^{ac} Exy.

should know it and see it present in their soul, it is, obviously, an object set there for contemplation. This is so, too, because they act for the sake of a good; but this means, not that the good arising from their action should be outside them, or that they should not have it, but that they should have it. But where do they have it? In their soul. So action bends back again to contemplation, for what someone receives in his soul, which is rational form—what can it be other than silent rational form? And more so, the more it is within the soul. For the soul keeps quiet then, and seeks nothing because it is filled, and the contemplation which is there in a state like this rests within because it is confident of possession. And, in proportion as the confidence is clearer, the contemplation is quieter, in that it unifies more, and what knows, in so far as it knows—we must be serious now—comes into unity with what is known. For if they are two, the knower will be one thing and the known another, so that there is a sort of juxtaposition, and contemplation has not yet made this pair akin to each other, as when rational principles present in the soul do nothing. For this reason the rational principle must not be outside but must be united with the soul of the learner, until it finds that it is its own. The soul, then, when it has become akin to and disposed according to the rational principle, still, all the same, utters and propounds it—for it did not possess it primarily—and learns it thoroughly and by its proposition becomes other than it, and looks at it, considering it, like one thing looking at another; and yet soul, too, was a rational principle and a sort of intellect, but an intellect seeing

γὰρ οὐ πλήρης, ἀλλὰ ἐλλείπει τῷ πρὸ αὐτῆς· ὁρᾷ μέντοι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡσύχως ἃ προφέρει. Ἃ μὲν γὰρ εὖ[1] προήνεγκεν, οὐκέτι προφέρει, ἃ δὲ προφέρει, τῷ ἐλλιπεῖ προφέρει εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν καταμανθάνουσα ὃ ἔχει. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐφαρμόττει ἃ ἔχει τοῖς ἔξω. Καὶ τῷ μὲν μᾶλλον ἔχειν ἢ ἡ φύσις ἡσυχαιτέρα, καὶ τῷ πλέον θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον, τῷ δὲ μὴ τελέως ἐφιεμένη μᾶλλον ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ θεωρηθέντος καταμάθησιν καὶ θεωρίαν τὴν ἐξ ἐπισκέψεως. Καὶ ἀπολείπουσα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γινομένη, εἶτ' ἐπανιοῦσα πάλιν, θεωρεῖ τῷ ἀπολειφθέντι αὐτῆς μέρει· ἡ δὲ στᾶσα ἐν αὑτῇ ἧττον τοῦτο ποιεῖ. Διὸ ὁ σπουδαῖος λελόγισται ἤδη καὶ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀποφαίνει· πρὸς δὲ αὑτὸν ὄψις. Ἤδη γὰρ οὗτος πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥσυχον οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ πάντα εἴσω.

7. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντα τά τε ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ θεωρία, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνων γενόμενα θεωρούντων ἐκείνων καὶ αὐτὰ θεωρήματα, τὰ μὲν αἰσθήσει τὰ δὲ γνώσει ἢ δόξῃ, καὶ αἱ πράξεις τὸ τέλος ἔχουσιν εἰς γνῶσιν καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις γνώσεως καὶ αἱ γεννήσεις ἀπὸ θεωρίας εἰς ἀποτελεύτησιν

[1] εὖ Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: οὐ codd., H–S.

something else. For it is not full, but has something wanting in relation to what comes before it; yet it itself sees also quietly what it utters. For it does not go on uttering what it has uttered well already, but what it utters, it utters because of its deficiency, with a view to examining it, trying to learn thoroughly what it possesses. But in men of action the soul fits what it possesses to the things outside it. And because the soul possesses its content more completely it is quieter than nature, and because it has a greater content it is more contemplative; but because it does not have perfect possession it desires to learn more thoroughly what it has contemplated and gain a fuller contemplation, which comes from examining it. And when it leaves itself and comes to be among other things, and then returns again, it contemplates with the part of itself it left behind; but the soul at rest in itself does this less. The truly good and wise man, therefore, has already finished reasoning when he declares what he has in himself to another; but in relation to himself he is vision. For he is already turned to what is one, and to the quiet which is not only of things outside but in relation to himself, and all is within him.

7. That all things come from contemplation and are contemplation, both the things which truly exist and the things which come from them when they contemplate and are themselves objects of contemplation, some by sense-perception and some by knowledge or opinion; and that actions have their goal in knowledge and their driving-force is desire of knowledge; and that the products of contemplation are directed to the perfecting of another form and object

εἴδους καὶ θεωρήματος ἄλλου, καὶ ὅλως μιμήματα ὄντα ἕκαστα τῶν ποιούντων θεωρήματα ποιεῖ καὶ εἴδη, καὶ αἱ γινόμεναι ὑποστάσεις μιμήσεις ὄντων οὖσαι ποιοῦντα δείκνυσι τέλος ποιούμενα οὐ τὰς ποιήσεις οὐδὲ τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἵνα θεωρηθῇ, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις ἰδεῖν θέλουσι καὶ ἔτι πρότερον αἱ αἰσθήσεις, αἷς τέλος ἡ γνῶσις, καὶ ἔτι πρὸ τούτων ἡ φύσις τὸ θεώρημα τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖ ἄλλον λόγον ἀποτελοῦσα—τὰ μὲν ἦν αὐτόθεν λαβεῖν, τὰ δ' ὑπέμνησεν ὁ λόγος—δῆλόν που. Ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνο δῆλον, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῶν πρώτων ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὄντων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἐφίεσθαι τούτου, εἴπερ τέλος ἅπασιν ἡ ἀρχή. Ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν τὰ ζῷα γεννᾷ, οἱ λόγοι ἔνδον ὄντες κινοῦσι, καὶ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια θεωρίας τοῦτο καὶ ὠδὶς τοῦ πολλὰ ποιεῖν εἴδη καὶ πολλὰ θεωρήματα καὶ λόγων πληρῶσαι πάντα καὶ οἷον ἀεὶ θεωρεῖν· τὸ γὰρ ποιεῖν εἶναί τι εἶδός ἐστι ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι πάντα πληρῶσαι θεωρίας. Καὶ αἱ ἁμαρτίαι δέ, αἵ τε ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις αἵ τε ἐν τοῖς πραττομένοις, θεωρούντων εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητοῦ παραφορᾷ· καὶ ὅ γε κακὸς τεχνίτης ἔοικεν αἰσχρὰ εἴδη

[1] This is one of the fundamental principles of Greek philosophical thought, here given a special application. By making *θεωρία* the end of all perception and action Plotinus abolishes, no doubt consciously and deliberately, Aristotle's distinction between *πρακτικὴ* and *θεωρητικὴ ἐπιστήμη* or *διάνοια* (cp.

of contemplation; and that in general all active things, which are representations, make objects of contemplation and forms; and that the realities which have come into existence, which are representations of real beings, show that their makers had as their goal in making, not makings or actions, but the finished object of contemplation; and that this is what processes of reasoning want to see, and, even before them, acts of sense perception, whose goal is knowledge; and that before them again nature makes the object of contemplation and the rational principle in itself, perfecting another rational principle; all these points are, I suppose, clear—some of them were self-evident, and the discussion brought others to mind. What follows, too, is clear; that it was necessary, since the first principles were engaged in contemplation, for all other things to aspire to this state, granted that their originative principle is, for all things, the goal.[1] For when living things, too, produce, it is the rational principles within which move them, and this is an activity of contemplation, the birthpain of creating many forms and many things to contemplate and filling all things with rational principles, and a kind of endless contemplation, for creating is bringing a form into being, and this is filling all things with contemplation. And failures, too, both in what comes into being and what is done, are failures of contemplators who are distracted from their object of contemplation; and the bad workman is the sort of person who makes ugly

Nicomachean Ethics A.3, 1095a5; Z.2, 1139a21–b4; K.10, 1179a35 ff.), and makes the whole life, not only of man but the universe, philosophy in Aristotle's sense.

ποιοῦντι. Καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες δὲ ἰδόντων καὶ πρὸς εἶδος σπευδόντων.

8. Ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω. Τῆς δὲ θεωρίας ἀναβαινούσης ἐκ τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰς νοῦν καὶ ἀεὶ οἰκειοτέρων τῶν θεωριῶν γιγνομένων καὶ ἑνουμένων τοῖς θεωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σπουδαίας ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ἰόντων τῶν ἐγνωσμένων ἅτε εἰς νοῦν σπευδόντων, ἐπὶ τούτου δηλονότι ἤδη ἓν ἄμφω οὐκ οἰκειώσει, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀρίστης, ἀλλ' οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ ἄλλο ἔσται, ὃ οὐκέτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. Δεῖ οὖν τοῦτο εἶναι ἓν ὄντως ἄμφω· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι θεωρία ζῶσα, οὐ θεώρημα οἷον τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ζῶν δι' ἐκεῖνο,[1] οὐκ αὐτοζῶν. Εἰ οὖν ζήσεταί τι θεώρημα καὶ νόημα, δεῖ αὐτοζωὴν εἶναι οὐ φυτικὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητικὴν οὐδὲ ψυχικὴν τὴν ἄλλην. Νοήσεις μὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἄλλαι· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν φυτικὴ νόησις, ἡ δὲ αἰσθητική, ἡ δὲ ψυχική. Πῶς οὖν νοήσεις; Ὅτι λόγοι. Καὶ πᾶσα ζωὴ νόησίς τις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλη ἄλλης ἀμυδροτέρα, ὥσπερ

[1] ζῶν δι'ἐκεῖνο, Dodds; ζῶν τι, Kirchhoff H–S: ζῶντι, Cr; codices inter ζῶν τι et ζῶντι non distinguunt.

[1] Plotinus is here alluding to Parmenides fr. B3DK, which he quotes accurately at V. 1 [10] 8. 17, and uses explicitly, as he does here implicitly, in support of his doctrine that the intelligible objects are not outside intellect.

forms. And lovers, too, are among those who see and press on eagerly towards a form.

8. This, then, is so. But, as contemplation ascends from nature to soul, and soul to intellect, and the contemplations become always more intimate and united to the contemplators, and in the soul of the good and wise man the objects known tend to become identical with the knowing subject, since they are pressing on towards intellect, it is clear that in intellect both are one, not by becoming akin, as in the best soul, but substantially, and because "thinking and being are the same."[1] For there is not still one thing and another, for if there is, there will be something else again, which is not any more one thing and another. So this must be something where both are really one. But this is living contemplation, not an object of contemplation like that in something else. For that which is in something else is alive because of that other, not in its own right.[2] If, then, an object of contemplation and thought is to have life, it must be life in its own right [absolute and unqualified life], not the life of growth or sense-perception or that which belongs to the rest of the soul. For the other lives are thoughts in a way, but one is a growth-thought, one a sense-thought, and one a soul-thought. How, then, are they thoughts? Because they are rational principles. And every life is a thought, but one is dimmer than another, just as life [has degrees of clarity and strength].

[2] Like E. R. Dodds (art. cit., p. 111) I can make no sense of ἐκεῖνο with the received text, and therefore follow him in reading ζῶν δι'ἐκεῖνο for ζῶν τι ἐκεῖνο, which gives a good and appropriate sense.

καὶ ζωή. Ἡ δὲ ἐναργεστέρα·[1] αὕτη καὶ πρώτη ζωὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς εἷς. Νόησις οὖν ἡ πρώτη ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ δευτέρα νόησις δευτέρα καὶ ἡ ἐσχάτη ζωὴ ἐσχάτη νόησις. Πᾶσα οὖν ζωὴ τοῦ γένους τούτου καὶ νόησις. Ἀλλὰ ζωῆς μὲν ἴσως διαφορὰς τάχ' ἂν λέγοιεν[2] ἄνθρωποι, νοήσεων δὲ οὐ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέν, τὰς δ' ὅλως οὐ νοήσεις, ὅτι ὅλως τὴν ζωὴν ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν οὐ ζητοῦσιν. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γε ἐπισημαντέον, ὅτι πάλιν αὖ ὁ λόγος πάρεργον ἐνδείκνυται θεωρίας τὰ πάντα ὄντα. Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ζωὴ ἡ ἀληθεστάτη νοήσει ζωή ἐστιν, αὕτη δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ νοήσει, ἡ ἀληθεστάτη νόησις ζῇ καὶ ἡ θεωρία καὶ τὸ θεώρημα τὸ τοιοῦτο ζῶν καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἓν ὁμοῦ τὰ δύο. Ἓν οὖν ὂν τὰ δύο πῶς αὖ πολλὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἕν; Ἢ ὅτι οὐχ ἓν θεωρεῖ. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἓν θεωρῇ οὐχ ὡς ἕν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ γίνεται νοῦς. Ἀλλὰ ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν οὐχ ὡς ἤρξατο ἔμεινεν, ἀλλ' ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν πολὺς γενόμενος, οἷον βεβαρημένος, καὶ ἐξείλιξεν αὑτὸν πάντα ἔχειν θέλων—ὡς βέλτιον ἦν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι τοῦτο, δεύτερον γὰρ ἐγένετο—οἷον γὰρ κύκλος ἐξελίξας αὐτὸν γέγονε καὶ σχῆμα

[1] ἐναργεστέρα, Ficinus, H–S: ἐνεργεστέρα codd.
[2] λέγοιεν Müller, H–S: λέγοιμεν codd.

[1] For the doctrine that Intellect in its contemplation of the One necessarily sees it as many and so becomes a multiplicity-in-unity, cp. V. 3 [49] 11; VI. 7 [38] 15. The view, however,

But this life is clearer; this is first life and first intellect in one. So the first life is thought, and the second life thought in the second degree, and the last life thought in the last degree. All life, then, belongs to this kind and is thought. But perhaps men may speak of different kinds of life, but do not speak of different kinds of thought but say that some are thoughts, but others not thoughts at all, because they do not investigate at all what kind of thing life is. But we must bring out this point, at any rate, that again our discussion shows that all things are a by-product of contemplation. If, then, the truest life is life by thought, and is the same thing as the truest thought, then the truest thought lives, and contemplation, and the object of contemplation at this level, is living and life, and the two together are one. So, if the two are one, how is this one many? Because what it contemplates is not one. For when it contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one:[1] otherwise it would not become intellect. But beginning as one it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if heavy [with drunken sleep], and unrolled itself because it wanted to possess everything—how much better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became the second!—for it became like a circle unrolling itself,

taken here of the generation of Intellect as a fall due to the desire for self-expression on a lower plane (cp. l. 34–36) is unusual for Plotinus in its pessimistic tone. Though Intellect is for him always inferior to the One he usually thinks and speaks of it as altogether good and does not emphasise that its generation is a fall or declension, as he does in speaking of the generation of Soul from Intellect (cp., e.g., III. 7 [45] 11).

καὶ ἐπίπεδον καὶ περιφέρεια καὶ κέντρον καὶ γραμμαὶ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνω, τὰ δὲ κάτω· βελτίω μὲν ὅθεν, χείρω δὲ εἰς ὅ. Τὸ γὰρ εἰς ὃ[1] οὐκ ἦν τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ εἰς ὅ, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ οἷον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ μόνον. Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς οὐχ ἑνός τινος νοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶς· πᾶς δὲ ὢν καὶ πάντων. Δεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν πάντα ὄντα καὶ πάντων καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἔχειν πᾶν καὶ πάντα· εἰ δέ μή, ἕξει τι μέρος οὐ νοῦν, καὶ συγκείσεται ἐξ οὐ νῶν, καὶ σωρός τις συμφορητὸς ἔσται ἀναμένων τὸ γενέσθαι νοῦς ἐκ πάντων. Διὸ καὶ ἄπειρος οὕτως καί, εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἠλάττωται, οὔτε τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι πάντα καὶ αὐτό, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐξ οὗ ὅτι μὴ σύνθεσις ἦν ἐκ μορίων.

9. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος· διὸ οὐ πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ, οὗπερ χάριν καὶ οἱ πρόσθεν λόγοι, πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι πλῆθος ἑνὸς ὕστερον· καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ οὗτος, ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου τὸ ὄντως[2] ἕν· καὶ οὗτος νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν ἅμα, ὥστε δύο ἅμα. Εἰ δὲ δύο, δεῖ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ δύο λαβεῖν. Τί οὖν; Νοῦς μόνον; Ἀλλὰ παντὶ νῷ συνέζευκται τὸ νοητόν· εἰ οὖν δεῖ μὴ συνεζεῦχθαι τὸ νοητόν, οὐδὲ νοῦς ἔσται. Εἰ οὖν μὴ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐκφεύξεται τὰ δύο, τὸ πρότερον τῶν

[1] εἰς ὃ Dodds, H–S²: ἀφ' ὅν codd.
[2] ὄντως Kirchhoff: οὕτως codd.

[1] Cp. Plato, *Republic* 509B9.

shape and surface and circumference and centre and radii, some parts above and some below. The better is the " whence," the worse the " whither." For the " whither " is not of the same kind as the " whence-and-whither," nor, again, the " whence-and-whither " the same kind as the " whence " by itself. And, to put it another way, Intellect is not the intellect of one individual, but is universal; and being universal, is the Intellect of all things. So, if it is universal and of all things, its part must possess everything and all things: otherwise it will have a part which is not intellect, and will be composed of non-intellects, and will be a heap casually put together waiting to become an intellect made up of all things. Therefore, too, it is unbounded in this way and, if anything comes from it, there is no diminution, neither of what comes from it, because it, too, is all things, nor of that from which it comes, because it is not something made out of pieces put together.

9. This, then, is what Intellect is like: and for this reason it is not the first, but what is beyond it[1] must exist (that to which our discussion has been leading), first of all, because multiplicity comes after unity; and Intellect is a number, but the principle of number, of this kind of number too, is that which is really one; and it is intellect and intelligible at one, so that it is two things at once. But if it is two, one must understand what comes before the two. What is it, then? Intellect only? But with every intellect its intelligible is coupled; if, then, it must not have its intelligible coupled with it, it will not be intellect. If, then it is not intellect, and is going to get out beyond the two, that which comes before

δύο τούτων ἐπέκεινα νοῦ εἶναι. Τί οὖν κωλύει τὸ νοητὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι; Ἢ ὅτι καὶ τὸ νοητὸν συνέζευκτο τῷ νῷ. Εἰ οὖν μήτε νοῦς μήτε νοητὸν εἴη, τί ἂν εἴη; Ἐξ οὗ ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὸ σὺν αὐτῷ νοητὸν φήσομεν. Τί οὖν τοῦτο καὶ ποιόν τι αὐτὸ φαντασθησόμεθα; Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἢ νοοῦν ἔσται ἢ ἀνόητόν τι. Νοοῦν μὲν οὖν νοῦς, ἀνόητον δὲ ἀγνοήσει καὶ ἑαυτό· ὥστε τί σεμνόν; Οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ λέγοιμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἁπλούστατον εἶναι, δῆλόν τι καὶ σαφὲς ἐροῦμεν τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, ἕως ἂν μὴ ἔχωμεν ἐπὶ τί ἐρείδοντες τὴν διάνοιαν λέγομεν. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῆς γνώσεως διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἄλλων γινομένης καὶ τῷ νῷ νοῦν γινώσκειν δυναμένων ὑπερβεβηκὸς τοῦτο τὴν νοῦ φύσιν τίνι ἂν ἁλίσκοιτο ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόᾳ; Πρὸς ὃν δεῖ σημῆναι, ὅπως οἷόν τε, τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁμοίῳ φήσομεν. Ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ· ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν, οἷς ἐστι μετέχειν αὐτοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παρὸν στήσας[1] ὁπουοῦν τὸ δυνάμενον ἔχειν ἔχεις ἐκεῖθεν· ὥσπερ εἰ φωνῆς κατεχούσης ἐρημίαν ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἐρημίας καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τοῦ ἐρήμου στήσας οὓς τὴν φωνὴν κομιεῖ πᾶσαν καὶ αὖ οὐ πᾶσαν. Τί οὖν ἐστιν ὃ κομιούμεθα νοῦν παραστησάμενοι; Ἢ δεῖ τὸν νοῦν οἷον εἰς τοὐπίσω

[1] τὸ codd.: τῷ Kirchhoff, H–S²: παρὸν στήσας Theiler: παραστήσας codd., H–S². τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παρὸν στήσας nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

these two must be beyond intellect. What then, prevents it from being the intelligible? The fact that the intelligible also is coupled with intellect. If, then, it is neither intellect nor intelligible, what can it be? We shall assert that it is that from which Intellect and the intelligible with it come. What, then, is this, and what kind of thing shall we imagine it to be? For certainly it will be either a thinking being or something unthinking. Well, if it is thinking it will be an intellect, but if it is unthinking, it will be ignorant even of itself; so what will be grand about it? For even if we say that it is the Good and absolutely simple, we shall not be saying anything clear and distinct, even though we are speaking the truth, as long as we do not have anything on which to base our reasoning when we speak. For, again, since knowledge of other things comes to us from intellect, and we are able to know intellect by intellect, by what sort of simple intuition could one grasp this which transcends the nature of intellect? We shall say to the person to whom we have to explain how this is possible, that it is by the likeness in ourselves. For there is something of it in us too; or rather there is nowhere where it is not, in the things which can participate in it. For, wherever you are, it is from this that you have that which is everywhere present, by setting to it that which can have it; just as if there was a voice filling an empty space, or with the empty space, men too, and by setting yourself to listen at any point in the empty space, you will receive the whole voice, and yet not the whole. What is it, then, which we shall receive when we set our intellect to it? Rather, the intellect

ἀναχωρεῖν καὶ οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀφέντα τοῖς εἰς ὄπισθεν αὐτοῦ ἀμφίστομον ὄντα, κἀκεῖ[να],[1] εἰ ἐθέλοι ἐκεῖνο ὁρᾶν, μὴ πάντα νοῦν εἶναι. Ἔστι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ζωὴ πρώτη, ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐν διεξόδῳ τῶν πάντων· διεξόδῳ δὲ οὐ τῇ διεξιούσῃ, ἀλλὰ τῇ διεξελθούσῃ. Εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ζωή ἐστι καὶ διέξοδός ἐστι καὶ πάντα ἀκριβῶς καὶ οὐχ ὁλοσχερῶς ἔχει—ἀτελῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτως ἔχοι—ἔκ τινος ἄλλου αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ οὐκέτι ἐν διεξόδῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴ διεξόδου καὶ ἀρχὴ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ νοῦ καὶ τῶν πάντων. Οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πάντα, αὕτη δὲ οὐκέτι τὰ πάντα οὐδέ τι τῶν πάντων, ἵνα γεννήσῃ τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα μὴ πλῆθος ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή· τοῦ γὰρ γεννηθέντος πανταχοῦ τὸ γεννῶν ἁπλούστερον. Εἰ οὖν τοῦτο νοῦν ἐγέννησεν, ἁπλούστερον νοῦ δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι. Εἰ δέ τις οἴοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πάντα εἶναι, ἤτοι καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων ἐκεῖνο ἔσται ἢ ὁμοῦ πάντα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοῦ πάντα συνηθροισμένα, ὕστερον ἔσται τῶν πάντων· εἰ δὲ πρότερον τῶν πάντων, ἄλλα μὲν τὰ πάντα, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται τῶν πάντων· εἰ δὲ ἅμα καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ πάντα, οὐκ ἀρχὴ ἔσται. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι

[1] κἀκεῖ Kirchhoff, H–S[1]: κἀκεῖνα codd.: † κἀκεῖνα H–S[2].

[1] Plotinus could hardly make it clearer than he does in this passage that he is not a pantheist. He is arguing here either against the Stoics, for whom the visible universe was both the totality of being and the supreme unity and divinity, or against

must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces in both directions); and there, if it wishes to see that First Principle, it must not be altogether intellect. For it is the first life, since it is an activity manifest in the way of outgoing of all things; outgoing not in the sense that it is now in process of going out but that it has gone out. If, then, it is life and outgoing and holds all things distinctly and not in a vague general way—for [in the latter case] it would hold them imperfectly and inarticulately—it must itself derive from something else, which is no more in the way of outgoing, but is the origin of outgoing, and the origin of life and the origin of intellect and all things. For all things [together, the totality of being] are not an origin, but they came from an origin, and this is no more all things, or one of them;[1] [if it is, it will not be of such a kind] that it can generate all things, and not be a multiplicity, but the origin of multiplicity; for that which generates is always simpler than that which is generated. If this, then, generated Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect. But if anyone should think that the One itself is also all things, then either it will be each one taken separately or all of them together. If, then, it is all of them collected together, it will be posterior to all things; but if it is prior to all things, all things will be other than it, and it will be other than all things, but if it and all things are simultaneous, then it will not be an origin. But it must be an origin, and exist before

Platonists who accepted the identification of the totality of being with Intellect, but did not see the need for the transcendent One.

καὶ εἶναι πρὸ πάντων, ἵνα ᾖ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ πάντα. Τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων πρῶτον μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν, ἔπειτα ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν διακρινεῖ. Καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν πάντων.

10. Τί δὴ ὄν; Δύναμις τῶν πάντων· ἧς μὴ οὔσης οὐδ' ἂν τὰ πάντα, οὐδ' ἂν νοῦς ζωὴ ἡ πρώτη καὶ πᾶσα. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν ζωὴν αἴτιον ζωῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα οὖσα πρώτη, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ προχυθεῖσα αὐτὴ οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς. Νόησον γὰρ πηγὴν ἀρχὴν ἄλλην οὐκ ἔχουσαν, δοῦσαν δὲ ποταμοῖς πᾶσαν[1] αὑτήν, οὐκ ἀναλωθεῖσαν τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀλλὰ μένουσαν αὐτὴν ἡσύχως, τοὺς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς προελθόντας πρὶν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ ῥεῖν ὁμοῦ συνόντας ἔτι, ἤδη δὲ οἷον ἑκάστους εἰδότας οἳ ἀφήσουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ ῥεύματα· ἢ ζωὴν φυτοῦ μεγίστου διὰ παντὸς ἐλθοῦσαν ἀρχῆς μενούσης καὶ οὐ σκεδασθείσης περὶ πᾶν αὐτῆς οἷον ἐν ῥίζῃ ἱδρυμένης. Αὕτη τοίνυν παρέσχε μὲν τὴν πᾶσαν ζωὴν τῷ φυτῷ τὴν πολλήν, ἔμεινε δὲ αὐτὴ οὐ πολλὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πολλῆς. Καὶ θαῦμα οὐδέν. Ἢ καὶ θαῦμα, πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ζωῆς ἐξ οὐ πλήθους ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν τὸ πλῆθος, εἰ μὴ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἦν ὃ μὴ πλῆθος ἦν. Οὐ γὰρ μερίζεται εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἡ

[1] πᾶσαν Mras et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: πᾶσιν codd., H–S.

[1] For the application of the word δύναμις to the One as principle of all things, cp. IV. 8 [6] 6. 11, and VI. 9 [9] 5. 36. It should not be misunderstood as meaning "potentiality" in the

all things, in order that all things, too, may exist after it. But as for its being each one taken separately, first, any one of them will be the same as any other, then all will be confounded together and there will be no distinction [between them]. And so it is not one of all things, but is before all things.

10. What is it, then? The productive power of all things;[1] if it did not exist, neither would all things, nor would Intellect be the first and universal life. But what is above life is cause of life; for the activity of life, which is all things, is not first, but itself flows out, so to speak, as if from a spring. For think of a spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of itself to rivers, and is not used up by the rivers but remains itself at rest, but the rivers that rise from it, before each of them flows in a different direction, remain for a while all together, though each of them knows, in a way, the direction in which it is going to let its stream flow; or of the life of a huge plant, which goes through the whole of it while its origin remains and is not dispersed over the whole, since it is, as it were, firmly settled in the root. So this origin gives to the plant its whole life in its multiplicity, but remains itself not multiple but the origin of the multiple life. And this is no wonder. Or, yes, it is a wonder how the multiplicity of life came from what is not multiplicity, and the multiplicity would not have existed, if what was not multiplicity had not existed before the multiplicity. For the origin is not divided up into the All, for if it were divided up

Aristotelian sense: it is rather (as translated here) "productive power," supremely active, not passive, a formlessness productive of forms, not a formlessness which submits to forms.

ἀρχή· μερισθεῖσα γὰρ ἀπώλεσεν ἂν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι γένοιτο μὴ μενούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἑτέρας οὔσης. Διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀναγωγὴ πανταχοῦ ἐφ' ἕν. Καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου μέν τι ἕν, εἰς ὃ ἀνάξεις, καὶ τόδε πᾶν εἰς ἓν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἕν, ἕως τις ἐπὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἓν ἔλθῃ· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκέτι ἐπ' ἄλλο. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ τοῦ φυτοῦ ἕν—τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ μένουσα—καὶ τὸ ζῴου ἓν καὶ τὸ ψυχῆς ἓν καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἓν λαμβάνοι, λαμβάνει ἑκασταχοῦ τὸ δυνατώτατον καὶ τὸ τίμιον· εἰ δὲ τὸ τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὄντων ἕν, τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πηγὴν καὶ δύναμιν, λαμβάνοι, ἀπιστήσομεν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὑπονοήσομεν; Ἢ ἐστι μὲν τὸ μηδὲν τούτων ὧν ἐστιν ἀρχή, τοιοῦτο μέντοι, οἷον, μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖσθαι δυναμένου, μὴ ὄντος, μὴ οὐσίας, μὴ ζωῆς, τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντα αὐτῶν εἶναι. Εἰ δὲ ἀφελὼν τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνοις, θαῦμα ἕξεις. Καὶ βαλὼν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τυχὼν ἐντὸς[1] αὐτοῦ ἀναπαυσάμενος συννόει μᾶλλον τῇ προσβολῇ συνείς, συνορῶν δὲ τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτὸ οὖσιν.

11. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὄψις τις καὶ ὄψις ὁρῶσα, δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα. Ἔσται τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτοῦ—[οἷον καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὅρασις][2]—

[1] ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ H–S²: ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ codd., H–S¹: ἐντὸς σαυτοῦ Dodds.

[2] οἷον . . . ὅρασις del. Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

it would destroy the All too; and the All could not any more come into being if the origin did not remain by itself, different from it. Therefore, too, we go back everywhere to *one*. And in each and every thing there is some *one* to which you will trace it back, and this in every case to the *one* before it, which is not simply one, until we come to the simply one; but this cannot be traced back to something else. But if we take the *one* of the plant—this is its abiding origin—and the *one* of the animal and the *one* of the soul and the *one* of the universe, we are taking in each case what is most powerful and really valuable in it; but if we take the *one* of the beings which truly exist, their origin and spring and productive power, shall we lose faith and think of it as nothing? It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not being, not substance, not life, as to be above all of these things. But if you grasp it by taking away being from it, you will be filled with wonder. And, throwing yourself upon it and coming to rest within it, understand it more and more intimately, knowing it by intuition and seeing its greatness by the things which exist after it and through it.[1]

11. And again, consider it this way, for since Intellect is a kind of sight, and a sight which is seeing, it will be a potency which has come into act. So there will be a distinction of matter and form in it, but the matter will be [the kind that

[1] The repeated συν- in this sentence defies translation: it suggests the intimate presence of the One both with the Forms which spring from it and the contemplating mind.

ὕλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διττὸν ἔχει· πρὶν γοῦν ἰδεῖν ἦν ἕν. Τὸ οὖν ἓν δύο γέγονε καὶ τὰ δύο ἕν. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ὁράσει ἡ πλήρωσις παρὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ οἷον τελείωσις, τῇ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πληροῦν. Εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, τί ἔδει ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ὅλως; Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐδενὸς δεῖται· διὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. Φθεγξάμενος οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔτι προσνόει· ἐὰν γάρ τι προσθῇς, ᾧ προσέθηκας ὁτιοῦν, ἐνδεὲς ποιήσεις. Διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ποιήσῃς δύο, νοῦν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐ δεῖται ἐκείνου· ὅθεν καὶ τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν εἴδους τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἥκοντος ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦντος. Οἷον δὲ ἐνορᾶται ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἴχνος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐννοεῖν προσήκει τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐκείνου ἐνθυμηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῷ νῷ ἐπιθέοντος ἴχνους. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ τῷ νῷ ὁρῶντι ἔδωκεν ἔχειν· ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ νῷ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων, ἐκεῖ⟨νος⟩[1] δὲ οὔτε ἐφιέμενος—τίνος γάρ;—οὔτε τυγχάνων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφίετο. Οὐ τοίνυν

[1] ἐκεῖ⟨νος⟩ Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ἐκεῖ codd., H–S.

exists in] the intelligible world:[1] since actual seeing, too, has a doubleness in it, it was, certainly, one before seeing. So the one has become two and the two one. For seeing, then, fulfilment and a kind of completion comes from the object perceived, but it is the Good which brings fulfilment to the sight of Intellect. For if it was itself the Good, why would it have to see, or to be active at all? For other things have their activity about the Good and because of the Good, but the Good needs nothing; therefore it has nothing but itself. Therefore, when you have said "The Good" do not add anything to it in your mind, for if you add anything, you will make it deficient by whatever you have added. Therefore you must not even add thinking, in order that you may not add something other than it and make two, intellect and good. For Intellect needs the Good, but the Good does not need it; hence, too, when it attains the Good it becomes conformed to the Good[2] and is completed by the Good, since the form which comes upon it from the Good conforms it to the Good. A trace of the Good is seen in it, and it is in the likeness of this that one should conceive its true archetype, forming an idea of it in oneself from the trace of it which plays upon Intellect. The Good, therefore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to Intellect to have by seeing, so that in Intellect there is desire, and it is always desiring and always attaining, but the Good is not desiring—for what could it desire?—or attaining, for it did not desire [to attain anything]. So it is not even Intellect.

[1] For matter in the intelligible world, cp. II. 4 [12] 3–5.
[2] Cp. *Republic* 509A3.

οὐδὲ νοῦς. Ἔφεσις γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ. Τοῦ δὴ νοῦ καλοῦ ὄντος καὶ πάντων καλλίστου, ἐν φωτὶ καθαρῷ καὶ αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ κειμένου καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων περιλαβόντος φύσιν, οὗ καὶ ὁ καλὸς οὗτος κόσμος σκιὰ καὶ εἰκών, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀγλαίᾳ κειμένου, ὅτι μηδὲν ἀνόητον μηδὲ σκοτεινὸν μηδ' ἄμετρον ἐν αὐτῷ, ζῶντος ζωὴν μακαρίαν, θάμβος μὲν ἂν ἔχοι τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ τοῦτον καὶ ὡς χρὴ εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσδύντα καὶ αὐτῷ[1] γενόμενον ἕνα. Ὡς δὴ ὁ ἀναβλέψας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄστρων φέγγος ἰδὼν τὸν ποιήσαντα ἐνθυμεῖται καὶ ζητεῖ, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ὃς ἐθεάσατο καὶ ἐνεῖδε καὶ ἐθαύμασε τὸν κἀκείνου ποιητὴν τίς ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτον ὑποστήσας ζητεῖν, [ἢ ποῦ][2] ἢ πῶς, ὁ τοιοῦτον παῖδα γεννήσας νοῦν, κόρον καλὸν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενον κόρον. Πάντως τοι οὔτε νοῦς ἐκεῖνος οὔτε κόρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ νοῦ καὶ κόρου· μετὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ κόρος, δεηθέντα καὶ κεκορέσθαι καὶ νενοηκέναι· ἃ πλησίον μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνενδεοῦς καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν οὐδὲν δεομένου, πλήρωσιν δὲ ἀληθινὴν καὶ νόησιν ἔχει, ὅτι πρώτως ἔχει. Τὸ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῶν οὔτε δεῖται οὔτε ἔχει· ἢ οὐκ ἂν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν.

[1] αὐτῷ Dodds, H–S²: αὐτοῦ codd.
[2] ἢ ποῦ del. Dodds, H–S².

For in Intellect there is desire and a movement to convergence with its form. Intellect is, certainly, beautiful, and the most beautiful of all; its place is in pure light and pure radiance[1] and it includes the nature of real beings; this beautiful universe of ours is a shadow and image of it; and it has its place in all glory, because there is nothing unintelligent or dark or unmeasured in it, and it lives a blessed life; so wonder would possess him[2] who saw this too, and, as he should, entered it and became one with it. As certainly, one who looks up to the sky and sees the light of the stars thinks of their maker and seeks him, so the man who has contemplated the intelligible world and observed it closely and wondered at it must seek its maker, too, and enquire who it is who has brought into being something like this, and how, he who produced a son like Intellect, a beautiful boy filled full from himself.[3] He is most certainly neither Intellect nor fullness, but before Intellect and fullness. For Intellect and fullness came after him; they needed to come into their fulfilment and intelligence; they are near to that which needs nothing and has no necessity to think, but have true fulfilment and true thinking, because they have them at first hand. But that which is before them neither needs nor has; or it would not be the Good.

[1] *Phaedrus* 250C4.
[2] An oddly inappropriate verbal reminiscence of *Iliad* III. 342.
[3] There is an untranslateable word-play here on κόρος (boy) and κόρος (satiety, fulness).

III. 9. VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

Introductory Note

THIS odd little collection of notes (No. 13 in Porphyry's chronological order, but the numbering must be quite arbitrary: the notes are unlikely all to have been written at about the same time), which Porphyry found among his master's papers and put together to make a ninth "treatise" to complete his Third Ennead, on the whole adds little to our understanding of the thought of Plotinus. They are quite disconnected, and each of them deals with a point discussed more fully elsewhere in the Enneads. The first and longest is, however, of some interest. In it we find Plotinus reflecting on a problem much discussed in his school, that of the relationship of Intellect to the Forms, which arises in the interpretation of *Timaeus* 39E. 7–9. And in the course of his discussion of it (l. 15 ff.) he appears to be considering with some sympathetic interest the possibility of a subdivision of Intellect very like that which is reported to have been taught by Amelius,[1] and which he decisively rejects in his treatise *Against the Gnostics*: [2] he certainly does not, however, commit himself to this, and at the end of the note seems to be putting forward his usual view that there are three, and only three, hypostases without subdivisions.

Synopsis

The correct interpretation of *Timaeus* 39E. 7–9: does it require a subdivision of Intellect, or can we interpret it in

[1] Proclus, *In Tim.* I. 306.1–3. [2] II. 9 [33] 1.25 ff.

terms of a single Intellect and Soul? (Note 1). We must unite ourselves as subjects of study are united in one discipline and direct our united selves to the higher world (Note 2). Universal Soul is not in place and unmoving; but individuals move and change, in a sense, and in so doing make their bodily images (Note 3). The One is everywhere and nowhere (Note 4). The soul is matter in relation to Intellect (Note 5). Intellect at rest exists before our self-thinking (Note 6). The One is beyond motion and rest, and transcends thinking (Note 7). Act and potency in compounded and uncompounded beings (Note 8). The Good does not think, and is not conscious of itself (Note 9).

III. 9. (13) ΕΠΙΣΚΕΨΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΙ

1. Νοῦς, φησιν, ὁρᾷ ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστι ζῷον· εἶτα διενοήθη, φησίν, ὁ δημιουργός, ἃ ὁ νοῦς ὁρᾷ ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστι ζῷον, καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἔχειν. Οὐκοῦν φησιν ἤδη εἶναι τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ, ὄντα δὲ αὐτὰ νοεῖν τὸν νοῦν; Πρῶτον οὖν ἐκεῖνο, λέγω δὲ τὸ ζῷον, ζητητέον εἰ μὴ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἕτερον νοῦ· τὸ γὰρ θεώμενον νοῦς· τὸ τοίνυν ζῷον αὐτὸ οὐ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ νοητὸν αὐτὸ φήσομεν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔξω φήσομεν αὐτοῦ ἃ ὁρᾷ ἔχειν. Εἴδωλα ἄρα καὶ οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔχει, εἰ ἐκεῖ τἀληθῆ. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι, οὗ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον. Ἢ, κἂν ἕτερον ἑκάτερον, οὐ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον τῷ ἕτερα. Ἔπειτα οὐδὲν κωλύει ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἓν εἶναι ἄμφω, διαιρούμενα δὲ τῇ νοήσει, εἴπερ μόνον ὡς ὂν τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοοῦν· ὃ γὰρ καθορᾷ οὔ φησιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ

[1] *Timaeus* 39E, 7–9.

[2] This view, which Plotinus here and elsewhere consistently opposes, was at one time held by Porphyry (cp. *Life*, ch. 18, 11, and Proclus, *In Tim.* I. 322. 22–4). It differs from that of

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1. " Intellect," Plato says, " sees the Ideas existing in the real living creature " then, he says, " the Maker planned that, what Intellect sees in the real living creature, this universe too should have.[1] " Does he, then, say that the Forms exist already before Intellect, and that Intellect thinks them when they [already] exist? First of all, then, we must investigate that reality (I mean the living creature), to see if it is not Intellect, but something other than Intellect; for that which contemplates it is Intellect; so we shall say that the living creature is not Intellect, but intelligible, and that Intellect has what it sees outside itself.[2] So, then, it has images and not true realities, if the true realities are there [in the living creature]. For there, Plato says, is truth too, in real being, where each and every thing in itself is.[3] Now, even if the two are different from each other, they are not separate from each other except in so far as they are different. Further, there is nothing in the statement against both being one, but distinguished by thought, though only in the sense that one is intelligible object, the other intelligent subject; for Plato does not say that what it sees is in something absolutely different, but in it,

Longinus, who made the Forms not only outside, but posterior to, the Demiurge (Proclus, l.c.).

[3] Cp. *Phaedrus* 247C–E.

νοητὸν ἔχειν. Ἢ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ νοῦν εἶναι ἐν στάσει καὶ ἑνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν τοῦ ὁρῶντος ἐκεῖνον τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειάν τινα ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ἣ ὁρᾷ ἐκεῖνον· ὁρῶντα δὲ ἐκεῖνον οἷον [ἐκεῖνον][1] εἶναι νοῦν ἐκείνου, ὅτι νοεῖ ἐκεῖνον· νοοῦντα δὲ ἐκεῖνον καὶ αὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἄλλως εἶναι τῷ μεμιμῆσθαι. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι τὸ "διανοηθέν," ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ, ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ποιῆσαι ζῴων γένη τέσσαρα. Δοκεῖ γε μὴν τὸ διανοούμενον ἐπικεκρυμμένως ἕτερον ἐκείνων τῶν δύο ποιεῖν. Ἄλλοις δὲ δόξει τὰ τρία ἓν εἶναι, τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν, ὁ νοῦς, τὸ διανοούμενον. Ἢ, ὥσπερ ἐν πολλοῖς, προτείνων ἄλλως, ὁ δὲ ἄλλως νοεῖ τρία εἶναι. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δύο εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τί, ὃ διενοήθη τὰ ὁρώμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ κείμενα αὐτὸ ἐργάσασθαι καὶ ποιῆσαι καὶ μερίσαι; Ἢ δυνατὸν τρόπον μὲν ἄλλον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τὸν μερίσαντα, τρόπον δὲ ἕτερον τὸν μερίσαντα μὴ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ μερισθέντα, αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν μερίσαντα, ᾗ δ' αὐτὸς ἀμέριστος μένει, τὰ δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὰ μερισθέντα—ταῦτα δέ ἐστι ψυχαί—ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν μερίσασαν εἰς πολλὰς ψυχάς. Διὸ

[1] ἐκεῖνον del. Volkmann, H–S².

[1] This may be a misinterpretation, or careless reading, of *Timaeus* 30C7–8.

in that it has the intelligible object in itself.[1] Or there is nothing against [this solution]; the intelligible object is also an intellect at rest and in unity and quietness, but the nature of the intellect which sees that intellect which remains within itself is an activity proceeding from it, which sees that [static] intellect; and by seeing that intellect it is in a way the intellect of that intellect, because it thinks it; but that thinking intellect itself too is intelligent subject and intelligible object in a different way, by imitation. This, then, is that which "planned" to make in this universe the four kinds of living creatures[2] which it sees in the intelligible. Plato seems, nevertheless, to be making, obscurely, the intending principle something other than those two. But to others it will seem that the three are one, the living creature which exists in itself, the intellect, and the planning principle. Just as in many other questions, different people understand "being three" in different ways because they formulate the problem differently. We have dealt with the two, but what is the third, which "planned" itself to construct and make and divide into parts the things seen by Intellect in the living creature? Now it is possible that in one way it may be Intellect that divides, but in another way the divider may not be Intellect; for in so far as the things divided into parts come from it, it is itself the divider, but in so far as it remains undivided itself, and it is the things which come from it which are divided—and these are souls—it is Soul which makes the division into many souls. This

[2] *Timaeus* 39E10–40A2. The "four kinds" are gods, birds, fishes and land animals, one kind for each of the elements, fire, air, water and earth.

καί φησι τοῦ τρίτου εἶναι τὸν μερισμὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ, ὅτι διενοήθη, ὃ οὐ νοῦ ἔργον—ἡ διάνοια—ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μεριστὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐχούσης ἐν μεριστῇ φύσει.

2. Οἷον γὰρ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ὅλης ὁ μερισμὸς εἰς τὰ θεωρήματα τὰ καθέκαστα οὐ σκεδασθείσης οὐδὲ κατακερματισθείσης, ἔχει δὲ ἕκαστον δυνάμει τὸ ὅλον, οὗ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, καὶ οὕτω χρὴ παρασκευάζειν αὐτόν, ὡς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τέλη εἶναι καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄριστον· ὁ γενόμενός ἐστιν ἐκεῖ· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὐτοῦ, ὅταν ἔχῃ, ἅψεται ἐκείνου.

3. Ἡ πᾶσα ψυχὴ οὐδαμοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἦλθεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ὅπου· ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα γειτονῆσαν μετέλαβεν αὐτῆς· διὸ οὐκ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐδ' ὁ Πλάτων φησί που, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα εἰς αὐτήν. Αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἔχουσιν ὅθεν—ἀπὸ γὰρ ψυχῆς—καὶ εἰς ὅ, καὶ κατελθεῖν καὶ μετελθεῖν· ὅθεν καὶ ἀνελθεῖν. Ἡ δ' ἀεὶ ἄνω ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν εἶναι ψυχή· τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὸ πᾶν, οἷον τὸ πλησίον ἢ τὸ ὑφ' ἡλίῳ.

[1] Plotinus is here very freely interpreting *Timaeus* 35A. Porphry held that Soul was the Demiurge, and believed that this interpretation agreed with that of Plotinus (Proclus, *In Tim.* I 306. 32–307, 2); this passage gives him some support, and, though elsewhere (II. 3 [52] 18. 15, and V. 9 [5] 3. 26) Plotinus identifies the Demiurge with Intellect, he makes it clear that it is Soul which actually makes the visible universe. Intellect is only "the true demiurge and maker" in the sense that it supplies Soul with the forms according to which it makes.

[2] Cp. *Timaeus* 36D9–E1.

is the reason why Plato also says that the division belongs to the third and is in the third, because it "planned," this—planning—is not the work of Intellect, but of Soul, which has a divided activity in a divided nature.[1]

2. Just as one discipline which is a whole is not scattered or broken into pieces by the division into the single subjects of study, but each of these contains potentially the whole, which has the same principle and goal; in the same way, too, a man must prepare himself so that the principles in him are also his goals, and each as a whole and all together are directed to the best of his nature; when he has become this, he is there [in the higher world]; for with this best of him, when he possesses it, he will grasp that [higher reality].

3. Universal Soul did not come to be anywhere or come to any place, for there was no place; but the body came near to it and participated in it; for this reason Plato, too, does not say anywhere that it is in the body, but that the body was put into it.[2] But the other souls have somewhere they come from—for they come from [universal] Soul and somewhere to go to, and a going down and going about: consequently also a going up. But the [universal] Soul is always above, where it is natural for it to be: that which comes next to it is the All [the physical universe] both the immediately neighbouring part and that which is beneath the sun.[3] The partial soul,

[3] This extremely puzzling remark may possibly be meant to exclude the literal, spatial meaning of "above" and to indicate that all parts of the universe, the lower as well as the upper, are "next" to soul.

Φωτίζεται μὲν οὖν ἡ μερικὴ πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς φερομένη—ὄντι γὰρ ἐντυγχάνει—εἰς δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτήν· πρὸς αὐτὴν γὰρ βουλομένη τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς, τὸ μὴ ὄν, οἷον κενεμβατοῦσα καὶ ἀοριστοτέρα γινομένη· καὶ τούτου τὸ εἴδωλον τὸ ἀόριστον πάντη σκοτεινόν· ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόητον πάντη καὶ πολὺ τοῦ ὄντος ἀποστατοῦν. Εἰς δὲ τὸ μεταξύ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ, πάλιν δὲ ἰδοῦσα οἷον δευτέρᾳ προσβολῇ τὸ εἴδωλον ἐμόρφωσε καὶ ἡσθεῖσα ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτό.

4. Πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος; Ὅτι πανταχοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅπου οὔ. Πάντα οὖν πληροῖ· πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἤδη. Αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἦν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ, τὰ πάντα γίνεται μὲν δι' αὐτόν, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνος, ἕτερα δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐδαμοῦ. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς μόνον πανταχοῦ καὶ αὖ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ; Ὅτι δεῖ πρὸ πάντων ἓν εἶναι. Πληροῦν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ ποιεῖν πάντα, οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, ἃ ποιεῖ.

5. Τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν εἶναι, ὁρατὸν δὲ αὐτῇ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ἀόριστον πρὶν ἰδεῖν, πεφυκυῖαν δὲ νοεῖν· ὕλην οὖν πρὸς νοῦν.

6. Νοοῦντες αὐτοὺς βλέπομεν δηλονότι νοοῦσαν φύσιν, ἢ ψευδοίμεθα ἂν τὸ νοεῖν. Εἰ οὖν νοοῦμεν

then, is illuminated when it goes towards that which is before it—for then it meets reality—but when it goes towards what comes after it, it goes towards non-existence. But it does this, when it goes towards itself, for, wishing to be directed towards itself it makes an image of itself, the non-existent, as if walking on emptiness and becoming more indefinite; and the indefinite image of this is every way dark: for it is altogether without reason and unintelligent and stands far removed from reality. Up to the time between it is in its own world, but when it looks at the image again, as it were directing its attention to it a second time, it forms it and goes into it rejoicing.

4. How then does multiplicity come from one? Because it is everywhere, for there is nowhere where it is not. Therefore it fills all things; so it is many, or rather it is already all. Now if it itself were only everywhere, it would itself be all things; but since it is also nowhere, all things come into being through him, because he is everywhere, but are other than him, because he is nowhere. Why, then, is he not only everywhere, and is also, besides being everywhere, nowhere? Because there must be one before all things. Therefore he must fill all things and make all things, not be all the things he makes.

5. The soul itself must be like sight, and what it sees must be Intellect; before it sees it is indeterminate, but naturally adapted to intellection: so it is matter in relation to intellect.

6. When we are thinking ourselves we are, obviously, looking at a thinking nature, or our statement that there is thinking would be false. If, then, we

καὶ ἑαυτοὺς νοοῦμεν, νοερὰν οὖσαν φύσιν νοοῦμεν· πρὸ ἄρα τῆς νοήσεως ταύτης ἄλλη ἐστὶ νόησις οἷον ἥσυχος. Καὶ οὐσίας δὴ νόησις καὶ ζωῆς νόησις· ὥστε πρὸ ταύτης τῆς ζωῆς καὶ οὐσίας ἄλλη οὐσία καὶ ζωή. Ταῦτα ἄρα εἶδεν, ὅσα ἐνέργειαι. Εἰ δὲ νόες αἱ ἐνέργειαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν οὕτως ἑαυτούς, τὸ νοητὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ ὄντως. Ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ αὐτῶν τὴν εἰκόνα φέρει.

7. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δύναμίς ἐστι κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, ὥστε ἐπέκεινα τούτων· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται περὶ ἐκεῖνο· καὶ νοῦς δὲ περὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ἄλλο γὰρ ὂν πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ ἓν νόησιν οὐκ ἔχει. Διπλοῦν δὲ τὸ νοοῦν, κἂν[1] αὐτὸν νοῇ, καὶ ἐλλιπές, ὅτι ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει τὸ εὖ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει.

8. Τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ παντὶ τῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ὅ ἐστι ταὐτὸν ἀεί, ἕως ἂν ᾖ· ὥστε καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρί· ἀλλ' οὐ δύναται ἀεὶ εἶναι, ὅτι μεθ' ὕλης· ὃ δ' ἂν ἀσύνθετον ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, ἀεί ἔστιν. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν δυνάμει κατ' ἄλλο εἶναι.

9. Ἀλλ' οὐ νοεῖ[2] τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα ὄντος·[3] ὁ δὲ νοῦς τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἔστι κίνησις ἐνταῦθα καὶ στάσις. Περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον, τὰ ἄλλα

[1] κἂν H–S: καὶ codd.
[2] νοεῖ Inge, H–S: θεοὶ wxy.
[3] ὄντος Vitringa, H–S: ὄντες wxy.

think, and think ourselves, we think a nature which is thinking; then before this thinking there is another which is, so to speak, at rest. And there is, certainly, a thinking of substance and a thinking of life; so that before this life and substance there is another substance and life. These, then, all the things which are activities saw. But if the activities engaged in thinking themselves in this way are intelligences, then our real selves are their intelligible object. But their thinking brings [only] the image of it.

7. The First is the power which causes motion and rest, so that it is beyond them; but the Second is at rest and also in motion around the First; and Intellect is in the sphere of the Second,[1] for it is one thing and has its thought directed to another, but the One does not have thought. So that which thinks is double, even if it thinks itself, and defective, because it has its good in its thinking, not in its being.

8. Being in act is, for everything which passes from potency to act, that which is always the same as long as the thing exists; so that completion exists for bodies too, fire, for instance; but they cannot always exist, because they are compounded with matter; but that which is uncompounded and in act always exists. But it is possible for the same thing which is in act to be in potency in another respect.

9. But the First beyond being does not think: Intellect is the real beings, and there is movement here and rest. The First itself is not related to anything, but the other things are related to it, staying

[1] Cp. Plato, *Second Letter* 312E3.

δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀναπαυόμενα ἕστηκε καὶ κινεῖται· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐφίεται· τίνος γὰρ τό γε ἀκρότατον; Οὐ νοεῖ οὖν οὐδὲ ἑαυτό; Ἢ ᾗ ἔχει ἑαυτό, καὶ νοεῖν ὅλως λέγεται; Ἢ τῷ ἔχειν ἑαυτὸ οὐ νοεῖν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον βλέπειν. Ἔστι δὲ πρώτη ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ νόησις. Εἰ οὖν αὕτη πρώτη, οὐδεμίαν δεῖ προτέραν. Τὸ οὖν παρέχον ταύτην ἐπέκεινα ταύτης· ὥστε δευτέρα ἡ νόησις μετ' ἐκεῖνο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πρώτως σεμνὸν ἡ νόησις· οὔκουν οὐδὲ πᾶσα, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα νοήσεως τἀγαθόν. Ἀλλ' οὐ παρακολουθήσει αὐτῷ. Τί οὖν ἡ παρακολούθησις αὐτῷ; Ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἢ οὔ; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος, ἤδη ἐστὶ πρὸ τῆς παρακολουθήσεως τἀγαθόν· εἰ δ' ἡ παρακολούθησις ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρὸ ταύτης τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὥστε οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἔσται μὴ οὖσα ἀγαθοῦ. Τί οὖν; Οὐδὲ ζῇ; Ἢ ζῆν μὲν οὐ λεκτέον, εἴπερ δέ, ζωὴν δίδωσι. Τὸ δὲ παρακολουθοῦν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν αὐτὸ δεύτερον· παρακολουθεῖ γάρ, ἵνα τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ταύτῃ συνῇ αὐτό. Δεῖ οὖν, εἰ καταμανθάνει αὐτό, ἀκαταμάθητον τετυχηκέναι εἶναι αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἐλλιπὲς εἶναι, τῇ δὲ νοήσει τελειοῦσθαι. Τὸ ἄρα κατανοεῖν ἐξαιρετέον· ἡ γὰρ προσθήκη ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ ἔλλειψιν ποιεῖ.

around it in their rest, and moving around it, for movement is desire, but it desires nothing, for what could it desire, it which is the highest? Does it not, then, even think itself? Is it not said in a general way to think in that it possesses itself? It is not by possessing itself that anything is said to think, but by looking at the First. But thinking itself is also the first actuality. If, then, this is the first, there is no need of anything before it. That, then, which produces this is beyond it, so thinking is second after that. For thinking is also not the primarily venerable; all thinking is certainly not venerable, only thinking about the Good, so the Good is beyond thinking. But the Good will not be conscious of itself. What, then, would its consciousness of itself be? A consciousness of itself as being good or not? Well, then, if it is of itself as being good, the Good exists already before the consciousness; but if the consciousness makes it good, the Good would not exist before it, so that the consciousness itself would not exist, since it is of the Good. What then? Is it not alive either? No, it cannot be said to live, but if it can, [only in the sense that] it gives life. That which is conscious of itself and thinks itself comes second, for it is conscious of itself in order that in this actuality of consciousness it may understand itself. Therefore, if it becomes acquainted with itself, it must have been unacquainted with itself and deficient in its own nature, and is completed by its thinking. So, then, thinking must be excluded from the Good, for the addition causes diminution and defect.

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

IV

ENNEADS
IV. 1–9

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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV–V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera II* Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S²): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in *Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectionum* in III (1982) pp. 304–325.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator's work was completed (except for

minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the Loeb Classics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A′ = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.

w = AE
x = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL

Enn.^{a} = wxUC
Enn.^{b} = A$^{\text{img}}$xUC

mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editore nominato
ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii

H-S ^{1} = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S ^{2} = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodds = *CQ* 28 (1934) 47–53

IV. 1 [2]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL I

Introductory Note

THIS little work is placed first in the Fourth Ennead by most MSS, and this order is confirmed by Porphyry in his account of his edition (*Life* ch. 25, see vol. I p. 78 ff.) and by the *Pinax* (table of contents: see p. 3). Ficino and the *editio princeps*, with the later editors, however, place it second, after the little detached note (IV. 2 [1]) which here follows it. Henry and Schwyzer print it first, but continue to number it IV. 2. It seemed to me slightly less illogical to print it first and number it IV. 1, while retaining the original numbering of the printed editions in brackets.

IV. 1 [2]. (4) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστι ζητοῦντες σῶμα οὐδὲν αὐτὴν δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐν ἀσωμάτοις αὖ ἁρμονίαν, τό τε τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὕτως, ὡς λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ὂν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀφέντες, καὶ μὴν τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως εἰπόντες καὶ τῆς θείας μοίρας εἶναι τάχα μὲν ἄν τι σαφὲς εἰρηκότες εἴημεν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς. ὅμως γε μὴν προσωτέρω χωρεῖν βέλτιον· τότε μὲν οὖν διηροῦμεν αἰσθητῇ καὶ νοητῇ φύσει διαστελλόμενοι, ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τιθέμενοι. νῦν δὲ κείσθω μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κατ' ἄλλην δὲ ὁδὸν τὸ προσεχὲς τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς μεταδιώκωμεν. λέγωμεν δὴ τὰ μὲν πρώτως εἶναι μεριστὰ καὶ τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει σκεδαστά· ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι, ὧν οὐδὲν μέρος ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἄλλῳ μέρει οὔτε τῷ ὅλῳ, τό τε μέρος αὐτῶν ἔλαττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ὅλου. ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὄγκοι, ὧν ἕκαστον ἴδιον τόπον ἔχει, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ταὐτὸν ἐν πλείοσι τόποις εἶναι. ἡ δέ ἐστιν

[1] The references back are to IV. 7 (2). Chs. 1–8[3] demonstrate that the soul is not a body; ch. 8[4] that it is not a harmony; ch. 8[5] that it is not an Aristotelian entelechy; chs. 9–12 expound Plotinus's own view as stated in the text.

IV. 1 [2]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL I

1. In our enquiry into what the soul's essential being is, we have shown that it is not any body, and, again, that in the class of bodiless things it is not a harmony; we have abandoned the concept of entelechy, which is not true in the sense in which it is stated and does not make clear what the soul is; and certainly, when we said that the soul belongs to the intelligible nature and the divine order, we did perhaps manage to say something exact about its essential being.[1] But all the same, it would really be better to go further: for then we were dividing and defining things by their perceptible or intelligible nature, and putting the soul in the intelligible class. But now, let it remain in the intelligible, but we will follow another route in our attempt to track down the particularity of its nature. Let us state that there are some things which are primarily divisible and by their very nature liable to dispersion: these are the things no part of which is the same as either another part or the whole, and the part of which must necessarily be less than the all and whole. These are the perceptible sizes and masses, which each have their own place, and it is not possible for the same one to

ἀντιτεταγμένη ταύτῃ οὐσία, οὐδαμῇ μερισμὸν δεχομένη, ἀμερής τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, διάστημά τε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπινοίας δεχομένη, οὐ τόπου δεομένη οὐδ' ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γιγνομένη οὔτε κατὰ μέρη οὔτε κατὰ ὅλα, οἷον πᾶσιν ὁμοῦ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐποχουμένη, οὐχ ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἱδρυθῇ, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ δύναται τὰ ἄλλα ἄνευ αὐτῆς εἶναι μηδὲ θέλει, ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία, κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν ἐφεξῆς οἷον κέντρον ἐν κύκλῳ, ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσαι αἱ πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν γραμμαὶ ἐξημμέναι οὐδὲν ἧττοι ἐῶσιν αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν ἔχουσαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ μετέχουσι μὲν τοῦ σημείου, καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ ἀμερὲς αὐταῖς, προῆλθόν γε μὴν ἐξαψάμεναι αὑτὰς ἐκεῖ. τούτου δὴ τοῦ πρώτως ἀμερίστου ὄντος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ αὖ ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς μεριστοῦ πάντη, πρὸ μὲν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐγγύς τι τούτου καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλη ἐστὶ φύσις, μεριστὴ μὲν οὐ πρώτως, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα, μεριστή γε μὴν γιγνομένη ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν· ὥστε διαιρουμένων τῶν σωμάτων μερίζεσθαι μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος, ὅλον γε μὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν μερισθέντων εἶναι πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ γινόμενον, ὧν ἕκαστον πάντη ἄλλου ἀπέστη, ἅτε πάντη μεριστὸν γενόμενον· οἷα χροιαὶ καὶ ποιότητες πᾶσαι καὶ ἑκάστη μορφή, ἥτις δύναται ὅλη ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι διεστηκόσιν οὐδὲν μέρος ἔχουσα πάσχον τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἄλλο πάσχειν· διὸ δὴ μεριστὸν πάντη καὶ τοῦτο θετέον.

be in several places at once. But there is another kind of being, opposed to this one, which in no way admits division, is without parts and cannot be divided into parts: it does not admit any extension, even in our thought about it; it has no need of place, and is not in any other being either part-wise or whole-wise; it rides, so to speak, on all beings at once, not so as to make them its basis, but because the other things cannot exist without it and do not want to; it is real being always in the same state, common to all that come after it like the centre in the circle, to which all the lines which extend to the circumference are attached but none the less let it remain in itself, and have from it their origin and their being, and participate in the point, and their principle is what is without parts; in proceeding from it they attached themselves to that central point. There is, then, this primarily indivisible being which dominates in the intelligible and among real beings, and there is also that other in the perceptible world which is altogether divisible; and, bordering on the perceptible, and rather near it, and in it, there is another nature which is not primarily divisible, like bodies, but all the same does become divisible in bodies; so that when bodies are divided, the form in them is divided too, but is a whole in each of the divided parts, becoming many and remaining the same, when each of the parts is completely separated from another part, since it is completely divisible: like colours and all qualities and every shape, which can be at the same time in many separate things, while having no part which is affected in the same way in which another part is affected: and therefore this too must be affirmed to be in every way divisible. But

πρὸς δ' αὖ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀμερίστῳ πάντη φύσει ἄλλη ἐξῆς οὐσία ἀπ' ἐκείνης οὖσα, ἔχουσα μὲν τὸ ἀμέριστον ἀπ' ἐκείνης, προόδῳ δὲ τῇ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν σπεύδουσα φύσιν εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν κατέστη, τοῦ τε ἀμερίστου καὶ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐχ ὄντινα τρόπον χρόα καὶ ποιότης πᾶσα πολλαχοῦ μέν ἐστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν πολλοῖς σωμάτων ὄγκοις, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀφεστὼς τοῦ ἑτέρου πάντη, καθόσον καὶ ὁ ὄγκος τοῦ ὄγκου ἀπέστη· κἂν τὸ μέγεθος δὲ ἓν ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει ταὐτὸν κοινωνίαν οὐδεμίαν εἰς ὁμοπάθειαν ἔχει, ὅτι τὸ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἕτερον, τὸ δ' ἑτερόν ἐστι· πάθημα γὰρ τὸ ταὐτόν, οὐκ οὐσία ἡ αὐτή. ἦν δὲ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ φύσει φαμὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀμερίστῳ προσχωροῦσαν οὐσίᾳ, οὐσία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐγγίγνεται σώμασιν, περὶ ἃ καὶ μερίζεσθαι αὐτῇ συμβαίνει οὐ πρότερον τοῦτο πασχούσῃ, πρὶν σώμασιν ἑαυτὴν δοῦναι. ἐν οἷς οὖν γίγνεται σώμασι, κἂν ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ γίγνηται καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα διεστηκότι, δοῦσ' ἑαυτὴν τῷ ὅλῳ οὐκ ἀφίσταται τοῦ εἶναι μία. οὐχ οὕτως, ὡς τὸ σῶμα ἕν· τῷ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἕν, ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ. οὐδ' ὡς ποιότης μία. ἡ δ' ὁμοῦ μεριστή τε καὶ ἀμέριστος φύσις, ἣν δὴ ψυχὴν εἶναί φαμεν, οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τὸ συνεχὲς μία, μέρος ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο ἔχουσα· ἀλλὰ μεριστὴ μέν, ὅτι

again, next to that altogether indivisible nature there is another reality following upon it and deriving from it, having indivisibility from that other nature, which pressing eagerly on in its progress from the one to the other nature, established itself in the middle between the two, the indivisible and primary and the "divisible which is in the sphere of bodies", which is upon bodies: [it does] not [behave] in the same way in which every colour and quality is the same in many places and many bodily masses, but the quality or colour in one mass is totally separate from that in the other, just as much as one mass is separate from the other; and even if the magnitude is one, yet what is the same in each part has no community [with any other] leading to a common experience, because this "same" is one thing here, another there: for what is the same is an affection, not the same substance. But the reality which we affirm to be immediately above this nature [of the forms in body], and bordering on the indivisible reality, is substance and becomes present in bodies, and it happens to become divided in the sphere of bodies, though it was not affected in this way before it gave itself to bodies. In any bodies, therefore, which it enters, even if it enters the largest of all and that which is universally extended, by giving itself to the whole it does not abandon its unity. It is not one in the sense in which body is one; for body is one by continuity, but its parts are different from each other and in different places. And it is not one in the way in which quality is, either. But the nature at once divisible and indivisible which we affirm to be soul is not one in the way in which the continuous is, having different parts; but it is divisible in that it

ἐν πᾶσι μέρεσι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἀμέριστος δέ, ὅτι ὅλη ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτοῦ ὅλη. καὶ ὁ τοῦτο κατιδὼν τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς κατιδὼν εἴσεται, ὡς θεῖον τὸ χρῆμα αὐτῆς καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ χρήματα φύσεων. μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσα παντὶ μεγέθει σύνεστι καὶ ὠδὶ οὖσα ὠδὶ πάλιν αὖ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ· ὥστε μεμερίσθαι καὶ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ μεμερίσθαι αὐτὴν μηδὲ μεμερισμένην γεγονέναι· μένει γὰρ μεθ' ἑαυτῆς ὅλη, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματά ἐστι μεμερισμένη τῶν σωμάτων τῷ οἰκείῳ μεριστῷ οὐ δυναμένων αὐτὴν ἀμερίστως δέξασθαι· ὥστε εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων πάθημα τὸν μερισμόν, οὐκ αὐτῆς.

2. Ὅτι δὲ τοιαύτην ἔδει τὴν ψυχῆς φύσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ παρὰ ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι ψυχὴν οὔτε ἀμέριστον οὖσαν μόνον οὔτε μόνον μεριστήν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἄμφω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἶναι, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴτε γὰρ οὕτως ἦν, ὡς τὰ σώματα, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἔχουσα μέρος, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου παθόντος τὸ ἕτερον μέρος εἰς αἴσθησιν ἦλθε τοῦ παθόντος, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἂν ἡ ψυχή, οἷον ἡ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον, ὡς ἑτέρα καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὖσα ᾔσθετο τοῦ παθήματος· πολλαί γε ὅλως ἦσαν ψυχαὶ αἱ διοικοῦσαι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδε οὐ μία, ἀλλὰ ἄπειροι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων. τὸ γὰρ τῆς συνεχείας, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἓν συντελοῖ, μάταιον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅπερ ἀπατῶντες ἑαυτοὺς λέγουσιν, ὡς διαδόσει

is in all the parts of that in which it is, but indivisible in that it is present in all the parts of it as a whole and in any one part as a whole. And anyone who clearly sees the greatness of the soul, and clearly sees its power, will know what a divine and wonderful thing it is and that it is one of the natures which transcend the things of this world. It has no size, but is present with every size, and is here and again there, not with a different part of itself but the same: so that it is divided and not divided, or rather it is not itself divided and has not become divided; for it remains whole with itself, but is divided in the sphere of bodies by the peculiar divisibility of bodies, since they are not able to receive it indivisibly; so that the division is an affection of bodies, not of itself.

2. The following arguments make it clear that the soul had to be a nature of this kind, and that there cannot be a soul different from this one which is neither only indivisible nor only divisible, but must be both in the way we have described. For if it was like bodies, having parts different from each other, then when one part was affected the other would not arrive at any perception of the affected part, but it would be that particular soul, the one in the region of the finger, for instance, which would perceive the affection as a soul distinct from the other and on its own: so, speaking generally, there would be many souls directing each one of us, and furthermore it would not be one soul which would direct this universe, but innumerable souls separate from each other. For the talk about continuity, if this does not gather to a unity, is futile: we certainly cannot accept what [the Stoics] say, deceiving themselves,

ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἴασιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, παραδεκτέον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ψυχῆς μέρος λέγειν ἀνεξετάστως λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριοῦσι καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο φήσουσι, τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονοῦν; πηλίκῳ ποσῷ διαιροῦντες ἑκάτερον ἢ τίνι διαφορᾷ ποιότητος, ἑνὸς καὶ συνεχοῦς ὄγκου ὄντος; καὶ πότερα μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη αἰσθήσεται; καὶ εἰ μὲν μόνον, εἰ μὲν αὐτῷ προσπέσοι τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι, ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἱδρυμένον τὸ αἴσθημα αἰσθήσεται; εἰ δὲ ἄλλῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς, αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐ πεφυκὸς τόδε τὸ μέρος οὐ διαδώσει τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι τὸ αὐτοῦ πάθημα, οὐδ' ὅλως αἴσθησις ἔσται. καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι εἰ προσπέσοι, ἢ μέρει αὐτοῦ προσπεσεῖται καὶ αἰσθομένου τοῦδε τὰ λοιπὰ οὐκέτι· μάταιον γάρ· ἢ πολλαὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἄπειροι ἔσονται καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιαι πᾶσαι· ἀλλ' ἡ μέν, ὅτι πρώτως ἔπαθον ἐγώ, ἡ δ' ὅτι τὸ ἄλλης πάθημα ᾐσθόμην· ποῦ τε ἐγένετο τὸ πάθημα, ἀγνοήσει ἑκάστη πάρεξ τῆς πρώτης. ἢ καὶ ἕκαστον μέρος ψυχῆς ἀπατήσεται δοξάζον, ὅπου ἔστιν, ἐκεῖ γεγονέναι. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν,

that the perceptions reach the ruling principle by "transmission".[1] For, first of all, to say that the ruling principle is a part of the soul is speaking without critical reflection: for how will they divide the soul, and say that one part is different from another, and one is the ruling principle? By what amount of quantity or difference of quality will they distinguish each part, when the mass is one and continuous? And will only the ruling principle perceive, or the other parts also? And if only the ruling principle perceives, and the object of perception comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, in what place will it perceive the object of perception as situated? But if the object comes into contact with another part of the soul, since this part is not naturally adapted to perceive, it will not transmit its affection to the ruling principle, and there will be no perception at all. And if the object comes into contact with the ruling principle itself, it will either come into contact with a part of it, and this will perceive, but the other parts will not any more: there would be no point in their doing so; or there will be many, indefinitely many, perceptions, and they will not all be alike; but one will say "I was affected first" and another, "I perceived another's affection"; but they will every one of them except the first be ignorant of where the affection occurred. Or even perhaps each part of the soul will deceive itself by supposing that the affection has occurred there where it is. But if not only the ruling principle, but any other part of the soul as well, is going to have per-

[1] For the Stoic doctrine see *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II 441 and 854 and Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* 41, 5 Bruns.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος αἰσθήσεται, διὰ τί τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονοῦν ἔσται, τὸ δὲ οὔ; ἢ τί δεῖ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀνιέναι; πῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων, οἷον ὤτων καὶ ὀμμάτων, ἕν τι γνώσεται; εἰ δ' αὖ πάντη ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη, οἷον ἀμέριστον πάντη καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕν, καὶ πάντη πλήθους καὶ μερισμοῦ ἐκφεύγοι φύσιν, οὐδὲν ὅλον, ὅ τι ἂν ψυχὴ καταλάβοι, ἐψυχωμένον ἔσται· ἀλλ' οἷον περὶ κέντρον στήσασα ἑαυτὴν ἑκάστου ἄψυχον ἂν εἴασε πάντα τὸν τοῦ ζῴου ὄγκον. δεῖ ἄρα οὕτως ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεμερισμένον καὶ ἀμέριστον ψυχὴν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν πολλαχοῦ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ παραδεχοίμεθα, ἡ τὰ πάντα συνέχουσα καὶ διοικοῦσα φύσις οὐκ ἔσται, ἥτις ὁμοῦ τε πάντα περιλαβοῦσα ἔχει καὶ μετὰ φρονήσεως ἄγει, πλῆθος μὲν οὖσα, ἐπείπερ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, μία δέ, ἵν' ᾖ ἓν τὸ συνέχον, τῷ μὲν πολλῷ αὐτῆς ἑνὶ ζωὴν χορηγοῦσα τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσι, τῷ δὲ ἀμερίστῳ ἑνὶ φρονίμως ἄγουσα. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ φρόνησις, τὸ ἓν τὸ ἡγούμενον μιμεῖται τοῦτο. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ θείως ᾐνιγμένον τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐχούσης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος. ἔστιν οὖν ψυχὴ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως· τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἕν· τὰ δὲ σώματα πολλὰ μόνον· τὸ δ' ὑπέρτατον ἓν μόνον.

ception, why will one part be the ruling principle and the other not? Or why is there any need for the perception to go up to the ruling principle? And how will it know as one the contents of many perceptions, of eyes and ears for instance? But on the other hand, if the soul was altogether one, in the sense of being altogether indivisible and a self-contained unity, and altogether escaped from multiplicity and divisibility, then nothing which soul took hold upon would ever be ensouled as a whole: but soul would set itself, so to speak, at the centre of each living being and leave the whole mass of it soulless. So then the soul must be in this way both one and many and divided and indivisible, and we must not disbelieve this on the ground that it is impossible for something which is one and the same to be in many places. For if we do not accept this, then the nature which holds together and directs all things will not exist, which encompassing all together holds and directs them with wisdom; it is a multiplicity because the beings of the universe are many, but one, that what holds them together may be one; by its manifold oneness it dispenses life to all the parts, and by its indivisible oneness it directs them wisely. This is the meaning of the divinely inspired riddling saying. "He mixed a third form of being from both, from the indivisible which is always in the same state and that which becomes divisible in the sphere of bodies."[1] So the soul is one and many in this way: the forms in body are many and one; bodies are many only; the Supreme is one only.

[1] The reference is *Timaeus* 35A1–4 (a passage repeatedly quoted or referred to in Plotinus's works on the soul).

IV. 2 [1]. (21) ΠΕΡΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία· νοῦς τὸ ἄριστον αὐτοῦ· ψυχαὶ δὲ κἀκεῖ· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. κἀκεῖνος ὁ κόσμος ψυχὰς ἄνευ σωμάτων ἔχει, οὗτος δὲ τὰς ἐν σώμασι γινομένας καὶ μερισθείσας τοῖς σώμασιν. ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁμοῦ μὲν νοῦς πᾶς καὶ οὐ διακεκριμένον οὐδὲ μεμερισμένον, ὁμοῦ δὲ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ ἐν αἰῶνι τῷ κόσμῳ, οὐκ ἐν διαστάσει τοπικῇ. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἀεὶ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ οὐ μεριστός, ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ ἀμέριστος· ἔχει δὲ φύσιν μερίζεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ μερισμὸς αὐτῆς τὸ ἀποστῆναι καὶ ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι. μεριστὴ οὖν εἰκότως περὶ τὰ σώματα λέγεται εἶναι, ὅτι οὕτως ἀφίσταται καὶ μεμέρισται. πῶς οὖν καὶ ἀμέριστος; οὐ γὰρ ὅλη ἀπέστη, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς οὐκ ἐληλυθός, ὃ οὐ πέφυκε μερίζεσθαι. τὸ οὖν ἐκ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς ταὐτὸν τῷ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω [καὶ κάτω][1] οὔσης[2] καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἐξημμένης, ῥυείσης δὲ μέχρι τῶνδε, οἷον γραμμῆς ἐκ κέντρου. ἐλθοῦσα δὲ ἐνθάδε τούτῳ τῳ μέρει ὅρα,[3] ᾧ[4] καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ

[1] del. Bréhier.
[2] Enn.[a]: *ἰούσης* Enn.[b], H–S[1-2].
[3] Igal: *ὁρᾷ* Enn.
[4] Enn.[a], H–S[1-2]: *ὡς* Enn.[b], Igal.

IV. 2 [1]. ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL II

In the intelligible world is true being; Intellect is the best part of it; but souls are There too; for it is because they have come Thence that they are here too. That world has souls without bodies, but this world has the souls which have come to be in bodies and are divided by bodies. There the whole of Intellect is all together and not separated or divided, and all souls are together in the world which is eternity, not in spatial separation. Intellect, then, is always inseparable and indivisible, but soul is inseparable and indivisible There, but it is in its nature to be divided. For its division is departing from Intellect and coming to be in a body. It is therefore properly said to be "divisible in the sphere of bodies" because it departs and is divided in this way. Then how is it also "indivisible"? Because the whole of it did not depart, but there is something of it which did not come [down here] which is not naturally divisible. So then "from the indivisible and that which is divisible in the sphere of bodies" is equivalent to saying that soul is composed of the part which is above and that which is attached to that higher world but has flowed out as far as these parts, like a line from a centre. But when it has come here in this part, see how in this way it preserves in this very part the nature of the whole.

μέρει σώζει τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ὅλου. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μόνον μεριστή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀμέριστος· τὸ γὰρ μεριζόμενον αὐτῆς ἀμερίστως μερίζεται. εἰς ὅλον γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δοῦσα αὑτὴν καὶ μὴ μερισθεῖσα τῷ ὅλῃ εἰς ὅλον τῷ ἐν παντὶ εἶναι μεμέρισται.

For even here it is not only divisible, but also indivisible; for that of it which is divided is indivisibly divided. For it gives itself to the whole body and is not divided in that it gives itself whole to the whole and is divided in that it is present in every part.

IV. 3–5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL

Introductory Note

THIS great work (Nos. 27–29 in the chronological order), rather oddly divided by Porphyry into two major parts (see notes on IV. 3. 32 and IV. 4. 29) with an appendix on seeing (and hearing), belongs to Plotinus's middle period. It was written soon after the treatise on omnipresence (VI. 4–5 [22–23]) and in Porphyry's chronological order immediately follows the treatise on impassibility (III. 6 [26]). In all these treatises Plotinus seems to have been particularly inclined to minimise the distinction between Intellect and Soul and to represent souls at their highest as virtually indistinguishable from intellects. In the great work which immediately follows in the chronological order (divided by Porphyry into III. 8 [30], V. 8 [31], V. 5 [32], and II. 9 [33]) the distinction between the hypostases is more strongly emphasised. The work consists of a series of very thorough discussions of what seemed to Plotinus to be the main difficulties in the Platonic doctrine of soul as he understood it. It is helpful to us (whose normal philosophical starting-point is very different) in our efforts to understand both the philosophy of Plotinus and late Greek philosophy in general to see how these difficulties arise. In the first place it is important to remember that for Plotinus, as for his Platonist and Stoic predecessors and his Neoplatonic successors, " soul " does not mean only, or primarily, human soul. The physical universe as a whole is a single ensouled living being, and its great parts, the heavenly bodies and the earth, have divine souls

greatly superior in dignity and power to human ones. The problem therefore arises of the relationship of our souls to the World-Soul, and we should notice that the conclusion of the very careful discussion of this at the beginning of IV. 3 is that we are not parts or products of the World-Soul, but it and our souls and all other souls are parts of the hypostasis Soul, beings, that is, on essentially the same level. The World-Soul is our elder sister, not our mother, and we can rise as high as it and become its fellow-contemplatives and collaborators. Problems also arise and have to be carefully considered about the psychology of the universe as a whole, the heavenly bodies and the earth, about whether they have or need sense-perception and memory.

We also need to remember that for Plotinus, as for all Platonists, the presence of souls in bodies is something which raises problems and has to be accounted for. The distinctive characteristic of Platonic thinking about the soul is that its activities of pure thought, which seem to be independent of the body, are not considered in any way problematic; it is the soul's presence, activity and experience in the body and the world of the senses which Platonists find in need of explanation. Hence a large part of IV. 3 is devoted to discussing how the soul gets into the body and in what sense it can ever be said to be " in " the body. It does not seem that there is as much difference as has sometimes been maintained between Plotinus's earlier and later views on the descent of souls into bodies, though, as always with him, there are variations of emphasis in different passages. The doctrine at which he eventually arrives in IV. 8 (6) (after a very pessimistic and dualistic beginning) does not appear to be substantially different from that in this treatise or in later writings, e.g. II. 9 (33), I. 4 (46), III. 2–3 (47–8), I. 1 (53). Consistently with this Platonic attitude, Plotinus takes care in his detailed discussions of sense-perception and emotion to maintain a strict body-soul dualism and does his best to show, here as elsewhere, that body cannot really affect soul

(this is particularly stressed in the immediately preceding III. 6 [26]). In the last part of the work (IV. 4. 30–end) and in the appendix (IV. 5) the doctrine, already mentioned, that the physical universe is a single living being, is used to solve two different sorts of problem: first, the characteristically late antique problem of how petitionary prayers to the stars and magic spells work; and then, in IV. 5, the problems, much discussed by both ancient and later psychologists, of how we see (and hear) and whether a medium is necessary for this sort of perception at a distance. Both are solved, to the satisfaction of Plotinus, by appealing to the sympathy which unites the parts of the universal living organism.

Readers of the parts of this work which deal with the problems about soul in body are recommended to make continual use of Dr. H. J. Blumenthal's *Plotinus' Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague 1971). Reference has been made to this several times in the notes, but its general helpfulness for understanding this very difficult and complex part of Plotinus's thought cannot be sufficiently indicated by particular references.

Synopsis

IV. 3–4

The investigation of the soul is of central importance: it is an investigation of that which investigates. Let us first consider five arguments of those who consider that our souls are part of the Soul of the All (ch. 1). Detailed discussion and refutation of these arguments (chs. 2–8). The entry of soul into body: how body is made by soul's " going forth " and is contained in soul, which is present to it without being affected (ch. 9). Soul between the two universes, intelligible and sense-perceived (which are not spatially separated), making this world in the image of the other (chs. 10–11). The descent of particular souls into bodies is required by the natural order (and their highest

parts remain above): it is the result of an irresistible impulse which draws them to the bodies prepared for them by Universal Soul, and so is at once free and necessary (chs. 12–13). Comparison with the story of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora arbitrarily interpreted (ch. 14). Souls descend first from the intelligible world to heaven and then some of them go to earthly bodies; the reasons for their differences here below are diverse (ch. 15). Punishments, suffering, injustices are part of the universal order (ch. 16). Heaven is closer to the intelligible than earth; the distracting magic of our lower world (ch. 17). In what sense disembodied souls, or souls in heavenly bodies, are reasonable, and why they do not talk (ch. 18). The embodied soul: what Plato means by " divisible " in the sphere of bodies, and what in embodied soul remains " indivisible " (ch. 19). Neither soul as a whole nor its so-called parts are in body as a place. In what sense then can soul be said to be " in body "? Discussion of this question, on more or less Peripatetic lines but rejecting the Peripatetic solution that soul is in body as form is in matter (chs. 20–21). The analogy of light; body is in soul, not soul in body, and the different organic parts of body (brain and nervous system etc.) are illumined and activated by soul according to their capacities and needs (chs. 22–3). What happens to souls when they have left their bodies, and how sinful souls inevitably and naturally wander into the appropriate place of punishment (ch. 24). Discussion of memory (continuing to IV. 4. 12): what has memory? Certainly not eternal beings; but does it belong to soul or the composite living being (ensouled body) (ch. 25)? Sense-perception and memory; memory belongs to the soul, not the composite (ch. 26). But to which soul? The analogy of the shade of Heracles (ch. 27). It is soul's image-making power which is the seat of memory, of desires, perceptions, and the verbal expression of our thoughts (chs. 28–30). Two image-making powers are required, one for the higher and one for the lower soul (ch. 31). What memories pass from one soul to the other,

and how quickly good souls lose their memories in the higher world; they do not even remember who they are, but are assimilated to Intellect, grasping the whole of intelligible reality in a single act of intuition (IV. 3. 32–IV. 4. 2). How souls again re-actualise their potential memories when they descend from the intelligible world to heaven and then to the world below (chs. 3–5). Memory and the souls in heaven (in the living, divine, heavenly bodies): they do not exercise memory and do not need to (chs. 6–8). The memory of "Zeus": this divine name can be used either for the World-Soul or for Divine Intellect as Maker of the physical universe; neither needs memory for its divine activity in the world (chs. 9–11). Calculation and memory are only necessary to beings which are not yet intelligent (ch. 12). The difference between Nature and Intellect (chs. 13–14). Time and souls, universal and individual (chs. 15–17). Discussion of the experience and activities of embodied soul (continuing to ch. 29): body is not soulless but ensouled, like warmed air (ch. 18). The nature of pain and pleasure (ch. 19). The part played by body and soul in desire (chs. 20–21). The psychology of the earth: does it have perceptions (ch. 22)? Organs are necessary for sense-perception (ch. 23). The perceptions of the universe and its great parts (heavenly bodies and earth), which do not need sense-organs like ours (chs. 24–7). The part played by body and soul in passions (chs. 28–9). Prayer, magic and the operations of the stars: difficulties can be resolved by understanding the interaction of the parts in the organic unity of the whole (chs. 30–39). The magic of the universal living organism (chs. 40–5).

IV. 5

How do we see? Discussion and detailed refutation of theories that a medium is necessary for sight (chs. 1–4). A medium is not necessary for hearing either: both are to be explained by the organic unity of the universe (ch. 5). Light as incorporeal energy or activity of the luminous

body (chs. 6–7). If there was a body outside the universe, could the universe see it, if it had an eye on its outside? No, because there would not be the organic sympathy which makes perception possible (ch. 8).

IV. 3. (27) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς, ὅσα ἀπορήσαντας δεῖ εἰς εὐπορίαν καταστῆναι, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς ἀπορίαις στάντας τοῦτο γοῦν κέρδος ἔχειν, εἰδέναι τὸ ἐν τούτοις ἄπορον, ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν πραγματείαν ποιήσασθαι. περὶ τίνος γὰρ ἄν τις μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ λέγων καὶ σκοπούμενος εὐλόγως ἂν διατρίβοι ἢ περὶ ταύτης; διά τε πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα, καὶ ὅτι ἐπ' ἄμφω τὴν γνῶσιν δίδωσιν, ὧν τε ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἐστι. πειθοίμεθα δ' ἂν καὶ τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ παρακελεύσματι αὐτοὺς γινώσκειν παρακελευομένῳ περὶ τούτου τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιούμενοι. ζητεῖν τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ εὑρεῖν βουλόμενοι δικαίως ἂν τὸ ζητοῦν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ζητοῖμεν, τό γε ἐραστὸν ποθοῦντες λαβεῖν θέαμα τοῦ νοῦ.[1] ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νῷ τὸ διττόν· ὥστε εὐλόγως ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος τὸ μὲν οὕτως μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ οὕτω. τὰς δὲ

[1] *θέαμα τοῦ νοῦ* Dodds: *θεαμάτων* Enn.*, H–S[1]: *θέαμα* Theiler.

[1] It is interesting to compare the beginning of this great treatise on the soul with the beginning of the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's work on the same subject (Alexander *De Anima* 1–2 Bruns). Plotinus had probably read Alexander's work and quotes the same Delphic

IV. 3. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL I

1. It would be right to occupy ourselves with the soul, with all the points at which we find ourselves in difficulties about it and must arrive at a solution, or, continuing in just these difficulties, at least gain this advantage, that we know what the difficult points are. For what could one more reasonably spend time in discussing and investigating extensively than this? There are many other reasons for doing so, and especially that it gives us knowledge in both directions, of the things of which the soul is the principle and those from which it is derived. And in enquiring into this we should be obeying the command of the god who urged us to know ourselves.[1] And, since we wish to seek and find other things, and long to grasp the lovely vision of the intellect, it would be proper for us to seek the real nature of that which seeks. For in universal Intellect, too, there was duality; so that it is reasonable that in partial things one should be more of one kind, and

maxim. But while Alexander firmly announces that his intention is to commend Aristotle's doctrine, Plotinus (though remaining convinced throughout that Plato's doctrine as he understands it is the true one) is much more independent in tone, and even suggests that the investigation would be worth making even if all it did was to show us what the difficulties are. It is the difference between a philosopher and a commentator.

ὑποδοχὰς τῶν θεῶν ὅπως, σκεπτέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ὅταν πῶς ἐν σώματι ψυχὴ γίγνεται ζητῶμεν· νῦν δὲ πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴσως ἱκανὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι τὸ φθάνειν μέχρι τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας, μέχρις ὧν καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἔρχεται, μηδὲ τὸ ὁμοίως νοερόν, καὶ εἰ συγχωροῖεν τὸ ὁμοίως, τῷ [1] μὴ μόρια αὐτῆς εἶναι· εἶναι γὰρ ὁμοειδῆ καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις. παραθήσονται δὲ καὶ Πλάτωνα τοῦτο δοξάζοντα, ὅταν πιστούμενος τὸ πὰν ἔμψυχον εἶναι λέγῃ, ὡς σῶμα μέρος ὂν τοῦ παντὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ τὸ συνέπεσθαι δὲ ἡμᾶς τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἐναργῶς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς τύχας ἐκεῖθεν λαμβάνοντας εἴσω τε γενομένους ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς τὴν ψυχὴν λαμβάνειν. καὶ ὅπερ ἐπὶ ἡμῶν μέρος ἕκαστον ἡμῶν παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς λαμβάνει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μέρη πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὄντας παρὰ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς μεταλαμβάνειν ὡς μέρη. καὶ τὸ ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σημαίνειν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔξωθεν ψυχῆς καταλείποντος μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τὸ πᾶν ἄψυχον ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ τιθεμένη.

2. Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὁμοειδῆ τιθέμενοι τῷ τῶν αὐτῶν συγχωρεῖν ἐφάπτεσθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ γένος κοινὸν διδόντες ἔξω

[1] τῷ (coniungendum cum 18 ἱκανὸν) H–S[1]: τοῦ Enn.

one of another. And we must consider how the gods are received into the soul. But we shall consider this when we investigate how the soul comes to be in a body; but now let us go back to those who say that our own souls, also, come from the soul of the All. For they will, perhaps, assert that it is not a sufficient argument for our souls not being parts of the Soul of the All that they too reach us far as it does, and are intellectual in the same way (even if they accept that " in the same way "), for parts [they will assert] have the same form as their wholes. And they will bring forward Plato as holding this opinion, when, to confirm that the All is ensouled, he says that, just as our own bodies are part of the All, so our souls are part of the Soul of the All. And [they will assert] that it is said and clearly shown that we follow along with the circuit of the All, and, deriving our characters and fortunes from it, and being inside the All, receive our souls from that which encompasses us. And what in us each part of us receives from our soul, in the same way we too, being on the same pattern parts in relation to the whole, receive as parts from the whole soul. And [they will say that] " all soul cares for all that is soulless " means just this, and that when Plato said it he intended not to leave anything else outside soul, beyond the Soul of the All: for this is the soul put in charge of all that is soulless.

2. The first answer which we have to make to this is the following: that, by agreeing that [the Soul of the All and individual souls] occupy themselves with the same [bodies] they admit that they have the same form, and so by this same admission give them

ποιοῦσι τοῦ μέρος εἶναι· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ἑκάστην πᾶσαν δικαιότερον ἂν εἴποιεν. μίαν δὲ ποιοῦντες εἰς ἄλλο ἀναρτῶσιν, ὃ μηκέτι τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε ἀλλὰ οὐδενὸς ὂν αὐτὸ ἢ κόσμου ἤ τινος ἄλλου αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, ὃ καὶ κόσμου καὶ ὁτουοῦν ἐμψύχου. καὶ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει μὴ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν τινος εἶναι οὐσίαν γε οὖσαν, ἀλλ' εἶναι, ἢ μή τινός ἐστιν ὅλως, τὰς δέ, ὅσαι τινός, γίγνεσθαί ποτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἴσως δὲ δεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς λέγεται σαφέστερον. τὸ μὲν δὴ ὡς σωμάτων μέρος, εἴτε ὁμοειδὲς τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε ἀνομοειδές, ἐατέον ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἐπισημηναμένους, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ὅταν λέγηται μέρος, κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον ἐστὶ τὸ μέρος, οὐ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον τὴν λευκότητα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ γάλακτος λευκότης μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γάλακτος λευκότητος, ἀλλὰ μορίου μέν ἐστι λευκότης, μόριον δὲ οὐκ ἔστι λευκότητος· ἀμέγεθες γὰρ ὅλως καὶ οὐ ποσὸν ἡ λευκότης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως. ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν οὐ σωμάτων λέγωμεν μέρος, ἤτοι οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λέγοιμεν ἄν, ὡς τὰ δύο τῶν δέκα· ἔστω δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλῶν μόνων τὸ λεγόμενον· ἢ ὡς κύκλου καὶ γραμμῆς μέρος, ἢ ὡς ἐπιστήμης μέρος τὸ θεώρημα. ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μονάδων καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἀνάγκη ὥσπερ ἐπὶ

a common genus and exclude individual souls from being parts; on the contrary, it would be more proper for them to say that they are the same, and one, and each soul is all. But if they make it one they attach it to something else, which is no longer the soul of this or that but is not itself the soul of anything, either of the universe or of anything else, but makes that which is soul both of the universe and of anything ensouled. And it really is correct that not all of soul belongs to anything, since of course it is an essence, but there is a soul which absolutely does not belong to anything, and all those which do belong to anything become souls of things occasionally and incidentally. But perhaps we must get a clearer idea of what " part " means in things of this kind. We can leave out of account " part " as understood of bodies, whether the body is all of the same form or not, noting only this, that when one speaks of " part " in the case of bodies whose parts are alike, the " part " refers to the mass, not to the form, as for instance with whiteness; for the whiteness in the portion of milk is not a part of the whiteness of the whole milk but is the whiteness of a portion, but not a portion of whiteness; for whiteness is totally without magnitude, and not a quantity. But when we speak of " part " in things which are not bodies, we should be using it either as we do in the case of numbers, two part of ten, for instance: what we are saying is to be applied only to numbers by themselves; or as we speak of a part of a circle and a line, or as we say a theorem is part of a science. Now in the case of numerical units and geometrical figures it is necessary that, just as with bodies, the

τῶν σωμάτων ἐλαττοῦσθαί τε τὸ ὅλον τῷ εἰς τὰ μέρη μερισμῷ, ἐλάττω τε τὰ μέρη ἕκαστα τῶν ὅλων εἶναι· ποσὰ γὰρ ὄντα καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ἔχοντα, οὐ τὸ αὐτοποσὸν ὄντα, μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. κατὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ποσὸν οὕτως, ὡς δεκάδα τὴν πᾶσαν, τὴν δὲ μονάδα εἶναι· ἄλλα τε γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα συμβήσεται, καὶ οὐχ ἕν τι τὰ δέκα, καὶ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν τῶν μονάδων ἢ ψυχὴ ἔσται, ἢ ἐξ ἀψύχων ἁπάντων ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς συγκεχώρηται ὁμοειδὲς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μέρος, οἷον τὸ ὅλον ἐστίν, εἶναι, οἷον κύκλου ἢ τετραγώνου, ἢ οὐ πάντα γε τὰ μόρια ὅμοια ἐφ' ὧν ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μέρος, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τριγώνων τρίγωνα, ἀλλὰ παραλλάσσοντα· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τίθενται εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν μέρος ἔχει τὸ γραμμὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει διαφέρει καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἐπὶ δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ διαφορὰ τῷ μεγέθει εἰ λέγοιτο τῆς μερικῆς πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, ποσόν τι ἔσται καὶ σῶμα τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνουσα καθὸ ψυχὴ παρὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἀλλὰ ὑπέκειντο πᾶσαι ὅμοιαι καὶ ὅλαι. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδὲ μεριζομένη οὕτως ὡς τὰ μεγέθη, οὐδ' ἂν συγχωρήσαιεν δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ κατατέμνεσθαι τὴν ὅλην εἰς μέρη· ἀναλώσουσι γὰρ τὴν ὅλην, καὶ ὄνομα

whole should become less by division into parts, and each of the parts should be less than the whole; for since they are quantitative and have their reality in their quantity, but are not absolute quantity, they necessarily become more and less. In this sense it is not admissible to speak of " part " when discussing soul; for it is not quantitative in a sense in which the whole could be the ten and the individual soul the unit; many other absurd consequences will follow [from this supposition] and, in particular, the ten are not one thing, and either each of the actual units will be a soul, or the soul will be entirely composed of soulless things, and, besides, it has been agreed that the part of the total soul has the same form as it. And in the case of a continuous surface it is not necessary for the part to be of the same kind as the whole, [the parts of] a circle or a square, for instance; or at any rate it is not necessary for *all* the parts to be like the whole, in the case of those figures where it is possible to take a part like the whole (as the part of a triangle can be a triangle), but they vary; but they assume that the soul is all of the same form. And in the case of a line, the part has the property of being a line, but there is a difference here too, a difference of size. But in the case of soul, if one were to say that the difference of the partial soul from the whole was one of size, then soul will be some kind of quantity, and a body, which gets its distinctive nature as soul from its quantity; but it was assumed that all souls were of like kind and wholes. But soul is obviously not divided in the way in which sizes are, and [our opponents] themselves would not agree that the whole soul is cut up into parts: if they do, they will use up the whole,

μόνον ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀρχή τίς ποτε ἦν πᾶσα, ὡς εἰ οἴνου μερισθέντος εἰς πολλὰ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀμφορεῖ λέγοι⟨το⟩[1] μέρος οἴνου τοῦ ὅλου. ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω μέρος ὡς θεώρημα τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης λέγεται τῆς ὅλης ἐπιστήμης, αὐτῆς μὲν μενούσης οὐδὲν ἧττον, τοῦ δὲ μερισμοῦ οἷον προφορᾶς καὶ ἐνεργείας ἑκάστου οὔσης; ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἕκαστον μὲν δυνάμει ἔχει τὴν ὅλην ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δέ ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὅλη. εἰ δὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ ψυχῆς τῆς τε ὅλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ὅλη, ἧς τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη, ἔσται τινός, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ κόσμου, ἀλλά τις καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἐν μέρει. μέρη ἄρα πᾶσαι μιᾶς ὁμοειδεῖς οὖσαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἡ μὲν κόσμου, αἱ[2] δὲ μερῶν τοῦ κόσμου;

3. Ἀλλ' ἆρα οὕτω μέρη, ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ζῴου τις εἴποι τὴν ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ[3] ψυχὴν μέρος τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζῴῳ ὅλης; ἀλλ' οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐδεμίαν ποιεῖ ψυχὴν ἔξω σώματος γίγνεσθαι, ἢ πᾶσαν οὐκ ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ' ἔξω τοῦ σώματος τοῦ

[1] Kirchhoff*: λέγοι wRJUC: λέγει B.
[2] Theiler: ἡ Enn.*
[3] R, Creuzer*: δακτυλίῳ wBJUC, H–S.

[1] Here and in IV. 3. 8. 43 practically all the MSS read δακτυλίῳ, which Henry and Schwyzer wish to retain, supposing that in these two places alone in Greek the word means *digitulus*, a "fingerlet" or "toelet". But (i) everywhere

and it will be only a name, unless it was once a kind of universal principle [but exists no longer], as if when wine has been divided into many portions, one might call each portion of wine in each jar a part of the whole wine. Well then, is it a part in the way in which a theorem that belongs to a science is said to be a part of the whole science, which continues to exist [as a whole] none the less, and its division is a kind of manifestation and activity of each individual part? In a state of affairs like this each theorem contains the whole science potentially, but the science is none the less a whole. If this is how it is with the whole soul and the others, the whole, of which the parts are parts of this kind, will not be the soul of anything, but an independent reality: so it will not even be the soul of the universe, but this too will be one of the partial souls. So all [both individual souls and the soul of the universe] will be parts of one, since they have the same form. But how then does one come to be the soul of the universe, and the others of parts of the universe?

3. But perhaps individual souls are parts in the way in which in one living thing the soul in the toe[1] might be called a part of the whole soul in all the living being? But this way of thinking about it either allows no soul to exist outside body, or makes all soul disembodied, and puts even the soul called

else in Greek δακτύλιος means a ring or something ring-shaped; (ii) there is no reason for Plotinus to use a diminutive in either passage. So it seems to me more reasonable to assume the recurrence of the same scribal mistake twice (perhaps the scribe of the archetype had some reason for thinking about rings while he was copying the early chapters of IV. 3!) than a use of a fairly common Greek word in an unprecedented sense for no good reason.

κόσμου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένην. τοῦτο δέ σκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ ὡς λέγοιτο ἂν κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξεταστέον. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς παρέχει αὑτὴν πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν μέρει ζῴοις, καὶ οὕτω μέρος ἑκάστη, διαιρεθεῖσα μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὑτὴν ἑκάστῳ παρέχοι, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἡ ὅλη, μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα οὖσα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκέτ' ἂν τὴν μὲν ὅλην, τὴν δὲ μέρος ἂν εἶναι παράσχοιτο, καὶ μάλιστα οἷς τὸ αὐτὸ δυνάμεως πάρεστιν· ⟨εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἅπασαι⟩.[1] ἐπεὶ καὶ οἷς ἄλλο ἔργον, τῷ δὲ ἄλλο, οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ ὠσίν, οὐ μόριον ἄλλο ψυχῆς ὁράσει, ἄλλο δὲ ὠσὶ λεκτέον παρεῖναι—ἄλλων δὲ τὸ μερίζειν οὕτως—ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτό, κἂν ἄλλη δύναμις ἐν ἑκατέροις ἐνεργῇ [εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ἅπασαι]·[2] τῷ δὲ τὰ ὄργανα διάφορα εἶναι διαφόρους τὰς ἀντιλήψεις γίνεσθαι, πάσας μέντοι εἰδῶν εἶναι εἰς [εἶδος][3] πάντα δυναμένης[4] μορφοῦσθαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς ἓν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα ἰέναι. τῶν δὲ ὀργάνων, δι' ὧν, μὴ ⟨πάντα⟩[5] πάντα δύνασθαι δέξασθαι, καὶ τὰ μὲν παθήματα διάφορα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ κρίσιν παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἷον δικαστοῦ καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς λεγομένους καὶ τὰ πραχθέντα κατανενοηκότος. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕν γε πανταχοῦ, εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαφόροις τῶν ἔργων. εἴ τε ὡς αἱ

[1] huc transpos. Theiler; ἀμφοτέραις sc. ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἅπασαι sc. αἱ δυνάμεις.
[2] transpos. Theiler ad lin. 12–13.
[3] del. Kirchhoff*: † εἰς εἶδος πάντα δυνάμενον μορφοῦσθαι† H–S.
[4] Theiler: δυνάμενον Enn.
[5] Beutler.

that of the All outside the body of the universe. This we must consider [later]; but now we must enquire in what sense it would be possible to speak of "part" according to this analogy. For if the soul of the All gives itself to all the partial living things, and each individual soul is a part in this sense, then if it was divided it would not give itself to each, but it will be itself everywhere, the complete soul existing simultaneously in many things as one and identical. But this would no longer allow one soul to be the whole and the other a part, especially in the case of things which have the same amount of power: for all the powers are present in both souls. For where organs, too, have different functions, eyes and ears for instance, we must not say that one part of the soul is present in sight, another in the ears—this sort of division belongs to other philosophers—but the same part, even if a different power, is active in each separate organ; but because the organs are different, different perceptions occur—though all are of forms, since the soul can take the shape of all forms (the fact that all perceived forms must go to one centre also makes this clear). And [we must say that] it belongs to the organs through which the forms go that not all of them are able to receive everything, and the affections differ according to the organs, but the judgement on them comes from one and the same principle, which is like a judge and is well informed about the words spoken and the things done. But we have already said that the soul is one thing everywhere, also in its different functions.

αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ἔνι ἕκαστον αὐτὸν νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνην· εἰ δ' οἰκεία ἦν ἡ νόησις, ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἑκάστη. ὅταν δὲ καὶ λογικὴ ᾖ ψυχή, καὶ οὕτω λογικὴ ὡς ⟨ἡ⟩ [1] ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ λεγόμενον μέρος ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ μέρος ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου.

4. Τί οὖν φατέον, εἰ οὕτω μία, ὅταν τις ζητῇ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν πρῶτον μὲν ἀπορῶν, εἰ οἷόν τε οὕτως ἓν ἅμα ἐν πᾶσιν, ἔπειτα, ὅταν ἐν σώματι ᾖ, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἐν σώματι; ἴσως γὰρ ἀκολουθήσει ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι πᾶσαν εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ παντός· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρα λέγεται καταλείπειν τὸ σῶμα· καίτοι τινές φασι τόδε μὲν καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ πάντη ἔξω σώματος ἔσται, πῶς ἡ μὲν καταλείψει, ἡ δὲ οὔ, ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα; ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ νοῦ ἑτερότητι χωριζομένου ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ μέρη ἄσχιστα [2] ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ὄντος [3] δὲ ὁμοῦ ἀεὶ—ἀμέριστος γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ οὐσία—οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἂν ἀπορία κατέχοι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς λεγομένης μεριστῆς εἶναι κατὰ σώματα τοῦτο τὸ ἕν τι εἶναι πάσας πολλὰς ἂν ἔχοι ἀπορίας· εἰ μή τις τὸ μὲν ἓν στήσειεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὴ πῖπτον εἰς σῶμα, εἶτ' ἐξ ἐκείνου τὰς πάσας, τήν τε τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, μέχρι τινὸς οἷον συνούσας ⟨ἀλλήλαις⟩ [4] καὶ μίαν τῷ μηδενός τινος γίνεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ πέρασιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρτημένας [καὶ συνούσας ἀλλήλαις] [5] πρὸς τὸ

[1] Theiler.
[2] Theiler: μάλιστα (vel ἕκαστα C) Enn.
[3] Theiler: ὄντων Enn.
[4] Harder.
[5] del. Harder.

And if our souls were like sense-perceptions, it is not possible for each one of us to think himself, but the soul of the All [would have to do the thinking]; but if our thinking was our own, each soul would be independent. But since the soul is also rational, and rational in the sense in which the universal soul is called rational, that which is called a part will be the same as the whole, not a part of the whole.

4. What then is to be said, if the soul is one in this way, when someone enquires into the consequences, and raises the first difficulty, whether this sort of simultaneous unity in all things is really possible, and the next, if it is possible when some soul is in body, and some not in body? For perhaps it will follow that all soul is always in body, and especially the soul of the All: for it is not said to leave the body, as ours is; and yet some people do say that ours will leave this particular body, but will not be altogether outside body. But if it is going to be altogether outside body, how will one soul leave the body and the other not, when it is the same soul [in both]? Now in the case of Intellect, which separates itself by differentiation into parts which are not cut off from each other, but is all together for ever—for this reality is surely undivided—no difficulty of this kind can arise; but in the case of the soul which is said to be divisible in relation to bodies, this assertion that all souls are one thing has many difficulties; unless of course one made the one stand by itself without falling into body, and then said that all the souls, the Soul of the All and the others, came from that one, living together with each other, so to speak, down to a certain level and being one soul by belonging to no particular thing; and that, being

ἄνω ὠδὶ καὶ ὠδὶ ἐπιβάλλειν, οἷον φωτὸς ἤδη πρὸς τῇ γῇ μεριζομένου κατ' οἴκους καὶ οὐ μεμερισμένου, ἀλλ' ὄντος ἑνὸς οὐδὲν ἧττον. καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ἀεὶ ὑπερέχειν τῷ μηδὲ εἶναι αὐτῇ τὸ κατελθεῖν μηδὲ τῷ [1] κάτω μηδὲ ἐπιστροφὴν τῶν [2] τῇδε, τὰς δ' ἡμετέρας τῷ τε εἶναι ἀφωρισμένον αὐταῖς τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷδε καὶ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ τοῦ προσδεομένου φροντίσεως, τῆς μὲν οὖν ἐοικυίας τῇ ἐν φυτῷ μεγάλῳ ψυχῇ, ἣ ἀπόνως τὸ φυτὸν καὶ ἀψόφως διοικεῖ, τοῦ κατωτάτω τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντός, τοῦ δὲ ἡμῶν κάτω, οἷον εἰ εὐλαὶ ἐν σαπέντι μέρει τοῦ φυτοῦ γίγνοιντο· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐν τῷ παντί. τῆς δὲ ἄλλης ψυχῆς τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς τῷ ἄνω τῆς ὅλης, οἷον εἴ τις γεωργὸς ἐν φροντίδι τῶν ἐν τῷ φυτῷ εὐλῶν γίνοιτο καὶ ταῖς μερίμναις πρὸς τῷ φυτῷ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἴ τις ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑγιαινόντων ὄντα πρὸς ἐκείνοις εἶναι λέγοι, πρὸς οἷς ἐστιν ἢ πράττων ἢ θεωρίαις ἑαυτὸν παρέχων, νοσήσαντος δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαις ὄντος πρὸς τῷ σώματι εἶναι καὶ τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι.

5. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἔτι ἡ μὲν σή, ἡ δὲ τοῦδε, ἡ δὲ ἄλλου ἔσται; ἆρ' οὖν τοῦδε μὲν κατὰ τὸ κάτω, οὐ τοῦδε δέ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ ἄνω; ἀλλ' οὕτω γε Σωκράτης μὲν ἔσται ὅταν ἔν σώματι καὶ ἡ Σωκράτους ψυχή·

[1] Harder, B–T: τὸ Enn.*
[2] suspic. H–S[1], scr. B–T: τὰ Enn.

fastened [to the one] by their edges on their upper side, they strike down this way and that, like the light which, just when it reaches the earth, divides itself among houses and is not divided, but is one none the less.[1] And the Soul of the All would always remain transcendent because it would have nothing to do with coming down, even with its lower part, nor with a turning to the things here below, but our souls would come down because they would have their part marked off for them in this sphere, and by the turning to them of that which needs their care. The Soul of the All (that is, its lowest part) would be like the soul in a great growing plant, which directs the plant without effort or noise; our lower part would be as if there were maggots in a rotten part of the plant—for that is what the ensouled body is like in the All. The rest of our soul, which is of the same nature as the higher parts of universal soul, would be like a gardener concerned about the maggots in the plant and anxiously caring for it. Or it is as one might speak of a healthy man living with other healthy men as being at the service of his neighbours either in his action or his contemplation; and of a sick man, concerned with the care of his body, as being at the service of his body and belonging to it.

5. But how will there still be one particular soul which is yours, one which is the soul of this particular man, and one which is another's? Are they the souls of particular individuals in the lower order, but belong in the higher order to that higher unity? But this will mean that Socrates, and the soul of Socrates, will exist as long as he is in the body; but

[1] For this image cp. Marcus Aurelius XII. 30.

ἀπολεῖται δέ, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ. ἢ ἀπολεῖται οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ οἱ νόες οὐκ ἀπολοῦνται, ὅτι μὴ εἰσι σωματικῶς μεμερισμένοι, εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ μένει ἕκαστον ἐν ἑτερότητι ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν εἶναι. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ψυχαὶ ἐφεξῆς καθ' ἕκαστον νοῦν ἐξηρτημέναι, λόγοι νῶν οὖσαι καὶ ἐξειλιγμέναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οἷον πολὺ ἐξ ὀλίγου γενόμεναι, συναφεῖς τῷ ὀλίγῳ οὖσαι ἀμερεστέρῳ ἐκείνων ἑκάστῳ, μερίζεσθαι ἤδη θελήσασαι καὶ οὐ δυνάμεναι εἰς πᾶν μερισμοῦ ἰέναι, τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον σῴζουσαι, μένει τε ἑκάστη ἓν καὶ ὁμοῦ ἓν πᾶσαι. εἴρηται δὴ κεφάλαιον τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἐκ μιᾶς, καὶ αἱ ἐκ μιᾶς πολλαὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ νῷ, [κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ][1] μερισθεῖσαι καὶ οὐ μερισθεῖσαι, καὶ λόγος εἷς τοῦ νοῦ ἡ μένουσα, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς λόγοι μερικοὶ καὶ ἄυλοι, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ.

6. Διὰ τί δὲ ἡ μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ὁμοειδὴς οὖσα πεποίηκε κόσμον, ἡ δὲ ἑκάστου οὔ, ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῇ; τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι ἐν πολλοῖς

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

he will cease to be precisely when he attains to the very best. Now no real being ever ceases to be; since the Intellects There too are not dissolved into a unity because they are not corporeally divided, but each remains distinct in otherness, having the same essential being. So too it is with souls, which depend in order on each several intellect, and are expressions of intellects, further unfolded than they are, having passed, we may say, from brevity to multiplicity.[1] They are linked to the brevity of intellect by that in each of them which is least divided. They have already willed to be divided but cannot reach complete division; they keep identity and difference; each soul remains one, and all are one together. So we have given the sum of the discussion, that the souls spring from one, and the souls springing from one are many in the same way as Intellect, divided and not divided; and the soul which abides is a single expression of Intellect, and from it spring partial expressions which are also immaterial, just as in the world of Intellect.

6. But why has the Soul of the All, which has the same form as ours, made the universe, but the soul of each individual has not, though it too has all things in itself? (We have explained that it can

[1] For the belief that there are Forms or Ideas of individuals (at least of individual men), which is probably, but not quite certainly, asserted here, cp. V. 7. It also seems to be implied in IV. 3. 12, 1–5. For a careful examination of all the evidence about Forms of individuals in Plotinus see H. J. Blumenthal, "Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?" in *Phronesis* 11 (1966), 61–80; A. H. Armstrong, "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus"; in *Dionysius* 1 (1977), 49–68 (=A. H. Armstrong *Plotinian and Christian Studies* (London 1979), No. XX.

γίνεσθαι ἅμα καὶ εἶναι εἴρηται. νῦν δὲ λεκτέον—
τάχα γὰρ καὶ πῶς ταὐτὸν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ μὲν
τοδί, τὸ δὲ τοδὶ ποιεῖ ἢ πάσχει ἢ ἄμφω, γνωσθήσε-
ται· ἢ καθ' αὑτό γε τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον—πῶς οὖν
καὶ διὰ τί κόσμον πεποίηκεν, αἱ δὲ μέρος τι κόσμου
διοικοῦσιν. ἢ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν
ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντας τοὺς μὲν πλειόνων, τοὺς δὲ
ἐλαττόνων ἄρχειν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἰπεῖν ἄν ἔχοι τις.
ἀλλ' ἔστιν, εἴποι τις ἄν, καὶ ψυχῶν διαφορά, ἢ
μᾶλλον, καθὸ ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀπέστη τῆς ὅλης, ἀλλ' ἔσχεν
ἐκεῖ οὖσα περὶ αὐτὴν τὸ σῶμα, αἱ δὲ ἤδη ὄντος οἷον
ἀδελφῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης μοίρας διέλαχον, οἷον
προπαρασκευασάσης ταύτης αὐταῖς οἰκήσεις. ἔστι
δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ὅλον νοῦν ἰδεῖν, τὰς δὲ
μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς αὑτῶν τοὺς ἐν μέρει. τάχα δ' ἂν
καὶ αὗται δύναιντο ποιεῖν, τῆς δὲ ποιησάσης οὐκέτι
οἷόν τε καὶ αὐταῖς, πρώτης ἐκείνης ἀρξάσης. τὸ δ'
αὐτὸ ἄν τις ἠπόρησε, καὶ εἰ ἠτισοῦν καὶ ἄλλη πρώτη
κατεῖχε. βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τῷ ἐξηρτῆσθαι μᾶλλον
τῶν ἄνω· τῶν γὰρ ἐκεῖ νενευκότων ἡ δύναμις μείζων.
σῴζουσαι γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐπ' ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου
ποιοῦσι· δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος μὴ πάσχειν ἐν οἷς
ποιεῖ· ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐκ τοῦ ἄνω μένειν. μένουσα

come to be and [continue to] exist in many things at once.) But now we must state—perhaps we shall also come to know how the same thing, when it is now in one body and now in another, does now this and now that, or is affected in this or that way, or both: this however requires a special discussion to itself—how then and why the Soul of the All has made the universe, but the particular souls direct [each] a part of it. There is of course nothing remarkable in some of those who have the same knowledge being in control of more, and some of less. But one could ask the reason why. But there is, one might answer, a difference between souls, and all the more in that the Soul of the All has not separated itself from soul as a whole but remained there and put on the body, but the individual souls, since body exists already, received their allotted parts when their sister soul, as we may say, was already ruling, as if it had already prepared their dwellings for them. There is a difference too, in that the soul of the All looks towards Intellect as a whole, but the individual souls rather to their own partial intellects. But perhaps these too would have been able to make [a world], but as the soul of the All had done so already they were unable to do so as well, since it had begun first. One could raise the same difficulty just as well if any other soul had taken the first place. But it is better to say [that the soul of the All has made the world] because it was more closely dependent on the beings above it: the beings which incline that way have greater power. For they keep themselves in a place of safety, and so make with the greatest ease; for it is a mark of greater power not to be affected in what it makes;

οὖν ἐν αὑτῇ ποιεῖ προσιόντων, αἱ δὲ αὐταὶ προσῆλθον. ἀπέστησαν οὖν εἰς βάθος. ἢ πολὺ αὐτῶν καθελκυσθὲν συνεφειλκύσατο καὶ αὐτὰς ταῖς γνώμαις εἰς τὸ κάτω εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας τῷ ἐγγύθεν καὶ τῷ πορρώτερον ὑπονοητέον εἰρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐχ ὁμοίως πάσαις ψυχαῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ[1] πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἑνοῖντο ἄν, οἱ δὲ βάλλοιεν ἂν ἐγγὺς ἐφιέμενοι, οἷς δὲ ἧττον ἂν ἔχοι τοῦτο, καθὸ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν οὐ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐνεργοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ, οἱ δὲ τῇ μετ' ἐκείνην, οἱ δὲ τῇ τρίτῃ, ἁπάντων τὰς πάσας ἐχόντων.

7. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν Φιλήβῳ λεχθὲν παρέχον ὑπόνοιαν μοίρας τῆς τοῦ παντὸς τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι; βούλεται δὲ ὁ λόγος οὐ τοῦτο, ὅ τις οἴεται, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἦν χρήσιμον αὐτῷ τότε, καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔμψυχον εἶναι. τοῦτο οὖν πιστοῦται λέγων, ὡς ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν ἡμῶν, οἳ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος; δῆλον δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τῆς γνώμης αὐτοῦ ἐν Τιμαίῳ ποιεῖ, οὗ γενομένης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς ὕστερον τὰς ἄλλας ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μιγνύων κρατῆρος, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων, ὁμοειδῆ ποιῶν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν δευτέροις καὶ τρίτοις διδούς. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ

[1] Harder B–T: τὰ Enn.*

[1] See *Timaeus* 41D7.

[2] Cp. *Philebus* 30A–B, where, as Plotinus suggests, Plato is really mainly concerned to argue that the universe must have a soul just as we have.

and power comes from abiding above. The Soul of the All, then, abiding in itself makes, and the things which it makes come to it, but the particular souls themselves go to the things. So they have departed to the depths; or rather, a great part of them has been dragged down and has dragged them with it by their thoughts to the lower existence. For we must understand that souls were called "second" and "third"[1] according to whether they are nearer to or farther from [the higher world]; just as among us too not all souls have the same relationship to the realities There, but some men may unify themselves, others nearly reach this point in their striving, and others attain it in a lesser degree, in so far as they act by powers which are not the same, but some by the first, others by that which comes after it, others by the third, though all of them have all.

7. So much for that. But what about the passage in the *Philebus* which suggests that the other souls are parts of the soul of the All[2]? But this is not, as someone thinks, the intention of what is said, but what suited Plato's purpose at that stage in the argument, that the universe is ensouled. He establishes that by saying that it is absurd to say that the universe is soulless, when we, who possess a part of the body of the All, have souls. For how could the part have a soul when the All was soulless? He makes his own thought especially clear in the *Timaeus*, where [the Demiurge], when the soul of the All has come into existence, makes the other souls, mixing them from the same mixing-bowl from which he made the soul of the whole, making the other kind of soul of the same form [as the soul of the All] but giving it a difference by using second and third class

"ψυχὴ πᾶσα παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου"; τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη, ὃ σώματος τὴν φύσιν διοικεῖ καὶ ἢ πλάττει ἢ τάττει ἢ ποιεῖ ἢ ψυχή; καὶ οὐχ ἡ μὲν πέφυκε τοῦτο δύνασθαι, ἡ δὲ οὔ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τελεία, φησίν, ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετεωροπορουῦσα οὐ δῦσα, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐποχουμένη, εἰς τὸν κόσμον ποιεῖ καὶ ἥτις ἂν τελεία ᾖ, οὕτω διοικεῖ. "ἡ δὲ πτεροῤῥυήσασα" εἰπὼν ἄλλην ταύτην παρ' ἐκείνην ποιεῖ. τὸ δὲ συνέπεσθαι τῇ τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾷ καὶ ἤδη ἐκεῖθεν κομίζεσθαι καὶ πάσχειν παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη σημεῖον τοῦτο τοῦ μέρη τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι. ἱκανὴ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ παρὰ φύσεως τόπων πολλὰ ἀπομάττεσθαι καὶ ὑδάτων καὶ ἀέρος· καὶ πόλεων διάφοροι [1] οἰκήσεις καὶ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κράσεις. καί τι ἔφαμεν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ὄντες τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ψυχῆς, καὶ παρὰ τῆς περιφορᾶς συνεχωροῦμεν τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλ' ἀντετίθεμεν ἄλλην ψυχὴν πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ μάλιστα τῇ ἀντιστάσει δεικνυμένην ἄλλην. τὸ δ' ὅτι εἴσω γεννώμεθα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μητρῶν [2] φαμεν ἑτέραν εἶναι οὐ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς τὴν ἐπεισιοῦσαν.

[1] Theiler: διαφόρων Enn.*
[2] Harder B–T (*in alvo materna* Ficinus): μητέρων Enn.*

[1] Again a reference to *Timaeus* 41D7.

[2] The reference is to *Phaedrus* 246B6. He then goes on to consider Plato's distinction, which follows immediately, between the perfect soul which is "winged" and "walks on high" and the soul which "loses its feathers" and falls into a human body, whose fall and subsequent fate is described in the rest of the great myth.

[3] Cp. *Timaeus* 90C8–D1. For a fuller statement of Plotinus's own position on the determination of the characters of

ingredients.[1] And what about the passage in the *Phaedrus* "All soul cares for all that is soulless"[2]? What could it be, then, which directs the nature of body, and either shapes it or sets it in order or makes it, except soul? And it is not the case that one soul is naturally able to do this, but the other is not. Plato says, then, that the "perfect" soul, the soul of the All, "walks on high", and does not come down, but, as we may say, rides upon the universe and works in it; and this is the manner of direction of every soul which is perfect. But when he speaks of the "soul which moults" he makes this another, distinct from the perfect one. But as for our following round the circuit of the All,[3] and deriving our characters from it and being affected by it, this would be no sort of indication that our souls are parts [of the soul of the All]. For the soul is capable of taking many impressions from the nature of places and waters and air; and the situations of cities and the temperaments of bodies are different. And we stated that, since we are in the All, we have something from the soul of the whole, and we agreed that we were affected by the circuit of the universe; but we opposed another soul to this, and one which shows itself other especially by its opposition. As for the fact that we are begotten inside the universe, in the womb too we say that the soul which comes into the child is another one, not that of the mother.

our lower selves, the composites of body and soul, by the physical universe of which they are parts, see II. 3. 9–12. Plotinus was always ready to admit that most of what ordinary people think of as distinctive traits of character and personality are due to physical conditions, heredity and environment.

8. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι λύσεως καὶ τοῦ τῆς συμπαθείας μὴ ἐμποδίζοντος τὸν λόγον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς αὐτῆς πᾶσαι οὖσαι, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὅλου, συμπαθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅτι καὶ μία καὶ πολλαί. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τῆς διαφορᾶς ὅπως, εἴρηται. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὅλως περὶ διαφορᾶς ψυχῆς καὶ νῦν συντόμως λεγέσθω, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὰ σώματα μὲν ἂν γίγνοιτο διαφέρειν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσι μάλιστα καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς διανοίας ἔργοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων βίων· κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς προβεβιωμένους φησὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνεσθαι. εἰ δέ τις φύσιν ψυχῆς ὅλως λαμβάνοι, καὶ ἐν ταύταις εἴρηνται αἱ διαφοραί, ἐν οἷς καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα ἐλέγετο, καὶ ὅτι πάντα πᾶσαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεργῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἑκάστη. τοῦτο δὲ τῷ τὴν μὲν ἑνοῦσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν γνώσει ⟨εἶναι⟩,[1] τὴν δὲ ἐν ὀρέξει, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλλην ἄλλα βλέπειν καὶ ἅπερ βλέπει εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι· καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τέλειον οὐχὶ ταὐτὸν πάσαις. ἀλλ' εἰ ποικίλον τὸ ὅλον σύνταγμα αὐταῖς—εἷς γὰρ πᾶς λόγος πολὺς καὶ ποικίλος, ὥσπερ ζῷον ψυχικὸν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἔχον—εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ σύνταξίς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ διέσπασται τὰ ὄντα ὅλως ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐδὲ τὸ εἰκῇ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ὅπου μηδὲ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ἀριθμόν τινα ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἑστάναι δεῖ τὰ

[1] Theiler.

8. This then is how it is with the solution of this problem, and the fact of sympathy does not hinder our arguments: for since all souls derive from the same from which the soul of the Whole derives too, they have a community of feeling. For we have said already that they are both one and many. We have also explained how the part differs from the whole. We have made a general statement about the differences between souls, and now let us add briefly that besides their [different] bodies they can differ very notably in character, and in the activities of discursive reason and as a result of the lives they have lived before; for Plato says that the souls' choices take place according to their previous lives. And if one takes a general view of the nature of soul, the differences in souls have been mentioned in those passages too where there was talk of " seconds " and " thirds ", and it was said that all souls are all things, but each [is differentiated] according to that which is active in it: that is, by one being united in actuality, one being in a state of knowledge, one in a state of desire, and in that different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at; and the fullness and completion for souls is not the same for all. But if the whole structure in which they exist is complex—for every single rational principle is manifold and complex, like a soul-organism containing many forms—if this is really so, there is structural organisation, and the realities are not completely cut off from each other, and there is nothing random among the realities (as there is not even among bodies), and it follows that there must be a [definite] number. For, again, realities must be static, and the intelligible realities must remain

ὄντα, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ νοητὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἕκαστον ἓν
25 ἀριθμῷ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ τόδε. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
τῶν σωμάτων τῇ φύσει τοῦ καθέκαστον ῥέοντος ἅτε
ἐπακτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους ὄντος τὸ εἶναι κατ' εἶδος ἀεὶ
ὑπάρχει μιμήσει τῶν ὄντων, τοῖς δὲ ἅτε οὐκ ἐκ
συνθέσεως οὖσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν
ἀριθμῷ ἕν, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὔτε
30 γίνεται ὃ μὴ ἦν, οὔτε ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ καὶ
εἰ ποιοῦν τι ἔσται αὐτά, ἐκ μὲν ὕλης οὐκ ἄν· εἰ δὲ
καὶ τοῦτο, δεῖ τι καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ οὐσιῶδες προσθεῖναι·
ὥστε μεταβολὴ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, εἰ νῦν
πλέον ποιεῖ ἢ ἔλαττον. καὶ διὰ τί νῦν, ἀλλ' οὐκ
ἀεὶ οὕτως; καὶ τὸ γενόμενον δὲ οὐκ ἀίδιον, εἴπερ
35 πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον· κεῖται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον.
πῶς οὖν ἄπειρον, εἰ στήσεται; ἢ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ
ἄπειρον, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἄπειρος, οὐχ ὡς μερισθησο-
μένης εἰς ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐ πεπερασ-
μένος. καὶ αὗται τοίνυν οὐ πέρατι ἀλλοτρίῳ ἐστὶν

[1] This passage is interesting as an example of the sense in which Plotinus is prepared to speak of the Second and Third Hypostases as ἄπειρος (infinite in the sense of unlimited or unbounded). ὁ θεός in line 38 is probably Νοῦς. Any kind of spatially conceived or numerical infinity is excluded from his intelligible world (cp. line 37 here and VI. 6. 17–18).

the same, and each must be numerically one: for this is how it is *this* definite reality. For in some things, because of their bodily nature, individuality is fluid because the form comes in from outside and they have continual existence only according to specific form, in imitation of the real beings, but in others, since they are not produced by composition, the existence of each is in that which it is, numerically one, which is there from the beginning, and does not become what it was not and will not cease to be what it is. Since even if there is to be something which makes them it will not make them out of matter; if it does do this it must add something substantial from itself: so that there will be change affecting this making power itself, if it now makes more and now less. And why should it make more or less now, but not go on always in this same way? And that which has come into being will not be everlasting, if it is now more and now less; but it is settled that soul is a thing of this [everlasting] kind. How then will it be infinite, if it is going to remain static? Its infinity lies in its power; it is infinite because its power is infinite, and not as if it was going to be divided to infinity. For God too is not limited.[1] And these souls, too, are not each what

"Infinity" there can only mean infinity of power (as here) or unboundedness because there is nothing to bound or measure intelligible reality—intelligible number is the ultimate measure and so not itself measured, bounded or limited (as in VI. 6). The doctrine of "relative ἀπειρία" in Proclus (*Elements of Theology* props. 89–96, pp. 83–7 Dodds) is helpful to the understanding of Plotinus here. The One for him is infinite in the sense of being absolutely beyond any sort of determination or limitation, because it is beyond being and thought, but is hardly ever called ἄπειρος.

ἑκάστη ὅ ἐστιν, οἷον τοσαύτη, ἀλλ' αὐτή ἐστιν ὅσον θέλει, καὶ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται προϊοῦσα ἔξω αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ φθάνει μὲν πανταχοῦ, ὃ πέφυκεν αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὰ σώματα [εἰς τὰ σώματα] [1] φθάνειν· οὐ μὴν διέσπασται ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποδί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί, εἰς ὃ ἂν φθάνῃ, ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ μέρει φυτοῦ καὶ ἀποτετμημένου, ὥστε εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φυτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τετμημένῳ· ἓν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἑνί ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ. καὶ σαπέντος δὲ ζῴου εἰ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐκείνη μὲν οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει αὖ τὸ δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέθανε. τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα πρὸς γενέσεις ζῴων, τὰ μὲν τῶνδε, τὰ δὲ τῶνδε, ἴσχει ψυχὴν οὐδενὸς ὄντος ὅτου ἀποστατεῖ, ὄντος δὲ τοῦ μὲν δέχεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μὴ δέχεσθαι δυναμένου. καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα οὕτως ἔμψυχα οὐ πλείους ἐποίησε ψυχάς· ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τῆς μιᾶς, ἣ μένει μία· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀποτεμνομένων τινῶν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀντ' αὐτῶν φυομένων, τῶν μὲν ἀπέστη ἡ ψυχή, τοῖς δὲ προσεγένετο, ἕως ἡ μία μένει. ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ μένει ἀεὶ ἡ μία· τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς τὰ μὲν ἴσχει, τὰ δὲ ἀποτίθεται, τῶν αὐτῶν ψυχικῶν μενόντων.

[1] del. Theiler.

they are by some external limit, as if they were a definite size, but each is itself as much as it wants to be, and never goes outside itself as it proceeds, but that part of it which is naturally adapted to reach bodies reaches everywhere in them; it is certainly not torn away from itself when it is in the finger [1] as in the foot. So it is also in the All, to whatever it reaches; it is in one part of a plant and also in another, even if it is cut off; so that it is in the original plant and the part cut off from it: for the body of the all is one, and soul is everywhere in it as in one thing. And when an animal rots, if many others spring from it, the original soul of the whole animal is no longer in the body: for the body on its side does not have the capacity to receive it, or the animal would not have died. But the products of the decay which are adapted for the generation of animals, some for those of one kind and some for those of another, have soul since there is nothing from which it is absent, but one thing is able to receive it and another not to receive it. And things which become ensouled in this way do not make more souls: for they depend on the one soul which remains one; just as in ourselves, when some parts are cut off and others grow instead of them, soul leaves the old ones and comes to the new as long as the one soul remains. But in the All the one soul is always there; but some of the things within it take soul and some put it off, but the soul-activities remain the same.

[1] See ch. 3, n. 1.

9. Ἀλλὰ ⟨καὶ⟩[1] πῶς ἐγγίγνεται σώματι ψυχή, ζητητέον. τίς ὁ τρόπος; [καὶ πῶς].[2] οὐχ ἧττον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ζητῆσαι ἄξιον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν διττὸς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰς σῶμα ψυχῆς εἰσόδου—ἡ μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ψυχῇ ἐν σώματι οὔσῃ τῇ τε μετενσωματουμένῃ καὶ τῇ ἐκ σώματος ἀερίνου ἢ πυρίνου εἰς γήινον γινομένῃ, ἣν δὴ μετενσωμάτωσιν οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι, ὅτι ἄδηλον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ εἴσκρισις, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου εἰς ὁτιοῦν σῶμα, ἣ δὴ καὶ πρώτη ἂν εἴη ψυχῇ κοινωνία σώματι—ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ ταύτης, τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον πάθος τότε, ὅτε ψυχὴ καθαρὰ οὖσα σώματος πάντη ἴσχει περὶ αὑτὴν σώματος φύσιν. περὶ μὲν δὴ τῆς τοῦ παντός—ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἴσως ⟨εἰκὸς⟩[1] ἄρξασθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον τυγχάνει—δεῖ δὴ τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εἴσοδον καὶ τὴν ἐμψύχωσιν διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χάριν γίγνεσθαι νομίζειν. ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἐψύχωτο τόδε τὸ πᾶν, οὐδὲ ἦν[3] ὅτε σῶμα ὑφειστήκει ψυχῆς ἀπούσης, οὐδὲ ὕλη ποτὲ ὅτε ἀκόσμητος ἦν· ἀλλ' ἐπινοῆσαι ταῦτα χωρίζοντας αὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τῷ λόγῳ οἷόν τε. ἔξεστι γὰρ ἀναλύειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ πᾶσαν σύνθεσιν. ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς ὧδε ἔχει· σώματος μὲν μὴ ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν προέλθοι ψυχή, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἄλλος ἐστίν, ὅπου πέφυκεν εἶναι. προϊέναι δὲ εἰ μέλλοι, γεννήσει ἑαυτῇ τόπον, ὥστε καὶ σῶμα. τῆς δὴ στάσεως αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ στάσει οἱονεὶ ῥωννυμένης οἷον πολὺ φῶς ἐκλάμψαν ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς ἐσχάτοις τοῦ πυρὸς σκότος ἐγίνετο, ὅπερ ἰδοῦσα ἡ ψυχή,

[1] Theiler. [2] del. Theiler. [3] Preller: οὐδ' ἐνῆν Enn., H–S[1].

9. But we must also enquire how soul comes to be in body. What is its way of entering? This too is a subject no less worth wondering about and enquiring into. Now there are two ways of soul entering body; one is when a soul is already in a body and changes bodies, or passes from a body of air or fire to one of earth (people do not call this change of body because the body from which entry is made is not apparent); and the other, passage from bodilessness to any kind of body, which would of course be the first communication of soul with body. About this last, then, it will be proper to investigate what it is that happens when a soul which is altogether pure and free from body takes upon itself a bodily nature. It is perhaps suitable, or rather it is necessary, to begin with the Soul of the All. Of course [when talking about the Soul of the All] we must consider that the terms " entry " and " ensoulment " are used in the discussion for the sake of clear explanation. For there never was a time when this universe did not have a soul, or when body existed in the absence of soul, or when matter was not set in order; but in discussing these things one can consider them apart from each other. [When one is reasoning about] any kind of composition, it is always legitimate to analyse it in thought into its parts. For the truth is as follows. If body did not exist, soul would not go forth, since there is no place other than body where it is natural for it to be. But if it intends to go forth, it will produce a place for itself, and so a body. Soul's rest is, we may say, confirmed in absolute rest; a great light shines from it, and at the outermost edge of this firelight there is a darkness. Soul sees this darkness and informs

ἐπείπερ ὑπέστη, ἐμόρφωσεν αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ ἦν θεμιτὸν γειτονοῦν τι αὐτῇ λόγου ἄμοιρον εἶναι, οἷον ἐδέχετο τὸ λεγόμενον "ἀμυδρὸν ἐν ἀμυδρῷ" τῷ γενομένῳ. γενόμενος δὴ οἷον οἶκός τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτὸν αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ πᾶς ἄξιος ἐπιμελείας νομισθεὶς ὠφελίμου μὲν ἑαυτῷ τῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ καλῷ, ὅσον δὴ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτῷ μεταλαμβάνειν, ἀβλαβοῦς δὲ τῷ ἐφεστηκότι· ἄνω γὰρ μένων ἐπιστατεῖ· ἔμψυχος τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ, ἔχων ψυχὴν οὐχ αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων. κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζῴῃ, οὐ δυνάμενον δὲ αὑτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δίκτυον ἐκτεινομένης ἤδη τῆς θαλάσσης συνεκτέταται, ὅσον αὐτὸ δύναται· οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἀλλαχόθι ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ἢ ὅπου κεῖται εἶναι. ἡ δὲ τοσαύτη ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι μὴ τοσήδε, ὥστε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα καταλαμβάνειν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ἐκταθῇ ἐκεῖνο, ἐκεῖ ἐστι· καὶ εἰ μὴ εἴη δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτῇ εἰς μέγεθος μέλοι· ἔστι γὰρ ἥτις ἐστί· τοσοῦτον γάρ ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, ὅπου ἐστὶν αὐτή, καὶ ὁρίζεται τῷ ὅσον, εἰς ὅσον προϊὸν σῴζουσαν αὐτὴν αὑτὸ ἔχει. καὶ τοσαύτη ἐστὶν ἡ σκιά, ὅσος ὁ λόγος ὁ παρ' αὐτῆς. ὁ δὲ λόγος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ὡς μέγεθος τοσοῦτον ἐργάσασθαι, ὅσον τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἐβούλετο μέγεθος ἐργάσασθαι.

it, since it is there as a substrate for form. For it was not lawful for that which borders on soul to be without its share of formative principle, as far as that was capable of receiving it of which the phrase was used "dimly in the dimness" which came to be. There came into being something like a beautiful and richly various house which was not cut off from its builder, but he did not give it a share in himself either; he considered it all, everywhere, worth a care which conduces to its very being and excellence (as far as it can participate in being) but does him no harm in his presiding over it, for he rules it while abiding above. It is in this sort of way that it is ensouled; it has a soul which does not belong to it, but is present to it; it is mastered, not the master, possessed, not possessor. The universe lies in soul which bears it up, and nothing is without a share of soul. It is as if a net immersed in the waters was alive, but unable to make its own that in which it is. The sea is already spread out and the net spreads with it, as far as it can; for no one of its parts can be anywhere else than where it lies. And soul's nature is so great, just because it has no size, as to contain the whole of body in one and the same grasp; wherever body extends, there soul is. If body did not exist, it would make no difference to soul as regards size; for it is what it is. The universe extends as far as soul goes; its limit of extension is the point to which in going forth it has soul to keep it in being. The shadow is as large as the rational formative principle which comes from soul; and the formative principle is of such a kind as to make a size as large as the form from which it derives wants to make.

10. Οὕτω δὴ ἀκούσαντας χρὴ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ οὕτως ἐλθόντας ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν πάντα ὄντα· οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ φῶς, τὸν ἥλιον, ἢ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ πάλιν τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοῦ πάντα, τάξιν δὲ πρώτων καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴν ἀεὶ ἑστῶσαν ἢ τὰ [1] πρῶτα καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ὡς πυρὸς ἔσχατα, εἰς ὕστερον τοῦ πρώτου ἐκ τοῦ ἐσχάτου νοουμένου πυρὸς σκιᾶς, εἶτα ἐπιφωτιζομένου ἅμα καὶ τούτου, ὥστε οἷον εἶδος ἐπιθεῖν τῷ ἐπιβληθέντι πρώτῳ γενομένῳ παντάπασιν ἀμυδρῷ. ἐκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχούσης ἐν αὑτῇ δι' ὅλης δύναμιν κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν· οἷα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῷα οἷον μικρούς τινας κόσμους. ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ἐφάψηται ψυχῆς, οὕτω ποιεῖται ὡς ἔχει φύσεως ψυχῆς ἡ οὐσία· ἡ δὲ ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ γνώμῃ οὐδὲ βουλὴν ἢ σκέψιν ἀναμείνασα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπακτὸν τέχνην ἂν ποιοῖ. τέχνη γὰρ ὑστέρα αὐτῆς καὶ μιμεῖται ἀμυδρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ ποιοῦσα μιμήματα, παίγνια ἄττα καὶ οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξια, μηχαναῖς πολλαῖς εἰς εἴδωλον φύσεως [2] προσχρωμένη. ἡ δὲ οὐσίας δυνάμει κυρία σωμάτων

[1] Igal: εἶτα Enn., H–S[1]: ἢ τὰ Theiler, H–S[2].

[2] suspic. H–S[1]: εἰς εἴδωλον φύσιν Enn., Perna: εἰς εἰδώλων (Perna[mg]) φύσιν Creuzer* (*ad simulacra pingenda* Ficinus), sed φύσις aliud ac κατὰ φύσιν (lin. 16) significare non potest.

[1] The context of this depreciation of art, which follows Plato's closely, should be noted. It is one of Plotinus's frequent assertions of the inferiority of planned, rational (in the ordinary human sense) activity as inferior to the divine, spontaneous activity which works without planning; cp. V. 8.

10. With this understanding we must go back again to that which is always unchanged and grasp all as existing simultaneously; just as the air, the light, the sun, or the moon, the light and again the sun all exist simultaneously, but hold first, second and third positions, so here there is soul always static, or the first, then the next in order, like the last gleams of the light of a fire; afterwards the first coming from this last gleam is thought of as a shadow of fire, and then this at the same time is thought of as illuminated, so that it is as if a form hovered over what is cast upon soul, which at first was altogether obscure. It was given ordered beauty according to a formative rational principle, since soul has potentially in it, and throughout the whole of it, the power to set in order according to rational principles; just as the formative rational principles in seeds mould and shape living beings like little ordered universes. For whatever comes into contact with soul is made as the essential nature of soul is in a state to make it; and it makes, not according to a purpose brought in from outside, nor waiting upon planning and consideration; for in this way it would not make according to nature, but to an art brought in from outside. For art is later than soul, and imitates it, making dim and weak imitations, toys not worth much, bringing in many devices to help it in producing an image of nature.[1] But soul is by its essential power in control

7 for his fullest critique of the idea of " artisan " creation. But Plotinus can be much more positive about art, and can even say that sometimes art can improve on nature because the artist's mind has direct access to the Forms in the Intelligible world of which natural things are images too, and sometimes, for various reasons, very imperfect ones; cp. V. 8. 1. 34–40.

εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι τε καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτὴ ἄγει, οὐ δυναμένων τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐναντιοῦσθαι τῇ αὐτῆς βουλήσει. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄλληλα ἐμποδίζοντα πολλάκις ἀποστερεῖται τοῦ τυχεῖν μορφῆς τῆς οἰκείας, ἣν ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν σμικρῷ θέλει· ἐκεῖ δὲ γιγνομένης καὶ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τάξιν τῶν γενομένων ἅμα ἐχόντων ἀπόνως τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως καλόν ἐστι. κατεσκευάσατο δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ἀγάλματα, τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἰκήματα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις. τί γὰρ ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ ψυχῆς, ἢ ὧν τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔχει; πυρὸς μὲν γὰρ θερμὰ ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸ ψύχειν ἄλλου· ψυχῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἰς ἄλλο. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀψύχοις τὸ μὲν [ἐξ αὐτῶν] [1] οἷον εὕδει κείμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ δὲ ⟨ἐξ αὐτῶν⟩ [1] εἰς ἄλλο ὁμοιῶσαι πρὸς αὑτὸ τὸ παθεῖν δυνάμενον· καὶ κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο παντὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτῷ ἄγειν. ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγρηγορός τι καὶ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ὡσαύτως. ζῆν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, ὅσα μὴ ζῇ παρ' αὑτῶν, καὶ τοιαύτην ζωήν, καθ' ἣν αὐτὴ ζῇ. ζῶσα οὖν ἐν λόγῳ λόγον δίδωσι τῷ σώματι, εἴδωλον οὗ ἔχει—καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἴδωλον ζωῆς, ὅσον δίδωσι τῷ σώματι—καὶ μορφὰς σωμάτων, ὧν τοὺς λόγους

[1] transpos. Kleist (Studien 40): del. Dodds, B–T.

of bodies, so that they come to be and are in the state to which soul leads them, since their first principles are unable to resist its will. In the things that come after one often hinders another and they are deprived of the attainment of their proper form, that which the formative principle operating on a small scale wishes them to have; but there in the universe as a whole, where the whole form is produced by soul and the things which are produced have all together an order, what has come into being is beautiful without labour or hindrance. But soul has constructed in the world shrines of gods and dwellings for men, and others for other creatures. For what else ought to come from soul except the things which it has the power to make? It belongs to fire to make things hot, and to something else to cool them; but one power belongs to soul which remains within it, and another which goes out to form something else. In soulless things the one power, so to speak, lies asleep in them; and the power from them which goes out to something else consists in making like themselves that which is capable of being affected: and this is of course common to all that exists, to bring things to likeness with themselves. But the work of soul is something awake, both that within it and in the same way that which goes out to something else. Soul therefore makes alive all the other things which do not live of themselves, and makes them live the sort of life by which it lives itself. So since it lives in a rational principle, it gives a rational principle to the body, an image of that which it has—for what it gives to the body is also [only] an image of life—and the shapes of body, of which it has the rational formative prin-

ἔχει· ἔχει δὲ καὶ θεῶν καὶ πάντων. διὸ πάντα καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἔχει.

11. Καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι σοφοί, ὅσοι ἐβουλήθησαν θεοὺς αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγάλματα ποιησάμενοι, εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἀπιδόντες, ἐν νῷ λαβεῖν ὡς πανταχοῦ μὲν εὐάγωγον ψυχῆς φύσις, δέξασθαί γε μὴν ῥᾷστον ἂν εἴη ἁπάντων, εἴ τις προσπαθές τι τεκτήναιτο ὑποδέξασθαι δυνάμενον μοῖράν τινα αὐτῆς. προσπαθὲς δὲ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μιμηθέν, ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἁρπάσαι εἶδός τι δυνάμενον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις πάντα εὐμηχάνως ποιησαμένη εἰς μίμησιν ὧν εἶχε τοὺς λόγους, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐγένετο ἐν ὕλῃ λόγος, ὃς κατὰ τὸν πρὸ ὕλης ἐμεμόρφωτο, συνήψατο τῷ θεῷ ἐκείνῳ, καθ' ὃν ἐγίνετο καὶ εἰς ὃν εἶδεν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ εἶχε ποιοῦσα. καὶ δὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἄμοιρον αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον αὖ κατελθεῖν εἰς τοῦτον. ἦν δὴ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐκεῖ ἥλιος—οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν γινέσθω παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου—ἐφεξῆς δὲ τούτῳ ψυχὴ ἐξηρτημένη μένοντος νοῦ μένουσα. δίδωσι δὴ αὕτη τὰ πέρατα

[1] The allusion here is to the ancient Egyptian practice of ritually animating statues: cp. the Hermetic *Asclepius* 37. II p. 347 Nock-Festugière. It became a regular part of later

ciples: it has these of gods and of everything. This, then, is why the universe too has everything.

11. And I think that the wise men of old, who made temples and statues in the wish that the gods should be present to them,[1] looking to the nature of the All, had in mind that the nature of soul is everywhere easy to attract, but that if someone were to construct something sympathetic to it and able to receive a part of it, it would of all things receive soul most easily. That which is sympathetic to it is what imitates it in some way, like a mirror able to catch [the reflection of] a form. Yes, the nature of the All, too, made all things skilfully in imitation of the [intelligible] realities of which it had the rational principles, and when each thing in this way had become a rational principle in matter, shaped according to that which was before matter, it linked it with that god in conformity with whom it came into being and to whom the soul looked and whom it had in its making.[2] For it was certainly not possible for the thing made to be without a share in the god, nor again for the god to come down to the thing made. So that sun in the divine realm is Intellect—let this serve as an example for our discourse—and next after it is soul, dependent upon it and abiding while Intellect abides. This soul gives the edge of itself

Neoplatonic theurgic practice, though not without objection from the more rational members of the school: cp. Eunapius 475 (Maximus, Eusebius of Myndus, and the Emperor Julian).

[2] For a fuller and more developed account of the making of the forms or rational principles in matter by Nature (the lowest, immanent part of universal Soul) and how the weak, dreamy form-making activity of Nature is linked through Soul with the divine forms in Intellect (here referred to as "the god") see III. 8. 1–5.

αὐτῆς τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον τούτῳ τῷ ἡλίῳ, καὶ ποιεῖ διὰ μέσου αὐτῆς κἀκεῖ συνῆφθαι οἷον ἑρμηνευτικὴ γενομένη τῶν τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου εἰς τοῦτον καὶ τῶν τούτου εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὅσον διὰ ψυχῆς εἰς ἐκεῖνον φθάνει. οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν οὐδὲ πόρρω οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν καὶ αὖ πόρρω τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ μὴ[1] μίξει, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ [οὐ τόποις][2] καὶ συνεῖναι χωρὶς ὄν. θεοὶ δέ εἰσιν οὗτοι τῷ ἀεὶ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν ἐκείνων, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐξαρχῆς ψυχῇ προσηρτῆσθαι τῇ οἷον ἀπελθούσῃ ψυχῇ, ταύτῃ δέ, ᾗπερ καί εἰσι καὶ ὃ λέγονται, πρὸς νοῦν βλέπειν οὐδαμοῦ ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐκεῖ βλεπούσης.

12. Ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα αὑτῶν ἰδοῦσαι οἷον Διονύσου ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐκεῖ ἐγένοντο ἄνωθεν ὁρμηθεῖσαι, οὐκ ἀποτμηθεῖσαι οὐδ' αὗται τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχῆς τε καὶ νοῦ. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ νοῦ

[1] Theiler: τῇ Enn.*, H–S[1].
[2] ut glossam post συνεῖναι delevimus.

[1] For the connection of the visible sun to the intelligible sun cp. Julian *Oration* IV (To King Helios) *passim*: though for Plotinus this relationship of the two suns is just an example of the way in which everything in the sense-world is linked to the intelligible, of the intimate presence of the divine in the whole material world, but in Julian it is a theological doctrine of central importance.

[2] For the Orphic story to which Plotinus here casually alludes see W. K. C. Guthrie *Orpheus and Greek Religion* 2nd ed. (London 1952) 122–3. The mirror was one of the toys with which the Titans lured away the child Dionysus-Zagreus

which borders on this [visible] sun to this sun, and makes a connection of it to the divine realm through the medium of itself, and acts as an interpreter of what comes from this sun to the intelligible sun and from the intelligible sun to this sun, in so far as this sun does reach the intelligible sun through soul.[1] For nothing is a long way off or far from anything else—distance in another sense is a matter of difference and not being mixed—but [the divine] is by itself, and is with the world while remaining separate. These [heavenly bodies] are gods by for ever not departing from those intelligible gods and by being linked to the original soul by the soul which, so to speak, went away [to the visible world], and by this, by which they are what they are also called, they look towards Intellect, since soul for them never looks elsewhere than There.

12. But the souls of men see their images as if in the mirror of Dionysus[2] and come to be on that level with a leap from above: but even these are not cut off from their own principle and from intellect.

to tear him to pieces and eat him; after they had done so Zeus destroyed them with his thunderbolts and men were made out of their ashes; so we contain a "Titanic", earthy, evil element and also a divine Dionysiac one which must be released by purification. Plotinus here simply takes the mirror, in which Dionysus enjoyed seeing his own reflection, as a symbol of the attractiveness of the visible world for the souls which must descend into it (all material things for him are reflections of soul). The later Neoplatonists worked out an elaborate allegorical interpretation of the whole story, in which the rending of Dionysus by the Titans symbolises the "division" of the divine power in the material world. The relevant passages are collected in O. Kern *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin 1963) 209. See further J. Pépin in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 24 (1970) 304–20.

ἦλθον, ἀλλ' ἔφθασαν μὲν μέχρι γῆς, κάρα δὲ αὐταῖς ἐστήρικται ὑπεράνω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. πλέον δὲ αὐταῖς κατελθεῖν συβέβηκεν, ὅτι τὸ μέσον αὐταῖς ἠναγκάσθη, φροντίδος δεομένου τοῦ εἰς ὃ ἔφθασαν, φροντίσαι. Ζεὺς δὲ πατὴρ ἐλεήσας πονουμένας θνητὰ αὐτῶν τὰ δεσμὰ ποιῶν, περὶ ἃ πονοῦνται, δίδωσιν ἀναπαύλας ἐν χρόνοις ποιῶν σωμάτων ἐλευθέρας, ἵν' ἔχοιεν ἐκεῖ καὶ αὗται γίνεσθαι, οὗπερ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴ ἀεὶ οὐδὲν τὰ τῇδε ἐπιστρεφομένη. ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πᾶν ἤδη, τοῦτο αὔταρκες αὐτῷ καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται, κατὰ λόγους ἀεὶ ἑστηκότας ἐν χρόνοις περαινόμενον· καὶ κατὰ χρόνους ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καθιστάμενον [1] ἐν μέτροις βίων ὡρισμένων εἰς συμφωνίαν ἀγομένων τούτων [2] ἐκείνοις καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνα, [τῶνδε] [3] περαινομένων ὑφ' ἕνα λόγον, πάντων τεταγμένων ἔν τε καθόδοις ψυχῶν καὶ ἀνόδοις καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς συμφωνίας τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς τάξιν οὐκ ἀπηρτημένων, ἀλλὰ συναπτουσῶν ἐν ταῖς καθόδοις ἑαυτὰς καὶ μίαν συμφωνίαν πρὸς τὴν περιφορὰν ποιουμένων, ὡς καὶ τὰς τύχας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς προαιρέσεις σημαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῶν ἄστρων σχήμασι καὶ οἷον μίαν τινὰ φωνὴν οὐκ ἐκμελῶς ἀφιέναι· καὶ

[1] $A^{pc}B^{ac}$, Perna, Creuzer, Müller*: καθιστάμενα $A^{ac}EB^{pc}$ RJUC, Kirchhoff, H–S.
[2] Theiler: ἀγόμενα ταῦτα Enn., H–S.
[3] del. Theiler.

For they did not come down with Intellect, but went on ahead of it down to earth, but their heads are firmly set above in heaven. But they experienced a deeper descent because their middle part was compelled to care for that to which they had gone on, which needed their care. But Father Zeus, pitying them in their troubles, makes the bonds over which they have trouble dissoluble by death and gives them periods of rest, making them at times free of bodies, so that they too may have the opportunity of being there where the soul of the All always is, since it in no way turns to the things of this world. For what it has is the All already complete; this is and will be sufficient to itself: it completes its course periodically according to everlastingly fixed rational principles, and everlastingly returns to the same state, period by period, in a proportionate succession of defined lives, these here being brought into harmony with those there and completed according to them,[1] everything being ordered under one rational principle in the descents of souls and their ascents and with regard to everything else. The harmonious adjustment of the souls to the order of this All of ours witnesses to this; they are not cut off from it, but fit themselves in in their descents and make one harmony with its circuit, so that their fortunes and their lives and their choices are indicated by the figures made by the heavenly bodies and they sing, as it were, with one

[1] I adopt Theiler's text here (see critical notes), in spite of the three alterations of the MSS which he makes, because it seems to me to be the only way of giving a satisfactory sense to the passage and because the critical reasons he gives for his alterations seem to me persuasive (see his note ad loc.).

τὸ μουσικῶς καὶ ἐναρμονίως μᾶλλον τοῦτο εἶναι
ἠνιγμένως. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μὴ τοῦ παντὸς
κατ' ἐκεῖνα ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος ἕκαστα ἐν
μέτροις περιόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ βίων κατὰ γένη
διεξόδων, οὓς αἱ ψυχαὶ διεξοδεύουσιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἐκεῖ,
ὁτὲ δὲ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὁτὲ δὲ εἰς τούσδε τοὺς τόπους
ἐπιστρεφόμεναι. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ἀεὶ ἄνω καὶ οὐ μή
ποτε ἔξω τῶν αὑτοῦ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἱδρυμένος πᾶς
ἄνω πέμπει εἰς τὰ τῇδε διὰ ψυχῆς. ψυχὴ δὲ ἐκ
τοῦ πλησίον μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν διάκειται
εἶδος καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτήν, ἡ μὲν ὡσαύτως,
ἡ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, ἴσχουσα ἐν τάξει τὴν πλάνην.
κάτεισι δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσον, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν πλέον, ὁτὲ
δὲ ἔλαττον, κἂν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἴῃ· κάτεισι δὲ
εἰς ἕτοιμον ἑκάστη καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τῆς διαθέσεως.
ἐκεῖ γάρ, ᾧ ἂν ὁμοιωθεῖσα ᾖ, φέρεται, ἡ μὲν εἰς
ἄνθρωπον, ἡ δὲ εἰς ζῷον ἄλλη ἄλλο.

13. Τὸ γὰρ ἀναπόδραστον καὶ ἡ δίκη οὕτως ἐν
φύσει κρατούσῃ ἰέναι ἕκαστον ἐν τάξει πρὸς ὅ
ἐστιν ἕκαστον γενόμενον εἴδωλον προαιρέσεως
καὶ διαθέσεως ἀρχετύπου, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο πᾶν
ψυχῆς εἶδος ἐκείνου πλησίον, πρὸς ὃ τὴν διάθεσιν
τὴν ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχει, καὶ τοῦ τότε πέμποντος καὶ
εἰσάγοντος οὐ δεῖ, οὔτε ἵνα ἔλθῃ εἰς σῶμα τότε

[1] The "fortunes and lives and choices" come from the concluding myth of Plato's *Republic* (see 617B). For a fuller discussion by Plotinus of this passage in Plato see III. 4. 5. Plotinus here, characteristically, interprets "the music of the spheres" allegorically to suit his own philosophical purposes. For the old literal interpretation of this Pythagorean doctrine see Cicero *Somnium Scipionis* 5. 10; and cf. P.-M. Schuhl *Etudes sur la Fabulation Platonicienne* (Paris 1947) 117 ff.

voice and are never out of tune. (And this is more properly the hidden meaning of the doctrine that the heavenly spheres move musically and melodically.) [1] But this could not be if the action and experience of the All was not on all occasions in accordance with the intelligible realities, in its measuring of periods and orders and the living through of the lives according to their kinds which the souls live through, sometimes in the intelligible world, sometimes in heaven, and sometimes turning to these regions. But Intellect as a whole is always above, and could never be outside its own world, but is settled as a whole above and communicates with things here through soul. Soul, because it is nearer, is disposed according to the form which comes to it from Intellect, and gives to the things below it, one kind of soul always in the same way, the other in different ways at different times, having its wanderings arranged in regular order. But [the individual soul] does not always come down the same distance, but sometimes more, sometimes less, even if it comes to the same species [of body]: each soul comes down to a body made ready for it according to its resemblance to the soul's disposition. It is carried there to that to which it is made like, one soul to a human being and others to different kinds of animals.

13. The inescapable rule and the justice [which govern the descent of souls] are thus set in a natural principle which compels each to go in its proper order to that to which it individually tends, the image of its original choice and disposition: each form of soul in that world is close to that to which it has an internal disposition, and there is no need of anyone to send it or bring it into body at a particular time,

οὔτε εἰς τοδί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ ἐνστάντος οἷον αὐτομάτως κάτεισι καὶ εἴσεισιν εἰς ὃ δεῖ—καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ χρόνος, οὗ παραγενομένου οἷον κήρυκος καλοῦντος κατίασι—καὶ εἰσέδυ εἰς τὸ πρόσφορον σῶμα, ὡς εἰκάσαι τὰ γιγνόμενα οἷον δυνάμεσι μάγων καὶ ὁλκαῖς τισιν ἰσχυραῖς κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ φέρεσθαι· οἷον καὶ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τελεῖται ἡ τοῦ ζῴου διοίκησις, ἐν χρόνῳ ἕκαστον κινούσης καὶ γεννώσης, οἷον γενειάσεις καὶ ⟨ἐκ⟩φύσεις [1] κεράτων καὶ νῦν πρὸς τάδε ὁρμὰς καὶ ἐπανθήσεις πρότερον οὐκ οὔσας καὶ περιττάς,[2] τῶν ⟨τε⟩[3] δένδρων διοίκησις [4] ἐν προθεσμίαις τακταῖς γινομένη.[5] ἴασι δὲ οὔτε ἑκοῦσαι οὔτε πεμφθεῖσαι· οὔ γε τὸ ἑκούσιον τοιοῦτον ὡς προελέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πηδᾶν κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ ⟨ὡς⟩[6] πρὸς γάμων φυσικὰς προθυμίας ἢ [ὡς πρὸς] [6] πράξεις τινὲς καλῶν οὐ λογισμῷ κινούμενοι· ἀλλ' εἱμαρμένον ἀεὶ τῷ τοιῷδε τὸ τοιόνδε, καὶ τῷ τοιῷδε τὸ νῦν, τῷ δὲ τὸ αὖθις. καὶ ὁ μὲν πρὸ κόσμου νοῦς εἱμαρμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μένειν ἐκεῖ ὁπόσον καὶ πέμπει,[7] καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον τῷ καθόλου ὑποπῖπτον νόμῳ πέμπεται· ἔγκειται γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ καθόλου, καὶ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἔξωθεν τὴν ἰσχὺν εἰς τὸ τελεσθῆναι ἴσχει, ἀλλὰ δέδοται ἐν αὐτοῖς ⟨τοῖς⟩[8] χρησαμένοις εἶναι καὶ περιφέρουσιν

[1] Theiler, cf. IV. 4. 11. 19.
[2] Theiler: *περὶ τὰς* Enn., H–S: *περὶ* del. Volkmann*.
[3] Theiler.
[4] Theiler: *διοικήσεις* Enn.* ,H–S.
[5] Theiler: *γινομένων* R, H–S: *γιγνομένας* Vitringa, Volkmann.
[6] transposuimus.
[7] Harder B–T: *πέμπειν* Enn.*
[8] *αὐτοῖς τοῖς* Kirchhoff: *αὐτοῖς* Enn.: *τοῖς* H–S².

or into this or that particular body, but when its moment comes to it it descends and enters where it must as if of its own accord. Each has its own time and when it comes, like a herald summoning it, the soul comes down and goes into the appropriate body, so that what happens is like a stirring and carrying away by magic powers and mighty attractions: it is like the way in which the ordered development of a living thing comes to its fulfilment as [its soul] stirs and produces everything in its time—for instance sprouting of beards and horns, and at the moment special impulses, and breaking out into spots in excessive numbers which were not there before, and like the ordered development of trees coming about at its appointed time. The souls go neither willingly nor because they are sent, nor is the voluntary element in their going like deliberate choice, but like a natural spontaneous jumping or a passionate natural desire of sexual union or as some men are moved unreasoningly to noble deeds. Each special kind has its special destiny and moment, one now and one at another time. Intellect which is before the universe has its destiny too, to remain There, however much it also sends out; and the individual, which is subordinated to the universal, is sent according to law. For the universal bears heavily upon the particular, and the law does not derive from outside the strength for its accomplishment, but is given to be in those themselves who are subject to it, and they

αὐτόν· κἂν ἐνστῇ καὶ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὃ θέλει γενέσθαι, γίνεται τότε ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτόν, ὥστε αὐτοὺς αὐτὸν τελεῖν, ἅτε περιφέροντας ἰσχύσαντα[1] ἐν τῷ ἐν αὐτοῖς αὐτὸν ἱδρῦσθαι, οἷον βρίθοντα εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ προθυμίαν ἐμποιοῦντα καὶ ὠδῖνα ἐκεῖ ἐλθεῖν, οὗ ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὢν οἷον ἐλθεῖν φθέγγεται.

14. Τούτων δὴ γινομένων φῶτα πολλὰ ὁ κόσμος οὗτος ἔχων καὶ καταυγαζόμενος ψυχαῖς ἐπικοσμεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς προτέροις ἄλλους κόσμους ἄλλον παρ' ἄλλου κομιζόμενος, παρά τε θεῶν ἐκείνων παρά τε νῶν τῶν ἄλλων ψυχὰς διδόντων· οἷον εἰκὸς καὶ τὸν μῦθον αἰνίττεσθαι, ὡς πλάσαντος τοῦ Προμηθέως τὴν γυναῖκα ἐπεκόσμησαν αὐτὴν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί· γαῖαν ὕδει φύρειν, καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἐνθεῖναι φωνήν, θεαῖς δ' ὁμοίαν τὸ εἶδος, καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τι δοῦναι καὶ Χάριτας καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλο δῶρον καὶ ὀνομάσαι ἐκ τοῦ δώρου καὶ πάντων τῶν δεδωκότων· πάντες γὰρ τούτῳ ἔδοσαν τῷ πλάσματι παρὰ προμηθείας τινὸς γενομένῳ. ὁ δὲ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἀποποιούμενος τὸ

[1] *περιφέροντας ἰσχύσαντα* Vitringa, Harder, Cilento, B–T: *περιφέροντα καὶ ἰσχύσαντα* Enn.: *περιφέροντας καὶ ἰσχύσαντας* H–S[1].

[1] The teaching of this chapter about the descent of the human soul should be carefully compared with that in the early treatise *On the Descent of the Soul* IV. 8. 3–6. In this treatise one can see particularly clearly the variations of emphasis and the fluctuations between optimism and pessimism about the material world and our life in it which are characteristic of Plotinus' discussions of this subject, because

bear it about with them. And if the time comes too, then what it wills to happen is also brought about by beings themselves in whom it is present, so that they accomplish it themselves because they bear it about, strong by its firm establishment in them; it makes itself a sort of weight in them and implants a longing, a birth pang of desire to come there where the law within them as it were calls them to come.[1]

14. Because all this has happened this universal order of ours, which has many lights and is illuminated by souls, is being further set in order and adorned, receiving new ordered beauties over and above its former ones, one from one source and one from another, from the gods of that other world and the other intellects which give souls[2]; it seems likely that this is the hidden meaning of the story that when Prometheus had made the woman the other gods too helped to adorn her; that "he mixed earth with water", and gave her a human voice, and made her like the goddesses in appearance, and that Aphrodite gave her something and the Graces, and different gods gave her different gifts, and that she took her name from the gift and all the givers: for all gave something to this formation which came into existence as a result of a forethought (or "providence"). But what could Epimetheus rejecting

its purpose is to reconcile the divergent accounts, pessimistic and optimistic, given by Plato in different dialogues. But there does not seem to be any fundamental difference between the thought of IV. 8 and the thought of this chapter. See further my Introductory Note to IV. 3–5, p. 26 ff.

[2] Cp. VI. 4. 14. 18–19 (from a treatise written shortly before this one) where the population of the intelligible world is described as including men (in their pure intelligible state) as well as gods.

δῶρον αὐτοῦ τί ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἐν νοητῷ μᾶλλον αἵρεσιν ἀμείνω εἶναι; δέδεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ποιήσας, ὅτι πως ἐφάπτεται τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος δεσμὸς ἔξωθεν· καὶ ἡ λύσις ἡ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλέους, ὅτι δύναμίς ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ὡς λελύσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅπῃ τις δοξάζει, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐμφαίνει τὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν κόσμον δόσεως, καὶ προσᾴδει τοῖς λεγομένοις.

15. Ἴασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς οὐρανὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ σῶμα ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι δι' αὐτοῦ ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα, εἰς ὅσον ἂν εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθῶσι. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ εἰς σώματα τὰ κατωτέρω, αἱ δὲ ἀπ' ἄλλων εἰς ἄλλα εἰσκρινόμεναι, αἷς ἡ δύναμις οὐκ ἤρκεσεν ἆραι ἐντεῦθεν διὰ βάρυνσιν καὶ λήθην πολὺ ἐφελκομέναις, ὧ αὐταῖς ἐβαρύνθη. γίνονται δὲ

[1] The story of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora here follows Hesiod, with slight variations: for the making of Pandora see Hesiod *Op.* 60–89; for the binding and loosing of Prometheus see Hesiod *Theog.* 521–8. Plotinus' remark about his own casual allegorical interpretation (line 17) shows how little seriously he took this sort of thing. The ancient myths do of course for him, as for other men of his age, express profound truths in symbolic form. But as long as you recognise what the truths are, it does not matter whether you discover them in any particular myth, or how you interpret the details of the poets' stories.

[2] Here there appears the " cosmic religiosity " which Plotinus shared with other philosophers of late antiquity: the belief, that is, that the celestial regions and the heavenly bodies are divine and far closer to any higher, spiritual or intelligible, divinities there may be, than the world below the

the gift of what had been formed signify except that the choice of a life lived more in the intelligible world is the better one? And the maker is bound because he is somehow in contact with that which he has made, and a bond of this kind is external; and his freeing by Heracles means that he has power even so to free himself. This interpretation is as anyone likes to think it, except that the story displays the gifts made to the universal order and is in harmony with what we say.[1]

15. The souls when they have peeped out of the intelligible world go first to heaven, and when they have put on a body there go on by its means to earthier bodies, to the limit to which they extend themselves in length.[2] And some souls [only] come from heaven to lower bodies; others pass from one body into another, those whose power is not sufficient to lift them from this region because they are weighed down and forgetful, dragging with them much that weighs upon them. They become different

moon, and that consequently the primary and proper material abode of souls is in this higher region from which they descend, assuming progressively inferior sorts of bodies according to the depth of their descent, the earthly body being the last and lowest: cp. chs. 9 and 17 of this treatise and Appendix II, *The Astral Body in Neoplatonism* in Proclus *The Elements of Theology* ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1963) 313–21. Philosophical cosmic religion was something which Plotinus took seriously. He defends it vigorously against astrological superstition in II. 3 and against the Gnostic contempt for the divinities of the visible heaven in II. 9. But it occupies a place of moderate importance in his thought, and is not easy to reconcile with other aspects of it; and the idea of " astral " or " pneumatic " bodies superior to our earthly bodies is of much less importance to him than the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies.

διάφοροι ἢ σωμάτων εἰς ἃ ἐνεκρίθησαν παραλλαγαῖς ἢ καὶ τύχαις ἢ καὶ τροφαῖς, ἢ αὐταὶ παρ' αὑτῶν τὸ διάφορον κομίζουσιν ἢ πᾶσι τούτοις ἤ τισιν αὐτῶν. καὶ αἱ μὲν τὰ πάντα ὑποπεπτώκασιν εἱμαρμένῃ τῇ ἐνταῦθα, αἱ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως, ὁτὲ δὲ αὑτῶν, αἱ δὲ ὅσα μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ὑπομεῖναι συγχωροῦσι, δύνανται δὲ ὅσα ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἔργα αὑτῶν εἶναι, ζῶσαι κατ' ἄλλην τὴν τῶν συμπάντων τῶν ὄντων νομοθεσίαν ἄλλῳ ἑαυτὰς θεσμῷ δοῦσαι. πέπλεκται δὲ αὕτη ἔκ τε τῶν τῇδε λόγων τε καὶ αἰτίων πάντων καὶ ψυχικῶν κινήσεων καὶ νόμων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν, συμφωνοῦσα ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν παραλαβοῦσα καὶ συνυφαίνουσα τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἀσάλευτα μὲν τηροῦσα, ὅσα δύναται σῴζειν ἑαυτὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἕξιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ᾗ πέφυκε περιάγουσα, ὡς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς κατελθοῦσιν εἶναι, ὅτι οὕτως, ὡς τὰ μὲν ὧδὶ τεθῆναι, τὰ δὲ ὧδὶ κεῖσθαι.

16. Τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα τιμωρήματα εἰς τοὺς πονηροὺς μετὰ δίκης τῇ τάξει ἀποδιδόναι προσήκει ὡς κατὰ τὸ δέον ἀγούσῃ· ὅσα δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς συμβαίνει ἔξω δίκης, οἷον κολάσεις ἢ πενίαι ἢ νόσοι, ἆρα διὰ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας λεκτέον γίνεσθαι; συμπέπλεκται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ προσημαίνεται, ὡς

either because of the variety of the bodies into which they entered or because of their fortunes or their upbringing, or they themselves bring with them a difference coming from themselves, or all these causes, or some of them, operate together to produce the differences. And some of them have altogether become subject to the destiny of this world, but others are sometimes subject to it and sometimes belong to themselves; others again accept all that it is necessary to endure, but are able to be self-possessed in all that is their own work, living according to another code of laws, that which governs the whole of reality, and submitting themselves to [this] other ordinance. This code of laws is woven from all the rational principles and causes here below, and the movement of souls and the laws which come from the intelligible world; it is in harmony with these last, and takes its principles from that world and weaves together what comes after with the intelligible principles, keeping undisturbed all things which can maintain themselves in accordance with the disposition of the intelligibles, and making the others circulate according to their natures, so that the responsibility lies with the souls which have come down for coming down in such a way that some are put in this place and others find themselves in that.

16. It is fitting to attribute the punishments which fall with justice on the wicked to the [universal] order in that it directs the world according to what is right; but as for all that happens without justice to the good, like [unjust] punishments or poverty or sickness, are these to be said to have come upon them because of previous sins? For these are woven in and signified beforehand, so that they too happen

καὶ αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον γίγνεσθαι. ἢ οὐ κατὰ λόγους φυσικοὺς ταῦτα, οὐδ' ἦν ἐν τοῖς προηγουμένοις, ἀλλ' ἑπόμενα ἐκείνοις· οἷον πιπτούσης τινὸς οἰκοδομίας τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀποθανεῖν ὁποῖός ποτ' ἂν ᾖ, ἢ καὶ ἵππων [1] δύο κατὰ τάξιν φερομένων ἢ καὶ ἑνὸς τὸ ἐμπεσὸν τρωθῆναι ἢ πατηθῆναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο οὐ κακὸν ὂν τῷ παθόντι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου χρήσιμον πλοκήν. ἢ οὐδὲ ἄδικον ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ἔχον [2] τὴν δικαίωσιν. οὐ γὰρ τὰ μὲν δεῖ νομίζειν συντετάχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεχαλάσθαι εἰς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ γὰρ κατ' αἰτίας γίγνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἕνα καὶ τάξιν μίαν, καὶ τὰ σμικρότερα δεῖ συντετάχθαι καὶ συνυφάνθαι νομίζειν. καὶ τὸ ἄδικον δὴ τὸ παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον αὐτῷ μὲν τῷ ποιήσαντι ἄδικον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφείθη αἰτίας ὁ δράσας, συντεταγμένον δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐκ ἄδικον ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐδ' εἰς τὸν παθόντα, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐχρῆν. εἰ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὁ παθών, εἰς ἀγαθὸν ἡ τελευτὴ τούτων. δεῖ γὰρ τήνδε τὴν σύνταξιν οὐκ ἀθεεὶ οὐδὲ ἄδικον, ἀλλ' ἀκριβῆ εἰς τὴν τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀπόδοσιν νομίζειν, ἀδήλους δὲ ἔχειν τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι παρέχειν μέμψεως αἰτίας.

17. Ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ εἰς τὴν οὐρανοῦ ἴασιν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ πρῶτον χώραν, λογίσαιτο ἄν τις ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γὰρ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἀμείνων, εἴη ἂν προσεχὴς τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις.

[1] Theiler: τινων Enn.*, H–S[1].
[2] Vitringa, Müller*: ἐχόντων Enn., H–S[1].

according to rational principle. No, these things do not occur according to the rational principles of nature and are not given in their premises, but are consequences of them; for instance, if a building falls the man who is underneath it is killed, whatever sort of man he is; or if two horses are moving in an orderly way—or even one—anything which gets in the way is injured or trampled. Or [we should think that] this injustice is not an evil to the sufferer [and contributes] to the interweaving of the whole. Or it is not unjust because it has its justification from former faults. For one must not think that some things are contained in the order, while others are let loose for the operation of free will. For if things have to happen according to causes and rational sequences and according to one rational principle and a single order, one must think that the less important things too are contained in the order and woven in. And the injustice which one man does to another is certainly an injustice from the point of view of the doer, and the man who perpetrates it is not free from guilt, but as contained in the universal order it is not unjust in that order, or in relation to the sufferer, but it was ordained that he should so suffer. But if the sufferer is a good man, this will turn out for his good. For one must not think that the order is godless or unjust, but that it is accurate in the distribution of what is appropriate, but it keeps its reasons hidden and gives grounds for blame to those who do not know them.

17. One could deduce from considerations like the following that the souls when they leave the intelligible first enter the space of heaven. For if heaven is the better part of the region perceived by the

ἐκεῖθεν τοίνυν ψυχοῦται ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ μεταλαμβάνει ὡς ἐπιτηδειότερα μεταλαμβάνειν. τὸ δὲ γεηρὸν ὕστατόν τε καὶ ψυχῆς ἥττονος πεφυκὸς μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως πόρρω. πᾶσαι μὲν δὴ καταλάμπουσι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ διδόασιν οἷον τὸ πολὺ αὑτῶν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκείνῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς ὑστέροις ἐναυγάζονται, αἱ δ' ἐπιπλέον κατιοῦσαι ἐναυγάζουσι μᾶλλον κάτω, αὐταῖς δὲ οὐκ ἄμεινον εἰς πολὺ προϊούσαις. ἔστι γάρ τι οἷον κέντρον, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ κύκλος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκλάμπων, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἄλλος, φῶς ἐκ φωτός· ἔξωθεν δὲ τούτων οὐκέτι φωτὸς κύκλος ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ δεόμενος οὗτος οἰκείου φωτὸς ἀπορίᾳ αὐγῆς ἀλλοτρίας. ἔστω δὲ ῥόμβος οὗτος, μᾶλλον δὲ σφαῖρα τοιαύτη, ἣ δὴ κομίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς τρίτης—προσεχὴς γὰρ αὐτῇ—ὅσον ἐκείνη ἐναυγάζεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγα φῶς μένον ἐλλάμπει, καὶ διήκει κατὰ λόγον ἐξ αὐτοῦ αὐγή, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συνεπιλάμπει, τὰ μὲν μένοντα, τὰ δ' ἐπιπλέον ἐπισπᾶται τῇ τοῦ ἐλλαμπομένου ἀγλαΐᾳ. εἶτα δεομένων τῶν ἐλλαμπομένων πλείονος φροντίδος, ὥσπερ χειμαζομένων πλοίων κυβερνῆται ἐναπερείδονται πρὸς τὸ πλέον τῇ τῶν νεῶν φροντίδι καὶ ἀμελήσαντες αὐτῶν

[1] See note on ch. 15. There is here a certain " creeping spatiality ". Plotinus does not really think that any part of the material universe, even the highest heaven, can be nearer to the intelligible than any other, because the intelligible is not in space at all. But here his language is influenced, perhaps not only by the " cosmic religiosity " of his time, but by his favourite myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* (cp. 246D6–247E6).

[2] Cp. VI. 4. 9. 25–6 and the Nicene creed. It is interesting

senses, it borders on the last and lowest parts of the intelligible.[1] So these heavenly regions are first ensouled thence, and participate in soul first because they are better adapted to participate. But the body of earth is the last, and less naturally adapted to participate in soul and far from the bodiless nature. All souls then illuminate the heaven and give it the greatest and first part of themselves, but illuminate the rest of the world with their secondary parts; those which come down further throw their light lower, but it is not to their advantage to have gone on so far. For there is a kind of centre, and around this a circle shining out from it, and beyond these another, light from light[2]: but outside these there is no longer another circle of light but this next circle through lack of its own light needs illumination from another source. Let this be a wheel, or rather a sphere of a kind which from the third—for it borders upon it—obtains all the illumination which that third receives. So the great light abides and shines, and its radiance goes out through the world in rational order and proportion; the other lights join in illuminating, some staying in their places, but others are more attracted by the brightness of what is illuminated. Then as the things which are illuminated need more care, just as the steersmen of ships in a storm concentrate more and more on the care of their ships and are unaware that

to find exactly this phrase (*φῶς ἐκ φωτός*) which appears in Plotinus in strongly subordinationist contexts, occupying an important place in the first great credal affirmation of non-subordinationist Trinitarian theology, where the Fathers of Nicaea are trying to state with the utmost possible emphasis that the Son is *not* inferior to the Father as one Plotinian hypostasis is to that above it.

ἔλαθον, ὡς κινδυνεύειν συνεπισπασθῆναι πολλάκις τῷ τῶν νεῶν ναυαγίῳ, ἔρρεψαν τὸ[1] πλέον καὶ αὗται καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν· ἔπειτα δὲ κατεσχέθησαν πεδηθεῖσαι γοητείας δεσμοῖς, σχεθεῖσαι φύσεως κηδεμονίᾳ. εἰ δ' ἦν τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον ζῷον οἷον καὶ τὸ πᾶν, τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν σῶμα καὶ ἀκίνδυνον παθεῖν, καὶ παρεῖναι λεγομένη ψυχὴ οὐκ ἂν παρῆν αὐτῷ, καὶ παρεῖχεν αὐτῷ ζωὴν μένουσα πάντη ἐν τῷ ἄνω.

18. Πότερα δὲ λογισμῷ ψυχὴ χρῆται πρὶν ἐλθεῖν καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἐξελθοῦσα; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ὁ λογισμὸς ἐγγίγνεται ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἤδη οὔσης καὶ φροντίδος πληρουμένης καὶ μᾶλλον ἀσθενούσης· ἐλάττωσις γὰρ νοῦ εἰς αὐτάρκειαν τὸ λογισμοῦ δεῖσθαι· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ὁ λογισμὸς ἀποροῦσι τοῖς τεχνίταις, ὅταν δὲ μὴ χαλεπὸν ᾖ, κρατεῖ καὶ ἐργάζεται ἡ τέχνη. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκεῖ ἄνευ λογισμῶν, πῶς ἂν ἔτι λογικαὶ εἶεν; ἢ ὅτι δύνανται, εἴποι τις ἄν, ὅταν περίστασις, εὐπορῆσαι διασκοποῦσαι. δεῖ δὲ τὸν λογισμὸν λαβεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις λογισμὸν λαμβάνει τὴν ἐκ νοῦ ἀεὶ γινομένην καὶ οὖσαν ἐν αὐταῖς διάθεσιν, καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἑστῶσαν καὶ οἷον ἔμφασιν οὖσαν, εἶεν ἂν κἀκεῖ λογισμῷ χρώμενοι. οὐδὲ δὴ φωναῖς, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι νομιστέον ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ οὔσας καὶ πάμπαν, σώματα δ' ἐχούσας ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὅσα μὲν διὰ χρείας ἢ δι'

[1] Theiler: τε Enn.*, H–S[1].

[1] For the " magic " of the physical universe, the living power of its organic unity on which the art of the magician depends, see IV. 4. 40.

they are forgetting themselves, that they are in danger of being dragged down with the wreck of the ships, these souls incline downwards more with what is theirs. Then they are held fettered with bonds of magic,[1] held fast by their care for [bodily] nature. But if every living creature was like the All, a perfect and sufficient body and in no danger of suffering, then the soul which is said to be present would not be present in it, and would give it life while remaining altogether in the upper world.

18. Does the soul use discursive reasoning before it comes and again after it goes out of the body? No, discursive reasoning comes into it here below, when it is already in perplexity and full of care, and in a state of greater weakness; for feeling the need of reasoning is a lessening of the intellect in respect of its self-sufficiency; just as in the crafts reasoning occurs when the craftsmen are in perplexity, but, when there is no difficulty, the craft dominates and does its work. But if they are without reasoning processes there, how could they still be reasonable? Because they are capable, one might say, when the circumstances arise, of considering rationally with the greatest of ease. But one must understand reasoning in this sort of sense; because if one understands reasoning to be the state of mind which exists in them always proceeding from Intellect, and which is a static activity and a kind of reflection of Intellect, they would employ reasoning in that other world, too. Nor do I think that we should suppose that they use speech in the intelligible world, and altogether, even if they have bodies in heaven, there would be none of that talk there which they engage in here because of needs or over doubtful and dis-

ἀμφισβητήσεις διαλέγοντα ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ποιοῦσαι δὲ ἐν τάξει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιτάττοιεν οὐδ' ἂν συμβουλεύοιεν, γινώσκοιεν δ' ἂν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλων ἐν συνέσει. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὰ σιωπώντων γινώσκοιμεν δι' ὀμμάτων· ἐκεῖ δὲ καθαρὸν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα καὶ οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ἕκαστος καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κρυπτὸν οὐδὲ πεπλασμένον, ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἄλλῳ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖνος ἔγνω. περὶ δὲ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν ἐν ἀέρι φωνῇ χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἄτοπον· ζῷα γὰρ τοιάδε.

19. Πότερα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστὸν ὥσπερ κραθέντων, ἢ ἄλλῃ μὲν καὶ κατ' ἄλλο τὸ ἀμέριστον, τὸ δὲ μεριστὸν οἷον ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἕτερον μέρος αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν λογιζόμενόν φαμεν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον; γνωσθείη δ' ἂν ληφθέντος τί λέγομεν ἑκάτερον. ἀμέριστον μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται αὐτῷ, μεριστὸν δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ σώματά φησι γινομένην μεριστὴν καὶ ταύτην οὐ γεγενημένην. τὴν δὴ σώματος φύσιν ὁρᾶν δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἵας ψυχῆς προσδεῖται, καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ τῷ σώματι καὶ ὅλῳ παρεῖναι. πᾶν μὲν δὴ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, εἴπερ διὰ παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ μερίζεσθαι· πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὃν μεμερίσθαι ἂν λέγοιτο· ὅλον δὲ πανταχοῦ φαινόμενον οὐ μεμερίσθαι ἂν παντελῶς λέγοιτο, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίγνεσθαι μεριστόν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι

puted points; but as they do everything they do in order and according to nature they would not give orders or advice and would know by intuition what passes from one to another. For here below, too, we can know many things by the look in people's eyes when they are silent; but there all their body is clear and pure and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or feigned, but before one speaks to another that other has seen and understood. But there is nothing absurd in spirits and souls in the air using voices; for they are [embodied] living creatures of a particular kind.

19. Are the " indivisible " and the " divisible " elements of the soul in the same place, as if they were mixed together, or is the " indivisible " in a different place and differently related, but the " divisible " so to speak following upon it and another part of soul, just as we say that the reasoning part is one thing and the unreasoning part another? This could be answered when it has been understood what we mean by each. The term " indivisible " is used without qualification, but " divisible " is not unqualified but Plato says that soul " becomes divisible in the sphere of bodies ", and not that it has already become so. One must then observe what kind of soul the nature of body requires in order to live, and what of soul must be present everywhere to body as a whole. Now the whole of the sense faculty, since it is going to operate throughout the whole body, comes to divide itself; for since it is everywhere it might be said to be divided; but since it appears everywhere as a whole, it could be said not to be absolutely and completely divided, but to become " divisible in the sphere of body ". But if anyone

μηδὲ μεμερίσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ, λεκτέον ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, εἴπερ σῶμά ἐστι τὸ μεταλαμβάνον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω μερίζεσθαι, ἔλαττον δὲ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ αὐξητικὸν ὡσαύτως· καὶ εἰ περὶ τὸ ἧπαρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν ὁ θυμός, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα οὐ παραλαμβάνει ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μίγματι, ἴσως δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ ἔκ τινος τῶν παραληφθέντων ταῦτα. λογισμὸς δὲ καὶ νοῦς; οὐκέτι ταῦτα σώματι δίδωσιν αὑτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν οὐ δι' ὀργάνου τελεῖται τοῦ σώματος· ἐμπόδιον γὰρ τοῦτο, εἴ τις αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι προσχρῷτο. ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστόν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἓν κραθέντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν ἑκατέρου καθαροῦ καὶ χωρὶς τῇ δυνάμει. εἰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνόμενον μεριστὸν παρὰ τῆς ἐπάνω δυνάμεως ἔχει τὸ ἀμέριστον, δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀμέριστον καὶ μεριστὸν εἶναι, οἷον κραθὲν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸ ἐλθούσης ἄνωθεν δυνάμεως.

20. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῆς ψυχῆς λεγόμενα μέρη, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ποῦ, ἢ ὅλως οὐδέν, ἐπιστῆσαι προσήκει. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἀφοριοῦμεν

[1] With Theiler I take the subject of παραλαμβάνει here to be " Plato ", not, as most editors (including Henry-Schwyzer), " the body ". Plotinus in this chapter is trying to give a coherent and philosophically satisfactory exposition of Plato's account of human psychology in the *Timaeus*, based on the often quoted text 35A1–3, to which he refers at the beginning

says that it is not divided at all in the other senses, but only in that of touch, we must reply that it must divide itself in the others too in this way, since it is body which participates in it, but less than in the sense of touch. And the plant principle in it, too, and the principle of growth are divided in the same way; and if desire is in the region of the liver and the spirited part in the region of the heart, the same argument will apply to them. But perhaps Plato does not admit that these sensations occur in the mixture of which we have been speaking: perhaps he considers that they arise in another way and as a result of some one of the things which have been already received.[1] But what about reasoning and intellect? These no longer give themselves to the body; for their work is not done through the instrument of the body: for this gets in the way if one uses it in rational investigations. So then the " indivisible " and the " divisible " are two different things, and not like one mingled thing but like a whole of parts, each of which is pure and separate in its power. If, however, that which is " divisible in the sphere of bodies " holds the " indivisible " from a higher power, this same thing can be both indivisible and divisible, as if it was mixed from itself and the power which comes into it from above.

20. It is proper that we should pay attention to the question whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are in place, or whether these are

of the chapter. At this point he seems somewhat uneasy about Plato's firm attribution of different parts of the soul to different parts of the body in 70–71. In the next sentence he turns, perhaps with relief, to the clear-cut dualism of *Phaedo* 65.

ἑκάστοις τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τόπον τινὰ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν θέντες, οὐ μᾶλλον εἴσω τοῦ σώματος ἢ ἔξω ποιοῦντες, ἄψυχον αὐτὸ ποιήσομεν, τά τε δι' ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἔργα ὅπῃ γίγνεσθαι προσήκει εἰπεῖν ἀπορήσομεν, εἴτε τοῖς μέν, τοῖς δ' οὔ, οἷς μὴ δίδομεν, οὐκ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ποιεῖν δόξομεν, ὥστε μὴ πᾶσαν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι. ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν οὐδὲ πᾶσαν φατέον ὡς ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι τῷ σώματι· περιεκτικὸν μὲν γὰρ ὁ τόπος καὶ περιεκτικὸν σώματος, καὶ οὗ ἕκαστον μερισθέν ἐστιν, ἔστιν ἐκεῖ, ὡς μὴ ὅλον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ σῶμα, καὶ οὐ περιεχόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ περιέχον. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ· ἄψυχον γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε ὡς ἀγγεῖον, εἴτε ὡς τόπος περιέχει· εἰ μὴ ἄρα διαδόσει τινὶ αὐτῆς οὔσης πρὸς αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένης, καὶ ἔσται, ὅσον μετέλαβε τὸ ἀγγεῖον, τοῦτο ἀπολωλὸς αὐτῇ. ὁ δὲ τόπος ὁ κυρίως ἀσώματος καὶ οὐ σῶμα· ὥστε τί ἂν δέοιτο ψυχῆς; καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῷ πέρατι αὑτοῦ πλησιάσει τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐχ αὑτῷ. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντιοῖτο πρὸς τὸ ὡς

[1] The sense seems much better if, with Theiler, we omit the comma between *ψυχῆς* and *τόπον* printed by Henry-Schwyzer.

[2] The denial that soul is in body as a place or a receptacle is normal Aristotelian doctrine: cp. the long critical discussion of ways in which the soul may be said to be "in" the body by Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* 13–15 Bruns, of which Plotinus makes use here and in the next chapter. Plotinus

not in any way in place but the others are, and where they are, or whether no part of the soul is in any way in place. For either, if we do not allot a place to each of the parts of the soul and put none of them anywhere,[1] not making them any more inside the body than outside, we shall make the body soulless, and shall find it difficult to see how the works of the soul which are done through bodily instruments ought to come about; or, if we give a place to some of them, but not to others, then it will appear that we are not making those to which we do not give a place work within us, so that the whole of our soul is not in us. Now we must say in general that neither any of the parts of the soul nor the whole soul are in body as in a place. For place is something encompassing, and encompassing body, and where each divided part is, there it is [and nowhere else] so that the whole is not [as a whole] in any place; but soul is not a body, and is no more encompassed than encompassing. It is certainly not in the body as in a receptacle either.[2] For the body would be soulless, whether it encompassed the soul as a receptacle or as a place, unless perhaps [it was ensouled] by a sort of transmission from the soul which remained collected together in itself, and then the amount of which the receptacle partakes will be lost to soul. But place in the strict and proper sense is bodiless and not a body: so what need would it have of soul? And body would come near to soul with its edge, not with itself. And many other objections could be made to [soul's being in body] as in place.

thinks that, if one is to use spatial metaphors at all, it is better to say that body is in soul than that soul is in body: cp. e.g. lines 14–15 here and ch. 22. 8–9.

ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ συμφέροιτο ἂν ἀεὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ αὐτό τι ἔσται τὸν τόπον αὐτὸν περιφέρον. ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰ ὁ τόπος διάστημα εἴη, πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τῷ σώματι. τὸ γὰρ διάστημα κενὸν εἶναι δεῖ· τὸ δὲ σῶμα οὐ κενόν, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐν ᾧ τὸ σῶμα ἔσται, ὥστε ἐν τῷ κενῷ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται τῷ σώματι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ πάθος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, ὡς χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ χωριστὸν ἡ ψυχή. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ· οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος τῷ ζῴῳ, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἂν μένοι ἀπορία, πῶς ἐν ὅλῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ τοῦ οἴνου ὁ οἶνος, ἢ ὡς ὁ ἀμφορεύς, οὐδ' ᾗ καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσται. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι· γελοῖον γὰρ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ὅλον λέγειν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα μέρη. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ· ἀχώριστον γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος, καὶ ἤδη ὕλης οὔσης ὕστερον τὸ εἶδος. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἄλλη τοῦ εἴδους οὖσα. εἰ δὲ οὐ τὸ γενόμενον εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ χωριζόμενον φήσουσι, πῶς τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ σώματι, οὔπω φανερὸν [καὶ χωριστὸν ἡ ψυχή].[1] πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται πρὸς πάντων; ἢ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα. σῶμα οὖν ὁρῶντες, ἔμψυχον δὲ συνιέντες, ὅτι κινεῖται καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχειν φαμὲν ψυχὴν αὐτό. ἐν αὐτῷ ἄρα τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀκολούθως ἂν λέγοιμεν. εἰ δέ γε ὁρατὸν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αἰσθητὸν ἦν

[1] del. Volkmann* ut iteratum e lin. 29–30.

For place would always be carried along with it, and body itself would be something carrying space itself about. But even if place is taken to mean interval, soul would still less be in body as in place. For an interval must be void; but body is not void; though that in which body is may be, so that body is in the void. But soul will certainly not be in body as in a substrate, either: for that which is in a substrate is an affection of that in which it is, colour and shape for instance, and soul is something separable. It is certainly not, either, like a part in the whole: for soul is not a part of body. If someone were to suggest that it was like a part in a whole living creature, first of all the same difficulty would remain about how it is in the whole: for it is not, presumably, as the wine is in the jar of wine, or the gallon in the gallon jar, or in the way in which some one thing is in itself. But it is not, either, in body as a whole is in its parts: for it would be absurd to say that the soul is a whole and the body its parts. But it is not, either, present like the form in matter: for the form in matter is inseparable, and it comes afterwards to the matter which is already there. But soul makes the form in matter and is other than the form [which it makes]. But if they assert that it is not the form which comes to be in the matter, but the separate form, it is not yet clear how this is the form in the body. How then is it that the soul is said by everyone to be in the body? It is because the soul is not visible, but the body is, so we see the body and are aware that it is ensouled because it moves and perceives, and so say that it has soul. It would then be a natural consequence for us to say that the soul is actually in the body. But if the soul was visible

περιειλημμένον πάντη τῇ ζωῇ καὶ μέχρις ἐσχάτων οὖσα εἰς ἴσον, οὐκ ἂν ἔφαμεν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ κυριωτέρῳ τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἐν τῷ συνέχοντι τὸ συνεχόμενον, καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ ῥέοντι τὸ ῥέον.

21. Τί οὖν; πῶς πάρεστιν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη μηδὲν αὐτὸς λέγων ὅπως, τί ἐροῦμεν; καὶ εἰ ὁμοίως πᾶσα, ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ἄλλως, τὸ δ' ἄλλως; ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τῶν νῦν λεγομένων τρόπων τοῦ ἔν τινι οὐδεὶς φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἁρμόττων, λέγεται δὲ οὕτως ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι ἡ ψυχή, ὡς ὁ κυβερνήτης ἐν τῇ νηί, πρὸς μὲν τὸ χωριστὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καλῶς εἴρηται, τὸν μέντοι τρόπον, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ παραστήσειεν. ὡς μὲν γὰρ πλωτὴρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ὡς δὲ κυβερνήτης πῶς; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ νηί, ὥσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ἀλλὰ ἆρα οὕτω φατέον, ὡς ἡ τέχνη ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις, οἷον ἐν τῷ οἴακι, [οἷον] [1] εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ οἴαξ ἦν, ὥστε κυβερνητικὴν εἶναι ἔνδον τὴν κινοῦσαν τεχνικῶς; νῦν δὲ τοῦτο διαλλάττειν, ὅτι ἔξωθεν ἡ τέχνη. εἰ οὖν κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ τοῦ κυβερνήτου τοῦ ἐνδύντος πρὸς τὸν οἴακα θείμεθα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι ὡς ἐν ὀργάνῳ φυσικῷ—κινεῖ γὰρ οὕτως αὐτὸ ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ ποιεῖν—ἆρ' ἄν τι πλέον ἡμῖν πρὸς

[1] del. Volkmann*.

and perceptible, in every way surrounded by life and extending equally to all the extremities [of the body], we should not have said that the soul was in the body, but that the unimportant was in the more important, and what is held together in what holds it together, and that which flows away in that which does not.

21. Well then, how is it present? If someone asks the question and does not give any answer himself, what are we going to say? And is it all present in the same sort of way, or one part in one way and another in another? For indeed, none of the ways of a thing's being in anything which are currently spoken of fits the relationship of the soul to the body, but it is also said that the soul is in the body as the steersman is in the ship; this is a good comparison as far as the soul's ability to be separate from the body goes, but would not supply very satisfactorily the manner of its presence, which is what we ourselves are investigating. For the steersman as a voyager would be present incidentally in the ship, but how would he be present as steersman? Nor is he in the whole of the ship, as the soul is in the body. Are we then to say that it is present as the skill is in the tools, in the rudder for instance, so that if the rudder was ensouled the steersman's skill which moves it according to the rules of his art would be within it? But the difference is this, that the skill comes from outside. If then, according to the model of the steersman who has got into the rudder, we stated that the soul was in the body as in a natural tool—for this is how the soul moves the body in whatever it wants to do—should we gain any advantage from the next point of view of our investiga-

τὸ ζητούμενον γένοιτο; ἢ πάλιν ἀπορήσομεν πῶς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ὀργάνῳ, καίτοι τρόπος οὗτος ἕτερος τῶν πρόσθεν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔτι ποθοῦμεν ἐξευρεῖν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω προσελθεῖν.

22. Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω φατέον, ὅταν ψυχὴ σώματι παρῇ, παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ὡς τὸ πῦρ πάρεστι τῷ ἀέρι; καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι' ὅλου παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται καὶ ἕστηκε μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ παραρρεῖ· καὶ ὅταν ἔξω γένηται τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τὸ φῶς, ἀπῆλθεν οὐδὲν ἔχων, ἕως δέ ἐστιν ὑπὸ τὸ φῶς, πεφώτισται, ὥστ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ ἐν τῷ φωτί, ἥπερ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων καλῶς τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεὶς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καί[1] φησι τὸ μέν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ᾧ τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾧ σῶμα μηδέν, ὧν δηλονότι δυνάμεων οὐ δεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. τῶν μὲν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδὲ παρουσίαν τῷ σώματι λεκτέον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὧν δὲ δεῖται, ταῦτα παρεῖναι, καὶ παρεῖναι οὐκ ἐνιδρυθέντα τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ πρὸς μὲν αἴσθησιν παρεῖναι παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρὸς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἤδη ἄλλο ἄλλῳ.

23. Λέγω δὲ ὧδε· τοῦ σώματος πεφωτισμένου

[1] καί (*etiam*) Enn.: del. Vitringa, H–S².

tion? We shall again be in a difficulty about how it is in the tool, though this is a way of being in the body different from those mentioned before; all the same we are still anxious to discover it completely and approach nearer to the goal of our investigation.

22. Are we to say then that when soul is present to body it is present as fire is present to air? For this too like soul is present without being present, and is present throughout the whole and mixed with none of it, and stays still itself while the air flows past; and when the air goes outside the space where the light is, it departs without retaining anything of it, but while it is under the light it is illuminated, so that one can rightly say here too that the air is in the light rather than the light in the air. That is why Plato[1] rightly does not put the soul in the body when he is speaking of the universe, but the body in the soul, and says also that there is a part of the soul in which body is and part in which there is no body, clearly the powers of the soul of which the body has no need. And the same principle clearly applies to the other souls. We must not say that there is even a presence of the other powers of soul to the body, but that the powers which it needs are present, and present without being situated in its parts, or in the whole either, and the sense-faculty is present to the whole of the perceiving body for the purposes of sense-perception, but one part at one time to one and one to another according to the [particular] sense-activity [which is going on].

23. What I mean is this: when the ensouled body is illuminated by soul, one part of it participates in

[1] The reference is to *Timaeus* 36D9–E3: cp. ch. 20, n. 2.

τοῦ ἐμψύχου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο ἄλλως μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ μέρος· καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα, δύναμιν τὴν προσήκουσαν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδιδοῦσαν, οὕτω τοι λέγεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς δύναμιν τὴν ὁρατικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐν ὠσὶ τὴν ἀκουστικήν, καὶ γευστικὴν ἐν γλώσσῃ, ὄσφρησιν ἐν ῥισί, τὴν δὲ ἁπτικὴν ἐν παντὶ παρεῖναι· πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι.[1] τῶν δὲ ἁπτικῶν ὀργάνων ἐν πρώτοις τοῖς νεύροις ὄντων, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ζῴου τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐνταῦθα τῆς τοιαύτης δούσης ἑαυτήν, ἀρχομένων δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγκεφάλου τῶν νεύρων, τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὁρμῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ ὅλως παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου ἐνταῦθα ἔθεσαν φέροντες, οὗ δηλονότι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ παρεῖναι τὸ χρησόμενον τιθέμενοι—βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς δυνάμεως ἐκεῖ—ὅθεν γὰρ ἔμελλε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὄργανον, ἐκεῖ ἔδει οἷον ἐναπερείδεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐκείνην τὴν τῷ ὀργάνῳ πρόσφορον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν δύναμιν—πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις—ἐκεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἀρχή, οὗ ἡ

[1] Beutler: παρεῖναι Enn.*

[1] The great doctor Herophilus of Chalcedon (first half of the 3rd century B.C.) and his younger contemporary Erasistratus of Ceos had discovered a great deal about the functions of the nervous system and the importance of the brain as its

one way and one in another; and according to the adaptation of [each] sense-organ to its task, as soul gives [each] the appropriate power for its task, so the power in the eyes is called that of sight, the power in the ears that of hearing, and the power of taste is said to be present in the tongue, that of smell in the nostrils, and that of touch in the whole body: for the whole body is sense-organ to the soul for this perception. Since the organs of touch are in the first nerves, which also have the power to set the living being in motion because the appropriate soul-power communicates itself at this point, and since these nerves begin in the brain,[1] they established the principle of perception and of impulse and in general of the whole living being in the brain, assuming that obviously that which was going to use the organs would be there where their beginnings were—but it would be better to say that the beginning of the actualisation of the potency [of perception] is there. For it was necessary that at the point from which the organ [or tool] was going to be moved that the power of the workman, as we may call it, which was appropriate to the tool should be fixed: or rather not the power—the power is everywhere—but the beginning of its actualisation at the point where the

centre and seat of the intelligence. Their discoveries had been used and developed by the great Galen (2nd century A.D.) and were well known in the time of Plotinus. Platonists welcomed these discoveries as confirmation of the view of Plato that intelligence was located in the head (*Timaeus* 44D–E: the reasons given are hardly scientific!) as against that of Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans, who located intelligence in the heart—a view still defended by Alexander *De Anima* 94, 7 ff. and 98. 24 ff. Bruns: cp. H. J. Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971) 75.

ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρμᾶν ψυχῆς οὖσα [1] αἰσθητικῆς καὶ φανταστικῆς [φύσις] [2] ἐπάνω ἑαυτῆς εἶχε τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἂν ⟨φύσις⟩ [2] γειτονοῦσα πρὸς τὸ κάτω οὗ αὐτὴ ἐπάνω, ταύτῃ ἐτέθη τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὡς οὖσα οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, ὃ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐκείνως ἵδρυτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔδει σώματι διδόναι, καὶ τῷ σώματος μάλιστα τῆς ἐνεργείας δεκτικῷ, τὸ δὲ σώματι οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνοῦν πάντως ἐκείνῳ κοινωνεῖν ἔδει, ὃ ψυχῆς εἶδος ἦν καὶ ψυχῆς δυναμένης τὰς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀντιλήψεις ποιεῖσθαι. αἰσθητικὸν γὰρ κριτικόν πως, καὶ φανταστικὸν οἷον νοερόν, καὶ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις, φαντασίᾳ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμενα. ἐκεῖ οὖν τὸ λογιζόμενον οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἐκεῖ ἀπολαύει αὐτοῦ. πῶς δὲ τὸ "ἐκεῖ" ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ φυτικοῦ αὖ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ μηδενὸς ἀπολειπομένου, τρέφοντος δὲ τῷ αἵματι, τοῦ δὲ αἵματος τοῦ τρέφοντος ἐν φλεψὶν ὄντος, ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ φλεβῶν καὶ αἵματος ἐν ἥπατι, οἷον [3] ἐναπερειδομένης ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ μοῖρα τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκεῖν ἀπεδόθη. ὃ γάρ τοι καὶ γεννᾷ καὶ τρέφει καὶ αὔξει, τοῦτο καὶ τούτων

[1] Theiler: οὔσης Enn.
[2] transpos. Igal.
[3] Harder, H–S, cf. lin. 17: ὅθεν Enn.*

organ begins. Since, then, the power of sensation which is also that of impulsion, belonging to the soul which perceives and imagines, has reason above it, as it were a nature in close contact on its underside with that which this is above, the ancients thus put reason at the highest point of the whole living creature at the head, supposing it to be not in the brain but in this perceptive faculty which in the way described above was situated in the brain. For one part of the soul had to give itself to body, and to the part of body most receptive of its activity, but the other part, which had no communication with body, was under the absolute necessity of communicating with the first part, which was a form of soul, and of soul capable of apprehending what came from reason. For the perceptive part of the soul is in some way capable of judgement, and the imaging part has a sort of intelligence, and impulse and desire are there following the lead of the imaging faculty, and reason. The reasoning part therefore is there in the perceptive not as in a place but because that which is there draws upon it. We have already explained the sense in which we say that the perceptive part is " there ". The part of the soul too which we have in common with plants, which is responsible for growth and nutrition, is not absent from any part of the body, and since it nourishes by means of the blood, and the nourishing blood is in the veins, and the starting point of veins and blood is in the liver, it is as if this [nutritive] power was fixed there, and so the appetitive part of the soul was assigned this place to dwell in. For that which generates and nourishes and produces growth must necessarily also have an appetite for generation, nourishment and

ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀνάγκη. τοῦ δὲ λεπτοῦ καὶ κούφου καὶ ὀξέος καὶ καθαροῦ αἵματος, θυμῷ προσφόρου ⟨ὄντας⟩ [1] ὀργάνου, ἡ τούτου πηγή, ⟨ἡ καρδία⟩ [2]— ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον αἷμα ἀποκρίνεται—τῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ζέσει [καρδία] [3] πεποίηται οἴκησις πρέπουσα. [ἔχουσαι δὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσιν.] [4]

24. Ἀλλὰ ποῦ ἐξελθοῦσα τοῦ σώματος γενήσεται; ἢ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἔσται, οὗ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ δεχόμενον ὁπωσοῦν, οὐδὲ δύναται παραμένειν τῷ μὴ πεφυκότι αὐτὴν δέχεσθαι, εἰ μή τι ἔχοι αὐτοῦ ὃ ἕλκει πρὸς αὐτὸ ἄφρονα οὖσαν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, εἰ ἄλλο ἔχει, κἀκεῖ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὗ πέφυκε τοῦτο εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι. ὄντος δὲ πολλοῦ καὶ ἑκάστου τόπου, καὶ παρὰ τῆς διαθέσεως ἥκειν δεῖ τὸ διάφορον, ἥκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσι δίκης. οὐ γὰρ μή ποτέ τις ἐκφύγοι, ὃ παθεῖν ἐπ' ἀδίκοις ἔργοις προσήκει· ἀναπόδραστος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ κριθὲν ἤδη. φέρεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πάσχων ἀγνοῶν ἐφ' ἃ παθεῖν προσήκει, ἀστάτῳ μὲν τῇ φορᾷ πανταχοῦ αἰωρούμενος ταῖς πλάναις, τελευτῶν δὲ ὥσπερ πολλὰ καμὼν οἷς ἀντέτεινεν εἰς τὸν προσήκοντα αὐτῷ τόπον ἐνέπεσεν, ἑκουσίῳ τῇ φορᾷ τὸ ἀκούσιον εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ἔχων. εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τῷ

[1] Kirchhoff*.
[2] Kleist.
[3] Kirchhoff*.
[4] del. Ficinus, Creuzer*, iterata ex 24, 20–21.

growth. But since the thin, light, quick, pure blood is the proper organ for the spirited part of the soul, the spring of this, the heart—for this is where blood of this kind is separated out—is made to be the appropriate dwelling place for the seething of the spirited part.[1]

24. But where will the soul be when it has left the body? It will not be here below, where there is nothing capable in any way of receiving it, and it cannot stay with that which is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless, because it is unreasonable, it still has something of body which draws it to it. If it has another body, it is in that, and accompanies it to the place naturally appropriate to its existence and development. But since there are many places for each as well [as many bodies], the difference between them must come from the disposition of the soul, and must come also from the justice in the nature of things. For no one can ever evade what he ought to suffer for his unrighteous doings: for the divine law is inescapable and has in itself together with the judgment already pronounced its execution. He too who is to suffer punishment is carried unknowing to what he has to suffer; on his unsteady course he is tossed about everywhere in his wanderings, and in the end, as if utterly weary, by his very efforts at resistance he falls into the place which suits him, having that which he did not will for his punish-

[1] I print and translate here the text and punctuation adopted by Beutler-Theiler: the minor alterations by Kirchhoff and Kleist which they accept, the insertion of ὄντος and the transposition of καρδία with their punctuation, seem to me to give a much better sense than the MSS text retained by Henry-Schwyzer.

νόμῳ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δεῖ παθεῖν, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ὁμοῦ συνέδραμεν ἡ ἄνεσις τῆς κολάσεως καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ἀναφυγεῖν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν τόπων, ἁρμονίας δυνάμει κατεχούσης τὰ πάντα. ἔχουσαι δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν σωματικῶν κολάσεων ἔχουσι· ταῖς δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαραῖς οὔσαις καὶ μηδὲν μηδαμῇ ἐφελκομέναις τοῦ σώματος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ⟨καὶ⟩[1] οὐδαμοῦ σώματος ὑπάρξει εἶναι. εἰ οὖν εἰσι [καὶ][1] μηδαμοῦ σώματος —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσι σῶμα—οὗ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ θεῖον—ἐν τῷ θεῷ—ἐνταῦθα καὶ μετὰ τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ ἔσται. εἰ δ' ἔτι ζητεῖς ποῦ, ζητητέον σοι ποῦ ἐκεῖνα· ζητῶν δὲ ζήτει μὴ τοῖς ὄμμασι μηδ' ὡς ζητῶν σώματα.

25. Περὶ δὲ μνήμης, εἰ αὐταῖς ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶνδε τῶν τόπων ἐξελθούσαις μνημονεύειν ὑπάρχει, ἢ ταῖς μέν, ταῖς δ' οὔ, καὶ πάντων ἤ τινων, καὶ εἰ μνημονεύουσιν ἀεί, ἢ ἐπί τινα χρόνον τὸν ἐγγὺς τῆς ἀφόδου, ζητεῖν ὁμοίως ἄξιον. ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς περὶ τούτων τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖσθαι, ληπτέον τί ποτε τὸ μνημονεῦόν ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οὐ τί μνήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τίνι συνίστασθαι πέφυκε τῶν ὄντων. τί μὲν γάρ ἐστι μνήμη,

[1] transpos. Beutler.

[1] It is not clear to what discussion of memory Plotinus is here referring. His short treatise *On Sense-Perception and Memory* (IV. 6) is, according to Porphyry, later than the present one (No. 41 in the chronological order). In the treatise III. 6 (26), written immediately before IV. 3–4, there is a brief treatment of memory which again seems to presuppose a previous discussion. In both these cases the references may be to oral discussions; at any rate, no trace of any writing of

ment as a result of the course which he willed. But it is stated in the law how much and how long he must suffer, and again there come together the release from punishment and the ability to escape up from these regions by the power of the harmony which holds the universe together. But if the souls have bodies they have the capacity to be aware of bodily punishments: but those souls which are pure and do not in any way draw anything of body to them will necessarily also have no place anywhere in body. If then they are nowhere in body—for they have no body—a soul of this kind will be where substance and reality and the divine are—that is in god—there it will be with them and in him. But if you are still looking for the place where the soul is, you must look for the place where they are; but in looking you must not look for it with your eyes or in the way you look for bodies.

25. It is likewise worth investigating the question of memory, whether the souls themselves which have left these regions have the power of remembering or whether some of them have and others have not, and whether they remember everything or only some things, and if they always remember, or only for the time close after their departure. But if we are going to carry out our investigation of these questions correctly, we must understand what it is that remembers, I do not mean what memory is, but in what kind of realities it naturally exists. For what memory is, we have discussed elsewhere and there has been plenty of talk about it,[1] but we must

Plotinus on memory other than the long ch. 3 of IV. 6 and the careful discussion of the subject and content of memory which follows immediately here has survived.

εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ πολλάκις τεθρύλληται, τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν πεφυκὸς ὅ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἀκριβέστερον ληπτέον. εἰ δέ ἐστι τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἐπικτήτου τινὸς ἢ μαθήματος ἢ παθήματος, οὔτε τοῖς ἀπαθέσι τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τοῖς ἐν ἀχρόνῳ[1] ἐγγίνοιτο ἂν τὸ μνημονεύειν. μνήμην δὴ περὶ θεὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ νοῦν θετέον· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ χρόνος, ἀλλ' αἰὼν περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ οὔτε τὸ πρότερον οὔτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀεὶ ὡς ἔχει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐ δεχόμενον παράλλαξιν. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁμοίῳ πῶς ἂν ἐν μνήμῃ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδ' ἴσχον ἄλλην κατάστασιν μεθ' ἣν εἶχε πρότερον, ἢ νόησιν ἄλλην μετ' ἄλλην, ἵνα ἐν ἄλλῃ μὲν ᾖ,[2] ἄλλης δὲ μνημονεύῃ ἣν εἶχε πρότερον; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει τὰς ἄλλων μεταβολὰς εἰδέναι οὐ μεταβάλλοντα αὐτόν, οἷον κόσμου τὰς περιόδους; ἢ ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ ὕστερον νοήσει ἐπακολουθοῦν ταῖς τοῦ τρεπομένου μεταβολαῖς, τό τε μνημονεύειν παρὰ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλο. τὰς δὲ αὐτοῦ νοήσεις οὐ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον, ἵνα κατέχῃ μὴ ἀπέλθοιεν· ἢ οὕτω γε τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ φοβοῖτο μὴ ἀπέλθοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ψυχὴν φατέον μνημονεύειν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον λέγομεν τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ὧν ἔχει

[1] Igal: ἐν χρόνῳ Enn.: ⟨μὴ⟩ ἐν χρόνῳ Kirchhoff, H–S[1-2].
[2] H–S[2]: μὲν ᾖ A[ac]E, Kirchhoff*: μένῃ A[pc]xUC, Perna, Creuzer, H–S[1].

understand more exactly what it is that has the natural capacity of remembering. If memory is something acquired, either learnt or experienced, then memory will not be present in those realities which are unaffected by experience or those which are in the timeless. We must certainly not attribute memory to God, or real being or Intellect; for nothing [external] comes to them and there is no time, but eternity in which real being is, and there is neither before nor after, but it is always as it is, in the same state not admitting of any change.[1] But how can that which stays in an identical and exactly similar state be in a condition of memory, when it neither has nor holds another way of being different from that which it had before, or one thought after another, so that it might stay in one and remember the other which it had before? But what prevents it from knowing the changes of other things without changing itself, the revolutions of the universe for instance? The reason is that it will think of one thing as before and another as after, following the changes of that which turns, and remembering is something different from thinking. One must not say that it remembers its own thoughts: for they did not come, so that it has to hold them fast to prevent them from going away; or in this way it would be afraid that its own essential nature might go away from it. In the same way, then, the soul must not be said to remember, either, in the sense in which we are speaking of remembering, the things

[1] The question whether divine beings (including higher souls and the World-Soul) have memory is fully treated and answered, as here, in the negative, in the latter part of the discussion which begins here (IV. 4. 16–17).

συμφύτων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθά ἐστιν, ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αὐτά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα ἡκούσῃ. τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη—ταῖς ἐνεργούσαις ἃ εἶχον μνήμην καὶ ἀνάμνησιν προστιθέναι ἐοίκασιν οἱ παλαιοί. ὥσθ' ἕτερον εἶδος μνήμης τοῦτο· διὸ καὶ χρόνος οὐ πρόσεστι τῇ οὕτω λεγομένῃ μνήμῃ. ἀλλ' ἴσως εὐχερῶς περὶ τούτων ἔχομεν καὶ οὐκ ἐξεταστικῶς. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε, μήποτε οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἐκείνης ἡ λεγομένη τοιαύτη ἀνάμνησις καὶ μνήμη, ἀλλὰ ἄλλης ἀμυδροτέρας, ἢ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τοῦ ζῴου. εἶτε γὰρ ἄλλης, πότε ἢ πῶς λαμβανούσης; εἴτε τοῦ ζῴου, πότε ἢ πῶς; διὸ ζητητέον τί ἐστι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ τὴν μνήμην ἴσχον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐζητοῦμεν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μνημονεύουσα, τίς δύναμις ἢ τί μέρος, εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔδοξέ τισι, τίς ὁ τρόπος, καὶ τί ποτε δεῖ φάναι τὸ ζῷον, καὶ ἔτι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τῶν νοημάτων, ἢ ἄλλο τοῦ ἑτέρου.

26. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῷον τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι—διὸ καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται

[1] The comparison of activities in which body and soul are both involved to craft activities like weaving is taken from Aristotle *De Anima* A 4, 408b13. But Plotinus has characteristically substituted the particular carpenter's operation τρυπᾶν "boring holes" for Aristotle's vaguer and more general οἰκοδομεῖν "building", to make the picture more vivid. κοινόν here means common to body and φύσις (nature or

which it possesses as part of its nature, but when it is here below it possesses them and does not act by them, particularly when it has just arrived here. But as for its activity, the ancients seem to apply the terms "memory" and "recollection" to the souls which bring into act what they possessed. So this is another kind of memory; and therefore time is not involved in memory understood in this sense. But perhaps we are being too easy-going about this, and not really examining it critically. For someone might perhaps raise the difficulty that perhaps what is called memory and recollection of this kind does not belong to that [higher] soul, but to another dimmer one, or to the composite, the living creature. Now if it belongs to another soul, when or how did it get it? And if it belongs to the living creature, when or how? So we must enquire what it is of the things within us which possesses memory, which is just what we were enquiring from the beginning. And if it is the soul which remembers, which power or what part of it; but if it is the living creature—just as the power of sense-perception has been thought by some to belong to this—how it works, and what one is to say that the living creature is, and, further, whether one must ascribe the apprehension of sense-perceptions and thoughts to the same thing, or a different one for each.

26. If then the composite living thing is involved in actual sense-perceptions, perception must be something like boring holes and weaving—that is why it is called "common" [1]—in order that the soul

lower soul), which is the other element in the "composite living thing". See Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* 61. There is no reference to anything like Aristotle's κοινὴ αἴσθησις.

—οἷον τὸ τρυπᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν τεχνίτην ἡ ψυχὴ ᾖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν σώματος πάσχοντος καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν τύπωσιν τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ σώματος· οὗ δὴ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὕτω κοινὸν ἔργον λέγοιτο ἄν, ἡ δὲ μνήμη οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο τοῦ κοινοῦ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη παραδεξαμένης τὸν τύπον καὶ ἢ φυλαξάσης ἢ ἀποβαλούσης αὐτήν· εἰ μή τις τεκμαίροιτο κοινὸν καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ μνημονικοὺς καὶ ἐπιλήσμονας ἡμᾶς γίγνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κωλυτικὸν ἂν ἢ οὐ κωλυτικὸν λέγοιτο τὸ σῶμα γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν οὐχ ἧττον εἴη. τῶν δὲ δὴ μαθήσεων πῶς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ μνημονεύουσα ἔσται; εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῷον τὸ συναμφότερον οὕτως, ὡς ἕτερον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον μήτε σῶμα μήτε ψυχὴν τὸ ζῷον λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ μεταβαλόντων ἀμφοτέρων ἕτερόν τι ἔσται τὸ ζῷον οὐδ' αὖ κραθέντων, ὡς δυνάμει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ζώῳ εἶναι· ἔπειτα[1] καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἧττον τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν οἰνομέλιτος κράσει εἴ τι γλυκάζει, παρὰ τοῦ μέλιτος τοῦτο ἔσται. τί οὖν, εἰ αὐτὴ μὲν μνημονεύοι, τῷ δὲ ⟨τῷ⟩[2] ἐν σώματι εἶναι [τῷ][2] μὴ καθαρὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ποιωθεῖσα, ἀναμάττεσθαι δύναται τοὺς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τύπους

[1] Beutler: ἐπεὶ Enn.*
[2] transpos. Theiler.

may be in the position of the workman in perceiving and the body in that of the tool; the body experiences and serves, and the soul receives the impression made on the body, or the impression which comes through the body, or the judgment which it made as a result of the experience of the body: sense-perception would certainly have in this case to be called a common work, but memory would not have to belong to what was common, as the soul would have already received the impression and either kept it or thrown it away; unless one was going to conclude that remembering is a common activity from the fact that the mixture of bodily elements makes us have good or bad memories. But even so the body might be said to be obstructive or not obstructive, but remembering would none the less belong to the soul. And how can it be what is common, and not the soul, which is the principle which remembers what we study? But if the composite living thing is something of such a sort as to be different from both its components, first of all it is absurd to say that the living thing is neither body nor soul: for the living thing will not be something different as the result of both of them having changed, nor again as the result of their having been mixed, so that the soul is in the living thing potentially. And then even so remembering would belong just as much to the soul, as in a mixture of wine and honey any sweetness there is will be due to the honey. But suppose it itself remembers, but because it is not pure as a result of being in the body, but has a kind of special quality, it is able to receive the impressions made by the

καὶ τῷ οἷον ἔδραν ἐν τῷ σώματι πρὸς τὸ παραδέχεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ παραρρεῖν; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τύποι οὐ μεγέθη, οὐδ' ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνσφραγίσεις οὐδ' ἀντερείσεις ἢ τυπώσεις, ὅτι μηδ' ὠθισμός, μηδ' ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος οἷον νόησις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοήσεων τίς ἡ ἀντέρεισις λέγοιτο ἄν; ἢ τί δεῖ σώματος ἢ ποιότητος σωματικῆς μεθ' ἧς; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν αὐτῆς κινημάτων ἀνάγκη μνήμην αὐτῇ γίγνεσθαι, οἷον ὧν ἐπεθύμησε καὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀπέλαυσεν οὐδὲ ἦλθεν εἰς σῶμα τὸ ἐπιθυμητόν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τὸ σῶμα περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς αὐτό; ἢ πῶς μετὰ σώματος μνημονεύσει, ὃ μὴ πέφυκε γινώσκειν ὅλως τὸ σῶμα; ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν λεκτέον εἰς ψυχὴν λήγειν, ὅσα διὰ σώματος, τὰ δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι μόνης, εἰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναί τι καὶ φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ἔργον τι αὐτῆς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔφεσιν καὶ μνήμην τῆς ἐφέσεως ἄρα καὶ τῆς τεύξεως καὶ τῆς οὐ τεύξεως, ἐπείπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς οὐ τῶν ῥεόντων. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ συναίσθησιν οὐδὲ παρακολούθησιν δώσομεν οὐδέ τινα σύνθεσιν καὶ οἷον σύνεσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲν ἔχουσα τοῦτων ἐν τῇ φύσει αὐτῆς ταῦτα κομίζεται ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείας μέν τινας ἴσχει ὧν ἔργων δεῖται ἡ ἐπιτέλεσις ὀργάνων, τῶν δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ἥκει

[1] An example of Plotinus's continually repeated attack on the corporealist Stoic theory of sense-perception: cp. *SVF* I 484 and II 343 for the theory; Plotinus's fullest statement of the Platonic case against Stoic psychology is IV. 7. 1–8[3] (ch. 6 deals with sense-impressions).

sense-objects[1] and is also able to do this because it has a kind of standing-ground in the body for receiving them and does not, so to speak, flow away? But to begin with, the impressions are not magnitudes; nor are they like seal-impressions or counter-pressures or stamps, because there is no pushing and it is not like what happens in wax, but the way of it is like thinking even in the case of sense-objects. But in acts of thought what counter-pressure could there be said to be? Or what need is there of a body or bodily quality as an accompaniment? But surely, too, the soul must have memory of its own movements, of what it desired, for instance, and of what it did not enjoy and the desired object did not enter the body. For how could the body speak of what did not come into it? Or how will it remember with the help of the body something which the body has been in no condition to know at all? But we must say that some things, all that come through the body, reach as far as the soul, and others belong to the soul alone, if the soul must be something, and a distinct nature, and have a work of its own. If this is so, it will have aspiration, and memory of its aspiration, and of attaining or not attaining it, since its nature is not one of those which are in a state of flux. For if this is not so, we shall not grant it self-awareness or consciousness of its own activities or any sort of power of combination and understanding. For it certainly is not the case that it has none of these in its own nature and acquired them in the body, but it has some activities of the works required for the completion of the bodily organs, and brings the potentialities of some of them with it when it comes, and the actualities of others. But as far as

φέρουσα, τῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας. τὸ δὲ τῆς μνήμης καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐμπόδιον ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν προστιθεμένων τινῶν λήθη, ἐν δ' ἀφαιρέσει καὶ καθάρσει ἀνακύπτει πολλάκις ἡ μνήμη. μονῆς δὲ οὔσης αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν κινουμένην καὶ ῥέουσαν λήθης αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ μνήμης εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὁ τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸς οὗτος ἂν ὑπονοοῖτο. ψυχῆς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο.

27. Ἀλλὰ τίνος ψυχῆς, τῆς μὲν λεγομένης ὑφ' ἡμῶν θειοτέρας, καθ' ἣν ἡμεῖς, τῆς δὲ ἄλλης τῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου; ἢ λεκτέον εἶναι μνήμας ἑκατέρας, τὰς μὲν ἰδίας, τὰς δὲ κοινάς· καὶ ὅταν μὲν συνῶσιν, ὁμοῦ πάσας, χωρὶς δὲ γενομένων, εἰ ἄμφω εἶεν καὶ μένοιεν, ἑκατέραν ἐπιπλέον τὰ ἑαυτῆς, ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον τὰ τῆς ἑτέρας. τὸ γοῦν εἴδωλον ἐν Ἅιδου Ἡρακλέους—τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον, οἶμαι, χρὴ νομίζειν ἡμᾶς—μνημονεύειν τῶν πεπραγμένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν βίον, αὐτοῦ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ ὁ βίος ἦν. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τὸ συναμφότερον ⟨γενόμεναι⟩ [οὖσαι][1] οὐδὲν πλέον ὅμως εἶχον λέγειν· ἢ ἄ γε[2] τοῦ βίου τούτου, καὶ αὐταὶ [τὸ συναμφότερον γενόμεναι][3] ταῦτα ᾔδεσαν· ἢ εἴ τι δικαιοσύνης ἐχόμενον. ὁ δὲ Ἡρακλῆς

[1] γενόμεναι e lin. 12 transpos. H–S²: οὖσαι Enn.
[2] H–S²: ἅτε wB^{pc}RJUC: ἀπὸ B^{ac}: τὰ Kirchhoff, Volkmann*, B–T: ἐπὶ Dodds.
[3] del. H–S², ut correctionem ad lin. 10 falso loco insertam: τὸ . . . ᾔδεσαν del. Theiler.

[1] An example of casual philosophical interpretation of a Platonic myth: the "river of Lethe" is taken from the

memory is concerned, it has the body as an actual hindrance: since even as things are, some additions produce forgetfulness, and when they are removed and purged away the memory revives. And since memory is a stable condition, the body's nature, moving and flowing, must be a cause of forgetfulness, not of memory: this is why the "river of Lethe" might be understood in this sense.[1] So, then, let this experience [of memory] belong to the soul.

27. But to which soul, that which we shall call the more divine, by which we are ourselves, or the other which comes from the Whole? Perhaps we must say that there are memories of both kinds, some individual and some common; and when the two souls are together all their memories coincide; but if they become separated, if they were both to exist and persist in separation, each would have its own memories for a longer time and for a short time those of the other. At any rate the shade of Heracles in Hades[2]—this shade too, I think, we must

conclusion of the great myth which ends the *Republic* (621C).

[2] The reference is to *Odyssey* 11. 601ff., where the shade of Heracles in Hades is distinguished from Heracles himself, who is with the gods: cp. I, 1. 12. 31ff. The passage had been recognised since Aristarchus as a later interpolation, but Plotinus was not aware of this (he was not a scholar), or ignored it. His philosophical explanation had earlier forerunners, the ultimate source of which may be in the Old Academy or post-Platonic Pythagoreanism. See Plutarch *De facie in orbe lunae* 944F–945A with the note of H. Cherniss ad loc. (*Moralia*, Loeb edition vol. 12); F. Cumont *Lux Perpetua* (Paris 1949) 189–91: H. J. Blumenthal *op. cit.* 86; and the latest and most thorough examination by J. Pépin, "Héracles et son reflet dans le Néoplatonisme" in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris 1971) 167–99.

αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδώλου τί ἔλεγεν, οὐκ εἴρηται. τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι ἡ ἑτέρα ψυχὴ ἀπαλλαγεῖσα μόνη; ἡ γὰρ ἐφελκομένη ὅ τι κἄν, πάντα, ὅσα ἔπραξεν ἢ ἔπαθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ καὶ ἄλλων μνῆμαι ἂν φανεῖεν ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν βίων, ὥστε τινὰ τούτων καὶ ἀτιμάσασαν ἀφεῖναι. σώματος γὰρ καθαρωτέρα γενομένη καὶ ἃ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν μνήμῃ ἀναπολήσει· εἰ δ' ἐν σώματι γενομένη ἄλλῳ ἐξέλθοι, ἐρεῖ μὲν τὰ τοῦ ἔξω βίου [καὶ ἐρεῖ εἶναι],[1] οἷ'[2] ἄρτι ἀφῆκε [ἐρεῖ δὲ][3] καὶ πολλὰ τῶν πρόσθεν. χρόνοις δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἐπακτῶν ἀεὶ ἔσται ἐν λήθῃ. ἡ δὲ δὴ μόνη γενομένη τί μνημονεύσει; ἢ πρότερον σκεπτέον τίνι δυνάμει ψυχῆς τὸ μνημονεύειν παραγίνεται.

28. Ἆρά γε ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ ᾧ μανθάνομεν; ἢ καὶ ᾧ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν, καὶ τῶν ὀργιστῶν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἀπολαύσει, φήσει τις, ἄλλο δὲ μνημονεύσει τῶν ἐκείνου. τὸ

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] Theiler: ὅ Enn.*
[3] del. H–S².

consider to be our self—remembers all that he did in his life, for the life particularly belonged to the shade. But the other souls which became composite entities [of higher and lower soul], all the same had nothing more to talk about than the things of this life, and they themselves knew them—except perhaps something concerned with righteousness. But Homer does not tell us what Heracles himself said, the Heracles without the shade. What then would the other soul say when it has been freed and is alone? The soul which drags after it anything at all [from the body] would speak of everything which the man had done or experienced. But as time goes on after death, memories of other things would appear from its former lives, so that it would even abandon with contempt some of these memories [of its immediately past life]. For since it has become freer from bodily contamination it will go over again in its memory also what it did not have in this life; but if when it goes out [of this body], it comes to exist in another, it will speak of the events of its outward life, of what it has just left and of many events of its former lives. But in time it will come to forgetfulness of many things which occurred to it from time to time. But when it comes to be alone what will it remember? First we must enquire what power of soul it is which remembering accompanies.

28. Is it that by which we perceive and by which we learn? Or does our remembrance of the things we desired accompany our power of desiring, and of the things which made us angry, our spirited power? For, someone will say, there will not be one thing which enjoys [the desired objects] and

γοῦν ἐπιθυμητικὸν ὢν ἀπέλαυσε τούτοις [1] κινεῖται πάλιν ὀφθέντος τοῦ ἐπιθυμητοῦ δηλονότι τῇ μνήμῃ. ἐπεὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἄλλου, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ αἴσθησιν τῶν τοιούτων διδόναι αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τοίνυν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ πάντα πᾶσιν ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἕκαστον λέγεσθαι; ἢ αἴσθησιν ἄλλως ἑκάστῳ· οἷον εἶδε μὲν ἡ ὅρασις, οὐ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἐκινήθη δὲ παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν οἷον διαδόσει, οὐχ ὥστε εἰπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν οἵα, ἀλλ' ὥστε ἀπαρακολουθήτως παθεῖν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ εἶδε τὸν ἀδικήσαντα, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς ἀνέστη, οἷον εἰ ποιμένος ἰδόντος ἐπὶ ποίμνῃ λύκον ὁ σκύλαξ τῇ ὀδμῇ ἢ τῷ κτύπῳ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἰδὼν ὅμμασιν ὀρίνοιτο. καὶ τοίνυν ἀπέλαυσε μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καὶ ἔχει ἴχνος τοῦ γενομένου ἐντεθὲν οὐχ ὡς μνήμην, ἀλλ' ὡς διάθεσιν καὶ πάθος· ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ παρ' αὑτοῦ ἔχον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ γεγενημένου. τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἡδεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μνήμην πολλάκις ὢν μετέσχε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, καίτοι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἦν ἄν.

29. Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ φέροντες ἀναθήσομεν

[1] suspic. Volkmann, scr. B–T: τοῦτο Enn.*

[1] The idea of "naming by predominance" goes back at least to Anaxagoras (see Aristotle *Physics* A 4, 187b1 ff.) and was used by Antiochus of Ascalon in discussing the question whether an incompletely happy life could be called "happy" (Cicero *Tusculans* V 22). It became important in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism: see P. Hadot, "Être, Vie, Pensée

another which remembers the objects enjoyed by the first. On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what it enjoyed when it sees the desired object again, obviously by means of the memory. For why [otherwise] should it not be moved when something else is seen, or seen in a different way? What then prevents us from giving the desiring power perception of desirable things and, again, the perceptive power desire, and giving everything to everything so that each is named by that which predominates in it [1]? Now perception can be attributed to each power in a different way. Sight, for instance, sees, not the desiring power, but the desiring power is moved by a sort of transmission from the perception, not so that it can say what sort of perception it is, but so that it is unconsciously affected by it. And in the case of anger, sight sees the wrongdoer and the anger arises; it is like when the shepherd sees the wolf by the flock and the sheepdog is excited by the scent or the noise, though he has not himself seen the wolf with his eyes. And the desiring power, certainly, enjoyed and has a trace of what happened implanted in it, not like a memory, but like an [unconscious] disposition and affection; but it is another power which has seen the enjoyment and of its own motion retains the memory of what happened. It is evidence of this that the memory of the desiring power's experiences is often not pleasant, though if it had been in it, it would have been.

29. Shall we then take the memory and put it in

chez Plotin et avant Plotin" in *Les Sources de Plotin* (*Entretiens Hardt* V, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960), with the discussion, 107–57.

τὴν μνήμην, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν μνημονευτικὸν καὶ αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται; ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον μνημονεύσει, ὡς ἐλέγετο, διττὸν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἔσται, καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δὲ τὸ μνημονευτικόν, ἀλλ' ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, διττὸν τὸ μημονεῦον ἔσται. ἔτι εἰ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἔσται καὶ τῶν διανοημάτων τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ἢ ἄλλο γε δεῖ ἑκατέρων. ἆρ' οὖν κοινὸν θέμενοι τὸ ἀντιληπτικὸν τούτῳ δώσομεν ἀμφοῖν τὴν μνήμην; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ νοητῶν, τάχα ἄν τι λέγοιτο· εἰ δὲ διαιρεῖται διχῇ, οὐδὲν ἧττον δύο ἂν εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ ψυχῇ δώσομεν ἄμφω, τέτταρα ἂν γένοιτο. ὅλως δὲ τίς ἀνάγκη, ᾧ αἰσθανόμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ μνημονεύειν, καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει γίνεσθαι ἄμφω, καὶ ᾧ διανοούμεθα, τούτῳ τῶν διανοημάτων μνημονεύειν; ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ αὐτοὶ διανοεῖσθαι κράτιστοι καὶ μνημονεύειν, καὶ ἐπίσης αἰσθήσει χρησάμενοι οὐκ ἐπίσης μνημονεύουσι, καὶ εὐαισθήτως ἔχουσιν ἄλλοι, μνημονεύουσι δὲ ἄλλοι οὐκ ὀξέως ἐν αἰσθήσει γεγενημένοι. ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ, εἰ ἄλλο ἑκάτερον δεήσει εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλο μνημονεύσει ὧν ἡ αἴσθησις ἤσθετο πρότερον, κἀκεῖνο δεῖ αἰσθέσθαι οὗπερ μελλήσει μνημονεύσειν; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύσει τῷ μνημονεύσοντι τὸ αἴσθημα φάντασμα εἶναι, καὶ τῷ φανταστικῷ ἄλλῳ ὄντι τὴν μνήμην καὶ κατοχὴν

the perceptive power, and will what remembers and what perceives be the same thing for us? But if the shade, too, is going to remember, as was said, the perceptive power will be double, and even if it is not the perceptive power but something else which remembers, this remembering power will be double. Again, if it is the perceptive power which remembers, this will also perceive studies and thoughts [as well as sense-objects]. But there must be a different power for each of these. Shall we then assume that there is a common power of apprehension, and give to it the memory of both? But if that which apprehended the objects of both the senses and the intelligence was one and the same, perhaps there would be something in this statement; but if it is divided in two, there will all the same be two powers. But if we give both of them to each soul, then there will be four. But in general, what necessity is there for us to remember by that by which we perceive, and for both perceiving and remembering to come about by the same power, and for us to remember our thoughts by that by which we think? For the same people are not the best at thinking and at remembering, and those who are equally perceptive have not equally good memories, and some people have quick perceptions, but others whose perceptions are not keen remember well. But once more, if it is going to be necessary for each of the two to be different, and something else is going to remember what perception first perceived, will that something else have to perceive what it is going to remember? Now nothing will prevent a perception from being a mental image for that which is going to remember it, and the memory and the reten-

ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ μηκέτι οὔσης τούτῳ πάρεστι τὸ ὅραμα. εἰ οὖν παρὰ τούτῳ τοῦ ἀπόντος ἤδη ἡ φαντασία, μνημονεύει ἤδη, κἂν ἐπ' ὀλίγον παρῇ. ᾧ δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμένοι, ὀλίγη ἡ μνήμη, ἐπὶ πολὺ δέ, μᾶλλον μνημονικοὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης οὔσης ἰσχυροτέρας, ὡς μὴ ῥᾳδίως τρεπομένης ἀφεῖσθαι[1] ἀποσεισθεῖσαν τὴν μνήμην. τοῦ φαντασικοῦ ἄρα ἡ μνήμη, καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν τῶν τοιούτων ἔσται. διαφόρως δ' ἔχειν πρὸς μνήμας φήσομεν ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτῆς διαφόρως ἐχούσαις ἢ ταῖς προσέξεσιν ἢ μή, ἢ καὶ σωματικαῖς κράσεσιν ἐνούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ ἀλλοιούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ οἷον θορυβούσαις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἑτέρωθι.

30. Τὸ δὲ τῶν διανοήσεων τί; ἆρά γε καὶ τούτων τὸ φανταστικόν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πάσῃ νοήσει παρακολουθεῖ φαντασία, τάχα ἂν ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας, οἷον εἰκόνος οὔσης τοῦ διανοήματος, μενούσης οὕτως ἂν εἴη τοῦ γνωσθέντος ἡ μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλο τι ζητητέον. ἴσως δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τῷ νοήματι παρακολουθοῦντος ἡ παραδοχὴ εἰς τὸ φανταστικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ νόημα ἀμερὲς καὶ

[1] Creuzer*: ἐφεῖσθαι Enn., H–S.

tion of the object from belonging to the image-making power, which is something different: for it is in this that the perception arrives at its conclusion, and what was seen is present in this when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is only for a short time. The man with whom the image remains for a short time will have a short memory, but people with whom the images remain for a long time have better memories; this power is stronger in them, so that it does not easily change and let the memory go, shaken out of it. Memory, then, will belong to the image-making power, and remembering will be of things of the mental image kind. And we shall say that the differences between men in respect of memory are due to the fact that their image-making powers are differently developed, or to the degree to which they attend or do not attend to them, or to the presence or absence of certain bodily temperaments, and whether they change or not and, so to speak, produce disturbances. But this we shall discuss elsewhere.[1]

30. But what is it that remembers thoughts? Does the image-making power remember these too? But if an image accompanies every intellectual act, perhaps if this image remains, being a kind of picture of the thought, in this way there would be memory of what was known; but if not, we must look for some other explanation. Perhaps the reception into the image-making power would be of the verbal expression which accompanies the act of intelligence.

[1] These words seem to express the intention to write something like ch. 3 of the later treatise IV. 6.

οὔπω οἷον προελήλυθὸς εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἔνδον ὂν λανθάνει, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀναπτύξας καὶ ἐπάγων ἐκ τοῦ νοήματος εἰς τὸ φανταστικὸν ἔδειξε τὸ νόημα οἷον ἐν κατόπτρῳ, καὶ ἡ ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ οὕτω καὶ ἡ μονὴ καὶ ἡ μνήμη. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ κινουμένης πρὸς νόησιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅταν ἐν τούτῳ γένηται, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀντίληψις. ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν ἀεί, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ δεχόμενον οὐ μόνον δέχεται νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ θάτερα.

31. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἡ μνήμη, ἑκατέρα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μνημονεύειν εἴρηται, δύο τὰ φανταστικά. χωρὶς μὲν οὖν οὖσαι ἐχέτωσαν ἑκάτερα, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ παρ' ἡμῖν πῶς τὰ δύο καὶ τίνι αὐτῶν ἐγγίνεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις, διτταὶ ἀεὶ αἱ φαντασίαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἑτέρας τῶν νοητῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν παντάπασι δύο ζῷα οὐδὲν ἔχοντα κοινὸν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔσται. εἰ οὖν ἀμφοτέραις, τίς ἡ διαφορά; εἶτα

[1] For this doctrine that the awareness of our own thinking which makes memory possible can only take place when pure thought is translated into images, cp. IV. 8. 8 and I. 4. 9–10; these passages add that the translation into images depends on the good health and freedom from disturbance of the body; consciousness in the ordinary sense, with memory, is thus secondary, dependent on our own physical condition, and

The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we apprehend it. The intellectual act is one thing and the apprehension of it another, and we are always intellectually active but do not always apprehend our activity; and this is because that which receives it does not only receive acts of the intelligence, but also, on its other side, perceptions.[1]

31. But if memory belongs to the image-making power, and each of the two souls remembers, as has been said, there will be two image-making powers. Well, then, when the souls are separate we can grant that each of them will have an imaging power, but when they are together, in our earthly life, how are there two powers, and in which of them does memory reside? If it is in both of them, the images will always be double; for one certainly cannot suppose that the power of one soul has images [only] of intelligible things and the power of the other images [only] of perceptible things; for in this way there will be two living things with nothing at all in common with each other. If then [both kinds of images]

relatively unimportant. As it appears in an early, a middle-period, and a late treatise, Plotinus seems to have held this doctrine consistently throughout his writing period.

πῶς οὐ γινώσκομεν; ἢ ὅταν μὲν συμφωνῇ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, οὐκ ὄντων οὐδὲ χωρὶς τῶν φανταστικῶν, κρατοῦντός τε τοῦ τῆς κρείττονος, ἓν τὸ φάντασμα γίνεται, οἷον παρακολουθούσης σκιᾶς τῷ ἑτέρῳ, καὶ ὑποτρέχοντος οἷον σμικροῦ φωτὸς μείζονι· ὅταν δὲ μάχη ᾖ καὶ διαφωνία, ἐκφανὴς ἐφ' αὑτῆς καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα γίνεται, λανθάνει δὲ ⟨ὅ τι⟩[1] ἐν ἑτέρῳ. [ὅτι][1] καὶ ὅλως τὸ διττὸν τῶν ψυχῶν λανθάνει· εἰς ἓν γὰρ ἦλθον ἄμφω καὶ ἐποχεῖται ἡ ἑτέρα. ἑώρα οὖν ἡ ἑτέρα πάντα καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἐξελθοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀφίησι τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας· οἷον ἑταίρων[2] ὁμιλίας φαυλοτέρων λαβόντες ποτὲ ἄλλους ἀλλαξάμενοι ὀλίγα τῶν ἐκείνων μεμνήμεθα, χρηστοτέρων δὲ γεγενημένων πλείω.

32. Τί δὲ δὴ φίλων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός; πατρίδος δὲ καὶ τῶν ὧν ἂν καὶ ἀστεῖος οὐκ ἄτοπος μνημονεύων; ἢ τὸ μὲν μετὰ πάθους ἑκάστου, ὁ δὲ ἀπαθῶς ἂν τὰς μνήμας τούτων ἔχοι· τὸ γὰρ πάθος ἴσως καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τῶν παθῶν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ, καθόσον τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τι ἐκοίνωσε. πρέπει δὲ τὴν μὲν χείρονα καὶ τῶν τῆς ἑτέρας ἐνεργημάτων ἐφίεσθαι τῆς μνήμης καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἀστεία ᾖ καὶ αὐτή· γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμείνων καὶ τῇ παιδεύσει τῇ παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος. τὴν δὲ δεῖ ἀσμένως λήθην ἔχειν

[1] transpos. H–S², et sic verterat Bouillet: ⟨τὸ⟩ suspic. Creuzer, scr. Bréhier, B–T.
[2] Cpc, Creuzer* (*sodalibus* Ficinus): ἑτέρων wxCac: ἑκατέρων U.

are in both souls, what is the difference? And why do we not recognise it? Now when one soul is in tune with the other, and their image-making powers are not separate, and that of the better soul is dominant, the image becomes one, as if a shadow followed the other and as if a little light slipped in under the greater one; but when there is war and disharmony between them, the other image becomes manifest by itself, but we do not notice what is in the other power, and we do not notice in general the duality of the souls. For both have come together into one and the better soul is on top of the other. This other soul, then, sees everything, and takes some things with it which belong to the other when it goes out [of the body] but rejects others; as when we keep company with inferior people and then change to other companions, we remember little of the inferior ones but more of the better sort.

32. But what about the memories of our friends and children and wife? Of our country, and all the things it would not be absurd for a man of quality to remember? Now the image-making power remembers each of these with emotion, but the man of quality would have his memories of them without emotion; for the emotion, perhaps, was in the imaging power even from the beginning, and those of the emotions which have any good quality pass to the noble soul, in so far as it has any communication with the other one. It is proper for the whole soul to aspire to the activities of the memory of the higher soul, especially when it is of good quality itself: for a lower soul can be comparatively good from the beginning and can become so as a result of education by the higher soul. But the higher soul ought to

τῶν παρὰ τῆς χείρονος. εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ σπουδαίας οὔσης τῆς ἑτέρας τὴν ἑτέραν τὴν φύσιν χείρονα εἶναι κατεχομένην ὑπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας βίᾳ. ὅσῳ δὴ σπεύδει πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, πλειόνων αὐτῇ ἡ λήθη, εἰ μή που πᾶς ὁ βίος αὐτῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοιοῦτος οἷος μόνων τῶν κρειττόνων εἶναι τὰς μνήμας· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καλῶς τὸ ἐξιστάμενον τῶν ἀνθρωπείων σπουδασμάτων. ἀνάγκη οὖν καὶ τῶν μνημονευμάτων· ὥστε ἐπιλήσμονα ἄν τις λέγων τὴν ἀγαθὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ. ἐπεὶ καὶ φεύγει ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν συνάγει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀφιείς. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οὐ μετὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλαφρὰ καὶ δι' αὑτῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν ἐκεῖ ἐθέλῃ εἶναι, ἔτι οὖσα ἐνταῦθα ἀφίησι πάντα ὅσα ἄλλα· ὀλίγα τοίνυν κἀκεῖ τὰ ἐντεῦθεν· καὶ ἐν οὐρανῷ οὖσα πλείω. καὶ εἴποι ἂν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἐκείνος ἀνδραγαθίας ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα σμικρὰ ἡγούμενος καὶ μετατεθεὶς εἰς ἁγιώτερον τόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ γεγενημένος καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἰσχύσας τοῖς ἄθλοις, οἷα ἀθλεύουσι σοφοί,

be happy to forget what it has received from the worse soul. For it could be that even when the higher soul is noble, the other soul is naturally a rather bad one and is restrained forcibly by the higher soul. The more it presses on towards the heights the more it will forget, unless perhaps all its life, even here below, has been such that its memories are only of higher things; since here below too it is best to be detached from human concerns, and so necessarily from human memories; so that if anyone said that the good soul was forgetful, it would be correct to say so in this sort of sense. For the higher soul also flies from multiplicity, and gathers multiplicity into one and abandons the indefinite; because in this way it will not be [clogged] with multiplicity but light and alone by itself; for even here below, when it wants to be in that higher world, while it is still here below it abandons everything that is different [from that world]; and there are few things here that are also there; and when it is in heaven it will abandon still more. And Homer's Heracles might talk about his heroic deeds; but the man who thinks these of little account and has migrated to a holier place, and has been stronger than Heracles in the contexts in which the wise compete,[1]—

[1] Porphyry, oddly, divides the great treatise here in the middle of a sentence. This may seem rather less odd if we consider that the sentence is anacoluthic: that the point of division marks the transition from the man of middle virtue (symbolised by Heracles) to the contemplative sage; and that division here enables Porphyry to lay great emphasis on the important question which begins IV. 4 (cp. the way in which Porphyry divides the treatise *On Providence* (III. 2–3) and the exciting question with which Plotinus himself begins I. 1).

IV. 4. (28) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. τί οὖν ἐρεῖ; καὶ τίνων τὴν μνήμην ἕξει ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης γενομένη; ἢ ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνα θεωρεῖν καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐνεργεῖν, ἐν οἷς ἔστιν, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖ εἶναι. τῶν οὖν ἐνταῦθα οὐδέν, οἷον ὅτι ἐφιλοσόφησε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα οὖσα ἐθεᾶτο τὰ ἐκεῖ; ἀλλ' εἰμὴ ἔστιν, ὅτε τις ἐπιβάλλει τινὶ τῇ νοήσει, ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἢ νοεῖν κἀκεῖνο θεωρεῖν—καὶ ἐν τῇ νοήσει οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τὸ "ἐνενοήκειν", ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἄν τις τοῦτ', εἰ ἔτυχεν, εἴποι, τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη μεταβάλλοντος—οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καθαρῶς ὄντα μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν τῇδέ ποτε αὐτῷ τινι γεγενημένων.[1] εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, ἄχρονος πᾶσα νόησις, ἐν αἰῶνι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντων τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἀδύνατον μνήμην εἶναι ἐκεῖ οὐχ ὅτι τῶν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ὁτουοῦν. ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον παρόν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ διέξοδος οὐδὲ μετάβασις ἀφ' ἑτέρου ἐπ' ἄλλο. τί οὖν; οὐκ

[1] τινι γεγενημένων Enn.*: ἐπιγεγενημένων Page, H–S[1]: codices defendit Theiler, collato VI. 6. 13. 59.

IV. 4. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL II

1.—What will he say? And what will the soul remember when it has come to be in the intelligible world, and with that higher reality? It is consistent to say that it will contemplate those things among which it is, and its mental activity will be concerned with them, or else it will not be there at all. Will it not, then, remember any of its experiences here below, for instance that it engaged in philosophy, and even that while it was here it contemplated the things in that other world? But if it is not possible, when one has one's thought directed on something, to do anything else but think and contemplate that object—and the statement "I had thought [it before]" is not included in the thinking, but one would say it afterwards, if one said it at all, that is when an alteration in one's thinking has already taken place; it would not then be possible, when one is purely in the intelligible world, to remember the things which happened to one at any time when one was here. But if, as we believe, every act of intelligence is timeless, since the realities there are in eternity and not in time, it is impossible that there should be a memory there, not only of the things here below, but of anything at all. But each and every thing is present there; so there is no discursive thought or transition from one to the other. Well,

ἔσται διαίρεσις ἄνωθεν εἰς εἴδη, ἢ κάτωθεν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἄνω; τῷ μὲν γὰρ νῷ[1] μὴ ἔστω ἐνεργείᾳ ὁμοῦ ὄντι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ ἐκεῖ οὔσῃ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔσται; τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀθρόαν ἀθρόων γίγνεσθαι; ἆρ' οὖν ὡς τινος ὁμοῦ; ἢ ὡς πολλῶν ὁμοῦ πάσας νοήσεις. τοῦ γὰρ θεάματος ὄντος ποικίλου ποικίλην καὶ πολλὴν τὴν νόησιν ἅμα γίγνεσθαι καὶ πολλὰς τὰς νοήσεις, οἷον αἰσθήσεις πολλὰς προσώπου ὀφθαλμῶν[2] ἅμα ὁρωμένων καὶ ῥινὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἕν τι διαιρῇ καὶ ἀναπτύσσῃ; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῷ διῄρηται· καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐναπέρεισις μᾶλλον. τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὐ χρόνῳ ὂν οὐδὲ τὴν νόησιν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου χρόνῳ ποιήσει· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τάξει, οἱονεὶ φυτοῦ ἡ τάξις ἐκ ῥιζῶν ἀρξαμένη ἕως εἰς τὸ ἄνω τῷ θεωμένῳ οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλως ἢ τάξει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἅμα τὸ πᾶν θεωμένῳ. ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς ἓν βλέπῃ, εἶτα[3] πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ἔχῃ,[4] πῶς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς; ἢ ἡ δύναμις ἡ μία οὕτως ἦν μία, ὡς πολλὰ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μίαν νόησιν πάντα. αἱ γὰρ ἐνέργειαι [οὐ][5] καθ' ἕνα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ

[1] Kleist, testatur Theologia II. 11: ἄνω Enn., H–S¹.
[2] C^pc, Kirchhoff* (*oculos* Ficinus): ὀφθαλμῷ wxUC^ac.
[3] xUC: εἶτα (sic) w: εἰ τὰ Perna, Creuzer, H–S¹.
[4] xUC: ἔχει w, Perna, Creuzer, H–S¹.
[5] del. Theiler, quod testatur Theologia II. 20.

then, will there be no division starting from above into species, or an ascent from below to the universal and the higher? Granted that the Intellect does not have this, since it is all together in one in its actuality, why should the soul when it is there not have it? What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects in one? Can it really see them as one thing, all together? Rather, it is as if all its acts of intelligence, with their many objects, were all together. For since its object of contemplation is richly varied, the act of intelligence too is richly varied and multiple, and there are many acts of intelligence, as there are many acts of perception of a face when the eyes and the nose and the other features are all seen at once. But [what happens] when the soul divides and unfolds some one object? It is already divided in Intellect and an act of this kind is more like a concentration of attention. And, as the prior and the subsequent in the species-forms are not temporal, so neither will the soul make its acts of intelligence of the prior and the subsequent in temporal sequence. For there is also the prior and the subsequent in order, as in a plant the order which begins from the roots and extends to the topmost point does not have for the observer the prior and the subsequent in any other way than in order, since he observes the whole plant at once. But when the soul looks first at one [intelligible object], and then possesses the whole multiplicity of them, how does it possess one first and another next? The one power is one in such a way that it becomes many in something else, and does not comprehend all things by one act of intelligence. For its acts are individual, but always to-

πᾶσαι δυνάμει ἑστώσῃ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις σχιζομένῃ.[1] ἤδη γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὡς μὴ ἓν ὂν δυνηθῆναι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἐν αὑτῷ φύσιν δέξασθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντων.

2. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πῶς; ἢ οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξει τὴν μνήμην, οὐδ' ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ θεωρῶν, οἷον Σωκράτης, ἢ ὅτι νοῦς ἢ ψυχή. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτά τις ἀναμνησθήτω, ὡς ὅταν καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεωρῇ καὶ μάλιστα ἐναργῶς, οὐκ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε τῇ νοήσει, ἀλλ' ἔχει μὲν ἑαυτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, κἀκεῖνο γίνεται οἷον ὕλην ἑαυτὸν παρασχών, εἰδοποιούμενος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ δυνάμει ὢν τότε αὐτός. τότε οὖν αὐτός τί ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ὅταν μηδὲν νοῇ; ἤ, εἰ μὲν αὐτός, κενός ἐστι παντός, ὅταν μηδὲν νοῇ. εἰ δέ ἐστιν αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος οἷος πάντα εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὸν νοῇ, πάντα ὁμοῦ νοεῖ· ὥστε τῇ μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιβολῇ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενα ἔχει, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πάντα ἐμπεριεχόμενον ἑαυτόν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτω ποιεῖ, μεταβάλλει τὰς νοήσεις, ὃ πρότερον αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἠξιοῦμεν. ἢ λεκτέον ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν οἷον ἐσχάτοις τοῦ νοητοῦ κειμένης

[1] Theiler: γινομένων Enn., H–S[1]: †γινομένων† H–S[2]: ἐν . . . γινομένων del. Kleist, Harder: ἄλλοις γινομένων ἤδη ⟨πολλῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ πᾶσαι· ἤδη⟩ Igal non male.

[1] I very tentatively adopt Theiler's σχιζομένῃ here to produce an intelligible text, though I think *locus nondum sanatus* (H—S[2]) may well be right. Kleist and Harder delete ἐν . . .

gether in a power which remains unchanged, but is divided in other things.[1] For that intelligible object is able in virtue of its not being one to receive in itself the nature of the many which did not previously exist.

2. But enough about this. How does it remember itself? It will not even have the remembrance of itself, or that it is the man himself, Socrates for instance, who is contemplating, or that it is intellect or soul. Besides, one should certainly remember that even here below when one contemplates, especially when the contemplation is clear, one does not turn to oneself in the act of intelligence, but one possesses oneself; one's activity, however, is directed towards the object of contemplation, and one becomes this, offering oneself to it as a kind of matter, being formed according to what one sees, and being oneself then only potentially. Is a man then actually himself in any way when he is thinking nothing at all? Yes, if he is [merely] himself he is empty of everything, when he is thinking nothing at all. But if he is himself in such a way as to be everything, when he thinks himself, he thinks everything at once; so that a man in this state, by his intuition of himself, and when he actually sees himself, has everything included in this seeing, and by his intuition of everything has himself included. But if this is what he does, he changes his acts of intelligence, and we ourselves did not think it right to assert this before. Must we say then that unchangeability belongs to Intellect, but that in the case of Soul, which lies, so

γινομένων. It adds nothing to what has been said in the previous sentence, but Plotinus is frequently repetitive. Igal's suggestion is attractive, but not completely convincing.

γίνεσθαι τοῦτο δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ προσχωρεῖν εἴσω; εἰ γάρ τι περὶ τὸ μένον γίνεται, δεῖ αὐτὸ παραλλαγὴν πρὸς τὸ μένον ἔχειν μὴ ὁμοίως μένον. ἢ οὐδὲ μεταβολὴν λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτόν, καὶ ὅταν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα· πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ἄμφω ἕν. ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα τοῦτο πάσχει τὸ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ; ἢ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα ἔχει τὸ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ αὐτή. καὶ γὰρ αὐτή ἐστιν ἃ ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ᾖ τῷ τόπῳ, εἰς ἕνωσιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ νῷ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἐπεστράφη· στραφεῖσα γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταξὺ ἔχει, εἴς τε νοῦν ἐλθοῦσα ἥρμοσται, καὶ ἁρμοσθεῖσα ἥνωται οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ' ἕν ἐστιν ἄμφω καὶ δύο. οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοι ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὑτῆς, ὡς ἓν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταὐτὸν γενομένη.

3. Ἐξελθοῦσα δὲ ἐκεῖθεν καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχομένη τὸ ἕν, τὸ δὲ αὑτῆς ἀσπασαμένη καὶ ἕτερον ἐθελήσασα εἶναι καὶ οἷον προκύψασα, μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφεξῆς λαμβάνει. μνήμη δὲ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ ἔτι κατέχει μὴ πεσεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ὠδὶ φέρει, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐκεῖ κατέχει, καὶ ὅλως, οὗ μνημονεύει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι καὶ γίνεται. ἦν γὰρ τὸ μνημονεύ-

to speak, on the frontier of the intelligible, this change can happen, since it can also advance further into Intellect? For if something comes to be in the region of that which abides, it must be different from that which abides, and not abide in the same way. No, we must not even say that there is a change, when the soul moves from its own content to itself, and from itself to the rest of its content: for the self is all things, and both are one. But does the soul when it is in the intelligible world experience this "one thing after another" in relation to itself and its contents? No, when it is purely and simply in the intelligible world it has itself too the characteristic of unchangeability. For it is really all the things it is: since when it is in that region, it must come to unity with Intellect, by the fact that it has turned to it, for when it is turned, it has nothing between, but comes to Intellect and accords itself to it, and by that accord is united to it without being destroyed, but both of them are one and also two. When therefore it is in this state it could not change but would be unalterably disposed to intelligence while at the same time having a concurrent awareness of itself, as having become one and the same thing with its intelligible object.

3. But if it comes out of the intelligible world, and cannot endure unity, but embraces its own individuality and wants to be different and so to speak puts its head outside, it thereupon acquires memory. Its memory of what is in the intelligible world still holds it back from falling, but its memory of the things here below carries it down here; its memory

εἶν ἢ νοεῖν ἢ φαντάζεσθαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία αὐτῇ[1] οὐ τῷ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷα ὁρᾷ, καὶ [οἷα][2] διάκειται· κἂν τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἴδῃ, ὁπόσον αὐτῶν ἂν ἴδῃ, τοσοῦτον ἔχει τὸ βάθος. ὅτι γὰρ ἔχει πάντα δευτέρως καὶ οὐχ οὕτω τελείως, πάντα γίνεται, καὶ μεθόριον οὖσα καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ κειμένη ἐπ' ἄμφω φέρεται.

4. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν καὶ τἀγαθὸν διὰ νοῦ ὁρᾷ, οὐ γὰρ στέγεται ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μὴ διελθεῖν εἰς αὐτήν· ἐπεὶ μὴ σῶμα τὸ μεταξὺ ὥστε ἐμποδίζειν· καίτοι καὶ σωμάτων μεταξὺ πολλαχῇ εἰς τὰ τρίτα ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἡ ἄφιξις. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὰ κάτω δοίη αὐτήν, ἀναλόγως τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἔχει ὃ ἠθέλησε. διὸ ἡ μνήμη, καὶ ὅταν τῶν ἀρίστων ᾖ, οὐκ ἄριστον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν μνήμην λαμβάνειν οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν διακέηται κατὰ τὰ πρόσθεν παθήματα ἢ θεάματα. γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν, καὶ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντα ὅτι ἔχει, ἔχειν παρ' αὐτῷ ἰσχυροτέρως ἢ εἰ εἰδείη. εἰδὼς μὲν γὰρ τάχα ἂν ὡς ἄλλο ἔχοι ἄλλος αὐτὸς ὤν, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ἔχει κινδυνεύει εἶναι ὃ ἔχει· ὃ δὴ πάθημα μᾶλλον πεσεῖν ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχήν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀφισταμένη τοῦ ἐκεῖ τόπου ἀναφέρει τὰς μνήμας ὁπωσοῦν, εἶχε κἀκεῖ. ἢ δυνάμει·[3] ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια

[1] αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ ψυχῇ) Kirchhoff*: αὐτὴ xUC, Creuzer: αὖτη w, Perna.
[2] del. Beutler.
[3] Gollwitzer, Bréhier, Harder, Cilento, B–T: ἡ δύναμις Enn.: del. Kirchhoff, Müller, Volkmann.

of what is in heaven keeps it there, and in general it is and becomes what it remembers. For remembering is either thinking or imaging; and the image comes to the soul not by possession, but as it sees, so it is disposed; and if it sees sense-objects, it sinks low in proportion to the amount of them it sees. For because it possesses all things in a secondary way, and not so perfectly [as Intellect], it becomes all things, and since it is a thing belonging to the frontier between the worlds, and occupies a corresponding position, it moves in both directions.

4. Now in the intelligible world the soul also sees the Good through Intellect; for it is not excluded, so as not to come through to the soul, since what is between them is not a body which would obstruct it —yet even with bodies between there are many ways of arrival at the third level from the first. But if the soul gives itself to what is below it, it has what it wants in proportion to its memory and imaging power. Therefore memory, even when it is of the best, is not the best thing. But one must understand memory not only in the sense of a kind of perception that one is remembering, but as existing when the soul is disposed according to what it has previously experienced or contemplated. For it could happen that, even when one is not conscious that one has something, one holds it to oneself more strongly than if one knew. For perhaps if one knew one would have it as something else, being different oneself, but if one does not know that one has it one is liable to be what one has; and this is certainly the experience which makes the soul sink lower. But if when the soul leaves the intelligible region it recovers its memories, it had them somehow there

ἐκείνων ἠφάνιζε τὴν μνήμην. οὐ γὰρ ὡς κείμενοι ἦσαν τύποι, ἵνα ἂν ᾖ ἴσως ἄτοπον τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις ἦν ἡ ἀφεθεῖσα ὕστερον εἰς ἐνέργειαν. παυσαμένης οὖν τῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἐνεργείας, εἶδεν ἃ πρότερον ἡ ψυχή, πρὶν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι, ἰδοῦσα ἦν.

5. Τί οὖν; κἀκεῖνα νῦν αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις, καθ' ἣν τὸ μνημονεύειν, εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγει; ἢ εἰ μὲν μὴ αὐτὰ ἑωρῶμεν, μνήμῃ, εἰ δ' αὐτά, ᾧ κἀκεῖ ἑωρῶμεν. ἐγείρεται γὰρ τοῦτο οἷς ἐγείρεται, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὁρῶν περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. οὐ γὰρ εἰκασίᾳ δεῖ χρώμενον ἀποφαίνεσθαι οὐδὲ συλλογισμῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄλλοθεν εἰληφότι, ἀλλ' ἔστι περὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς λέγεται, καὶ ἐνθάδε οὖσι τῷ αὐτῷ λέγειν,[1] ᾧ δύναμιν ἔχει τἀκεῖ θεωρεῖν. ταὐτὸ γὰρ οἷον ἐγείραντας δεῖ ὁρᾶν τἀκεῖ, ὥστε καὶ ἐγεῖραι ἐκεῖ· οἷον εἴ τις ἀνάγων αὑτοῦ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐπί τινος ὑψηλῆς σκοπιᾶς ὁρῴη ἃ μηδεὶς τῶν οὐ σὺν αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότων. ἡ τοίνυν μνήμη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου φαίνεται ἄρχεσθαι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, ἤδη τῆς ψυχῆς τοὺς ἐκεῖ τόπους καταλειπούσης. ἐντεῦθεν μὲν οὖν ἐν οὐρανῷ γενομένη καὶ στᾶσα θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τῶν ἐνθάδε μνήμην πολλῶν ἔχοι οἷων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπιγινώσκειν πολλὰς τῶν πρότερον

[1] Creuzer* (*dicere* Ficinus): λέγεται Enn.

too. Yes, it had them potentially, but the active actuality of the intelligible realities obscured the memory. For its memories were not like imprints left in it (a supposition which would possibly have absurd consequences), but the potentiality was there which was later let loose into actuality. So when the actuality in the intelligible world ceased to be active, the soul saw what it had been seeing before it came to be in that world.

5. Well, then, does this very potentiality by which we remember bring the intelligible realities also to actuality in us now? If we did not see them themselves, it is by memory [that they are actual], but if we did see them, it is by that with which we also saw them there. For this is awakened by that which awakens it, and this is the power which sees in the sphere of the realities we mentioned. For one must not, when one makes statements about the intelligible world, use analogy or syllogistic reasoning which takes its principles from elsewhere, but even when we are here below we can speak about the intelligible realities by that same power which is able to contemplate the higher world. For one must see the things in that world by a kind of awakening of the same power, so that one can awake it in the higher world also; as if one went up to some high viewpoint and raising one's eyes saw what no one saw who had not come up with one. From our discussion, then, it seems that memory begins in heaven, when the soul has already left the higher regions. Now if the soul has arrived in heaven from down here and stays there, it is in no way surprising if it remembers many things here below of the sort we have mentioned, and recognises many souls from

ἐγνωσμένων, εἴπερ καὶ σώματα ἔχειν περὶ αὑτὰς ἀνάγκη ἐν σχήμασιν ὁμοίοις. καὶ εἰ τὰ σχήματα δὲ ἀλλάξαιντο σφαιροειδῆ ποιησάμεναι, ἆρα διὰ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν τρόπων ἰδιότητος γνωρίζοιεν; οὐ γὰρ ἄτοπον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη ἔστωσαν ἀποθέμεναι, τὰ δ' ἤθη οὐ κωλύεται μένειν. εἰ δὲ καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δύναιντο, καὶ οὕτως ἂν γνωρίζοιεν. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ κατέλθωσι, πῶς; ἢ ἀνακινήσουσι τὴν μνήμην, ἐλαττόνως μέντοι ἢ ἐκεῖναι, τῶν αὐτῶν· ἄλλα τε γὰρ ἕξουσι μνημονεύειν, καὶ χρόνος πλείων λήθην παντελῆ πολλῶν πεποιηκὼς ἔσται. ἀλλ' εἰ τραπεῖσαι εἰς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον εἰς γένεσιν τῇδε πεσοῦνται, ποῖος τρόπος [1] ἔσται τοῦ μνημονεύειν; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς πᾶν βάθος πεσεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ κινηθείσας καὶ στῆναι ἐπί τι προελθούσας καὶ οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει πάλιν ἐκδῦναι, πρὶν γενέσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τόπον.

6. Τὰς μὲν οὖν μετιούσας καὶ μεταβαλλούσας [τὰς ψυχὰς] [2] ἔχοι ἄν τις εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ μνημονεύσουσι· τῶν γὰρ γεγενημένων καὶ παρεληλυθότων ἡ μνήμη· αἷς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει μένειν, τίνων ἂν αὗται μνημονεύοιεν; ἄστρων δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τῶν γε ἄλλων ἁπάντων καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἐπιζητεῖ ὁ λόγος τὰς μνήμας, καὶ τε-

[1] Kleist, Volkmann*: ποῖος χρόνος Enn.: πόσος χρόνος Thillet.
[2] del. Kirchhoff, Müller, H–S.

among those it knew previously, especially if they must necessarily be clothed in bodies of similar forms [to their earthly ones]. And even if they have changed the forms of their bodies and adopted spherical ones, might they recognise [each other] by their characters and the individuality of their behaviour [1]? For this is not absurd. Granted that they have put away their passions, there is nothing to prevent their characters persisting. And if they were also able to talk, they could recognise [each other] in this way too. But when they come down from the intelligible world to heaven, how do they remember? They will arouse again their memories of the same things, but less than the souls which come from below; for they will have other things to remember, and the longer time which has elapsed will have produced complete forgetfulness of many things. But if they turn to the world of sense and fall to birth here, what will be the manner of their rememberings? It is not necessary to fall the whole way into the depths. For it is possible for souls in motion to halt when they have advanced a certain distance, and nothing prevents them from emerging again before they come to the lowest point of the process of generation.

6. One could say, then, that souls which migrate and change their state will also remember; for memory is of things which have happened and are past; but as for the souls to which it belongs to remain in the same state, what could they remember? The discussion is trying to find out about the memo-

[1] In view of the importance attached to spherical shape (and circular motion) as the most perfect in late antiquity, Plotinus's lack of interest in the shape of our heavenly bodies is striking.

λευτῶν εἶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπιτολμήσει καὶ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτοῦ τὰς μνήμας πολυπραγμονεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ζητῶν καὶ τὰς διανοίας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τίνες εἰσὶ θεωρήσει, εἴπερ εἰσίν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ζητοῦσι μήτε ἀποροῦσιν—οὐδενὸς γὰρ δέονται, οὐδὲ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐν γνώσει—τίνες ἂν λογισμοὶ ἢ τίνες συλλογισμοὶ αὐτοῖς γίγνοιντο ἢ διανοήσεις; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αὐτοῖς ἐπίνοιαι καὶ μηχαναί, ἐξ ὧν διοικήσουσι τὰ ἡμέτερα ἢ ὅλως τὰ τῆς γῆς· ἄλλος γὰρ τρόπος τῆς εἰς τὸ πᾶν παρ' αὐτῶν εὐθημοσύνης.

7. Τί οὖν; ὅτι τὸν θεὸν εἶδον οὐ μνημονεύουσιν; ἢ ἀεὶ ὁρῶσιν. ἕως δ' ἂν ὁρῶσιν, οὐκ ἔνι δήπου φάναι αὐτοῖς ἑωρακέναι· παυσαμένων γὰρ τοῦτο ἂν πάθος εἴη. τί δέ; οὐδ' ὅτι περιῆλθον χθὲς τὴν γῆν καὶ [τὸ][1] πέρυσιν, οὐδ' ὅτι ἔζων χθὲς καὶ πάλαι καὶ ἐξ οὗ ζῶσιν; ἢ ζῶσιν ἀεί· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ταὐτὸν ἕν. τὸ δὲ χθὲς τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη, οἷον ἂν εἴ τις τὴν ὁρμὴν τὴν κατὰ πόδα ἕνα γενομένην μερίζοι εἰς πολλά, καὶ ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην καὶ πολλὰς ποιοῖ τὴν μίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μία φορά, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῖν μετροῦνται πολλαὶ καὶ ἡμέραι ἄλλαι, ὅτι καὶ νύκτες διαλαμβάνουσιν. ἐκεῖ δὲ μιᾶς οὔσης ἡμέρας πῶς πολλαί; ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ πέρυσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διάστημα οὐ ταὐτόν,

[1] del. Buchwald.

ries of the soul of all the heavenly bodies in general, and in particular about the sun and moon, and in the end it will go as far as the soul of the All, and will dare to be busy with the memories of Zeus himself. And in looking for this it will observe what their discursive reasonings and calculations are, if there are any. If, then, they neither investigate nor are perplexed—for they need nothing and learn nothing which was not part of their knowledge before—what could their calculations or logical deductions or discursive reasonings be? They will not even have designs and devices concerned with human affairs, by which they will manage our business and that of the earth in general: the right order which comes from them to the All is of another kind.

7. Well, then, will they not remember that they saw God? They always see him; and while they see him it is surely not possible for them to say that they have seen him: this would be something which would happen to those who have ceased to see. Well, will they not remember that they went round the earth yesterday, and last year, and that they lived yesterday and for a long time past and from the beginning of their lives? They live for ever: and "for ever" means an identical unity. The "yesterday" of their transit and the "last year" would be the same kind of thing as if one was to divide the step taken by one foot into many parts, and make the one step into many, one after another. For up there there is one transit, but we measure many, and different days, because nights intervene. But there, since there is one [unbroken] day, how can there be many? So there is not a last year either. But the space traversed is not the same, but

ἀλλ' ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ζῳδίου τμῆμα ἄλλο. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐρεῖ "παρῆλθον τόδε, νῦν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἰμί"; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐφορᾷ τὰ ἀνθρώπων, πῶς οὐ καὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τὰς περὶ αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἄλλοι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι πρότερον ἕτεροι καὶ ἕτερα· ὥστε καὶ μνήμη.

8. Ἡ οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε ὅσα τις θεωρεῖ ἐν μνήμῃ τίθεσθαι, οὔτε τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐπακολουθούντων ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίγνεσθαι, ὧν τε ἡ νόησις καὶ ἡ γνῶσις ἐνεργεστέρα, εἰ ταῦτα αἰσθητῶς γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη παρέντα τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτῶν τῷ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητῷ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι, εἰ μή τις ἔργῳ οἰκονομοῖτό τι, τῶν ἐν μέρει τῇ γνώσει τοῦ ὅλου ἐμπεριεχομένων. λέγω δὲ ἕκαστον ὧδε· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ἅ τις ὁρᾷ, παρατίθεσθαι παρ' αὑτῷ. ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν[1] διαφέρῃ, ἢ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ᾖ ὅλως ἡ αἴσθησις ἀπροαιρέτως τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὁρωμένων κινηθεῖσα, τοῦτο αὐτὴ ἔπαθε μόνη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ δεξαμένης εἰς τὸ εἴσω, ἅτε μήτε πρὸς χρείαν μήτε πρὸς ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν αὐτῆς τῆς διαφορᾶς μέλον. ὅταν δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτὴ πρὸς ἄλλοις ᾖ καὶ παντελῶς, οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιτο τῶν τοιούτων παρελθόντων τὴν μνήμην, ὅπου μηδὲ παρόντων γινώσκει τὴν αἴσθησιν. καὶ

[1] Beutler: μηδὲ Enn., H–S[1]: μὴ Kirchhoff*, Theiler.

[1] For the idea that we have sensations of which we are unconscious cp. IV. 9. 2; V. 1. 12; see E. R. Dodds "Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus" (*J.R.S.* 50, 1960, 5–6) for Plotinus's discovery of the unconscious. On the assimilation in these chapters of celestial

different, and the section of the Zodiac is different. Why, then, will not the star say, "I have passed through this section, and am now in another"? And if it keeps watch over human affairs, why does it not see the changes which take place among men, and that they are now different? And if this is so, it sees that men and their affairs were formerly otherwise: so that it also has memory.

8. Now it is not necessary to deposit in one's memory everything that one observes, or that altogether incidental consequences should come to be present in the imaging faculty; and further, in the case of things of which the thought and knowledge is more effective, it is not necessary, if these occur in the field of sense-perception, to let the knowledge of them go and pay attention to the particulars perceived by sense (unless one is engaged in the practical management of something), since the particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole. What I mean by each of these statements is as follows. First point: that it is not necessary to keep stored up in oneself what one sees. When what is perceived makes no difference, or the perception is not at all personally relevant, but is provoked involuntarily by the difference in the things seen, it is only the sense-perception which has this experience and the soul does not receive it into its interior, since the difference is not of concern to it either because it meets a need or is of benefit in some other way.[1] And when the

souls to the unchanging life of eternity, because they are not aware of and do not remember their embodied experience in so far as it is temporal and changing, see my "Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Νοῦς" in *Le Néoplatonisme* (Paris 1971) 68–9.

μὴν ὅτι τῶν πάντη κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γινομένων οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν φαντασίᾳ γίνεσθαι, εἰ δὲ καὶ γίνοιτο, οὐχ ὥστε καὶ φυλάξαι καὶ παρατηρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τύπος τοῦ τοιούτου οὐ δίδωσι συναίσθησιν, μάθοι ἄν τις, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτω λάβοι. λέγω δὲ ὧδε· εἰ μηδέποτε προηγούμενον γίνεται τὸν ἀέρα τόνδε εἶτα τόνδε τεμεῖν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διελθεῖν, οὔτ' ἂν τήρησις αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἔννοια βαδίζουσι γένοιτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰ μὴ ἐγίνετο τὸ τόδε διανύσαι προηγούμενον, δι' ἀέρος δὲ ἦν τὴν διέξοδον ποιήσασθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο ἡμῖν μέλειν τὸ ἐν ὅτῳ σταδίῳ γῆς ἐσμεν, ἢ ὅσον ἠνύσαμεν· καὶ εἰ κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἔδει μὴ τοσόνδε χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μόνον κινεῖσθαι, μηδ' ἄλλην τινὰ πρᾶξιν εἰς χρόνον ἀνήγομεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐν μνήμῃ ἄλλον ἂν καὶ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐποιησάμεθα. γνώριμον δέ, ὅτι τῆς διανοίας ἐχούσης τὸ πραττόμενον ὅλον καὶ πιστευούσης οὕτω πάντως πραχθήσεσθαι οὐκ ἂν ἔτι προσέχοι γιγνομένοις ἑκάστοις. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν τις ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ ποιῇ, μάτην ἂν ἔτι παρατηροῖ ἕκαστα τοῦ ταὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄστρα φερόμενα τὰ αὑτῶν πράττοντα φέρεται καὶ οὐχ ἵνα

soul's activity is directed to other things, and completely directed to them, it will not accept the memory of things like these when they have passed away, since it is not aware of the sense-impression produced by them when they are there. Then again, one might understand the point that things which happen altogether incidentally do not necessarily come to be present in the imaging faculty, and even if they did would not necessarily be there in such a way that it would guard and observe them, but the impression of a thing like this does not produce a conscious perception, if one took what was said in the following sense. This is what I mean: if it is never a primary consideration to us in local motion to cut through this piece of air and then that, or, even more, to pass through the air at all, we shall not observe the air or have an idea of it in our minds as we walk. For if it was not a primary consideration to us to complete a particular stretch of the road, but we could go on our way through the air, it would be no concern of ours at what milestone in the land we were, or how much of the way we had covered; and if we did not have to travel for a particular space of time, but only to travel, and referred no other activity to time, we should not remember successive periods of time. It is also well known that when our reason grasps what is being done as a whole, and has confidence that it will be completely carried out in this particular way, it will not any more attend to the details as they occur. Again, when someone is always doing the same thing, there would be no point in his observing the details of this same operation. If, then, the heavenly bodies in their courses move along concerned with their own affairs and not

παρέλθῃ ταῦτα ὅσα παρέρχεται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἡ θέα ὧν πάρεισιν, οὔτε τὸ παρελθεῖν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε ἡ πάροδος, πρὸς ἄλλοις τε ἡ γνώμη μείζοσι, τά τε αὐτὰ ἀεὶ δι' ὧν διέρχονται ταῦτα, ὅ τε χρόνος οὐκ ἐν λογισμῷ ὁ ἐν τοσῷδε, εἰ καὶ διῃρεῖτο, οὐκ ἀνάγκη οὔτε τόπων ὧν παρίασιν οὔτε χρόνων εἶναι μνήμην· ζωήν [1] τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα, ὅπου καὶ τὸ τοπικὸν αὐτοῖς περὶ ταὐτόν, ὡς μὴ τοπικόν, ἀλλὰ ζωτικὸν τὸ κίνημα εἶναι ζῴου ἑνὸς εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐν στάσει μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, κινήσει δὲ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῇ ἀιδίῳ οὔσῃ— καὶ μὴν εἰ καὶ χορείᾳ ἀπεικάσειέ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτῶν, εἰ μὲν ἱσταμένῃ [2] ποτέ, ἡ πᾶσα ἂν εἴη τελεία ἡ συντελεσθεῖσα ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος, ἀτελὴς δὲ ἡ ἐν μέρει ἑκάστη· εἰ δὲ τοιαύτῃ [3] οἷα ἀεί, τελεία ἀεί. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ τελεία, οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τελεσθήσεται οὐδὲ τόπον· ὥστε οὐδὲ ἔφεσιν ἂν ἔχοι οὕτως· ὥστε οὔτε χρονικῶς οὔτε τοπικῶς μετρήσει· ὥστε οὐδὲ μνήμη τούτων. εἰ μέντοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ζωὴν ζῶσι μακαρίαν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς τὸ ζῆν προσεμβλέποντες, ταύτῃ δὲ [4] τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἓν [ταύτῃ] [5] τῇ νεύσει καὶ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν ἐλλάμψει—ὥσπερ χορδαν ἐν λύρᾳ συμπαθῶς κινηθεῖσαι μέλος ἂν ᾄσειαν ἐν φυσικῇ τινι ἁρμονίᾳ—εἰ οὕτω κινοῖτο ὁ σύμπας

[1] $A^{pc}C^{pc}$ (=Schegk), Creuzer* (*vitam* Ficinus): *ζώων* A^{ac} $ExUC^{ac}$.
[2] Kirchhoff*: *ἱσταμένη* H–S^1.
[3] Kirchhoff*: *τοιαύτη* H–S^1.
[4] Volkmann*: *τῇ δὲ* wxC: *τῆδε* U.
[5] del. Volkmann*, ut correctionem ad *τῇ* falso loco insertam.

in order to cover the distance which they cover, and their business is not the sight of what they pass or the passing, and their passage is incidental and their mind is on other, greater things, and these things which they travel through are always the same, and the time taken on a particular stage of their course is not calculated (even if it were divided into stages): then there is no necessity for them to have any memory of the regions they have passed through or the periods of time; and they have the same life, in that their local movement also is around the same centre, so that it is not a local but a vital movement, the movement of a single living being with a self-directed activity, at rest in relation to what is outside it, but in motion by virtue of the everlasting life in it—even if one were to compare their motion to a dance, if it was a dance which at some time came to a stop, the whole would be perfect when it had been completed from beginning to end, but each figure which formed a part of it would be imperfect; but if it is the sort of dance which goes on for ever, it is for ever perfect. But if it is for ever perfect, it has no time or space within which it will be completed; so consequently it will have no aspiration [for completion]; and in consequence of this it will not measure either temporally or spatially; and consequently it will have no memory of this. If, of course, the heavenly bodies themselves live a blessed life, and contemplate this life besides with their souls, by this direction of their souls towards one object and by the illumination which extends from them to the whole heaven—like strings on a lyre plucked harmoniously they sing a song which is naturally in tune—if this is how the whole heaven

οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ, πρὸς αὑτὸν φερόμενος καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλως πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλης αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς θέσεως οὔσης, ἔτι ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὀρθοῖτο μιᾶς ζωῆς καὶ ὁμοίας τῆς πάντων ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔσης.

9. Ὁ δὲ δὴ πάντα κοσμῶν Ζεὺς καὶ ἐπιτροπεύων καὶ διατιθεὶς εἰσαεί, ψυχὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ πρόνοιαν, ὅπως γίνοιτο, καὶ γινομένων ἐπιστασίαν καὶ τάξει διοικῶν καὶ περιόδους ἑλίττων πολλὰς ἤδη καὶ τελέσας, πῶς ἂν ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μνήμην οὐκ ἔχοι; ὁπόσαι τε ἐγένοντο καὶ οἷαι αἱ περίοδοι, καὶ ὡς ἂν καὶ ἔπειτα γένοιτο, μηχανώμενος καὶ συμβάλλων καὶ λογιζόμενος μνημονικώτατος ἂν εἴη πάντων, ὅσῳ καὶ δημιουργὸς σοφώτατος. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν περιόδων τῆς μνήμης καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἂν ἔχοι πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, ὁπόσος ἀριθμὸς εἴη καὶ εἰ εἰδείη. πεπερασμένος γὰρ ὢν ἀρχὴν τῷ παντὶ χρονικὴν δώσει· εἰ δ' ἄπειρος, οὐκ εἰδήσει, ὁπόσα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἔργα. ἢ ὅτι ἕν,[1] εἰδήσει, καὶ μία ζωὴ[2] ἀεί—οὕτως[3] γὰρ ἄπειρος—καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐ γνώσει ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ, συνόντος ἀεὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἀπείρου, μᾶλλον δὲ παρεπομένου καὶ θεωρουμένου οὐκ ἐπακτῷ γνώσει. ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον τῆς

[1] Kirchhoff*: ἐν Enn., H–S[1].
[2] Theiler: μιᾷ ζωῇ Enn.*
[3] Kirchhoff, Volkmann*: οὗτος Enn., H–S[1].

[1] As Plotinus says at the beginning of the next chapter, it was legitimate for a Platonist of his period to use "Zeus" as a name either for Divine Intellect or for the Soul of the Universe: cp. III. 5. 8, where Zeus is Intellect. The general

and its parts move, the heaven itself being self-directed and the different parts having the same direction in different ways (since their positions are different), then our account will be still more correct, since the life of all the heavenly bodies is still more one and uniform.

9. But Zeus who sets all things in order and administers and directs them for ever, who has a "royal soul" and a "royal mind" and foresight of how things will happen and authority over them when they have happened, and arranges the heavens in order and sets their cycles turning and has already brought many cycles to completion, how could he not have memory when all this is going on[1]? In his devising and comparing and calculating how many cycles and of what kind there have been, and how thereafter they may come to be, he would have the best memory of all, just as he is the wisest craftsman. Now the matter of his memory of the cycles is in itself one of much difficulty; there is the question of how great the number is and whether he could know it. For if the number is limited it will give the All a temporal beginning; but if it is unlimited, he will not know how many his works are. Now he will know that his work is one and a single life for ever—this is how the number is unlimited—and will know the unity not externally, but in his work; the unlimited in this sense will always be with him, or rather follows upon him and is contemplated by a knowledge which has not come to him from something other than himself. For as he knows the

description of the activity of Zeus is inspired by Plato *Phaedrus* 246E4–6; his "royal soul" and "royal mind" are from *Philebus* 30D1–2.

ζωῆς οἶδεν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πᾶν οὖσαν μίαν, οὐχ ὅτι εἰς τὸ πᾶν.

10. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κοσμοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸν δημιουργὸν λέγομεν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν, καὶ τὸν Δία λέγοντες ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν φερόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντός. ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἀφαιρετέον πάντη τὸ πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω μίαν αὐτῷ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἄχρονον ζωὴν διδόντας. ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ζωὴ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχουσα ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖ λόγον, εἰ οὖν καὶ αὕτη μὴ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι ἔχει τὸ ζῆν, μηδ' ἐν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅ τι δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἤδη γὰρ ἐξεύρηται καὶ τέτακται ἃ δεῖ, οὐ ταχθέντα· τὰ γὰρ ταχθέντα ἦν τὰ γινόμενα, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αὐτὰ ἡ τάξις· τοῦτο δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐξηρτημένης μενούσης [1] φρονήσεως, ἧς εἰκὼν ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξις. οὐ τρεπομένης δὲ

[1] A^{ac}E, Creuzer*: *μέσης οὔσης* A^{pc}xUC, H–S^{1}.

[1] It seems to have been traditional in the Platonic school to identify the Craftsman, the maker of the world in the *Timaeus*, with Divine Intellect, and Plotinus maintains this identification, though for him Universal Soul is the transcendent organising and directing principle of the material

unlimitedness of his own life, so he knows his activity exercised upon the All as being one single activity, but not that it is exercised upon the All.

10. But since the ordering principle is twofold, we speak of one form of it as the Craftsman and the other as the Soul of the All; and when we speak of Zeus we sometimes apply the name to the Craftsman [1] and sometimes to the ruling principle of the All. In the case of the Craftsman we must completely eliminate " before " and " after " and give him a single unchanging and timeless life. But the life of the universe which contains in itself the ruling principle still requires discussion [to determine] whether this too has a life which is not spent in calculation or in enquiring what it ought to do.[2] [It does], for the things it ought to do have already been discovered and ordered without being set in order; for the things set in order were the things that happened, and what made them was the order; and this is the activity of soul which depends on an abiding intellect of which the image is the order in soul. But if that intelligence does not change, it is

universe, its lower phase, Nature, being the immanent principle of life and bodily form. Soul's creative activity is for him real and important (cp. V. 1. 2; II. 9. 18) but instrumental and intermediary, entirely dependent on the creative energy of the living World of Forms which is Intellect: cp. V. 8. 7. 15–16. So Intellect remains for him the " true Craftsman and maker of the universe " (V. 9. 3. 25–6).

[2] The spontaneous, unreasoning (though supremely intelligent) character of the creative activity of Intellect and higher soul is something on which Plotinus several times insists, against Jews, Christians and simple-minded Platonists who supposed that God thought out his plans for the world and then made it: cp. especially the chapter cited in the last note, V. 8. 7.

ἐκείνης ἀνάγκη μηδὲ ταύτην τρέπεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν βλέπει ἐκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ βλέπει· ἀπολειπομένη γὰρ ἂν ἀποροῖ· μία γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ἓν ἔργον. τὸ γὰρ ἡγεμονοῦν ἓν κρατοῦν ἀεί, καὶ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν κρατοῦν, ὁτὲ δὲ κρατούμενον· πόθεν γὰρ τὰ πλείω, ὥστε καὶ γενέσθαι μάχην ἢ ἀπορίαν; καὶ τὸ διοικοῦν ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἐθέλει· διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, ἵνα εἰς πλείω ἀπορῇ; καίτοι, εἰ καὶ ἓν οὖσα μεταβάλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἤδη πολλὰ τὸ πᾶν καὶ μέρη ἔχει καὶ ἐναντιώσεις πρὸς τὰ μέρη, διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀποροῖ, ὅπως διαθεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν ἄρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, καὶ ἀπὸ πρώτου ἀρξαμένη ὁδῷ ἀνεμποδίστῳ ἐπὶ πάντα εἶσι καὶ κοσμεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρατεῖ, ὅτι ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἔργου μένει τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ταὐτόν. εἰ δ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο βούλοιτο, πόθεν τὸ ἄλλο; εἶθ' ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ἀπορήσει, καὶ ἀσθενήσει τὸ ἔργον αὐτῇ εἰς ἀμφίβολον τοῦ πράττειν ἐν λογισμοις ἰούσῃ.

11. Ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ζῴου ἡ διοίκησις, ἡ μέν τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ μερῶν, ἡ δέ τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἰατρὸς μὲν ἔξωθεν ἀρχόμενος καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἄπορος πολ-

necessary that this soul does not change either; for it does not sometimes look to Intellect and sometimes not; for if it left off looking it would be perplexed; for there is one soul and one work. For the ruling principle is one, always dominant, and not sometimes dominant and sometimes dominated: for from what source could come a multiplicity [of ruling principles] so that there would be strife between them and perplexity? And the one directing principle always wills the same thing: for why should it will now one thing and now another, so as to be perplexed about the multiple alternatives? Yet, even if, being one thing, it were to change, it would not be perplexed; for because the All is already many, and has parts, and oppositions between the parts, it is not for this reason in perplexity about how it shall arrange them; for it does not start from the last and lowest things, or from the parts, but from the primary things, and beginning from the first it proceeds by an unobstructed way to all things and arranges them in ordered beauty and dominates them for this reason, because it persists in one and the same work and is the same thing. But if it wishes for one thing after another, where would the other thing it wished for come from? Then it would be perplexed about what it ought to do, and its work would weaken as it advanced in its calculations to uncertainty about what to do.

11. The administration of the universe is like that of a single living being, where there is one kind which works from outside and deals with it part by part, and another kind which works from inside, from the principle of its life. So a doctor begins from outside and deals with particular parts and is often perplexed

λαχῇ καὶ βουλεύεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπροσδεὴς βουλεύσεως. καὶ δεῖ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν διοίκησιν καὶ τὸν διοικοῦντα ἐν τῷ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐ κατ' ἰατροῦ ἕξιν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ φύσις. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντων ἐμπεριειλημμένων ὡς μερῶν ζῴου ἑνός. πάσας γὰρ τὰς φύσεις κρατεῖ μία, αἱ δὲ ἔπονται ἀνηρτημέναι καὶ ἐξηρτημέναι καὶ οἷον ἐκφῦσαι, ὡς αἱ ἐν κλάδοις τῇ τοῦ ὅλου φυτοῦ. τίς οὖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἢ τίς ἀρίθμησις ἢ τίς ἡ μνήμη παροῦσης ἀεὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐνεργούσης καὶ κρατούσης καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ διοικούσης; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ποικίλα καὶ διάφορα τὰ γινόμενα, δεῖ συνεπόμενον ταῖς τοῦ γινομένου μεταβολαῖς καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡγεῖσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ ποικίλα τὰ γινόμενα, τοσούτῳ τὸ ποιοῦν ὡσαύτως μένον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ζῴου τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντα, αἱ ἡλικίαι, αἱ ἐκφύσεις ἐν χρόνοις, οἷον κεράτων, γενείων, μαζῶν αὐξήσεις, ἀκμαί, γενέσεις ἄλλων, οὐ τῶν πρόσθεν λόγων ἀπολλυμένων, ἐπιγιγνομένων δὲ ἄλλων· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ γεννωμένῳ αὖ ζῴῳ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ σύμπαντα λόγον εἶναι. καὶ δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φρόνησιν ἄξιον περιθεῖναι καὶ καὶ ταύτην καθόλου εἶναι οἷον κόσμου φρόνησιν ἑστῶσαν, πολλὴν μὲν καὶ ποικίλην καὶ αὖ ἁπλῆν ζῴου ἑνὸς μεγίστου, οὐ τῷ πολλῷ ἀλλοιουμένην,

and considers what to do, but nature begins from the principle of life and has no need of consideration. And the administration and the administrator of the All must not behave like a doctor in its ruling, but like nature. But the administration of the universe is much simpler, in that all things with which it deals are included as parts of a single living being. For one nature rules all the natures, and they come after it, depending on and from it, growing out of it so to speak, as the natures in branches grow out of that of the whole plant. What calculation, then, can there be or counting or memory when intelligence is always present, active and ruling, ordering things in the same way? One certainly should not think that, because a great variety of different things comes to pass, that which produces them also conforms to the changes of the product. The unchanging stability of the producer is in proportion to the variety of products. For the things which happen according to nature in one single living being are many, and they do not all happen at once; there are the different ages and the growths which occur at particular times, for instance of the horns or the beard or the breasts; there is the prime of life and procreation of other living things; the previous rational forming principles are not destroyed, but others come into operation as well; this is clear from the fact that the same rational forming principle [which is in the parent], and the whole of it, is also in the offspring. So it is right to attribute the same [unchanging] intelligence [to the Soul of the All] and that this, as belonging to the universe, is a kind of static universal intelligence, manifold and varied, and yet at the same same time simple, belonging to a single mighty

ἀλλὰ ἕνα λόγον καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντα, οὐκ ἐκείνη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ μερῶν ἡ φρόνησις.

12. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον ἔργον φύσεως ἄν τις εἴποι, φρονήσεως δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὔσης καὶ λογισμοὺς ἀνάγκη καὶ μνήμας εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων τὸ φρονεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ φρονεῖν τιθεμένων, καὶ το ζητεῖν φρονεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ φρονεῖν νενομικότων. τὸ γὰρ λογίζεσθαι τί ἄλλο ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι εὑρεῖν φρόνησιν [1] καὶ λόγον ἀληθῆ καὶ τυγχάνοντα [νοῦ] [2] τοῦ ὄντος; ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ λογιζόμενος κιθαρίζοντι εἰς κιθάρισιν καὶ μελετῶντι εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ὅλως τῷ μανθάνοντι εἰς γνῶσιν. ζητεῖ γὰρ μαθεῖν ὁ λογιζόμενος ὅπερ ὁ ἤδη ἔχων φρόνιμος· ὥστε ἐν τῷ στάντι τὸ φρονεῖν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λογισάμενος· ὅταν γὰρ εὕρῃ ὃ δεῖ, πέπαυται λογιζόμενος· καὶ ἀνεπαύσατο ἐν τῷ φρονῆσαι γενόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τοὺς μανθάνοντας τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦ παντὸς τάξομεν, λογισμοὺς ἀποδοτέον καὶ ἀπορίας καὶ μνήμας συμβάλλοντος τὰ παρεληλυθότα τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ τοῖς μέλλουσιν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἰδότα, ἐν στάσει ὅρον ἐχούσῃ νομιστέον αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν. εἶτα εἰ μὲν οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα—τὸ γὰρ μὴ εἰδέναι λέγειν ἄτοπον—διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ ὅπως ἔσται οὐκ εἰδήσει; εἰ δὲ εἰδήσει καὶ ὅπως ἔσται, τί ἔτι δεῖ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ τὰ παρεληλυθότα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συμβάλλειν; καὶ ἡ γνῶσις δὲ τῶν

[1] $A^{sc}E$, Perna*: φρονεῖν $A^{pc}xUC$, H–S^1.
[2] del. Vitringa, Volkmann*.

living being, not subject to change because of the multiplicity of things, but a single rational principle and all things at once; for if it was not everything, it would not be that [universal] intelligence, but the intelligence of partial things.

12. But perhaps someone might say that a work of this kind belongs to nature, but it is necessary that the intelligence which is in the All should have calculations and memories. This is a statement of men who assume that unintelligence is intelligence, and have come to the conclusion that to seek to be intelligent is the same thing as being intelligent. For what else could calculation be but the effort to find intelligence and reason which is true and attains to the truly existent? For the man who calculates is like one who is playing the lyre to acquire the art of lyre-playing or who is practising to acquire habitual proficiency, or in general like one who is learning in order to know. For the man who is calculating seeks to learn that which if someone already possesses, he is intelligent: so that intelligence is in one who has come to rest. The man who has been calculating is himself a witness to this; for when he finds what is needed, he stops calculating; and he comes to rest because he has entered into intelligence. If then we are going to put the ruling principle of the universe into the class of learners, we should attribute to it calculations and perplexities and memories which are proper to one who compares the past with the present and the future. But if we are going to class it as the knower, we must consider that its knowing is in a repose which reached its term. Then if it knows future events—and it would be absurd to say that it did not—why will it not

μελλόντων, εἴπερ αὐτῷ συγχωρεῖται παρεῖναι, οὐ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη, οἷα τοῖς μάντεσι πάρεστιν, ἀλλ' οἷα αὐτοῖς τοῖς ποιοῦσι τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν ὅτι ἔσται, τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τοῖς πάντα κυρίοις, οἷς οὐδὲν ἀμφίβολον οὐδὲ ἀμφιγνοούμενον. οἷς ἄρα ἄραρεν ἡ δόξα, τούτοις παραμένει. ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα καὶ περὶ μελλόντων φρόνησις, οἵα καὶ ἡ περὶ παρόντων, κατὰ τὸ ἑστάναι· τοῦτο δὲ λογισμοῦ ἔξω. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ οἶδε τὰ μέλλοντα, ἃ αὐτὸς ποιήσει, οὐδὲ εἰδήσει ποιήσει[1] οὐδὲ πρός τι βλέπων [ποιήσει],[2] ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπελθὸν ποιήσει· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ εἰκῇ. μένει ἄρα καθὸ ποιήσει. ἀλλ' εἰ μένει καθὸ ποιήσει, οὐκ ἄλλως ποιήσει, ἢ ὡς οἷον τὸ ἐν αὑτῷ παράδειγμα ἔχει. μοναχῶς ἄρα ποιήσει ὡσαύτως· οὐ γὰρ νῦν μὲν ἄλλως, ὕστερον δὲ ἄλλως, ἢ τί κωλύει ἀποτυχεῖν; εἰ δὲ τὸ ποιούμενον διαφόρως ἕξει, ἀλλ' ἔσχε γε διαφόρως οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δουλεῦον λόγοις· οὗτοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὥστε ἠκολούθησε τοῖς ἐφεξῆς λόγοις. ὥστε οὐδαμῇ τὸ ποιοῦν ἀναγκάζεσθαι πλανᾶσθαι οὐδ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδ' ἔχειν πράγματα, ὥσπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν δύσκολον εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πράγματα ἦν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἔργοις ἀλλοτρίοις·

[1] Kirchhoff*: ποιῆσαι Enn., H–S[1].
[2] delevimus.

know how they will turn out? And if it knows how they will turn out, why does it still need calculation and comparison of past events with present? And its knowledge of future events, granted that it has it, will not be like that which diviners have, but like that which those have who make things happen with full confidence that they will do so; this is the same as saying, those who are fully masters of the situation to whom nothing is doubtful or disputable. Now those who have a fixed opinion retain it permanently. The intelligence of future things is, then, in its stability, of the same kind as that of present things; but this is outside the sphere of calculation. But if it does not know the future things which it is going to make, it will not make them with knowledge or looking at any [model] but will make whatever comes to it; but this is the same as saying, it will make at random. [The model], then, according to which it will make, abides. But if that according to which it will make abides, it will not make otherwise than in conformity with the pattern which it has in itself. It will make, then, in one single unvarying way; for it will not make now in one way and now in another, or what is there to prevent its failing? But if that which is being made is in different states, these different states do not derive from itself, but it is subservient to the rational forming principles; and these come from the maker, so that it follows upon the forming principles in their series. So the maker is in no way compelled to be in doubt or perplexity or to have difficulties, as some people have thought who considered the administration of the universe to be a burden. For to have difficulties is a matter, so it seems, of undertaking tasks which

τοῦτο δὲ ὧν μὴ κρατεῖ. ὧν δέ τις κρατεῖ καὶ μόνος, τίνος ἂν οὗτος δέοιτο ἢ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ βουλήσεως; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ φρονήσεως· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ ἡ βούλησις φρόνησις. οὐδενὸς ἄρα δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπειδὴ οὐδ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀλλοτρία, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς οὐδενὶ ἐπακτῷ χρώμενος. οὐδὲ λογισμῷ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μνήμῃ· ἐπακτὰ γὰρ ταῦτα.

13. Ἀλλὰ τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης φύσεως ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις; ἢ ὅτι ἡ μὲν φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἔσχατον· ἴνδαλμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὂν ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λόγον ἔχει, οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ διικνοῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος, ἐναργοῦς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ ἄνω, ἴχνους δὲ ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος τοῦ κάτω. ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ· ὃ γὰρ ἔχει τῷ ἐφεξῆς διδοῦσα ἀπροαιρέτως, τὴν δόσιν τῷ σωματικῷ καὶ ὑλικῷ ποίησιν ἔχειν, οἷον καὶ τὸ θερμανθὲν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἁψαμένῳ δέδωκε τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος, θερμὸν ἐλαττόνως ποιῆσαν. διὰ τοῦτό τοι ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει· ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρεῖττον· φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως. ἡ μέν γε οὐθενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ φαντασία σύνεσιν ἐπακτοῦ· δίδωσι γὰρ τῷ

[1] Plotinus here recognises, but does not satisfactorily solve, one of the great difficulties which his idea of unreasoning intelligence brings with it in his hierarchical system. This is, as he says here, how to explain in any intelligible way the difference between the unreasoning intelligence of Intellect and higher soul, which is above reason and imagination, and

do not belong to one, that is, of which one is not master. But in work of which someone is master, and sole master, what does he need except himself and his own will? But this is the same thing as his own intelligence; for in a being of this kind will is intelligence. So a being like this needs nothing for its making, since its intelligence does not belong to someone else but is itself, using nothing brought in from outside. So it does not use calculation or memory; for these come from outside.

13. But how will intelligence of this kind differ from what we call nature[1]? It differs in that intelligence is primary, but nature is last and lowest. For nature is an image of intelligence, and since it is the last and lowest part of soul has the last ray of the rational forming principle which shines in it, just as in a thick piece of wax a seal-stamp penetrates right through to the surface on the other side, and is clear on the upper side, but a faint trace on the lower. For this reason it does not know, but only makes; for since it gives what it has spontaneously to what comes after it, it has its giving to the corporeal and material as a making, just as a heated body gives its own form to that which is next in contact to it and makes it hot in a lesser degree. For this reason nature does not have an imaging faculty either; but intellect is higher than the power of imaging: the imaging faculty is between the impression of nature and intellect. Nature has no grasp or consciousness of anything, but the imaging faculty has consciousness of what comes from outside; for it gives to the

the unreasoning creativity of Nature, the soul-principle immanent in the physical world, which is below reason and imagination (for its unconscious activity see III. 8. 3–4).

φαντασθέντι εἰδέναι ἃ ἔπαθεν· ἡ δὲ γέννα αὐτὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἔχει, ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ἐκομίσατο εἰς ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκεκόμιστο, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ σύνεσις νοούσης· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐμφαντασθὲν εἰς ὕλην φύσις, ἐν ᾗ ἵσταται τὰ ὄντα, ἣ καὶ πρὸ τούτου, καὶ ἔστιν ἔσχατα ταῦτα τοῦ νοητοῦ· ἤδη γὰρ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μιμήματα. ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις εἰς αὐτὴν ποιοῦσα καὶ πάσχουσα, ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ πλησίον αὐτῆς ποιοῦσα οὐ πάσχει, ἡ δ' ἔτι ἄνωθεν εἰς σώματα ἢ εἰς ὕλην οὐ ποιεῖ.

14. Τὰ δὲ σώματα ὑπὸ φύσεως λεγόμενα γίγνεσθαι τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα αὐτὸ τοῦτο [τὰ σώματα],[1] τὰ δὲ ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἆρα οὕτως, ὥστε τὴν φύσιν οἷον παρακειμένην ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν; οἷον ἐπὶ φωτὸς ἔχει· ἀπελθόντος οὐδὲν ὁ ἀὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οἷον χωρὶς τὸ φῶς, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ οἷον οὐ [2] κιρνάμενος· ἢ οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ θερμανθέντος, οὗ ἀπελθόντος μένει τις θερμότης ἑτέρα οὖσα παρὰ τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ πυρί, πάθος τι τοῦ θερμανθέντος. τὴν μὲν γὰρ μορφήν, ἣν δίδωσι τῷ πλασθέντι, ἕτερον εἶδος θετέον παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν. εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅ ἐστιν οἷον μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, ζητητέον. καὶ ἥτις μὲν διαφορὰ φύσεως καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρονήσεως, εἴρηται.

[1] del. Kirchhoff.
[2] Creuzer, Volkmann* (*non* Ficinus), cf. IV. 3. 22. 3: ὁ Enn., H–S[1].

one who has the image the power to know what he has experienced; but intellect itself is origin and activity which comes from the active principle itself. Intellect, then, possesses, and the Soul of the All receives from it for ever and had always received, and this is its life, and what appears at each successive time is its consciousness as it thinks; and that which is reflected from it into matter is nature, in which, or indeed before it, the real beings come to a stop, and these are the last and lowest realities of the intelligible world: for what comes after at this point is imitation. But nature acts on matter and is affected by it, but that soul which is before nature and close to it acts without being affected, and that which is still higher does not act on bodies or matter.

14. As for the bodies which are said to be produced by nature, the elements are just precisely products of nature; but are the animals and plants so disposed as to have nature present in them? Their relationship to nature is like that of air to light: when light goes away air holds nothing of it, but the light is in a way separate and the air is separate and as if it did not mix with the light. Or it is like that of fire and the heated body, when if the fire goes away a heat remains which is distinct from the heat in the fire and is an affection of the heated body. In the same way the shape which nature gives to the formed body must be considered as another form, distinct from nature itself. But if the body has anything else besides this, which is somehow in between it and nature itself, we must investigate it. And so we have explained the difference between nature and the intelligence in the All about which we were speaking.

15. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄπορον πρὸς [τὰ νῦν][1] ἅπαντα τὰ ⟨νῦν⟩[1] εἰρημένα· εἰ γὰρ αἰὼν μὲν περὶ νοῦν, χρόνος δὲ περὶ ψυχήν—ἔχειν γάρ φαμεν ⟨ἐν⟩[2] τῇ ὑποστάσει[3] τὸν χρόνον περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης—πῶς οὐ, μεριζομένου τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἔχοντος, μερίζοιτο ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐπιστρέφουσα ποιήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ τὴν μνήμην; καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν μὲν τῷ αἰῶνι τὴν ταὐτότητα, ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν ἑτερότητα τίθεσθαι, ἢ ταὐτὸν αἰὼν ἔσται καὶ χρόνος, εἰ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείαις τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐ δώσομεν. ἆρ' οὖν τὰς μὲν ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς μεταβολὴν δεχομένας τήν τε ἄλλην καὶ τὴν ἔνδειαν οἷα ἐν χρόνῳ φήσομεν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅλου γεννᾶν μὲν χρόνον, οὐ μὴν ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι; ἀλλ' ἔστω μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ· τί ἐστιν, ὃ ποιεῖ γεννᾶν αὐτὴν χρόνον, ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰῶνα; ἢ ὅτι, ἃ γεννᾷ, οὐκ ἀίδια, ἀλλὰ περιεχόμενα χρόνῳ. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν ἄττα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ποιήματα. ἀίδιοι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὕστερος, καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔλαττον χρόνου· περιέχειν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ὥσπερ, φησί, τὸ ἐν τόπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

16. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν αὐτῇ τόδε μετὰ τόδε καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῶν ποιουμένων, κἂν εἰ

[1] transpos. Theiler.
[2] Igal.
[3] Enn., H–S.: *τὴν ὑπόστασιν* Kirchhoff*.

15. But there is the following difficulty in relation to all that has just been said: for if eternity belongs to Intellect and time to Soul—for we maintain that we grasp time in its essential nature as around the activity of soul and deriving from it—how, if time is divided up, and has a past, will not the activity of soul be divided up, and when it turns towards the past will produce memory in the Soul of the All as well [as in our souls]? For, again, one must place sameness in eternity and otherness in time, or time and eternity will be the same, even if we do not attribute change to the activities of soul. Shall we then say that our souls, which are subject to other kinds of change and especially to deficiency, are somehow in time, but the soul of the universe generates time, but is not in time? But, granted that it is not in time, what makes it generate time, and not eternity? It is because the things which it generates are not eternal, but encompassed by time; since even the [individual] souls are not in time, but such affections as they have are, and the things they make. For the souls are eternal, and time is posterior to them, and that which is in time is less than time; for time must encompass what is in time, as is the case, Aristotle says, with what is in place and number.[1]

16. But if in soul one thing comes after another and if it itself makes some of its works earlier and some later, that is, if it makes them in time, it also

[1] *φησί* "he says" refers here, exceptionally, to Aristotle, not to Plato; cp. I. 1. 4. 26. The reference is to *Physics* Δ, 12, 221a18 and 28–30. This is the clearest assertion in Plotinus that individual human souls in their true, highest nature live, not in time, but in eternity.

ἐν χρόνῳ, αὐτὴ ποιεῖ, καὶ νεύει καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρεληλυθός. ἢ ἐν τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ παρεληλυθός, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ οὐδὲν παρεληλυθός, ἀλλὰ πάντες οἱ λόγοι ἅμα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποιουμένοις τὸ οὐχ ἅμα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοῦ, καίτοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ ὁμοῦ, οἷον χεῖρες καὶ πόδες οἱ ἐν λόγῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς χωρίς. καίτοι κἀκεῖ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ χωρίς· ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἄλλον τρόπον. ἢ τὸ μὲν χωρὶς εἴποι ἄν τις ἑτερότητι· τὸ δὲ πρότερον πῶς, εἰ μὴ ἐπιστατοῖ τὸ τάττον; ἐπιστατοῦν δὲ ἐρεῖ τὸ τόδε μετὰ τόδε· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα πάντα ἔσται; ἢ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τὸ τάττον καὶ ἡ τάξις, οὕτως ὡς οἷον λέγειν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστατοῦν ἡ πρώτη τάξις, οὐκέτι λέγει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ μόνον τόδε μετὰ τόδε. εἰ γὰρ λέγει, εἰς τάξιν βλέπων λέγει· ὥστε ἕτερον τῆς τάξεως ἔσται. πῶς οὖν ταὐτόν; ὅτι μὴ ὕλη καὶ εἶδος τὸ τάττον, ἀλλ' εἶδος μόνον καὶ δύναμις, καὶ ἐνέργεια δευτέρα μετὰ νοῦν ἐστι ψυχή· τὸ δὲ τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐ δυναμένοις ἅμα πάντα. σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθείς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα. εἰ δὲ τἀγαθόν τις κατὰ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε,

[1] The reference back is to the end of ch. 11.
[2] Cp. V. 8. 7. 23 ff.

directs itself to the future; and if so, also to the past. Now the earlier and the past are in the things it makes, but in it nothing is past, but all the rational forming principles are present at once, as has been said.[1] But in the things that are made there is no simultaneity, as there is no togetherness, though there is togetherness in the rational forming principles, as the hands and feet in the rational principle are together, but in the objects of sense they are separate. And yet there is separateness in another way in the intelligible world; so that there is also priority in another way. Now one could speak of separateness consisting in otherness; but how could one speak of priority unless the arranging principle gave orders? But if it gives orders it will say "this after that": for why will not all things exist at once? Now if the arranging principle is other than the arrangement, it will be of such a kind as to speak, in a way; but if that which gives orders is the primary arrangement, it no longer says, but only makes this after that.[2] For if it says it, it does so with its eye on the arrangement: so that it will be other than the arrangement. How then is it the same? Because the arranging principle is not form and matter, but only form and power, and Soul is the second active actuality after Intellect; but the "this after that" is in the [material] things which cannot all exist at once. For the soul of this kind is a noble thing, like a circle fitting itself round its centre, the first expansion after the centre, an unextended extension: for this is how each [of the intelligible realities] is. But if one ranks the Good as a centre one would rank Intellect as an unmoved circle and Soul as a moving circle; but moving by

κινούμενον δὲ τῇ ἐφέσει. νοῦς γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ ἔχει καὶ περιείληφεν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος ἐφίεται. ἡ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς σφαῖρα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκείνως ἐφιεμένην ἔχουσα ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι κινεῖται. πέφυκε δὲ ᾗ σῶμα τοῦ οὗ ἔστιν ἔξω ἐφίεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ περιπτύξασθαι καὶ περιελθεῖν πάντῃ ἑαυτῷ. καὶ κύκλῳ ἄρα.

17. Ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὕτως αἱ νοήσεις αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ[1] τὸ ὕστερον καὶ αἱ ζητήσεις ὧδί; ἆρ' ὅτι πολλὰ ἃ ἄρχει καὶ κινεῖται, καὶ οὐχ ἓν κρατεῖ; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πρὸς τὴν χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὡρισμένον ἐν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλο ἔξω. ὅθεν ἄλλο τὸ βούλευμα καὶ πρὸς καιρόν, ὅτε ἡ χρεία πάρεστι καὶ συμβέβηκεν ἔξωθεν τουτί, εἶτα τουτί. καὶ γὰρ τῷ πολλὰ ἄρχειν ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι καὶ ἐπικτήτους καὶ καινὰς ἄλλου ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐμποδίους τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου κινήμασι καὶ ἐνεργήμασιν. ὅταν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κινηθῇ, ἦλθεν ἡ φαντασία τούτου οἷον αἴσθησις ἀπαγγελτικὴ καὶ μηνυτικὴ τοῦ πάθους ἀπαιτοῦσα συνέπεσθαι καὶ ἐκπορίζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμούμενον· τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν ἀπόρῳ συνεπόμενον καὶ πορίζον ἢ καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον γίνεται. καὶ ὁ θυμὸς δὲ εἰς ἄμυναν παρακαλῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖ κινηθείς, καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος χρεῖαι καὶ τὰ

[1] χρόνῳ καὶ Theiler: χρόνοις Enn.*

aspiration. For Intellect immediately possesses and encompasses the Good, but Soul aspires to [the Good] beyond being. But the sphere of the All, since it possesses the soul which aspires in that way, moves by its natural aspiration. But its natural aspiration as a body is to that which it is outside: that is, it is an enfolding and surrounding it on every side with itself, and so therefore [movement in] a circle.

17. But why are not the thoughts and reasonings of the soul of this kind in us too, but here below we are in time and there is succession and in this way investigations? Is it because there are many things which rule and are moved, and it is not one which has the power? Yes, and it is because there is one thing after another related to our needs and the present moment, not definite in itself but always related to one external thing after another; as a result our decisions are different and relevant to the occasion when the need arises, and now this and now that external incident occurs. For because there are many that rule it is necessary that there should be many mental images, and they must come in from outside and the images of one must be new to another, and they must get in the way of the movements and activities of each individual part. For when the desiring part of the soul is moved, the mental image of its object comes like a perception announcing and informing us of the experience, and demanding that we should follow along with it and obtain the desired object for it; but our other part necessarily falls into perplexity, whether it goes along and obtains the object or resists. And the spirited part when it summons us to repel something does the same when it is moved, and the needs of

πάθη ἄλλα ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλα δοξάζειν· καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι εἴπῃ πάντη ἀγομένη, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος τούτων ἄλλα. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον αὐτὸ ἄλλα δοξάζει; ἢ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἡ ἀπορία καὶ ἡ ἀλλοδοξία· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ βελτίστου ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν δοθεὶς τῷ [ἀσθενὴς] [1] εἶναι ἐν τῷ μίγματι, οὐ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀσθενής, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ ἐκκλησίας ὁ ἄριστος τῶν συμβούλων εἰπὼν οὐ κρατεῖ, ἀλλ' οἱ χείρονες τῶν θορυβούντων καὶ βοώντων, ὁ δὲ κάθηται ἡσυχῇ οὐδὲν δυνηθείς, ἡττηθεὶς δὲ τῷ θορύβῳ τῶν χειρόνων. καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μὲν τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ ἀνδρὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ἐκ πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ πολιτείαν τινὰ φαύλην· ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ ⟨ὡς⟩ [2] ἐν ᾗ πόλει κἂν χρηστόν τι κρατήσειε δημοτικῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἀκράτου οὔσης· ἐν δὲ τῷ βελτίονι ἀριστοκρατικὸν τὸ τῆς ζωῆς φεύγοντος ἤδη τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῖς ἀμείνοσι διδόντος· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀρίστῳ, τῷ χωρίζοντι, ἓν τὸ ἄρχον, καὶ παρὰ τούτου εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ἡ τάξις· οἷον διττῆς πόλεως οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἄνω, τῆς δὲ τῶν κάτω, κατὰ τὰ ἄνω κοσμουμένης. ἀλλ' ὅτι γε ἐν

[1] del. Kirchhoff*.
[2] Theiler.

[1] Plotinus is not interested in politics. When, as here, he expresses political opinions incidentally in the course of a Platonic analogy between soul and state, they are taken from Plato and Aristotle and have little relevance to the Roman Empire in the 3rd century A.D.; though the belief in the inferiority of democracy which he expresses here would have been shared, not only by his friends of the Roman senatorial aristocracy but by everyone who wrote or spoke about politics in the later Roman Empire (Christians as well as pagans). For the sources of the opinions here see Plato *Republic* VIII 557 ff. and (for the μέσος and his state) Aristotle *Politics* IV 1295a25 ff.

the body and the passions make us have continually different opinions. Then there is ignorance of the [true] good, and the soul's not knowing what to say when it is dragged in every direction, and still other results from the mixture of all these. But is it actually our best part which has different opinions? No, perplexity and variety of opinions belong to the gathering [of our various parts and passions]: from our best part the right account of the matter is given to the common gathering, and is weak because it is in the mixture, not by its own nature. But it is as if in the great clamour of an assembly the best of the advisers does not prevail when he speaks, but the worse of those who clamour and shout, but he sits quietly unable to do anything, defeated by the clamour of the worse. And in the worst kind of man there is the common gathering and his human nature is composed of everything in the manner of a bad political constitution; in the middling man it is as it is in the city in which some good can prevail as the democratic constitution is not entirely out of control; but in the better kind of man the style of life is aristocratic; his human nature is already escaping from the common gathering and giving itself over to the better sort.[1] But in the best man, the man who separates himself, the ruling principle is one, and the order comes from this to the rest. It is as if there was a double city, one above and one composed of the lower elements set in order by the

τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁμοίως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλως, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἴρηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ.

18. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τι ἔχει τὸ σῶμα καὶ παρούσης ζῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχον ἤδη τι ἴδιον, ἢ ὃ ἔχει ἡ φύσις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ προσομιλοῦν τῷ σώματι ἡ φύσις. ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ, οἷον τὸ ἄψυχον καὶ οἷον ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ πεφωτισμένος, ἀλλ' οἷον ὁ τεθερμασμένος, καὶ ἔστι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῷου καὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ δὲ οἷον σκιὰν ψυχῆς ἔχοντα, καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι δὲ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονὰς περὶ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμά ἐστιν· ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τούτου ἀλγηδὼν καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡδονὴ εἰς γνῶσιν ἀπαθῆ ἔρχεται. λέγω δὲ ἡμῖν τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, ἅτε καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ὄντος· διὸ καὶ μέλει ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡμῶν ὄντος. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦτό ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς, οὔτε καθαροὶ τούτου ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐξήρτηται καὶ ἐκκρέμαται ἡμῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ κύριον, ἡμῶν δὲ ἄλλως ὅμως τοῦτο. διὸ καὶ ἡδομένου καὶ ἀλγοῦντος μέλει, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀσθενέστεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὅσῳ ἑαυτοὺς μὴ χωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἡμῶν τὸ τιμιώτατον καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τιθέμεθα καὶ οἷον εἰσδυόμεθα εἰς αὐτό. χρὴ γὰρ τὰ πάθη τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ψυχῆς ὅλως εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ σώματος τοιοῦδε καί τινος κοινοῦ καὶ συναμφοτέρου. ὅταν γὰρ ἕν τι ᾖ, αὑτῷ οἷον αὔταρκές ἐστιν. οἷον σῶμα μόνον τί ἂν πάθοι ἄψυχον ὄν; διαιρούμενόν τε γὰρ οὐκ αὐτό,

powers above. But now it has been explained that in the soul of the All there is unity, sameness and likeness, but in other souls things are different, and what the reasons for this are. So much, then, for that.

18. Now about whether the body has anything by itself, and possesses already something of its own in its life when soul is present, or whether what it has is nature, and this, nature, is what is in association with body. Now the body itself, in which are soul and nature, cannot be something of a soulless kind or like air which is illuminated, but it must be like air which is warmed; the body of an animal or a plant has a kind of shadow of soul, and pain and bodily pleasures affect a body which is so qualified; but the pain of this body and pleasure of this kind result for us in a dispassionate knowledge. When I say " for us " I am referring to the other soul, since the qualified body does not belong to someone else, but is ours, and so we are concerned with it because it belongs to us. We ourselves are not it, nor are we clear of it, but it depends upon and is attached to us. " We ourselves " refers to the dominant and essential part of us; this body is in a different way ours, but ours all the same. So we are concerned with its pains and pleasures, more in proportion as we are weaker and do not separate ourselves, but consider the body the most honourable part of ourselves and the real man, and, so to speak, sink ourselves in it. For we must say that experiences of this kind do not belong entirely to the soul, but to the qualified body and something common and composite. For when something is one, it is sufficient to itself; for example, what could happen to body by itself if it was lifeless?

ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕνωσις. ψυχή τε μόνη οὐδὲ τοῦτο
25 [οὐδὲ τὸ διαιρεῖσθαι],[1] καὶ οὕτως ἔχουσα ἐκφεύγει
πᾶν. ὅταν δὲ δύο ἐθέλῃ ἓν εἶναι, ἐπακτῷ χρη-
σάμενα τῷ ἓν ἐν τῷ οὐκ ἐᾶσθαι εἶναι ἓν τὴν
γένεσιν εἰκότως τοῦ ἀλγεῖν ἔχει. λέγω δὲ δύο
οὐκ, εἰ δύο σώματα· μία γὰρ φύσις· ἀλλ' ὅταν
ἄλλη φύσις ἄλλῃ ἐθέλῃ κοινωνεῖν καὶ γένει ἄλλῳ,
30 καί τι τὸ χεῖρον λάβῃ παρὰ τοῦ κρείττονος, καὶ
ἐκεῖνο μὲν μὴ δυνηθῇ λαβεῖν, ἐκείνου δέ τι ἴχνος,
καὶ οὕτω γένηται δύο καὶ ἓν μεταξὺ γενόμενον τοῦ
τε ὃ ἦν καὶ τοῦ ὃ μὴ ἐδυνήθη ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν
ἐγέννησεν αὑτῷ ἐπίκηρον κοινωνίαν καὶ οὐ
βεβαίαν εἰληχός, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἀεὶ φερομένην.
35 κάτω τε οὖν καὶ ἄνω αἰωρούμενον φερόμενον μὲν
κάτω ἀπήγγειλε τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀλγηδόνα, πρὸς δὲ τὸν
ἄνω τὴν ἔφεσιν τῆς κοινωνίας.

19. Τοῦτο δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον ἡδονήν τε εἶναι καὶ
ἀλγηδόνα, εἶναι μὲν ἀλγηδόνα γνῶσιν ἀπαγωγῆς
σώματος ἐνδάλματος ψυχῆς στερισκομένου,
ἡδονὴν δὲ γνῶσιν ζῴου ἐνδάλματος ψυχῆς ἐν
5 σώματι ἐναρμοζομένου πάλιν αὖ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν τὸ
πάθος, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ
γειτονίᾳ αἰσθανομένης καὶ ἀπαγγελάσης τῷ εἰς ὃ
λήγουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ ἠλγύνθη μὲν ἐκεῖνο·

[1] del. Kirchhoff*, ut glossam ad οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

[1] For a clear and full explanation of Plotinus's doctrine of the parts played by body and soul in experiencing pleasure and pain see H. J. Blumenthal *Plotinus' Psychology* ch. 5, "The Affections". The essential point of it is that only body

For if it was divided the division would not affect it itself, but the unity in it. And soul by itself is not subject even to division, and when it is in this state escapes everything. But when two things aspire to unity, since the unity which they have is an extraneous one, the origin of pain, it is reasonable to expect, lies in their not being permitted to be one. I do not mean "two" as if there were two bodies, for they would have one and the same nature; but when one nature wants to share with another one, and a different kind, and the worse takes something from the better, and cannot take it itself but only a trace of it, and so there come to be two things, and one which has come to be in between what it was and what it could not grasp, this makes difficulties for itself by acquiring a communion with the other which is hazardous and insecure, always borne from one extreme to the other. So it swings up and down, and as it comes down it proclaims its pain, and as it goes up its longing for communion.

19. This is what people call pleasure and pain; pain is consciousness of withdrawal of a body which is being deprived of the image of soul, and pleasure is the knowledge of a living being that the image of soul is again fitting itself back in the body. The affection, then, is there, in the body, but the knowledge belongs to the perceptive soul, which perceives in the neighbourhood of the affection and reports to that in which the sense-perceptions terminate.[1] And it was the body which felt the pain—I mean by "felt

is genuinely affected: soul perceives the affection without being affected (on Plotinus's difficulties in maintaining this position see Blumenthal l.c.).

λέγω δὲ τὸ "ἠλγύνθη" τὸ "πέπονθεν ἐκεῖνο". οἷον ἐν τῇ τομῇ τεμνομένου τοῦ σώματος ἡ μὲν διαίρεσις κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον, ἡ δ' ἀγανάκτησις κατὰ τὸν ὄγκον τῷ μὴ μόνον ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοιόνδε ὄγκον εἶναι· ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ φλεγμονή· ᾔσθετο δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ παραλαβοῦσα τῷ ἐφεξῆς οἷον κεῖσθαι. πᾶσα δὲ ἤσθετο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάθος οὐκ αὐτὴ παθοῦσα. αἰσθανομένη γὰρ πᾶσα ἐκεῖ λέγει τὸ πάθος εἶναι, οὗ ἡ πληγὴ καὶ ἡ ὀδύνη. εἰ δ' ἦν αὐτὴ παθοῦσα ἐν παντὶ ὅλη τῷ σώματι οὖσα, οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐμήνυσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔπαθεν ἂν τὴν ὀδύνην πᾶσα καὶ ὠδυνήθη ὅλη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἐδήλωσεν ὅτι ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ ὅπου ἐστὶν εἶπεν ἂν ἐκεῖ· ἔστι δὲ πανταχοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὁ δάκτυλος ἀλγεῖ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλγεῖ, ὅτι ὁ δάκτυλος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. τὸν δὲ δάκτυλον ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται ἀλγεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ γλαυκὸς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ[1] τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ γλαυκόν. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν τὸ πεπονθὸς ἀλγεῖ, εἰ μή τις τὸ "ἀλγεῖ" μετὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς αἰσθήσεως περιλαμβάνοι· περιλαμβάνων δὲ δηλονότι τοῦτο σημαίνει, ὡς ὀδύνη μετὰ τοῦ μὴ λαθεῖν τὴν ὀδύνην τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἀλλ' οὖν τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὴν οὐκ ὀδύνην λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ γνῶσιν ὀδύνης· γνῶσιν δὲ οὖσαν ἀπαθῆ εἶναι, ἵνα γνῷ καὶ ὑγιῶς ἀπαγγείλῃ. πεπονθὼς γὰρ ἄγγελος σχολάζων τῷ πάθει ἢ οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλει, ἢ οὐχ ὑγιὴς ἄγγελος.

[1] suspic. Creuzer, scr. Kirchhoff*: καὶ Enn., H–S[1].

the pain " that the body was affected; as in a surgical operation when the body is cut the division is in its material mass, but the distress is felt in the mass because it is not only a mass, but a mass qualified in a particular way; it is there too that inflammation occurs. But the soul perceives it, taking it over because it is, so to speak, situated next to it. The whole soul perceives the affection in the body without being affected itself. For it perceives as a whole and says that the affection is there where the wound and the pain are. But if it was affected itself, being wholly present in every part of the body, it would not have said or indicated that the affection was there [in that particular place] but would all have been affected by the pain, and in pain as a whole, and would not have said or made clear that the pain was there [in that particular place] but would have said that it was there where the soul is; but the soul is everywhere. But as it is the finger has a pain, and the man has a pain, because the man's finger does. The man is said to have a pain in his finger in the same way as we speak of a bright-looking man, because of his bright eyes. So then that which is affected has the pain, unless one takes " has the pain " as including the immediately consequent perception: if one includes this obviously one is indicating that pain goes with sense-perception's awareness of the pain. But, then, the sense-perception itself is not to be called pain, but knowledge of pain; but since it is knowledge it is unaffected, so that it can know and give a sound report. For a messenger who is affected, if he gives himself over to the affection, either does not deliver his message or is not a sound and reliable messenger.

20. Καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτω κοινοῦ καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης σωματικῆς φύσεως ἀκόλουθον τίθεσθαι γίνεσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι σώματι δοτέον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως καὶ προθυμίας, οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ ἁλμυρῶν ἢ γλυκέων ζήτησιν, ἀλλὰ ὃ σῶμα μέν ἐστιν, ἐθέλει δὲ μὴ μόνον σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κινήσεις ἐκτήσατο πλέον ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπίκτησιν ἠνάγκασται τρέπεσθαι· διὸ οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἔχον ἁλμυρῶν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ γλυκέων, καὶ ὑγραίνεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μελῆσαν, εἰ μόνον ἦν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐκεῖ ἐκ τῆς ὀδύνης ἐγίνετο ἡ γνῶσις, καὶ ἀπάγειν ἐκ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ πάθος ἡ ψυχὴ βουλομένη ἐποίει τὴν φυγήν, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου παθόντος διδάσκοντος τοῦτο φεύγοντός πως καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ συστολῇ, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις μαθοῦσα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἐγγύς, ἣν δὴ φύσιν φαμὲν τὴν δοῦσαν τὸ ἴχνος, ἡ μὲν φύσις τὴν τρανὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τέλος οὖσαν τῆς ἀρξαμένης ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀφ' ἧς ἤδη ἢ πορίζει ἡ ψυχή, ἧς τὸ πορίζειν, ἢ ἀντιτείνει καὶ καρτερεῖ καὶ οὐ προσέχει οὔτε τῷ ἄρξαντι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, οὔτε τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπιτεθυμηκότι. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δύο ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν μόνον τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε; ἢ εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον ἡ φύσις, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ σῶμα τὸ τοιόνδε παρὰ τῆς φύσεως γενόμενον—ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φύσις πρὸ τοῦ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα γενέσθαι, αὕτη γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα πλάττουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα—ἀνάγκη

20. And it is consistent to attribute the origin of the bodily desires to this kind of common entity and bodily nature. For the origin of appetite and impulse is not to be attributed to the body in any sort of state, nor the search for savoury or sweet to the soul itself, but [the origin] is that which is body, but wants to be not only body, but has acquired a greater number of movements than the soul itself, and has been compelled by this acquisition to turn in many directions; so when it is in one state it desires savoury things, in another sweet, and to be cooled, or warmed, which would be of no concern of its if it was alone. But just as in the case of pain it was from the pain that the knowledge came, and the soul, wishing to take the body away from that which produced the affection, brought about flight—and the part which was primarily affected taught it this by taking flight itself in a way by its contraction—so in this case too it is sense-perception which acquires knowledge and the soul near by, which we call nature, which gives the trace of soul to the body; nature knows the explicit desire which is the final stage of that which begins in the body, and sense-perception knows the image, and the soul starts from the image, and either provides what is desired—it is its function to do so—or resists and holds out and pays no attention either to what started the desire or to that which desired afterwards. But why do we say that there are two desires, but not that it is only that qualified body which we have been discussing that desires? Because, if nature is one thing and the qualified body another which has come into being from nature (for nature exists before the qualified body has come into being, since it itself makes the qualified body, shap-

μήτε ἄρχειν αὐτὴν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σῶμα τὸ πεπονθὸς ταδὶ καὶ ἀλγυνόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει ἐφιέμενον, ἡδονῆς ἐκ τοῦ πονεῖν καὶ πληρώσεως ἐκ τῆς ἐνδείας· τὴν δὲ φύσιν ὡς μητέρα, ὥσπερ στοχαζομένην τῶν τοῦ πεπονθότος βουλημάτων, διορθοῦν τε πειρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐπανάγειν εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ζήτησιν τοῦ ἀκεσομένου ποιουμένην συνάψασθαι τῇ ζητήσει τῇ τοῦ πεπονθότος ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ τὴν περάτωσιν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ—εἴποι ἄν τις προεπιθυμίαν ἴσως καὶ προθυμίαν—τὴν δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου καὶ δι' ἄλλου ἐπιθυμεῖν, τὴν δὲ ποριζομένην ἢ μὴ ἄλλην εἶναι.

21. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι, περὶ ὃ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι μαρτυροῦσιν αἱ διάφοροι. ἄλλαι γὰρ παίδων καὶ μειρακίων καὶ ἀνδρῶν αἱ σωματικαὶ ὑγιαινόντων τε καὶ νοσούντων τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ σωματικὸν καὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε εἶναι τρεπόμενον παντοίας τροπὰς παντοδαπὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἴσχει. καὶ τὸ μὴ συνεγείρεσθαι δὲ πανταχοῦ ταῖς λεγομέναις προθυμίαις τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, εἰς τέλος τῆς σωματικῆς μενούσης, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὸν λογισμὸν εἶναι μὴ βούλεσθαι ἢ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν ἐπί τι προελθοῦσαν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν λέγει, ὅσον ἦν ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν μὴ συνάψασθαι αὐτὴν μηδὲ προσθέσθαι,[1] μηδὲ βούλεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης, ἄγειν εἰς φύσιν, ὡς ἂν αὐτὴν τῷ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιστατοῦσαν. εἰ δέ τις πρὸς τὸ πρότερον λέγοι ἀρκεῖν τὸ σῶμα

[1] A^{ac}, Kirchhoff, Müller, Volkmann: προθέσθαι A^{pc}ExUC.

ing and forming it), then it is necessary that nature should not begin desire; but it must be the qualified body which is affected in particular ways and feels pain in desiring the opposite of what it experiences, pleasure instead of suffering and sufficiency instead of want; but nature is like a mother, trying to make out the wishes of the sufferer, and attempting to set it right and bring it back to herself; and, searching for the remedy, she attaches herself by her search to the desire of the sufferer, and the consummation of the desire passes from the body to nature. So one might say, perhaps, that the desiring comes from the body itself—one might call it preliminary desiring and eagerness—but that nature desires from and through something else, and it is another soul which provides what is desired or does not.

21. The differences of age-groups show that it is in this region that desire starts, for the bodily desires of children and adolescents and men, and of healthy men and sick men, are different though the desiring faculty is the same: because it is bodily and a qualified body it is subject to every sort of change and has every variety of desire. And the whole desire is not in all cases aroused by what we call impulses and does not wish to eat or drink before consideration though the bodily desire persists to the end; this means that the desire reaches a certain point, as far as it was in the qualified body, but nature does not attach itself to the desire or associate itself with it or wish, as the desire is not according to nature, to bring it into nature, since it has to decide itself what is against nature and according to nature. But if someone answers this first argument by saying that the body in its different states is sufficient to

διάφορον γινόμενον διαφόρους τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ποιεῖν, οὐκ αὔταρκες λέγει πρὸς τὸ ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλως αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου διαφόρους ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν, ὁπότε οὐδ' αὐτῷ γίνεται τὸ ποριζόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἡ τροφὴ ἢ θερμότης καὶ ὑγρότης [οὐδὲ κίνησις] [1] οὐδὲ κούφισις κενουμένου οὐδὲ πλήρωσις μεστουμένου, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου πάντα.

22. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυτῶν ἆρα ἄλλο μὲν τὸ οἷον ἐναπηχηθὲν τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ χορηγῆσαν, ὃ δὴ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ φυτικόν, ἢ ἐν μὲν τῇ γῇ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἐν αὐτῇ οὔσης, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου; ζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις πρότερον, τίς ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ γῇ, πότερα ἐκ τῆς σφαίρας τοῦ παντός, ἣν καὶ μόνην δοκεῖ ψυχοῦν πρώτως Πλάτων, οἷον ἔλλαμψις [2] εἰς τὴν γῆν, ἢ πάλιν αὖ λέγων πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν τῶν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ δίδωσι ψυχὴν οἵαν καὶ τοῖς ἄστροις· πῶς γὰρ ἂν θεὸς εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἐκείνην ἔχοι; ὥστε συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅπως ἔχει ἐξευρεῖν δύσκολον, καὶ μείζω ἀπορίαν ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὁ Πλάτων γίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πρότερον, πῶς ἂν εὐλόγως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα δόξειε. τὴν μὲν οὖν φυτικὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἔχει ἡ γῆ, ἐκ τῶν φυομένων

[1] del. Igal.
[2] Kirchhoff*: ἔλλαμψιν ARJUC, H–S: ἔλαμψιν EB.

[1] This passage illustrates the attitude of Plotinus to reason and the traditional authority of Plato. He is primarily

make the desires in the desiring faculty different, he does not produce a sufficient reason to show why when one thing is affected in different ways the desiring faculty itself has various desires on behalf of this other, when what is provided to satisfy the desires is not for it. For certainly food, warmth, moisture, relief of what is emptied or satisfaction of what is filled, do not benefit the desiring faculty, but they all belong to the body.

22. But in the case of plants, is the kind of echo of soul in their bodies one thing and that which supplies it another, which is the desiring power in us, but the growth-power in them, or is this in the earth, as the earth has a soul in it, and is it what comes from this which is in plants? One might enquire first what soul there is in the earth. Is it a kind of illumination coming to the earth from the sphere of the All, which alone Plato seems to think primarily ensouled; or, on the other hand, when he says that the earth is " the first and oldest of the gods within heaven ", does he give it too a soul like that of the stars? For how could it be a god if it did not have a soul like that? So the consequence is that it is difficult to discover the real state of affairs, and what Plato has said makes the situation more, or at least not less, perplexing. But first of all we should consider what appears to be most probably the real state of affairs.[1] One might con-

concerned to arrive at a true, rationally defensible solution of the problem with which he is dealing; and, though Plato seems to him to be the safest guide to follow, his reverence for him is not so exaggerated as to prevent him here and elsewhere complaining of the difficulties raised by the obscurity or carelessness of the master's language: cp. III. 6. 12. 9–11.

ἐξ αὐτῆς ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ζῷα πολλὰ ἐκ γῆς γινόμενα ὁρᾶται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ζῷον ἄν τις εἴποι αὐτὴν εἶναι; ζῷον δὲ τοσοῦτον οὖσαν καὶ οὐ σμικρὰν μοῖραν τοῦ παντὸς διὰ τί οὐ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φήσειε καὶ οὕτω θεὸν εἶναι; εἴπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν ζῷον μέρος τοῦ παντὸς ζῷου οὖσαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξωθεν μὲν συνέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἀλλοτρίας φατέον, ἔνδον δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ὡς οὐ δυναμένης καὶ αὐτῆς ἔχειν οἰκείαν. διὰ τί γὰρ τὰ μὲν πύρινα δύναται, τὸ δὲ γήινον οὔ; σῶμα γὰρ ἑκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἶνες οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σάρκες οὐδ' αἷμα οὐδὲ ὑγρόν· καίτοι ἡ γῆ ποικιλώτερον καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῶν σωμάτων. εἰ δ' ὅτι δυσκίνητον, τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἐκ τόπου λέγοι τις ἄν. ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πῶς; πῶς γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ σαρκῶν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐδ' ὅλως σῶμα δοτέον τῇ ψυχῇ, ἵνα αἰσθάνοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ σώματι δοτέον ψυχήν, ἵνα ᾖ καὶ σῴζοιτο τὸ σῶμα· κριτικῇ δὲ οὔσῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει βλεπούσῃ εἰς σῶμα καὶ τῶν τούτου παθημάτων τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι. τίνα οὖν ⟨τὰ⟩[1] παθήματα γῆς, καὶ τίνων αἱ κρίσεις; ἐπεὶ[2] καὶ τὰ φυτά, καθόσον γῆς, οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. τίνων οὖν αἰσθήσεις καὶ διὰ τίνων; ἢ οὐ τολμητέον καὶ ἄνευ ὀργάνων γίνεσθαι

[1] Theiler.
[2] Müller: ἔπειτα Enn., H–S[1] (τα correctio ad lin. 32 falso loco inserta).

jecture from the things which grow out of it that the earth has a growth-soul; but if many animals are visibly produced by the earth, why should one not say also that it is an animal? But since it is so large an animal, and no small part of the All, why should not one say that it has intelligence also, and so is a god? For if each of the stars is a living thing, why should not the earth also be a living thing, since it is part of the universal living thing? For one must certainly not say that it is held together from outside by a soul which does not belong to it, but has no soul within it, as if it was not able to have a soul of its own as well as the stars. For why should the fiery bodies be able to have a soul, but not the body of earth? For both are bodies, and the stars do not have muscular fibres or flesh or blood or humours any more than the earth does; even though the earth is more varied in composition and made of all bodies. But if [it is objected] that it is not very mobile, one might say that this only refers to its not moving from its place. But how does it have sense-perception? Well, how do the stars? For perception does not belong to flesh, nor, in general, does a body have to be given to the soul so that it may perceive, but a soul to the body so that the body may exist and be kept in being; but since the soul has the power of making judgments it can look to the body and make a judgment also about the body's affections. What then are the affections of the earth, and about what are the judgments made? Plants, too, insofar as they belong to earth, have no perceptions. Of what, then, are the earth's perceptions, and through what organs do they come? It is surely not too rash to say that perceptions take place with-

αἰσθήσεις; καὶ εἰς τίνα δὲ χρείαν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτῇ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ γινώσκειν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἴσως † γνῶσις, οἷς μὴ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεταί τις χρεία. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὴν χρείαν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἴδησίς τις οὐκ ἄμουσος, οἷον ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς· αἱ γὰρ τούτων αἰσθήσεις καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖαι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ πάλιν, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις τῇ γῇ, καὶ [ζῴων][1] τίνων αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ πῶς. ἢ ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον ἀναλαβεῖν τὰ ἀπορηθέντα καὶ καθόλου λαβεῖν, εἰ ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ πρὸς χρείαν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, κἂν εἰ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν χρείαν γίγνοιτο.

23. Δεῖ δὴ θέσθαι, ὡς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀντίληψις τὴν προσοῦσαν τοῖς σώμασι ποιότητα συνιείσης καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν ἀποματτομένης. ἢ τοίνυν μόνη ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἀντιλήψεται, ἢ μετ' ἄλλου. μόνη μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πῶς; ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς γὰρ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ μόνον νόησις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, δεῖ πρότερον καὶ ταῦτα ἐσχηκέναι ἤτοι ὁμοιωθεῖσαν ἢ τῷ ὁμοιωθέντι συνοῦσαν. ὁμοιωθῆναι μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μένουσαν

[1] del. Theiler.

[1] The most likely supposition seems to be that γνῶσις here is a gloss on the whole phrase which has ousted some other word now lost; as it is not possible to be quite certain what that word was, I print the MSS text with Henry-Schwyzer and translate δύναμις, a plausible suggestion of Cilento.

out organs. And what use would perception be to the earth? It would not need it for knowledge. For the power of thought[1] perhaps suffices for beings which have no need arising from sense-perception. One could not, however, accept this argument. For over and above need there is in the objects of perception a knowing which brings a not uncivilised pleasure, of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, and the sky and the earth, for instance: for the perception of these is pleasant in itself. This, then, we must consider later; now we must go back to the question whether the earth has perceptions, and of what it has perceptions, and how long it has them. First, we must take up again the difficulties which have been raised, and consider in general whether there can be perception without organs, and if perceptions are to meet a need, or if they have any other purpose independent of need.

23. We must suppose that the perception of sense-objects is for the soul or the living being an act of apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and takes the impression of their forms. Well, then, the soul will either apprehend alone by itself or in company with something else. But how can it do this when it is alone and by itself? For when it is by itself it apprehends what is in itself, and is pure thought; but if it also apprehends other things it must first have taken possession of them as well, either by becoming assimilated to them, or by keeping company with something which has been assimilated. But it cannot be

Henry-Schwyzer tentatively conjectured χρῆσις and Thillet (*Revue internationale de philosophie* 24, 1970, 206) now suggests δόσις.

οὐχ οἷόν τε. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁμοιωθείη σημεῖον
γραμμῇ; ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ νοητὴ τῇ αἰσθητῇ ἂν γραμμῇ
ἐφαρμόσειεν, οὐδὲ τὸ νοητὸν πῦρ ἢ ἄνθρωπος τῷ
αἰσθητῷ πυρὶ ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἡ φύσις ἡ
ποιοῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ γενομένῳ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς
ταὐτόν. ἀλλὰ μόνη, κἂν εἰ οἷόν τε τῷ αἰσθητῷ
ἐπιβάλλειν, τελευτήσει εἰς νοητοῦ σύνεσιν, ἐκφυγόν-
τος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ αὐτήν, οὐκ ἐχούσης ὅτῳ αὐτοῦ
λάβοιτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν ὅταν ψυχὴ πόρρωθεν
ὁρᾷ, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα εἶδος εἰς αὐτὴν ἥκῃ, ἀρχόμε-
νον τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν οἷον ἀμερὲς ὂν λήγει εἰς τὸ
ὑποκείμενον χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ
ὁρώσης. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ μόνα ταῦτα εἶναι, τὸ ἔξω
καὶ τὴν ψυχήν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν πάθοι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ
πεισόμενον τρίτον εἶναι, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ τὴν
μορφὴν δεξόμενον. συμπαθὲς ἄρα καὶ ὁμοιοπαθὲς
δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὕλης μιᾶς καὶ τὸ μὲν παθεῖν, τὸ δὲ
γνῶναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι τὸ πάθος, οἷον
σῴζειν μέν τι τοῦ πεποιηκότος, μὴ μέντοι ταὐτὸν
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἅτε μεταξὺ τοῦ πεποιηκότος καὶ ψυχῆς
ὄν, τὸ πάθος ἔχειν μεταξὺ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ
κείμενον μέσον ἀνάλογον, συνάπτον πως τὰ ἄκρα

assimilated while it remains by itself. For how could a point be assimilated to a line? For even the intelligible line would not assimilate to the sensible one, nor would the intelligible fire or man assimilate to the sense-perceived fire or man (since even the nature which makes the man does not identify itself with the man who comes into being). But when the soul is alone, even if it is possible for it to direct its attention to the world of sense, it will end with an understanding of the intelligible; what is perceived by sense will escape it, as it has nothing with which to grasp it. Since also when the soul sees the visible object from a distance, however much it is a form which comes to it, that which reaches it, though it starts by being in a way without parts, ends in the substrate of the form as colour and shape, when the soul sees all that is there outside. There cannot, then, be nothing but these two things, the external object and the soul: since then the soul would not be affected; but there must be a third thing which will be affected, and this is that which will receive the form. This must be jointly subject to like affections and of one matter with the sense-object, and it must be this which is affected and the other principle [the soul] which knows; and its affection must be of such a kind that it retains something of that which produced it, but is not the same as it, but as it is between the producer of the affection and the soul, it must have an affection which lies between the sensible and the intelligible, a proportional mean somehow linking the extremes to each other, with

ἀλλήλοις, δεκτικὸν ἅμα καὶ ἀπαγγελτικὸν ὑπάρχον, ἐπιτήδειον ὁμοιωθῆναι ἑκατέρῳ. ὄργανον γὰρ ὂν γνώσεώς τινος οὔτε ταὐτὸν δεῖ τῷ γινώσκοντι εἶναι οὔτε τῷ γνωσθησομένῳ, ἐπιτήδειον δὲ ἑκατέρῳ ὁμοιωθῆναι, τῷ μὲν ἔξω διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν, τῷ δὲ εἴσω διὰ τοῦ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ εἶδος γενέσθαι. εἰ δή τι νῦν[1] ὑγιὲς λέγομεν, δι' ὀργάνων δεῖ σωματικῶν τὰς αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀκόλουθον τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν πάντη σώματος ἔξω γενομένην μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι αἰσθητοῦ. τὸ δὲ ὄργανον δεῖ ἢ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, ἢ μέρος τι πρὸς ἔργον τι ἀφωρισμένον εἶναι, οἷον ἐπὶ ἁφῆς καὶ ὄψεως. καὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ δὲ τῶν ὀργάνων ἴδοι τις ἂν μεταξὺ τῶν κρινόντων καὶ τῶν κρινομένων γινόμενα καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντα τῷ κρίνοντι τὴν τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἰδιότητα· ὁ γὰρ κανὼν τῷ εὐθεῖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ συναψάμενος ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τεθεὶς τὸ κρίνειν τῷ τεχνίτῃ τὸ τεχνητὸν ἔδωκεν. εἰ δὲ συνάπτειν δεῖ τὸ κριθησόμενον τῷ ὀργάνῳ, ἢ καὶ διά τινος μεταξὺ διεστηκότος πόρρω τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον εἰ πόρρω τὸ πῦρ τῆς σαρκός, ⟨ἢ καὶ⟩[2] τοῦ μεταξὺ μηδὲν παθόντος, [ἢ][2] οἷον εἰ κενόν τι εἴη μεταξὺ ὄψεως καὶ χρώματος, δυνατὸν ὁρᾶν τοῦ ὀργάνου τῇ δυνάμει παρόντος, ἑτέρου λόγου. ἀλλ' ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐν σώματι καὶ διὰ σώματος ἡ αἴσθησις, δῆλον.

[1] νῦν Theiler: τοίνυν Enn.*
[2] Kleist.

the capacity both of receiving and of transmitting information, suitable to be assimilated to each of the extremes. For since it is the organ of a kind of knowledge it must not be the same either as the knower or what is going to be known, but suitable to be assimilated to each, to the external object by being affected, and to the internal knower by the fact that its affection becomes form. If, certainly, what we are going to say now is sound, sense-perceptions must take place through bodily organs. This is consistent as well with the fact that the soul when it is altogether outside the body does not apprehend anything perceived by the senses. The organ must be either the body as a whole or some member of it set apart for a particular work; an example of the first is touch, of the second, sight. And one can see how the artificial kind of organs [or tools] are intermediaries between those who judge and what they are judging, and inform the judger of the characteristics of the object under consideration: for the ruler acts as link between the straightness in the soul and that in the wood; it has its place between them and enables the craftsman to judge that on which he is working. But it belongs to another discussion to determine whether what is to be judged must be immediately linked to the organ, or can affect it through a space between when it is at a distance from the sense-object, as when the fire is at a distance from the flesh, or if the medium is not affected, as if there was a void between the seeing and the colour, the possibility of seeing being due to the potential presence of the organ. But it is clear that sense-perception belongs to the soul in the body and working through the body.

24. Τὸ δὲ εἰ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἡ αἴσθησις, ὧδε σκεπτέον. εἰ δὴ ψυχῇ μὲν μόνῃ οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις γίνοιτο, μετὰ δὲ σώματος αἱ αἰσθήσεις, διὰ σῶμα ἂν εἴη, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ διὰ τὴν σώματος κοινωνίαν δοθεῖσα, καὶ ἤτοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπακολουθοῦσα—ὅ τι γὰρ πάσχει τὸ σῶμα, καὶ φθάνει τὸ πάθος μεῖζον ὂν μέχρι ψυχῆς—ἢ καὶ μεμηχάνηται, ὅπως καὶ πρὶν μεῖζον γενέσθαι τὸ ποιοῦν, ὥστε καὶ φθεῖραι, ἢ καὶ πρὶν πλησίον γενέσθαι, φυλάξασθαι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, πρὸς χρείαν ἂν εἶεν αἱ αἰσθήσεις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν, τῷ μὴ ἐν γνώσει ὄντι ἀλλ' ἀμαθαίνοντι διὰ συμφοράν, καὶ ἵνα ἀναμνησθῇ διὰ λήθην, οὐ τῷ μήτε ἐν χρείᾳ μήτε ἐν λήθῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ περὶ τῆς γῆς ἂν μόνον εἴη σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἄστρων ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου. μέρεσι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς μέρη, οἷς καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ὑπάρχει, γένοιτο ἂν αἴσθησις κατὰ τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ὅλῳ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τίς ἂν εἴη ἀπαθῶς ἔχοντι πανταχῇ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτόν; καὶ γὰρ εἰ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον τοῦ αἰσθανομένου εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ οὗ αἰσθάνεται ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὅλον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν δι' οὗ, τὸ δὲ οὗ ἡ αἴσθησις· ἀλλὰ συναίσ-

24. But the question whether perception is only concerned with need must be considered in this way. If the soul when it is alone could not have sense-perception, but its perceptions are with the body, then perception would be for the sake of the body, from which the perceptions also come, and would be given to the soul because of its communion with the body; and either it would be a necessary consequence—for every affection of the body, if it is one of the stronger ones, also reaches as far as the soul—or it has been devised so that we can take steps to guard ourselves against what is acting on the body before it becomes so strong as to destroy us, or before it comes too near. If this is so, perceptions would be intended for need. For even if they are also intended for knowledge, this would be for a being which is not in knowledge but is ignorant because of its misfortune, and so that it might remember again because of its forgetfulness, not for a being which is not in a state of need or forgetfulness. But if this is so, our investigation will not be confined to the earth, but must be about all the heavenly bodies and particularly the whole heaven and universe. For according to the present argument parts which are subject to being affected will have sensation directed to other parts, but what sensation directed to itself could the whole have, when it is in every way incapable of being affected; what sensation of itself directed to itself could the universe have? Again, if the organ of perception must belong to that which perceives, and that which it perceives must be something different from the organ, but the All is one whole, it would not have an organ through which the perception comes distinct from the object

θησιν μὲν αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν συναισθανόμεθα, δοτέον, αἴσθησιν δὲ ἀεὶ ἑτέρου οὖσαν οὐ δοτέον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἡμεῖς παρὰ τὸ καθεστὼς ἀεί τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀντιλαμβανώμεθα, ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον τῶν ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀντίληψις, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρει μέρους, τί κωλύει καὶ τὸ πᾶν τῇ ἀπλανεῖ τὴν πλανωμένην ὁρᾶν, καὶ ταύτῃ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ βλέπειν; καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀπαθῆ ταῦτα τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν, καὶ ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχειν καὶ τὴν ὅρασιν μὴ μόνον ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν τῆς ἀπλανοῦς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀπαγγέλλοντος τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῇ ἃ εἶδε; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαθής, διὰ τί ὡς ὄμμα οὐκ ὄψεται φωτοειδὲς ἔμψυχον ὄν; ἀλλ' ὀμμάτων, φησίν, οὐκ ἐπεδεῖτο. ἀλλ' εἰ ὅτι μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ὑπελέλειπτο ὁρατόν, ἀλλ' ἔνδον γε ἦν καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶν οὐδὲν ἐκώλυσεν· εἰ δ' ὅτι μάτην ἂν ἦν αὐτὸν ὁρᾶν, ἔστω μὴ προηγουμένως μὲν οὕτως ἕνεκα τοῦ ὁρᾶν γεγονέναι, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ τῷ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοιούτῳ ὄντι σώματι διαφανεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν;

25. Ἢ οὐκ ἀρκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δι' οὗ, ἵνα ὁρᾷ καὶ

which it perceives; but we must grant it self-perception, just as we are aware of ourselves, but not perception of a continual succession of different objects; since we too, when we apprehend something in our body which differs from its permanent state, apprehend it as something coming from outside. But just as with us there is not only apprehension of things outside, but apprehension of part by part, what prevents the All from seeing the sphere of the planets with that of the fixed stars, and looking at the earth and the things in it with the planetary sphere? And, if these [parts of the universe] are not free from the other affections, why should they not have other sense-perception, and particularly why should not sight not only belong to the sphere of the fixed stars as its own by itself, but as an eye announcing to the soul of the All what it sees? And even if it is not subject to the other affections, why should it not see as an eye when it is luminous and ensouled? But, Plato says, " it had no need of eyes ".[1] But if this was because there was nothing visible left outside, there were things to see within it, and nothing prevented it looking at itself; but if it was because it would be pointless for it to look at itself, let us assume that it was not brought into being as it is with the main purpose of seeing, but that seeing is a necessary consequence of its being as it is. Why should not a translucent body of this kind have the power of seeing?

25. [The answer is that] the existence of the medium is not a sufficient cause for sight, and in

[1] The reference is to *Timaeus* 33C1–2. As always, what Plato says is accepted as in some sense true, but very firmly interpreted to fit in with Plotinus's present line of argument.

ὅλως αἰσθάνηται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς νεύειν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά. ᾗ [1] δὲ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι, κἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ αὐτῇ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο τῷ πρὸς κρείττοσιν εἶναι, ὁπότε καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρα πρὸς τοῖς νοητοῖς οὖσιν, ὅτε ἐσμέν, λανθάνουσι καὶ ὄψεις καὶ αἰσθήσει ἄλλαι· κἂν πρὸς ἑτέρῳ δὲ ὅλως, τὰ ἕτερα λανθάνει. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέρει τινὶ μέρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι θέλειν, οἷον ἑαυτὸν εἰ καταβλέποι, περίεργον καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἕνεκά τινος, μάτην. ἄλλου τε ὄψιν ὡς καλοῦ ὁρᾶν, πεπονθότος καὶ ἐνδεοῦς. ὀσφραίνεσθαι δὲ [καὶ ἀκούειν] [2] καὶ γεύεσθαι χυμῶν περιστάσεις ἄν τις καὶ περιελκυσμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖτο· ἥλιον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν δέ. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι δι' ἄμφω, οὐκ ἄλογος ἡ θέσις. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπιστρέφοιτο, καὶ μνημονεύσει· ἢ ἄτοπον, ὧν εὐεργετεῖ, μὴ μνημονεύειν. πῶς οὖν εὐεργετεῖ, εἰ μὴ μνημονεύει;

26. Γίνονται δὲ εὐχῶν γνώσεις κατὰ οἷον σύναψιν καὶ κατὰ τοιάνδε σχέσιν ἐναρμοζομένων, καὶ αἱ ποιήσεις οὕτως· καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάγων τέχναις εἰς τὸ συναφὲς πᾶν· ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεσιν ἑπομέναις συμπαθῶς.

Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν γῆν αἰσθάνεσθαι

[1] Theiler: τῇ Enn., H–S[1].
[2] del. Kleist.

general for perception, but the soul must be so disposed as to incline towards sense-objects. But for the soul [of the universe], to which it is natural to be always directed towards the objects of intellect, even if it can perceive, this could not happen because it is always directed towards higher things; so with us too, when we are strongly concentrating on the objects of intellect, as long as we are in this state, sights and other perceptions pass unnoticed; and in general, when one is concentrating entirely on one thing, all the others are unnoticed. And then, too, it is mere inquisitiveness to want to apprehend a part by a part, as if a man were to look at himself, and if it is not for some purpose, it is futile. And to see the sight of something else as beautiful is the mark of someone who is suffering or in need. But smelling and tasting flavours one would consider as mere externalities and distractions of the soul; but one would suppose that the sun and the other heavenly bodies see and hear incidentally. Certainly if one supposes that they pay attention [to the world below] by means of both these senses, the supposition would not be unreasonable. But if they pay attention, they will remember: it is absurd not to remember the benefits one confers. How then will they confer benefits, if they do not remember?

26. Their knowledge of prayers is the result of a sort of linking and a particular disposition of things fitted into the whole, and the same applies to their accomplishment of what we pray for; and in the arts of the magicians everything is directed to this linking: this means that magic works by powers which follow on sympathetically.

But if this is so, why should we not give perception

δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ ποίας αἰσθήσεις; ἢ διὰ τί οὐ πρῶτον ἁφὴν καὶ μέρει μέρους ἀναπεμπομένης ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυσκίνητον, οὔτι γε ἀκίνητον. ἀλλ' ἔσονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὐ τῶν μικρῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί; ἢ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ψυχης ἐνούσης τὰς κινήσεις τὰς μεγίστας μὴ λανθάνειν. κωλύει δ' οὐδὲν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, ἵνα εὖ τίθοιτο τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ὅσον εἰς αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀνάκειται —εὖ τίθοιτο δὲ οἷον συμπαθῶς—καὶ ἀκούειν δὲ εὐχομένων καὶ ἐπινεύειν εὐχαῖς οὐχ ὃν ἡμεῖς τρόπον, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι παθητὴν εἶναι πρὸς αὑτήν. καὶ τἆλλα, οἷον ὀσμῶν πέρι καὶ τῶν γευστῶν; ἀλλ' ἤ,[1] ὅσα ὀσφραντὰ κατὰ τὰς τῶν χυλῶν ὀσμάς, πρὸς ζῴων πρόνοιαν καὶ κατασκευὴν καὶ ἐπισκευὴν τοῦ σωματικοῦ αὐτῆς. καὶ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον ἃ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄργανα· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις ταὐτά· οἷον ὦτα οὐ πᾶσι, καὶ οἷς μὴ ἔστιν, ἀντίληψίς ἐστι ψόφων. περὶ δὲ ὄψεως, εἰ φωτὸς δεῖ, πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀπαιτητέον ὄμματα. εἰ οὖν τοῦ φυτικοῦ συγχωρουμένου ἦν συγχωρεῖν, ἢ ἐν πνεύματι ὄντος τοῦ φυτικοῦ πρώτως, οὕτως ἔχειν, ⟨ἢ⟩[2] ὄντος πνεύματος, τί χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν καὶ διαφανὲς εἶναι; μᾶλλον δ' εἴπερ πνεῦμα, καὶ διαφανὲς

[1] coniecimus: ἄλλοις ἢ Enn.: ἄλλως ἢ Theiler: ἄλλων καὶ Blumenthal: del. Kirchhoff*.
[2] suspic. Cilento, add. Harder.

to the earth? But what sort of perceptions? Why not first touch, both touching of part by part (with sense-perception reporting this to the governing principle) and touching of fire and the other elements by the whole? For even if the earth's body is difficult to move, it is certainly not immovable. But the earth's perceptions will not be of small things, but of great ones. But why? Because it is necessary, since there is a soul in it, that it should not be unaware of the greatest movements. And there is nothing to prevent the earth having perceptions for this reason, too, that it may make good arrangements for men, as far as the affairs of men concern it—it will make good arrangements by a kind of sympathy —and hearing those who pray to it, and answering their prayers, not in the way we do, and being subject to affection by the other senses in relation to itself. And what about other things, for instance concerning scents and flavours? But [it will perceive] the scents which come from the juices of plants in order to provide for living things and for the construction and repair of its own bodily parts. And we must not require it to have the organs which we have: for these are not the same in all living creatures; for instance, not all have ears, and those which do not have them are able to apprehend sounds. But how about sight, if light is necessary? For we certainly must not require eyes. If, then, accepting that the earth has a power of growth, we could agree that this was so either because the power of growth was primarily in the breath of life, or because it was the breath of life, why should we disbelieve that this is also translucent? But rather, if it is the breath of life, it must also be translucent, and, when it is

καί, ἐλλαμπόμενον παρὰ τοῦ κύκλου, ἐνεργείᾳ διαφανές· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄτοπον οὐδ' ἀδύνατον ὁρᾶν τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ψυχήν. καὶ δεῖ[1] καὶ νοεῖν ψυχὴν οὐ φαύλου σώματος εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ θεὸν εἶναι· πάντως γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὴν δεῖ ἀεὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

27. Εἰ οὖν τοῖς φυτοῖς δίδωσι τὴν γεννητικήν—ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν γεννητικήν, ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ἡ γεννητική, ταύτης δὲ ἴχνος ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς—καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ὡς ἡ σὰρξ ἔμψυχος ἤδη καὶ ἐκομίσατο, εἰ ἔχει, καὶ τὴν γεννητικὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς τὰ φυτά. ἐνοῦσα δὲ δίδωσι τῷ σώματι τοῦ φυτοῦ ὅπερ βέλτιον, ᾧ διαφέρει τοῦ κοπέντος καὶ οὐκέτι φυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ξύλου. ἀλλ' αὐτῷ γε τῷ σώματι τῆς γῆς τί δίδωσιν ἡ ψυχή; οὐ ταὐτὸν δεῖ νομίζειν σῶμα εἶναι γήινον ἀποτμηθέν τε τῆς γῆς καὶ μένον συνεχές, οἷα λίθοι δεικνύουσιν αὐξόμενοι μέν, ἕως εἰσὶ συνηρτημένοι, μένοντες δὲ ὅσον ἐτμήθησαν ἀφῃρημένοι. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν μέρος ἴχνος ἔχειν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἐπιθεῖν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ πὰν φυτικόν, ὃ οὐκέτι τοῦδέ ἐστιν ἢ τοῦδε, ἀλλὰ

[1] w, Perna*: δὴ xUC.

illuminated by the heavenly circuit, actively translucent; so that there is nothing absurd or impossible in the earth's soul seeing. And we must certainly consider that it is the soul of no inferior body, so that it is even a god: for this soul must also be always good in every way.

27. If, then, the earth gives the generative soul to plants—either the generative soul itself, or the generative soul is in the earth itself and a trace of it is the generative principle in plants—in this latter case too, plants would be like flesh which is already ensouled and have acquired, if they possess it, the generative soul in themselves. And this generative soul, being present in the body of the plant, gives it what is better in it, that by which it differs from the piece which has been cut off and is no longer a plant, but only a stick. But what does the soul give to the body of the earth itself? One should not consider an earthy body the same when it is cut off from the earth and when it remains connected with it, as stones show, which grow as long as they are attached to the earth but remain the size they were cut when they are taken away from it.[1] One must therefore consider that each part has a trace of the generative soul, and the whole power of growth is diffused over this, and belongs no more to this part or that, but

[1] This remarkable doctrine that stones grow as long as they remain parts of the living body of the earth (cp. VI. 7. 11. 24–5) is a striking illustration of the strength of the conviction that the great parts of the universe, the earth and the heavenly bodies, and the universe as a whole are living organisms. The idea that minerals and stones in the earth grow is to be found in Strabo V. 2. 6 and VII. 5. 8 and may well go back to the great Stoic geographer and philosopher Posidonius: see W. Theiler *Vorbereitung d. Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1930) 74.

τῆς ὅλης· εἶτα τὴν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ φύσιν οὐκέτι τῷ σώματι συμπεφυρμένην, ἐποχουμένην δέ· εἶτα τὴν ἄλλην ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν, ἣν δὴ Ἑστίαν καὶ Δήμητραν ἐπονομάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι θείᾳ φήμῃ καὶ φύσει ἀπομαντευομένῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα χρώμενοι.

28. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἐπανιτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ζητητέον, εἰ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἡδονάς—τὰ πάθη, οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις—ἐν τῷ οὕτως ἔχοντι σώματι ἐτίθεμεν τῷ οἷον ζωωθέντι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ καὶ πάντα τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος σώματος θησόμεθα ἢ μέρους τινὸς σώματος, οἷον καρδίας οὕτως ἐχούσης ἢ χολῆς οὐ νεκροῦ σώματος· καὶ εἰ, ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ διδόντος, τὸ ἴχνος τὸ ψυχικόν, ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἕν τι τοῦτο ὁ θυμός, οὐκέτι παρὰ φυτικοῦ[1] ἢ αἰσθητικοῦ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυτικὸν ὂν παντὶ ἐδίδου τῷ σώματι τὸ ἴχνος, καὶ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἦν ἐν παντὶ καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐν παντὶ τοῦ πληροῦσθαι· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων οὐκ εἴρητο, ἀλλ' ἔστω περὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν τοιούτων τελεστικά. ἔστω δὲ ὁ περὶ τὸ ἦπαρ τόπος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχή, ὅτι τὸ φυτικὸν ἐκεῖ ἐνεργεῖ μάλιστα, ὃ τὸ ἴχνος τὸ ψυχικὸν τῷ ἥπατι καὶ τῷ σώματι παρέχει· ἐκεῖ δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἄρχεται ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ θυμικοῦ[2]

[1] Sleeman (*C.Q.* 20, 1926, 53): θυμικοῦ Enn.*
[2] Theiler: θυμοῦ Enn.*

to the whole earth: then comes the nature of sense-perception which is no longer "mixed up with the body"[1] but in contact with it from above; then the rest of the soul and its intelligence, which men, making use of divine revelation and a nature which divines such things, call Hestia and Demeter.

28. So much, then, for this. But we must go back again and enquire about the passionate power, whether, just as we placed the origin of desires, and pains and pleasures—the feelings, not the perceptions—in the body in a particular state, the body, that is, somehow given life, so we shall attribute the origin of the passionate spirit, or the passionate spirit as a whole, to the body in a particular state, or some part of the body, for instance to the heart in a particular state or the bile in a body which is not dead; and also whether, if it is something else which gives it, the passionate power is the trace of soul, or whether here the passionate spirit is this one particular thing, no longer derived from a power of growth or perception. Now in the case of desires the power of growth, which is in the whole body, gave the trace of soul to all the body, and pain and pleasure were in it all, and the origin of desire was in all the body, the desire, that is, of being satisfied; the desire of sexual pleasures was not mentioned, but let us assume that it concerns the parts which bring them to fruition. Let us grant, too, that the region around the liver is the origin of desire, because the power of growth is most active there which gives the trace of soul to the liver and to the body: it is there because its activity begins there. But about the passionate

[1] Plato *Phaedo* 66B5.

τί τε αὐτὸ καὶ τίς ψυχή, καὶ εἰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἴχνος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τὴν κίνησιν εἰς συναμφότερον τελοῦν παρέχεται, ἢ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἴχνος, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι παρέχεται. πρῶτον οὖν σκεπτέον, τί αὐτό. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάσχῃ τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν καὶ ἕτερός τις τῶν προσηκόντων, καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄν τις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ποιῇ, ὀργιζόμεθα, δῆλόν που· ὅθεν καὶ αἰσθήσεως δεῖ καὶ συνέσεώς τινος ἐν τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι. διὸ καὶ εἰς ταῦτά τις ὁρῶν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ φυτικοῦ ὡρμῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν ζητοῖ τὸν θυμὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἴσχειν. ἀλλ' ὅταν ταῖς σωματικαῖς διαθέσεσιν ἕπηται τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς πρόχειρον, καὶ ὅταν οἱ μὲν ζέοντες αἵματι καὶ χολῇ ἕτοιμοι εἰς τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ὦσιν, ἀνειμένοι δὲ πρὸς ὀργὰς οἱ ἄχολοι λεγόμενοι καὶ κατεψυγμένοι, τά τε θηρία πρὸς τὰς κράσεις ἀλλ' οὐ[1] πρὸς τὸ δοκηθὲν

[1] *κράσεις ἀλλ' οὐ* Bréhier: *κράσεις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἀλλὰ* Enn.: *βράσεις οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἀλλὰ* H–S.

[1] With the utmost regret I find myself compelled (with Theiler and B. S. Page in his latest (1969) revision of MacKenna's translation) to reject Professor H.-R. Schwyzer's emendation *βράσεις*—printed in the Henry-Schwyzer text—and fall back on the best of Bréhier's usually unacceptable critical suggestions. All that can be said in favour of *βράσεις* is excellently said by Schwyzer in his "Sieben ἅπαξ εἰρημένα bei Plotin" in *Mus. Helv.* 20 (1963) 193–5. My reason for rejecting it is not the unprecedented sense given to the rare word *βράσις* ("boiling"). Schwyzer makes a reasonable case for this, and is also of course right in saying that the substitution of *κράσεις* for *βράσεις* is paleographically easy to explain.

power [we must enquire] what it is itself and what kind of a soul it is, and whether a trace derived from it causes movement around the heart or something else which is classed as part of the composite being, or whether here it is not a trace, but the passionate power of soul itself which causes anger. First of all, then, we must consider what it is itself. It is obvious, I think, that we are angry not only over whatever our bodies suffer, but over the sufferings of anyone closely connected with us, and in general over anyone's improper behaviour. So there is need of perception and some kind of understanding in being angry. For this reason anyone looking at these facts would not think that passion arose from the power of growth, but would try to find that it had its source in some other power of soul. But when a propensity to anger follows bodily dispositions, and when those whose blood and bile are boiling are prompt to fly into a rage, and those who are said to be "without bile" and "chilly" are easy-going and slow to anger, and animals are angry because of their temperaments,[1] but not because it appears to them that

But the sense given by this emendation—that animals are not made angry by the "boiling up" of anger in another animal, but only by their supposition that they are being ill-treated—seems to me inconsistent with the whole argument of the sentence, which is that the causes of anger should be looked for in the constitution and state of the body, not in the soul. Bréhier's emendation gives exactly the necessary sense here and does not seem to me an intolerably violent change. I append Schwyzer's latest note on the passage (on a postcard to me), in which he makes clear with force and elegance in both ancient languages that he maintains his original position: "In IV 4, 28, 32 (quamvis ab omnibus nec non ab infideli Page despectus repulsus derelictus) *βράσεις* (*κἀγὼ τὰς ὀργὰς ἔχω πρὸς τὸ δοκηθὲν λυμήνασθαι*)."

λυμήνασθαι τὰς ὀργὰς ἔχωσι, πρὸς τὸ σωματικώτερον πάλιν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ ζῴου σύστασιν τὰς ὀργὰς ἄν τις ἀνοίσειε. καὶ ὅταν οἱ αὐτοὶ νοσοῦντες μὲν ὀργιλώτεροι ἢ ὑγιαίνοντες, ἄγευστοι δὲ σιτίων ἢ λαβόντες, σώματος τοιοῦδε μηνύουσι τὰς ὀργὰς ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς ὀργῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν χολὴν ἢ τὸ αἷμα οἷον ψυχοῦντα παρέχεσθαι τὰς τοιάσδε κινήσεις, ὥστε παθόντος τοῦ τοιοῦδε σώματος εὐθέως κινεῖσθαι τὸ αἷμα ἢ τὴν χολήν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ γενομένης τὴν φαντασίαν κοινώσασαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῇ τοιοῦδε σώματος διαθέσει ἤδη πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἴεσθαι· ἄνωθεν δὲ αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν λογισμῷ χρωμένην φανέντος ἀδικήματος—κἂν [1] μὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα—ἔχουσαν ἕτοιμον τὸ ἐκείνως θυμούμενον ἅτε πεφυκὸς τῷ ἀποδειχθέντι ἐναντίῳ μάχεσθαι σύμμαχον τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐγειρόμενον ἀλόγως καὶ ἐφέλκεσθαι τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λῆγον εἰς τὸ πεφυκὸς χολοῦσθαι· καὶ παρὰ τοῦ φυτικοῦ καὶ γεννητικοῦ ἄμφω γίγνεσθαι κατασκευάζοντος τὸ σῶμα οἷον ἀντιληπτικὸν ἡδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὸ δὲ πεποιηκέναι χολώδες καὶ πικρόν. καὶ ⟨τῷ⟩ [2] ἐν τοιούτῳ ⟨εἶναι⟩ [2] ψυχῆς ἴχνος [τῷ ἐν τοιούτῳ εἶναι] [2] τοιάδε κινεῖσθαι δυσχεραντικὰ καὶ ὀργίλα καὶ τῷ κεκακῶσθαι πρῶτον αὐτὸ κακοῦν πως ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ οἷον ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτῷ.

[1] Igal: καὶ Enn.
[2] transposuimus.

they have been ill-treated, one would be inclined to attribute anger again to the more bodily part and to that which keeps the living organism together. And when the same people are more prone to anger when they are ill than when they are healthy, and when they have not tasted food than when they have eaten, they indicate that fits of anger, or the origins of anger, belong to the qualified body, and that the bile or the blood, as a kind of animating principle, produce these movements of such a kind that, when the qualified body suffers, the blood or the bile are immediately set in motion, and a perception occurs, and the mental image puts the soul in touch with the state of the qualified body, and the soul launches itself against what has caused the pain; but on the other hand, the process can start from above: the reasoning soul, when a wrong appears, even if it is not a wrong which concerns the body, has that impassioned thing just described ready to hand and makes an ally of it, as it is naturally adapted to fight against the enemy which has been shown to it. And there are two kinds of angry passion, one which is irrationally awakened and drags the reason over to its side by means of the mental image, and one which begins in the reason and comes to its conclusion in that which is naturally adapted to be angry; and both of these derive from the power of growth and generation which constructs the body so as to be receptive of pleasures and pains, and it is this which makes the body bilious and bitter. And by being in a body of this kind the trace of soul is moved in this way by displeasure and anger, and, because wrong has been done to it itself first, it tries in a way to wrong the others too and, so to speak, make them

μαρτύριον δὲ τοῦ ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦτο τῷ ἑτέρῳ
ἔχνει ψυχῆς τὸ τοὺς ἧττον τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδέων
ἐφιεμένους καὶ ὅλως σώματος καταφρονοῦντας
ἧττον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ὀργὰς [καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἀπαθείᾳ].[1]
τὸ δὲ τὰ δένδρα μὴ ἔχειν θυμὸν καίπερ τὸ φυτικὸν
ἔχοντα οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἵματος οὐδὲ
χολῆς αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν. ἐγγενομένων μὲν γὰρ
τούτων ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ζέσις ἂν ἐγένετο μόνον καὶ
οἷον ἀγανάκτησις, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἐγγενομένης καὶ
πρὸς τὸ ἀδικοῦν ἂν ἤδη, ὥστε καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι,
ὁρμή. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς διαιροῖτο εἰς τὸ
ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ μὲν εἴη τὸ
φυτικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδὲς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἴχνος περὶ αἷμα
ἢ χολὴν ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν ὀρθὴ ἡ
ἀντιδιαίρεσις γίνοιτο, τοῦ μὲν προτέρου, τοῦ δὲ
ὑστέρου ὄντος. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἄμφω ὕστερα καὶ
τῶν ἐπιγενομένων ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὴν διαίρεσιν
εἶναι· ὀρεκτικῶν γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις, ᾗ ὀρεκτικά, οὐ
τῆς οὐσίας, ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἐκείνη δὲ ἡ οὐσία καθ'
αὑτὴν οὐκ ὄρεξις, ἀλλ' ἴσως τελειοῦσα τὴν ὄρεξιν
συνάψασα αὐτῇ τὴν παρ' αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν. καὶ τὸ
ἐκπεσὸν δὲ εἰς θυμὸν ἴχνος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν λέγειν
οὐκ ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ τὴν
τοῦ αἵματος ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐνταῦθα λεγέσθω
εἶναι.

[1] del. Harder.

like itself. The fact that those who are less desirous of bodily pleasures and in general despise the body are less moved to anger is evidence that this trace of soul is consubstantial[1] with the other. But there is no need to be surprised that trees do not have a passionate spirit although they have the power of growth, since they have no share of blood or bile. For if these were present in them without sense-perception there would only be a seething and a kind of irritation, but if sense-perception was present as well there would then be a drive against the cause of the wrong, resulting also in a movement of self-defence. But if the irrational part of the soul was divided into the desiring and the passionate, and the first was taken to be the power of growth, and the passionate a trace of it in the blood or the gall or the composite being, the dichotomy would not be a correct one, as one would be prior and one posterior. There is however nothing to prevent both being posterior, and the division being one between two things which are derived from a common source: for the division is one of impulses in so far as they are impulses, not of the substance from which they have come. But that substance in itself is not an impulse, but perhaps it brings the impulse to its goal by taking to itself the activity which comes from it. And it is not absurd to say that the trace of soul which is expressed in passion is in the region of the heart; for this is not to say that the soul is there, but the starting point of the blood which has this qualification.

[1] The occurrence of the word *ὁμοοῦσιος*, so theologically important later, as an ordinary philosophical term here should be noted.

29. Πῶς οὖν, εἴπερ τῷ θερμανθέντι τὸ σῶμα ἔοικεν ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ φωτισθέντι, ἐξελθούσης τῆς ἄλλης ψυχῆς οὐδέν τι ζωτικὸν ἔχει; ἢ ἔχει ἐπ' ὀλίγον, ἀπομαραίνεται δὲ θᾶττον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θερμανθέντων ἀποστάντων τοῦ πυρός. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ τρίχες φυόμεναι ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὄνυχες αὐξόμενοι καὶ ζῷα διαιρούμενα ἐπὶ πολὺ κινούμενα· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἔτι ἐγκείμενον ἴσως. καὶ εἰ συναπέρχεται δὲ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ, οὐ τεκμήριον τοῦτο τοῦ μὴ ἕτερον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἀπελθόντος ἡλίου οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐφεξῆς φῶς καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξηρτημένον ἀπέρχεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς τὸ ἔξω τούτου ὁρώμενον ἐν τοῖς παρακειμένοις ἕτερον ὂν ἐκείνου συναπέρχεται. ἆρ' οὖν συναπέρχεται, ἢ φθείρεται; τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ τοιούτου ζητητέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἣν δή φαμεν οἰκείαν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν τοῦ φωτὸς λειπόμενον ἐν τοῖς πεφωτισμένοις, δῆλον· ἀλλ' εἰ μεταπίπτει εἰς τὸ πεποιηκὸς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς, ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς ὅν γέ τι πρότερον; ἀλλὰ τί ἦν ὅλως; ὅτι μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων, ἀφ' ὧν τὸ φῶς, ἡ λεγομένη χρόα, [καὶ][1] ὅταν φθαρτὰ ᾖ τὰ σώματα, μεταβαλόντων[2] οὐκ ἔστι, [καὶ][3] οὐδεὶς ζητεῖ, ⟨οἷον⟩[4] ὅπου τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ πυρὸς φθαρέντος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὅπου τὸ σχῆμα; ἢ

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] Theiler: μεταβαλλόντων Enn., H–S.
[3] del. Kleist.
[4] Theiler.

29. Why, then, supposing that the body is like something warmed, but not like something illuminated, does it not have any trace of life when the other soul has gone out of it? It does have it for a short time, but it fades quickly, just as with things which are warmed when they go away from the fire. There is evidence for this in the growth of hair on corpses, and the growth of their nails, and the living creatures which move for a long time after they have been cut in two; for this is probably the trace of life still present in them. And if it goes away with the other soul, this is not a sign that it is not different from it. For when the sun goes away it is not only the light which is continuous with it and depends on it and is attached to it which goes, but the light which passes from this to that which is outside it and is seen in the things near by it, which is different from that first light, goes away too. Does it then really go away too, or does it perish? This is a question we must ask both about light of this kind and about the life in the body, which we say belongs to the body as its own. It is obvious that there is nothing of the light left in the things illuminated; but our discussion is enquiring whether it changes back into that which produced it or does not exist at all. How then can it not exist at all when it was certainly something before? But what, anyhow, was it? That in the case of corrupt bodies, when the bodies from which the light (which we call colour) comes have changed, the light does not exist is something into which nobody enquires, for instance where the colour of a burnt-out fire is, just as no one enquires where its shape is. But still, shape is a disposition, like clench-

τὸ μὲν σχῆμα σχέσις τις, ὥσπερ συστολὴ τῆς χειρὸς καὶ ἡ ἔκτασις, χρῶμα δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ γλυκύτης. τί γὰρ κωλύει φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ γλυκέος τὴν γλυκύτητα μὴ ἀπολωλέναι καὶ τοῦ εὐώδους τὴν εὐωδίαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ σώματι γίνεσθαι, οὐκ αἰσθητὰ δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τὰ σώματα τὰ μετειληφότα, ὥστε ἀντερείδειν τὰς ἐπ' αὐτῶν γενομένας ποιότητας τῇ αἰσθήσει; οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ φῶς τῶν φθαρέντων σωμάτων μένειν, τὴν δὲ ἀντιτυπίαν τὸ ἐκ πάντων οὖσαν μὴ μένειν. εἰ μή τις λέγοι νόμῳ ὁρᾶν, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ποιότητας μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις εἶναι. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀφθάρτους ποιήσομεν καὶ οὐ γινομένας ἐν ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων συστάσεσι τὰς ποιότητας, καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι ποιεῖν τὰς χρόας, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ποικίλων ὀρνίθων, ἀλλ' οὔσας συνάγειν ἢ ποιεῖν μέν, προσχρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πλήρει ὄντι τῶν τοιούτων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὐ τοιαῦτα, οἷα, ὅταν γένηται, ἐν τοῖς σώμασι φαίνεται. ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἔστω ἡ ἀπορία ἐνθαδὶ κειμένη· μενόντων δὲ τῶν σωμάτων εἰ συνήρτηται καὶ οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, τί κωλύει τὸ φῶς μετακινουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμετακινεῖσθαι τό τε προσεχὲς καὶ εἴ τι τῷ προσεχεῖ συνήρτηται, κἂν μὴ ὁρᾶται ἀπιόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ προσιὸν φαίνεται; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ συνέπεται τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς προτέροις καὶ

[1] The reference is to the doctrine of Democritus the Atomist that "secondary qualities" exist only "by convention",

ing and opening the hand, but colour is not like this, but like sweetness. What then prevents sweetness and sweet scent from not perishing with the destruction of the sweet or sweet-scented body, but passing into another body, but not being perceptible because the bodies which have received something of them are not of such a kind that the qualities in them make an impact on sense-perception? So then the light of bodies which have perished would remain, but the repercussion, which is the result of all the [visible] qualities, would not remain. One might of course say that one sees by convention, and that the so-called qualities are not in their substrates.[1] But if this is so, we shall make the qualities indestructible and not originating in the structure of bodies, and [we shall maintain] that it is not the forming principles in the seeds which make the colours, in the case of many-coloured birds, for instance, but they bring existing colours together, or produce them but make use in doing so also of the colours in the air, which is full of things of this kind; for in the air they are not as they appear in bodies when they come to exist in them. But let us leave this difficult question here. When, however, the [luminous] bodies remain unchanged, if the light is continuous with them and not cut off, what prevents it, when the luminous body moves to another place, from moving along with it? [This would apply both to] the light immediately adjacent to the luminous body and to any light which is continuous with that adjacent to it, even if it is not seen to move away, just as it does not appear to approach. But in the case of soul, we have discussed

and really there are only atoms and void: see fr. B 125 Diels-Kranz.

τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἀεὶ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν, ἢ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστα καὶ ἐστερημένα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμενα ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν μένειν ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀποτέτμηται τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι μία καὶ πολλαί, καὶ ὅστις ὁ τρόπος, ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἤδη σώματος γενόμενον ἴχνος τῆς ψυχῆς ὄν; ἢ εἰ μὲν ψυχή, συνέψεται, εἴπερ μὴ ἀποτέτμηται, τῷ ψυχῆς λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ οἷον ζωὴ τοῦ σώματος, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐκεῖ, ὃς περὶ φωτὸς ἐνδάλματος ἠπορεῖτο, καὶ εἰ δυνατὸν ζωὴν ἄνευ ψυχῆς εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τῷ παρακεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς ἄλλο, ταῦτα σκεπτέον.

30. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ μνήμας μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις περιττὰς εἶναι ἐθέμεθα, αἰσθήσεις δὲ ἔδομεν καὶ ἀκούσεις πρὸς ταῖς ὁράσεσι καὶ εὐχῶν δὴ κλύοντας ἔφαμεν, ἃς πρὸς ἥλιον ποιούμεθα καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς

[1] The reference back is to the earlier treatise IV. 9 (8) *If All Souls are One.*

[2] At this point the MSS preserve a note which tells us that in the edition of Eustochius the second book on the soul ended here and the third book began with the next chapter. This is the only evidence for the existence of another edition of the works of Plotinus by his physician Eustochius (see *Life* chs. 2 and 7 and my *Preface* to Vol I, ix). Whether this was the edition from which Eusebius took his quotations in the *Praeparatio Evangelica*, as Henry and Schwyzer, with some probability, still maintain, or whether, as a number of other good Plotinian scholars suppose, Eusebius was using Porphyry's edition, is a much disputed but not very important question: in either case the evidence of the Eusebius quotations confirms the soundness of the textual tradition (see Henry and Schwyzer *Plotini Opera* II (1959) *Praefatio* X–XI). If, of course, we could be certain that Eusebius was using the Eustochius edition, we should have some confirmation of the general belief of Plotinian scholars that Porphyry did not as editor tamper with the text of Plotinus.

elsewhere [1] whether the secondary parts follow along with the prior ones, and those in successive order go along always with those before them, or whether all the individual parts are on their own and separated from those before them and able to remain permanently on their own, or whether in general no part of soul is cut off, but all are one and many, and in what way this is so. But what is that which already belongs to the body and is a trace of soul? Now if it is soul, it will, if it is not cut off, go along with the rational principle of soul. But if it is a kind of life of the body, the same problem arises which arose about the vestige of light, and we must also enquire whether it is possible to have life without soul, except perhaps by the close presence of soul working on something else.[2]

30. But now, since we established that memory in the heavenly bodies was unnecessary, but gave them perceptions, and hearing as well as sight, and said that they heard the prayers which we make to the sun, and other men to the stars,[3] and since it is

[3] The cult of the sun was rare, but not unknown, in the ancient Greek world: it flourished particularly at Rhodes, where Helios was the most important god. Socrates prayed to the sun, and this was not considered unusual (Plato *Symposium* 220D4–5). Everyone admitted that the sun was a god, even if he was not much worshipped. In Plotinus's own time the cult of the sun was gaining in importance, and shortly after his death, in 274, the Emperor Aurelian established the cult of the Sun Lord of the Empire at Rome, with a college of senatorial *pontifices*. For devout pagans of the first Christian centuries the sun was often of central religious importance: see Julian *Oration* IV (Hymn to King Helios) and Macrobius *Saturnalia* I. 17 ff. But the cult of the star-gods was always rightly regarded in the Greek world as Oriental (especially Chaldean) and not belonging to the ancient Greek religious tradition.

ἄστρα ἄλλοι τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πεπίστευται, ὡς δι' αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς πολλὰ καὶ τελεῖται καὶ δὴ καὶ οὕτω ῥᾷστα, ὡς μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων συλλήπτορας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀδίκων, τούτων τε πέρι παραπεπτωκότων ζητητέον—ἔχει γὰρ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ μεγίστας καὶ πολυθρυλλήτους παρὰ τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀπορίας, θεοὺς συνεργοὺς καὶ αἰτίους γίγνεσθαι ἀτόπων ἔργων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ ἀκολάστους συλλήψεις—τούτων τε οὖν εἵνεκα καὶ μάλιστα περὶ οὗ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, τῆς μνήμης αὐτῶν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ εὐξαμένων ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ παραχρῆμα δρῶσιν αὐτά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὕστερον καὶ πάνυ πολλάκις εἰς χρόνους, μνήμην ὧν εὔχονται ἄνθρωποι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ πρόσθεν λόγος ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενος οὐκ ἐδίδου τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους εὐεργεσίας ἦν ἂν τοιοῦτον, οἷον Δήμητρος καὶ Ἑστίας γῆς γε οὔσης εἰ μή τις τῇ γῇ μόνον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀνθρώπεια λέγοι. ἀμφότερα οὖν πειρατέον δεικνύναι, πῶς τε τὰ τῆς μνήμης θησόμεθα ἐν τούτοις—ὃ δὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει, οὐ πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἳ οὐ κωλύονται μνήμας διδόναι—καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλοκότως δοκούντων γίγνεσθαι, ὃ φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐπισκέψασθαι, εἴ πῃ ἔστιν ἀπολογήσασθαι πρὸς τὰ κατὰ θεῶν τῶν

believed that the heavenly bodies accomplish many things for men, and do so in such a casual way that they are not only helpers in right actions, but in many wrong actions too, we must enquire into these incidental questions—for there are very great difficulties about them in themselves and these are much talked about by those who dislike the idea that gods should be culpable accomplices in improper behaviour, especially in love-affairs and wanton couplings—for these reasons, and particularly about what we were discussing at the beginning, their memory. For it is obvious that if when we pray they act, and do not do it at once, but afterwards, and very often after a long delay, they have memory of the prayers which mortals offer to them. But the argument which we expounded earlier did not allow this. But there would also be some such need of memory for the conferring of benefits on mortals as with Demeter and Hestia—earth after all [1]—unless one were to attribute to the earth alone a beneficent influence on human life. We must therefore try to explain both how we are going to understand the phenomena of memory in these beings—this is something which concerns us, not the opinions of others, who are not prevented from giving [the heavenly bodies] memory—and also about these strange and unpleasant things which seem to happen, which it is the task of philosophy to investigate and see if there is any defence to be found to the charges brought against

[1] Demeter was, naturally, always closely connected (though not originally identified) with the earth in Greek religious tradition. The identification of Hestia with earth is to be found in the 5th century B.C. (Euripides frs. 938 and 944 Nauck) and cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247A1.

ἐν οὐρανῷ· καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου—ὡς καὶ εἰς τοῦτον εἶσιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη—εἰ πιστοὶ οἱ λέγοντες, οἳ καὶ αὐτόν φασι τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν γοητεύεσθαι ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων τόλμης καὶ τέχνης. καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων δὲ ἐπιζητήσει ὁ λόγος, ὅπως τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπουργεῖν λέγονται, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν προτέρων λύσιν καὶ τὰ τούτων λαμβάνοι.

31. Καθόλου τοίνυν τὰς ποιήσεις ληπτέον ἁπάσας καὶ τὰς πείσεις, ὅσαι γίγνονται ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ, τάς τε λεγομένας φύσει, καὶ ὅσαι τέχνῃ γίνονται· καὶ τῶν φύσει τὰς μὲν φατέον ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἢ μερῶν εἰς μέρη, τὰς δὲ τέχνῃ γινομένας ἢ τῆς τέχνης, ὥσπερ ἤρξατο, ἐν τοῖς τεχνητοῖς τελευτώσης, ἢ προσχρωμένης δυνάμεσι φυσικαῖς εἰς ἔργων φυσικῶν ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις. τὰς μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὅλου λέγω, ὅσα τε ἡ φορὰ ἡ πᾶσα ποιεῖ εἰς αὑτὴν καὶ εἰς τὰ μέρη—κινουμένη γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν διατίθησί πως καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς—τά τε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ ὅσα δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς· μερῶν δὲ πρὸς μέρη πείσεις ⟨καὶ ποιήσεις⟩[1] εὔδηλοί που παντί, ἡλίου τε πρός τε τὰ ἄλλα σχέσεις [καὶ ποιήσεις][1] καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις στοιχείοις αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις—περὶ ὧν ἑκάστου ἐξεταστέον. τέχναι δὲ αἱ μὲν οἰκίαν ποιοῦσαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα

[1] Theiler post Bréhier in versione.

the gods in the sky; and we must also try to explain about the whole universe itself—since this kind of charge is directed against it too—and see if those people are to be believed who say that the whole heavenly system is subject to spells put upon it by the presumption and skill of men. And our discussion will also enquire about spirits, in what way they are said to serve magical purposes, unless the problems of spirits are also solved by the previous discussion.

31. We must, then, take a general view of all actions and experiences which occur in the whole universe, both the ones which are called natural and those which come about by art: we must say that some of the natural ones are effects of the All on its parts and [some] of the parts on the All or of the parts on the parts; and that in those which come about by art the art either ends as it began, in the products of art, or brings in natural powers to help in producing acts and experiences which belong to the works of nature. By the acts of the whole universe I mean those which the whole heavenly circuit does to itself and its parts—for as it moves it disposes both itself and its parts in a certain way—both those within the circuit itself and all the effects which it produces on the things on earth. The effects and actions of parts on parts are obvious, presumably, to everyone, the positions of the sun in relation to the other heavenly bodies and the things on earth, and in the other elements, and not only the actions of the sun but those of the other heavenly bodies and of the things on the earth and in the other elements—each of these requires separate investigation. As for the arts, those which produce a house and the

τεχνητὰ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἔληξαν· ἰατρικὴ δὲ καὶ γεωργία καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ βοήθειαν εἰς τὰ φύσει εἰσφερόμεναι, ὡς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν· ῥητορείαν δὲ καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχαγωγίαν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἄγειν ἀλλοιούσας, ἐν αἷς ζητητέον, ὅσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ τίνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσι· καί, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τοῖς πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διατί ἐφ' ὅσον δυνατὸν πραγματευτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φορὰ ποιεῖ, αὐτὴν μὲν πρῶτον διαφόρως διατιθεῖσα καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς αὑτῆς, ἀναμφισβητήτως μὲν τὰ ἐπίγεια οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς διαθέσεσι, καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον εἰς τὰ ἐπίγεια καὶ ὅλως τὰ κάτω ποιεῖ, πολλαχῇ δῆλον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα, ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ τὰ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις συγχωρούμενα ἐάσαντες οὕτως ἔχειν, ὅσα διὰ λόγου φανεῖται, πειρατέον λέγειν τὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς ποιήσεως λαβόντας. οὐ γὰρ μόνον θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ ποιότητες πρῶται τῶν στοιχείων λέγονται, οὐδ' ὅσαι ἐκ τῆς τούτων μίξεως ποιεῖν λεκτέον οὐδὲ πάντα τὸν ἥλιον θερμότητι, ψύξει δὲ ἄλλον τινά—τί γὰρ ἂν ψυχρὸν εἴη ἐν οὐρανίῳ[1] καὶ πυρίνῳ σώματι; —οὐδ' ἄλλον ὑγρῷ πυρί. οὕτω τε γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν οἷόν τε. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν γινομένων εἰς τούτων τι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀναγαγεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴ τις τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν διαφορὰς δοίη αὐτοῖς

[1] Harder: οὐρανῷ Enn.*

other products of art terminate in these; but the arts of medicine and agriculture and others of this kind are ancillary and help natural things to be in a natural state; but rhetoric and music and all the class of arts which influence the soul must be said to lead men to be better or worse by changing them; in these we must enquire how many they are and what is the power they have; and in all these which are relevant to our present purpose we must, as far as is possible, concern ourselves with the reason why. Now it is abundantly clear that the heavenly circuit acts, first of all disposing itself and the bodies within it in different ways, and indisputably acting on the things of earth, not only in their bodies but in the dispositions of their souls, and that each of the parts of the circuit acts on the things of earth and in general on what is below it. But we shall discuss later whether the things of earth also act on the heavenly bodies; but for the present, we grant that what is agreed by all, or by most people, is so, in so far as rational discussion will show it to be so, and we must try to explain the way in which the heavenly bodies act, starting from the beginning. For we must not simply assert that it is hot and cold and things of this kind which act, the things which are called the primary qualities of the elements, nor that the sun does everything by its heat, and some other heavenly body by its cold—for what cold could there be in a fiery body in the heavens?—and another by its humid fire. In this way it is not possible to understand the difference between them, and there are many things which happen which cannot be referred to one of these qualities as its cause. For even if one were to attribute differences

κατὰ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων κράσεις διὰ ψυχρότητα ἐπικρατοῦσαν ἢ διὰ θερμότητα τοιαύτας—πῶς ἂν φθόνους ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ πανουργίας εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγοι; ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ταῦτα, τύχας γοῦν πῶς, χείρους τε καὶ βελτίους, πλουσίους καὶ πένητας, καὶ πατέρων εὐγενείας ἢ αὐτῶν, θησαυρῶν τε εὑρέσεις; μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι λέγειν πόρρω ἄγων σωματικῆς ποιότητος τῆς ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἰς τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς ἰούσης. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ προαιρέσει ἀναθετέον τῶν ἄστρων καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς γνώμῃ καὶ τοῖς τούτων λογισμοῖς τὰ συμπίπτοντα περὶ ἕκαστα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐκείνους μηχανᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν γένοιντο κλέπται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδισταὶ τοιχωρύχοι τε καὶ ἱερόσυλοι, ἄνανδροί τε ἄλλοι καὶ θήλεις τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ δρῶντες. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι θεῶν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων μετρίων, τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ ὠντινωνοῦν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ καταμηχανᾶσθαι, ἐξ ὧν αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ἡτισοῦν ὠφέλεια ἂν γίγνοιτο.

32. Εἰ οὖν μήτε σωματικαῖς αἰτίαις ἀναθήσομεν μήτε προαιρέσεσιν, ὅσα ἔξωθεν εἰς ἡμᾶς τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ γῆς ἀφικνεῖται ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, τίς ἂν εἴη λοιπὴ καὶ εὔλογος αἰτία; πρῶτον τοίνυν

of character to these qualities [and say that] they were as they were according to the bodily temperaments,[1] because of the predominance of cold or heat —how could one refer envy or jealousy or wickedness to these causes? But even if one could, how could one anyhow make them responsible for fortunes, for men being good and bad, rich and poor, for the nobility of their families or themselves, and for the finding of treasures? One could mention a vast number of things, leading the discussion very far from the bodily quality which comes from the elements to the bodies and souls of living creatures. We must certainly not, either, attribute to the deliberate choice of stars and the decision of the All, and to their rational calculations, what happens to the individuals subject to them. For it would be inappropriate for those divinities to plan human affairs so that some men became thieves, and other kidnappers, housebreakers and temple-robbers, others again effeminate, womanish in their doings and feelings and committing indecencies. So far from being appropriate behaviour for gods, it would not even be appropriate for respectable men, or perhaps any kind of men, to do and plan things like this, from which they would get not the slightest benefit.

32. If, then, we are not to attribute all that comes from the sky to us and the other living creatures, and in general upon the earth, to bodily causes or the deliberate choices of the heavenly bodies, what reasonable explanation is left? First of all we must

[1] The " bodily temperaments " are those of men, not of the stars. Plotinus follows a long Greek tradition in attributing differences in emotional character and strength of the desires to the varying proportions of the elements mixed in the body.

θετέον ζῷον ἓν πάντα τὰ ζῷα τὰ ἐντὸς αὑτοῦ περιέχον τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, ψυχὴν μίαν ἔχον εἰς πάντα αὐτοῦ μέρη, καθόσον ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος· μέρος δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ αἰσθητῷ, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάντη, ὅσον δὲ καὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ παντὸς μετέχει, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ταύτῃ· καὶ τὰ μὲν μόνης ταύτης μετέχοντα κατὰ πᾶν ἐστι μέρη, ὅσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλης, ταύτῃ ἔχει τὸ μὴ μέρη πάντη εἶναι, πάσχει δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καθόσον αὐτοῦ τι ἔχει, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνα, ἃ ἔχει. συμπαθὲς δὴ πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὡς ζῷον ἕν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω δὴ ἐγγύς, ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶν καθέκαστα ὄνυξ καὶ κέρας καὶ δάκτυλος καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ διαλείποντος τοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ παθόντος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τὸ οὐκ ἐγγύς. οὐ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς τῶν ὁμοίων κειμένων, διειλημμένων δὲ ἑτέροις μεταξύ, τῇ δὲ ὁμοιότητι συμπασχόντων, καὶ εἰς τὸ πόρρω ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τὸ παρὰ τοῦ μὴ παρακειμένου δρώμενον· ζῴου τε ὄντος καὶ εἰς ἓν τελοῦντος οὐδὲν οὕτω πόρρω τόπῳ, ὡς μὴ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου πρὸς τὸ συμπαθεῖν φύσει.

posit that this All is a "single living being which encompasses all the living beings that are within it"; it has one soul which extends to all its parts, in so far as each individual thing is a part of it; and each thing in the perceptible All is a part of it, and completely a part of it as regards its body; and in so far as it participates in the soul of the All, it is to this extent a part of it in this way too; and those things which participate in the soul of the All alone are altogether parts, but all those which also participate in another soul are in this way not altogether parts, but none the less are affected by the other parts in so far as they have something of the All, and in a way corresponding to what they have.[1] This one universe is all bound together in shared experience and is like one living creature, and that which is far is really near, just as, in one of the individual living things, a nail or horn or finger or one of the other limbs which is not contiguous: the intermediate part leaves a gap in the experience and is not affected, but that which is not near is affected. For the like parts are not situated next to each other, but are separated by others between, but share their experiences because of their likeness, and it is necessary that something which is done by a part not situated beside it should reach the distant part; and since it is a living thing and all belongs to a unity nothing is so distant in space that it is not close enough to the

[1] The quotation which introduces this sentence is Plato *Timaeus* 30D3–31A1. The doctrine indicated here, that men are truly parts of the all but not only parts—there is something in them which transcends the organic unity of the cosmos in which their lower natures share—is of great importance to Plotinus: see the *Introduction* to this treatise, p. 27.

τὸ μὲν οὖν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχον πεῖσιν ἔχει οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν, ἀνομοίου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἀλλότριον τὸ πάθημα καὶ οὐ προσηνὲς τὸ πάσχον ἴσχει. βλαβερὰν δὲ ποίησιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλου ἑνὸς ὄντος ζῴου οὐ δεῖ τεθαυμακέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταῖς ἡμετέραις βλάπτοι ἂν ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλου μέρος, ἐπεὶ καὶ χολὴ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄλλο, ὡς δοκεῖ, πιέζει καὶ κεντεῖ. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔστι τι θυμῷ καὶ χολῇ ἀνάλογον καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς δὲ ἐμπόδιον ἔσται ἄλλο ἄλλῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἀφαυᾶναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον ἓν ζῷον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν ὁρᾶται· ὥστε καθόσον μὲν ἕν, ἕκαστον τῷ ὅλῳ σῴζεται, καὶ καθόσον δὲ καὶ πολλά, πρὸς ἄλληλα συνιόντα πολλαχῇ τῷ διαφόρῳ ἔβλαψε· καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ χρείαν ἄλλο ἕτερον ἔβλαψε, καὶ δὴ καὶ τροφὴν ἐποιήσατο συγγενὲς ἅμα καὶ διάφορον ὑπάρχον· καὶ σπεῦδον ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅσον τε οἰκεῖον τοῦ ἑτέρου, λαμβάνει εἰς αὑτό, καὶ ὅσον ἀλλότριον ἐγίνετο, ἀφανίζει εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. ἔργον τε τὸ αὑτοῦ ποιοῦν ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν δυνηθὲν ἀπολαῦσαί τι τῶν αὑτοῦ ἔργων ὠφέλησεν, ὃ δ' ἀδύνατον ἦν ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ ἔργου, ἠφάνισεν ἢ ἔβλαψεν, ὥσπερ ὅσα αὐανθείη ἂν παριόντος πυρός, ἢ ζῷα ἐλάττω ὑπὸ μειζόνων δρόμου παρασυρείη ἢ καί που πατηθείη. πάντων δὲ τούτων ἡ γένεσις ἥ τε φθορὰ ἀλλοίωσίς τε πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς ζῴου

nature of the one living thing to share experience. So, then, that part which has a likeness to that which is acting upon it has an experience which is not alien to it, but if that which is acting is unlike, that which is affected has an experience which is alien and unpleasant. But one should not be surprised if the action of one part on another is harmful when it is one living creature: for in ourselves too in our activities one part can harm another, since bile and the passionate spirit, so it seems, oppress and sting another part. And there is certainly something in the All which corresponds to bile and the passionate spirit, and other things which correspond to others [in our bodies]; and in plants one part gets in the way of another, so as even to make it wither. This All is visibly not only one living creature, but many; so that in so far as it is one, each individual part is preserved by the whole, but in so far as it is many, when the many encounter each other they often injure each other because they are different; and one injures another to supply its own need, and even makes a meal of another which is at the same time related to and different from it; and each one, naturally striving to do the best for itself, takes to itself that part of the other which is akin to it, and makes away with all that is alien to itself because of its self-love. Each as it does its own work benefits that which can profit in any way from its workings, but makes away with or injures that which cannot endure the impact of its activity, like the things which are withered when fire comes near them, or the smaller animals which are swept aside or even trampled underfoot by the rush of larger ones. The coming into being and destruction and alteration for

ἐκείνου ἀνεμπόδιστον καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν ζωὴν ἀποτελεῖ, ἐπείπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἕκαστα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς μόνα ὄντα, οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὸ τέλος εἶναι καὶ βλέπειν μέρη ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, οὗπερ καὶ μέρη, διάφορά τε ὄντα μὴ πάντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἐν μιᾷ ζωῇ ὄντα ἀεὶ ἔχειν· οὐκ ἦν τε μένειν οὐδὲν πάντη ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ἔμελλε τὸ πᾶν μένειν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μένειν ἔχον.

33. Τῆς δὴ φορᾶς τὸ εἰκῆ οὐκ ἐχούσης, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ζῷον φερομένης, ἔδει καὶ συμφωνίαν τοῦ ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὸ πάσχον εἶναι καί τινα τάξιν εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ πρός ἄλληλα συντάσσουσαν, ὥστε καθ' ἑκάστην σχέσιν τῆς φορᾶς καὶ τῶν αὖ ὑπὸ τὴν φορὰν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι, οἷον μίαν ὄρχησιν ἐν ποικίλῃ χορείᾳ ποιούντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ὀρχήσεσι τὰ μὲν ἔξω [πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν][1] καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν κινημάτων, ὡς ἑτέρως μεταβαλλόντων τῶν συντελούντων πρὸς τὴν ὄρχησιν, αὐλῶν τε καὶ ᾠδῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνηρτημένων, τί ἄν τις λέγοι φανερῶν ὄντων; ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν παρεχομένου καθ' ἕκαστον σχῆμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἂν ὡσαύτως δύναιτο ἔχειν, τῶν μελῶν τοῦ σώματος ταύτῃ συνεπομένου καὶ καμπτομένου, καταπιεζομένου[2] μὲν ἑτέρου, ἀνιεμένου δὲ ἄλλου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν πονοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀναπνοήν τινα ἐν τῷ διαφόρῳ σχηματισμῷ δεχομένου. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις τοῦ ὀρχουμένου πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπει, τὰ δὲ πάσχει τῇ ὀρχήσει ἑπομένως καὶ ὑπουργεῖ τῇ

[1] del. Theiler ut iteratum e lin. 9–10.

[2] Igal: καὶ πιεζομένου Enn.: καὶ ⟨τῶν μελῶν⟩ πιεζομένου Theiler.

worse or better of all these individual things brings to its fulness the unhindered life according to nature of that one [universal] living creature; since it was not possible for all the individual things to be as if they were alone nor for the final purpose to be directed and look towards them when they are [only] parts, but it must be directed to that of which they are parts, and since they are different, they cannot all have their own for ever in a single life; it was not possible for anything to persist altogether the same, if the All was going to persist, which has its persistence in its movement.

33. The heavenly circuit has nothing casual in it, but goes according to the rational principle of its living organism; there must therefore be a harmony of action and experience and an order which arranged things together, adapting them and bringing them into due relation with each other, so that according to every figure of the heavenly circuit there is a different disposition of the things which it governs, as if they were performing a single ballet in a rich variety of dance-movements. In our ballets, too, there is no need to mention, since they are obvious, the external elements, the way in which piping and singing and everything else which joins in contributing to the total effect of the performance change variously at every movement. But the parts of the dancer's body, too, cannot possibly keep the same position in every figure: as his body follows the pattern of the dance and bends with it, one of his limbs is pressed hard down, another relaxed, one works hard and painfully, another is given a rest as the figuring changes. The dancer's intention looks elsewhere; his limbs are affected in accordance with

ὀρχήσει καὶ συναποτελεῖ τὴν πᾶσαν, ὥστε τὸν ἔμπειρον ὀρχήσεως εἰπεῖν ἄν, ὡς τῷ τοιούτῳ σχηματισμῷ αἴρεται μὲν ὑψοῦ τοδὶ μέλος τοῦ σώματος, συγκάμπτεται δὲ τοδί, τοδὶ δὲ ἀποκρύπτεται, ταπεινὸν δὲ ἄλλο γίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλως τοῦ ὀρχηστοῦ προελομένου τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος ὀρχήσει θέσιν ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχοντος τοῦδε τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τὴν ὄρχησιν διαπεραίνοντος. τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ φατέον ποιεῖν, ὅσα ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ καὶ σημαίνειν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν μὲν ὅλον κόσμον τὴν ὅλην αὑτοῦ ζωὴν ἐνεργεῖν κινοῦντα ἐν αὑτῷ τὰ μέρη τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μετασχηματίζοντα ἀεί, τὰς δὲ σχέσεις τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰς διαφόρους αὐτῶν θέσεις ἑπόμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς ζῴου ἑνὸς κινουμένου, παρέχεσθαι, ὧδὶ μὲν ἴσχοντα κατὰ τὰς ὧδὶ σχέσεις καὶ θέσεις καὶ σχηματισμούς, ὧδὶ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὧδί, ὡς μὴ τοὺς σχηματιζομένους τοῦς ποιοῦντας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν σχηματίζοντα, μηδ' αὖ τὸν σχηματίζοντα ἄλλο ποιοῦντα ἄλλο ποιεῖν—οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο—ἀλλὰ αὐτὸν πάντα τὰ γινόμενα εἶναι, ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ σχήματα, ἐνθαδὶ δὲ τὰ συνεπόμενα τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα περὶ τὸ οὕτωσὶ κινούμενον ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ αὖ περὶ τὸ οὕτωσὶ συγκείμενον καὶ συνεστὼς φύσει καὶ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀνάγκαις.

[1] The dancer here, as in III. 2. 16, is one of the great solo ballet artists of the Empire, the *pantomimi*, who danced whole mythological stories by themselves to a choral and orchestral accompaniment. These excellent descriptions, and the choice

the dance and serve the dance, and help to make it perfect and complete; and the connoisseur of ballet can say that to fit a particular figure one limb is raised, another bent together, one is hidden, another degraded; the dancer does not choose to make these movements for no reason, but each part of him as he performs the dance has its necessary position in the dancing of the whole body.[1] It is in this way, then, that we must say that the beings in the sky do what they do (but some things they only indicate); or, better, we should say that the whole universe actively lives its own complete life, moving its great parts within itself, and continually rearranging them, and, as when a single living thing moves, the relations of the parts to each other and to the whole and their different positions make everything else follow, being disposed in one way according to one set of relationships, positions, and arrangements and another way according to another, so that it is not the arranged parts which do what is done, but the arranger; but the arranger is not a doer distinct from what he does —for he is not acting on something different from himself—but he is himself all the things he does, the arrangements up in the sky and their consequences here below, which are experiences necessarily affecting the living being when it moves in this particular way, the living being, that is, which is composed in this particular way and naturally conjoined, and necessarily both acts upon itself and experiences its own action.

of the *pantomimus* to symbolise the living and moving harmony of the cosmos, suggest that Plotinus may at some period of his life have attended and enjoyed performances by *pantomimi*. The coincidence of symbolism with the (much later) bronze figures of the dancing Shiva from India is striking.

34. Ἡμᾶς δὲ διδόντας τὸ μέρος αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅσον ἦν ἡμέτερον ἐκείνου τοῦ σώματος, μὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐκείνου νομίζοντας, μέτρια παρ' αὐτοῦ πάσχειν· ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμφρονες τῶν θητευόντων τὸ μέν τι τοῖς δεσπόζουσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες, τὸ δ' αὑτῶν ὄντες, μετριωτέρων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἐπιταγμάτων διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνοντες, ἅτε μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὄντες μηδὲ τὸ πᾶν ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ τῶν σχηματισμῶν διάφορον τῶν θεόντων μὴ ἰσοταχῶν ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον ἦν γίνεσθαι, ὡς νῦν γίνεται. λόγῳ δὲ φερομένων καὶ διαφόρων τῶν σχέσεων τοῦ ζῷου γινομένων, εἶτα καὶ ἐνταῦθα τούτων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν συμπαθῶν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ γινομένων, εὔλογον ζητεῖν, πότερα συνέπεσθαι φατέον ταῦτα συμφωνοῦντα ἐκείνοις, ἢ τὰ σχήματα τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν ποιουμένων ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ σχήματα ἁπλῶς ἢ τὰ τούτων. οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς σχηματισμὸς ταὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄλλου καὶ αὖ ἄλλων τὴν αὐτὴν σημασίαν ἢ ποίησιν ἐργάζεται· ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ἕκαστος διάφορον ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ. ἢ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὴν τούτων σχημάτισιν ταδὶ καὶ τοιάνδε διάθεσιν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλλων τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν ἐν σχηματισμῷ ἄλλην; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι τοῖς σχήμασιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις δώσομεν. ἢ συναμφοτέροις; τοῖς γοῦν αὐτοῖς διάφορον σχέσιν λαβοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ

34. But we, by yielding that part of ourselves to experience which was our share of the body of the All, and not considering the whole of ourselves to belong to it, are subject to experience only within reasonable limits: just as sensible serfs with one part of themselves serve their master, but with another belong to themselves, and therefore receive more reasonably limited orders from their master since they are not slaves and do not totally belong to another. But it was necessary that the arrangements of the heavenly bodies should vary as they now do, since the heavenly bodies do not run their courses at equal speeds. But since the heavenly bodies move according to reason and their relationships within the [universal] living being vary, and then here below these events occur in our own sphere in sympathy with those above, it is reasonable to enquire whether we should assert that these earthly occurrences follow on those above by correspondence, or whether the figures have the powers which bring about what is done, and whether it is simply the figures or the figures made by particular heavenly bodies. For the same arrangement of the same body in relation to another body and then again to others does not produce the same signification or action: since even by itself each appears to have a different nature. Or is it right to say that the configuration of these particular heavenly bodies is of a particular kind and this specific disposition, but the configuration of other heavenly bodies which is the same in arrangement is another? But if this is so, we shall give the power no more to the figures but to the actual bodies which are arranged. Should we give it to both? For we shall certainly give different

αὐτῷ μόνῳ διάφορον τόπον ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί; ποιήσεις ἢ σημασίας; ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῷ σχηματισμῷ τῷ τούτων ἄμφω καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ σημασίας ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ σημασίας μόνον. οὗτος τοίνυν ὁ λόγος δυνάμεις μὲν δίδωσι τοῖς σχήμασι, δυνάμεις δὲ καὶ τοῖς σχηματιζομένοις· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ὀρχουμένων ἔχει μὲν δύναμίν τινα καὶ χεὶρ ἑκατέρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰ σχήματα πολλήν, τρίτα δέ ἐστι τὰ συνεπόμενα, αὐτῶν τε τῶν εἰς τὴν ὄρχησιν παραλαμβανομένων τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα, οἷον χειρὸς τὰ συνθλιβόμενα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ φλέβες συμπαθοῦντα.

35. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὗται αἱ δυνάμεις; σαφέστερον γὰρ πάλιν λεκτέον, τί τὸ τρίγωνον παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον διάφορον ἔχει, τί δὲ ὁδὶ πρὸς τονδί, καὶ κατὰ τί τοδὶ ἐργάζεται καὶ μέχρι τίνος. ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν οὔτε ταῖς προαιρέσεσιν ἀπέδομεν τὰς ποιήσεις· τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον σώματος ἦν ποιήματα τὰ γινόμενα, ταῖς δὲ προαιρέσεσιν, ὅτι ἄτοπον ἦν προαιρέσεσι θεοὺς ποιεῖν ἄτοπα. εἰ δὲ μνημονεύοιμεν, ὅτι ζῷον ἓν ὑπεθέμεθα εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχον συμπαθὲς αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, ἐξανάγκης ἔδει εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι

[1] "Triangles" are among the important "configurations" or "aspects" of the apparent patterns of the signs of the Zodiac at various seasons on which a great deal of astrological

powers to the same heavenly bodies when they take up different relative positions, and even to the same single one when it occupies a different place. But what powers are we giving them? Powers of action or of signification? To the combination, the arrangement of these particular stars, both, and in many cases there is both action and signification, but elsewhere there are only significations. This argument, then, gives powers to the figures and powers to the bodies arranged: since with dancers each hand has a distinct power and so have the other limbs, but the figures also have great power, and then there is a third group of consequentially effective things, the parts of the limbs which are brought into the dance and their constituents, for instance the clenched fingers of the hand and the muscles and veins which are affected along with them.

35. How, then, should we understand these powers? We need to explain again more clearly what is the difference between triangle and triangle,[1] in what way this heavenly body differs from that, and why and up to what point it acts in this particular way. For we did not attribute their activities either to their bodies or to their deliberate choices: not to their bodies, because the things which happened were not the works of body alone, and not to their choices, because it would be inappropriate for gods to choose to do inappropriate things. But if we remember that we posited that the universe is a single living thing, and that since it is so it was absolutely necessary for it to have an internal self-communication of its experiences; and if we remember further that the

calculation was based: cp. II. 3. 4, where Plotinus shows himself much more hostile to the astrologers than here.

κατὰ λόγον ἡ διέξοδος τῆς ζωῆς σύμφωνος ἑαυτῇ ἅπασα, καὶ ὅτι τὸ εἰκῇ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ἀλλὰ μία ἁρμονία καὶ τάξις, καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ λόγον, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμοὺς δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ χορεύοντα ζῴου μέρη, ἄμφω ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι, τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ τὰ σχηματιζόμενα μέρη αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα καὶ οὕτω, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζῆν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τοῦτο συμβάλλειν, ἅσπερ [1] καὶ ἔχοντες ἐγένοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις [2] πεποιηκότος. καὶ τὰ μὲν σχήματα οἷον λόγους εἶναι ἢ διαστάσεις ζῴου καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχέσεις ζῴου κατὰ λόγον, τὰ δὲ διεστηκότα καὶ ἐσχηματισμένα μέλη· ἀλλὰ [3] καὶ εἶναι τοῦ ζῴου δυνάμεις χωρὶς [τῆς] [4] προαιρέσεως ἄλλας τὰς ὡς ζῷου μέρη, ἐπεὶ τὸ τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῖς ἔξω καὶ οὐ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦ ζῴου τοῦδε τὴν φύσιν. μία γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις ἑνὸς ζῴου, αἱ δὲ δυνάμεις αἱ ἄλλαι αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ πολλαί. ὅσαι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ προαιρέσεις, πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ μία. ἐπιθυμία μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· λαβεῖν γάρ τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐθέλει μέρος τὸ ἄλλο μέρος ἐνδεὲς ὂν αὐτό· καὶ θυμὸς πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅταν τι παραλυπῇ, καὶ ἡ αὔξησις παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς ἄλλο τῶν μερῶν. τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ βλέπει. τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ προαίρεσις ἡ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάθη

[1] Theiler: ὥσπερ Enn.*
[2] Enn., H–S[1] recte: εὐλόγως H–S[2].
[3] Dodds, Cilento: ἄλλα Enn.*
[4] del. Theiler.

process of its life must be rational and all in tune with itself, and that there is nothing casual in its life but a single melody and order, and that the celestial arrangements are rational, and each individual part moves by numbers, as do the dancing parts of the living being, we must admit that both are the activity of the All, the figures in it and the parts of it which are arranged in figures (and the consequences of these and how they follow), and that this is the way in which the All lives, and the powers contribute to this, which they were brought into existence possessing by him who made them in their rational principles. And the figures are like the proportions and intervals of the living being and its rational rhythms and relationships, and the bodies which are set at intervals and arranged in figures are its limbs; but there are other powers of the living being, which are, apart from deliberate choice, like parts of the living being, since what belongs to deliberate choice in these beings is outside [the universal organism] and does not contribute to the nature of this living being. For the deliberate choice of the one living being is one, but the other powers which it has directed towards itself are many. But all the choices which occur in it are directed to the same end to which that one choice of the All is directed. For the desire of one thing in it is directed towards another thing in it; for one part wants to take a part of the others since it is itself in need; and anger is felt against another part, when it is annoying in some way, and growth derives from another of the parts and coming into being results in another. But the Whole does these things in these parts, but itself seeks the Good, or rather gazes upon it. This too is what the right

ζητεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ταύτῃ συμβάλλει· ἐπεὶ καὶ
35 τῶν παρ' ἄλλῳ θητευόντων πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἔργων
αὐτοῖς βλέπει πρὸς τὰ ἐπιταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσ-
πότου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς
ὃ καὶ ὁ δεσπότης. εἰ δὴ δρᾷ τι ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
ἄστρα εἰς τὰ τῇδε, χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν μὲν ἄνω
βλέποντα εἶναι—ἐφ' ἑνὸς γὰρ τὸν λόγον ποιητέον
40 —ποιεῖσθαι δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι
τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς, οὕτω καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τοῦτο, ψυχῆς
διαδόσει, ὅσον ἐν αὐτῷ, φυτικῆς [1] ψυχῆς πολλῆς
οὔσης. καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ὁμοίως οἷον ἐλλάμπον
δύναμιν παρ' αὑτοῦ ἀπροαίρετον διδόναι. καὶ
45 πάντας [2] δὴ ἕν τι οὕτως ἐσχηματισμένον γενο-
μένους τὴν διάθεσιν ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην αὖ διδόναι·
ὥστε καὶ τὰ σχήματα δυνάμεις ἔχει—παρὰ γὰρ τὸ
οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως—καὶ δι' αὐτῶν
τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων γίνεσθαί τι—παρὰ γὰρ [τὸ] [3]
τούτους ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο αὖ παρ' ἄλλους. ἐπεὶ καὶ
50 καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ σχήματα, ὡς δυνάμεις ἔχει, καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν τῇδε ἄν τις ἴδοι. διατί γὰρ τὰ μὲν
φοβερὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι τῶν σχημάτων μηδέν τι
προπεπονθότων τῶν φοβουμένων, τὰ δὲ οὐ φοβεῖ
ὀφθέντα; καὶ ἄλλους μὲν ταδί, ἄλλους δὲ ταδί;
ἢ ὅτι εἰς μὲν τὸν [4] τοιόνδε ταδὶ ἐργάζεται, εἰς δὲ

[1] Kirchhoff*: φυσικῆς Enn., H–S[1].
[2] πάντας (sc. ἀστέρας, masc. sicut 47–8 ἐσχηματισμένων) et τούτους suspic. Theiler: πάντα Enn.*
[3] del. Creuzer.
[4] Kirchhoff*: τὸ Enn., H–S.

choice which transcends the emotions seeks and in this way it contributes to the achievement of the same purpose: since when serfs work for another man many of the things they do are directed to fulfilling the commands of their master, but their aspiration to the Good is directed to the same end to which their master also aspires. If then the sun and the other heavenly bodies act in any way on the things here below, one must think that the sun—it is best to speak of one body only—remains looking above, but just as its warming of the things on earth proceeds from it, so do any subsequent actions upon them, by a dissemination of soul, as far as is in its power, since there is plenty of the growth-soul in it. And in the same way any other heavenly body, without choosing to do so, gives off a kind of irradiation from itself. And all the heavenly bodies when they have been unified in this or that particular configuration produce now one and now another disposition of things: so that the figures have power —for according to this or that figure different consequences follow—and something is due to the actual heavenly bodies arranged in the figures—for one consequence follows if these particular heavenly bodies are in the figure, and another if others are. As regards the figures themselves, one can see from what happens here below that they have powers. For why are some figures terrifying to those who see them though those who are terrified have had no experience of evil from them before, but others when they are seen do not terrify? And why do these particular figures terrify some people and different ones others? It is because these particular ones work on a man of a particular kind and

τοῦτον ἄλλα, οὐκ ἂν μὴ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πεφυκὸς ποιεῖν. καὶ οὑτωσὶ μὲν σχηματισθὲν ἐκίνησε τὴν ὄψιν, οὑτωσὶ δὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ κάλλος εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, διατί τὸν μὲν τοῦτο, τὸν δὲ ἄλλο ἐκίνησε, μὴ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα διαφορᾶς τὴν δύναμιν ἐχούσης; διατί γὰρ τὰς μὲν χρόας φήσομεν δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ σχήματα οὐ φήσομεν; ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως ἄτοπον εἶναι μέν τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, μὴ μέντοι ἔχειν τι ὃ δύναται. τὸ γὰρ ὂν τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δοτέον τὸ ποιεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἄμφω. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ παρὰ τὰ σχήματα· καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν εἰσι πολλαί, ἃς οὐ θερμὰ ἢ ψυχρὰ παρέχεται, ἀλλὰ γενόμενα ποιότησι διαφόροις καὶ λόγοις εἰδοποιηθέντα καὶ φύσεως δυνάμεως μεταλαβόντα, οἷον καὶ λίθων φύσεις καὶ βοτανῶν ἐνέργειαι θαυμαστὰ πολλὰ παρέχονται.

36. Ποικιλώτατον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν καὶ λόγοι πάντες ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ δυνάμεις ἄπειροι καὶ ποικίλαι· οἷον δέ φασι καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου ἄλλην μὲν δύναμιν ἔχειν [ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ][1] ὀστοῦν τόδε, τοδὶ δ' ἄλλην, χειρὸς μὲν τοδὶ καὶ δακτύλου τοῦ ποδός, καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος εἶναι ὃ μὴ ἔχει καὶ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει—ἀγνοοῦμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς, εἰ μή τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μεμάθηκεν—οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον· μᾶλλον δὲ

[1] del. Theiler, Harder.

others on this other man, since they cannot fail to act on that which corresponds to their nature. And something with one kind of figure stimulates one to look at it, but another kind does not stimulate the same man. And if someone were to say that it is the beauty which stimulates, why does one stimulate one man and another another, if it is not the difference in figure which has the power? For why should we assert that colours have power and act, but not assert that figures do? It would be absolutely absurd for something to exist in reality but not to have any power which it could exercise. For anything which exists is of such a kind that it can either act or be acted upon[1]: in some cases we should attribute action, in other cases both. But besides the figures there are also powers in the bodies subject to configuration; and in the bodies in our world there are many powers which are not produced by hot or cold things but by things which have come into existence as the result of different qualities and been formed by rational principles and have a share in the power of nature, as the natures of stones and the active powers of herbs produce many astonishing results.

36. The All is full of the richest variety: all rational formative principles are present in it, and an unbounded store of varied powers. It is like what they say about man, that each of the bones has its own distinctive powers, the bones of the hand one power and the toe-bone another, and there is no part which has not a power, and one different from every other—but we know nothing about it, unless one of us has studied this sort of subject. The

[1] This philosophical commonplace goes back to Plato *Sophist* 247D–E and 248C.

ἴχνος ταῦτα ἐκείνων· ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀδιήγητον δὲ καὶ θαυμαστὴν ποικιλίαν εἶναι δυνάμεων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' οὐρανὸν φερομένοις. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἄψυχον οἰκίαν μεγάλην ἄλλως καὶ πολλὴν ἔκ τινων εὐαριθμήτων κατ' εἶδος, οἷον λίθων καὶ ξύλων, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, εἰς κόσμον ἔδει αὐτὸ γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πανταχῇ καὶ ζῶν ἄλλο ἄλλως καὶ μηδὲν δύνασθαι εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λύοιτο ἂν ἡ ἀπορία ἡ πῶς ἐν ζῴῳ ἐμψύχῳ ἄψυχον· οὕτως γὰρ ὁ λόγος φησὶν ἄλλο ἄλλως ζῆν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ἡμᾶς δὲ τὸ μὴ αἰσθητῶς παρ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον ζῆν μὴ λέγειν· τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἕκαστον ζῶν λανθάνον, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητῶς ζῶν συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν μὴ αἰσθητῶς μὲν ζώντων, θαυμαστὰς δὲ δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ ζῆν τῷ τοιούτῳ ζῴῳ παρεχομένων. μὴ γὰρ ἂν κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τοσαῦτα ἄνθρωπον ἐκ πάντη ἀψύχων τῶν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων κινούμενον, μηδ' αὖ τὸ πᾶν οὕτω ζῆν μὴ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ζώντων τὴν οἰκείαν ζωήν, κἂν προαίρεσις αὐτῷ μὴ παρῇ· ποιεῖ γὰρ καὶ προαιρέσεως οὐ δεηθέν, ἅτε προαιρέσεως ὂν προγενέστερον· διὸ καὶ πολλὰ δουλεύει αὐτῷ [1] ταῖς δυνάμεσιν.

37. Οὐδὲν οὖν τῷ παντὶ ἀπόβλητον αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὅσα τῶν τοιούτων λέγομεν ποιεῖν, εἴ τις τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν ζητήσειε τί ποτ'

[1] Theiler: αὐτῶν wxUC: αὐτοῦ z.

All is like this, but even more so: or rather the parts of our bodies with their powers are only traces of the parts and powers of the universe. In the All there is an indescribably wonderful variety of powers, especially in the bodies which move through the heavens. For it did not have to come to be an ordered universe like a soulless house, even if a large and complex one, made of materials easy to reckon up according to kind, stones and timber, perhaps, and other things of the sort; but it exists, all awake and alive differently in different parts, and nothing can exist which does not belong to it. This then solves the difficulty of how there can be anything without soul in an ensouled living being; for in this way the account explains that different things in the Whole live in different ways, but we do not say that anything is alive which does not move itself perceptibly; but each thing of this sort has a hidden life; and the thing which is perceptibly alive is composed of parts which are not perceptibly alive but contribute wonderful powers to the life of a living thing of this kind. Man would not have been moved to such great achievements if the powers in himself from which he started had been without soul, nor would the All live as it does if each particular thing in it did not live its own life—even if the All does not exercise deliberate choice. For it acts without need of deliberate choice, since it is of older birth than choice; and therefore many things serve it with their powers.

37. Nothing, therefore, which belongs to the All can be discarded by it; since with fire and all the other things of the kind which we say are active, if any one of the people who have the reputation of experts tried to find out what their activity was, he

ἐστὶ τῶν νῦν δοκούντων εἰδέναι, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν, εἰ μὴ δύναμιν ταύτην ἀποδοίη αὐτῷ ⟨τῷ⟩ [1] ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς ἐν χρήσει λέγοι. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τὰ μὲν συνήθη οὔτ' ἀξιοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὔτ' ἀπιστοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἔξω τοῦ συνήθους δυνάμεων ἀπιστοῦμέν τε ὡς ἔχει ἕκαστον, καὶ τῷ ἀσυνήθει τὸ θαυμάζειν προστίθεμεν θαυμάσαντες ἂν καὶ ταῦτα, εἰ ἀπείροις αὐτῶν οὖσιν ἕκαστόν τις προσφέρων ἐξηγεῖτο αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις. ἔχειν μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον δύναμίν τινα ἄλογον φατέον ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλασθὲν καὶ μορφωθὲν καὶ μετειληφός πως ψυχῆς παρὰ τοῦ ὅλου ὄντος ἐμψύχου καὶ περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τοιούτου καὶ μόριον ὂν ἐμψύχου—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ὅ τι μὴ μέρος—ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν δυνατώτερα καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν οὐρανίων μᾶλλον, ἅτε ἐναργεστέρᾳ φύσει χρώμενα· καὶ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, οὐ τῇ προαιρέσει ἀφ' ὧν δοκεῖ ἰέναι τὸ δρώμενον—ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσιν—οὐδὲ ἐπιστραφέντων τῇ δόσει τῆς δυνάμεως, κἂν ψυχῆς τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ᾖ. γένοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ζῷα ἐκ ζῴου οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ποιούσης οὐδ' αὖ ἐλαττουμένου οὐδ' αὖ παρακολουθοῦντος· ἀργὸς [2]

[1] Bréhier.
[2] Theiler: αὐτὸς Enn., H–S[1]: αὐτὸ Kirchhoff*.

[1] A philosophical commonplace, probably of Stoic origin,

would get into difficulties if he did not attribute this power to their actually being in the All, and did not say the same sort of thing about everything else which is in daily use. But we do not think it proper to investigate ordinary things, nor do we disbelieve in them, but we disbelieve in the detailed working of the other powers which are out of the ordinary, and encounter the extraordinary with astonishment,[1] though we should be astonished at these ordinary things too if we were unfamiliar with them and someone presented a detailed account of them to us and explained their powers. We must admit, then, that each particular thing has an unreasoned power, since it is moulded and shaped in the All and in some way has a share of soul from the Whole which is ensouled, and is surrounded by a universe of this kind and is part of an ensouled being—for there is nothing in it which is not a part—but some things are more powerfully effective than others, both among the things on earth and still more among those in the heavens, since these have a clearer nature; and many things happen according to these powers, not by deliberate choice of the beings from which the action appears to proceed—for the powers exist also in beings which have no choice—nor with any direction of attention to the giving of the power, even if there is some transmission of soul from them. For living beings could be generated from a living being without any act of deliberate choice, nor any diminution of the original living being, nor any consciousness of what is happening: for the act of choice would be inactive, if he had it, or it would not be the choice

rhetorically amplified by Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones* VII 1. 1.

γὰρ ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις, εἰ ἔχοι, ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἡ ποιοῦσα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι τι προαίρεσιν ζῷον, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν.

38. Ἅ τε [1] οὖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς κινήσαντος ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης αὐτοῦ ζωῆς γίνεται [καὶ ὅλως ὅσα ἐξ αὐτοῦ],[2] ὅσα τε κινήσαντος ἄλλου, οἷον εὐχαῖς ἢ ἁπλαῖς ἢ τέχνῃ ᾀδομέναις, ταῦτα οὐκ εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν τοῦ δρωμένου φύσιν ἀνενεκτέον. καὶ ὅσα μὲν χρηστὰ [3] πρὸς ζωὴν ἤ τινα ἄλλην χρείαν συμβάλλεται, τῇ δόσει ἀνενεκτέον, ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους μείζονος εἰς ἄλλο ἔλαττον ἰόν· ὅ τι δ' ἂν δυσχερὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν λέγηται εἰς τὰς γενέσεις τῶν ζῴων ἰέναι, ἢ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ εὔχρηστον δέξασθαι τὸ ὑποκείμενον—οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἰς τοδὶ καὶ ὡδί· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάσχον καὶ τὸ πεισόμενον ὑποκειμένην τινὰ καὶ τοιάνδε φύσιν ἔχειν—πολλὰ δὲ καὶ αἱ μίξεις ποιοῦσιν, ἑκάστου τι εὔχρηστον εἰς τὸ ζῆν διδόντος. γίνοιτο δ' ἄν τῳ καὶ μὴ συμφερόντων τῶν λυσιτελῶν τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡ σύνταξις ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐ δίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ ἀεὶ ὃ βούλεται· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ προστίθεμεν αὐτοὶ τοῖς δοθεῖσι. πάντα δ' ὅμως εἰς ἓν συμπλέκεται καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὴν συμφωνίαν ἔχει καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλων ἄλλα, κἂν ἀπ' ἐναντίων ᾖ· πάντα γὰρ ἑνός. καὶ εἴ τι δὲ

[1] Kirchhoff*: ἅτε Perna, Creuzer, H–S[1]: ὅσα τε Harder: ὅσα B–T.
[2] del. Bouillet, Harder, B–T, ut glossam complectentem lin. 1–2 ἅ τε et ὅσα τε.
[3] Kirchhoff* (*utilia* Ficinus): χρὴ τὰ Enn.

which would be operative. But if a living being had no choice, still more would there be an absence of consciousness.

38. The effects, then, which come from the heavenly body from its other kind of life without anything stimulating it, and all which are produced by the stimulation of another, for instance by prayers, either plain or sung according to art, all these are to be attributed, not to each individual heavenly body, but to the nature of what is done. And all the effects which are beneficial for the preservation of life or some other useful purpose are to be attributed to the gift [of the heavenly body] and are something which comes from the greater part of the universe to another lesser one; but whatever bad influence is said to come from the heavenly bodies upon the births of living creatures is to be attributed to the inability of the substrate to receive the favourable influence—for what happens does not simply happen, but happens to this specific thing and in this specific way; and that which is affected, and that which is going to be affected, has a specific kind of underlying nature—but also the mixtures of influences produce many effects, though each individual heavenly body gives something beneficial to life. And a bad effect on something may occur also because the naturally favourable forces are not operating to help it, and the concatenation of universal forces does not always give each individual what it wants; and we too add a great deal to what we are given. But all the same, all things are woven into one, and are marvellously in tune, and things come from other things, even if they come from opposites: for all belong to one [universe]. And if anything among the things

ἐλλεῖπον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τῶν γινομένων μὴ εἰδοποιηθὲν εἰς τέλος μὴ κρατηθείσης τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ἐλλεῖπον τῷ γενναίῳ, οὗ στερηθὲν πίπτει εἰς αἰσχρότητα. ὥστε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνων, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν εἰσφέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν προστιθέναι.

39. Συνταττομένων δὲ ἀεὶ πάντων καὶ εἰς ἓν συντελούντων πάντων, σημαίνεσθαι πάντα. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον· συνυφαίνεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα τῇ συντάξει, ἅτε καὶ τῶν τῇδε ἐκεῖθεν ἐξηρτημένων, τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ τοῖς θειοτέροις, καὶ μετέχοντος καὶ τοῦδε ἐκείνων. γίνεται τοίνυν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικοὺς καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμάτων λόγους· οὐ γὰρ ἐν σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνι τι τῶν γινομένων παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τῆς ὕλης εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντελούντων οὐδὲ τῶν δρωμένων εἰς ἄλληλα παρὰ τῶν γενομένων. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν ἐοίκοι ὁ λόγος τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ λόγον τιθέντα κόσμον πόλεως καὶ νόμον, ἤδη εἰδότα ἃ πράξουσιν οἱ πολῖται καὶ δι' ἃ πρ ξουσι, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα νομοθετοῦντος καὶ συνυφαίνοντος τοῖς νόμοις τὰ πάθη πάντα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας, πάντων ὁδῷ οἷον αὐτομάτῃ εἰς συμφωνίαν χωρούντων. ἡ δὲ

which come into being is at all lacking in excellence, since it is not completely formed because the matter has not been mastered, it is, so to speak, lacking in nobility of birth, and since it is deprived of this falls into ugliness. Some things, then, are done by the heavenly bodies, some the underlying nature introduces, and some are additions due to ourselves.

39. But since all things are for ever brought together into order and all are directed to a single end, all are signified. "But virtue has no master",[1] yet its works, too, are woven into the common order, since the things here below depend on the world above, the things in this world on diviner beings, and this universe has a share, also, in those higher realities. What come to be in the All, then, does not come to be according to seminal formative principles but according to formative principles which include powers which are prior to the principles in the seeds; for in the seminal principles there is nothing of what happens outside the sphere of the seminal principles themselves, or of the contributions which come from matter to the whole, or of the interactions on each other of the things which have come to be. But the rational formative principle of the All is more like the formative thought which establishes the order and law of a state, which knows already what the citizens are going to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this, and weaves together by the laws all their experiences and arts and the honour or dishonour that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the state moves as if spontaneously into a harmonious order. But the

[1] This Platonic phrase, from *Republic* X 617E3, is more than once quoted by Plotinus: cp. II. 3. 9. 17; VI. 8. 5. 31.

σημασία οὐ τούτου χάριν, ἵνα σημαίνῃ προηγουμένως, ἀλλ' οὕτω γιγνομένων σημαίνεται ἐξ ἄλλων ἄλλα· ὅτι γὰρ ἓν καὶ ἑνός, καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλου ἄλλο γινώσκοιτ' ἄν, καὶ ἀπὸ αἰτιατοῦ δὲ τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἐκ τοῦ προηγησαμένου, καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἀπὸ θατέρου, ὅτι θάτερον καὶ θάτερον ὁμοῦ ποιῶν. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, λύοιντο ἂν ἤδη αἱ ἀπορίαι, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸ κακῶν δόσιν παρὰ θεῶν γίνεσθαι τῷ μήτε προαιρέσεις εἶναι τὰς ποιούσας, φυσικαῖς δὲ ἀνάγκαις γίνεσθαι, ὅσα ἐκεῖθεν, ὡς μερῶν πρὸς μέρη, καὶ ἑπόμενα ἑνὸς ζῳῆ, καὶ τῷ πολλὰ παρ' αὐτῶν τοῖς γινομένοις προστιθέναι, καὶ τῷ τῶν διδομένων παρ' ἑκάστων οὐ κακῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ μίξει γίγνεσθαι ἄλλο τι, καὶ τῷ μὴ ἕνεκα ἑκάστου ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ ὅλου τὴν ζωήν, καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην δὲ φύσιν ἄλλο λαβοῦσαν ἄλλο πάσχειν καὶ μηδὲ δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι τοῦ δοθέντος.

40. Τὰς δὲ γοητείας πῶς; ἢ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ, καὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι συμφωνίαν εἶναι ὁμοίων καὶ ἐναντίωσιν ἀνομοίων, καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ εἰς ἓν ζῷον συντελούντων. καὶ γὰρ μηδενὸς μηχανωμένου ἄλλου πολλὰ ἕλκεται καὶ γοητεύεται· καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος αὖ. καὶ ὁ γόης ὁ πρῶτος

[1] The reference is to Empedocles: cp. e.g. fr. B 17, 19–20. This and the following chapters make clear that magic was for Plotinus a manipulation of natural forces, attractions and sympathies resulting from the living organic unity of the physical universe. His interest in it was philosophical rather than practical (see further n. 1 on ch. 43). An idea of the sort of magic of which Plotinus is thinking can be obtained

signification is not designed for the sake of indicating what is going to happen before it does, but since things happen as they do some are indicated by others; for since all is one and belongs to one, one thing can be known from another, the cause from what is caused and the consequence from the antecedent, and the composite from one of its parts, because the rational principle of the universe composes one part and another together. If this argument is correct, the difficulties would be solved, that about the gift of evils coming from the gods by the consideration that it is not their deliberate choices which are effective but all that comes from above happens by natural necessity, as actions of parts on parts, and as consequences of the life of the one universe; and that we by ourselves contribute much to what happens, and that, though the gifts of the individual heavenly bodies are not evil, something else comes about in their mixture, and that the life of the universe does not serve the purposes of each individual but of the whole, and that the underlying nature receives one thing but experiences another, and is unable to master what it is given.

40. But how do magic spells work? By sympathy and by the fact that there is a natural concord of things that are alike and opposition of things that are different, and by the rich variety of the many powers which go to make up the life of the one living creature. For many things are drawn and enchanted without anyone else's magical contrivance: and the true magic is the " Love " and also the " Strife " in the All.[1] And this is the primary wizard and enchan-

from the spells published in the *Papyri Graecae Magicae* ed. and tr. K. Preisendanz (2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig 1928, 1931).

καὶ φαρμακεὺς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃν κατανοήσαντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις χρῶνται αὐτοῦ τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς γοητεύμασι. καὶ γάρ, ὅτι ἐρᾶν πεφύκασι καὶ τὰ ἐρᾶν ποιοῦντα ἕλκει πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀλκὴ [1] ἐρωτικῆς διὰ γοητείας τέχνης γεγένηται, προστιθέντων ἐπαφαῖς φύσεις ἄλλας ἄλλοις συναγωγούς καὶ ἐγκείμενον ἐχούσας ἔρωτα· καὶ συνάπτουσι δὲ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἄλλῃ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ φυτὰ διεστηκότα ἐξαψάμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι δὲ προσχρῶνται δυνάμεις ἔχουσι, καὶ αὐτοὺς σχηματίζοντες ὡδὶ ἐπάγουσιν ἐπ' αὐτούς ἀψοφητὶ δυνάμεις ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντες εἰς ἕν. ἐπεὶ ἔξω γε τοῦ παντὸς εἴ τις ὑποθοῖτο τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὔτ' ἂν ἕλξειεν οὔτ' ἂν καταγάγοι ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ καταδέσμοις· ἀλλὰ νῦν, ὅτι μὴ οἷον ἀλλαχοῦ ἄγει, ἔχει ἄγειν εἰδὼς ὅπῃ τι ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς ἄλλο ἄγεται. πέφυκε δὲ καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς τῷ μέλει καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε ἠχῇ καὶ τῷ σχήματι τοῦ δρῶντος· ἕλκει γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὰ ἐλεεινὰ σχήματα καὶ φθέγματα. [ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ] [2] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδ' ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ μουσικῆς θέλγεται ἀλλ' ἡ ἄλογος ψυχή, καὶ οὐ θαυμάζεται ἡ γοητεία ἡ τοιαύτη· καίτοι φιλοῦσι κηλούμενοι, κἂν μὴ τοῦτο αἰτῶνται παρὰ τῶν τῇ μουσικῇ χρωμένων. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ εὐχὰς οὐ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀκουούσης οἰητέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ θελγόμενοι ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς

[1] E, Creuzer, Cilento (*efficacia* nominativus Ficinus): ἀλκῇ ARJUCz, Perna, H–S: ἀλκῆς B.

[2] om. z: delendum ut e glossa ad 24–5 ἀλλ' ἡ . . . ψυχὴ ortum.

ter, from observing whom men came to use his philtres and spells on each other. For, because love is natural to men and the things that cause love have a force of attraction to each other, there has come into existence the helpful power of a magical art of love, used by those who apply by contact to different people different magical substances designed to draw them together and with a love-force implanted in them; they join one soul to another, as if they were training together plants set at intervals. They use as well figures with power in them, and by putting themselves into the right postures they quietly bring powers upon themselves, since they are within one universe and work upon one universe. For if anyone put a magician outside the All, he could not draw or bring down by attractive or binding spells. But now, because he does not operate as if he were somewhere else, he can work on his subjects knowing by what way one thing is drawn to another in the living being. And there is a natural drawing power in spells wrought by the tune and the particular intonation and posture of the magician—for these things attract, as pitiable figures and voices attract; for it is the irrational soul—not the power of choice or the reason—which is charmed by music, and this kind of magic causes no surprise: people even like being enchanted, even if this is not exactly what they demand from the musicians. And we must not think that other kinds of prayers either are freely and deliberately answered: for people charmed by spells do not act with free deliberation, nor, when

οὕτως, οὐδ' ὅταν γοητεύῃ ὄφις ἀνθρώπους, σύνεσιν ὁ γοητευόμενος ἔχει, οὐδ' αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ γινώσκει, ἤδη παθών, ὅτι πέπονθεν, ἀπαθὲς δ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἡγούμενόν ἐστιν. ᾧ δ' ηὔξατο, ἦλθέ τι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον.

41. Ὁ δὲ ἥλιος ἢ ἄλλο ἄστρον οὐκ ἐπαΐει. καὶ γίνεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐχὴν συμπαθοῦς μέρους μέρει γενομένου, ὥσπερ ἐν μιᾷ νευρᾷ τεταμένῃ· κινηθεῖσα γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κάτω καὶ ἄνω ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἄλλης κινηθείσης ἄλλη οἷον αἴσθησιν ἔχει κατὰ συμφωνίαν καὶ τῷ ὑπὸ μιᾷ ἡρμόσθαι ἁρμονίᾳ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ λύρᾳ ἡ κίνησις ἀπ' ἄλλης ἔρχεται, ὅσον τὸ συμπαθές, καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τοίνυν μία ἁρμονία, κἂν ἐξ ἐναντίων ᾖ· καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίων δέ ἐστι καὶ πάντων συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ ὅσα λωβᾶται ἀνθρώπους, οἷον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐλχθὲν μετὰ χολῆς εἰς ἧπατος φύσιν ἦλθεν, οὐχ ὡς λωβησόμενα· οἷον εἰ πῦρ τις ἐκ πυρὸς λαβὼν ἔβλαψεν ἄλλον † ὁ μηχανησάμενος ἢ ἐλθεῖν ἢ ὁ λαβὼν† [1] ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ τῷ [2] δεδωκέναι γοῦν τι [3] οἷον μετατιθέν τι [4] ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο· καὶ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς [5] δέ, εἰ μὴ οἷός τε ἐγένετο δέξασθαι εἰς ὃν μετηνέχθη.

[1] locus nondum sanatus. [2] wUz: τὸ xC.
[3] γοῦν τι Enn., H–S: ἀγνοοῦντι Theiler.
[4] τῷ δεδωκέναι . . . μετατιθέν τι *quoniam aliquid* (sc. ignem) *praebuit quod quasi traderet quiddam* (sc. alterum ignem): μετατιθέν τι Enn.: μετατεθὲν Creuzer (*translatum* Ficinus): μετατεθέν τι Theiler. [5] τὸ ἐληλυθὸς (i.e. τὸ πῦρ) sc. λωβᾶται.

[1] The text here is very uncertain. H–S's critical note, printed under the Greek text, gives the principal suggestions

a snake fascinates men, does the one who is fascinated understand or perceive what is happening, but he knows only afterwards that he has had the experience; his ruling intellect, however, remains unaffected. But, when a man prays to a heavenly body, some influence comes from it upon him or upon another person.

41. But the sun, or another heavenly body, does not hear his prayers. And that which he prays for comes about because one part is in sympathetic connection with another, just as in one tense string; for if the string is plucked at the lower end, it has a vibration at the upper. But often, too, when one string is plucked another has a kind of sense of this by its concord and the fact that it is tuned to the same scale. But if the vibration can even pass from one lyre to another in so far as a sympathy exists, then there is also one single harmony in the All, even if it is composed of opposites; and it is in fact composed of parts which are alike and all akin, even when they are opposites. And all the things which harm men do not come with the intention of harming, but as when the passionate spirit is drawn down with the bile and enters the nature of the liver; just as if someone, taking a light from a fire, hurts someone else—either the person who has made arrangements to go or that one who took it does the damage by having given some fire to someone who, in a way, moves it about from one place to another; and the fire which has come hurts if the person to whom it was transferred was unable to take hold of it.[1]

for improvement. I, very hesitantly, follow Cilento's suggestion (see his commentary ad loc.) in my translation, as it gives some sort of sense without too violent alteration.

42. Ὥστε οὔτε μνήμης διὰ τοῦτο δεήσει τοῖς ἄστροις, οὗπερ χάριν καὶ ταῦτα πεπραγμάτευται, οὔτε αἰσθήσεων ἀναπεμπομένων· οὔτε ἐπινεύσεις τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εὐχαῖς, ὡς οἴονταί τινες, προαιρετικάς τινας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ' εὐχῆς γίνεσθαί τι δοτέον καὶ εὐχῆς ἄνευ παρ' αὐτῶν, ᾗ μέρη καὶ ἑνός· καὶ ὅτι δυνάμεις καὶ χωρὶς προαιρέσεως πολλαὶ καὶ αὗται καὶ ἄνευ μηχανῆς καὶ μετὰ τέχνης, ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ ἑνί· καὶ ἀπολαύει ἄλλο ἄλλον καὶ βλάπτεται τῷ οὕτω πεφυκέναι, καὶ τέχναις ἰατρῶν καὶ ἐπαοιδῶν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἠναγκάσθη παρασχεῖν τι τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὑτοῦ. καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὲ ὡσαύτως εἰς τὰ μέρη δίδωσι καὶ παρ' αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑλκύσαντος ἄλλου εἰς μέρος τι αὐτοῦ, κείμενον τοῖς αὑτοῦ μέρεσι τῷ αὑτοῦ φυσικῷ, ὡς μηδενὸς ἀλλοτρίου τοῦ αἰτοῦντος ὄντος. εἰ δὲ κακὸς ὁ αἰτῶν, θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ ποταμῶν ἀρύονται οἱ κακοί, καὶ τὸ διδὸν αὐτὸ[1] οὐκ οἶδεν ᾧ[2] δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ δίδωσι μόνον· ἀλλ' ὅμως συντέτακται καὶ ⟨ὃ⟩[3] δέδοται τῇ φύσει τοῦ παντός· ὥστε, εἴ τις ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῶν πᾶσι κειμένων, οὐ δέον, ἔπεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀναγκαίῳ νόμῳ τὴν δίκην. οὔκουν δοτέον τὸ πᾶν πάσχειν· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἡγεμονοῦν αὐτοῦ ἀπαθὲς δοτέον πάντη εἶναι, γιγνομένων δὲ παθῶν ἐν μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐκείνοις μὲν ἧκειν τὸ

[1] z, Creuzer, Müller*: αὐτοῦ wxC: αὑτοῦ U.
[2] Harder, B–T, et testatur Theologia VI. 41: ὃ Enn.* (ὃ correctio ad lin. 17).
[3] καὶ ὃ Theiler: καὶ Enn.* : ὃ Kleist (Programm 19).

42. So there will be no need for the heavenly bodies to have memory, either, for this purpose [of answering prayers]—this was the reason why this investigation was undertaken—or sense-perceptions arising from the lower world; nor, if we look at it in this way, do they deliberately choose to attend to prayers, but we must admit that some influence comes from them both with and without prayer in so far as they are parts, and parts of one whole; and that there are many powers which work even without deliberate choice, both without contrivance and with [magic] art, as in a single living being; and one thing is benefited and harmed by another because it is naturally so disposed, and by the arts of physicians and magicians one thing is compelled to give something of its power to another. And in the same way the All gives to its parts, both spontaneously and if someone else magically attracts [its power] to a part of it; for it lies at the disposal of its parts by its own natural disposition, and so the one who makes the prayer is no alien. But if the man who prays is evil, there is no need to be surprised; for the wicked draw water from the streams and that which gives does not know itself to what it gives, but only gives; but all the same that which is given is also co-ordinated with the nature of the All; so that if someone takes what he ought not from what lies at the disposal of all, justice pursues him by an inevitable law. We must not therefore assume that the All can be affected; or we must grant that its ruling principle is altogether impassible, and when the parts come to be affected, the affection pene-

πάθος, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῷ ὄντος ἀπαθὲς [τὸ γενόμενον][1] ὡς πρὸς αὑτὸ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄστροις, καθόσον μὲν μέρη, τὰ πάθη, ἀπαθῆ μέντοι αὐτὰ εἶναι τῷ τε τὰς προαιρέσεις καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἀβλαβεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῷ, καὶ εἰ διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τι διδόασι, μὴ ἐλαττοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ μένειν καί, εἴ τι ὑπεκρεῖ, ἀναισθήτως ἀπιόντος καὶ τοῦ προσιόντος, εἰ πρόσεισι, λανθάνοντος.

43. Ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος πῶς ὑπὸ γοητείας καὶ φαρμάκων; ἢ τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ ἀπαθὴς εἰς γοήτευσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τὸ λογικὸν αὐτοῦ πάθοι, οὐδ' ἂν μεταδοξάσειε· τὸ δὲ ὅσον τοῦ παντὸς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλογον, κατὰ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πάθοι ἄν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔρωτας ἐκ φαρμάκων, εἴπερ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἐπινευούσης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἄλλης τῷ τῆς ἄλλης παθήματι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπῳδαῖς τὸ ἄλογον πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντᾴδων καὶ ἀντεπᾴδων τὰς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεις ἀναλύσει. θάνατον δὲ ἐκ τοιούτων ἢ νόσους ἢ ὅσα σωματικὰ πάθοι ἄν· τὸ γὰρ μέρος τοῦ παντὸς ὑπὸ μέρους ἄλλου ἢ τοῦ παντὸς πάθοι ἄν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀβλαβής. τὸ δὲ μὴ εὐθύς, ἀλλ' ὕστερον, οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ φύσεως.

[1] delevimus: ⟨εἰς⟩ τὸ γενόμενον Seidel, B–T.

[1] I still think it probable that, although ἐπῳδαῖς in this sentence means ordinary magic spells, when Plotinus speaks of the σπουδαῖος as ἀντᾴδων καὶ ἀντεπᾴδων he is thinking of Plato's metaphorical use of ἐπῳδή for salutary philosophical exhortation in *Charmides* 156–7. He uses the word himself in this way, of the highest sort of philosophy, in V. 3. 17. 18–20. For a further discussion of this passage, and in general

trates to them, but since there is nothing there which is contrary to the nature of the All, it is unaffected, directed as it is towards itself. For the heavenly bodies, too, in so far as they are parts, are subject to affections; they are however impassible in themselves, because their powers of choice, as well [as that of the All], cannot be affected and their bodies and natures remain unharmed, and if they give something by means of their soul, their soul is not diminished and their bodies remain the same, and if anything flows from them, it goes imperceptibly, and if anything is added to them, it is unnoticed.

43. But how is the good man affected by magic and drugs? He is incapable of being affected in his soul by enchantment, and his rational part would not be affected, nor would he change his mind; but he would be affected in whatever part of the irrational in the All there is in him, or rather this part would be affected; but he will feel no passionate loves provoked by drugs, if falling in love happens when one soul assents to the affection of the other. But, just as the irrational part of him is affected by incantations, so he himself by counter-chants and counter-incantations will dissolve the powers on the other side.[1] But he might suffer death or illnesses or anything bodily from such incantations; for the part of the All [in him] would be affected by another part or by the All, but he himself would be unharmed. (That the effects of magic do not follow immediately, but later, is not out of line with nature.) But spirits

of the attitude of Plotinus to magic, see my contribution to the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* 207–8 and the literature there referred to.

δαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἀπαθεῖς οὐδ' αὐτοὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ· μνήμας δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τούτοις οὐκ ἄτοπον διδόναι καὶ θέλγεσθαι φυσικῶς ἀγομένους καὶ κατακούειν καλούντων τοὺς αὐτῶν ἐγγυτέρω τῶν τῇδε καὶ ὅσῳ πρὸς τὰ τῇδε. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο γοητεύεται ὑπ' ἄλλου· πρὸς ὃ γάρ ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο γοητεύει καὶ ἄγει αὐτό· μόνον δὲ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀγοήτευτον. διὸ καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις γεγοήτευται καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ βίος· κινεῖται γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἃ θέλγει αὐτόν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος Ἐρεχθέως δῆμος. τί γὰρ μαθών τις πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει; ἢ ἑλκόμενος οὐ μάγων τέχναις, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὴν ἀπάτην[1] δούσης καὶ συναψάσης ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο οὐ τοῖς τόποις, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔδωκε φίλτροις.

44. Μόνη δὲ λείπεται ἡ θεωρία ἀγοήτευτος εἶναι, ὅτι μηδεὶς πρὸς αὐτὸν γεγοήτευται· εἷς γάρ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ θεωρούμενον αὐτός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἠπατημένος, ἀλλ' ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ζωὴν καὶ τὸ ἔργον ποιεῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ὁ λόγος τὴν ὁρμήν, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου, αἱ τοῦ πάθους προτάσεις. τέκνων μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ πρὸς γάμον[2] σπουδαὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὁλκὴν

[1] Kirchhoff*: *τῆς ἀπάτης* Enn., H–S.
[2] wz, Perna*: *γάμων* xUC, H–S[1].

[1] This is a reference to Plato *Alcibiades* I 132A5, where Plato is adapting *Iliad* 2. 547 to his own purposes. Plato adds "but you ought to see it undressed", and the context is the attempt by Socrates to prevent Alcibiades from being corrupted by falling in love with the Athenian *demos*. This serves Plotinus as a good Platonic illustration of the charms

themselves, also, are not incapable of being affected in their irrational part; it is not out of place to ascribe memory and sense-perceptions to them and to grant that they are charmed by attractions appropriate to their nature and that those of them who are nearer to the things here below hear the prayers of those who call upon them according to the degree of their concern with things here below. For everything which is directed to something else is enchanted by something else; for that to which it is directed enchants and draws it; but only that which is self-directed is free from enchantment. For this reason all practical action is under enchantment, and the whole life of the practical man: for he is moved to that which charms him. This is the reason for saying " The citizen body of great-hearted Erectheus looks attractive ".[1] For why does a man direct himself to something else? He is drawn not by the arts of wizards but of nature, which brings illusion and links one thing to another not spatially but by the magic draughts which it gives.

44. Contemplation alone remains incapable of enchantment because no one who is self-directed is subject to enchantment: for he is one, and that which he contemplates is himself, and his reason is not deluded, but he makes what he ought and makes his own life and work. But in practical life there is no self-possession, and the reason does not produce the impulse, but the irrational also has an origin in the premises derived from the affection. For the care of children and concern for marriage have a manifest drawing power, and so do all the things

of the lower world, which are always illusory, whether political or sexual.

ἔχουσιν, ὅσα τε ἀνθρώπους δελεάζει ἡδέα γινόμενα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. πράξεις δὲ αἱ μὲν διὰ θυμὸν ἀλόγως κινοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίας ὡσαύτως, πολιτεῖαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχῶν ὀρέξεις τὸ φίλαρχον τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἔχουσι προκαλούμενον. καὶ αἱ μὲν γινόμεναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι τὸν φόβον, αἱ δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλείονος τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. αἱ δὲ τῶν χρειωδῶν χάριν τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἔνδειαν ζητοῦσαι ἀποπληροῦν φανερῶς ἔχουσι τὴν τῆς φύσεως βίαν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οἰκειώσασαν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὰς πράξεις τῶν καλῶν ἀγοητεύτους εἶναι ἢ καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν καλῶν οὖσαν γοητεύεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ τὰς καλὰς λεγομένας πράξεις πράττοι ἄλλο τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ἔχων, οὐ γεγοήτευται —οἶδε γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῇδε βλέπει, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ὁ βίος—ἀλλὰ τῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης βίᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκειώσει—δοκεῖ γὰρ εὔλογον ἴσως μὴ ἐξάγειν ἑαυτὸν διὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν —[ὅτι][1] οὕτως ἐγοητεύθη. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀγαπήσας καλὸν τὰς πράξεις αἱρεῖται ἀπατηθεὶς τοῖς ἴχνεσι τοῦ καλοῦ, γεγοήτευται τὸ περὶ τὰ κάτω καλὸν διώκων· ὅλως γὰρ ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐοικὸς τῷ ἀληθεῖ πραγματεία καὶ ὁλκὴ εἰς αὐτὸ πᾶσα ἠπατημένου ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν ἐπ' αὐτὰ

[1] del. Theiler.

which entice men since they give pleasure to their carnal desires. And the practical actions which are caused by our passionate spirit are the result of an irrational impulse, as are in the same way those caused by our carnal desires; political activity and the pursuit of office have the desire of power in us provoking them. And the activities which are undertaken to avoid suffering have fear as their origin, and those for the sake of getting more, carnal desire. Those undertaken because of necessary requirements, since they seek to satisfy a need of nature, obviously have the force of nature behind them making survival our own essential concern. But if someone says that noble practical activities are free from enchantment, or, if they are not, contemplation also, which is of noble objects, is under enchantment, [the answer is] that if one carries out the so-called noble activities as necessary ones, and grasps that what is really noble is something else, one has not been enchanted —for one knows the necessity, and does not look to this world, and one's life is not directed to other things—but one has been enchanted in this way by the force of human nature and by the essential concern for the survival of others, or indeed of oneself—for it seems, perhaps, reasonable not to take oneself out of this world on account of this essential concern. But if one is content with the nobility in practical activities, and chooses activity because one is deluded by its vestiges of nobility, one has been enchanted in one's pursuit of the nobility in the lower world; for, in general, to be actively occupied with the semblance of truth and drawn towards it in any way is characteristic of someone who has been deluded by the forces which draw one to the lower

ἑλκόντων· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ τῆς φύσεως γοητεία ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀγαθὸν διώκειν ἐλχθέντα τῷ ἐκείνου εἴδει ἀλόγοις ὁρμαῖς, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγομένου ὅπου μὴ ἤθελεν οὐκ εἰδότος. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἄν τις ἄλλο ἢ γοητείαν εἴποι; μόνος οὖν ἀγοήτευτος, ὃς ἑλκόμενος τοῖς ἄλλοις αὑτοῦ μέρεσι τούτων οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν λέγει εἶναι ὧν ἐκεῖνα λέγει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὃ οἶδεν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠπατημένος οὐδὲ διώκων, ἀλλ' ἔχων. οὐκ ἂν οὖν ἕλκοιτο οὐδαμοῦ.

45. Ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἁπάντων ἐκεῖνο φανερόν, ὅτι, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἔχει φύσεως καὶ διαθέσεως, οὕτω τοι συντελεῖ εἰς τὸ πᾶν καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἑκάστου ζῴου ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, ὡς ἔχει φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συντελεῖ καὶ ὑπουργεῖ καὶ τάξεως καὶ χρείας ἠξίωται· δίδωσί τε τὸ παρ' αὑτοῦ καὶ δέχεται τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσων αὐτῷ δεκτικὴ ἡ φύσις· καὶ οἷον συναίσθησις παντὸς πρὸς πᾶν· καὶ εἰ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μερῶν καὶ ζῷον ἦν, εἶχεν ἂν καὶ ζῴου ἔργα ἕτερα ὄντα τῶν τοῦ μέρους. καὶ δὴ κἀκεῖνο ἀναφαίνεται, ὅπως τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔχει, ὡς ποιοῦντές τι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ παντί, οὐ μόνον ὅσα σῶμα πρὸς σῶμα καὶ πάσχον αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην αὐτῶν φύσιν εἰσφερόμεθα συναφθέντες τοῖς συγγενέσιν οἷς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὰ συγγενῆ τῶν ἔξω· καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν καὶ διαθέσεσι συναφεῖς γινόμενοι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντες, πρός τε τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἐν τῷ δαιμονίῳ

world: this is what the magic of nature does; for to pursue what is not good as if it was good, drawn by the appearance of good by irrational impulses, belongs to one who is being ignorantly led where he does not want to go. And what would anyone call this other than magical enchantment? The man, then, is alone free from enchantment who when his other parts are trying to draw him says that none of the things are good which they declare to be so, but only that which he knows himself, not deluded or pursuing, but possessing it. So he would not be drawn in any direction.

45. From everything which has been said this is perfectly clear, that each thing in the All, according to how it is in nature and disposition, contributes to the All and is acted upon and acts, just as in each individual living thing each of the parts, according to how it is in nature and condition, contributes to the whole and serves its purposes and has its own proper rank and utility; it gives what comes from it and receives as much of what comes from the others as its nature is capable of receiving; and all has a kind of common awareness of all ; and if each of the parts was a living being, it would have functions as a living being different from its functions as a part. And this too has become obvious, how it is with us, that we too do something in the All, not only all that body does to body, and the kind of ways in which body is affected in return, but we also introduce the other nature which we have, in that we are connected by what we have that is akin to us in things outside us: we have certainly become connected, or rather we are connected, by our souls and dispositions both to what is next to us in the region of

τόπῳ καὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λανθάνομεν ὁποῖοί τινες ἐσμέν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πάντες δίδομεν οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν δεχόμεθα· ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔχομεν πῶς ἂν μεταδοίημεν ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἀγαθόν; οὐδ' αὖ τῷ μὴ δεκτικῷ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθόν τι κομιούμεθα. τὴν οὖν αὐτοῦ τις κακίαν συνάψας ἐγνώσθη τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ὥσθη εἰς ὃ ἔχει καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀπαλλαγεὶς εἰς ἄλλον τοιοῦτον τόπον φύσεως ὁλκαῖς. τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ αἵ τε λήψεις αἵ τε δόσεις καὶ αἱ μεταθέσεις ἄλλαι, ὥσπερ ἐκ μηρίνθων ὁλκαῖς τισι φύσεως μετατιθεμένων. οὕτω θαυμαστῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως καὶ τάξεως τόδε τὸ πᾶν γινομένων ἁπάντων ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ κατὰ δίκην, ἣν οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν οὐδενί, ἧς ἐπαΐει μὲν ὁ φαῦλος οὐδέν, ἄγεται δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἳ δεῖ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φέρεσθαι· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ οἶδε, καὶ οὗ δεῖ ἄπεισι, καὶ γινώσκει πρὶν ἀπιέναι οὗ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἐλθόντι οἰκεῖν, καὶ εὔελπίς ἐστιν, ὡς μετὰ θεῶν ἔσοιτο. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγῳ ζῴῳ σμικραὶ τῶν μερῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ καὶ συναισθήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ μέρη ζῷα εἶναι, εἰ μή που ἐπὶ βραχὺ

[1] As in IV. 3. 15–17 (see notes there) some influence of the "cosmic religiosity" of the period can be detected here. The "region of the spirits" is the air, "what lies beyond them" is the Upper Cosmos of the heavenly bodies.

[2] Plotinus is here summarising the doctrine of Plato *Laws* X 903E ff., with a reminiscence of the passage about men as

the spirits and to what lies beyond them and it is impossible that it should be unknown what sort of people we are.[1] But of course we do not all give the same things, or receive the same: for how could we give to another what we have not got—for instance, good? Nor, again, could we get any good if we have an incapacity to receive it. Anyone, therefore, who connects up his wickedness is recognised for what he is, and according to his own nature is thrust into that which holds him here in this world, and, when he escapes from here, into another region of the same kind by the pull of nature. But for the good man his acts of taking and giving and his transferences are different, since [all things] are transferred by pulls of nature as if they were drawn by lines.[2] So wonderfully is this All possessed of power and order; all things go their quiet way according to a justice which nobody can escape; the bad man understands nothing of it, but is taken without knowing it to the place in the All to which he is destined to be carried; but the good man both knows and departs where he must, and knows before he departs where it is necessary for him to come and dwell, and has the good hope that he will be with gods.[3] For in a small living being the changes of the parts and their mutual perceptions of each other are little ones, and it is not possible for the parts in it to be living beings—except perhaps for a short time in some things [4]; but

puppets of the gods moved by strings in I 644D–E (*σμήρινθοι* 644E2). The "quiet way" is from Euripides *Troades* 887–8.

[3] Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 63B–C.

[4] Plotinus may possibly be thinking here of Aristotle's reflections on the psychology of cut-up insects in *De Anima* A 5, 411b19–22 and B 2, 413b19–24.

ἔν τισιν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐν ᾧ διαστάσεις τε τοσαῦται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ χάλασιν ἔχει καὶ ζῷά ἐστι πολλά, τὰς κινήσεις δεῖ καὶ τὰς μεταστάσεις μείζους εἶναι. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα ἐν τάξει μετατιθέμενα καὶ μετακινούμενα. οὐ τοίνυν ἄλογον οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς μετατίθεσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἦθος σῳζομένας, τατ-τομένας δὲ ἀνάλογον ὧν ἔπαθον καὶ ποιοῦσι, τάξιν οἷον κεφαλῆς, τὰς δὲ οἷον ποδῶν λαβούσας, πρὸς τὸ πᾶν σύμφωνον. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινόν τε καὶ χεῖρον. ἣ δ' ἂν μήτε τὸ ἄμεινον τὸ ἐνταῦθα αἱρῆται μήτε τοῦ χείρονος μετέχουσα ᾖ, ἄλλον τόπον καὶ καθαρὸν ἠλλάξατο τοῦτον, ὃν εἵλετο, λαβοῦσα. αἱ δὲ κολάσεις ὥσπερ νενοσηκότων μερῶν, τῶν μὲν ἐπιστύψεις φαρμάκοις, τῶν δὲ ἐξαιρέσεις ἢ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις, ἵνα ὑγιαίνοι τὸ πᾶν ἑκάστου διατιθεμένου οὗ δεῖ· τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀλλοιουμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἐξαιρουμένου ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἐνθαδὶ νοσοῦντος, οὗ δὲ μὴ νοσήσει, τιθεμένου.

in that in which the distances are so great and each of the things in it has freedom of movement, and there are many living beings, the movements and transitions must be greater. And we see that the sun and moon and the other heavenly bodies make their transits and move from place to place in order. It is not then unreasonable either for souls to change their places, since they do not always keep the same character, and are ranked in accordance with their experiences and actions, some receiving a rank like that of the head, others like that of the feet, in tune with the All: for the All itself has differences of better and worse. But the soul which neither chooses what is better here below, nor has any part in what is worse, changes to another place, a pure one, and has the position which it chose. But the punishments are like [the medical treatment] of diseased parts; some have caustics applied to them, others are extracted or modified, so that the All may be healthy when every part is disposed where it should be; but the healthy state of the All comes about when one part is modified, and another extracted from the place where it is diseased and placed where it will not be diseased.

IV. 5. (29) ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΑΠΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΟΨΕΩΣ

1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπερεθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, εἰ μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ ἔστιν ὁρᾶν οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοῦ λεγομένου διαφανοῦς σώματος, νῦν σκεπτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν διὰ σώματός τινος δεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι γίνεσθαι, εἴρηται· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ σώματος πάντη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος ἀντιλήψεως οὐ νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ αἰσθητῶν μόνον, δεῖ πως τὴν ψυχὴν συναφῆ γενομένην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν προσομοίων κοινωνίαν τινὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ γνώσεως ἢ παθήματος ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ δι' ὀργάνων σωματικῶν ἡ γνῶσις· διὰ γὰρ τούτων οἷον συμφυῶν ἢ συνεχῶν ὄντων οἷον εἰς ἕν πως πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἰέναι, ὁμοπαθείας τινὸς οὕτω πρὸς αὐτὰ γινομένης. εἰ οὖν δεῖ συναφήν τινα πρὸς τὰ γινωσκόμενα γίνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τῶν ὅσα ἁφῇ τινι γινώσκεται, τί ἄν τις ζητοῖ; περὶ δὲ τῆς ὁράσεως—εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ὕστερον—ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν, εἰ δεῖ τι

IV. 5. ON DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SOUL III, OR ON SIGHT

1. Since we undertook [1] to investigate whether it is possible to see without any medium, like air or some other body of the kind called transparent, we must now carry out the investigation. Now we have said that seeing, and in general sense-perception, must take place by means of some body; for without body the soul is wholly in the intelligible world. Since sense-perception is an apprehension, not of intelligible objects, but of sense-objects alone, the soul must somehow be connected with sense-objects through things which are very much like them and establish a sort of communion of knowledge or affection with them. This is why this knowledge comes through bodily organs; for through these, which are in a way naturally united to or continuous with sense-objects, the soul must somehow in some way come to a unity with the sense-objects themselves, and so a sort of common affection with them must arise. If then there must be a connection with the objects which are being known, why should one investigate all the things which are known by some kind of touch? But about seeing—we shall discuss later if we also ought to include hearing—but about sight, we must enquire whether there must be

[1] In IV. 4. 23. 42 ff. The reference back in the next sentence is to the same chapter.

μεταξὺ εἶναι σῶμα τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ χρώματος. ἢ νύττοι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ σῶμα, συμβάλλεται δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ὅρασιν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν; ἀλλ' εἰ πυκνὰ μὲν ὄντα τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ τὰ γεηρά, κωλύει ὁρᾶν, ὅσῳ δὲ λεπτότερα ἀεὶ τὰ μεταξύ, μᾶλλον ὁρῶμεν, συνεργὰ ἄν τις τοῦ ὁρᾶν τὰ μεταξὺ θείη. ἤ, εἰ οὐ συνεργά, οὐ κωλυτικά· ταῦτα δὲ κωλυτικὰ ἄν τις εἴποι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πάθος πρότερον τὸ μεταξὺ παραδέχεται καὶ οἷον τυποῦται— σημεῖον δὲ τό, εἰ καὶ ἔμπροσθέν τις ἡμῶν ἔστη[1] πρὸς τὸ χρῶμα βλέπων, κἀκεῖνον ὁρᾶν—πάθους ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ μὴ γενομένου οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ἀφικνοῖτο. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μεταξὺ πάσχειν, εἰ τὸ πεφυκὸς πάσχειν—ὁ ὀφθαλμός—πάσχει· ἤ, εἰ πάσχοι, ἄλλο πάσχει· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὁ κάλαμος ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς νάρκης καὶ τῆς χειρός, ὃ πάσχει ἡ χείρ· καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖ, εἰ μὴ μεταξὺ ὁ κάλαμος εἴη καὶ ἡ θρίξ, οὐκ ἂν πάθοι ἡ χείρ. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀμφισβητοῖτο ἄν· καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἐντὸς δικτύου γένοιτο, ὁ θηρευτὴς πάσχειν λέγεται τὸ ναρκᾶν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς λεγομένας συμπαθείας ἰέναι. εἰ δὲ τοδὶ ὑπὸ τουδὶ πέφυκε πάσχειν συμπα-

[1] Beutler: ἔσται ἢ Enn.: ἔσται ἤ H–S[1]: ἔσται Kirchhoff, Volkmann*.

some body between the eye and the colour. Or does the body in between impinge[1] incidentally on the sight, but contribute nothing to the seeing for those who see? But if when the bodies in between are dense, earthy for instance, they prevent us seeing, but we see better in proportion as the intervening bodies are subtler, one might maintain that the intermediaries are a help to sight. Otherwise, if they cannot be a help, they cannot be a hindrance: but one would say that earthy bodies are a hindrance. But if the body in between receives the affection first, and is in a way stamped by it—an indication that this is so is the fact that if someone is standing in front of us, in so far as he is looking at the colour, he sees it too—then, if there was no affection in the intermediary, this would not reach us either. But on the other hand it is not necessary that the intermediary should be affected if that which is naturally disposed to be affected—the eye—is affected; or if it is affected, it is affected in a different way: for the rod which is between the torpedo-fish and the hand is not affected at all in the same way as the hand; and certainly there too, if the rod and the line were not in between, the hand would not be affected.[2] Or even this might be disputed: for if the torpedo-fish gets into a net, the fisherman is said to receive a shock. But really the discussion seems to be moving in the direction of the sympathies we

[1] The word *νύττοι* was used in this context by the Stoics; cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* p. 130, 15 Bruns (=*SVF* II. 864).

[2] The example of the torpedo-fish is probably drawn from ordinary observation; but the comparison of Socrates to the fish in Plato *Meno* 80A may have suggested it to Plotinus.

θῶς τῷ τινα ὁμοιότητα ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν τὸ μεταξὺ ἀνόμοιον ὂν πάθοι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἂν πάθοι. εἰ τοῦτο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ πάθοι ἂν τὸ πεφυκὸς πάσχειν, κἂν τὸ μεταξὺ τοιοῦτον ᾖ, οἷον αὐτὸ καὶ παθεῖν τι.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρᾶν, οἷον τὸ τῆς ὄψεως φῶς συνάπτειν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ [φῶς][1] μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, δεῖ μεταξὺ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις αὕτη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦτο ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ τροπὴν ἐργάζεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα κεχρωσμένον, τί κωλύει τὴν τροπὴν εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ὄμμα ἰέναι μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξύ; εἰ καὶ νῦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅτε ἐστί, τρέπεταί πως τὸ τῶν ὀμμάτων πρόσθεν κείμενον. καὶ οἱ ἐκχέοντες δὲ τὰς ὄψεις οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν ἀκολουθοῦν τὸ πάντως μεταξύ τι εἶναι, εἰ μὴ φοβοῖντο, μὴ πέσῃ ἡ ἀκτίς· ἀλλὰ φωτός ἐστι, καὶ τὸ φῶς εὐθυποροῦν. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἔνστασιν αἰτιώμενοι δέοιντο ἂν πάντως τοῦ μεταξύ. οἱ δὲ τῶν εἰδώλων προστάται διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ λέγοντες διιέναι χώραν ζητοῦσιν, ἵνα μὴ κωλυθῇ· ὥστε, εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ κωλύσει τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ, οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῇ ὑποθέσει. ὅσοι δὲ συμπαθείᾳ τὸ

[1] delevimus.

[1] This very summary sketch of the doctrines of earlier philosophers, which introduces Plotinus's own view that seeing is by sympathy, seems to depend on earlier brief collections and summary refutations of philosophical theories of vision: cp. especially Alexander of Aphrodisias op. cit. pp. 127, 17 ff. Bruns; also Pseudo-Plutarch *De Placitis Philosophorum*

talk about. But if one thing is naturally disposed to be sympathetically affected by another because it has some kind of likeness to it, then the intermediary between them, being unlike, would not be affected, or would not be affected in the same way. If this is so, then that which is naturally disposed to be affected would be so much more if there was nothing in between them, even if the intermediary was of such a kind as to be affected also in some way itself.

2. If then seeing is an activity of such a kind that the light of the eye connects with the intermediary which extends as far as the seen object, the light must be this intermediary, and this supposition requires this intermediary; but if the coloured body which is the object brings about an alteration [in the eye], what prevents the alteration getting to the eye immediately without any intermediary? This is all the more likely if, even as things are, that which is situated immediately in front of the eyes, when it is there, is necessarily altered in some way. Those who regard seeing as an efflux [of light from the eye] would not in consequence have to maintain that there was any intermediary at all, unless they were afraid that the ray might fall down, but it is a ray of light, and light goes straight. Those who regard resistance as the cause of sight would have every reason for requiring an intermediary. The advocates of images, who say that these pass through the void, require space to prevent obstruction; so that, if the absence of an intermediary will result in even less obstruction, they have no quarrel with the supposition.[1]

IV. 13, 901A–C; other references in the notes of the Harder–Beutler–Theiler edition II b, p. 548.

ὁρᾶν λέγουσιν, ἧττον μὲν ὁρᾶν φήσουσιν, εἴ τι μεταξὺ εἴη, ᾗ κωλύοι καὶ ἐμποδίζοι καὶ ἀμυδρὰν ποιοῖ τὴν συμπάθειαν· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀκόλουθον λέγειν ποιεῖν πάντως ἀμυδρὰν καὶ τὸ συγγενές, ᾗ καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ σῶμα συνεχὲς ἐν βάθει ἐκ προσβολῆς πυρὸς καίοιτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν βάθει αὐτοῦ τῇ προσβολῇ τοῦ πρόσθεν ἧττον ἂν πάσχοι. ἀλλ' εἰ ζῴου ἑνὸς μόρια εἴη συμπαθῆ, ἆρ' ἂν ἧττον πάθοι, ὅτι μεταξύ τί ἐστιν; ἢ ἧττον μὲν ἂν πάθοι, σύμμετρον δ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, ὅσον ἐβούλετο ἡ φύσις, κωλύοντος τὸ ἄγαν τοῦ μεταξύ· εἰ μή που τοιοῦτον εἴη τὸ διδόμενον, ὥστε ὅλως τὸ μεταξὺ μὴ πάσχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ συμπαθὲς τῷ ἓν ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν ὅτι ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἑνός, πῶς οὐ δεῖ, ὅταν τοῦ πόρρω αἴσθησις ᾖ, συνέχειαν εἶναι; ἢ τὴν συνέχειαν καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ διὰ τὸ τὸ ζῷον δεῖν συνεχὲς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ πάθος κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς συνεχοῦς, ἢ πᾶν ὑπὸ παντὸς φήσομεν πάσχειν. εἰ δὲ τόδε μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦδε, ἄλλο δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλου οὐ τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἂν δέοιτό τις τοῦ μεταξὺ πανταχοῦ. εἰ οὖν ἐπὶ ὄψεως λέγοι τις δεῖσθαι, διὰ τί φατέον· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πανταχοῦ φαίνεται τὸ δι' ἀέρος ἰὸν πάσχειν ποιοῦν τὸν ἀέρα, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον διαιρεῖν· οἷον λίθος εἰ ἄνωθεν πίπτοι, τί ἄλλο ἢ οὐχ ὑπομένει

But all those who say that seeing takes place by sympathy will assert that one would see less well if there was any intermediary, in that it would obstruct and hinder and weaken the sympathy; but it would be more consistent to say that even that which is akin in all circumstances weakens the sympathy, in so far as it is itself affected. Certainly, if a body continuous to the bottom is set alight by the application of fire, all the same the bottom of it will be less affected by the fire applied to it than the part before it. But if the parts of one living being are in sympathy will they be less affected because there is something between them? Yes, perhaps they might be less affected, but the affection would be in the proportion which nature willed, and the intermediary would prevent excess: unless what is conceded amounts to this, that the intermediary is not affected at all. But if sympathy depends on being one living thing, and we are affected because we are in one and belong to one, how is continuity not needed when there is perception of something far off? The answer is that continuity and the intermediary are there because the living being must be continuous, but the affection is only incidentally of something continuous, or we shall have to say that everything is affected by everything. But if one thing is affected by one thing and another by another, not in the same way, one would have no need at all of an intermediary. If then someone says that an intermediary is needed in the case of sight, he must say why; since it does not seem to be even generally true that what goes through the air produces any effect on the air, apart from simply dividing it: for instance, if a stone falls from above, does anything

ὁ ἀήρ; ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει εὔλογον κατὰ φύσιν οὔσης τῆς φορᾶς· ἐπεὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἄνω τῇ ἀντιπεριστάσει· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· φθάνει γὰρ τὸ πῦρ τῇ αὐτοῦ κινήσει ταχείᾳ οὔσῃ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν τοῦ ἀέρος. εἰ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ τάχους ταχύνεσθαί τις τὴν ἀντιπερίστασίν φησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν γίνοιτο, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἄνωθεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ξύλων ἡ ὁρμὴ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω οὐκ ὠθούντων· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ κινούμενοι τέμνομεν τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀντιπερίστασις ὠθεῖ, πληροῖ δὲ μόνον ἐφεπόμενος τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν κενούμενον. εἰ οὖν τοῖς σώμασι διίσταται τοῖς τοιούτοις μηδὲν παθών, τί κωλύει καὶ ἄνευ διαστάσεως συγχωρεῖν παριέναι τοῖς εἰς ὄψιν εἴδεσιν; εἰ δὲ μηδὲ πάρεισιν ὡς ἐν ῥοῇ τὰ εἴδη, τίς πάσχειν ἀνάγκη καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάθος πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῷ προπαθεῖν ἰέναι; εἰ γὰρ τῷ προπαθεῖν τὸν ἀέρα ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες τὸ ὁρώμενον εἴδομεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ παρακειμένου ἔσχομεν ἂν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὸ πόρρωθεν πῦρ, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ παρακείμενος θερμανθεὶς θερμαίνειν δοκεῖ· ἁφῇ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὁράμασιν οὐχ ἁφή· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἐπιτεθὲν τῷ ὄμματι τὸ αἰσθητὸν ὁρᾶν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ φωτισθῆναι δεῖ τὸ μεταξύ· ἢ ὅτι σκοτεινὸν ὁ

[1] Cp. again Alexander of Aphrodisias op. cit. 129, 1 Bruns.
[2] Cp. IV. 6. 1. 32–3; Aristotle *De Anima* B 7, 419a12–13.

else happen except that the air does not stay as it is? For it is unreasonable to say [that the stone falls] as the result of the reciprocal thrust[1] of bodies, when its fall is natural, since if this was so fire would go upwards by reciprocal thrust: but this is absurd, for the fire by the speed of its movement gets ahead of the reciprocal thrust of air. But if anyone says that the reciprocal thrust is speeded up by the speed of the movement of fire, this would all the same happen incidentally, and would not cause the upward movement; for in trees also the impulse to grow upwards comes from themselves, without anything pushing them; and we when we are in motion cut through the air, and the reciprocal thrust does not push us on, but only follows us and fills up the place we have left empty. If then the air parts to make way for bodies like these without being affected, what prevents it from allowing passage, even without parting, for the forms which come to our sight? But if the forms do not even pass through the air as if in a stream, what need is there for the air to be affected and for the affection to reach us through it as the result of its previous affection? For if our perception resulted from the air being previously affected, when we looked at the object of sight we should not see it, but we should get our perception from the air which lay close to us, just as when we are warmed. For in this case it is not considered to be the distant fire, but the warmed air lying close, that warms us; for warming is by contact, but in acts of seeing there is no contact; this is the reason why the sense-object does not produce sight when it is placed on the eye,[2] but the intermediary space must be illu-

ἀήρ. μὴ ὄντος δὲ τούτου σκοτεινοῦ οὐδ' ἂν ἐδέησε φωτὸς ἴσως. τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινὸν ἐμπόδιον ὂν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δεῖ κρατηθῆναι τῷ φωτί. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ προσαχθὲν τῇ ὄψει οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ὅτι σκιὰν φέρει τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ.

3. Μέγιστον δὲ μαρτύριον τοῦ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος παθόντος τὸ εἶδος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ὁρᾶν [καὶ τὰς τούτων μορφὰς][1] ὥσπερ διαδόσει τὸ νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ πῦρ τε καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ τὰς τούτων μορφάς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ φήσει τις ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ τὰ εἴδη γενόμενα οὕτω συνάψασθαι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν σκότος τοῦ πυρὸς ἐλλάμψαντος τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος. ἐπεὶ καὶ πάνυ πολλοῦ σκότου ὄντος καὶ κεκρυμμένων καὶ τῶν ἄστρων [καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς][2] καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ ἐλλάμποντος ἐκ τῶν φρυκτωριῶν ὁρᾶται τὸ πῦρ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν πύργων τῶν ταῖς ναυσὶ σημαινόντων. εἰ δὲ καὶ διιέναι τις λέγοι καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸ πῦρ ἐναντιούμενος τῇ αἰσθήσει, ἐχρῆν τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίληψιν, οὐκ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐναργές. εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ σκότου ὄντος ὁρᾶται τὸ ἐπέκεινα, πολλῷ μᾶλλον μηδενός. ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ ἄν τις ἐπιστήσειε, μὴ τῷ μεταξὺ μηδὲν οὐκ ἔσται ὁρᾶν, οὐχ ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι μεταξύ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ συμπάθεια τοῦ ζῴου ἀναιρεῖται πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν τῷ ἓν εἶναι. τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι

[1] del. Kirchhoff, ut iteratum e lin. 4.
[2] del. Volkmann*.

minated—or this may be because the air is [naturally] dark. If it was not dark, it would not perhaps need light. For the darkness which hinders seeing needs to be mastered by the light. But perhaps when the object is applied to the eye it is not seen because it brings with it the shadow of the air and its own shadow.

3. The most important evidence that we do not see the form of the sense-object by a kind of transmission through the medium of the air which has been affected is that fire and the heavenly bodies and their shapes are seen by night. For certainly nobody will assert that the forms come to be present in the darkness and so make connection with the eye: or there would not be a darkness, as the fire would radiate its own form. For even when it is very dark indeed and the stars are hidden and the light from them does not shine, the fire from beacons and lighthouses is seen. But if someone, contradicting the evidence of the senses, says that even in these cases the fire passes through the air, then the eye would have to apprehend the dimness in the air, not that original fire in all its brightness. But if when darkness intervenes what lies beyond is seen, it would be all the more visible with nothing intervening. But one might pause to consider this further point, whether it is not possible to see in the absence of an intermediary, not because there is no intermediary but because the sympathy of the living being with itself and of its parts with each other, which depends on being one thing, will be done away with. For it

ὁπωσοῦν εἶναι, ὅτι συμπαθὲς τὸ ζῷον—τόδε τὸ πᾶν—ἑαυτῷ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ἄλλο ἄλλου τῆς δυνάμεως μετελάμβανε καὶ μάλιστα τῆς πόρρω; τοῦτο δὴ ἐπισκεπτέον, εἰ ἄλλος κόσμος ἦν καὶ ἄλλο ζῷον μὴ συντελοῦν πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ ὄψις ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς νώτοις τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰ ἐθεάσατο ἐκεῖνον ἐκ διαστήματος συμμέτρου· ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τούτῳ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἄν τις μαρτύραιτο εἰς τὸ μὴ τῷ πάσχειν τὸ μεταξὺ τούτῳ τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πάσχοι τὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, σωματικῶς δήπουθεν ἀνάγκη πάσχειν· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οἷον ἐν κηρῷ τύπον γενέσθαι. μέρος δὴ δεῖ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον μόριον τυποῦσθαι· ὥστε καὶ τὸ συναφὲς τῇ ὄψει μόριον τοσοῦτον, ὅσον καὶ ἡ κόρη τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μόριον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ δέχοιτο ἄν. νῦν δὲ πᾶν τε ὁρᾶται, καὶ ὅσοι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι κατά γε τὸ καταντικρὺ ἔκ τε πλαγίων ἐπὶ πολὺ ὁρῶσιν ἐγγύς τε καὶ κατόπιν οὐκ ἐπιπροσθούμενοι· ὥστε ἕκαστον μόριον τοῦ ἀέρος ὅλον οἷον τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ ὁρώμενον ἔχειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ κατὰ σώματος πάθημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μείζους καὶ ψυχικὰς καὶ ζῴου ἑνὸς συμπαθοῦς ἀνάγκας.

4. Ἀλλὰ τὸ συναφὲς τῆς ὄψεως φῶς πρὸς τὸ περὶ

looks as if any kind of perception depends on this, that the living being—this All—is in sympathy with itself. For if this were not so, how would one thing share in the power of another, and especially in power from a distance? But we should consider this problem: if there was another universe, that is another living being making no contribution to the life of this one, and there was an eye " on the back of the sky ", would it see that other universe at a proportionate distance[1]? This universe would have nothing to do with that one. But we will discuss this later. But now one might produce this additional evidence to show that seeing does not happen through the intermediary being affected. For if the intermediary air was affected, the affection would presumably have to be a bodily one; but this means there would have to be an impression, as in wax. Then a part of the seen object would have to be stamped on each part of the air; so that the part of the air in contact with the eye would receive a part of the seen object just as large as the part which the pupil of the eye would receive according to its own size. But as it is, the whole object is seen, and all those who are in the air see it, from the front and sideways, from far and near, and from the back, as long as their line of sight is not blocked; so that each part of the air contains the whole seen object, the face for instance; but this is not a bodily affection, but is brought about by higher necessities of the soul belonging to a single living being in sympathy with itself.

4. But what is the situation with the light of the

[1] The phrase " on the back of the sky " is taken from Plato *Phaedrus* 247B7–C1. This interesting speculation is pursued further in ch. 8: see note there.

τὴν ὄψιν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πῶς; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀέρος οὐ δεῖται, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀέρος ἄνευ λέγοιτο. οὕτω δὲ τοῦτο μεταξὺ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, αὐτὸ δὲ φῶς ἂν εἴη μεταξὺ οὐ πάσχον· οὐδ' ὅλως πάθους ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅμως τοῦ μεταξύ· εἰ δὲ τὸ φῶς οὐ σῶμα, οὐ σώματος. καὶ δὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν ἁπλῶς δέοιτο ἂν τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ μεταξὺ ἡ ὄψις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πόρρω ὁρᾶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο ἄνευ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο σκεπτέον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ φῶς τοῦτο τὸ συναφὲς ἔμψυχον γίνεται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ δι' αὐτοῦ φερομένη καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔνδον, ἐν τῷ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δήπουθεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁρᾶν, οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ μεταξὺ φωτός, ἀλλ' ἁφῇ ἔσται ἐοικὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν τῆς ὁρατικῆς δυνάμεως ἐν φωτὶ ἀντιλαμβανομένης πάσχοντος οὐδὲν τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τῆς ὄψεως φορὰ ἐκεῖ. οὗ δὴ ζητητέον, πότερα τῷ διάστημά τι εἶναι ἐκεῖ δεῖ πορευθῆναι τὴν ὄψιν ἢ τῷ σῶμά τι εἶναι ἐν τῷ διαστήματι. καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ σῶμα ἐν τῷ διαστήματι εἶναι τὸ διεῖργον, εἰ ἀφαιρεθείη τοῦτο, ὄψεται· εἰ δ' ὅτι διάστημα ἁπλῶς, ἀργὴν δεῖ ὑποθέσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν δρῶσαν ὅλως. ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἁφὴ ὅτι ἐγγύς τι

eye which is connected to the light around the eye and as far as the object? Now first of all the intermediate air is not needed—unless it might be said that the light could not be there without air. In this way the air would be incidentally intermediate, but the light itself would be intermediate without being affected; and in general there is no need of an affection here, but there is, all the same, need for an intermediary; but if the light is not a body, there is no need for a body. And, further, the eye would not need this intermediate light, which is not its own, just for seeing, but only for seeing at a distance. The question then whether light could occur without air will be discussed later[1]; but now we must consider our first question. If, then, this connecting light is ensouled, and the soul moves through it and is present in it, as it is also the case with the light within the eye, then of course in the apprehension of the object, which is what seeing is, there would be no need of the intermediate light, but seeing will be like touch; the power of sight will apprehend its object in the light and the intermediary will not be affected but the sight moves to its object. At this point one must enquire whether the sight must move there because there is a space between or because there is a body in the space. And if it is because it is a body in the intervening space which separates sight and object, if this was removed, the sight would see; but if it is simply because there is a space between, one must assume that the nature of the seen object is inert and does nothing at all. But this is not possible: for touch does not only tell us

[1] In ch. 6.

λέγει καὶ ἅπτεται, ἀλλὰ τὰς τοῦ ἁπτοῦ πάσχουσα ἀπαγγέλλει διαφοράς, καὶ εἰ μὴ διείργοι τι, κἂν τοῦτο πόρρω, ἤσθετο. ἅμα γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ὁ μεταξὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς πυρὸς αἰσθανόμεθα οὐκ ἀναμείναντες θερμανθῆναι ἐκεῖνον. μᾶλλον γοῦν τὸ σῶμα θερμαίνεται τὸ στερεὸν ἢ ὁ ἀήρ· ὥστε δι' αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτό. εἰ οὖν ἔχει δύναμιν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ἢ καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἡ ὄψις, διὰ τί ἄλλου δεῖται μέσου εἰς ὃ δύναται πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμποδίου ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ φῶς προσίῃ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, οὐ πρότερον δεῖ τὸν ἀέρα εἶτα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἅμα, καὶ πρὶν ἐγγὺς τῆς ὄψεως γενέσθαι πολλάκις ὄντος ἀλλαχοῦ, ὡς μὴ παθόντος τοῦ ἀέρος ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν, μεταξὺ ὄντος τοῦ μὴ πεπονθότος καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς μήπω ἐληλυθότος, πρὸς ὃ δεῖ τὴν ὄψιν συνάψαι. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ὁρᾶν τὰ ἄστρα ἢ ὅλως πῦρ χαλεπὸν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποθέσει ἀπευθῦναι. εἰ δὲ μένει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, φωτὸς δὲ δεῖται ὥσπερ βακτηρίας πρὸς τὸ φθάσαι, ἔδει τὴν ἀντίληψιν βίαιον καὶ ἀντερείδοντος εἶναι καὶ τεταμένου τοῦ φωτός, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τὸ χρῶμα, ᾗ χρῶμα, ἀντιτυποῦν καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ διὰ μέσου αἱ

that something is near and that it is touching it, but it is affected by and reports the distinctive characteristics of the object, and if there was nothing to separate it, it would perceive the object even if it was a long way off. For the intermediate air and we ourselves perceive a fire at the same time; we do not wait for the air to be warmed. Certainly the solid body [1] is more warmed than the air: so that [the perception of warmth] comes through the air but is not caused by the air. If then the object has the capacity to act, and the recipient of the perception, or in any way the sight, has the capacity to be affected, why does it need another medium to act on what it is capable of acting on? This is to need a hindrance. For when the light of the sun approaches, it does not have to reach the air first and then us, but it reaches both at the same time, and we often perceive it when it is elsewhere, before it comes near our eyes; so we see without the air being affected, with that which has not been affected in between and when the light with which our sight must connect has not yet arrived. Also it would be difficult on this hypothesis to explain correctly how we see the stars, or any kind of fire, at night. But if the soul stays in its own place, but needs light like a stick to reach the object with,[2] then the apprehension would be a violent business, with the light stretched out and pushing against the object and the object of perception, the colour as colour, itself pressing back: for this is how sensations of touch occur through a medium. And [on this hypothesis] the object was

[1] I.e. our body.

[2] Again the Stoic theory according to Alexander of Aphrodisias, op. cit. 130, 17 Bruns (=*SVF* II 867).

ἀφαί. εἶτα καὶ πρότερον ἐγγὺς γέγονε μηδενὸς μεταξὺ ὄντος τότε· οὕτω γὰρ ὕστερον τὸ διὰ μέσου ἅπτεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν γνῶσιν, οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον συλλογισμῷ· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. ἀλλ' εἰ παθεῖν δεῖ τὸ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν φῶς, εἶτα διαδοῦναι μέχρι ὄψεως, ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται ὑπόθεσις τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὸ μεταξὺ πρότερον τρεπούσῃ, πρὸς ἣν ἤδη καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἠπόρηται.

5. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἆρα ἐνταῦθα συγχωρητέον, πάσχοντος τοῦ ἀέρος τὴν κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην τοῦ παρακειμένου[1] ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν ψόφον ποιοῦντος, τῷ τὸν μέχρι ἀκοῆς ἀέρα πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι; ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν τὸ μεταξὺ τῷ παρεῖναι ἐν μέσῳ ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἅπαξ δὲ γενομένου τοῦ ψόφου, οἷον συμβαλλόντων δύο σωμάτων, εὐθέως ἀπαντᾶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν αἴσθησιν; ἢ καὶ δεῖ μὲν ἀέρος τὴν πρώτην τοῦ πληττομένου, τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἄλλως τὸ μεταξύ; ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ κύριος εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ τοῦ ψόφου· μὴ γὰρ ἂν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι ψόφον δύο σωμάτων συρραγέντων, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀὴρ πληγεὶς ἐν τῇ ταχείᾳ συνόδῳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξωσθεὶς πλήξας ἔδωκε τῷ ἐφεξῆς μέχρις ὤτων καὶ ἀκοῆς. ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἀὴρ κύριος τοῦ ψόφου καὶ τούτου κινηθέντος ἡ πληγή, παρὰ τί ἂν εἶεν αἱ

[1] Harder: *τὸν παρακείμενον* Enn.*: del. Beutler.

formerly close to the eye, and there was nothing then between them: for this is the way in which touching through a medium causes knowledge, as if by memory and, still more, by a process of reasoning: but as things are [seeing] is not like this. But if the light near the sense-object has to be affected first, and the affection then transmitted to the eye, this hypothesis becomes the same as that which first brings about an alteration in the intermediary which originates from the sense-object, against which we have raised objections elsewhere.[1]

5. But as far as hearing is concerned, must we agree that the neighbouring air is given the first movement by that which makes the sound, and that by the air as far as the ear being affected in the same way the movement reaches our perception? Or is the intermediary affected incidentally because it is in between, and if the intermediary was taken away would the sound, once it had occurred, for instance when two bodies collide, encounter our perception immediately? Or must there be air, that which is set vibrating by the first movement, and will the intermediary air from that point onwards have a different degree of importance? It does seem that there air is responsible for sound: for there would be no sound at all to begin with when two bodies clash together unless the air, struck by their quick coming together and pushed out, struck the air next to it and so transmitted the vibration to our ears and hearing. But if the air is responsible for sound and the vibration is of air in motion, what

[1] It is not clear to what Plotinus is referring here. The passage suggested by Henry–Schwyzer, IV. 4. 23. 20 ff. is, as Theiler points out, not very relevant.

διαφοραὶ τῶν φωνῶν καὶ τῶν ψόφων; ἄλλο γὰρ ἠχεῖ χαλκὸς πρὸς χαλκὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλο· ὁ δὲ ἀὴρ εἷς καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ πληγή· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ διαφοραί. εἰ δ' ὅτι πρὸς ἀέρα γενομένη πληγὴ ψόφον ἐποίησεν, οὐχ ᾗ ἀὴρ φατέον· τότε γὰρ φωνεῖ, ὅταν στάσιν λάβῃ στερεοῦ σώματος, πρὶν χυθῆναι μένων ὥσπερ στερεόν τι· ὥστε ἀρκεῖ τὰ συγκρούοντα, καὶ τὴν σύρρηξιν καὶ ταύτην τὴν πληγὴν εἶναι τὸν ψόφον εἰς αἴσθησιν ἐλθοῦσαν· μαρτυρεῖν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον ἤχους τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ συγκρούσαντος καὶ πλήξαντος ἄλλο ἄλλου· οἷον καὶ ὀστῶν κάμψεις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα παρατριβομένων ἀέρος μὴ ὄντος μεταξὺ [καὶ][1] πρίσεις. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἠπορήσθω ὁμοίου ἤδη καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ζητήματος γενομένου, ὅπερ ἐλέγετο ἐπὶ τῆς ὄψεως εἶναι, συναισθήσεώς τινος ὡς ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν πάθους ὄντος.

6. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς γένοιτο ἂν μὴ ὄντος ἀέρος, οἷον ἡλίου [ὄντος][2] ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιλάμποντος, τοῦ μεταξὺ ὄντος κενοῦ καὶ νῦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι πάρεστι, φωτιζομένου; ἀλλ' εἰ δι' αὐτὸν παθόντα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τῷ φωτὶ διὰ τὸν ἀέρα—πάθημα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι—μὴ ἂν οὖν ἔσεσθαι τὸ πάθημα μὴ ὄντος τοῦ πεισομένου. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρώτως οὐδ' ᾗ αὐτός. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] del. Müller*.

would account for the differences between voices and between other sounds? For bronze when it strikes bronze has a different ring from when it strikes something else, and other things striking others make different noises; but the air is one and so is the vibration in it; the differences of sounds are not just differences of loud and soft. But if a stroke produces sound because it strikes air, it must be admitted that it is not in so far as it is air: for air speaks when it has the static quality of a solid body, when it stays still like something solid before it is set flowing; so that the colliding bodies and their clash are enough [to produce sound] and their impact is the sound which comes to our perception; the sounds inside living beings are evidence of this, which are not in air, but are produced by one part knocking and striking another: bending of joints, for instance, and the grinding of one bone against another with no air between them. But enough of our problems [about hearing]! The line of enquiry has been much the same here too as in the case of sight, since the experience of hearing is a kind of common awareness of the sort which occurs in a living being.

6. But could light also occur if there was no air, as when the sun shines upon the surfaces of bodies, if the intermediary was void—and even as things are the intermediary is illuminated incidentally, because it is there? But if light resulted from an affection of air and the other [translucent bodies], and light had its substantial existence through the air—for it would be an affection of it—the affection could not exist without something to be affected. Now, first of all light does not belong primarily to air, nor to air in virtue of its intrinsic character; for it belongs

σώματος πυρίνου καὶ λαμπροῦ· καὶ δὴ καὶ λίθων τοιούτων φωτεινὴ χρόα. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς ἄλλο ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρόαν τοιαύτην ἰὸν ἆρα ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντος ἐκείνου; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ποιότης μόνον καί τινος ποιότης, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὔσης πάσης ποιότητος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φῶς ζητεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἔσται σώματι. εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀπ' ἄλλου, διὰ τί οὐκ ὄντος ἐφεξῆς σώματος, ἀλλὰ οἷον κενοῦ μεταξύ, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, οὐκ ἔσται καὶ ἐπιβαλεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα; ἀτενὲς γὰρ ὂν διὰ τί οὐ περάσει οὐκ ἐποχούμενον; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον πεσεῖν, καταφερόμενον ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδ' ὅλως τὸ φωτιζόμενον ἔσται τόδε ἕλκον ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτίζοντος καὶ βιαζόμενον προελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε πάντως ἐπ' ἄλλῳ, ἢ πάθημα ἄλλου, ὥστε δεῖ εἶναι τὸ πεισόμενον· ἢ ἔδει μένειν ἐληλυθότος· νῦν δὲ ἄπεισιν· ὥστε καὶ ἔλθοι ἄν· ποῦ οὖν; ἢ τόπον δεῖ μόνον εἶναι. ἢ οὕτω γε ἀπολεῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν [αὐτοῦ][1] τὴν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου σῶμα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ φῶς. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ φῶς τινος ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἔκ τινος ὑποκειμένου, οὐκ εἰς ὑπόκείμενον δέ· πάθοι δ' ἄν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, εἰ παρείη. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ζωὴ ἐνέργεια οὖσα ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια παθόντος ἄν τινος, οἷον τοῦ σώματος, εἰ παρείη, καὶ μὴ παρόντος δέ ἐστι, τί ἂν κωλύοι καὶ ἐπὶ φωτὸς οὕτως, εἴπερ ἐνέργειά τις [τὸ φωτεινὸν][2] εἴη; οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τὸ φωτεινὸν[3]

[1] del. Volkmann*.

[2] del. Theiler, ut correctionem ad τὸ σκοτεινὸν falso loco insertam: τοῦ φωτεινοῦ suspic. Creuzer, ser. Kirchhoff*.

[3] Kleist (Studien 136), B–T: σκοτεινὸν Enn.*

also to each and every bright and fiery body: there are even stones of this kind with a shining surface. But could that which passes to something else from a thing which has a surface of this kind exist if air did not? But if it is only a quality, and a quality of something, since every quality is in a substrate, one must look for a body in which light will be. But if it is an activity from something else, why should it not exist and travel to what lies beyond without the existence of an adjoining body, but with a kind of void in between (if that is possible)? For since it is stretched out straight, why should it not get across without support? But if it is of such a kind as to fall, it will move downwards. For it will certainly not be the air (or in general what is illuminated) which pulls it out of the luminary and compels it to proceed: since it is not something which occurs incidentally, so that it is completely dependent on something else, nor is it an affection of something else, so that there must be something which is affected; or it would have to stay when it arrived; but now it goes away, so that it could also come. But where is it then? All it needs is a place. If this is so, the body of the sun will lose the activity which comes from it. But this was the light. If this is so the light will not belong to anything else. But activity comes from a substrate, but does not pass into a substrate; but the substrate, if it was there, would be affected in some way. But, just as life, being an activity, is activity of the soul, and if something, body for instance, is there, it is affected, but life also exists if this something is not there, what would prevent this being so also in the case of light, if it is a kind of activity? For as things

τοῦ ἀέρος γεννᾷ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλὰ γῇ συμμιγνύμενος [1] σκοτεινὸν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν ὄντως· ὥστε ὅμοιον εἶναι λέγειν τὸ γλυκὺ εἶναι, εἰ πικρῷ μιγείη. εἰ δέ τις τροπὴν λέγοι τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ φῶς, λεκτέον ὡς ἐχρῆν αὐτὸν τρέπεσθαι τὸν ἀέρα τῇ τροπῇ, καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν αὐτοῦ μὴ σκοτεινὸν γεγονέναι ἠλλοιωμένον. νῦν δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ οἷός ἐστι μένει, ὡς ἂν οὐδὲν παθών. τὸ δὲ πάθημα ἐκείνου δεῖ εἶναι, οὗ πάθημα· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ χρῶμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ· πάρεστι δὲ ὁ ἀήρ. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὕτωσὶ ἐπεσκέφθω.

7. Πότερα δὲ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἀνατρέχει; τάχα γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ ἐκ τούτου λάβοιμεν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἔνδοθεν, ὥστε τὸ μετειληφὸς ἔχειν οἰκεῖον ἤδη, τάχα ἄν τις εἶπεν ἀπόλλυσθαι· εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια οὐ ῥέουσα—περιέρρεε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐχεῖτο εἴσω πλέον ἢ ὅσον τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἐπεβάλλετο—οὐκ ἂν ἀπολλύοιτο μένοντος ἐν ὑποστάσει τοῦ φωτίζοντος. μετακινουμένου δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τόπῳ οὐχ ὡς παλιρροίας ἢ μεταρροίας γενομένης, ἀλλ' ὡς τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκείνου οὔσης καὶ παραγινομένης, εἰς ὅσον κωλύει οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ πολλαπλασία ἡ ἀπόστασις ἦν ἢ νῦν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦ ἡλίου, ἦν ἂν καὶ μέχρι ἐκεῖ φῶς μηδενὸς κωλύοντος μηδὲ ἐμποδὼν ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἱσταμένου. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργεια καὶ οἷον

[1] Kleist (loc. cit.), B–T: *συμμιγνύμενον* Enn.*

are it is not the luminosity of air which generates the light, but air, being mixed with earth, makes it dark and not genuinely pure; so that it is like saying that something sweet exists if it is mixed with something bitter. But if someone says that light is a modification of air, one must reply that the actual air would have to be modified by the modification, and its darkness would be altered and cease to be dark. But now the air stays as it is, as if it was not affected at all. But an affection must belong to that of which it is an affection; light therefore is not the colour of air either, but exists independently. Air is [simply] present. And so let us conclude this enquiry.

7. But does light perish or return to its source? For perhaps from this too we could gain something which would contribute to the solution of our previous problem. Now if it entered into what participated in it, so that this possessed it as its own, perhaps one would have said that it perished; but if it is an activity which does not flow away—for if it was, more of it would overflow all round and pour into the interior of the recipient than reached the recipient from the source of activity—it would not perish as long as the luminary remained in existence. But if the luminary moves, the light is in another place, not as if it flowed back or changed the course of its flow, but because the activity belongs to the luminary and becomes present in so far as there is no obstacle. For even if the distance between us and the sun was many times greater than it is, light would extend over that further distance if there was no obstacle or obstruction standing in between. But the activity within the luminous body, which is

ζωὴ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πλείων καὶ οἷον
ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ πηγή· ἡ δὲ μετὰ τὸ πέρας
τοῦ σώματος, εἴδωλον τοῦ ἐντός, ἐνέργεια δευτέρα
οὐκ ἀφισταμένη τῆς προτέρας. ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστον
τῶν ὄντων ἐνέργειαν, ἥ ἐστιν ὁμοίωμα αὐτοῦ,
ὥστε αὐτοῦ ὄντος κἀκεῖνο εἶναι καὶ μένοντος
φθάνειν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, τὸ μὲν ἐπιπλέον, τὸ δὲ εἰς
ἔλαττον· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀμυδραί, αἱ δὲ
καὶ λανθάνουσαι, τῶν δ' εἰσὶ μείζους καὶ εἰς τὸ
πόρρω· καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ πόρρω, ἐκεῖ δεῖ νομίζειν
εἶναι, ὅπου τὸ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ δυνάμενον, καὶ αὖ οὗ
φθάνει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἰδεῖν ζῴων
λαμπόντων τοῖς ὄμμασι, γινομένου αὐτοῖς φωτὸς
καὶ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ζῴων, ἃ
ἔνδον συνεστραμμένον πῦρ ἔχοντα ταῖς ἀνοι-
δάνσεσιν ἐν σκότῳ ἐκλάμπει εἰς τὸ ἔξω, καὶ ἐν
ταῖς συστολαῖς αὐτῶν οὐδέν ἐστι φῶς ἔξω, οὐδ' αὖ
ἐφθάρη, ἀλλ' ἢ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω. τί οὖν;
εἰσελήλυθεν; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ πῦρ
πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἔδυ εἰς τὸ εἴσω. τὸ οὖν φῶς
ἔδυ καὶ αὐτό; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μόνον· δύντος δὲ
ἐπίπροσθέν ἐστι τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα, ὡς μὴ ἐνεργεῖν
ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ ἔξω. ἔστιν οὖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν
σωμάτων φῶς ἐνέργεια φωτεινοῦ σώματος πρὸς τὸ

[1] Plotinus speaks of the light within the eyes, which sometimes flashes out from them, in V. 5. 7. 24 ff. (a comparison for the internal contemplation of Intellect). Aristotle speaks briefly of the phenomenon of phosphorescence (mentioning luminous fish and fungi and eyes which shine in the dark) in

like its life, is greater and is a kind of source and origin of its [outward] activity; that which is outside the limits of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from the first. For each thing that exists has an activity, which is a likeness of itself, so that while it exists that likeness exists, and while it stays in its place the likeness goes far out, sometimes a longer, sometimes a lesser distance; and some activities are weak and dim, and some even indiscernible, but other things have greater activities which go far; and when an activity goes far, one must think that it is there where the active and powerful thing is, and again there at the point it reaches. As for eyes, one can see what happens when animals have luminous eyes, and their light is also outside the eyes; and with animals which have compressed fire within them, and when they expand, in the darkness, the fire shines outside them, and when they contract there is no light outside, neither has it perished, but it either is outside or is not outside.[1] What then? Has it gone in? Now, it is not outside because the fire is not reaching to the outside, but has gone into the inside. Has the light itself, then, gone in too? No, but only the fire; but when it has gone in the rest of the body is in front of it, so that its activity does not reach the outside. The light from bodies, therefore, is the external activity of a luminous body; but the light

De Anima B 7 419a2–6; Plotinus may be using this passage here or a Peripatetic commentary on it.

ἔξω· αὐτὸ δὲ ὅλως [φῶς][1] τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν, ἃ δὴ πρώτως ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, οὐσία ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ φωτεινοῦ πρώτως σώματος. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἀναμιχθῇ, χρόαν ἔδωκε· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐ δίδωσιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπιχρώννυσιν, ἅτε οὖσα ἄλλου κἀκείνου οἷον ἐξηρτημένη, οὗ τὸ ἀποστὰν κἀκείνου τῆς ἐνεργείας ἄπεστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι, κἂν σώματος ᾖ. διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἀπελήλυθε" κυρίως οὐδὲ τὸ "πάρεστιν", ἀλλὰ τρόπον ἕτερον ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐνέργεια. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κατόπτρῳ εἴδωλον ἐνέργεια λεκτέον τοῦ ἐνορωμένου ποιοῦντος εἰς τὸ πάσχειν δυνάμενον οὐ ῥέοντος· ἀλλ' εἰ πάρεστι, κἀκεῖνο ἐκεῖ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ὡς εἴδωλον χρόας ἐσχηματισμένης ὡδί· κἂν ἀπέλθῃ, οὐκέτι τὸ διαφανὲς ἔχει, ὃ ἔσχε πρότερον, ὅτε παρεῖχεν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅσον ἐνέργεια ἄλλης προτέρας, μενούσης τῆς προτέρας μένει καὶ ἡ ἐφεξῆς ἐνέργεια. εἴ τις δὲ μὴ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐνεργείας, οἵαν ἐλέγομεν τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν ἤδη ζωήν, ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς

[1] del. Kirchhoff*.

[1] For the incorporeality of light in Plotinus cp. I. 6. 3. 18–19; II. 1. 7. 26–8. The background of the doctrine is Aristotelian (cp. *De Anima* B 7 418b3 ff.); but for Plotinus it means, as it did not for Aristotle, that light is, as here (cp. lines 49–51), closely parallel to the life which is the incorporeal activity of soul, and is itself, as he says in I. 6. 3, formative principle and

in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily luminous body. When a body of this kind together with its matter enters into a mixture, it gives colour; but the activity by itself does not give colour, but only, so to speak, tints the surface, since it belongs to something else and is, one might say, dependent on it, and what separates itself from this something else separates itself from its activity. But one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body.[1] Therefore " it has gone away " or " it is present " are not used of it in their proper sense, but in a different way, and its real existence is as an activity. For the image in a mirror must also be called an activity: that which is reflected in it acts on what is capable of being affected without flowing into it; but if the object reflected is there, the reflection too appears in the mirror and it exists as an image of a coloured surface shaped in a particular way; and if the object goes away, the mirror-surface no longer has what it had before, when the object seen in it offered itself to it for its activity. But with soul also, in so far as it is an activity of another prior soul, as long as the prior soul remains, so does the dependent activity. But suppose someone says that it is not an activity, but the product of an activity, as we said that the life was which belongs to the body already, just like the light which has

form. The doctrine of the incorporeality of light is not very much stressed by Plotinus, and seems to have been of only moderate importance to him; but it did provide a justification (if he felt he needed one) for his very free use of the symbolic language of light when speaking of spiritual activity.

τὸ ἀναμεμιγμένον ἤδη τοῖς σώμασιν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα τῷ καὶ συμμεμίχθαι τὸ ποιοῦν τὸ χρῶμα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ζωῆς τῆς τοῦ σώματος τί; ἢ παρακειμένης ψυχῆς ἄλλης ἔχει. ὅταν οὖν τὸ σῶμα φθαρῇ—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τι ἄμοιρον δύναται εἶναι—φθειρομένου οὖν τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐκ ἐπαρκούσης αὐτῷ οὔτε τῆς δούσης οὔτ' εἴ τις παράκειται, πῶς ἂν ἔτι ζωὴ μένοι; τί οὖν; ἐφθάρη αὕτη; ἢ οὐδὲ αὕτη· εἴδωλον γὰρ ἐκλάμψεως καὶ τοῦτο· οὐκέτι δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ μόνον.

8. Εἰ δ' εἴη σῶμα ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ὄψις τις ἐντεῦθεν μηδενὸς κωλύοντος εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν, ἆρ' ἂν θεάσαιτο ὅ τι μὴ συμπαθὲς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τὸ συμπαθὲς νῦν διὰ τὴν ζῴου ἑνὸς φύσιν; ἢ εἰ τὸ συμπαθὲς διὰ τὸ ἑνὸς ζῴου τὰ αἰσθανόμενα καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις οὕτως οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τὸ ἔξω μέρος τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου· εἰ γὰρ εἴη, τάχα ἄν. εἰ μέντοι μὴ μέρος εἴη, σῶμα δὲ κεχρωσμένον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας ἔχον, οἷον τὸ ἐνταῦθα, ὁμοειδὲς ὂν τῷ ὀργάνῳ; ἢ οὐδ' οὕτως, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις· εἰ μή τις τούτῳ γε αὐτῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν πειρῶτο ἄτοπον εἶναι λέγων, εἰ μὴ χρῶμα ὄψεται ἡ ὄψις παρόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν παρόντων αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐνεργήσουσι πρὸς αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, πόθεν δὴ φαίνεται, φήσομεν. ἢ ὅτι ἐνταῦθα

already been mixed with bodies? Now in this case there is colour because that which produces it has been mixed with the bodies. But what about the life of the body? It has it because there is another soul close by it. When, therefore, the body perishes —for nothing can exist without a share of soul—when the body, then, is perishing and neither the soul which gave it life nor any neighbouring soul is sufficient [to avert its destruction] how could the life still remain? Well, then, has this life perished? No, certainly not; for this too is the image of an irradiation: it is simply no longer there.

8. But if there was a body outside the heavenly sphere and there was an eye looking from our universe with nothing to obstruct its vision, would it see what would not be sympathetically connected with our universe, if as things are sympathetic connection is due to the nature of a single living being? Now if sympathetic connection is due to the fact that perceiving subjects and perceived objects belong to a single living thing, there would be no perception, unless this outside body was part of our [universal] living being: for if it was, there would perhaps be perceptions of it. But suppose it was not a part, but a body which was coloured and had the other qualities like those of a body in this world, and so had the appropriate form for the organ of vision? No, it would not be perceived even so, if our hypothesis is correct: unless someone were to try to destroy the hypothesis by saying that it will be absurd if the sight does not see a colour when it is present, and if the other senses, when their objects are presented to them, do not exercise their activities in relation to them. But we shall state the origin

ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντες καὶ ἑνὸς ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν καὶ πάσχομεν. τοῦτο οὖν σκεπτέον, εἰ παρὰ τοῦτο. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτάρκως δέδεικται· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ δι' ἄλλων δεικτέον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῷον ὅτι συμπαθὲς αὑτῷ, δῆλον· καὶ εἰ εἴη ζῷον, ἀρκεῖ· ὥστε καὶ τὰ μέρη, ᾗ ἑνὸς ζῴου. ἀλλ' εἰ δι' ὁμοιότητά τις λέγοι; ἀλλ' ἡ ἀντίληψις κατὰ τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὅτι τοῦ ὁμοίου μετέχει τὸ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ ὄργανον ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ· ὥστε ἡ αἴσθησις ψυχῆς ἀντίληψις ἔσται δι' ὀργάνων ὁμοίων τοῖς ἀντιληπτοῖς. ἐὰν οὖν ζῷον ὂν αἰσθάνηται μὲν μὴ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, τῶν δὲ ὁμοίων τοῖς ἐν αὑτῷ, ᾗ μὲν ζῷον, ἀντιλήψεται· ᾗ [1] μέντοι τὰ ἀντιληπτὰ ⟨ἀντιληπτὰ⟩ [2] ἔσται οὐχ ᾗ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ᾗ ὅμοια τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ. ἢ καὶ τὰ ἀντιληπτὰ οὕτως ἀντιληπτὰ ὅμοια ὄντα, ὅτι αὕτη αὐτὰ ὅμοια πεποίηκεν, ὥστε μὴ οὐ προσήκοντα εἶναι· ὥστε εἰ τὸ ποιοῦν ἐκεῖ εἴη [3] ψυχὴ πάντη ἑτέρα, καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὑποτεθέντα ὅμοια οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ ἀτοπία τὸ μαχόμενον ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει δείκνυσιν ὡς αἴτιόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγει καὶ οὐ ψυχήν, καὶ συγγενῆ καὶ οὐ συγγενῆ, καὶ ὅμοια ταὐτὰ [4] καὶ ἀνόμοια· ὥστε

[1] A[1]JUC: ᾗ BR, H–S[1].
[2] Igal.
[3] Igal: ᾖ Enn.
[4] Kirchhoff*: *ταῦτα* Enn., H—S[1].

of this apparent absurdity. It is that here, being in one and belonging to one, we act and are affected in this way. We must therefore investigate whether this is the reason why we do so. And if this has already been sufficiently shown, our demonstration is complete; if not, we must demonstrate it by other arguments as well. Now it is clear that a living being is sympathetically aware of itself; and if the universe is a living being, this is enough; so that the parts also will be sympathetically aware of each other in that they belong to one living being. But suppose someone were to say that this [sympathy] is because of their likeness? But apprehension and perception take place in the living being because one and the same thing participates in likeness; for its organ is like itself; so that perception is the soul's apprehension through organs like the objects apprehended. If then the universe, being a living being, perceives, not the things in itself but things like those in itself, will it perceive them by virtue of being a living thing? In so far as the objects apprehended are apprehended, they will be so not by virtue of their belonging to itself, but in virtue of their being like the things in itself. Now the objects apprehended are apprehended in this way by being like, because this soul [of the universe] has made them like, so that they are not incongruous; so that if the active principle out there is the altogether different soul [of that other universe], the objects assumed to exist there would be in no way like the soul of our universe. Certainly, then, the absurdity shows that the contradiction in the hypothesis was its cause: for it says at once " soul " and " not soul " and " akin " and " not akin ", and that the objects apprehended

ἔχουσα τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἐν αὑτῇ οὐδ' ἂν ὑπόθεσις
35 εἴη. καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τούτῳ· ὥστε πᾶν καὶ
οὐ πᾶν τίθησι, καὶ ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ
μηδὲν καὶ οὐ τὸ μηδέν, καὶ τέλεον καὶ οὐ τέλεον.
ὥστε ἀφετέον τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ζητεῖν τὸ
ἀκόλουθον τῷ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποτεθὲν ἐν αὑτῷ ἀναιρεῖν.

are " like " and " unlike "; so that since it has these oppositions in itself it is no hypothesis at all. For, besides, it asserts that the soul is in this other universe, so that it postulates something which is " all " and " not-all " and " other " and " not-other ", and " nothing " and " not-nothing " and " perfect " and " not-perfect ". So the hypothesis must be dismissed, as it is not possible to investigate the consequence of it by destroying its foundation in the very investigation.[1]

[1] Plotinus in this chapter draws an extreme logical conclusion from his doctrine that perception is due to the sympathy which unites the parts of the great living organism which is the physical universe. Taking up the (to him completely fantastic) suggestion made in ch. 3 that there might be another universe outside this one, he argues that, even if our universe had an eye on its outside, it could not see the other one because it would be outside the universal sympathy which causes perception: the two universes would be distinct organisms with different and unconnected souls. Plotinus does not seem to advert here to his discussion in IV. 3. 1–5, of which the conclusion is that the hypostasis Soul, of which all souls are parts, is not identical with the Soul of the universe, which is a partial soul, like our souls (though of greater power and dignity). If he had done so, he would have had to consider the possibility that there might be two (or more) such partial souls of distinct universes, united by sympathy as being parts in some sense of the hypostasis Soul. But the unity and uniqueness of the physical universe was a dogma so firmly held and passionately defended in late antiquity that this line of thought probably never occurred to him.

IV. 6. ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

Introductory Note

THIS little treatise is a later supplement to the great treatise on the soul which it immediately follows in the Ennead arrangement. Plotinus is, as always, concerned to show that perceiving and remembering are activities of the soul, and that soul is not a quasi-corporeal thing which passively receives stamps or impressions from sense-objects and then stores them up in its memory.

Synopsis

The expression theory of sense-perception fails to correspond with the facts of sense-experience (ch. 1). The soul is active, not passive, exercising its power of knowing in its acts of sense-perception, as it does to a higher degree in its knowledge of intelligible reality (ch. 2). Memory again is the exercise of a power, which can be strengthened by training and varies in different people (ch. 3).

IV. 6. (41) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ

1. Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις οὐδ' ἐνσφραγίσεις λέγοντες ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὰς μνήμας πάντως τε καὶ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν κατοχὰς μαθημάτων καὶ αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῦ τύπου μείναντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃς μηδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. διὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἂν εἴη ἄμφω, ἢ ἐγγίγνεσθαί τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μένειν, εἰ μνημονεύοιτο, ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ὁποτερονοῦν μὴ διδόντα μὴ διδόναι μηδὲ θάτερον. ὅσοι δὴ λέγομεν μηδέτερον, ἀναγκαίως ζητήσομεν, τίς τρόπος ἑκατέρου, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τὸν τύπον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐγγίγνεσθαί φαμεν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τυποῦν αὐτήν, οὔτε τὴν μνήμην λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ τύπου ἐμμείναντος. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως θεωροῖμεν τὸ συμβαῖνον, τάχ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων μεταφέροντες τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξεύροιμεν ἂν τὸ ζητούμενον. δῆλον δὲ δήπου ἐν παντί, ὡς αἴσθησιν ὁτουοῦν λαμβάνοντες δι' ὁράσεως ἐκεῖ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τῇ ὄψει προσβάλλομεν, οὗ τὸ ὁρατόν ἐστιν ἐπ' εὐθείας κείμενον, ὡς ἐκεῖ δηλονότι τῆς ἀντιλήψεως γινομένης καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω τῆς ψυχῆς βλεπούσης, ἅτε μηδενός, οἶμαι,

[1] Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* I. 450a30–32 for the doctrine here rejected.

[2] The phrase comes from Plato *Phaedrus* 250D2.

IV. 6. ON SENSE-PERCEPTION AND MEMORY

1. Since we say that sense-perceptions are not impressions or seal-stamps on the soul, we cannot say either with any sort of consistency that memories are retentions of what we have learnt or perceived while the impression remains on the soul which was not there to begin with.[1] Both would be a part of the same argument; either one must maintain that an impression enters the soul and remains if there is memory, or, if one does not grant one or the other of these propositions, one must not grant the other either. Those of us who do not say either will necessarily enquire how we perceive and how we remember, since we do not assert that the impression of the sense-object enters the soul and stamps it, nor do we say that memory exists because the impression remains. But if we observe what happens in the case of the " clearest sense ",[2] perhaps we could apply the same also to the other senses and find what we are looking for. It is clear presumably in every case that when we have a perception of anything through the sense of sight, we look there where it is and direct our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight line from us; obviously it is there that the apprehension takes place and the soul looks outwards, since, I think, no impression has

τύπου ἐν αὐτῇ γενομένου ἢ γιγνομένου, οὐδέπω[1]
σφραγῖδα [λαμβανούσης][2] ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ
δακτυλίου λαμβανούσης.[3] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδεήθη τοῦ
ἔξω βλέπειν, ἤδη ἔχουσα παρ' ἑαυτῆς εἶδος τοῦ
ὁρωμένου τούτῳ τῷ ἐκεῖ εἰσελθεῖν τὸν τύπον
βλέπουσα. τὸ δὲ δὴ διάστημα προστιθεῖσα τῷ ὁράματι καὶ ἐξ ὅσου ἡ θέα ἡ ψυχὴ λέγουσα οὕτως ἂν
τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐδὲν ἀφεστηκὸς ἀφ' αὑτῆς ὡς πόρρω
ὂν βλέποι; τό τε μέγεθος αὐτοῦ, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἔξω,
πῶς ἂν ὅσον ἐστὶ λέγοι, ἢ ὅτι μέγα, οἷον τὸ τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τύπον τοσοῦδε εἶναι οὐ
δυναμένου; τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἁπάντων· εἰ γὰρ
τύπους λαμβάνοιμεν ὧν ὁρῶμεν, οὐκ ἔσται βλέπειν
αὐτὰ ἃ ὁρῶμεν, ἐνδάλματα δὲ ὁραμάτων καὶ σκιάς,
ὥστε ἄλλα μὲν εἶναι αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, ἄλλα δὲ
τὰ ἡμῖν ὁρώμενα. ὅλως δέ, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ὡς
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιθέντα τῇ κόρῃ τὸ ὁρατὸν θεάσασθαι,
ἀποστήσαντα δὲ δεῖ οὕτως ὁρᾶν, τοῦτο χρὴ καὶ
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μεταφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ
τὸν τύπον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ θείμεθα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐκεῖνο μέν,
ᾧ ἐνεσφράγισται, οὐκ ἂν ὅραμα ἴδοι· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ[4]
δύο γενέσθαι τό τε ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἄλλο
ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὁρῶν ἀλλαχοῦ[5] κείμενον τὸν

[1] Igal: οὐδὲ τῷ A[1]BJUC: οὐδὲ τὴν R.
[2] del. Igal.
[3] Igal: βλεπούσης Enn.
[4] καὶ defendit Igal, collato V. 5. 11. 4: del. Kirchhoff, H–S.
[5] ὁρῶν ⟨καὶ⟩ ἀλλαχοῦ H–S[1], sed τὸν τύπον obiectum ad τὸ ὁρῶν.

been or is being imprinted on it, nor has it yet received a seal-stamp, like the mark of a seal-ring on wax. For there would have been no need for it to look outwards, if it already had in it the form of the visible object since it saw by this entrance into it of the impression. And when the soul adds the distance to what it sees and says how far it is looking at it from, could it in this way be seeing as distant what was in it and not separated from it by any interval? And how would it be able to state the size as it is outside or say that it is large, to state for instance the size of the sky, when it would be impossible for as large an impression to be inside it? Most important of all: if we received impressions of what we see, there will be no possibility of looking at the actual things we see, but we shall look at images and shadows of the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see.[1] But in general, just as it is said that it is not possible to look at a visible object if one puts it on the pupil of the eye, but one must move it away to see it,[2] so, much more, one should transfer this to the soul. For if we placed in it the impression of the visible object, that in which the impression was stamped could not see the sight: for that which sees and that which is seen must be two [distinct things]. That which sees, then, must be a distinct thing seeing the impression situated else-

[1] In V. 5. 1. 17–18, where Plotinus is contrasting sense-perception with the immediate intuition of Intellect, he says that in sense-perception we do only see an image of the thing, not the thing itself.
[2] Cp. Aristotle *De Anima* B 7, 419a12–13.

τύπον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι[1] κείμενον. δεῖ ἄρα τὴν ὅρασιν οὐ κειμένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ κειμένου εἶναι, ἵνα ᾖ ὅρασις.

2. Εἰ οὖν μὴ οὕτως, τίς ὁ τρόπος; ἢ λέγει περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει· τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμεως, οὐ τὸ παθεῖν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνηθῆναι καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι. οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τύποι μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι περὶ ὃ ἔπεισι πεφύκασιν. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες, μὴ οὐ δύνηται, ἐὰν μὴ πληγῇ, τὸ αὐτῆς γινώσκειν δύναμις ἑκάστη, πάσχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, οὗ κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ' οὐ κρατεῖσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ ἀκοῆς δεῖ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι· τὸν μὲν τύπον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πληγήν τινα οὖσαν διηρθρωμένην, οἷον γραμμάτων ἐγγεγραμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ τὴν φωνὴν πεποιηκότος, τὴν μέντοι δύναμιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν οἷον ἀναγνῶναι τοὺς τύπους ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γεγραμμένους ἐλθόντας πλησίον, εἰς ὃ ἐλθόντες πεφύκασιν ὁρᾶσθαι. γεύσεως δὲ καὶ ὀσφρήσεως τὰ μὲν πάθη, τὰ δ' ὅσα αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν παθῶν εἰσι γνώσεις ἄλλαι τῶν παθῶν οὖσαι. τῶν δὲ νοητῶν ἡ γνῶσις

[1] ad ἐστι subiectum τὸ ὁρῶν.

where, but not in that in which that which sees it is. The seeing, then, cannot be of an object situated where the seeing is, but of something not situated there.

2. If, then, it is not like this, how does it work? [The soul] speaks about things which it does not possess: this is a matter of power, not of being affected in some way but of being capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned. This is the way, I think, in which a distinction is made by the soul between what is seen and what is heard, not if both are impressions, but if they are not by nature impressions or affections, but activities concerned with that which approaches [the soul]. But we men do not believe that each particular power [of perception] can come to know its object unless it is struck by it, and make it be affected by the object near it instead of coming to know it, though it has been appointed to master it, not to be mastered by it. One should suppose that the same kind of process takes place in the case of hearing: the impression is in the air, and is a sort of articulated stroke, like letters written on the air by the maker of the sound; but the power and the substance of the soul does something like reading the impressions written on the air when they come near and reach the point at which they can be seen.[1] And where taste and smell are concerned, there are some affections, but all [tastings and smellings] that are perceptions of them and judgments are acts of knowledge of the affections distinct from the affections themselves. But the

[1] The pre-eminence of sight, the "clearest sense" (cp. p. 321, n. 2), in Greek psychological thought is well illustrated by this casual use of sight-language to describe hearing.

ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀτύπωτός ἐστι μᾶλλον· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ ἔσωθεν οἷον προπίπτει, τὰ δὲ ἔξωθεν θεωρεῖται· καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἐνέργειαι καὶ κυριώτεραι· αὐτῆς γάρ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἐνεργοῦσα ἕκαστον. πότερα δὲ αὐτὴν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ δύο καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ὁρᾷ, νοῦν δὲ ἓν καὶ ἄμφω τὰ δύο ἕν, ἐν ἄλλοις.

3. Νῦν δὲ τούτων εἰρημένων περὶ μνήμης ἐφεξῆς λεκτέον εἰποῦσι πρότερον, ὡς οὐ θαυμαστόν—μᾶλλον δὲ θαυμαστὸν μέν, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ δεῖ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς—εἰ μηδὲν λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν ἀντίληψιν ὧν οὐκ ἔσχε ποιεῖται. λόγος γάρ ἐστι πάντων, καὶ λόγος ἔσχατος μὲν τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, πρῶτος δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ παντί. διὸ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχει, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν εὐπαθοῦσα καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένη, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τῇ ὁμοιότητι ἀπατωμένη καὶ κατιοῦσα ὥσπερ θελγομένη. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ οὖσα αἰσθάνεται ἀμφοῖν, καὶ τὰ μὲν νοεῖν λέγεται εἰς μνήμην ἐλθοῦσα, εἰ πρὸς αὐτοῖς γίγνοιτο· γινώσκει γὰρ τῷ αὐτά πως εἶναι· γινώσκει γὰρ οὐ τῷ ἐνιζάνειν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ἔχειν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ καὶ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἀμυδρότερον καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀμυδροῦ τῷ οἷον ἐγείρεσθαι ἐναργεστέρα καὶ

[1] The reference is probably to V. 6. 1–2.

[2] The idea of Soul as the intermediary logos, the lowest principle in the intelligible world which is first in the world of sense because it expresses the intelligible there as far as it can, is frequent in Plotinus (and in general in the Platonist or Platonically-influenced thought of late antiquity): cp. in this Ennead, for Soul as in the lowest region of the intelligible

knowledge of intelligible objects is much freer from affections and impressions; sense-objects are observed from outside, but the intelligibles in reverse come out, one can say, from within; and they are activities in a higher degree and more authentically: for the object belongs to the knowledge, and the knowledge in its active exercise is each of its objects. But we discuss elsewhere [1] whether the soul sees itself as two and as another, but Intellect is one, or whether both the dualities are one.

3. But now that we have said this [about sense-perception] we must next speak about memory; first we must say that it is not astonishing, or rather it is astonishing, but we should not disbelieve that the soul has a power of this kind, if it receives nothing itself and contrives an apprehension of what it does not have. For it is the rational principle of all things, and the nature of soul is the last and lowest rational principle of the intelligibles and the beings in the intelligible world, but first of those in the whole world perceived by the senses.[2] Therefore it is certainly in relation with both; by the power of the one it flourishes and gains new life, by the power of the others it is deceived because of their likeness and comes down as if charmed. But, being in the middle, it perceives both, and is said to think the intelligibles when it arrives at memory of them, if it comes to be near them; for it knows them by being them in a way: for it knows, not because they settle in it, but because it has them in some way and sees them and is them in a rather dim way, and becomes them more clearly out of the dimness by

IV. 4. 2. 17, and for Soul as the link between the two worlds IV. 8. 7.

ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἰέναι. τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷον συναψάμενα καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὑτῆς οἷον ἐκλάμπειν ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἶναι ἐργάζεται ἑτοίμης οὔσης καὶ πρὸ οἷον ὠδινούσης πρὸς αὐτὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. ὅταν τοίνυν ῥωσθῇ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν τῶν φανέντων, ὥσπερ πρὸς παρὸν διάκειται ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον, τόσῳ ἀεί. διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία μνημονεύειν λέγεται μᾶλλον, ὅτι μὴ ἀφίστανται, ἀλλὰ κεῖται αὐτοῖς πρὸ ὀμμάτων ὡς ἂν ὁρῶσιν οὔπω εἰς πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀλίγα· οἷς δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ὥσπερ παραθέουσι καὶ οὐ μένουσιν. εἰ δέ γε ἔμενον οἱ τύποι, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸ πλῆθος ἧττον μνήμας. ἔτι, εἰ τύποι μένοντες, οὐδὲν ἔδει σκοπεῖν, ἵνα ἀναμνησθῶμεν, οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐπιλαθομένους ὕστερον ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι κειμένων. καὶ αἱ εἰς ἀνάληψιν δὲ μελέται δηλοῦσι δυνάμωσιν ψυχῆς τὸ γινόμενον ὑπάρχον, ὥσπερ χειρῶν ἢ ποδῶν τὰ γυμνάσια εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ῥᾳδίως, ἃ μὴ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἢ ποσὶ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἃ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἡτοίμασται. διὰ τί γὰρ ἅπαξ μὲν ἀκούσας ἢ δεύτερον οὐ μέμνηται, ὅταν δὲ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ πρότερον ἀκούσας οὐκ ἔσχε, πολλῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ μέμνηται ἤδη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ μέρη ἐσχηκέναι πρότερον τοῦ τύπου· ἔδει γὰρ τούτων μεμνῆσθαι· ἀλλ' οἷον ἐξαίφνης γίγνε-

a kind of awakening, and passes from potentiality to actuality. In the same way [the soul] makes the objects of sense which are, so to speak, connected with it, shine out, one might say, by its own power, and brings them before its eyes, since its power [of sense-perception] is ready for them and, in a way, in travail towards them. When, therefore, the soul is strongly moved to anything that appears to it, it is for a long time in a state as if the object was present to it, and the more strongly it is moved, the more lasting the presence. This is why children are said to be better at remembering, because they do not go away from things, but they remain before their eyes, since they do not look at a multiplicity of things, but at few; but those whose thought and soul-power are directed to many things, as it were, rush past them and do not linger on them. But if the impressions remained, their multiplicity would not make memories less. Further, if impressions remained, there would be no need for us to consider in order to remember, nor should we forget before and remember afterwards if the impressions were lying ready to hand. And exercises to improve our mental grasp show that what is going on is an empowering of the soul, just like physical training of our arms and legs to make them do easily what does not lie in the arms or legs, but what they are made ready for by continuous exercise. For why, when one has heard something once or twice, does one not remember it, but [only] when one has heard it many times, and, when one has heard something before and not retained it, why does one remember it long afterwards? It is certainly not because one previously had the parts of the impression; for then one would

ται τοῦτο ἔκ τινος [τῆς][1] ὑστέρας ἀκροάσεως ἢ μελέτης. ταῦτα γὰρ μαρτυρεῖ πρόκλησιν τῆς δυνάμεως καθ' ἣν μνημονεύομεν τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ῥωσθεῖσαν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο. ὅταν δὲ μὴ μόνον πρὸς ἃ ἐμελετήσαμεν τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν παρῇ, ἀλλ' οἵπερ πολλὰ ἀνειλήφασιν ἐκ τοῦ εἰθίσθαι ἀπαγγελίαις χρῆσθαι, ῥᾳδίας ἤδη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰς λεγομένας ἀναλήψεις ποιῶνται, τί ἄν τις ἐπαιτιῷτο τῆς μνήμης ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ῥωσθεῖσαν εἶναι; οἱ μὲν γὰρ τύποι μένοντες ἀσθένειαν μᾶλλον ἢ δύναμιν κατηγοροῖεν· τὸ γὰρ ἐντυπώτατον τῷ εἴκειν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, καὶ πάθους ὄντος τοῦ τύπου τὸ μᾶλλον πεπονθὸς τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μνημονεῦον μᾶλλον. τούτου δὲ τοὐναντίον φαίνεται συμβαῖνον· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν γυμνασία εὐπαθὲς τὸ γυμνασάμενον ποιεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐ τὸ ἀσθενὲς ὁρᾷ οἷον ὀφθαλμός, ἀλλ' ὅτῳ δύναμίς ἐστιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν πλείων. διὸ καὶ οἱ γεγηρακότες καὶ πρὸς τὰς αἰσθησεις ἀσθενέστεροι καὶ πρὸς τὰς μνήμας ὡσαύτως. ἰσχὺς ἄρα τις καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ μνήμη. ἔτι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τυπώσεων οὐκ οὐσῶν, πῶς οἷόν τε τὰς μνήμας κατοχὰς τῶν οὐκ ἐντεθέντων οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι; ἀλλ' εἰ δύναμίς τις καὶ παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ ἕτοιμον, πῶς οὐχ ἅμα, ἀλλ' ὕστερον εἰς ἀναπόλησιν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα; ἢ ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν δεῖ οἷον ἐπιστῆσαι καὶ ἑτοιμάσασ-

[1] om. RJ: delendum suspic. Volkmann: del. Theiler.

have to remember these; but this happens with a kind of suddenness, as the result of some later hearing or exercise. This is evidence of a calling out of the power of soul by which we remember, in that this is strengthened, either in a general way or for the specific art of remembering. But when the power of memory is present to us not only for what we have trained ourselves [to remember], but men who have acquired a great deal of knowledge through being accustomed to use reports come to a point where they easily apprehend (as people say)[1] other information, what could one say was the cause of memory if not the strengthened power? For the persistence of impressions would tell of weakness rather than power; for that which is most impressible is so by giving way, and, since the impression is an affection, that which is more affected must remember more. But what actually occurs appears to be the opposite of this; for nowhere does exercise for any purpose make what is exercised easily affected; since with the senses also it is not what is weak, an eye for instance, which sees, but that organ which has greater power for its activity. This is why those who have grown old are weaker in perception, and in just the same way in memory. So both perception and memory are a kind of strength. Further, when sense-perceptions are not impressions, how could memories be retentions of imprints which were never made [in the soul] at all? But if memory is a power and a preparation for readiness, why do we not come to recall the same things at once, but only later? Because one needs to set up the power, so to speak,

[1] Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* 2. 451a20.

θαι. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ὁρῶμεν εἰς τὸ ποιῆσαι ὃ δύνανται ἑτοιμαζομένων καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθύς, τὰ δέ, εἰ συλλέξαιντο ἑαυτάς, ἐργαζομένων. γίγνονται δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι [πολλάκις],[1] ὅτι οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις ἑκατέρου, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ αὐτὸς πυκτικὸς καὶ δρομικός· ἐπικρατοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδέαι. καίτοι οὐκ ἐκώλυε τὸν ἀστινασοῦν ἔχοντα πλεονεξίας ψυχῆς ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ κείμενα, οὐδὲ τὸν ταύτῃ ῥυέντα τὴν τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἔχειν τὸ πάθος ἀδυναμίαν κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ ἀμέγεθες [καὶ ὅλως][2] ψυχὴν μαρτυρεῖ δύναμιν εἶναι. καὶ ὅλως τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν πάντ' οὐ[3] θαυμαστὸν ἄλλον τρόπον ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ὑπειλήφασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐξετάζειν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ ὡς πρόχειροι αὐτοῖς ἐπιβολαὶ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν ἐγγίνονται δι' ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπατῶσαι. οἷον γὰρ ἐν πίναξιν ἢ δέλτοις γεγραμμένων γραμμάτων, οὕτως περὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν διάκεινται, καὶ οὔτε οἱ σῶμα αὐτὴν τιθέμενοι ὁρῶσιν, ὅσα ἀδύνατα τῇ ὑποθέσει αὐτῶν συμβαίνει, οὔτε οἱ ἀσώματον.

[1] del. Müller.
[2] del. Müller, ut iteratum e lin. 71.
[3] Theiler (πάντα ⟨οὐ⟩ Kirchhoff*): πάντα Enn.

and get it ready. For we see this with the other powers, which are made ready to do what they are able to do, and effect some things at once and some if they collect themselves. But the same people do not as a general rule have both good memories and quick minds,[1] because it is not the same power in each case, just as the same man is not a good boxer and a good runner: for different characteristics dominate in different people. And yet there would be nothing to prevent a man who had any kind of superiority of soul from reading off the deposited impressions, nor would a man who had a strong inclination this way have to possess an inability to be affected and to retain the affection. And the sizelessness of soul is also evidence that soul is a power. And in general it is not surprising that anything about the soul is different from what men have supposed because they have not examined it, or from the hasty notions derived from sense-objects which occur to them and deceive them by likenesses. For they think about perception and memory as they do about letters written on tablets or pages, and neither do those who assume that the soul is a body see all the impossibilities which their hypothesis involves, nor do those who assume it to be bodiless.

[1] Cp. Aristotle *De Memoria* 1. 449b7–8.

IV. 7. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Introductory Note

THIS very early treatise is more "scholastic" than any other writing of Plotinus. The greater part of it is occupied by refutations of school-positions opposed to the Platonic doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the soul by standard arguments taken from any convenient source; and the positive exposition of Platonic doctrine has little that is originally Plotinian. Bréhier's *Notice* introducing the treatise gives an excellent short account of the origins of the various arguments. Those against Stoic corporealism (to the refutation of which most of the controversial part of the treatise is devoted) are Peripatetic in origin, probably derived from the *De Anima* of Plotinus's favourite Aristotelian author, Alexander of Aphrodisias; those against a misinterpretation (so Plotinus thinks) of the Pythagorean soul-harmony doctrine derive from Aristotle's *De Anima* as well as Plato's *Phaedo*; those against Aristotle's own entelechy-doctrine are of course Platonic (and perhaps original), but sometimes intelligently exploit difficulties raised by Aristotle himself in the *De Anima*. The Epicurean position is, as usual, very summarily dismissed (at the beginning of ch. 3) with an objection of Stoic origin.

Considerable portions of the treatise were missing from the archetype of our MSS of the *Enneads*, but were preserved in the excerpts made by Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica* XV, 22 and 10). Henry and Schwyzer give precise details in *Plotini Opera* II, *Praefatio* xviii–xxii. The awkward double numbering of chs. 8^1–8^5 is due to

the fact that these chapters, preserved by Eusebius, were not included in the Latin translation of Ficino, from which our chapter-numbering derives; the first printed edition to insert them was that of F. Creuzer.

Chapter 15 is an odd little appendix to the treatise, indicating cursorily the support for belief in the immortality of the soul which those who feel they need this sort of thing can find in traditional religious beliefs and practices. There is no reason to doubt that it is really by Plotinus: it is quite in accordance with his normal respectfully detached attitude to traditional Hellenic religion.

Synopsis

Man is not a simple thing, but a composite of soul and body; the body perishes, but the soul, which is the real self, survives (ch. 1). The soul is not a body: refutation of the Stoic corporealist position (and, incidentally and in passing, the Epicurean) in detail (chs. 2–8^3). Refutation of the soul-harmony theory supposed to be held by the Pythagoreans (ch. 8^4). Refutation of Aristotle's theory that the soul is the body's "entelechy" or inseparable form (ch. 8^5). Exposition and defence of the Platonic doctrine (chs. 9–14). Those who need this sort of evidence can find support for the doctrine of immortality in oracles and the cult of the dead (ch. 15).

IV. 7. (2) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἢ φθείρεται πᾶς, ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτοῦ ἄπεισιν εἰς σκέδασιν καὶ φθοράν, τὰ δὲ μένει εἰς ἀεί, ἅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ὧδ' ἄν τις μάθοι κατὰ φύσιν ἐπισκοπούμενος. ἁπλοῦν μὲν δή τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχή, ἔχει δὲ καὶ σῶμα εἴτ' οὖν ὄργανον ὂν ἡμῖν, εἴτ' οὖν ἕτερον τρόπον προσηρτημένον. ἀλλ' οὖν διῃρήσθω τε ταύτῃ καὶ ἑκατέρου τὴν φύσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν καταθεατέον. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ συγκείμενον οὔτε παρὰ τοῦ λόγου δύναται μένειν, ἥ τε αἴσθησις ὁρᾷ λυόμενόν τε καὶ τηκόμενον καὶ παντοίους ὀλέθρους δεχόμενον, ἑκάστου τε τῶν ἐνόντων πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ φερομένου, φθείροντός τε ἄλλου ἕτερον καὶ μεταβάλλοντος εἰς ἄλλο καὶ ἀπολλύντος, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ψυχὴ ἡ φίλα ποιοῦσα μὴ παρῇ τοῖς ὄγκοις. κἂν μονωθῇ δὲ ἕκαστον γενόμενον ἕν, οὐκ ἔστι, λύσιν δεχόμενον εἴς τε μορφὴν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων τὰς συστάσεις ἔχειν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοντα, ἅτε σώματα ὄντα, τεμνόμενά τε καὶ εἰς μικρὰ θραύο-

IV. 7. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

1. One might discover as follows, by an investigation according to the nature of the subject, whether each individual one of us human beings is immortal, or whether the whole human being is destroyed, or whether some of it goes away to dispersion and destruction but some of it, the part which is the self, abides for ever. Man could not be a simple thing, but there is in him a soul, and he has a body as well, whether it is our tool or attached to us in some other way. But let us divide man like this, and consider the essential nature of each part of him. The body, certainly, is also itself a composite thing and so cannot reasonably be supposed to last, and, besides, our senses perceive it dissolving and wasting away and undergoing all sorts of destructions, when each one of its component parts moves to its own place, and one destroys another, and changes into another and does away with it, especially when soul, which reconciles the parts, is not present to their material masses. And even if one part is isolated when it has become one, it is not really [one], since it admits dissolution into form and matter, from which it is necessary that even the elementary bodies should have their composition. And besides this, since they have size, because they are bodies, they can be divided and broken up into little pieces and so under-

μενα καὶ ταύτῃ φθορὰν ἂν ὑπομένοι. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν μέρος ἡμῶν τοῦτο, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἀθάνατοι, εἰ δὲ ὄργανον, ἔδει γε αὐτὸ εἰς χρόνον τινὰ δοθὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν φύσιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἴπερ τοῦτο, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρώμενον ὡς πρὸς ὄργανον· ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός.

2. Τοῦτο οὖν τίνα φύσιν ἔχει; ἢ σῶμα μὲν ὂν πάντως ἀναλυτέον· σύνθετον γὰρ πᾶν γε σῶμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ σῶμα εἴη, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἄλλης, κἀκείνην ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ κατ' ἄλλον σκεπτέον. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον, εἰ ὅ τι δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ὃ λέγουσι ψυχήν, ἀναλύειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ψυχῇ πάρεστιν ἐξανάγκης, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μὲν ἐκ δύο σωμάτων ἢ πλειόνων εἴη, ἤτοι ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἢ ἕκαστον ζωὴν σύμφυτον ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ μή, ἢ μηδέτερον ἢ μηδὲν ἔχειν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἑνὶ αὐτῶν προσείη τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη ψυχή. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη σῶμα ζωὴν παρ' αὑτοῦ ἔχον; πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ ἄψυχα παρ' αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅτῳ πάρεστι τούτων ψυχή, τοῦτο ἐπακτῷ κέχρηται τῇ ζωῇ, ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι. καὶ οἷς γε δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕτερα, σώματα, οὐ ψυχαί, ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι οὐδὲ ζωὴν ἔχοντα. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωήν, ἄτοπον—εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ—μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ νοῦν

go destruction also in this way. So, if this body of ours is a part of us, the whole of us is not immortal, but if it is a tool, it must, since it was given us for a certain time, be of a nature to last for that time. But the other part is the most important and the man himself; if it is this, then it is related to the body as form to matter or user to tool; in either way, the soul is the self.

2. What nature, then, does this have? If it is a body, it must be completely separable into its parts, for every body is a composite. But if it was not a body, but of another nature, then that nature also would have to be investigated either by the same [analytic] method or by another. But first we must enquire into what [constituent parts] we are to analyse this body which they call soul. For since life is necessarily present in soul, then of necessity if this body, the soul, was composed of two or more bodies, either both or all of them will have a connatural life, or one of them will have it and another not, or neither or none of them will have it. Now if life was a property of one of them, this one would actually be the soul. What body, then, could there be which has life of itself? For fire and air and water and earth are lifeless of themselves; and when soul is present to any one of them this makes use of a borrowed life—but there are no other bodies besides these. And those who hold that there are elements other than these have maintained that they were bodies, not souls, and that they did not have life. But if, when no single one of them had life, their coming together produced life, it would be absurd (but if each one of them has life, one is enough) or rather impossible for a drawing together

γεννᾶν τὰ ἀνόητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐχ ὁπωσοῦν κραθέντα ταῦτα φήσουσι γίγνεσθαι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι τὸ τάξον καὶ τὸ τῆς κράσεως αἴτιον· ὥστε τοῦτο τάξιν ἂν ἔχοι ψυχῆς. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι [1] σύνθετον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔσης ἐν τῷ παντί, εἴπερ λόγος προσελθὼν τῇ ὕλῃ σῶμα ποιεῖ, οὐδαμόθεν δ' ἂν προσέλθοι λόγος ἢ παρὰ ψυχῆς.

3. Εἰ δέ τις μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῆ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν τῇ ἑνώσει λέγοι καὶ ὁμοπαθείᾳ, ἐλέγχοιτ' ἂν καὶ τῇ παραθέσει μὴ δι' ὅλου δέ, οὐ γιγνομένου ἑνὸς οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἑνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων· ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῇ συμπαθής. ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν σῶμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ὅσον ὑλικὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ ζωὴν ἔχειν οὐ φήσουσιν—ὕλην γὰρ ἄποιον—τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τεταγμένον ἐπιφέρειν τὴν ζωήν, εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν φήσουσι τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο εἶναι, οὐ τὸ συναμφότερον, θάτερον δὲ τούτων ἔσται ἡ ψυχή· ὃ

[1] ὅτι H–S.

of bodies to produce life and for mindless things to generate mind. [The holders of this theory] will not themselves assert that their elements come alive when mixed at random. There is need, therefore, of an ordering principle and a cause of the mixture; so that this would rank as soul. This is not only because body is composite, but not even a simple body could be in existence without soul being in the universe, if it is the coming of a formative principle to matter which makes body, but a formative principle could not come from anywhere except from soul.

3. But if someone says that it is not so, but that atoms or things without parts make the soul when they come together by unity and community of feeling, he could be refuted by their [mere] juxtaposition, and that not a complete one, since nothing which is one and united with itself in community of feeling can come from bodies which are without feeling and unable to be united, but soul is united with itself in community of feeling.[1] But no body or magnitude could be produced from partless constituents. Further, if the body is simple and they [2] are not going to assert that what is material in it has life of itself, but that what holds the rank of form brings the life, then if they are going to say that this form is a substance, it will not be the composite body but one of these constituents which will

[1] The true sense of this difficult passage was seen and clearly explained by Dr. H-R. Schwyzer in his review of Harder, *Gnomon* 32 (1960) 34–5.

[2] After a very summary dismissal of the Epicurean position in the first six lines of the chapter, Plotinus returns here to his main corporealist opponents, the Stoics.

οὐκέτ' ἂν σῶμα· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦτο, ἢ πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀναλύσομεν. εἰ δὲ πάθημα τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίαν φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πάθημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐλήλυθε, λεκτέον αὐτοῖς. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη αὑτὴν μορφοῖ οὐδὲ αὑτῇ ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι. δεῖ ἄρα τι εἶναι τὸ χορηγὸν τῆς ζωῆς, εἴτε τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ χορηγία, εἴθ' ὁτῳοῦν τῶν σωμάτων, ἔξω ὂν καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωματικῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἴη σῶμα οὐδὲν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης. ῥεῖ γάρ, καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, καὶ ἀπόλοιτο ἂν ὡς τάχιστα, εἰ πάντα σώματα εἴη, κἂν εἰ ὄνομα ἑνὶ αὐτῶν ψυχήν τις θεῖτο. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν πάθοι τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ὕλης μιᾶς οὔσης αὐτοῖς. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ στήσεται ἐν ὕλῃ τὰ πάντα, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ μορφοῦντος αὐτήν. τάχα δ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὕλη τὸ παράπαν εἴη. λυθήσεταί τε καὶ τόδε τὸ ξύμπαν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ πιστεύσειε σώματος συνέρξει, διδοὺς αὐτῷ ψυχῆς τάξιν μέχρι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀέρι καὶ πνεύματι σκεδαστοτάτῳ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι ἔχοντι οὐ παρ' αὑτοῦ. πῶς γὰρ τεμνομένων τῶν πάντων σωμάτων ᾠτινιοῦν τις ἀναθεὶς τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ ποιήσει; τίς γὰρ τάξις ἐν πνεύματι δεομένῳ παρὰ ψυχῆς τάξεως ἢ λόγος ἢ νοῦς; ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν οὔσης ὑπουργὰ ταῦτα πάντα αὐτῇ εἰς σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ζῴου ἑκάστου,

be the soul, and this one would no longer be body: for this cannot also be made of matter, or we shall separate it again [into matter and form] in the same way; but if they are going to assert that it is an affection of matter, but not a substance, they must say where the affection and the life came from into matter. For certainly matter does not shape itself or implant soul in itself. There must, then, be something which supplies life, whether it is to matter that it supplies it or to any one of the bodies, and it must be outside and transcend all bodily nature. For there would not even be any body if the power of soul did not exist. For it flows away, and its nature is transitory, and it would perish very quickly if all things were bodies, even if somebody gave one of them the name of soul. For [the body called soul] would be affected in the same way as the other bodies if they had one and the same matter. Or rather it would not even come into existence, but all things would stick [undeveloped] in matter, if there was nothing to shape it. But perhaps there would not even be any matter at all. And this universe of ours would be dissolved if one entrusted it to the conjoining power of a body, giving the rank of soul as far as names go to this body, to air and breath which is extremely liable to dispersion and does not have its unity of itself. For how, since all bodies are in process of division, if one attributed the origin of this universe to any one of them, would one not make it a mindless thing, moving at random? For what order could there be in a breath, which needs order from soul, or what reason or intelligence? But, if soul exists, all these bodies serve it for the maintenance of the world and of each individual

ἄλλης παρ' ἄλλου δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ὅλον συντε-
λούσης· ταύτης δὲ μὴ παρούσης ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις
οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τάξει.

4. Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας
ἀγόμενοι, ὡς δεῖ τι πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρεῖτ-
τον αὐτῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος, ἔννουν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ
νοερὸν τιθέμενοι, ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος
οὐ δυναμένης τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν
εἶναι, τόπον δὲ ζητούσης εἰς τὸ ἱδρυθῆναι, δέον
ζητεῖν, ὅπου τὰ σώματα ἱδρύσουσιν, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ
ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἱδρῦσθαι. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν
παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται,
τί τὸ πολυθρύλλητον αὐτοῖς "πῶς ἔχον" εἰς ὃ
καταφεύγουσιν ἀναγκαζόμενοι τίθεσθαι ἄλλην παρὰ
τὰ σώματα φύσιν δραστήριον; εἰ οὖν οὐ πᾶν μὲν
πνεῦμα ψυχή, ὅτι μυρία πνεύματα ἄψυχα, τὸ δέ
πως ἔχον πνεῦμα φήσουσι, τό πως ἔχον τοῦτο καὶ
ταύτην τὴν σχέσιν ἢ τῶν ὄντων τι φήσουσιν ἢ
μηδέν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδέν, πνεῦμα ἂν εἴη μόνον, τὸ
δέ πως ἔχον ὄνομα. καὶ οὕτω συμβήσεται αὐτοῖς
οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἶναι λέγειν ἢ τὴν ὕλην καὶ ψυχὴν
καὶ θεόν, καὶ ὀνόματα πάντα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μόνον. εἰ
δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ σχέσις καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμε-
νον καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ἐν ὕλῃ μέν, ἄυλον δὲ αὐτὸ τῷ
μὴ πάλιν αὖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ὕλης, λόγος ἂν εἴη τις

living thing, with different powers from different bodies contributing to the whole; but if soul was not present in the Whole these bodies would be nothing, and certainly not in order.

4. But they themselves are driven by the truth to bear witness that there must be a form of soul prior to bodies and stronger than they are, when they state that the breath has a mind in it and the fire is intelligent, as if without fire and breath the higher part of reality could not be in existence, and as if this higher part was looking for a place to establish itself in; when what they ought to be looking for is a place where they will establish body, as bodies must be established in the powers of soul. But if they hold that life and soul are nothing but the breath, what is this "character" which they are always talking about, in which they take refuge when they are compelled to posit another working principle besides bodies? If, then, not every breath is soul, because there are innumerable soulless breaths, but they are going to assert that the breath "with a certain character" is soul, they will either say that this character and this condition belongs to the class of real beings or that it does not. But if it does not, then soul would be only breath and the character would be a mere word. And so it will happen to them that they will not be saying that soul and God are anything but matter, and these will all be mere names—only that [material breath] will exist. But if the condition belongs to the class of real beings and is something else over and above the substrate and the matter, in matter but immaterial itself—because it is not again composed of matter and form—then it would be a rational principle, and not a

καὶ οὐ σῶμα καὶ φύσις ἑτέρα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε οὐχ ἧττον φαίνεται ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι σῶμα ὁτιοῦν. ἢ γὰρ θερμόν ἐστιν ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ σκληρὸν ἢ μαλακόν, ὑγρόν τε ἢ πεπηγός, μέλαν τε ἢ λευκόν, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ποιότητες σωμάτων ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλοις. καὶ εἰ μὲν θερμὸν μόνον, θερμαίνει, ψυχρὸν δὲ μόνον, ψύξει· καὶ κοῦφα ποιήσει τὸ κοῦφον προσγενόμενον καὶ παρόν, καὶ βαρυνεῖ τὸ βαρύ· καὶ μελανεῖ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν λευκὸν ποιήσει. οὐ γὰρ πυρὸς τὸ ψύχειν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ψυχροῦ θερμὰ ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' ἥ γε ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν ζῴοις ἄλλα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ποιεῖ, καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐναντία, τὰ μέν πηγνῦσα, τὰ δὲ χέουσα, καὶ τὰ μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δὲ ἀραιά, μέλανα λευκά, κοῦφα βαρέα. καίτοι ἓν δεῖ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ποιότητά τε τὴν ἄλλην καὶ δὴ καὶ χρόαν· νῦν δὲ πολλά.

5. Τὰς δὲ δὴ κινήσεις πῶς διαφόρους, ἀλλ' οὐ μίαν, μιᾶς οὔσης παντὸς σώματος κινήσεως; εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν προαιρέσεις, τῶν δὲ λόγους αἰτιάσονται, ὀρθῶς μὲν τοῦτο· ἀλλ' οὐ σώματος ἡ προαίρεσις οὐδὲ οἱ λόγοι διάφοροί γε ὄντες, ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ ἁπλοῦ τοῦ σώματος καὶ οὐ μετὸν αὐτῷ τοιούτου γε λόγου, ἢ ὅσος δέδοται αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ποιήσαντος θερμὸν αὐτὸ ἢ ψυχρὸν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν χρόνοις αὔξειν, καὶ μέχρι τοσούτου μέτρου, πόθεν ἂν τῷ σώματι αὐτῷ γένοιτο, ᾧ προσήκει ἐναύξεσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀμοίρῳ τοῦ αὔξειν εἶναι, ἢ ὅσον παραληφθείη ἂν ἐν ὕλης ὄγκῳ ὑπηρετοῦν τῷ δι' αὐτοῦ

body, and so a different kind of nature. And besides, it is equally obvious for the following reasons that it is impossible for soul to be any kind of body. For [if it is], it is hot or cold, hard or soft, fluid or solid, black or white, and [one could mention] all the other qualities of bodies which are different in different ones. And if it is only hot, it heats, but if it is only cold, it will cool, and the light when it is present makes things light and the heavy makes them heavy; and the black will blacken, and the white will make things white. For it does not belong to fire to cool things, nor to the cold to make them hot. But the soul does different things in different living beings, and even opposite things in the same one, solidifying some and liquefying others, and making some things dense and others rarefied, making things black and white, light and heavy. But [if it was a body] it ought to produce one effect according to the body's qualities, all of them including its colour; but as it is it produces many effects.

5. But why, I ask, are the movements different, and not one, when every body has one movement? If they make choices responsible for some and rational principles for others, that is correct; but choice does not belong to body and neither do rational principles which are various, while body is one and simple and has no share in rational principle of this kind, but only as much rational principle as is given to it by what made it hot or cold. But from where could the body get the power to cause growth in season and up to a certain measure? It is proper to body to grow, but to be without the power of causing growth except as much as may be received in the mass of matter for the service of that which

τὴν αὔξην ἐργαζομένῳ; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμα οὖσα αὔξοι, ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὴν αὔξεσθαι, προσθήκῃ δηλονότι ὁμοίου σώματος, εἰ μέλλει εἰς ἴσον ἰέναι τῷ αὐξομένῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς. καὶ ἢ ψυχὴ ἔσται τὸ προστιθέμενον ἢ ἄψυχον σῶμα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψυχή, πόθεν καὶ πῶς εἰσιούσης, καὶ πῶς προστιθεμένης; εἰ δὲ ἄψυχον τὸ προστιθέμενον, πῶς τοῦτο ψυχώσεται καὶ τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμογνωμονήσει καὶ ἓν ἔσται καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν τῇ πρόσθεν μεταλήψεται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ξένη ψυχὴ αὕτη ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἔσται ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα; εἰ δὲ καί, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄλλος ὄγκος ἡμῶν, τὸ μέν τι ἀπορρεύσεται αὐτοῦ, τὸ δέ τι προσελεύσεται, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔσται τὸ αὐτό, πῶς οὖν ἡμῖν αἱ μνῆμαι, πῶς δὲ ἡ γνώρισις οἰκείων οὐδέποτε τῇ αὐτῇ ψυχῇ χρωμένων; καὶ μὴν εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσις δὲ σώματος μεριζόμενον εἰς πλείω ἕκαστον μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τῶν μερῶν τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰ τὸ τοσόνδε μέγεθος ψυχή, ὃ ἐὰν ἔλαττον ᾖ ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, ὥσπερ πᾶν ποσὸν ἀφαιρέσει τὸ εἶναι τὸ πρόσθεν ἠλλάξατο—εἰ δέ τι τῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων τὸν ὄγκον ἐλαττωθὲν τῇ ποιότητι ταὐτὸν μένοι, ᾗ μὲν σῶμα ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ποσόν, τῇ δὲ ποιότητι ἑτέρᾳ τῆς ποσότητος οὔσῃ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποσῴζειν δύναται—τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες; πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχήν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνε-

brings about growth by means of it. For if soul, being a body, was to cause growth, it would have to grow itself, obviously by the addition of similar body, if it was going to keep pace with the body it was causing to grow. And what is added will be either soul or soulless body. And if it is soul, where will it come from, and how will it get in and how is it added? But if what is added is soulless, how will this become soul and how will it come to agreement with what was there before, and be one with it and share the same thoughts with the soul which was there before, but not be like a strange soul which will be ignorant of what the other soul knows? But if, just like the rest of our [bodily] mass, some of its substance will flow away, and some of it will come from outside, and nothing will be the same, how then do we have memories, and how do friends and relations recognise each other when they never have the same souls? Then again, if soul is a body, and when the nature of body is divided into several parts each part is not the same as the whole, if soul is a particular definite size of body, which is not soul if it is smaller, as every quantity changes from its former existence by subtraction—but if one of the things which have size remains the same in quality when its mass is diminished, it is different in so far as it is body, and in so far as it is a particular size, but can retain its identity by its quality which is different from its quantity—what then are the people who assert that soul is a body going to say about this? First of all about each individual part of the soul which is in the same body: is each of them a soul in the same way as the whole is? And again, is the part of the part? If this is so, the size contri-

βάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος ὄντος· καὶ ὅλον πολλαχῇ ὅπερ σώματι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει. καὶ προσέτι ψυχῆς ἑκάστης τὸ μέγεθος ὡρισμένον ἔσται [οὐδὲ][1] ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, ἢ[2] ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττόν γε [ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον][3] ψυχὴ οὐκ ἔσται. ὅταν τοίνυν ἐκ συνόδου μιᾶς καὶ ἑνὸς σπέρματος δίδυμα γένηται γεννήματα, ἢ καί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, πλεῖστα τοῦ σπέρματος εἰς πολλοὺς τόπους μεριζομένου, οὗ δὴ ἕκαστον ὅλον ἐστί, πῶς οὐ διδάσκει τοῦτο τοὺς βουλομένους μανθάνειν, ὡς, ὅπου τὸ μέρος τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τῷ ὅλῳ, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, ἄποσον δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μένοι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ κλεπτομένου, ἅτε μὴ μέλον αὐτῷ ποσότητος καὶ ὄγκου, ὡς ἂν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ ἕτερόν τι οὔσης. ἄποσον ἄρα· ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

6. Ὅτι δέ, εἰ σῶμα εἴη ἡ ψυχή, οὔτε τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ νοεῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὔτε ἀρετὴ οὔτε τι τῶν καλῶν ἔσται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. εἴ τι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος, ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα εἴη ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποιότητες, κἂν δι' ἑνὸς ποικίλον οἷον πρόσωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινός, ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ

[1] om. Eusebius*.
[2] Eus.: ἢ Enn.
[3] om. Eus.

butes nothing to its essential being; and yet it ought to, if the soul is a particular size, and it is as a whole in many places; this is something of which a body cannot possibly be capable, for the same body to be as a whole in more than one place and for the part to be what the whole is. But if they are going to say that each of the parts is not a soul, their soul will consist of soulless parts. And besides, if the size of each soul is limited in both directions, that at any rate which is less [than the minimum size] will not be soul; when, therefore, from one act of intercourse and one seed twin offspring are produced or, as in other living things a great many, the seed being distributed to many parts [of the womb], and each is a complete whole, why does this not teach those who are willing to learn that, where the part is the same as the whole, this thing transcends quantity in its own essential being, and must necessarily itself be non-quantitative? For thus it would remain the same when robbed of quantity since it would not care about quantity and mass, because its own nature would be something else. The soul and rational principles, then, are without quantity.

6. But it is clear from the following arguments that if soul is a body, neither perception nor thinking nor knowing nor virtue nor anything of value will exist. If anything is going to perceive anything, it must itself be one and perceive every object by one and the same means, both if a number of impressions are received through many sense-organs, or many qualities are perceived in one thing, or if through one sense-organ a complex thing, for example a face, is perceived. For there is not one perception of the nose and another of the eyes, but one and the

ταὐτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἕν τι δεῖ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ ἄμφω. ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἐλθόντων; δεῖ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὥσπερ κέντρον εἶναι, γραμμὰς δὲ συμβαλλούσας ἐκ περιφερείας κύκλου τὰς πανταχόθεν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τοῦτο περαίνειν, καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἶναι, ἓν ὂν ὄντως. εἰ δὲ διεστὼς τοῦτο γένοιτο, καὶ οἷον γραμμῆς ἐπ' ἄμφω τὰ πέρατα αἱ αἰσθήσεις προσβάλλοιεν, ἢ συνδραμεῖται εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν, οἷον τὸ μέσον, ἢ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου αἴσθησιν ἕξει· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἴσθοιο. καὶ εἰ ἓν εἴη τὸ αἴσθημα, οἷον πρόσωπον, ἢ εἰς ἓν συναιρεθήσεται—ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται· συναιρεῖται γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς κόραις· ἢ πῶς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα διὰ ταύτης ὁρῷτο; ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἰόντα οἷον μερῆ νοήματα γίγνεσθαι —καὶ ἔσται ἀμερὲς τοῦτο· ἢ μεγέθει ὄντι τοῦτῳ συμμερίζοιτο ἄν, ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τὴν ἀντίληψιν ἴσχειν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ

same perception of all together. And if one perception comes through the eyes and another through hearing, there must be some one thing to which both come. Or how could one say that these sense-perceptions are different, if they did not all come together to one and the same [recipient]? This then must be like a centre, and the sense-perceptions from every quarter, lines coming together from the circumference of the circle, must reach it, and that which apprehends them must be of this kind, really one.[1] But if this were extended, and the sense-perceptions arrived at something like the terminal points at both ends of a line, either they will run together again at one and the same point, like the middle of the line, or the two different terminal points will each have a perception of something different (as if I perceived one thing and you another).[2] And if the object of perception was one, a face for instance, either it will be gathered together into a unity—which is what does obviously happen; for it is gathered together in the pupils of the eyes themselves: or how could the largest things be seen through the pupil of our eye? So still more when they reach the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts—and this ruling principle will be partless; or if this is a size the sense-objects would be divided up along with it, so that each part would perceive a different part of the object and none of us would apprehend the perceptible thing as a whole. But the whole is one: for how could it be divided?

[1] This is a Peripatetic comparison: cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias *De Anima* p. 63, 8–13 Bruns.

[2] Again Peripatetic language: cp. Aristotle *De Anima* 2, 426b19 and Alexander *De Anima* p. 61, 1–3 Bruns.

διαιροῖτο; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ἴσῳ ἐφαρμόσει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν παντὶ αἰσθητῷ. κατὰ πηλίκα οὖν ἡ διαίρεσις; ἢ εἰς τοσαῦτα διαιρεθήσεται, καθόσον ἂν ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοι εἰς ποικιλίαν τὸ εἰσιὸν αἴσθημα; καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ ἐκείνων τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μορίοις αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσεται. ἢ ἀναίσθητα τὰ μέρη τῶν μορίων ἔσται; ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται, εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας. καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου οὐκ ἂν ἄλλον τρόπον γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οἷον ἐν κηρῷ ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες, εἴτ' οὖν εἰς αἷμα, εἴτ' οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐνσημαινομένων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ καὶ εὔλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ συγχυθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μένουσιν οἱ τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλους ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων κατεχόντων, ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται, ἢ γινομένων ἄλλων ἐκεῖνοι οἱ πρότεροι ἀπολοῦνται· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται μνημονεύειν. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ' ἄλλοις οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι.

7. Ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀλγεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀλγεῖν αἰσθήσεως τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ μὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ

So equal will certainly not fit equal, because the ruling principle is not equal to every perceptible object. Into how many parts, then, will its division be? Will it be divided into a number of parts corresponding to the varied complexity of the entering sense-object? And of course each of those parts of the soul will perceive with its own subdivisions. Or will the parts of the parts be without perception? But this is impossible. But if any and every part perceives the whole, since a size is naturally capable of division to infinity, there will come to be an infinity of perceptions for each observer regarding the sense-object, like an infinite number of images of the same thing in our ruling principle. Again, since the object being perceived is a body, perception could not occur in any other way than that in which seal-impressions are imprinted in wax from seal-rings, whether the sense-objects are imprinted on blood or on air. And if this happens as it does in fluid bodies, which is probable, the impression will be obliterated as if it was on water, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions persist, either it will not be possible for others to be imprinted because the first will prevent them, so that there will be no other sense-impressions, or if others are made, those former impressions will be destroyed: so that there will be no possibility of remembering. But if it is possible to remember and to perceive one set of things after another without the previous ones hindering, it is impossible for the soul to be a body.

7. One might see this very same thing also from pain and from the perception of pain. When a man is said to have a pain in his toe, the pain is presumably in the region of the toe, but they will obviously

ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁμολογήσουσιν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν γίγνεται. ἄλλου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος μέρους τοῦ παθήματος[1] τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο συμβαίνει; διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος μὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύματος, μεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τούτου ἄλλῳ, ἕως πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον πονοῦν ᾔσθετο, ἄλλην τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ δευτέρου εἶναι, εἰ κατὰ διάδοσιν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἄλλην, καὶ πολλὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀπείρους περὶ ἑνὸς ἀλγήματος γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τούτων ἁπασῶν ὕστερον τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν αἴσθεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ ταύτας. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἑκάστην ἐκείνων μὴ τοῦ ἐν τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἐφεξῆς τῷ δακτύλῳ, ὅτι ὁ ταρσὸς ἀλγεῖ, τὴν δὲ τρίτην, ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ πρὸς τῷ ἄνωθεν, καὶ πολλὰς εἶναι ἀλγηδόνας, τό τε ἡγεμονοῦν μὴ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ δακτύλῳ ἀλγήματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτῷ, καὶ τοῦτο γινώσκειν μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐᾶν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, ὅτι ἀλγεῖ ὁ δάκτυλος. εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ σώματος, ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος ἄλλου γνῶσιν εἶναι—παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστί—δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον

[1] Vitringa: *πνεύματος* Enn., Eus., H–S.

agree that the perception of pain is in the region of the ruling principle.[1] Well then, though the breath or life is different from the suffering part, the ruling principle perceives that it is affected, and the whole soul is affected in the same way. How then does this happen? They will assert that it is by transmission[2]: first of all the soul-breath in the region of the toe is affected, and passes the affection to the part situated next to it, and this to another, until it arrives at the ruling principle. It is necessary then, if the first part when it suffered perceived the suffering, that the second part's perception should be different, if the perception is by transmission, and the third part's different again, and there would be many perceptions, even an infinite number, of one pain, and the ruling principle would perceive after all these and have its own perception over and above all these. But the truth would be that each of those perceptions would not be of the pain in the toe, but the perception next to the toe would be that the sole of the foot was suffering, and the third perception that another part higher up was, and there would be many feelings of pain, and the ruling principle would not perceive the pain in the toe but the pain in the part next to itself, and would know this alone and let the other pains go, and not understand that the toe had a pain. If, then, it is not possible for the perception of this kind of thing to come about by transmission, nor for one body to have knowledge when another is affected, since body is mass—for every size has one part different from another—one must suppose that the perceiving principle is of such

[1] Cp. *SVF* II 854.
[2] This Stoic doctrine is attacked again at IV. 2. 2. 13.

πανταχοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει.

8. Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἴη, δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ σώματι προσχρωμένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τὲ διὰ σώματος καταλαμβάνειν, ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ οὖν τὸ νοεῖν ἐστι τὸ ἄνευ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, πολὺ πρότερον δεῖ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ νοῆσον εἶναι. ἔτι εἰ αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἡ αἴσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἡ νόησις—εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλονται, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔσονταί γε καὶ νοητῶν τινων νοήσεις καὶ ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις—πῶς οὖν μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν νοήσει; ἢ μέρει τινὶ ἀμερεῖ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐ σῶμα ἔσται τὸ νοῆσον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ ὅλου χρεία πρὸς τὸ θίγειν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καθ' ἕν τι. εἰ μὲν οὖν συγχωρήσονται τὰς πρώτας νοήσεις, ὅπερ ἀληθές ἐστιν, εἶναι τῶν πάντη σώματος καθαρωτάτων αὐτοεκάστου, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ νοοῦν σώματος καθαρὸν ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον γινώσκειν. εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε τῶν σωμάτων γίγνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος. οὐ

a kind that it is everywhere identical with itself. But this action is characteristic of some other kind of reality than body.

8. It can be shown by the following arguments that it would not even be possible to think if soul was any kind of body. For if sense-perception is the soul's apprehension of the objects of sense by making use of the body, thinking cannot be comprehension through the body, or it will be the same as sense-perception. If then thinking is apprehension without the body, it is much more necessary that what is going to do the thinking should not be body. Again, if sense-perception is of sense-objects, and thinking is of objects of thought—even if they do not like it, yet all the same there will be thoughts at least of some objects of thought and apprehensions of things without size—how then will something which is a size think what is not a size and think what is partless with something which has parts? Perhaps [it will do so] with a partless part of itself. But if what is going to do the thinking is this, it will not be a body; for there is no need of the whole for touching: contact at one point is enough.[1] If then they are going to agree that the primary thoughts, as is true, are of the objects most completely free from body, of absolute individual reality, then what thinks must know these objects by being or becoming free of body. But if they are going to say that thoughts are of the forms in matter, yet these thoughts come to be by the separation from them of the bodies,

[1] This is again an argument of Aristotle: cp. *De Anima* A 407a15–22. Plotinus does not appear to have noticed that it is directed against Plato (against a literal interpretation of the " soul-circles " of *Timaeus* 35A–37C).

γὰρ δὴ μετὰ σαρκῶν ἢ ὅλως ὕλης ὁ χωρισμὸς κύκλου καὶ τριγώνου καὶ γραμμῆς καὶ σημείου. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίσαι. δεῖ ἄρα μηδὲ αὐτὴν σῶμα εἶναι.

Ἀμέγεθες δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νόησις. ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται. πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ σώματος ὄντος τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρία τε καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι; πνεῦμά τι γὰρ ἢ αἷμά τι ἂν τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴη ἢ δικαιότης ἢ ἀνδρία, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρία τὸ δυσπαθὲς τοῦ πνεύματος εἴη, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἡ εὐκρασία, τὸ δὲ κάλλος εὐμορφία τις ἐν τύποις, καθ' ἣν λέγομεν ἰδόντες ὡραίους καὶ καλοὺς τὰ σώματα. ἰσχυρῷ μὲν οὖν καὶ καλῷ ἐν τύποις πνεύματι εἶναι προσήκοι ἄν· σωφρονεῖν δὲ τί δεῖ πνεύματι; ἀλλ' οὐ τοὐναντίον ἐν περιπτύξεσι καὶ ἁφαῖς εὐπαθεῖν, ὅπου ἢ θερμανθήσεται ἢ συμμέτρως ψύχεος ἱμείροι ἢ μαλακοῖς τισι καὶ ἁπαλοῖς καὶ λείοις πελάσει; τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν νεῖμαι τί ἂν αὐτῷ μέλοι; πότερον δὲ ἀιδίων ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νοητῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφάπτεται, ἢ γίνεταί τῳ ἡ ἀρετή, ὠφελεῖ καὶ πάλιν φθείρεται; ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ ποιῶν καὶ πόθεν; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνο πάλιν

and it is mind which separates them. For the separation of "circle" and "triangle" and "line" and "point" is certainly not carried out with the help of flesh, or in general of matter. The soul, then, must separate itself from body in this kind of [abstractive] thinking.

But nobility and justice are also, I think, without size; so, then, is thinking about them. So that when they come to it, our thought will receive them in its partlessness and they will remain in it as partless. But how, if the soul is a body, could its virtues exist, self-control and justice and courage and the rest? For self-control or justice or courage would be a kind of breath or blood, unless courage was the breath's lack of susceptibility to affection, and self-control the well-balanced mixture of its elements, and beauty a kind of shapeliness in impressions, by which we say when we see them that people are fresh and young and beautiful in body. Now it might be appropriate to strength and beauty to consist in impressions on the breath: but what does breath need self-control for? Would it not rather find its comfort in embracing and touching, where it will be warmed or have a moderated desire to be cool,[1] or come close to soft, delicate, smooth things? But what would it care about distribution according to worth? But does the soul attain the objects of its contemplation of the virtues and other intelligible things as eternal, or does virtue just happen to someone, benefit them and perish again? But who is it who makes it happen, and where does it come from? For if there is something which

[1] An allusion to *Odyssey* 10. 555.

μένοι. δεῖ ἄρα ἀιδίων εἶναι καὶ μενόντων, οἷα καὶ τὰ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἀιδίων καὶ μενόντων, οὐ σωμάτων. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔσται τοιοῦτον εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα μὴ σῶμα εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ μένει, ἀλλὰ ῥεῖ ἡ σώματος φύσις πᾶσα.

8[1]. Εἰ δὲ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων ποιήσεις ὁρῶντες θερμαινούσας καὶ ψυχούσας καὶ ὠθούσας καὶ βαρυνούσας ἐνταῦθα τάττουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον ἐν δραστηρίῳ τόπῳ ἱδρύοντες αὐτήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὰ [1] τὰ σώματα δυνάμεσι ταῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀσωμάτοις ταῦτα ἐργάζεται· ἔπειτα, ὅτι οὐ ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις περὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀξιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, λογίζεσθαι, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἐμφρόνως καλῶς,[2] ἃ πάντα ἄλλην οὐσίαν ζητεῖ. τὰς οὖν δυνάμεις τῶν ἀσωμάτων μεταβιβάσαντες εἰς τὰ σώματα οὐδεμίαν ἐκείνοις καταλείπουσιν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀσωμάτοις δυνάμεσι δύναται ἃ δύναται, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὁμολογήσουσι γὰρ ἕτερον ποιότητα καὶ ποσότητα εἶναι, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ποσὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ποιὸν [3] εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὴν ὕλην. ταῦτα δὲ ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν ποιότητα ὁμολογήσουσιν ἕτερον οὖσαν ποσοῦ ἕτερον σώματος εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ μὴ

[1] Kirchhoff*: ταῦτα Eus., H–S[1].

[2] Eus., Schwyzer (*Mus. Helv.* 26, 1969, 254): ἐμφρόνως καὶ καλῶς *Vigier**, Creuzer*: ἐμφρόνως κακῶς H–S[1]: an coniciendum [ἐμφρόνως] καλῶς (cf. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλῶς Plat. Leg. 766A7)?

[3] suspic. *Vigier*, scr. Volkmann*, *Gifford*: ποσὸν Eus., *Stephanus*, *Gaisford*, Creuzer, Kirchhoff, Cilento.

makes it happen, that again would abide. The virtues, then, are required to be eternal and abiding, like the objects of geometry. But if they are eternal and abiding they are not bodies. That, therefore, in which they are must be of the same kind: therefore it cannot be a body. For the whole nature of body does not abide, but flows away.

8[1]. But if when they see the actions of bodies heating and cooling and pushing and weighing down they rank the soul with them and in a kind of way establish it in a field of action, first of all they are ignorant that bodies themselves do these things by the bodiless powers in them; and then that these are not the powers which we consider to belong to the soul, but thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, supervising, intelligently and well,[1] which all require another kind of being. By transferring, therefore, the powers of bodiless realities to bodies, they leave nothing for the bodiless. But that bodies are able to do what they can do by bodiless powers is obvious for the following reasons. They will agree that quality is different from quantity, and that every body is of a certain quantity, and also that not every body is of a certain quality, as matter is not. But in admitting this they will also admit that quality in being different from quantity is different from body. For how without being of a

[1] This list of powers of soul may be influenced by the list of soul-movements in Plato *Laws* X 897A1–4, but the resemblance is not very close. Plato's list is neutral and comprehensive: bad as well as good soul-movements are included. In Plotinus's more conventional list there are only good powers, if the reading of the MSS of Eusebius καλῶς in line 8 is accepted, as it is now by Henry and Schwyzer, and has generally been by editors of Eusebius and Plotinus.

ποσὸν οὖσα σῶμα ἔσται, εἴπερ πᾶν σῶμα ποσόν; καὶ μήν, ὅπερ καὶ ἄνω που ἐλέγετο, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ ὄγκος πᾶς ἀφαιρεῖται ὅπερ ἦν, κερματιζομένου δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει ἡ αὐτὴ ὅλη ποιότης μένει, οἷον γλυκύτης ἡ τοῦ μέλιτος οὐδὲν ἔλαττον γλυκύτης ἐστὶν ἡ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ γλυκύτης. ὁμοίως καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι. ἔπειτα, εἰ σώματα ἦσαν αἱ δυνάμεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὰς μὲν ἰσχυρὰς τῶν δυνάμεων μεγάλους ὄγκους, τὰς δὲ ὀλίγον δρᾶν δυναμένας ὄγκους μικροὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ μεγάλων μὲν ὄγκων μικραί, ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ μικρότατοι τῶν ὄγκων μεγίστας ἔχουσι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ μεγέθει τὸ ποιεῖν ἀναθετέον· ἀμεγέθει ἄρα. τὸ δὲ ὕλην μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι σῶμα, ὥς φασιν, οὖσαν, διάφορα δὲ ποιεῖν ποιότητας προσλαβοῦσαν, πῶς οὐ δῆλον ποιεῖ τὰ προσγενόμενα λόγους ἀΰλους [1] καὶ ἀσωμάτους εἶναι; μή, διότι πνεύματος ἢ αἵματος ἀποστάντων ἀποθνῄσκει τὰ ζῷα, λεγόντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄνευ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη. καὶ μὴν οὔτε πνεῦμα διὰ πάντων οὔτε αἷμα, ψυχὴ δέ.

8[2]. Ἔτι εἰ σῶμα οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ διῆλθε διὰ παντός, κἂν κραθεῖσα εἴη, ὃν τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἡ κρᾶσις. εἰ δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων κρᾶσις οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐᾷ εἶναι τῶν κραθέντων, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐνείη τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον ἀπολέσασα τὸ εἶναι ψυχή· ὥσπερ, εἰ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν κραθείη, τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα

[1] Arnim (*SVF* II. 375), Theologia III. 14: αὐτοὺς Eus., *Stephanus**.

certain quantity could it be a body, if every body is of a certain quantity? And further, as I think was said above, if every body and every mass ceases to be what it was before when divided, but when a body is broken up the same quality remains complete in every piece, as for instance the sweetness of the honey is no less sweetness in every fragment, sweetness could not be a body, and the same is true of the other qualities. Then again, if the powers were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong powers to be large masses, and the ones which could do little, small masses. But if the powers of large masses are small, but even the smallest masses have great powers, action must be attributed to something other than size: to something sizeless, therefore. And the fact that matter remains the same, being, as they say, a body, but does different things when it acquires qualities, surely makes clear that what it acquires are immaterial and bodiless rational principles. And they must not say that [soul is a body because] living things die when breath or blood leaves them. For it is not possible for living things to exist without them, or without a great many other things, none of which is soul. And further, neither does breath pervade the whole body nor does blood, but soul does.

8[2]. Again, if soul was a body and permeated the whole body, it would be mixed with it in the way in which other bodies are intermixed. But if the mixture of bodies allows none of the bodies which are mixed to exist in actuality, the soul would not be actually present in bodies either, but only potentially, and would lose its existence as soul, just as, if sweet and bitter are mixed, the sweet does not

ἔχομεν ψυχήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ σῶμα ὂν σώματι κεκρᾶσθαι ὅλον δι' ὅλων, ὡς ὅπου ἂν ᾖ θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον εἶναι, ἴσον ὄγκων ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τόπον[1] κατεχόντων, καὶ μηδεμίαν αὔξην γεγονέναι ἐπεμβληθέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου, οὐδὲν ἀπολείψει ὃ μὴ τέμῃ. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη παραλλὰξ ἡ κρᾶσις—οὕτω γάρ φησι παράθεσιν ἔσεσθαι—διεληλυθὸς δὲ διὰ παντὸς τὸ ἐπεμβληθέν, ἔτι εἰ[2] σμικρότερον—ὅπερ ἀδύνατον, τὸ ἔλαττον ἴσον γενέσθαι τῷ μείζονι—ἀλλ' οὖν διεληλυθὸς πᾶν τέμοι[3] κατὰ πᾶν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ καθ' ὁτιοῦν σημεῖον καὶ μὴ μεταξὺ σῶμα ἔσται ὃ μὴ τέτμηται, εἰς σημεῖα τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ σώματος γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δέ, ἀπείρου τῆς τομῆς οὔσης—ὃ γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς σῶμα, διαιρετόν ἐστιν—οὐ δυνάμει μόνον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὰ ἄπειρα ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ σῶμα· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δι' ὅλων· ἀσώματος ἄρα.

8[3]. Τὸ δὲ καὶ φύσιν μὲν προτέραν τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα λέγειν, ἐν δὲ ψυχρῷ γενομένην καὶ στομωθεῖσαν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι λεπτοτέραν ἐν ψυχρῷ γιγνομένην—ὃ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄτοπον· πολλὰ γὰρ ζῷα ἐν θερμῷ γίγνεται καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχει οὐ ψυχθεῖσαν —ἀλλ' οὖν φασί γε προτέραν φύσιν ψυχῆς εἶναι

[1] Schwyzer (*Gnomon* 15, 1939, 10): *τὸ πᾶν* Eus.

[2] *ἔτι εἰ* (*etiam si*) Schwyzer (*Rh. Mus.* 88, 1939, 377 §16): *ἐπεὶ TJMV*: *ἐπὶ ONDPQ, Stephanus**, Creuzer*: *εἰ καὶ* Harder: del. Arnim (*SVF* II. 799).

[3] Henry (Etats 13), Mras: *τέμῃ ONPTJM*: *τέμει DQV*: *τεμεῖ* Harder: *τέμνει Stephanus-Gifford*, Creuzer*.

exist; we shall not then have a soul. But if it is a body and is mixed with the body " whole through whole " so that wherever the one is, the other is also, with both bodily masses also occupying an equal amount of space, and if no increase takes place when the other one is inserted, this will leave nothing undivided. For mixture is not by large parts placed side by side—for in this way [the Stoic] says it will be juxtaposition [not mixture]—but what is inserted penetrates through every part, even if it is smaller—this is impossible, for the less to be equal to the greater—but, anyhow, in penetrating it all it divides it everywhere; it is necessary therefore, if it divides it at every geometrical point, and there is no body in between which is not divided, that the division of the body must be into geometrical points, which is impossible. But if this is so, since the division is infinite—for whatever body you take is divisible—the infinity of parts will exist not only potentially but actually. It is impossible therefore for one body to penetrate another " whole through whole "[1]: but soul penetrates through whole bodies, therefore it is immaterial.

8[3]. But as for saying that the same breath was growth-principle before, but when it got into the cold and was tempered became soul, since it becomes rarefied in the cold—this is absurd to start with; for many animals come into existence in heat and have a soul which has not been cooled—but anyhow

[1] For the curious Stoic doctrine of " complete transfusion " see e.g. *SVF* I. 102, II. 467 and 471. For a fuller refutation of it by Plotinus, based on Peripatetic arguments from Alexander of Aphrodisias critically used, see *Enneads* II. 7.

κατὰ συντυχίας τὰς ἔξω γιγνομένης.[1] συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον, ἣν λέγουσιν ἕξιν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὕστατος ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος. ἢ εἰ πρὸ πάντων νοῦς, ἐφεξῆς ἔδει ψυχὴν ποιεῖν, εἶτα φύσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ τὸ ὕστερον χεῖρον, ἥπερ πέφυκεν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ὕστερος καὶ γεννητὸς καὶ ἐπακτὸν τὸ νοεῖν ἔχων, ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μηδὲ ψυχὴν μηδὲ νοῦν μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι. εἰ τὸ δυνάμει, μὴ ὄντος πρότερον τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ νοῦ, γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἥξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν. τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἄγον μὴ ὄντος ἑτέρου παρ' αὐτὸ προτέρου; εἰ δ' αὐτὸ ἄξει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ βλέπον γε πρός τι ἄξει, ὃ οὐ δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ἔσται. καίτοι τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν τὸ αὐτὸ εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει ἕξει, καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄξει, καὶ τοῦτο κρεῖττον ἔσται τοῦ δυναμένου οἷον ὀρεκτὸν ὂν ἐκείνου. πρότερον ἄρα τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ ἑτέραν φύσιν ἔχον σώματος καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ἀεί· πρότερον ἄρα καὶ νοῦς καὶ ψυχὴ φύσεως. οὐκ ἄρα οὕτως ψυχὴ ὡς πνεῦμα οὐδ' ὡς σῶμα. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα λέγοιτ' ἄν, καὶ εἴρηται καὶ ἄλλοις ἕτερα, ἱκανὰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα.

8[4]. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλης φύσεως, δεῖ ζητεῖν, τίς αὕτη.

[1] Kirchhoff*, cf. Theol. III. 37: γι(γ)νομένην Eus.

they assert that growth-principle is prior to soul which comes into existence because of external happenings. So they find themselves making the worse first, and before this another of less good quality, which they call " character ", and intellect last, obviously originating from the soul. Now if Intellect is before all things, then they ought to have made soul come next to it, then growth-principle, and have made what comes after always worse, as is the natural state of affairs. If then God (conceived as Intellect) is for them posterior and generated and has his intelligence as something brought in from outside, it would be possible for neither soul nor intellect nor God to exist. If the potential, without the prior existence of what is actual and of Intellect, were to come into existence it could not attain to actuality. For what will be the principle which will bring it there if there is not one different from and prior to itself? But if it is going to bring itself to actuality, which is absurd, all the same it will bring itself by looking to something, which will exist not potentially, but actually; though, if the potential is to have the property of always remaining the same, it will bring itself to an actuality corresponding to itself, and this will be better than that which is potential, as it is the potential's desired objective. The better, which has a nature different from body, and always exists in actuality, is therefore prior: so intellect and soul are prior to growth-principle. Soul, then, is not like breath or like body. But that soul should not be called a body has been proved by others with different arguments, but these too are sufficient.

8[4]. But since it is of another nature, we must

ἆρ' οὖν ἕτερον μὲν σώματος, σώματος δέ τι, οἷον ἁρμονία; τοῦτο γὰρ ἁρμονίαν τῶν ἀμφὶ Πυθαγόραν λεγόντων ἕτερον τρόπον ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸ τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ περὶ χορδὰς ἁρμονία. ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἐντεταμένων τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίνεταί τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς, ὃ λέγεται ἁρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν πρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινομένου τὴν ποιὰν κρᾶσιν ζωήν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὖσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. ὅτι δὲ ἀδύνατον, πολλὰ ἤδη πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δόζαν εἴρηται· καὶ γάρ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἡ ψυχή, ἡ δ' ἁρμονία ὕστερον, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τε καὶ ἐπιστατεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μάχεται πολλαχῇ, ἁρμονία δὲ οὐκ ἂν οὖσα ταῦτα ποιοῖ, καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐσία, ἡ δ' ἁρμονία οὐκ οὐσία, καὶ ὅτι ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν σωμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ἐν λόγῳ οὖσα ὑγεία ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅτι καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἄλλως κραθὲν εἴη ἂν ψυχὴ ἑτέρα, ὥστε πολλὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ δὴ μέγιστον, ὡς ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ταύτης ἄλλην ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν ποιοῦσαν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ταύτην, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν μουσικὸν τὸν ἐντιθέντα ταῖς χορδαῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν λόγον ἔχοντα παρ' αὑτῷ, καθ' ὃν ἁρμόσει. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ χορδαὶ παρ' αὑτῶν οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα τὰ σώματα ἑαυτὰ εἰς ἁρμονίαν ἄγειν δυνήσεται. ὅλως δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐξ ἀψύχου ἔμψυχα ποιοῦσι καὶ [τὰ][1] ἐξ ἀτάκτων κατὰ συντυχίαν τεταγμένα, καὶ τὴν τάξιν οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς

[1] del. *Stephanus*, Creuzer*.

enquire what this nature is. Is it, then, something different from body, but belonging to body, like its tuning? For, though the Pythagoreans meant this term, tuning, in another sense, people thought it was something like the tuning of strings. For just as here, when the strings are stretched, they come to be affected in a kind of way, and this being affected is called being in tune, in the same way, since our body also consists of a mixture of dissimilar parts, the mixture of a particular kind produces life and soul, which is the way of being affected which comes upon the mixture. But many arguments have already been brought against this view to show that it is impossible: they are, that the soul is the prior and the tuning subsequent to it; and that this prior reality rules and directs the body and fights it in many ways, but the soul would not do this if it was a being in tune; and that the prior reality is a substance, but being in tune is not a substance, and that the mixture of bodies of which we consist, when it was in proportion, would be health [not soul]; and that in each part, which is mixed in a different way, there would be a different soul, so that there would be many; and what is certainly the greatest difficulty of all, that it is necessary that there should be another soul before this soul producing this being in tune, as with musical instruments there is the player who brings the strings into tune and has a proportion in himself according to which he will tune them. For neither can the strings nor the bodies here bring themselves into tune by themselves. And in general these people also make ensouled things out of soulless, and things casually arranged out of things in disorder, and do not make order arise from

αὐτομάτου τάξεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰληφέναι. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δυνατὸν γενέσθαι. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία.

8[5]. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐντελεχείας ὧδ' ἄν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο, πῶς περὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται· τὴν ψυχήν φασιν ἐν τῷ συνθέτῳ εἴδους τάξιν ὡς πρὸς ὕλην τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον ⟨ὂν⟩[1] ἔχειν, σώματος δὲ οὐ παντὸς εἶδος οὐδὲ ᾗ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ[2] ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ᾗ παραβέβληται ὡμοίωται, ὡς μορφὴ ἀνδριάντος πρὸς χαλκόν, καὶ διαιρουμένου τοῦ σώματος συμμερίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἀποκοπτομένου τινὸς μέρους μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκοπέντος ψυχῆς μόριον εἶναι, τήν τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἀναχώρησιν μὴ γίνεσθαι, εἴπερ δεῖ προσφυᾶ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν οὗ ἐστιν εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἀληθές, μηδὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι· καὶ μὴν ἐντελεχείας οὔσης οὐδὲ ἐναντίωσιν λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας, ἓν δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν δι' ὅλου πεπονθέναι τὸ πᾶν οὐ διαφωνοῦν ἑαυτῷ. αἰσθήσεις δὲ μόνον δυνατὸν ἴσως γίνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ νοήσεις ἀδύνατον. διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄλλην ψυχὴν ἢ νοῦν εἰσάγουσιν, ὃν ἀθάνατον τίθενται. τὴν οὖν λογιζομένην ψυχὴν ἄλλως ἐντελέχειαν ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὐδ' ἡ αἰσθητική, εἴπερ καὶ αὕτη τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀπόντων

[1] Dodds.
[2] *Stephanus*, Creuzer*: *ψυχικοῦ* Eus.

[1] This is a slightly paraphrased version of Aristotle *De Anima* B 1, 412a27–b1. The MSS of Eusebius here read *ψυχικοῦ* for Aristotle's *φυσικοῦ* and Schwyzer suggests that this could just possibly be a slip of Plotinus himself (who, if we keep the MSS text, rather illogically qualified the body, which is matter to the soul as form, as *ἔμψυχον* in line 3).

the soul, but say that the soul has received its existence from a chance arrangement. But this cannot happen either in parts or wholes. The soul, then, is not being in tune.

8[5]. One might investigate the question of how the term " entelechy " could be applied to the soul in the following way: [the Peripatetics] assert that the soul in the composite being holds the rank of form in relation to the ensouled body as matter, but is not the form of every kind of body, and not of body simply as body, but of a " natural organic body which has life potentially."[1] If then it is assimilated to the body by being applied to it, as the form of the statue is to the bronze, then when the body was divided the soul would be separated into parts along with it, and when a part was cut off there would be a bit of soul with the cut-off piece of body, and the withdrawal in sleep would not take place, if the entelechy must be firmly fixed where it is—but in fact there could not even be sleep; further, if the soul was an entelechy there could be no opposition of reason to desire, but the whole would be affected throughout in one and the same way without disagreeing with itself. But perhaps it would only be possible for sense-perceptions to occur, but thoughts would be impossible. For this reason [the Peripatetics] themselves introduce another soul or intelligence, which they assume to be immortal. The reasoning soul, therefore, must be an entelechy in some sense other than this, if one really ought to use the name. And the perceiving soul, if this also possesses the impressions of absent sense-objects,

τοὺς τύπους ἔχει, αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἄρα ἕξει· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἐνέσονται ὡς μορφαὶ καὶ εἰκόνες· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλους δέχεσθαι, εἰ οὕτως ἐνεῖεν. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, μὴ σιτίων μηδὲ ποτῶν ἀλλ' ἄλλων παρὰ τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. λοιπὸν δὲ τὸ φυτικὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ ἀμφισβήτησιν ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν, μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐντελέχεια ἀχώριστος ᾖ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ παντὸς φυτοῦ περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ αὐαινομένου τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος περὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ κάτω ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν φυτῶν ἡ ψυχή, δῆλον ὅτι [1] ἀπολιποῦσα τὰ ἄλλα μέρη εἰς ἕν τι συνεστάλη· οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὡς ἀχώριστος ἐντελέχεια. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐστι πρὶν αὐξηθῆναι τὸ φυτὸν ἐν τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὄγκῳ. εἰ οὖν καὶ εἰς ὀλίγον ἔρχεται ἐκ μείζονος φυτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου ἐπὶ πᾶν, τί κωλύει καὶ ὅλως χωρίζεσθαι; πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ ἀμερὴς οὖσα μεριστοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἐντελέχεια γένοιτο; ἥ τε αὐτὴ ψυχὴ ἐξ ἄλλου ζῴου ἄλλον γίνεται· πῶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ προτέρου τοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ ἦν ἐντελέχεια ἑνός; φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων ζῴων εἰς ἄλλα ζῷα. οὐκ ἄρα τῷ εἶδος εἶναί τινος τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐσία οὐ παρὰ τὸ ἐν σώματι ἱδρῦσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνουσα, ἀλλ' οὖσα πρὶν καὶ τοῦδε γενέσθαι [οἷον ζῴου οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν

[1] *Gifford, Mras*, Harder: φυτῶν, ἡ ψυχὴ δηλονότι H–S[1].

will therefore hold them without the assistance of the body; but if this is not so, they will be present in it as shapes and images; but it would be impossible for it to receive other impressions if they were in it in this way. It is therefore not [in the body] as an inseparable entelechy. Furthermore, not even that which desires, not food and drink but other things besides those of body, can be an inseparable entelechy. There would remain the growth-principle, and there might seem to be some possibility of questioning whether this might not be an inseparable entelechy in this sense. But even this is clearly not so. For if the principle of every plant is in the region of the root, and when the rest of the body of the plant withers up, in many plants the soul [remains] in the region of the root and the lower parts, it is obvious that it has left the other parts and gathered itself together into one: it was not, then, in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And again, before the plant grows, the soul is in the small bulk [of the root]. If then the soul passes into a small root from a larger plant and from a small root to the whole plant, what prevents it from being completely separated? But also, how when it is without parts could it become the entelechy of a body with parts? And the same soul belongs to one living thing after another: how then could the soul of the first become the soul of that which comes next, if it was the entelechy of one? (This is obvious from the change of living things into other living things.) The soul, therefore, does not have its existence by being the form of something, but it is a substance which does not derive its existence from its foundation in body, but exists before belonging to this particular body. What then is its

γεννήσει].[1] τίς οὖν οὐσία αὐτῆς; εἰ δὲ μήτε σῶμα, μήτε πάθος σώματος, πρᾶξις δὲ καὶ ποίησις, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὐσία παρὰ τὰ σώματα οὖσα ποία τίς ἐστιν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἣν φαμεν ὄντως οὐσίαν εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένεσις, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσία, πᾶν τὸ σωματικὸν εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἄν, γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν, μεταλήψει δὲ τοῦ ὄντος σῳζόμενον, καθόσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνῃ.

9. Ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα φύσις, ἡ παρ' αὐτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι, πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν, ὃ οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· ἢ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα οἰχήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ὕστερον γένοιτο τοῦτου ἀπολωλότος, ὃ παρέχει αὐτοῖς σωτηρίαν, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷδε τῷ παντὶ διὰ ψυχῆς σῳζομένῳ καὶ κεκοσμημένῳ. ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινήσεως ἥδε χορηγοῦσα τοῖς ἄλλοις κίνησιν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινουμένη, καὶ ζωὴν τῷ ἐμψύχῳ σώματι διδοῦσα, αὐτὴ δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα, ἣν οὔποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ἅτε παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντα ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ χρῆται· ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα φύσιν πρώτως ζῶσαν εἶναι, ἣν ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀθάνατον εἶναι δεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἅτε ἀρχὴν ζωῆς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσαν. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἅπαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ ζῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ὂν παρ' αὐτοῦ, πρώτως ὂν καὶ ζῶν πρώτως, μεταβολῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἄμοιρον, οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον. πόθεν γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένοιτο, ἢ εἰς τί ἀπόλοιτο; καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἐπαληθεύειν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος

[1] del. Page, ut glossam.

substance? If it is not a body or an affection of body, but action and making and many things are in it and come from it, then since it is a substance distinct from bodies, of what kind is it? It is obviously what we call real substance. For everything bodily should be called becoming, not substance; it "comes to be and passes away, but never really is", but is preserved by participation in being, in so far as it does participate in it.

9. But the other nature, which has being of itself, is all that really exists, which does not come into being or perish: or everything else will pass away, and could not come into being afterwards if this real existence had perished which preserves all other things and especially this All, which is preserved and given its universal order and beauty by soul. For soul is the "origin of motion"[1] and is responsible for the motion of other things, and it is moved by itself, and gives life to the ensouled body, but has it of itself, and never loses it because it has it of itself. For certainly all things cannot have a borrowed life: or it will go on to infinity; but there must be some nature which is primarily alive, which must be indestructible and immortal of necessity since it is also the origin of life to the others. Here, assuredly, all that is divine and blessed must be situated, living of itself and existing of itself, existing primarily and living primarily, without any part in essential change, neither coming to be nor perishing. For where could it come into being from, or into what could it change when it perished? And if we are to apply the name "being" to it truly, then being itself ought not to

[1] Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9.

προσηγορίαν, αὐτὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι δεήσει. ὡς καὶ τὸ λευκόν, αὐτὸ τὸ χρῶμα, οὐ ποτὲ μὲν λευκόν, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ λευκόν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὂν ἦν τὸ λευκὸν μετὰ τοῦ λευκὸν εἶναι, ἦν ἂν ἀεί· ἀλλὰ μόνον ἔχει τὸ λευκόν. ᾧ δ' ἂν τὸ ὂν ᾖ παρὸν παρ' αὑτοῦ καὶ πρώτως, ὂν ἀεὶ ἔσται. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ ὂν πρώτως καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐχὶ νεκρόν, ὥσπερ λίθον ἢ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ ζῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ζωῇ καθαρᾷ κεχρῆσθαι, ὅσον ἂν αὐτοῦ μένῃ μόνον· ὃ δ' ἂν συμμιχθῇ χείρονι, ἐμπόδιον μὲν ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα—οὔτι γε μὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀπολωλέναι—ἀναλαβεῖν δὲ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀναδραμόν.

10. Ὅτι δὲ τῇ θειοτέρᾳ φύσει συγγενὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῇ ἀιδίῳ, δῆλον μὲν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὴν δεδεῖχθαι. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σχῆμα ἔχει οὐδὲ χρῶμα ἀναφής τε. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε ἔστι δεικνύναι. ὁμολογουμένου δὴ ἡμῖν παντὸς τοῦ θείου καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ζωῇ ἀγαθῇ κεχρῆσθαι καὶ ἔμφρονι, σκοπεῖν δεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, οἷόν ἐστι τὴν φύσιν. λάβωμεν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ τὴν ἐν σώματι ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγους καὶ θυμοὺς προσλαβοῦσαν καὶ πάθη ἄλλα ἀναδεξαμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταῦτα ἀποτριψαμένην καὶ καθόσον οἷόν τε μὴ κοινωνοῦσαν τῷ σώματι. ἥτις καὶ δῆλον ποιεῖ, ὡς προσθῆκαι τὰ κακὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἄλλοθεν, καθηραμένῃ δὲ αὐτῇ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ἄριστα, φρόνησις καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, οἰκεῖα ὄντα. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν ἀνέλθῃ, πῶς οὐ τῆς φύσεως

exist at one time, but not at another; as for instance white, the colour itself, is not white at one time and not-white another; but if white was being as well as being white, it would exist for ever; but [as it is] it only has the white [not being]. But that with which being is from itself, and primarily, will always be existent. This, then, which is primarily and always existent cannot be dead, like a stone or wood, but must be alive, and have a pure life, as much of it as remains alone; but whatever is mixed with what is worse has an impeded relationship to the best—yet it certainly cannot lose its own nature—but recovers its "ancient state"[1] when it runs up to its own.

10. Our demonstration that the soul is not a body makes it clear that it is akin to the diviner and to the eternal nature. It certainly does not have a shape or a colour, and it is intangible. But we can also demonstrate its kinship in the following way. We agree of course that all the divine and really existent has a good, intelligent life; now we must investigate what comes next, starting from our own soul and finding out what sort of nature it has. Let us take soul, not the soul in body which has acquired irrational desires and passions and admitted other affection, but the soul which has wiped these away and which, as far as possible, has no communion with the body. This soul does make it clear that its evils are external accretions to the soul and come from elsewhere, but that when it is purified the best things are present in it, wisdom and all the rest of virtue, and are its own. If, then, the soul is something of this kind when it goes up again to itself,

[1] Plato *Republic* 547B6–7.

ἐκείνης, οἵαν φαμὲν τὴν τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀιδίου παντὸς εἶναι; φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθὴς θεῖα ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἐγγένοιτο φαύλῳ τινὶ καὶ θνητῷ πράγματι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη θεῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἅτε θείων μετὸν αὐτῷ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον. διὸ καὶ ὅστις τοιοῦτος ἡμῶν ὀλίγον ἂν παραλλάττοι τῶν ἄνω τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῇ μόνον τοῦτο, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν σώματι, ἐλαττούμενος. διὸ καί, εἰ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ἦν, ἢ πλῆθός τι τοιαύταις ψυχαῖς κεχρημένον, οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἦν ἄπιστος, ὡς μὴ πιστεύειν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῖς πάντη ἀθάνατον εἶναι. νῦν δὲ πολλαχοῦ λελωβημένην τὴν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ψυχὴν ὁρῶντες οὔτε ὡς περὶ θείου οὔτε ὡς περὶ ἀθανάτου χρήματος διανοοῦνται. δεῖ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου σκοπεῖσθαι εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ ἀφορῶντα, ἐπείπερ τὸ προστεθὲν ἐμπόδιον ἀεὶ πρὸς γνῶσιν τοῦ ᾧ προσετέθη γίγνεται. σκόπει δὴ ἀφελών, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ ἀφελὼν ἑαυτὸν ἰδέτω καὶ πιστεύσει ἀθάνατος εἶναι, ὅταν ἑαυτὸν θεάσηται ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ γεγενημένον. ὄψεται γὰρ νοῦν ὁρῶντα οὐκ αἰσθητόν τι οὐδὲ τῶν θνητῶν τούτων, ἀλλὰ ἀιδίῳ τὸ ἀίδιον κατανοοῦντα, πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, κόσμον καὶ αὐτὸν νοητὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν γεγενημένον, ἀληθείᾳ καταλαμπόμενον τῇ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλήθειαν· ὡς πολλάκις αὐτῷ δόξαι τοῦτο δὴ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι· χαίρετ', ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀναβὰς καὶ[1] τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁμοιότητα

[1] Enn., defendit Seidel: καὶ ⟨εἰς⟩ Kirchhoff*: εἰς H–S[1].

it must surely belong to that nature which we assert is that of all the divine and eternal. For wisdom and true virtue are divine things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but something of such a kind [as to possess them] must be divine, since it has a share in divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality. For this reason any one of us who is like this would deviate very little from the beings above as far as his soul itself was concerned and would only be inferior by that part which is in body. For this reason, if every man was like this, or there were a great number who had souls like this, no one would be so unbelieving as not to believe that what is soul in men is altogether immortal. But, as it is, they see the soul in the great majority of people damaged in many ways, and do not think of it as if it was divine or immortal. But when one considers the nature of any particular thing one must concentrate on its pure form, since what is added is always a hindrance to the knowledge of that to which it has been added. Consider it by stripping, or rather let the man who has stripped look at himself and believe himself to be immortal, when he looks at himself as he has come to be in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the senses, none of these mortal things, but apprehends the eternal by its eternity, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become itself an intelligible universe full of light, illuminated by the truth from the Good, which radiates truth over all the intelligibles; so he will often think that this was very well said: " Greetings, I am for you an immortal god "[1] having ascended

[1] Empedocles fr. B 112 Diels-Kranz 4.

ἀτενίσας. εἰ δ' ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἔνδον οὖσαι ἀναφαίνονται, αἳ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔξω που δραμοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ σωφροσύνην καθορᾷ καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ παρ' αὐτῇ ἐν τῇ κατανοήσει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὃ πρότερον ἦν ὥσπερ ἀγάλματα ἐν αὐτῇ ἱδρυμένα ὁρῶσα οἷα ὑπὸ χρόνου ἰοῦ πεπληρωμένα καθαρὰ ποιησαμένη· οἷον εἰ χρυσὸς ἔμψυχος εἴη, εἶτα ἀποκρουσάμενος ὅσον γεηρὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ πρότερον ἑαυτοῦ ὤν, ὅτι μὴ χρυσὸν ἑώρα, τότε δὴ αὑτὸν ἥδη τοῦ χρήματος θαυμάσειεν ὁρῶν μεμονωμένον, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἔδει αὐτῷ κάλλους ἐπακτοῦ ἐνθυμοῖτο, αὐτὸς κρατιστεύων, εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐάσῃ εἶναι.

11. Περὶ τοιούτου χρήματος τίς ἂν ἀμφισβητοίη νοῦν ἔχων, ὡς οὐκ ἀθάνατον; ᾧ πάρεστι μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ζωή, ἣν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀπολέσθαι· πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίκτητόν γε οὖσαν οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως ἔχουσαν, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ θερμότης πάρεστι; λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐπακτὸν ἡ θερμότης τῷ πυρί, ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῷ πυρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὑποκειμένῃ τῷ πυρὶ ὕλῃ. ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ διαλύεται τὸ πῦρ. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐχ οὕτω τὴν ζωὴν ἔχει, ὡς ὕλην μὲν οὖσαν ὑποκεῖσθαι, ζωὴν δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῇ γενομένην τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδεῖξαι. ἢ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ζωή, καὶ ἔστιν οὐσία ἡ τοιαύτη παρ' αὐτῆς ζῶσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ζητοῦμεν,

[1] Again the *Phaedrus* myth (247D5 ff.), but remarkably transformed. The moral forms stand, not as in Plato in the "place above the heavens", but within the soul itself, and the soul sees them not as transcendent realities, but as included in its self-vision when it has in the course of its self-

to the divine and concentrating totally on likeness to it. But if purification causes us to be in a state of knowledge of the best, then the sciences which lie within become apparent, the ones which really are sciences. For it is certainly not by running around outside that the soul "sees self-control and justice", but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was, seeing them standing in itself like splendid statues all rusted with time which it has cleaned [1]: as if gold had a soul, and knocked off all that was earthy in it; it was before in ignorance of itself, because it did not see the gold, but then, seeing itself isolated, it wondered at its worth, and thought that it needed no beauty brought in from outside, being supreme itself, if only one would leave it alone by itself.

11. Who with any sense could doubt that a thing of this kind is immortal? It has life of itself, which cannot perish: for how could it, since it is not brought in from outside, nor again does soul have it in the way in which heat is present to fire. I do not mean, of course, that heat in relation to fire is something brought in from outside, but that, even if it is not so for fire, it is for the matter which underlies fire; for it is by this that fire comes to an end. But soul does not have life in this way, as if it was underlying matter and life came upon it and made it soul. For life is rather a substance, and soul is a substance of this kind, living of itself—which is the thing we are looking for—and they will admit that this is

purification "cleansed the rust of time" off them and returned to a true self-understanding. The image of the "living gold" hammering away its own dross which follows is one of Plotinus's most original dynamic images.

ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον ὁμολογοῦσιν, ἢ ἀναλύσουσιν ὡς σύνθετον καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἀθάνατον ἔλθωσι παρ' αὐτοῦ κινούμενον, ᾧ μὴ θέμις θανάτου μοῖραν δέχεσθαι. ἢ πάθος ἐπακτὸν τῇ ὕλῃ λέγοντες τὴν ζωήν, παρ' ὅτου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν ὕλην, αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκασθήσονται ὁμολογεῖν ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ἄδεκτον ὂν τοῦ ἐναντίου ᾧ ἐπιφέρει. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι μία φύσις ἐνεργείᾳ ζῶσα.

12. Ἔτι εἰ πᾶσαν φήσουσι φθαρτήν, πάλαι ἂν ἔδει πάντα ἀπολωλέναι· εἰ δὲ τὴν μέν, τὴν δ' οὔ, οἷον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡμετέραν μή, λεκτέον αὐτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν. ἀρχή τε γὰρ κινήσεως ἑκατέρα, καὶ ζῇ παρ' αὑτῆς ἑκατέρα, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐφάπτεται νοοῦσα τά τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τά τε οὐρανοῦ ἐπέκεινα καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν ζητοῦσα καὶ μέχρι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀναβαίνουσα. ἥ τε δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ θεαμάτων κατανόησις αὐτοεκάστου καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως γιγνομένη πρὸ σώματός τε αὐτῇ δίδωσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀιδίοις ἐπιστήμαις κεχρημένην ἀίδιον καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι. πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι εἰληφὸς ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ᾗ συνετέθη. ψυχὴ δὲ μία καὶ ἁπλῆ ἐνεργείᾳ οὖσα ἐν τῷ ζῆν φύσις· οὐ τοίνυν ταύτῃ φθαρήσεται. ἀλλ' ἆρα μερισθεῖσα κερματιζομένη ἀπόλοιτο ἄν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄγκος τις οὐδὲ ποσόν, ὡς ἐδείχθη, ἡ ψυχή. ἀλλ'

immortal, or they will treat it also as a composite and separate its parts until they come to an immortal thing moved by itself; it is against the divine law for this to accept the fate of death. Or if they say that life is an external affection of matter, they will be compelled to admit that the very thing from which this affection came into matter is immortal, unable to receive the opposite of the life it brings. But there really is one single nature which is actually alive.

12. Besides, if they are going to assert that every soul is destructible, everything ought to have perished long ago; but if they say that one soul is destructible and another is not, for instance that the soul of the All is immortal, but ours is not, they must explain why. For each of them is a principle of movement, and each of them lives of itself, and each of them apprehends the same things by the same means, thinking the things in heaven and the things beyond heaven and searching out everything which has substantial existence, and ascending to the first principle. And the intellection of the authentic reality of each thing which the soul derives from itself, from the contemplations within it, and from recollection, gives it an existence prior to body and makes it everlasting because it has everlasting knowledge. Again, everything which is dissoluble has come into existence by being put together and is naturally liable to be disintegrated in the same way in which it was put together. But the soul is a single and simple nature which has actual existence in its living; it cannot, then, be destroyed in this way. "But then if it was divided into parts it would be chopped up and so perish." But the soul, as has been demonstrated, is not a mass or a quantity.

ἀλλοιωθεῖσα ἥξει εἰς φθοράν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀλλοίωσις φθείρουσα τὸ εἶδος ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν δὲ ὕλην ἐᾷ· τοῦτο δὲ συνθέτου πάθος. εἰ οὖν κατὰ μηδὲν τούτων οἷόν τε φθείρεσθαι, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι ἀνάγκη.

13. Πῶς οὖν τοῦ νοητοῦ χωριστοῦ ὄντος ἥδε εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται; ὅτι, ὅσος μὲν νοῦς μόνος, ἀπαθὴς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ζωὴν μόνον νοερὰν ἔχων ἐκεῖ ἀεὶ μένει—οὐ γὰρ ἔνι ὁρμὴ οὐδ' ὄρεξις—ὃ δ' ἂν ὄρεξιν προσλάβῃ ἐφεξῆς ἐκείνῳ τῷ νῷ ὄν, τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς ὀρέξεως οἷον πρόεισιν ἤδη ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ κοσμεῖν ὀρεγόμενον καθὰ ἐν νῷ εἶδεν, ὥσπερ κυοῦν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὠδῖνον γεννῆσαι, ποιεῖν σπεύδει καὶ δημιουργεῖ. καὶ τῇ σπουδῇ ταύτῃ περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τεταμένη, μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ διοικουμένου εἰς τὸ ἔξω καὶ τοῦ παντὸς συνεπιμελουμένη, μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βουληθεῖσα μονουμένη καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ γιγνομένη, ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅλη οὐδὲ πᾶσα τοῦ σώματος γενομένη, ἀλλά τι καὶ ἔξω σώματος ἔχουσα. οὔκουν οὐδὲ ὁ ταύτης νοῦς ἐμπαθής· αὕτη δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν σώματι, ὁτὲ δὲ σώματος ἔξω, ὁρμηθεῖσα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, εἰς δὲ τὰ τρίτα προελθοῦσα εἰς τὰ ἐπὶ τάδε, νοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ[1] μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ψυχῆς πάντα καλῶν πληροῦντος καὶ διακοσμοῦντος, ἀθανάτου δι' ἀθανάτου, εἴπερ ἀεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν ἔσται δι' ἐνεργείας ἀπαύστου.

[1] Harder: ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦ A^{pc}: ἐνέργεια νοῦ A^{ac}EUCD: ἐνέργειαν οὐ x.

"But it will come to destruction by qualitative change." But a qualitative change which destroys anything takes away its form, but leaves its matter; but this is something which happens to a compound. If then soul cannot be destroyed in any of these ways, it must be indestructible.

13. How then, since the intelligible is separate, does soul come into body? It is in this way: as much of it as is only intellect has a purely intellectual life in the intelligible and stays there for ever without being affected; but that which acquires desire, which follows immediately on that intellect, goes out further in a way by its acquisition of desire, and, desiring to impart order and beauty according to the pattern which it sees in Intellect, is as if pregnant by the intelligibles and labouring to give birth, and so is eager to make, and constructs the world. And, straining towards the sense-world by its eagerness, along with the whole of the soul of the universe it transcends what it directs and shares in the care of the All, but when it wants to direct a part it is isolated and comes to be in that part in which it is; it does not come to belong wholly and altogether to the body, but has some part as well outside the body. And not even the intellect of this [individual] soul is subject to affection; but this soul is sometimes in the body and sometimes out of the body; it starts from the first realities and goes out to the third, the things down here, by the activity of the Intellect which remains the same and fills all things through soul with beauties and sets them in order, immortal through immortal, since Intellect will be existent for ever through its inexhaustible activity.

14. Περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ψυχῆς, ὅσαι μὲν αὐτῶν σφαλεῖσαι καὶ μέχρι θηρίων ἦκον σωμάτων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀθανάτους εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι εἶδος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ζώσης φύσεως δεῖ καὶ ταύτην εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴν οὖσαν ζωῆς τοῖς ζῴοις αἰτίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς· ἅπασαι γὰρ ὡρμήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ζωὴν ἔχουσαι οἰκείαν ἀσώματοί τε καὶ αὗται καὶ ἀμερεῖς καὶ οὐσίαι. εἰ δὲ τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν τριμερῆ οὖσαν τῷ συνθέτῳ λυθήσεσθαι [1] ⟨λέγεται⟩,[2] καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν τὰς μὲν καθαρὰς ἀπαλλαττομένας τὸ προσπλασθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἀφήσειν, τὰς δὲ τούτῳ συνέσεσθαι ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· ἀφειμένον δὲ τὸ χεῖρον οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπολεῖσθαι, ἕως ἂν ᾖ, ὅθεν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολεῖται.

15. Ἃ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀποδείξεως δεομένους ἐχρῆν λέγεσθαι, εἴρηται. ἃ δὲ καὶ πρὸς δεομένους πίστεως αἰσθήσει κεκρατημένης, ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῆς οὔσης ἐκλεκτέον, ἔκ τε ὧν θεοὶ ἀνεῖλον κελεύοντες μῆνιν ψυχῶν ἠδικημένων ἱλάσκεσθαι τιμάς τε νέμειν τεθνηκόσιν ὡς ἐν αἰσθήσει οὖσι, καθὰ καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀπεληλυθότας. πολλαὶ δὲ ψυχαὶ πρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὖσαι σωμάτων ἔξω γενόμεναι οὐκ ἀπέστησαν τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν ἀνθρώπους· αἳ δὴ καὶ μαντεῖα ἀποδειξάμεναι εἴς τε τὰ ἄλλα χρῶσαι ὠφελοῦσι καὶ δεικνύουσι δι' αὑτῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψυχῶν, ὅτι μὴ εἰσὶν ἀπολωλυῖαι.

[1] wD: λυθήσεται xUC.
[2] coniecimus: ⟨λεχθήσεται⟩ Igal.

14. As for the souls of other living things, those of them which have been failures and come into animal bodies must also be immortal. But if there is another [non-human] kind of soul, it cannot come from anywhere else than from the nature which lives, and this too must really exist and be the cause of life in living things, and the same is certainly true of the soul in plants: for they all started from the same origin and have their own life and they too are bodiless and without parts and substances. But if it is said that the human soul, since it is tripartite, will be dissolved because of its composition, we too shall say that pure souls when they are set free abandon what was plastered on to them at their birth, but the others remain with it for a very long time; but when the worse part is abandoned, even it does not perish, as long as that from which it has its origin exists. For nothing of real being perishes.

15. Well, then, we have said what needed to be said to those who require proof. But what needs to be said to those who require confidence supported by the evidence of the senses is to be selected from the body of information about such things, which is extensive; from the oracles of the gods commanding appeasement of the wrath of souls which have been wronged, and the giving of honours to the dead (which supposes that they are conscious of them), just as all men do to those who have passed away. And many souls which were formerly in human beings did not cease to benefit mankind when they were out of the body: they have established oracular shrines and give help by their prophecies in other ways and demonstrate through themselves that the other souls have also not perished.

IV. 8. ON THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, written in a style which suggests that it was intended for a comparatively wide circle of readers, is particularly interesting in a number of ways. It shows more clearly than any other work of Plotinus how conscious he was of the tension between the two sides of Plato's thought about the material world and the human body, the pessimistic dualism most strikingly apparent in the *Phaedo* and the optimistic view of the physical universe as the good product of ungrudging divine goodness which all later Platonists found in the *Timaeus*; and it shows how hard (even if never entirely successfully) he tried to reconcile them. The movement of his thought in the treatise is worth noticing, from the pessimistic and dualistic beginning to a view (in chapters 6 and 7) of the material world and of soul's descent into body as positive and optimistic as anything in the *Enneads*. Read as a whole, the treatise is strong evidence against the view that there is a development in the thought of Plotinus from a pessimism about the material world with Gnostic affinities to a sane positive Hellenic view. The tension, and some never fully reconciled inconsistency, between the two sides of Platonism appears in his latest works as it does in this early one. The extremely positive attitude to matter in chapter 6 should be noted. Whether it is to be regarded as an independent reality or as derived from higher principles is a question he here leaves open (in fact he adopted the second alternative; cp. III. 4. [15] 1; II. 3. [52] 17; I. 8. [51] 7). But in either case he sees it

here as a capacity for good rather than, as he does in later treatises, as the principle of evil (see II. 4 [12]; I. 8 [51]). The passage points forward to the abandonment of the doctrine of matter as the principle of evil and its positive valuation as an expression of the infinity immediately derived from the Good by the later Neoplatonists. The ten lines of spiritual autobiography at the beginning of chapter 1 say more about the personal experience of Plotinus than any other passage in the *Enneads*, and justify the belief generally held by his readers that very much of what he says in the *Enneads* about divine reality is in some way based on his own religious experience.

Synopsis

The experience of " waking up from the body "; how is the fact that we are in the body to be explained? What Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato have to say about Universal Soul in the physical universe (chs. 1–2); and about the human soul and its descent to and life in the body (chs. 3–4). Reconciliation of the apparent contradiction in Plato's thought between the idea of a " fall " and the idea of a " mission " of the soul (ch. 5). The necessity of the material world as the term of the divine outgoing, and its closeness to the intelligible of which it is an image (ch. 6). Our souls need not be harmed, and may even be benefited by their necessary descent into this lower world (ch. 7). And we do not altogether descend. Our highest part remains in the intelligible, though we are not always conscious of it (ch. 8).

IV. 8. (6) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΑ ΣΩΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΘΟΔΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ

1. Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ γινόμενος τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔξω, ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἴσω, θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζωήν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας καὶ τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἱδρυθεὶς εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας, μετὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θείῳ στάσιν εἰς λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβὰς ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο οὖσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ' ἑαυτήν, καίπερ οὖσα ἐν σώματι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος, ὃς ἡμῖν παρακελεύεται ζητεῖν τοῦτο, ἀμοιβάς τε ἀναγκαίας τιθέμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδόν τε ἄνω κάτω εἰπὼν καὶ μεταβάλλον ἀναπαύεται καὶ κάματός ἐστι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μοχθεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι εἰκάζειν ἔδωκεν ἀμελήσας σαφῆ ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς δέον ἴσως παρ' αὑτῷ ζητεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ζητήσας εὗρεν. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε εἰπὼν ἁμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸς φυγὰς θεόθεν γενόμενος ἥκειν πίσυνος μαινομένῳ νείκει τοσοῦτον παρεγύμνου, ὅσον καὶ Πυθαγόρας,

IV. 8. ON THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO BODIES

1. Often I have woken up out of the body to my self and have entered into myself, going out from all other things; I have seen a beauty wonderfully great and felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine; and set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever came down, and how my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even when it is in the body. Heraclitus, who urges us to investigate this, positing " necessary changes " from opposite to opposite, and saying " way up and down " and " changing it is at rest ", and " weariness to toil at and be subjected to the same things ", has left us guessing, since he has neglected to make clear to us what he is saying, perhaps because we ought to seek by ourselves, as he himself sought and found. And Empedocles, when he said that it is a law that sinful souls should fall into this world, and that he himself has come here as " an exile from the country of the gods " who " put his trust in raving strife ", revealed just as much as the riddling statements of Pythagoras

οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἠνίττοντο περί τε τούτου περί τε πολλῶν ἄλλων. τῷ δὲ παρῆν καὶ διὰ ποίησιν οὐ σαφεῖ εἶναι. λείπεται δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων, ὃς πολλά τε καὶ καλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς εἶπε περί τε ἀφίξεως αὐτῆς πολλαχῇ εἴρηκεν ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ λόγοις, ὥστε ἐλπίδα ἡμῖν εἶναι λαβεῖν παρ' αὐτοῦ σαφές τι. τί οὖν λέγει ὁ φιλόσοφος οὗτος; οὐ ταὐτὸν λέγων πανταχῇ φανεῖται, ἵνα ἄν τις ἐκ ῥᾳδίας τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς βούλημα εἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν πανταχοῦ ἀτιμάσας καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεμψάμενος ἐν δεσμῷ τε εἶναι καὶ τεθάφθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει, καὶ τὸν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενον λόγον μέγαν εἶναι, ὃς ἐν φρουρᾷ τὴν ψυχήν φησιν εἶναι· καὶ τὸ σπήλαιον αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ ἄντρον, τόδε τὸ πᾶν—δοκῶ μοι—λέγειν, ὅπου γε λύσιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἄνοδον ἐκ τοῦ σπηλαίου τῇ ψυχῇ φησιν εἶναι τὴν πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν πορείαν. ἐν δὲ Φαίδρῳ πτεροῤῥύησιν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀφίξεως· καὶ περίοδοι αὐτῷ ἀνελθοῦσαν πάλιν φέρουσι τῇδε, καὶ κρίσεις δὲ καταπέμπουσιν ἄλλας ἐνταῦθα καὶ κλῆροι καὶ τύχαι καὶ ἀνάγκαι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μεμψάμενος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφιξιν πρὸς σῶμα, ἐν Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ

[1] Plotinus here starts from an account of his own personal experience unique in the *Enneads*, and then turns to tradition to help him to explain that experience. As always, he spends little time in considering the Pre-Socratics and does not seem to find them very helpful. " Necessary changes " is a phrase attributed to Heraclitus by both Iamblichus (cp. Stobaeus

and his followers about this, and many other matters (and, besides, he is unclear because he writes poetry).[1] We are left with the godlike Plato, who said many fine things about the soul and about its coming [into this world] in his writings, so that we hope we can get something clear from him. What, then, does this philosopher say? He is obviously not saying the same thing everywhere, so that one can easily know what his intention is; but he everywhere speaks with contempt of the whole world of sense and disapproves of the soul's fellowship with body and says that soul is fettered and buried in it, and that " the esoteric saying is a great one ", which asserts that the soul is " in custody "; and his cave, like the den of Empedocles, means, I think, this universe, where he says that the soul's journey to the intelligible world is a " release from fetters " and an " ascent from the cave ". And in the *Phaedrus* he makes " moulting " the cause of coming here; and he has cycles which bring here again the soul which has ascended, and judgments send others down here, and lots and chances and necessities. And, though in all these passages he disapproves of the soul's coming to body, in the *Timaeus* when speaking about

Anth. I 49 p. 378, 21–5) and Stobaeus; the other Heraclitus quotations are fr. B 60, B 84a, and B 84b DK (the last two known from Plotinus alone). The Empedocles quotation is from B 115 DK, lines 13–14. The impatience with which Pythagoras and his followers are dismissed is noteworthy: for Numenius and other Neopythagoreans before Plotinus, and for the later Neoplatonists after him, Pythagoras was a traditional authority if anything more venerable than Plato. The attitude of Plotinus to Pythagoras is here closer to that of Aristotle than to that which was normal in his own school-tradition.

παντὸς λέγων τόν τε κόσμον ἐπαινεῖ καὶ θεὸν λέγει εἶναι εὐδαίμονα τήν τε ψυχὴν παρὰ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔννουν τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι δεδόσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἔννουν μὲν αὐτὸ ἔδει εἶναι, ἄνευ δὲ ψυχῆς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι. ᾗ τε οὖν ψυχὴ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς τούτου χάριν εἰς αὐτὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπέμφθη, ᾗ τε ἑκάστου ἡμῶν, πρὸς τὸ τέλεον αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ ἔδει, ὅσα ἐν νοητῷ κόσμῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα γένη ζῴων καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ὑπάρχειν.

2. Ὥστε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν ζητήσασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὅλως ζητῆσαι, πῶς ποτε κοινωνεῖν σώματι πέφυκε, καὶ περὶ κόσμου φύσεως οἷόν τινα δεῖ αὐτὸν τίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ψυχὴ ἐνδιαιτᾶται ἑκοῦσα εἴτε ἀναγκασθεῖσα εἴτε τις ἄλλος τρόπος· καὶ περὶ ποιητοῦ δέ, εἴτε ὀρθῶς εἴτε ὡς ἡμέτεραι, ψυχαὶ ἴσως, ἃς ἔδει σώματα διοικούσας χείρω δι' αὐτῶν εἶσω πολὺ δῦναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλον κρατήσειν, σκεδασθέντος μὲν ἂν ἑκάστου καὶ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον τόπον φερομένου—ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ πάντα ἐν οἰκείῳ κατὰ φύσιν κεῖται—πολλῆς δὲ καὶ ὀχλώδους προνοίας δεομένων, ἅτε πολλῶν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων αὐτοῖς προσπιπτόντων ἀεί τε ἐνδείᾳ συνεχομένων καὶ

[1] As always, Plotinus thinks that Plato will be our best guide to the truth if we take the trouble to interpret him rightly and to reconcile his apparent contradictions. The passages in Plato's dialogues quoted or alluded to here are *Phaedo* 67D1; *Cratylus* 400C2; *Phaedo* 62B2–5; *Republic* 514A5; 515C4; 517B4–5; *Phaedrus* 246C2; 247D4–5; 249A6; *Republic* 619D7; *Timaeus* 34B8. The *Phaedo*, the image of the cave in the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus* myth are for Plotinus the principal Platonic authorities for the negative view of the soul's descent into the world, the *Timaeus* the principal authority for the positive view.

this All he praises the universe and calls it a blessed god, and says that the soul was given by the goodness of the Craftsman, so that this All might be intelligent, because it had to be intelligent, and this could not be without soul. The Soul of the All, then, was sent into it for this reason by the god, and the soul of each one of us was sent that the All might be perfect: since it was necessary that all the very same kinds of living things which were in the intelligible world should also exist in the world perceived by the senses.[1]

2. So that what happens to us when we seek to learn from Plato about our own soul is that we have also to undertake a general enquiry about soul, about how it has ever become naturally adapted to fellowship with body, and about what kind of a universe we ought to suppose that it is in which soul dwells, willingly or under compulsion or in any other way; and about its maker, whether [he has done his work] rightly, or whether perhaps [the Soul of the All] is in the same state as our souls, which, since they direct worse bodies, had to sink deep into the world because of them, if they were going to control them, as otherwise each [element of the individual bodies] would be dispersed and carried to its appropriate place—but in the All all parts are naturally set in their appropriate place—and our individual bodies need a great deal of troublesome thought, since many alien forces assail them and they are continually in the grip of poverty, and require every

πάσης βοηθείας ὡς ἐν πολλῇ δυσχερείᾳ δεομένων. τὸ δὲ τέλεόν τε ὂν καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ αὔταρκες καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον αὑτῷ παρὰ φύσιν βραχέος οἷον κελεύσματος δεῖται· καὶ ὡς πέφυκε ψυχὴ ἐθέλειν, ταύτῃ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔχει οὔτ' ἐπιθυμίας ἔχουσα οὔτε πάσχουσα· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπεισιν οὐδὲ πρόσεισι. διὸ καί φησι καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν, εἰ μετ' ἐκείνης γένοιτο τελέας, τελεωθεῖσαν καὶ αὐτὴν μετεωροπορεῖν καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖν, ὅτε ἀφίσταται εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν σωμάτων μηδέ τινος εἶναι, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συνδιοικήσειν ῥᾳδίως τὸ πᾶν, ὡς οὐ κακὸν ὂν ψυχῇ ὁπωσοῦν σώματι παρέχειν τὴν τοῦ εὖ δύναμιν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα πρόνοια τοῦ χείρονος ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ τὸ προνοοῦν μένειν. διττὴ γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια παντός, τὸ[1] μὲν καθόλου κελεύσει κοσμοῦντος ἀπράγμονι ἐπιστασίᾳ βασιλικῇ, τὸ δὲ καθέκαστα ἤδη αὐτουργῷ τινι ποιήσει συναφῇ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πραττόμενον τὸ πρᾶττον τοῦ πραττομένου τῆς φύσεως ἀναπιμπλᾶσα. τῆς δὲ θείας ψυχῆς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἅπαντα διοικεῖν ἀεὶ λεγομένης, ὑπερεχούσης μὲν τῷ κρείττονι, δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην εἰς τὸ εἴσω πεμπούσης, αἰτίαν μὲν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι λέγοιτο ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἐν χείρονι πεποιηκέναι, ἥ τε ψυχὴ οὐκ ἀπεστέρηται τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξ ἀιδίου τοῦτ' ἔχουσα καὶ ἕξουσα ἀεί, ὃ μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῇ εἶναι, ὅπερ διηνεκῶς αὐτῇ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει οὔποτε ἀρξάμενον. τάς τε τῶν ἀστέ-

[1] Igal: τοῦ Enn.

sort of help as being in great trouble. But since [the body of the universe] is perfect and adequate and self-sufficient and there is nothing in it contrary to its nature it needs only a kind of brief command; and its soul is always as it naturally wants to be; it has no desires and is not affected: for [the world's body] " loses nothing and gains nothing ".[1] For this reason Plato says that our soul as well, if it comes to be with that perfect soul, is perfected itself and " walks on high and directs the whole universe "[2]; when it departs to be no longer within bodies and not to belong to any of them, then it also like the Soul of the All will share with ease in the direction of the All, since it is not evil in every way for soul to give body the ability to flourish and to exist, because not every kind of provident care for the inferior deprives the being exercising it of its ability to remain in the highest. For there are two kinds of care of everything, the general, by the inactive command of one setting it in order with royal authority, and the particular, which involves actually doing something oneself and by contact with what is being done infects the doer with the nature of what is being done. Now, since the divine soul is always said to direct the whole heaven in the first way, transcendent in its higher part but sending its last and lowest power into the interior of the world, God could not still be blamed for making the soul of the All exist in something worse, and the soul would not be deprived of its natural due, which it has from eternity and will have for ever, which cannot be against its nature in that it belongs to it continually and without beginning.

[1] *Timaeus* 33C6–7.
[2] *Phaedrus* 246C1–2.

ρων ψυχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἔχειν
40 λέγων, ὥσπερ τὸ πᾶν—ἐντίθησι γὰρ καὶ τούτων
τὰ σώματα εἰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιφοράς—
ἀποσῴζοι ἂν καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτους πρέπουσαν
εὐδαιμονίαν. δύο γὰρ ὄντων δι' ἃ δυσχεραίνεται ἡ
ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα κοινωνία, ὅτι τε ἐμπόδιον
πρὸς τὰς νοήσεις γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἡδονῶν καὶ
45 ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν πίμπλησιν αὐτήν, οὐδέτε-
ρον τούτων ἂν γένοιτο ψυχῇ, ἥτις μὴ εἰς τὸ εἴσω
ἔδυ τοῦ σώματος, μηδέ τινός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἐκείνου
ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς, ἔστι τε τοιοῦτον, οἷον
μήτε τινὸς δεῖσθαι μήτε τινὶ ἐλλείπειν· ὥστε μηδὲ
50 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν πίμπλασθαι ἢ φόβων· οὐδὲν
γὰρ δεινὸν μήποτε περὶ σώματος προσδοκήσῃ
τοιούτου, οὔτε τις ἀσχολία νεῦσιν ποιοῦσα κάτω
ἀπάγει τῆς κρείττονος καὶ μακαρίας θέας, ἀλλ'
ἔστιν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἀπράγμονι δυνάμει τόδε τὸ
πᾶν κοσμοῦσα.

3. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς, ἣ ἐν σώματι
πάντα λέγεται κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ταλαιπωρεῖν
ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις κακοῖς γιγνομένη, ᾗ καὶ δεσμὸς τὸ σῶμα
5 καὶ τάφος, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῇ σπήλαιον καὶ
ἄντρον, ἤντινα γνώμην οὐ διάφωνον ἔχει ἐκ τῶν
αἰτιῶν οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς καθόδου, νῦν λέγωμεν.
ὄντος τοίνυν παντὸς νοῦ ἐν τῷ τῆς νοήσεως τόπῳ
ὅλου τε καὶ παντός, ὃν δὴ κόσμον νοητὸν τιθέμεθα,
ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτῳ περιεχομένων νοερῶν

And when Plato says that the souls of the stars are related to their bodies in the same way as the All—for he inserts their bodies also into the circles of the soul [1]—he keeps safe for them also their appropriate state of well-being. For, as there are two reasons why the soul's fellowship with body is displeasing, that body becomes a hindrance to thought and that it fills the soul with pleasures, desires and griefs,[2] neither of these things could happen to a soul which has not sunk into the interior of its body, and is not anyone's property, and does not belong to the body, but the body belongs to it, and is of such a kind as to want nothing and be defective in nothing; so that the soul will not be filled with desires or fears; for it will never have any frightening expectations about a body of this kind, nor does any business make it turn to what is below and take it away from the better, blessed vision, but it is always directed to those higher realities and sets this world in order with a power which requires no active effort.

3. As for what Plato says about the human soul, which is said to suffer all kinds of evils and to be in misery because it comes to exist among stupidities and desires and fears and all other evils, in that the body is its chain and tomb and the universe its cave and den, let us now state his thought about it, not inconsistent because the reasons [which he gives] for its descent are different. Now since universal Intellect exists in the realm of thought as a universal whole, which we call the intelligible universe, and since there also exist the intellectual powers con-

[1] *Timaeus* 38C7–8.
[2] *Phaedo* 65A10 and 66C2–3.

δυνάμεων καὶ νόων τῶν καθέκαστα—οὐ γὰρ εἷς μόνος, ἀλλ' εἷς καὶ πολλοί—πολλὰς ἔδει καὶ ψυχὰς καὶ μίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ τῆς μιᾶς τὰς πολλὰς διαφόρους, ὥσπερ ἐκ γένους ἑνὸς εἴδη τὰ μὲν ἀμείνω, τὰ δὲ χείρω, νοερώτερα, τὰ δ' ἧττον ἐνεργείᾳ τοιαῦτα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ μὲν νοῦς περιέχων δυνάμει τἆλλα οἷον ζῷον μέγα, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστον, ἃ δυνάμει περιεῖχε θάτερον· οἷον εἰ πόλις ἔμψυχος ἦν περιεκτικὴ ἐμψύχων ἄλλων, τελειοτέρα μὲν ⟨ἡ⟩[1] πόλεως καὶ δυνατωτέρα, οὐδὲν μὴν ἐκώλυε τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. ἢ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς πυρὸς τὸ μὲν μέγα, τὸ δὲ μικρὰ πυρὰ εἴη· ἔστι δὲ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία ἡ τοῦ παντὸς πυρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀφ' ἧς καὶ τοῦ παντός. ψυχῆς δὲ ἔργον τῆς λογικωτέρας νοεῖν μέν, οὐ τὸ νοεῖν δὲ μόνον· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ νοῦ διαφέροι; προσλαβοῦσα γὰρ τῷ νοερὰ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλο, καθὸ νοῦς οὐκ ἔμεινεν· ἔχει τε ἔργον καὶ αὐτή, εἴπερ πᾶν, ὃ ἐὰν ᾖ τῶν νοητῶν. βλέπουσα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρὸ ἑαυτῆς νοεῖ, εἰς δὲ ἑαυτὴν τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν [ὃ][2] κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ καὶ ἄρχει αὐτοῦ· ὅτι μηδὲ οἷόν τε ἦν στῆναι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, δυναμένου ἐφεξῆς καὶ ἄλλου γενέσθαι ἐλάττονος μέν, ἀναγκαίου δὲ εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

4. Τὰς δὴ καθέκαστα ψυχὰς ὀρέξει μὲν νοερᾷ

[1] Kirchhoff*.
[2] del. Kirchhoff*.

tained in this and the individual intellects—for Intellect is not only one, but one and many—there had to be many souls and one soul, and the many different souls springing from the one, like the species of one genus, some better and others worse, some more intelligent, and some whose intelligence is less actualized. For There, in Intellect, we have on the one hand Intellect potentially including the others like a great living creature, and on the other the individual intellects, each of which actualizes a potentiality which the other [universal] intellect includes; as if, supposing that a city had a soul and included other beings with souls, the soul of the city would be more complete and more powerful, but there would certainly be nothing to prevent the others from being the same kind of thing. Or it is like universal fire, from which comes the great fire and the little ones; but the universal substance is that of the universal fire, or rather that from which the substance of the universal fire comes. The work, then, of the more rational kind of soul is intellection, but not only intellection; for [if it was] why would it be different from Intellect? For by adding to its being intelligent something else, according to which it did not remain intelligence, it itself also has a work to do, like any other intelligible reality which exists. But when it looks to what comes before it it exercises its intelligence, when it looks to itself it sets in order what comes after it and directs and rules it; because everything could not be stationary in the intelligible, when it was possible for something else as well to exist next in order to it, something less, but something which must exist if that before it exists.

4. The individual souls, certainly, have an intelli-

χρωμένας ἐν τῇ ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐπιστροφῇ, δύναμιν δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπίταδε ἐχούσας, οἷά περ φῶς ἐξηρτημένον μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄνω ἡλίου, τῷ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ φθονοῦν τῆς χορηγίας, ἀπήμονας μὲν εἶναι μετὰ τῆς ὅλης μενούσας ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, ἐν οὐρανῷ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ὅλης συνδιοικεῖν ἐκείνῃ, οἷα οἱ βασιλεῖ τῶν πάντων κρατοῦντι συνόντες συνδιοικοῦσιν ἐκείνῳ οὐ καταβαίνοντες οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων τόπων· καὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὁμοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τότε. μεταβάλλουσαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰς τὸ μέρος τε εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οἷον κάμνουσαι τὸ σὺν ἄλλῳ εἶναι ἀναχωροῦσιν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστη. ὅταν δὴ τοῦτο διὰ χρόνων ποιῇ φεύγουσα τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῇ διακρίσει ἀποστᾶσα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν βλέπῃ, μέρος γενομένη μονοῦταί τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέρος βλέπει καὶ τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου χωρισμῷ ἑνός τινος ἐπιβᾶσα καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν φυγοῦσα, ἐλθοῦσα καὶ στραφεῖσα εἰς τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο πληττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ πᾶν, τοῦ τε ὅλου ἀπέστη καὶ τὸ καθέκαστον μετὰ περιστάσεως διοικεῖ ἐφαπτομένη ἤδη καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ παροῦσα καὶ δῦσα αὐτοῦ πολὺ εἰς τὸ εἴσω. ἔνθα καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῇ τὸ λεγόμενον πτεροροῦσαι καὶ ἐν δεσμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ σώματος γενέσθαι ἁμαρτούσῃ τοῦ ἀβλαβοῦς τοῦ ἐν τῇ διοικήσει

[1] This is a particularly clear expression of Plotinus's constant conviction that the sin of the soul is self-isolation, individualism, a turning away (never quite complete) from

gent desire consisting in the impulse to return to itself springing from the principle from which they came into being, but they also possess a power directed to the world here below, like a light which depends from the sun in the upper world but does not grudge of its abundance to what comes after it, and they are free from sorrow if they remain with universal soul in the intelligible, but in heaven with the universal soul they can share in its government, like those who live with a universal monarch and share in the government of his empire; these also do not come down from the abode of royalty: for they are then all together in the same [place]. But they change from the whole to being a part and belonging to themselves, and, as if they were tired of being together, they each go to their own. Now when a soul does this for a long time, flying from the All and standing apart in distinctness, and does not look towards the intelligible, it has become a part and is isolated and weak and fusses and looks towards a part and in its separation from the whole it embarks on one single thing and flies from everything else; it comes to and turns to that one thing battered by the totality of things in every way, and has left the whole and directs the individual part with great difficulty; it is by now applying itself to and caring for things outside and is present and sinks deep into the individual part.[1] Here the " moulting ", as it is called, happens to it, and the being in the fetters of the body, since it has missed the immunity which it had when it was with the universal soul directing

the free universality of its higher state to bind itself to the particular. This for him provides the key to the understanding of the Platonic passages referred to in ch. 1.

τοῦ κρείττονος, ὃ ἦν παρὰ τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ὅλῃ· τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἦν παντελῶς ἄμεινον ἀναδραμούσῃ· εἴληπται οὖν πεσοῦσα καὶ πρὸς τῷ δεσμῷ οὖσα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐνεργοῦσα διὰ τὸ κωλύεσθαι τῷ νῷ ἐνεργεῖν καταρχάς, τεθάφθαι τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν σπηλαίῳ εἶναι, ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ πρὸς νόησιν λύεσθαί τε ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ ἀναβαίνειν, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως θεᾶσθαι τὰ ὄντα· ἔχει γάρ τι ἀεὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπερέχον τι. γίγνονται οὖν οἷον ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τόν τε ἐνταῦθα παρὰ μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, αἳ δύνανται πλεῖον τῷ νῷ συνεῖναι, τὸν δὲ ἐνθάδε πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύσει ἢ τύχαις ὑπῆρξεν. ἃ δὴ ὑποδεικνὺς ὁ Πλάτων ἠρέμα, ὅτε διαιρεῖ αὖ τὰ [1] ἐκ τοῦ ὑστέρου κρατῆρος καὶ μέρη ποιεῖ, τότε καί φησιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθεῖν, ἐπείπερ ἐγένοντο μέρη τοιαῦτα. εἰ δὲ λέγει σπεῖραι τὸν θεὸν αὐτάς, οὕτως ἀκουστέον, ὥσπερ ὅταν καὶ λέγοντα καὶ οἷον δημηγοροῦντα ποιῇ· ἃ γὰρ ἐν φύσει ἐστὶ τῶν ὅλων, ταῦτα ἡ ὑπόθεσις γεννᾷ τε καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς δεῖξιν προάγουσα ἐφεξῆς τὰ ἀεὶ οὕτω γιγνόμενά τε καὶ ὄντα.

5. Οὐ τοίνυν διαφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις ἥ τε εἰς γένεσιν

[1] Igal: αὐτὰ Enn.: αὐτὰς Kirchhoff.

the better part [of the universe]; it was altogether better for it before when it was running upwards; it is fallen, therefore, and is caught, and is engaged with its fetter, and acts by sense because its new beginning prevents it from acting by intellect, and it is said to be buried and in a cave, but, when it turns to intelligence, to be freed from its fetters and to ascend, when it is started on the contemplation of reality by recollection: for, in spite of everything, it always possesses something transcendent in some way. Souls, then, become, one might say, amphibious, compelled to live by turns the life There, and the life here: those which are able to be more in the company of Intellect live the life There more, but those whose normal condition is, by nature or chance, the opposite, live more the life here below. Plato indicates this unobtrusively when he distinguishes again the products of the second mixing-bowl and makes parts of them; then he says also that they must enter into becoming, since they became parts of this kind.[1] But if he says that God "sowed" them, this must be understood in the same way as when he makes God talk, and even deliver a kind of public speech; for the plan of his exposition generates and makes the things which exist in the nature of the Whole, bringing out in succession for purposes of demonstration what are always coming into being and always existing there.

5. There is then no contradiction between the

[1] Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 41D5–8. There is in fact only one "mixing-bowl" in Plato, though there are two mixtures. But Atticus before Plotinus and Theodore of Asine after him read two mixing-bowls into the Platonic text, as Proclus notes with disapproval (*In Tim.* III 246–7 Diehl).

σπορὰ ἥ τε εἰς τελείωσιν κάθοδος τοῦ παντός, ἥ τε δίκη τό τε σπήλαιον, ἥ τε ἀνάγκη τό τε ἑκούσιον, ἐπείπερ ἔχει τὸ ἑκούσιον ἡ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὸ ἐν κακῷ τῷ σώματι εἶναι· οὐδ' ἡ Ἐμπεδοκλέους φυγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πλάνη οὐδ' ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἐφ' ᾗ ἡ δίκη, οὐδ' ἡ Ἡρακλείτου ἀνάπαυλα ἐν τῇ φυγῇ, οὐδ' ὅλως τὸ ἑκούσιον τῆς καθόδου καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον αὖ. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἰὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀκούσιον, φορᾷ γε μὴν οἰκείᾳ ἰὸν πάσχον τὰ χείρω ἔχειν λέγεται τὴν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπραξε δίκην. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτα πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν ᾖ ἀναγκαῖον ἀιδίως φύσεως νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ συμβαῖνον εἰς ἄλλου του χρείαν ἐν τῇ προσόδῳ ἀπαντᾷ καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτόν, θεὸν εἴ τις λέγοι καταπέμψαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀσύμφωνος οὔτε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχῆς ἕκαστα, εἰ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ πολλά, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναφέρεται. διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἁμαρτίας οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ κατελθεῖν αἰτίᾳ, τῆς δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνθάδε γενομένην κακὰ δρᾶσαι, ⟨δίκη⟩[1] ἡ μέν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὃ πέπονθε κατελθοῦσα, τῆς δὲ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰς σώματα ἄλλα δῦναι καὶ θᾶττον ἐκ κρίσεως τῆς κατ' ἀξίαν—ὃ δὴ θεσμῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενον διὰ τοῦ τῆς κρίσεως ὀνόματος δηλοῦται —τὸ δὲ τῆς κακίας ἄμετρον εἶδος μείζονος καὶ τῆς δίκης ἠξίωται ἐπιστασίᾳ τινυμένων δαιμόνων. οὕτω τοι καίπερ οὖσα θεῖον καὶ ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν ἄνω ἐντὸς γίνεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ θεὸς οὖσα ὁ ὕστερος ῥοπῇ αὐτεξουσίῳ καὶ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως καὶ

[1] Theiler.

sowing to birth and the descent for the perfection of the All, and the judgment and the cave, and necessity and free-will (since necessity contains the free-will) and the being in the body as an evil; nor [is there anything inconsistent about] Empedocles' flight from God and wandering nor the sin upon which judgment comes, nor Heraclitus' rest on the flight, nor in general the willingness and also the unwillingness of the descent. For everything which goes to the worse does so unwillingly, but, since it goes by its own motion, when it experiences the worse it is said to be punished for what it did. But when it is eternally necessary by the law of nature that it should do and experience these things, and, descending from that which is above it, it meets the need of something else in its encounter with it, if anyone said that a god sent it down he would not be out of accord with the truth or with himself. For final results are referred to the principle from which they spring, even if there are many intervening stages. And since the sin of the soul can refer to two things, either to the course of the descent or to doing evil when the soul has arrived here below, the punishment of the first is the very experience of descent, and of the lesser degree of the second the entrance, and a very quick one, into other bodies according to the judgment passed on its deserts—the word "judgment" indicates what happens by divine decree—but the boundless kind of wickedness is judged to deserve greater punishment in charge of chastising spirits. So then the soul, though it is divine and comes from above, enters into the body and, though it is a god of the lowest rank, comes to this world by a spontaneous inclination, its own power and the

τοῦ μετ' αὐτὴν κοσμήσει ὡδὶ ἔρχεται· κἂν μὲν θᾶττον φύγῃ, οὐδὲν βέβλαπται γνῶσιν κακοῦ προσλαβοῦσα καὶ φύσιν κακίας γνοῦσα τάς τε δυνάμεις ἄγουσα αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ δείξασα ἔργα τε καὶ ποιήσεις, ἃ ἐν τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ ἠρεμοῦντα μάτην τε ἂν ἦν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἀεὶ οὐκ ἰόντα, τήν τε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν ἔλαθεν ἂν ἃ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐκφανέντα οὐδὲ πρόοδον λαβόντα· εἴπερ πανταχοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια τὴν δύναμιν ἔδειξε κρυφθεῖσαν ἂν ἀπάντη καὶ οἷον ἀφανισθεῖσαν καὶ οὐκ οὖσαν μηδέποτε ὄντως οὖσαν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ θαῦμα ἔχει τῶν ἔνδον ἕκαστος διὰ τῆς ποικιλίας τῶν ἔξω, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ τὰ γλαφυρὰ ταῦτα δρᾶσαι.

6. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἓν μόνον εἶναι—ἐκέκρυπτο γὰρ ἂν πάντα μορφὴν ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἔχοντα, οὐδ' ἂν ὑπῆρχέ τι τῶν ὄντων στάντος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ πλῆθος ἦν ἂν τῶν ὄντων τούτων τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεννηθέντων μὴ τῶν μετ' αὐτὰ τὴν πρόοδον λαβόντων, ἃ ψυχῶν εἴληχε τάξιν—τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἔδει μόνον εἶναι μὴ τῶν δι' αὐτὰς γενομένων φανέντων, εἴπερ ἑκάστῃ φύσει τοῦτο ἔνεστι τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖν καὶ ἐξελίττεσθαι οἷον σπέρματος ἔκ τινος ἀμεροῦς ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἰούσης, μένοντος μὲν ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου

[1] The same image of the seed is used in III. 7. 11. 23–7, but with a significant difference of tone: here the emphasis is on the both necessary and generous self-expansion and self-

setting in order of what comes after it being the cause of its descent. If it escapes quickly it takes no harm by acquiring a knowledge of evil and coming to know the nature of wickedness, and manifesting its powers, making apparent works and activities which if they had remained quiescent in the spiritual world would have been of no use because they would never have come into actuality; and the soul itself would not have known the powers it had if they had not come out and been revealed. Actuality everywhere reveals completely hidden potency, in a way obliterated and non-existent because it does not yet truly exist. As things are, everyone wonders at what is within because of the varied splendour of the outside and admires what the doer is because it does these fine things.

6. If, then, there must not be just one alone—for then all things would have been hidden, shapeless within that one, and not a single real being would have existed if that one had stayed still in itself, nor would there have been the multiplicity of these real beings which are generated from the One, if the things after them had not taken their way out which have received the rank of souls—in the same way there must not be just souls alone either, without the manifestation of the things produced through them, if this is in every nature, to produce what comes after it and to unfold itself as a seed does,[1] from a partless beginning which proceeds to the final stage perceived by the senses, with what comes before abiding for ever in its own proper

communication of the One, there on the degeneration and weakening which is the inevitable result of the passage from unity to multiplicity.

ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἕδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ οἷον γεννωμένου ἐκ δυνάμεως ἀφάτου, ὅση ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἣν οὐκ ἔδει στῆσαι οἷον περιγράψαντα φθόνῳ, χωρεῖν δὲ ἀεί, ἕως εἰς ἔσχατον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τὰ πάντα ἦκῃ αἰτίᾳ δυνάμεως ἁπλέτου ἐπὶ πάντα παρ' αὐτῆς πεμπούσης καὶ οὐδὲν περιδεῖν ἄμοιρον αὐτῆς δυναμένης. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἦν ὃ ἐκώλυεν ὁτιοῦν ἄμοιρον εἶναι φύσεως ἀγαθοῦ, καθόσον ἕκαστον οἷόν τ' ἦν μεταλαμβάνειν. εἶτ' οὖν ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ τῆς ὕλης φύσις, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτὴν μὴ μετασχεῖν οὖσαν τοῦ πᾶσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθόσον δύναται ἕκαστον χορηγοῦντος· εἴτ' ἠκολούθησεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ γένεσις αὐτῆς τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῆς αἰτίοις, οὐδ' ὡς ἔδει χωρὶς εἶναι, ἀδυναμίᾳ πρὶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν στάντος τοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι οἷον ἐν χάριτι δόντος. δεῖξις οὖν τῶν ἀρίστων ἐν νοητοῖς τὸ ἐν αἰσθητῷ κάλλιστον, τῆς τε δυνάμεως τῆς τε ἀγαθότητος αὐτῶν, καὶ συνέχεται πάντα εἰσαεὶ τά τε νοητῶς τά τε αἰσθητῶς ὄντα, τὰ μὲν παρ' αὑτῶν ὄντα, τὰ δὲ μετοχῇ τούτων τὸ εἶναι εἰσαεὶ λαβόντα, μιμούμενα τὴν νοητὴν καθόσον δύναται φύσιν.

7. Διττῆς δὲ φύσεως ταύτης οὔσης, νοητῆς, τῆς δὲ αἰσθητῆς, ἄμεινον μὲν ψυχῇ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη γε μὴν ἔχειν καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν τοιαύτην φύσιν ἐχούσῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἀγανακτη-

dwelling-place, but, in a way, bringing to birth what comes after it from a power unspeakably great, all the power which was in those higher beings, which could not stand still as if it had drawn a line round itself in selfish jealousy, but had to go on for ever, until all things have reached the ultimate possible limit [impelled] by the power itself, which sends them out and cannot leave anything without a share of itself. For there was certainly nothing which hindered anything whatever from having a share in the nature of good, as far as each thing was able to participate in it. The nature of matter, then, either existed for ever, and it was impossible for it, since it existed, not to participate in that which grants all things as much good as each one of them can take; or else its coming into being was a necessary consequence of the causes before it, and not even so was it required to be separate because that which gave it existence as a kind of gracious gift became stationary through lack of power before it came to it. The greatest beauty in the world of sense, therefore, is a manifestation of the noblest among the intelligibles, of their power and of their goodness, and all things are held together for ever, those which exist intelligibly and those which exist perceptibly, the intelligibles existing of themselves and the things perceived by the senses receiving their existence for ever by participation in them, imitating the intelligible nature as far as they can.

7. Since this nature is twofold, partly intelligible and partly perceptible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible, but all the same, since it has this kind of nature, it is necessarily bound to be able to participate in the perceptible, and it should not

τέον αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ, εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, μέσην τάξιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐπισχοῦσαν, θείας μὲν μοίρας οὖσαν, ἐν ἐσχάτῳ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὖσαν, ὡς ὅμορον οὖσαν τῇ αἰσθητῇ φύσει διδόναι μέν τι τούτῳ τῶν παρ' αὐτῆς, ἀντιλαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ αὐτῆς ἀσφαλοῦς διακοσμοῖ, προθυμίᾳ δὲ πλείονι εἰς τὸ εἴσω δύοιτο μὴ μείνασα ὅλη μεθ' ὅλης, ἄλλως τε καὶ δυνατὸν αὐτῇ πάλιν ἐξαναδῦναι, ἱστορίαν ὧν ἐνταῦθα εἶδέ τε καὶ ἔπαθε προσλαβούσῃ καὶ μαθούσῃ, οἷον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῇ παραθέσει τῶν οἷον ἐναντίων οἷον σαφέστερον τὰ ἀμείνω μαθούσῃ. γνῶσις γὰρ ἐναργεστέρα τἀγαθοῦ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ πεῖρα οἷς ἡ δύναμις ἀσθενεστέρα, ἢ ὥστε ἐπιστήμῃ τὸ κακὸν πρὸ πείρας γνῶναι. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ νοερὰ διέξοδος κατάβασίς ἐστιν εἰς ἔσχατον τὸ χεῖρον—οὐ γὰρ ἔνι εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἀναβῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐνεργήσασαν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ μὴ δυνηθεῖσαν μεῖναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς φύσεως δὲ[1] ἀνάγκῃ καὶ νόμῳ μέχρι ψυχῆς ἐλθεῖν· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦτο· ταύτῃ δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς παραδοῦναι αὐτὴν πάλιν ἀναδραμοῦσαν—οὕτως καὶ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια· τὸ μὲν μετ' αὐτὴν τὰ τῇδε, τὸ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἡ θέα τῶν ὄντων, ταῖς μὲν παρὰ μέρος καὶ χρόνῳ γιγνομένου τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἐν τῷ χείρονι γιγνομένης ἐπιστροφῆς πρὸς τὰ ἀμείνω, τῇ δὲ λεγομένῃ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι τὸ μηδ' ἐν τῷ χείρονι ἔργῳ γεγονέναι, ἀπαθεῖ δὲ κακῶν οὔσῃ θεωρίᾳ τε περινοεῖν τὰ ὑπ' αὐτὴν ἐξηρτῆσθαί τε τῶν πρὸ

[1] Enn., defendit Igal (*Helmantica* 28, 1977, 252): δὴ Creuzer.

be annoyed with itself because, granted that all things are not the best, it occupies a middle rank among realities, belonging to that divine part but being on the lowest edge of the intelligible, and, having a common boundary with the perceptible nature, gives something to it of what it has in itself and receives something from it in return, if it does not use only its safe part in governing the universe, but with greater eagerness plunges into the interior and does not stay whole with whole; especially as it is possible for it to emerge again having acquired the whole story of what it saw and experienced here and learnt what it is like to be There, and, by the comparison of things which are, in a way, opposite, learning, in a way more clearly, the better things. For the experience of evil is a clearer knowledge of the Good for those whose power is too weak to know evil with clear intellectual certainty before experiencing it. And just as the intellectual way of outgoing is a descent to the lower limit of that which is worse [than Intellect]—for it is not possible for it to go up to that which transcends it; but it must, acting outwards from itself and unable to remain on its own, by the necessity and law of nature arrive at soul; for this is its goal, and it must hand over what comes after to soul and run up again itself—so is the activity of soul; what comes after it is this world and what is before it is the contemplation of real being; this kind of experience comes slowly to partial souls, when they are in the worse and a turn takes place to the better, but that which is called the Soul of the All has not become engaged in the worse kind of work and, having no experience of evils, considers what lies below it contemplatively

ἀὐτῆς ἀεί· ἢ ἅμα δυνατὸν καὶ ἄμφω, λαμβανούσῃ μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, χορηγούσῃ δὲ ἅμα ἐνταῦθα, ἐπείπερ ἀμήχανον ἦν μὴ καὶ τούτων ἐφάπτεσθαι ψυχῇ οὔσῃ.

8. Καὶ εἰ χρὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμῆσαι τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ' ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἔδυ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀεί· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ κρατοῖτο καὶ θορυβοῖτο, οὐκ ἐᾷ αἴσθησιν ἡμῖν εἶναι ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω. τότε γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς τὸ νοηθέν, ὅταν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἥκῃ καταβαῖνον· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ γίγνεται περὶ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς, γινώσκομεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἥκῃ· οἷον καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ μένουσα γιγνώσκεται ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ὅταν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμει ἢ καὶ διανοητικῇ ἀντιλαβώμεθα ἢ ἄμφω. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τοῦ ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου τῷ αὐτῆς μέρει τῷ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὅλον κοσμεῖ ὑπερέχουσα ἀπόνως, ὅτι μηδ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ, ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ νῷ ὡς ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται,[1] †τὸ κάτω

[1] R[2mg] (*consultare* Ficinus): *βούλεται* Enn.

[1] For this doctrine, that our consciousness of what goes on in the soul is limited and dependent on our bodily condition, cp. IV. 3. (27) 30 and I. 4. (46) 10.

[2] "Art does not deliberate" is a quotation from Aristotle *Physics* B 199b28–9: "Art in fact does not deliberate either, and if the ship building art were incorporate in the timber, it would proceed by nature in the same way in which it now proceeds by art" (tr. Wicksteed-Cornford). This passage seems to be the starting-point for the development of the doctrine that the activity of Soul and Nature in forming and

and remains attached to the realities before it for ever; both are certainly possible; it can receive from There and at the same time distribute here, since it was impracticable for it as soul not to be in contact with this world.

8. And, if one ought to dare to express one's own view more clearly, contradicting the opinion of others, even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible; but if the part which is in the world of sense-perception gets control, or rather if it is itself brought under control, and thrown into confusion [by the body], it prevents us from perceiving the things which the upper part of the soul contemplates.[1] For what is grasped by the intellect reaches us when it arrives at perception in its descent, for we do not know everything which happens in any part of the soul before it reaches the whole soul; for instance desire which remains in the desiring part is known by us, but [only] when we apprehend it by the power of inner sense or discursive reason, or both. For every soul has something of what is below, in the direction of the body, and of what is above, in the direction of Intellect. And the soul which is a whole and is the soul of the whole, by its part which is directed to body, maintains the beauty and order of the whole in effortless transcendence because it does not do so by calculating and considering, as we do, but by intellect, as art does not deliberate. . . .[2] But the

directing the physical world is non-deliberative, on which Plotinus always insists strongly. It seems impossible to make any tolerable sense of the words which follow, and no convincing emendations have been suggested; so I follow Harder in leaving them untranslated.

αὐτῆς κοσμοῦντος ὅ τι ὅλου †. αἱ δ' ἐν μέρει γινόμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὗται τὸ ὑπερέχον, ἄσχολοι δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀντιλήψει πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ λυπούντων καὶ ταραττόντων, ἅτε οὗ ἐπιμέλονται μέρους καὶ ἐλλειποῦς καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντος τὰ ἀλλότρια κύκλῳ, πολλὰ δὲ ὧν ἐφίεται· καὶ ἥδεται δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἠπάτησε. τὸ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀνήδονον ὂν τὰς προσκαίρους ἡδονάς, ἡ δὲ διαγωγὴ ὁμοία.

souls which are partial and of a part have also the transcendent element, but they are occupied with sense-perception, and by their [lower] faculty of conscious apprehension they apprehend many things which are contrary to their nature and grieve and trouble them, since what they care for is a part, and defective, and has a great many alien and hostile things around it, and a great many which it desires; and it has pleasures, and pleasure deceives it; but there is a higher part which the transitory pleasures do not please, and its life is conformable [to its nature].

IV. 9. IF ALL SOULS ARE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS short early treatise takes up and carries forward the discussion of the same subject in the shorter and earlier IV. 2 (4) and anticipates the much more careful and elaborate discussions of the unity-in-multiplicity of Intellect and of Soul in VI. 4–5 (22–3) and of the relationship of our souls to the Soul of the Universe in IV. 3. (27) 1–8. The subject was one of much concern to Plotinus, to which he often returns in his writings; and he shows clearly by his defensive and argumentative tone in this treatise that he is aware that his characteristic doctrine of the unity-in-diversity of immaterial beings would seem paradoxical and objectionable to some Platonists.

Synopsis

Are all souls one? Objections from differences of perception, virtue, desire, experience and rationality between souls (ch. 1). Answers to these objections; bodily differences affect our perceptions etc. and the unity of soul does not completely exclude diversity (ch. 2). The argument for unity of souls from universal sympathy; and soul is no less a unity because it has many powers, of reason, perception, growth etc. (ch. 3). The one immanent soul in the many bodies derives from a prior, transcendent one which is not many (ch. 4). Soul both gives itself and does not give itself to the multiplicity of individuals; the analogy (often tacit and unnoticed) of the whole of a body of knowledge in each of its parts (ch. 5).

IV. 9. (8) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΠΑΣΑΙ ΑΙ ΨΥΧΑΙ ΜΙΑ

1. Ἆρ' ὥσπερ ψυχὴν ἑκάστου μίαν φαμὲν εἶναι, ὅτι πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ὅλη πάρεστι, καὶ ἔστιν ὄντως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον μία, οὐκ ἄλλο μέν τι αὐτῆς ὠδί, ἄλλο δὲ ὠδὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς οὕτως ἡ αἰσθητική, καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς δὲ ὅλη πανταχοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ μία καὶ πᾶσαι μία; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ ἐν πᾶσι μία οὐχ ὡς ὄγκῳ μεμερισμένη, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ ταὐτόν; διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἐμοὶ μία, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ μία; οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ σῶμα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σή, μία δὲ ἐκείνη, καὶ ταύτας δεῖ εἶναι μίαν. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ ἐκ ψυχῆς μιᾶς, πάλιν αὖ πᾶσαι μία. αὕτη τοίνυν τίς ἡ μία; ἀλλὰ πρότερον λεκτέον, εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγεται τὸ μίαν τὰς πάσας, ὥσπερ ἡ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου. ἄτοπον γάρ, εἰ μία ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ ὁτουοῦν ἄλλου· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ αἰσθανομένου καὶ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνον εἶναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους

IV. 9. IF ALL SOULS ARE ONE

1. Is it true that, just as we maintain that the soul of each individual is one because it is present as a whole at every point of the body, and is really one in this way, not having one part of it here and another there in the body, and in beings which have sense-perception the perceptive soul is there in this way, and in plants [the growth-soul] is present as a whole everywhere in each part; so in the same way my soul and your soul are one, and all the souls are one? And in the All is the soul in all things one, not as divided into parts by its mass, but one and the same thing everywhere? For why should my soul be one, but the soul in the universe not one? For there is no mass or body there either. Now if my soul and your soul come from the soul of the All, and that soul is one, these souls also must be one. But if the soul of the All and my soul come from one soul, again all souls are one. Well, then, what is this one soul? But, before this, we must discuss whether it is correct to say that all the souls are one soul, like the soul of each individual. For it would be absurd if my soul and anyone else's were one soul: for if I perceived anything another would have to perceive it too, and if I was good he would have to be good, and if I desired anything he would have to desire it, and in general we should have to have the same experiences as each other and as the All, so

καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε ἐμοῦ παθόντος συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ πᾶν. πῶς δὲ καὶ μιᾶς οὔσης ἡ μὲν λογική, ἡ δὲ ἄλογος, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐν ζῴοις, ἡ δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς ἄλλη; πάλιν δὲ εἰ μὴ θησόμεθα ἐκείνως, τό τε πᾶν ἓν οὐκ ἔσται, μία τε ἀρχὴ ψυχῶν οὐχ εὑρεθήσεται.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ μία ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ ἄλλου, ἤδη καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ ταὐτόν. ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ταὐτὸν ὂν οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἕξει ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν ἐμοὶ κινουμένῳ· ἐν ἐμοὶ γὰρ κινουμένῳ καὶ ἐν σοὶ μὴ κινουμένῳ ἐν ἐμοὶ μὲν κινούμενος, ἐν σοὶ δὲ ἑστὼς ἔσται· καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ παραδοξότερον τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ἀνάγκη αἰσθανομένου ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλον πάντη τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἔχειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς σώματος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας χειρὸς πάθημα ἡ ἑτέρα ᾔσθετο, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. εἰ δὴ ἔδει τὸ ἐμὸν γινώσκειν καὶ σέ, ἕν τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὄν, συνημμένον σῶμα ἐχρῆν εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ συναφθεῖσαι ἑκατέρα ᾔσθετο ταὐτόν. ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δὲ προσήκει τὸ καὶ πολλὰ λανθάνειν τὸ ὅλον καὶ τῶν ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι γιγνομένων, καὶ τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ἂν μέγεθος ἔχῃ τὸ σῶμα πολύ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ κητῶν λέγεται μεγάλων, ἐφ' ὧν παθήματός τινος περὶ τὸ μέρος ὄντος τῷ ὅλῳ αἴσθησις διὰ μικρότητα τοῦ κινήματος οὐδεμία προσέρχεται·

that if I had an experience the All would share in the perception of it. And how, if there is [only] one soul, is one soul rational and another irrational, and one in animals but a different one in plants? But on the other hand, if we are not going to make that assumption, the All will not be one, and we shall not discover one principle of souls.

2. First of all, then, it is not true that, if my soul and someone else's are one soul, just for that reason my composite [of body and soul] is the same as his composite. For when something which is the same is both in one thing and in another it will not have the same experiences in each of them, as for instance the [form of] the human being in me when I am in motion: the form in me in motion and in you not in motion will be in motion in me and stationary in you; and there is nothing absurd, nothing really disconcerting about the same thing being in me and in you: it is certainly not necessary that when I have a perception the other also should have exactly the same experience. For even in one body one hand does not perceive what happens to the other, but the soul in the whole body. If you really had to know what happened to me because there was some one thing composed of both of us, it would have to be a joint body; for if they were joined together in this way each soul would have the same perceptions. But one ought to consider also that there are a great many things which the whole being does not notice, even among those which happen in one and the same body, and this is all the more so when the body is of great size, as they say happens with great sea-beasts, with whom, when a part is affected, no perception of it reaches the whole because of the

ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη διάδηλον τύπῳ τὴν αἴσθησιν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι ἑνός τινος παθόντος. ἀλλὰ συμπάσχειν μὲν οὐκ ἄτοπον οὐδὲ ἀπογνωστέον, τύπωσιν δὲ αἰσθητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι. ἀρετὴν δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔχειν, κακίαν δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαι ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑστάναι ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτως μίαν λέγομεν, ὡς πάντη πλήθους ἄμοιρον—τοῦτο γὰρ τῇ κρείττονι φύσει δοτέον—ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ πλῆθος λέγομεν καὶ μετέχειν τῆς φύσεως τῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς γινομένης καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου αὖ, ὥστε πάλιν εἶναι μίαν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ γενόμενον περὶ τὸ μέρος πάθος οὐκ ἀνάγκη κρατεῖν τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ δ' ἂν περὶ τὸ κυριώτερον γένηται φέρει τι εἰς τὸ μέρος, οὕτω τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἰς ἕκαστον σαφέστερα μᾶλλον ὁμοπαθούντων πολλαχοῦ τῷ ὅλῳ, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἄδηλον εἰ συντελεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.

3. Καὶ μὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φησὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ συμπαθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡμᾶς καὶ συναλγοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ διαχεομένους καὶ εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν

smallness of the disturbance; so that it is not necessary, when one part is affected, for a clearly impressed perception to reach the total whole. But it is not absurd, and we do not have to abandon the idea, that the whole is jointly affected, but there is no need for there to be a perceptible impression. And it is not absurd that [the one soul] should possess virtue in me, but vice in another man, since it is not impossible for the same thing to be in motion in one and at rest in another. For we do not say, either, that it is one in such a way as to be altogether without a share in multiplicity—this must be attributed to a higher nature—but we say that it is one and a multiplicity, and participates in " that nature which is divisible in the sphere of bodies ", and also in the " indivisible nature ",[1] so that again it is one. But just as in me the experience of a part need not dominate the whole, but what happens to what is more essential has an influence on the part, in the same way the influences which come from the All to the individual are more obvious, and we are often affected in the same way as the whole, but it is not clear whether what comes from us contributes anything to the whole.

3. Indeed, the argument deriving from facts opposed [to the assumption of complete separation of souls] asserts that we do share each other's experiences when we suffer with others from seeing their pain and feel happy and relaxed [in their company] and

[1] The phrases from Plato's *Timaeus* 35A1–3 which provide the starting-point for the earlier discussion in IV. 2 (4), the much more careful and thorough discussion of the unity of souls in IV. 3. (27) 1–8, and for many later Neoplatonic discussions of the same subject.

ἑλκομένους κατὰ φύσιν· μήποτε γὰρ τὸ φιλεῖν διὰ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ ὅλως μαγεῖαι συνάγουσι καὶ συμπαθεῖς πόρρωθεν ποιοῦσι, πάντως τοι διὰ ψυχῆς μιᾶς. καὶ λόγος δὲ ἠρέμα λεχθείς διέθηκε τὸ πόρρω, καὶ κατακούειν πεποίηκε τὸ διεστὼς ἀμήχανον ὅσον τόπον· ἐξ ὧν ἐστι τὴν ἑνότητα μαθεῖν ἁπάντων τῆς ψυχῆς μιᾶς οὔσης.

Πῶς οὖν, εἰ ψυχὴ μία, ἡ μὲν λογική, ἡ δὲ ἄλογος, καί τις καὶ φυτική; ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀμέριστον αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν τακτέον οὐ μεριζόμενον ἐν τοῖς σώμασι, τὸ δὲ μεριζόμενον περὶ σώματα ἓν μὲν ὂν καὶ αὐτό, περὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα μεριζόμενον παρεχόμενον τὴν αἴσθησιν πανταχοῦ ἄλλην δύναμιν αὐτῆς θετέον, τό τε πλαστικὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ποιητικὸν σωμάτων δύναμιν ἄλλην. οὐχ ὅτι δὲ πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις, οὐ μία· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι πλείους αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τούτου πολλὰ ἕν. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ πᾶσαι; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς πανταχοῦ λεγομένης εἶναι ἡ αἴσθησις οὐκ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσιν ὁμοία, ὅ τε λόγος οὐκ ἐν ὅλῳ, τό τε φυτικὸν καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὅμως εἰς ἓν ἀνατρέχει ἀποστάντα τοῦ σώματος. τὸ δὲ θρεπτικόν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου, ἔχει καὶ ἐκείνης. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς τὸ θρεπτικόν; ὅτι τὸ τρεφόμενον μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ καὶ παθητικῶς αἰσθητικόν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἡ

are naturally drawn to love them: for without a sharing of experience there could not be love for this reason. And if spells and magical acts in general draw men together and make them share experiences at a distance, this must be altogether due to the one soul. And a word spoken quietly acts on what is far off, and makes something separated by an enormous distance listen; from this one can learn the unity of all because their soul is one.

How then, if the soul is one, is one soul rational and another irrational, and one a mere principle of growth? It is because the indivisible part of it must be put on the rational level, and is not divided in bodies, but the part which is divided in the sphere of bodies is also itself one, but since it is divided in the sphere of bodies, when it supplies sense-perception in every part of the body this is to be counted as one of its powers, and its ability to shape and make bodies as another. Not because it has many powers is it not one: for in the seed there are many powers and it is one; and from this one come many units. Why then are not all souls everywhere? Well, in the case of the one soul which is said to be everywhere in the body, the sense-perception is not alike in all the parts, and the reason is not in the whole, and the growth-principle is also in the parts where there is no perception; and all the same it runs up into one when it leaves the body. But the nutritive power, if it comes from the whole, has also something from that [universal] soul. But why does not the nutritive power also come from our soul? Because what is nourished is a part of the whole, that which also is passively perceptive, but the perception which judges with intelligence belongs to the

κρίνουσα μετὰ νοῦ ἑκάστου, ᾗ οὐδὲν ἔδει πλάττειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὴν πλάσιν ἔχον. ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐποίησεν αὐτήν, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τούτῳ ἔδει αὐτὴν εἶναι.

4. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὡς μὴ θαυμάζειν τὴν εἰς ἓν ἀναγωγήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ζητεῖ ὁ λόγος, πῶς μία; ἆρα γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἢ μία αἱ πᾶσαι; καὶ εἰ ἀπὸ μιᾶς, μεριζομένης ταύτης ἢ μενούσης μὲν ὅλης, ποιούσης δὲ παρ' αὐτῆς οὐδὲν ἧττον πολλάς; καὶ πῶς ἂν μένουσα οὐσία πολλὰς ποιοῖ ἐξ αὑτῆς; λέγωμεν οὖν θεὸν συλλήπτορα ἡμῖν γενέσθαι παρακαλέσαντες, ὡς δεῖ μὲν εἶναι μίαν πρότερον, εἴπερ πολλαί, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰς πολλὰς εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν σῶμα εἴη, ἀνάγκη μεριζομένου τούτου τὰς πολλὰς γίγνεσθαι, ἄλλην πάντη οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην γινομένην· καὶ ὁμοιομεροῦς οὔσης ὁμοειδεῖς πάσας γενέσθαι εἶδος ἓν ταὐτὸν φερούσας ὅλον, τοῖς δὲ ὄγκοις ἑτέρας· καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς ὄγκους εἶχον τοὺς ὑποκειμένους τὸ ψυχαὶ εἶναι, ἄλλας ἀλλήλων εἶναι, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, μίαν τῷ εἴδει ψυχὰς εἶναι. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐν πολλοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ πρὸ ταύτης τῆς μιᾶς τῆς ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλην αὖ εἶναι μὴ ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ ἐν πολλοῖς μία, ὥσπερ εἴδωλον οὖσα πολλαχοῦ φερόμενον τῆς ἐν ἑνὶ μιᾶς, οἷον εἰ ἐκ δακτυλίου ἑνὸς πολλοὶ κηροὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον ἀπομαξάμενοι φέροιεν. ἐκείνως μὲν οὖν ἀνηλίσκετο ἂν εἰς πολλὰς ἡ μία, ὡς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον ἀσώματον

individual, and there was no need for this to shape that which had its shaping from the All. It would also have made this shaping, if it had not been necessary for it to be in this All.

4. We have said this, then, to prevent astonishment at the bringing back of all souls to one. But our discussion still wants to find out how they are one. Is it because they all come from one or because they all are one? And if they all come from one, is this one divided or does it remain whole, but none the less make many from itself? And how could it continue to exist as a substance and make many souls out of itself? Let us then call upon God to be our helper and say that there must be one which is prior, if there are many, and the many must come from this. If then it was a body, it would be necessary for the many to come into existence by the division of this, each one becoming an entirely different substance; and if the one soul was uniform in all its parts, all the souls would be formally the same, bearing one and the same complete form, but would differ in their [corporeal] masses; and if their soulness was due to their underlying masses, they would be different from each other, but if it was due to the form, the souls would be formally the same. But this means that there is one and the same soul in many bodies, and, before this one in the many bodies, another again exists which is not in many bodies, from which derives the one in the many, which is like an image of the one in one projected in many places, as if many pieces of wax took and bore the impression of one seal-ring. Now in the former way the one soul would be used up in making the many, but in the second way the soul would be

μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐγίνετο. καὶ πάθημα μὲν ὂν θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν εἶχε μίαν ποιότητα γενομένην ἐξ ἑνός τινος ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι· καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον δὲ ἡ ψυχή, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. νῦν δὲ ἀσώματόν τε αὐτὸ τιθέμεθα καὶ οὐσίαν.

5. Πῶς οὖν οὐσία μία ἐν πολλαῖς; ἢ γὰρ ἡ μία ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλη, ἢ ἀπὸ ὅλης καὶ μιᾶς αἱ πολλαὶ ἐκείνης μενούσης. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν μία, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ εἰς ταύτην ὡς μίαν δοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν εἰς πλῆθος καὶ οὐ δοῦσαν· ἱκανὴ γὰρ πᾶσι παρασχεῖν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μένειν μία· δύναται γὰρ εἰς πάντα ἅμα καὶ ἑκάστου οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται πάντη· τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν ἐν πολλοῖς. μὴ δή τις ἀπιστείτω· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅλη, καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς ὡς μένειν τὴν ὅλην καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη. καὶ τὸ σπέρμα ὅλον καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον ὅλον καὶ μένει ὅλον οὐκ ἠλαττωμένον τὸ ὅλον—ἡ δ' ὕλη ἐμέρισε—καὶ πάντα ἕν. ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, εἴποι τις ἄν, τὸ μέρος οὐχ ὅλον. ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν μέρος τὸ προχειρισθὲν οὗ χρεία, καὶ τοῦτο προτέτακται, ἕπεται μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δυνάμει λανθάνοντα καὶ ἔστι πάντα ἐν τῷ μέρει. καὶ ἴσως ταύτῃ ἡ ὅλη λέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέρος· ἐκεῖ μὲν οἷον ἐνεργείᾳ ἅμα πάντα· ἕτοιμον οὖν ἕκαστον, ὃ προχειρίσασθαι θέλεις· ἐν δὲ τῷ

incorporeal. And, even if it was an affection, there would be nothing surprising in one quality being produced in many things from some one thing; and if the soul existed as a composition [of affection and substance] there would be nothing surprising. But as it is we suppose it to be incorporeal and a substance.

5. How, then, is there one substance in many souls? Either the one is present as a whole in them all, or the many come from the whole and one while it abides [unchanged]. That soul, then, is one, but the many [go back] to it as one which gives itself to multiplicity and does not give itself; for it is adequate to supply itself to all and to remain one; for it has power extending to all things, and is not at all cut off from each individual thing; it is the same, therefore, in all. Certainly, no one should disbelieve this; for knowledge is a whole, and its parts are such that the whole remains and the parts derive from it. And the seed is a whole and the parts into which it naturally divides derive from it, and each part is a whole and the whole remains an undiminished whole—but matter divides it—and all the parts are one. But someone might say that in knowledge the part is not a whole. Now there too that which has been brought into readiness because it is needed is an actualised part, and this part is put in front, but the other parts follow as unnoticed possibilities, and all are in the part [which is brought forward]. And perhaps this is the meaning of "whole" and "part" here: there [in the whole body of knowledge] all the parts are in a way actual at once; so each one which you wish to bring forward for use is ready; but in the part only that which is

μέρει τὸ ἕτοιμον, ἐνδυναμοῦται δὲ οἷον πλησιάσαν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔρημον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρημάτων οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται οὐκέτι τεχνικὸν οὐδὲ ἐπιστημονικόν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν καὶ εἰ παῖς λέγοι. εἰ οὖν ἐπιστημονικόν, ἔχει δυνάμει καὶ τὰ πάντα. ἐπιστήσας γοῦν ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐπάγει τὰ ἄλλα οἷον ἀκολουθίᾳ· καὶ ὁ γεωμέτρης δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει δηλοῖ, ὡς τὸ ἓν ἔχει τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντα, δι' ὧν ἡ ἀνάλυσις, καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς δέ, ἃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾶται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν ἀπιστεῖται, καὶ διὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπισκοτεῖται· ἐκεῖ δὲ φανὰ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον.

ready for use is actual; but it is given power by a kind of approach to the whole. But one must not think of it as isolated from all other rational speculations; if one does, it will no longer be according to art or knowledge, but just as if a child was talking. If then it is according to knowledge, it contains also all the other parts potentially. So then the knower in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a kind of sequence; and the geometer in his analysis makes clear that the one proposition contains all the prior propositions by means of which the analysis is made and the subsequent propositions which are generated from it. But we do not believe all this because of our weakness, and it is obscured by the body; but There [in the intelligible world] all and each shine out.

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

V

ENNEADS
V. 1–9

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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV–V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera II* Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S^2): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in *Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectionum* in III (1982) pp. 304–325.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator's work was completed (except for

minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the Loeb Classics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A^1 = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.

w = AE
x = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL

$Enn.^a$ = wxUC
$Enn.^b$ = A^{lmg}xUC

mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editore nominato
ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii

H-S ^{1} = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
H-S ^{2} = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodds = *CQ* 28 (1934) 47–53

V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the tenth in Porphyry's chronological order, in which the first great treatise on the One (VI. 9) is the ninth. It is a fine example of the way in which metaphysical reflection and personal spiritual life are always indissolubly united in Plotinus. The treatise does indeed, as its title indicates, give an account of the " three primary hypostases ", the three great realities of Plotinus's world, in ascending order, Soul, Intellect, and the One, and argues vigorously, if sometimes obscurely, for Plotinus's distinctive views of their differences and derivations one from the other. But it is not a text-book exposition of an abstract metaphysical system which does not involve or commit writer or reader, but an " ascent of the mind to God " which recalls man to an understanding of his true nature and dignity and guides him on his way to his ultimate goal. The first two chapters give a vivid picture of the soul's alienation and self-forgetfulness here below and remind it of its true nature in language of a power unsurpassed in the *Enneads*; then we are shown how, having returned to an understanding of our true nature as soul, we find transcending it Intellect and the One or Good, and are brought to see how the Good must transcend and generate Intellect. After a doxographical digression in Chapters 8 and 9 designed mainly to show (probably against contemporary objections) that what Plotinus is expounding is the true doctrine of Plato, we return in the last three chapters to a reminder of how we, being soul, can find Intellect and the One within us, and a final

exhortation not to be distracted by our superficial mundane consciousness but to turn inwards and "listen to the voices from on high".

Synopsis

The souls of men have forgotten their Father and their true nature in their desire to belong to themselves which has led them into self-alienation and self-contempt and an ignorant admiration of material things. Two ways to convert them and lead them back up to God: one is to show how contemptible material things are, the other, better one, is to remind the soul of its high birth and value. Soul must know itself to know whether it is capable of knowing higher things (ch. 1). Every soul must remember that it made the whole universe: if it frees itself from illusion and attains to true peace it will see the great soul to which it is akin giving life and light and beauty to the world which is dead and worthless without it, keeping the heavens in motion and giving divinity to the sun and other heavenly bodies (ch. 2). When you have understood the nature of soul, go on to the next stage on the way to God, and grasp Intellect, the soul's upper neighbour, and see how soul is an image of Intellect and depends on it and is perfected by it (ch. 3). Intellect is the archetype of this visible universe, containing all that is in it in the eternal fulness of which Kronos is a symbol. How its eternal living reality is properly expressed in the categories of Plato's *Sophist* (ch. 4). Where does Intellect come from? The One. Number is posterior to and produced by the One and it is number (and so in another way the One) which gives Intellect its structure (ch. 5). How the One produces Intellect without movement or turning away from itself, as an eternal radiation from its perfection, and how Intellect determines itself as the perfect unity-in-diversity of the intelligible world by its return to the One, and in its turn produces Soul, as all that is perfect must produce (chs. 6–7). Confirmation that this is the true doctrine of

Plato, and of Parmenides, at least as improved by Plato (ch. 8). Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles also agree in essentials, but Aristotle, though he makes the first principle separate and intelligible, makes the mistake of thinking it a self-knowing intellect and introduces incoherence into the intelligible world by his doctrine of the plurality of unmoved movers (ch. 9). How we find Soul, Intellect, and the One within ourselves (chs. 10–11). Final exhortation to turn inwards and concentrate our attention so that we hear the voices from on high (ch. 12).

V. 1. (10) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΙΩΝ ΑΡΧΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ

1. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὔσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ ἐκεῖνον; ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τόλμα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. τῷ δὴ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσαι, πολλῷ τῷ κινεῖσθαι παρ' αὑτῶν κεχρημέναι, τὴν ἐναντίαν δραμοῦσαι καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν πεποιημέναι, ἠγνόησαν καὶ ἑαυτὰς ἐκεῖθεν εἶναι· ὥσπερ παῖδες εὐθὺς ἀποσπασθέντες ἀπὸ πατέρων καὶ πολὺν χρόνον πόρρω τραφέντες ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πατέρας. οὔτ' οὖν ἔτι ἐκεῖνον οὔτε ἑαυτὰς ὁρῶσαι, ἀτιμάσασαι ἑαυτὰς ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ γένους, τιμήσασαι τἆλλα καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτὰς

[1] τόλμα was a Neopythagorean name for the Indefinite Dyad (for which see below ch. 5) " because it separated itself from the One ": cp. Plutarch *De Iside et Osiride* 75, 381 F; Iamblichus *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* 7, 19 and 9, 6 de Falco (quoting Anatolius, the third-century Aristotelian professor at Alexandria who became a Christian bishop). Plotinus several times in the *Enneads* takes up this Pythagorean idea and sees the root of all multiplicity, that is of all reality other than and inferior to the One or good, in an audacious act of self-assertion, a will to independent existence. This is applied

V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

1. What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity [1] and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were clearly delighted with their own independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible, they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world; just as children who are immediately torn from their parents and brought up far away do not know who they themselves or their parents are. Since they do not any more see their father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and honour other things, admiring everything rather than themselves, and,

to Intellect's coming into separate existence at VI. 9. 5. 29 (where the word τολμήσας is used); cp. III. 8. 8. 32–6. And the passage here about the τόλμα of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word τόλμα is not used there, but cp. ἀρχεῖν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς lines 15–16, with τὸ βουληθῆναι ἑαυτῶν εἶναι here. See further Naguib Baladi *La Pensée de Plotin* (Paris 1970), which is entirely concerned with the theme of audacity in Plotinus, and my discussion in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* 242–5.

θαυμάσασαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκπλαγεῖσαι καὶ ἀγασθεῖσαι καὶ ἐξηρτημέναι τούτων, ἀπέρρηξαν ὡς οἷόν τε ἑαυτὰς ὧν ἀπεστράφησαν ἀτιμάσασαι· ὥστε συμβαίνει τῆς παντελοῦς ἀγνοίας ἐκείνου ἡ τῶνδε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ἑαυτῶν ἀτιμία εἶναι αἰτία. ἅμα γὰρ διώκεται ἄλλο καὶ θαυμάζεται, καὶ τὸ θαυμάζον καὶ διῶκον ὁμολογεῖ χεῖρον εἶναι· χεῖρον δὲ αὐτὸ τιθέμενον γιγνομένων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ θνητότατον πάντων ὧν τιμᾷ ὑπολαμβάνον οὔτε θεοῦ φύσιν οὔτε δύναμιν ἄν ποτε ἐν θυμῷ βάλοιτο. διὸ δεῖ διττὸν γίγνεσθαι τὸν λόγον πρὸς τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, εἴπερ τις ἐπιστρέψει αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀνάγοι μέχρι τοῦ ἀκροτάτου καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ πρώτου. τίς οὖν ἑκάτερος; ὁ μὲν δεικνὺς τὴν ἀτιμίαν τῶν νῦν ψυχῇ τιμωμένων, ὃν ἐν ἄλλοις δίιμεν ἐπιπλέον, ὁ δὲ διδάσκων καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκων τὴν ψυχὴν οἷον τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς ἀξίας, ὃς πρότερός ἐστιν ἐκείνου καὶ σαφηνισθεὶς κἀκεῖνον δηλώσει. περὶ οὗ νῦν λεκτέον· ἐγγὺς γὰρ οὗτος τοῦ ζητουμένου καὶ πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. τὸ γὰρ ζητοῦν ἐστι ψυχή, καὶ τί ὂν ζητεῖ γνωστέον αὐτῇ, ἵνα αὐτὴν

[1] Plotinus seems to have in mind the sort of melancholy commonplace, contrasting the transitoriness of human life with the ceaseless self-renewal of non-human nature, which found its finest expressions in the Latin poetry of the first century B.C., e.g. Catullus 5, Horace *Odes* IV. 7; cp. [Moschus] *Elegy on Bion* 99–104 (which may have inspired Catullus).

[2] Editors disagree on where, if anywhere, in the *Enneads*

astonished and delighted by and dependent on these [earthly] things, they broke themselves loose as far as they could in contempt of that from which they turned away; so that their honour for these things here and their contempt for themselves is the cause of their utter ignorance of God. For what pursues and admires something else admits at the same time its own inferiority; but by making itself inferior to things which come into being and perish and considering itself the most contemptible and the most liable to death of all the things which it admires [1] it could not possibly have any idea of the nature and power of God. One must therefore speak in two ways to men who are in this state of mind, if one is going to turn them round to what lies in the opposite direction and is primary, and to lead them up to that which is highest, one, and first. What, then, are these two ways? One shows how contemptible are the things now honoured by the soul, and this we shall develop more amply elsewhere,[2] but the other teaches and reminds the soul how high its birth and value are, and this is prior to the other one and when it is clarified will also make the other obvious. This is what we must speak about now; it is close to the subject of our investigation and will be useful for that other discourse. For that which investigates is the soul, and it should know what it

this fuller treatment is to be found, and it seems better to suppose with Harder that Plotinus may never have carried out his plan for a full-scale discourse on contempt of this world, at any rate in writing—perhaps because he found it very hard really to despise our world of sense, though he sometimes felt he ought to do so, and when challenged by people who really despised and hated it (the Gnostics) he defended its beauty and goodness passionately (cp. II. 9).

πρότερον μάθῃ, εἰ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητεῖν, καὶ εἰ ὄμμα τοιοῦτον ἔχει, οἷον ἰδεῖν, καὶ εἰ προσήκει ζητεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλότρια, τί δεῖ; εἰ δὲ συγγενῆ, καὶ προσήκει καὶ δύναται εὑρεῖν.

2. Ἐνθυμείσθω τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο πᾶσα ψυχή, ὡς αὐτὴ μὲν ζῷα ἐποίησε πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζωήν, ἅ τε γῆ τρέφει ἅ τε θάλασσα ἅ τε ἐν ἀέρι ἅ τε ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρα θεῖα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον, αὐτὴ δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανόν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκόσμησεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει φύσις οὖσα ἑτέρα ὧν κοσμεῖ καὶ ὧν κινεῖ καὶ ἃ ζῆν ποιεῖ· καὶ τούτων ἀνάγκη εἶναι τιμιωτέραν, γιγνομένων τούτων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὅταν αὐτὰ ψυχὴ ἀπολείπῃ ἢ χορηγῇ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὴ δὲ οὖσα ἀεὶ τῷ μὴ ἀπολείπειν ἑαυτήν. τίς δὴ τρόπος τῆς χορηγίας τοῦ ζῆν ἔν τε τῷ σύμπαντι ἔν τε τοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὧδε λογιζέσθω. σκοπείσθω δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν ἄλλη ψυχὴ οὐ σμικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη ἀπαλλαγεῖσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς ἄλλας ἡσύχῳ τῇ καταστάσει. ἥσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον· ἥσυχος μὲν γῆ, ἥσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ

[1] This phrase is taken from Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9. The whole account of soul's cosmic activity here is inspired by *Phaedrus* 245C5ff. and *Laws* X 895A5ff.

[2] This passage made a deep impression on both St. Basil (*Hom. XV de fide* II 131c–d Garnier=PG 31, 465A–B; *De Spiritu* I 320C–322A Garnier=PG 29, 768B–772B—Basil is here making extensive use of the whole passage 1. 29–3. 10) and St. Augustine, whose adaptation of it in his account of

is as an investigating soul, so that it may learn first about itself, whether it has the power to investigate things of this kind, and if it has an eye of the right kind to see them, and if the investigation is suitable for it. For if the objects are alien, what is the point? But if they are akin, the investigation is suitable and discovery is possible.

2. Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it made all living things itself, breathing life into them, those that the earth feeds and those that are nourished by the sea, and the divine stars in the sky; it made the sun itself, and this great heaven, and adorned it itself, and drives it round itself, in orderly movement; it is a nature other than the things which it adorns and moves and makes live; and it must necessarily be more honourable than they, for they come into being or pass away when the soul leaves them or grants life to them, but soul itself exists for ever because " it does not depart from itself ".[1] This is how soul should reason about the manner in which it grants life in the whole universe and in individual things. Let it look at the great soul, being itself another soul which is no small one, which has become worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the things that have bewitched the other souls, and is established in quietude. Let not only its encompassing body and the body's raging sea be quiet, but all its environment: the earth quiet, and the sea and air quiet, and the heaven itself at peace.[2] Into

the spiritual experience which he shared with his mother at Ostia is deservedly famous (*Confessions* IX 10. 25ff.). The *σώματος κλύδων* may be inspired by Plato *Timaeus* 43B5; for the metaphor cp. the oracle of Apollo on Plotinus (Porphyry *Life* 22. 25–6 and 30–4).

αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκήμων.[1] νοείτω δὲ πάντοθεν εἰς αὐτὸν ἑστῶσα ψυχὴν ἔξωθεν οἷον εἰσρέουσαν καὶ εἰσχυθεῖσαν καὶ πάντοθεν εἰσιοῦσαν καὶ εἰσλάμπουσαν· οἷον σκοτεινὸν νέφος ἡλίου βολαὶ φωτίσασαι λάμπειν ποιοῦσι χρυσοειδῆ ὄψιν διδοῦσαι, οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχὴ ἐλθοῦσα εἰς σῶμα οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκε μὲν ζωήν, ἔδωκε δὲ ἀθανασίαν, ἤγειρε δὲ κείμενον. ὁ δὲ κινηθεὶς κίνησιν ἀίδιον ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἐμφρόνως ἀγούσης ζῷον εὔδαιμον ἐγένετο, ἔσχε τε ἀξίαν οὐρανὸς ψυχῆς εἰσοικισθείσης ὢν πρὸ ψυχῆς σῶμα νεκρόν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ, μᾶλλον δὲ σκότος ὕλης καὶ μὴ ὂν καὶ ὃ στυγέουσιν οἱ θεοί, φησί τις. γένοιτο δ' ἂν φανερωτέρα αὐτῆς καὶ ἐναργεστέρα ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ φύσις, εἴ τις ἐνταῦθα διανοηθείη, ὅπως περιέχει καὶ ἄγει ταῖς αὑτῆς βουλήσεσι τὸν οὐρανόν. παντὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει τούτῳ, ὅσος ἐστίν, ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὴν καὶ πᾶν διάστημα καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἐψύχωται, ἄλλου μὲν ἄλλῃ κειμένου τοῦ σώματος, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ὧδί, τοῦ δὲ ὧδὶ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίας, τῶν δὲ ἄλλην ἀπάρτησιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐχόντων. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲ μέρει αὑτῆς ἑκάστῳ κατακερματισθεῖσα [μορίῳ ψυχῆς][2] ζῆν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα ζῇ τῇ ὅλῃ, καὶ πάρεστι πᾶσα πανταχοῦ τῷ γεννήσαντι πατρὶ ὁμοιουμένη καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πάντη. καὶ πολὺς ὢν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλῃ ἕν ἐστι τῇ ταύτης δυνάμει καὶ θεός ἐστι διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος

[1] ἀκήμων (*silens*) Schwyzer (*Mus. Helv.* 37, 1980): ἀμείνων ARJ^{pc}: ἀμείνω EBJ^{ac}UC.

[2] om. Basilius: delevimus, ut glossam ad μέρει αὑτῆς.

this heaven at rest let it imagine soul as if flowing in from outside, pouring in and entering it everywhere and illuminating it: as the rays of the sun light up a dark cloud, and make it shine and give it a golden look, so soul entering into the body of heaven gives it life and gives it immortality and wakes what lies inert. And heaven, moved with an everlasting motion by the wise guidance of soul, becomes a "fortunate living being" and gains its value by the indwelling of soul; before soul it was a dead body, earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter and non-existence, and "what the gods hate", as a poet says.[1] The power and nature of soul will become still clearer and more obvious if one considers here how it encompasses the heaven and drives it by its own acts of will. For soul has given itself to the whole magnitude of heaven, as far as it extends, and every stretch of space, both great and small, is ensouled; one body lies in one place and one in another, and one is here and another there; some are separated by being in opposite parts of the universe, and others in other ways. But soul is not like this and it is not by being cut up that it gives life, by a part of itself for each individual thing, but all things live by the whole, and all soul is present everywhere, made like to the father who begat it in its unity and its universality. And by its power the heaven is one, though it is multiple with one part in one place and one in another, and our universe is a

[1] The phrase is used of Hades in *Iliad* 20. 65.

ὅδε. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεός, ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς, εἴπερ τι, διὰ τοῦτο· νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι. τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι. ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῇς λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχή, καὶ τιμιώτερον παντὸς τοῦ ὃ ἂν σωματικὸν ᾖ. γῆ γὰρ πάντα· κἂν πῦρ δὲ ᾖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ καῖον αὐτοῦ; καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων σύνθετα, κἂν ὕδωρ αὐτοῖς προσθῇς κἂν ἀέρα. εἰ δ' ὅτι ἔμψυχον διωκτὸν ἔσται, τί παρείς τι ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον διώκει; τὴν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ ψυχὴν ἀγάμενος σεαυτὸν ἄγασαι.

3. Οὕτω δὴ τιμίου καὶ θείου ὄντος χρήματος τῆς ψυχῆς, πιστεύσας ἤδη τῷ τοιούτῳ θεὸν μετιέναι μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἀνάβαινε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον· πάντως που οὐ πόρρω βαλεῖς· οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ μεταξύ. λάμβανε τοίνυν τὸ τοῦ θείου τούτου θειότερον τὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω γειτόνημα, μεθ' ὃ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ψυχή. καίπερ γὰρ οὖσα χρῆμα οἷον ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, εἰκών τίς ἐστι νοῦ· οἷον λόγος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω τοι

[1] Heraclitus, Diels B 96.

[2] Plotinus has perhaps remembered the unusual word γειτόνημα from Plato *Laws* IV 705A4, but if so he has forgotten the singularly inappropriate context—the sea in Plato would be a "bitter and briny neighbour" to the city for which a site is being considered.

god by the agency of this soul. And the sun also is a god because it is ensouled, and the other heavenly bodies, and we, if we are in any way divine, are so for this reason: for "corpses are more throwable away than dung".[1] But that which is for the gods the cause of their being gods must necessarily be a divinity senior to them. But our soul is of the same kind, and when you look at it without its accretions and take it in its purified state you will find that very same honourable thing which [we said] was soul, more honourable than everything which is body. For all bodily things are earth; and even if they are fire, what would its burning principle be [but soul]? And the same is true of all things compounded of these, even if you add water to them, and air as well. But if the bodily is worth pursuing because it is ensouled, why does one let oneself go and pursue another? But by admiring the soul in another, you admire yourself.

3. Since the soul is so honourable and divine a thing, be sure already that you can attain God by reason of its being of this kind, and with this as your motive ascend to him: in all certainty you will not look far; and the stages between are not many. Grasp then the soul's upper neighbour,[2] more divine than this divine thing, after which and from which the soul comes. For, although it is a thing of the kind which our discussion has shown it to be, it is an image of Intellect; just as a thought in its utterance is an image of the thought in soul, so soul itself is the expressed thought of Intellect,[3] and its

[3] The distinction here made between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (the thought in the mind) and the λόγος προφορικός (the thought expressed) first appears in Stoic logic: cp. *SVF* II 135.

καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἣν προΐεται ζωὴν εἰς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν· οἷον πυρὸς τὸ μὲν ἡ συνοῦσα θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἣν παρέχει. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἐκρέουσαν, ἀλλὰ μένουσαν μὲν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην. οὖσα οὖν ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερά ἐστι, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ τελείωσις ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν οἷον πατρὸς ἐκθρέψαντος, ὃν οὐ τέλειον ὡς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐγέννησεν. ἥ τε οὖν ὑπόστασις αὐτῇ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὅ τε ἐνεργείᾳ λόγος νοῦ αὐτῇ ὁρωμένου. ὅταν γὰρ ἐνίδῃ εἰς νοῦν, ἔνδοθεν ἔχει καὶ οἰκεῖα ἃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. καὶ ταύτας μόνας δεῖ λέγειν ἐνεργείας ψυχῆς, ὅσα νοερῶς καὶ ὅσα οἴκοθεν· τὰ δὲ χείρω ἄλλοθεν καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς τῆς τοιαύτης. νοῦς οὖν ἐπὶ μᾶλλον θειοτέραν ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ πατὴρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ παρεῖναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξὺ ἢ τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι, ὡς ἐφεξῆς μέντοι καὶ ὡς τὸ δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς εἶδος· καλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ νοῦ ὕλη νοοειδὴς οὖσα καὶ ἁπλῆ. οἷον δὲ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ταὐτῷ μὲν τούτῳ δῆλον, ὅτι κρεῖττον ψυχῆς τοιᾶσδε οὔσης.

4. Ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε· κόσμον αἰσθητὸν τόνδε εἴ τις θαυμάζει εἴς τε τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῆς φορᾶς τῆς ἀιδίου

whole activity, and the life which it sends out to establish another reality; as fire has the heat which remains with it and the heat which it gives. But one must understand that the activity on the level of Intellect does not flow out of it, but the external activity comes into existence as something distinct. Since then its existence derives from Intellect soul is intellectual, and its intellect is in discursive reasonings, and its perfection comes from Intellect, like a father who brings to maturity a son whom he begat imperfect in comparison with himself. Soul's establishment in reality, then, comes from Intellect and its thought becomes actual in its seeing of Intellect. For when it looks into Intellect, it has within it and as its own what it thinks in its active actuality. And we should call these alone activities of the soul, all it does intellectually and which spring from its own home; its inferior activities come from elsewhere and belong to a soul of this inferior kind. Intellect therefore makes soul still more divine by being its father and by being present to it; for there is nothing between but the fact that they are different,[1] soul as next in order and as the recipient, Intellect as the form; and even the matter of Intellect is beautiful, since it has the form of Intellect and is simple. But what Intellect is like is clear from this very fact that it is superior to soul which is of such great excellence.

4. But one might see this also from what follows: if someone admires this perceptible universe, observing its size and beauty and the order of its ever-

[1] Cp. V. 8. 7. 13, where the phrase οὐδενὸς δὲ μεταξὺ ὄντος is used of the intelligible and material universes.

ἀποβλέπων καὶ θεοὺς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, τοὺς μὲν ὁρωμένους, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀφανεῖς ὄντας, καὶ δαίμονας καὶ ζῷα φυτά τε πάντα, ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀληθινώτερον ἀναβὰς κἀκεῖ πάντα ἰδέτω νοητὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀίδια ἐν οἰκείᾳ συνέσει καὶ ζωῇ, καὶ τούτων τὸν ἀκήρατον νοῦν προστάτην, καὶ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον θεοῦ κόρου καὶ νοῦ ὄντος. πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἀθάνατα περιέχει, νοῦν πάντα, θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν πᾶσαν, ἑστῶτα ἀεί. τί γὰρ ζητεῖ μεταβάλλειν εὖ ἔχων; ποῦ δὲ μετελθεῖν πάντα παρ' αὐτῷ ἔχων; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὔξειν ζητεῖ τελειότατος ὤν. διὸ καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ πάντα τέλεια, ἵνα πάντη ᾖ τέλειος οὐδὲν ἔχων ὅ τι μὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ μὴ νοεῖ· νοεῖ δὲ οὐ ζητῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχων. καὶ τὸ μακάριον αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐπίκτητον, ἀλλ' ἐν αἰῶνι πάντα, καὶ ὁ ὄντως αἰών, ὃν μιμεῖται χρόνος περιθέων ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν παριείς, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβάλλων. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα αὖ περὶ ψυχήν· ποτὲ γὰρ Σωκράτης, ποτὲ δὲ ἵππος, ἕν τι ἀεὶ τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πάντα. ἔχει οὖν [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ][1] πάντα ἑστῶτα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔστι μόνον, καὶ τὸ "ἔστιν" ἀεί, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ μέλλον—ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τότε—οὐδὲ τὸ παρεληλυθός—οὐ γάρ τι ἐκεῖ παρελήλυθεν—ἀλλ' ἐνέστηκεν ἀεὶ ἄτε τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα οἷον ἀγαπῶντα

[1] del. Harder.

lasting course, and the gods in it, some of whom are seen and some are invisible, and the spirits, and all animals and plants, let him ascend to its archetypal and truer reality and there see them all intelligible and eternal in it, in its own understanding and life; and let him see pure Intellect presiding over them, and immense wisdom, and the true life of Kronos, a god who is fulness and intellect.[1] For he encompasses in himself all things immortal, every intellect, every god, every soul, all for ever unmoving. For why should it seek to change when all is well with it? Where should it seek to go away to when it has everything in itself? But it does not even seek to increase, since it is most perfect. Therefore all things in it are perfect, that it may be altogether perfect, having nothing which is not so, having nothing in itself which does not think; but it thinks not by seeking but by having. Its blessedness is not something acquired, but all things are in eternity, and the true eternity, which time copies, running round the soul, letting some things go and attending to others. For around Soul things come one after another: now Socrates, now a horse, always some one particular reality; but Intellect is all things. It has therefore everything at rest in the same place, and it only is, and its "is" is for ever, and there is no place for the future for then too it is—or for the past—for nothing there has passed away—but all things remain stationary for ever, since they are the same, as if

[1] The quaint etymology of Plato *Cratylus* 396B6–7 is in Plotinus' mind here: but there κόρος signifies τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ. For Plotinus, here and elsewhere, the word κόρος is applied to Intellect or Soul in its two meanings of "satiety" (signifying the plenitude of intelligible being) and "boy" (the son of the Father, the One): cp. ch. 7 below and III. 8. 11; V. 8. 12–13.

ἑαυτὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν νοῦς καὶ ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὸ σύμπαν πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶν ὄν, ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφιστὰς τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὂν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νῷ διδὸν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ νοεῖν αἴτιον ἄλλο, ὃ καὶ τῷ ὄντι· ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἅμα αἴτιον ἄλλο. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ συννπάρχει καὶ οὐκ ἀπολείπει ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ δύο ὄντα τοῦτο τὸ ἓν ὁμοῦ νοῦς καὶ ὂν καὶ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον, ὁ μὲν νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δὲ ὂν κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ νοεῖν ἑτερότητος μὴ οὔσης καὶ ταὐτότητος δέ. γίνεται οὖν τὰ πρῶτα νοῦς, ὄν, ἑτερότης, ταὐτότης· δεῖ δὲ καὶ κίνησιν λαβεῖν καὶ στάσιν. καὶ κίνησιν μέν, εἰ νοεῖ, στάσιν δέ, ἵνα τὸ αὐτό. τὴν δὲ ἑτερότητα, ἵν' ᾖ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον. ἢ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τὴν ἑτερότητα, ἓν γενόμενον σιωπήσεται· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοηθεῖσιν ἑτέροις πρὸς ἄλληλα εἶναι. ταὐτὸν δέ, ἐπεὶ ἓν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ κοινὸν δέ τι ἓν πᾶσι· καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἑτερότης. ταῦτα δὲ πλείω γενόμενα ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ποιεῖ· καὶ τὸ ποιὸν δὲ ἡ ἑκάστου τούτων ἰδιότης, ἐξ ὧν ὡς ἀρχῶν τἆλλα.

[1] Plotinus is here paraphrasing what Plato says about eternal intelligible being in *Timaeus* 37E5–38B3 (though it is not certain whether Plato was thinking like Plotinus of timeless eternity and not rather of changeless duration). Plotinus follows the *Timaeus* here in insisting that all things in Intellect are stationary, but when he turns, as he so often does, later in the chapter (lines 35ff.) to apply the " Platonic

they were satisfied with themselves for being so.[1] But each of them is Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect making Being exist in thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought. But the cause of thinking is something else, which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other than themselves. For they are simultaneous and exist together and one does not abandon the other, but this one is two things, Intellect and Being and thinking and thought, Intellect as thinking and Being as thought. For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness. These then are primary, Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness; but one must also include Motion and Rest. One must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there may be thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of thought, also, must have otherness in relation to each other. But one must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some common unity; and the distinctive quality of each is otherness. The fact that there are several of these primaries makes number and quantity; and the particularity of each makes quality, and from these as principles everything else comes.

categories " of *Sophist* 254Dff. to Intellect he has to introduce κίνησις, the motion of thought, into it (lines 36–7); and he sometimes goes much further than here in introducing the movement which seems inseparable from our concepts of life and thought into the intelligible world: cp. V. 8. 3–4 and VI. 7. 13.

5. Πολὺς οὖν οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ· τῇ δὲ ὑπάρχει ἐν τούτοις εἶναι συναφθείσῃ, εἰ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν ἐθέλοι. πελάσασα οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ οἷον ἓν γενομένη ζῇ ἀεί.[1] τίς οὖν ὁ τοῦτον γεννήσας; ὁ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ὁ πρὸ τοιούτου πλήθους, ὁ αἴτιος τοῦ καὶ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν εἶναι τοῦτον, ὁ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ποιῶν. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶτος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸ δυάδος τὸ ἕν, δεύτερον δὲ δυὰς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς γεγενημένη ἐκεῖνο ὁριστὴν ἔχει, αὐτὴ[2] δὲ ἀόριστον παρ' αὑτῆς· ὅταν δὲ ὁρισθῇ, ἀριθμὸς ἤδη· ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὡς οὐσία· ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχή. οὐ γὰρ ὄγκοι τὰ πρῶτα οὐδὲ μεγέθη· τὰ γὰρ παχέα ταῦτα ὕστερα, ἃ ὄντα ἡ αἴσθησις οἴεται. οὐδὲ ἐν σπέρμασι δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρώμενον· τοῦτο δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος. ὁ οὖν ἐκεῖ λεγόμενος ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἡ δυὰς λόγοι καὶ νοῦς· ἀλλὰ ἀόριστος μὲν ἡ δυὰς τῷ οἷον ὑποκειμένῳ λαμβανομένη, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὁ ἐξ

[1] Seidel, et testatur Theol. VIII. 129: ζητεῖ Enn.* defendunt Henry (Etats 196) et Cilento.
[2] Ficinus: αὕτη Enn.

[1] The "dyad" here is the indefinite life or sight which is the first moment in the timeless formation of Intellect by procession from and return upon the One. See V. 4. 2. 4–10, where the ἀόριστος ὄψις of Intellect is explicitly identified

5. This god, then, which is over the soul, is multiple; and soul exists among the intelligible realities in close unity with them, unless it wills to desert them. When it has come near then to him and, in a way, become one with him, it lives for ever. Who is it, then, who begat this god? The simple god, the one who is prior to this kind of multiplicity, the cause of this one's existence and multiplicity, the maker of number. For number is not primary: the One is prior to the dyad, but the dyad is secondary and, originating from the One, has it as definer, but is itself of its own nature indefinite; but when it is defined, it is already a number, but a number as substance; and soul too is a number.[1] For masses and magnitudes are not primary: these things which have thickness come afterwards, and sense-perception thinks they are realities. Even in seeds it is not the moisture which is honourable, but what is unseen: and this is number and rational principle. Therefore what is called number in the intelligible world and the dyad are rational principles and Intellect; but the dyad is indefinite when one forms an idea of it by what may be called the substrate, but each and

with the ἀόριστος δυάς; and for a fuller exposition of this very important doctrine VI. 7. 16–17 and V. 3. 11. 1–12; cp. also the account of "intelligible matter" in II. 4. 1–5. For the dyad as τόλμα see Chapter 1, n. 1. For Plotinus's full treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Numbers, briefly and obscurely referred to in this chapter, see VI. 6 *On Numbers*. For the doctrine of the Ideal Numbers and their generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato (as reported by Aristotle) and the Old Academy see, in the first instance, P. Merlan in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1970) Part I, Chapter 2, and the references there given.

αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶδος ἕκαστος, οἷον μορφωθέντος τοῖς γενομένοις εἴδεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ· μορφοῦται δὲ ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον παρὰ τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλον δὲ παρ' αὑτοῦ, οἷον ὄψις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόησις ὅρασις ὁρῶσα ἄμφω τε [1] ἕν.

6. Πῶς οὖν ὁρᾷ καὶ τίνα, καὶ πῶς ὅλως ὑπέστη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου γέγονεν, ἵνα καὶ ὁρᾷ; νῦν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει, ἐπιποθεῖ δὲ τὸ θρυλλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς, πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου ὄντος, οἷον λέγομεν τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ὁτιοῦν εἴτε πλῆθος εἴτε δυὰς εἴτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τοσοῦτον δὲ πλῆθος ἐξερρύη, ὃ ὁρᾶται μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀξιοῦμεν. ὧδε οὖν λεγέσθω θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένοις οὐ λόγῳ γεγωνῷ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, εὔχεσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον. δεῖ τοίνυν θεατήν, ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ εἴσω οἷον νεῷ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, μένοντος ἡσύχου ἐπέκεινα ἁπάντων, τὰ οἷον πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἤδη ἀγάλματα ἑστῶτα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἄγαλμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκφανὲν θεᾶσθαι πεφηνὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· παντὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ δεῖ τι εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ κινεῖται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐκείνῳ μηδενὸς μὴ τιθώμεθα αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι μετ' αὐτὸ

[1] ἄμφω τε (*et ambo* Ficinus) Sleeman, et testatur Theol. VIII. 135: ἄμφω τὸ Enn., Perna, Creuzer: ἀμφὶ τὸ Kirchhoff, Müller: ⟨καὶ⟩ ἄμφω τὸ Volkmann *.

every number which comes from it and the One is a form, as if Intellect was shaped by the numbers which came to exist in it; but it is shaped in one way by the One and in another by itself, like sight in its actuality; for intellection is seeing sight, and both are one.

6. How then does it see, and whom does it see? And how did it come into existence at all and arise from the One so as to be able to see? For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One. Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in spoken words, but stretching ourselves out with our soul into prayer to him, able in this way to pray alone to him alone.[1] The contemplator, then, since God exists by himself as if inside the temple, remaining quiet beyond all things, must contemplate what correspond to the images already standing outside the temple, or rather that one image which appeared first; and this is the way in which it appeared: everything which is moved must have some end to which it moves. The One has no such end, so we must not consider that it moves. If anything comes

[1] The only explicit reference to genuine prayer in Plotinus (though his whole philosophy is prayer in this sense). Prayer to lesser deities for material needs is for him a magical activity: see IV. 4. 30–39.

γίνεται, ἐπιστραφέντος ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γεγονέναι. ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ποιουμένοις· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὴν γένεσιν προσάπτοντας αὐτοῖς ⟨ἀποδόσει⟩ [1] αἰτίας καὶ τάξεως [αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσει] [1] τὸ οὖν γινόμενον ἐκεῖθεν οὐ κινηθέντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γιγνόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ οὐ δεύτερον. δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον; περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος. καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἕως μένει, ἐκ τῆς αὑτῶν οὐσίας ἀναγκαίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω αὑτῶν ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αὑτῶν ἐξηρτημένην ὑπόστασιν, εἰκόνα οὖσαν οἷον ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ· πῦρ μὲν τὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ θερμότητα· καὶ χιὼν οὐκ εἴσω μόνον τὸ ψυχρὸν κατέχει· μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα εὐώδη μαρτυρεῖ τοῦτο· ἕως γάρ ἐστι, πρόεισί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτά, ὧν ἀπολαύει ὑποστάντων ὁ

[1] *ἀποδόσει* transposuimus, *αἰτίας* genetivus (testatur Theologia): *αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσει* (*-δόσει* cod. Ottobonianus: *-δώσειν* H-S [1-2]) delevimus; distinctio ante *τὸ* tollenda.

into being after it, we must think that it necessarily does so while the One remains continually turned towards itself. When we are discussing eternal realities we must not let coming into being in time be an obstacle to our thought; in the discussion we apply the word " becoming " to them in attributing to them causal connection and order, and must therefore state that what comes into being from the One does so without the One being moved: for if anything came into being as a result of the One's being moved, it would be the third starting from the One, not the second, since it would come after the movement.[1] So if there is a second after the One it must have come to be without the One moving at all, without any inclination or act of will or any sort of activity on its part. How did it come to be then, and what are we to think of as surrounding the One in its repose? It must be a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it remains unchanged. All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their

[1] Cp. what is said about the unnecessary multiplication of hypostases in II. 9. 1.

πλησίον. καὶ πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ· καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν. μέγιστον δέ μετ' αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ δεύτερον· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνον καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν· καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρειττων ἁπάντων νοῦς, ὅτι τἆλλα μετ' αὐτόν· οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος—ὡς γὰρ εἴδωλον νοῦ—ταύτῃ καὶ εἰς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ· νοῦς δὲ ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἵνα ᾖ νοῦς. ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν οὐ χωρισθείς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν, ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ. ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνοι τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ᾖ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι.

7. Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ σαφέστερον λέγειν· πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι δεῖ πως εἶναι ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ἀποσῴζειν πολλὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτό, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου. ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκεῖνο. πῶς οὖν νοῦν γεννᾷ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ

[1] A striking example of the often misunderstood metaphor of "emanation", on which see my contribution to *The*

existence.[1] And all things when they come to perfection produce; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is less than itself. What then must we say about the most perfect? Nothing can come from it except that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is next to it in greatness and second to it: for Intellect sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of Intellect; and that which derives from something greater than Intellect is intellect, which is greater than all things, because the other things come after it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One. But soul's expression is obscure—for it is a ghost of Intellect—and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but Intellect in the same way has to look to that god, in order to be Intellect. But it sees him, not as separated from him, but because it comes next after him, and there is nothing between, as also there is not anything between soul and Intellect. Everything longs for its parent and loves it, especially when parent and offspring are alone; but when the parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him only in otherness.

7. But we say that Intellect is an image of that Good; for we must speak more plainly; first of all we must say that what has come into being must be in a way that Good, and retain much of it and be a likeness of it, as light is of the sun. But Intellect is not that Good. How then does it generate Intellect? Because by its return to it it sees: and

Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy Part III, Chapter 15, 239–41.

ἑώρα· ἡ δὲ ὅρασις αὕτη νοῦς. τὸ γὰρ καταλαμβάνον ἄλλο ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ νοῦς· αἴσθησιν γραμμὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· ἀλλ' ὁ κύκλος τοιοῦτος οἷος μερίζεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. ἢ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἓν μέν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἓν δύναμις πάντων. ὧν οὖν ἐστι δύναμις, ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως οἷον σχιζομένη ἡ νόησις καθορᾷ· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν νοῦς. ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ' αὑτοῦ ἔχει ἤδη οἷον συναίσθησιν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτ δύνατιαι οὐσίαν. αὐτὸς γοῦν δι' αὑτὸν καὶ ὁρίζει τὸ εἶναι αὑτῷ τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει καὶ ὅτι οἷον μέρος ἕν τι τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ῥώννυται παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν

[1] Several scholars have thought that the subject of ἑώρα in this sentence is the One or Good, which is certainly the subject of γεννᾷ in the preceding sentence. Henry and Schwyzer now accept this view (see their *Addenda ad Textum* in *Plotini Opera* III. p. 397). The sentence would then mean "The One by its return to itself sees: and this seeing is Intellect." But this simple identification of Intellect with the self-vision of the One does not agree with anything else which is said about the relationship of the two hypostases in the *Enneads*; and it seems to me most unlikely that Plotinus would ever have spoken of the One as "returning" upon itself and seeing itself as the unity-in-multiplicity which is Intellect: for in his thought there can be absolutely no

this seeing is Intellect.[1] For that which apprehends something else is either sense-perception or intellect; (sense-perception is a line etc.)[2] but the circle is of a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual apprehension] is not so. There is One here also, but the One is the productive power of all things. The things, then, of which it is the productive power are those which Intellect observes, in a way cutting itself off from the power; otherwise it would not be Intellect. For Intellect also has of itself a kind of intimate perception of its power, that it has power to produce substantial reality. Intellect, certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and because its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened

separation from itself or multiplicity in the One. The development of one side of his thought about this ultimate and mysterious relationship, on the line which appears to have been followed by Porphyry, might lead to a conclusion something like this. But I do not think it should be read back into Plotinus himself without better evidence than the present ambiguous passage supplies. I therefore, with Cilento, Igal and others, suppose an abrupt change of subject (by no means unprecedented in Plotinus) and take αὐτό as non-reflexive ("it", not "itself") and understand that Plotinus is expounding his normal doctrine that Intellect constitutes itself by returning in vision or contemplation upon the One (cp. ch. 5, n. 1).

[2] We need not suppose any corruption of the text here if, with Igal, we assume that Plotinus is briefly reminding his readers of an analogy which would be familiar to them, in which sense-perception is compared to a line, intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. (These early treatises were written for circulation only to a few intimate associates, for whom this sort of summary reminder would be sufficient: cp. Porphyry *Life* ch. 4.)

παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου. ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖθεν, οἷον μεριστῷ ἐξ ἀμερίστου, καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ πάντα, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μηδὲν τῶν πάντων· ταύτῃ γὰρ πάντα ἐξ ἐκείνου, ὅτι μή τινι μορφῇ κατείχετο ἐκεῖνος· μόνον γὰρ ἓν ἐκεῖνο· καὶ εἰ[1] μὲν πάντα, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἂν ἦν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲν μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ νῷ, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ πάντα [ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἂν ἦν].[2] διὸ καὶ οὐσίαι ταῦτα· ὥρισται γὰρ ἤδη καὶ οἷον μορφὴν ἕκαστον ἔχει. τὸ δὲ ὂν δεῖ οὐκ ἐν ἀορίστῳ οἷον αἰωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅρῳ πεπῆχθαι καὶ στάσει· στάσις δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁρισμὸς καὶ μορφή, οἷς καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει. ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ἀξίας[3] νοῦ τοῦ καθαρωτάτου μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς φῦναι, γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα πάντα σὺν αὑτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητούς· πλήρη δὲ ὄντα ὧν ἐγέννησε καὶ ὥσπερ καταπιόντα πάλιν τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχειν μηδὲ ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς ὕλην μηδὲ τραφῆναι παρὰ τῇ Ῥέᾳ, ὡς τὰ μυστήρια καὶ οἱ μῦθοι οἱ περὶ θεῶν αἰνίττονται Κρόνον μὲν θεὸν σοφώτατον πρὸ τοῦ Δία γενέσθαι ἃ γεννᾷ πάλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, ᾗ καὶ

[1] Harder: ὁ vel ὃ Enn.
[2] del. Kirchhoff, Volkmann*, Harder (qui πάντα quoque del.), iteratum e lin. 21.
[3] Igal (*Emerita* 39, 1971, 157): ἄξιος Enn.: ἄξιον δὲ Harder, H-S[1].

by the One and made perfect in substantial existence by and from it. But Intellect sees, by means of itself, like something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and thought and all things come from the One, because that God is not one of all things; for this is how all things come from him, because he is not confined by any shape; that One is one alone: if he was all things, he would be numbered among beings. For this reason that One is none of the things in Intellect, but all things come from him. This is why they are substances; for they are already defined and each has a kind of shape. Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit and stability; and stability in the intelligible world is limitation and shape, and it is by these that it receives existence. "Of this lineage"[1] is this Intellect of which we are speaking, a lineage worthy of the purest Intellect, that it should spring from nowhere else but the first principle, and when it has come into existence should generate all realities along with itself, all the beauty of the Ideas and all the intelligible gods; and it is full of the beings which it has generated and as it were swallows them up again, by keeping them in itself and because they do not fall out into matter and are not brought up in the house of Rhea; as the mysteries and the myths about the gods say riddlingly that Kronos, the wisest god, before the birth of Zeus took back and kept within himself all that he begat, and in this way is full and

[1] A phrase from *Iliad* 6. 211, applied by Plato (*Republic* VIII. 547A4–5) to the birth of civil strife in his ideal state—another curious case of Plotinus remembering Plato's words but, apparently, forgetting their context (cp. ch. 3, n. 2, p. 19).

πλήρης καὶ νοῦς ἐν κόρῳ· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φασι Δία γεννᾶν κόρον ἤδη ὄντα· ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα γεννᾶν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι. κρεῖττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ἔλαττον ὂν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἀόριστον μὲν ὡσαύτως, ὁριζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ οἷον εἰδοποιούμενον. νοῦ δὲ γέννημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, κατὰ θάτερα μὲν συνηγμένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀποπιμπλάμενον καὶ ἀπολαῦον καὶ μεταλαμβάνον αὐτοῦ καὶ νοοῦν, κατὰ θάτερα δὲ ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν μετ' αὐτό, μᾶλλον δὲ γεννῶν καὶ αὐτό, ἃ ψυχῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι χείρονα· περὶ ὧν ὕστερον λεκτέον. καὶ μέχρι τούτων τὰ θεῖα.

8. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος τριττὰ τὰ πάντα περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα—φησὶ γὰρ πρῶτα—καὶ δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ περὶ τὰ τρίτα τρίτον. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου εἶναι πατέρα αἴτιον μὲν τὸν νοῦν λέγων· δημιουργὸς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῷ· τοῦτον δέ φησι τὴν ψυχὴν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι ἐκείνῳ. τοῦ αἰτίου δὲ

[1] For this interpretation of the myth and play on Κρόνος–κόρος cp. ch. 4 and n. 1 there.

[2] Plotinus's invariable assumption that the product or offspring must be inferior to the producer or parent, which he rather strangely asserts here, is borne out by our experience in this world. Did he consider himself inferior to his parents?

[3] Cp. ch. 1, n. 2, p. 13.

is Intellect in satiety; and after this they say he begat Zeus who is then his Koros [that is, boy and satiety][1]; for Intellect generates soul, since it is perfect Intellect. For since it was perfect it had to generate, and not be without offspring when it was so great a power. But its offspring could not be better than it (this is not so even here below) but had to be a lesser image of it,[2] and in the same way indefinite, but defined by its parent and, so to speak, given a form. And the offspring of Intellect is a rational form and an existing being, that which thinks discursively; it is this which moves round Intellect and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, united to it on one side and so filled with it and enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, but, on the other side, in touch with the things which came after it, or rather itself generating what must necessarily be worse than soul; about these we must speak later.[3] This is as far as the divine realities extend.

8. This is the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold " about the king of all "—he means the primary realities—and " the second about the second and the third about the third ". But he also says that there is a " father of the cause ", meaning Intellect by " the cause ": for Intellect is his craftsman; and he says that it makes Soul in that " mixing-

νοῦ ὄντος πατέρα φησὶ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα
νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ὂν
καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὴν ἰδέαν λέγει· ὥστε Πλάτωνα εἰδέναι
ἐκ μὲν τἀγαθοῦ τὸν νοῦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ψυχήν.
καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ καινοὺς μηδὲ νῦν,
ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τοὺς
δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι μαρτυ-
ρίοις πιστωσαμένους τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς
εἶναι τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν.
ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς
τοιαύτης δόξης καθόσον εἰς ταὐτὸ συνῆγεν ὂν καὶ
νοῦν, καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐτίθετο
"τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί τε καὶ εἶναι" λέγων.
καὶ ἀκίνητον δὲ λέγει τοῦτο—καίτοι προστιθεὶς
τὸ νοεῖν—σωματικὴν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐξαίρων ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μένῃ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὄγκῳ σφαίρας
ἀπεικάζων, ὅτι πάντα ἔχει περιειλημμένα καὶ ὅτι
τὸ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἓν δὲ λέγων ἐν
τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν αἰτίαν εἶχεν ὡς τοῦ
ἑνὸς τούτου πολλὰ εὑρισκομένου. ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλά-
τωνι Παρμενίδης ἀκριβέστερον λέγων διαιρεῖ ἀπ'

[1] Plotinus begins his demonstration that his doctrine of the Three Hypostases is the true doctrine of Plato with a favourite text from the Platonic *Letter* II 312E1–4, which he also cites in I. 8. 2 and VI. 7. 42 and alludes to in III. 5. 8. He goes on to refer to supporting texts from *Letter* VI 323D2–5 and *Timaeus* 34Bff. and 41D4–5. Plotinus always identifies Plato's craftsman with his own Intellect, never with Soul, whose function in making the physical universe he sees as subordinate and instrumental: cp. V. 8. 7.

bowl" he speaks of.[1] And the father of Intellect which is the cause he calls the Good and that which is beyond Intellect and "beyond being".[2] And he also often calls Being and Intellect Idea: so Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and Soul from Intellect. And [it follows] that these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato's own writings for evidence that these views are ancient.[3] And Parmenides also, before Plato, touched on a view like this, in that he identified Being and Intellect and that it was not among things perceived by the senses that he placed Being, when he said "Thinking and Being are the same". And he says that this Being is unmoved—though he does attach thinking to it—taking all bodily movement from it that it may remain always in the same state, and likening it to "the mass of a sphere", because it holds all things in its circumference and because its thinking is not external, but in itself.[4] But when he said it was one, in his own works, he was open to criticism because this one of his was discovered to be many. But Parmenides in Plato speaks more accurately, and distinguishes from each

[2] Another very favourite passage from Plato *Republic* VI 509B8–10.

[3] The belief that the true doctrines are present, but often not explicit, in the writings regarded as traditionally authoritative is, for obvious reasons, essential for pagan and Christian traditionalists of the first centuries A.D. (and for Christian traditionalists later): cp. Origen *De Principiis* I 3.

[4] The references are to Parmenides Diels B 3 (cited also at I. 4. 10. 6 and III. 8. 8. 8) and B 8, 26 and 43.

ἀλλήλων τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἕν, καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων, καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά. καὶ σύμφωνος οὕτως καὶ αὐτός ἐστι ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς τρισίν.

9. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ νοῦν καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ λέγων ἁπλοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς τίθεται τὸ πρῶτον καὶ χωριστὸν τὸ ἕν, τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς δι' ἀρχαιότητα παρῆκε. καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὸ ἓν οἶδεν ἀίδιον καὶ νοητόν· τὰ γὰρ σώματα γίγνεται ἀεὶ καὶ ῥέοντα. τῷ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ νεῖκος μὲν διαιρεῖ, ἡ δὲ φιλία τὸ ἕν—ἀσώματον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο—τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ὡς ὕλη. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ὕστερον χωριστὸν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ νοητόν, νοεῖν δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ λέγων πάλιν αὖ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖ· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νοητὰ ποιῶν καὶ τοσαῦτα, ὁπόσαι ἐν οὐρανῷ σφαῖραι, ἵν' ἕκαστον ἑκάστην κινῇ, ἄλλον τρόπον λέγει τὰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἢ Πλάτων, τὸ εὔλογον οὐκ ἔχον ἀνάγκην τιθέμενος. ἐπιστήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ καὶ εὐλόγως· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ πάσας πρὸς μίαν σύνταξιν συντελούσας πρὸς ἓν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον βλέπειν. ζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις τὰ πολλὰ νοητὰ εἰ ἐξ ἑνός ἐστιν αὐτῷ τοῦ πρώτου, ἢ πολλαὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς

[1] Plato *Parmenides* 137C–142A, 144E5 and 155E5. The interpretation of the *Parmenides* adopted here may be Neopythagorean: see E. R. Dodds "The *Parmenides* of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'", *C.Q.* 22 (1928) 129–42. Note the sharp distinction made between the historical Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides. Plotinus always cites the Pre-Socratics (including Pythagoras) to provide supplementary corroboration of the doctrines which he finds in Plato. He does not regard them as traditional authorities on the same level as Plato, and often thinks they are wrong

other the first One, which is more properly called One, and the second which he calls "One-Many" and the third, "One and Many".[1] In this way he too agrees with the doctrine of the three natures.

9. And Anaxagoras also, when he says that Intellect is pure and unmixed, posits that the first principle is simple and that the One is separate, but he neglects to give an accurate account because of his antiquity. Heraclitus also knows that the One is eternal and intelligible: for bodies are always coming into being and flowing away. And for Empedocles Strife divides, but Love is the One—he too makes it incorporeal—and the elements serve as matter.[2] Later, Aristotle makes the first principle separate and intelligible, but when he says that it knows itself, he goes back again and does not make it the first principle; and by making many other intelligible realities, as many as the heavenly spheres, that each particular intelligible may move one particular sphere, he describes the intelligible world in a different way from Plato, making a probable assumption which has no philosophical necessity. But one might doubt whether it is even probable: for it would be more probable that all the spheres, contributing their several movements to a single system, should look to one principle, the first. And one might enquire whether Aristotle thinks that the many intelligibles derive from one, the first, or whether there are many primary principles in the

(as Parmenides here), confused or obscure (cp. the remark about Anaxagoras at the beginning of the next chapter).

[2] The references are to Anaxagoras Diels B 12, Empedocles B 26, 5–6, and the sort of general account of the teachings of Heraclitus given in Diogenes Laertius IX 8 (=Diels A 1).

ἀρχαί· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνός, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι ἕξει ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αἱ σφαῖραι ἄλλης ἄλλην περιεχούσης, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ἔξω κρατούσης· ὥστε περιέχοι ἂν κἀκεῖ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κόσμος νοητὸς ἔσται· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα αἱ σφαῖραι οὐ κεναί, ἀλλὰ μεστὴ ἄστρων ἡ πρώτη, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν ἄστρα, οὕτω κἀκεῖ τὰ κινοῦντα πολλὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἕξει καὶ τὰ ἀληθέστερα ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, κατὰ συντυχίαν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται· καὶ διὰ τί συνέσονται καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνίαν ὁμονοήσει; πῶς δὲ ἴσα πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ καὶ κινοῦντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ αἰσθητά; πῶς δὲ καὶ πολλὰ οὕτως ἀσώματα ὄντα ὕλης οὐ χωριζούσης; ὥστε τῶν ἀρχαίων οἱ μάλιστα συντασσόμενοι αὖ τοῖς Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ Φερεκύδους δὲ περὶ ταύτην μὲν ἔσχον τὴν φύσιν· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν αὐτοῖς αὑτῶν λόγοις, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀγράφοις ἐδείκνυον συνουσίαις ἢ ὅλως ἀφεῖσαν.

10. Ὅτι δὲ οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν ἔχειν, ὡς ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἕν, οἷον ἤθελεν ὁ λόγος δεικνύναι ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν περὶ τούτων ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ἔστι δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὸ ὂν καὶ νοῦς, τρίτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

[1] This criticism of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover(s) expounded by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* Λ looks rather like a Platonic development of that made by Theophrastus *Metaphysics* II 7–9 Ross–Fobes; but the resemblance is not close enough for us to assume that Plotinus had read Theophrastus.

intelligible world; and if they derive from one, the situation will clearly be analogous to that of the heavenly spheres in the sense-world, where each contains the other and one, the outermost, dominates; so that there too the first would contain the others and there will be an intelligible universe; and, just as here in the sense-world the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of heavenly bodies and the others have heavenly bodies in them, so there also the moving principles will have many realities in them, and the realities there will be truer. But if each is primary principle, the primary principles will be a random assembly; and why will they be a community and in agreement on one work, the harmony of the whole universe? And how can the perceptible beings in heaven be equal in number to the intelligible movers? And how can the intelligibles even be many, when they are incorporeal, as they are, and matter does not divide them[1]? For these reasons those of the ancient philosophers who took up positions closest to those of Pythagoras and his successors (and Pherecydes)[2] held closely to this nature; but some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings, others did not do so in written works but in unwritten group discussions,[3] or left it altogether alone.

10. It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to show, so far as demonstration was possible in these matters, and next in order there is Being and

[2] Cp. Pherecydes Diels A 29.

[3] This may possibly be a reference to Plotinus's master Ammonius: cp. Longinus in Porphyry *Life* ch. 20.

φύσις, ἤδη δέδεικται. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει τριττὰ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς—χωριστὰ γὰρ ταῦτα—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητῶν ἔξω, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ "ἔξω" ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνα τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ ἔξω· οὕτω καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷον λέγει Πλάτων τὸν εἴσω ἄνθρωπον. ἔστι τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ θεῖόν τι καὶ φύσεως ἄλλης, ὁποία πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις· τελεία δὲ ἡ νοῦν ἔχουσα· νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν λογιζόμενος, ὁ δὲ λογίζεσθαι παρέχων. τὸ δὴ λογιζόμενον τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδενὸς πρὸς τὸ λογίζεσθαι δεόμενον σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν καθαρῷ ἔχον, ἵνα καὶ λογίζεσθαι καθαρῶς οἷόν τε ᾖ, χωριστὸν καὶ οὐ κεκραμένον σώματι ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ τις τιθέμενος οὐκ ἂν σφάλλοιτο. οὐ γὰρ τόπον ζητητέον οὗ ἱδρύσομεν, ἀλλ' ἔξω τόπου παντὸς ποιητέον. οὕτω γὰρ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ ἄυλον, ὅταν μόνον ᾖ οὐδὲν ἔχον παρὰ τῆς σώματος φύσεως. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθέν φησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχὴν περιέβαλεν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ μένον· ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπικρύπτων[1] ἐπ'

[1] Heintz apud Harder: ἔτι κρύπτων (-τον E) Enn.

[1] The phrase comes from Plato *Republic* IX 587A7. Plotinus uses it again at I. 1. 10. 15 (see my note there). This

Intellect, and the nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also in ourselves. I do not mean in [ourselves as] beings of the sense-world—for these three are separate [from the things of sense]—but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception; " outside " here is used in the same sense as those realities are also said to be " outside " the whole universe: so the corresponding realities in man are said to be " outside ", as Plato speaks of the " inner man ".[1] Our soul then also is a divine thing and of a nature different [from the things of sense], like the universal nature of soul; and the human soul is perfect when it has intellect; and intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity in purity in order that it may be able to engage in pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as separate and unmixed with body, in the primary intelligible realm. For we should not look for a place in which to put it, but make it exist outside all place. For this is how it is by itself and outside and immaterial, when it is alone and retains nothing from the nature of body. This is the reason why Plato says of the universe also that the craftsman wrapped the soul round it " from outside ", indicating the part of the soul which remains in the intelligible; and he said obscurely about us that the soul is " on

whole chapter shows clearly Plotinus's sense of the inadequacy of spatial metaphors and the need of using them consciously and critically.

ἄκρᾳ εἴρηκε τῇ κεφαλῇ. καὶ ἡ παρακέλευσις δὲ
25 τοῦ χωρίζειν οὐ τόπῳ λέγεται—τοῦτο γὰρ φύσει
κεχωρισμένον ἐστίν—ἀλλὰ τῇ μὴ νεύσει καὶ ταῖς
⟨μὴ⟩ [1] φαντασίαις καὶ τῇ ἀλλοτριότητι τῇ πρὸς τὸ
σῶμα, εἴ πως καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ψυχῆς εἶδος ἀναγάγοι
τις καὶ συνενέγκαι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα
30 αὐτῆς ἱδρυμένον, ὃ μόνον ἐστὶ σώματος δημι-
ουργὸν καὶ πλαστικὸν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν περὶ
τοῦτο ἔχον.

11. Οὔσης οὖν ψυχῆς τῆς λογιζομένης περὶ δικαί-
ων καὶ καλῶν καὶ λογισμοῦ ζητοῦντος εἰ τοῦτο δί-
καιον καὶ εἰ τοῦτο καλόν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἑστώς
τι δίκαιον, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς περὶ ψυχὴν
5 γίγνεται. ἢ πῶς ἂν λογίσαιτο; καὶ εἰ ὁτὲ μὲν
λογίζεται περὶ τούτων ψυχή, ὁτὲ δὲ μή, δεῖ τὸν
⟨μὴ⟩ [2] λογιζόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἔχοντα τὸ δίκαιον
νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν νοῦ ἀρχὴν καὶ
αἰτίαν καὶ θεόν—οὐ μεριστοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ
μένοντος ἐκείνου, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ μένοντος—ἐν
10 πολλοῖς αὖ θεωρεῖσθαι καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν δυναμένων

[1] Page, collato III. 6. 5. 25.

[2] τὸν ⟨μὴ⟩ Dodds (Select Passages 52): supra τὸν scr. μὴ A^2 (*non* Ficinus): ⟨μὴ⟩ τὸν Creuzer *.

[1] The references are to Plato *Timaeus* 36E3 and 90A5 (cp. 44D–E). Plotinus probably uses the word ἐπικρύπτων (an emendation, but a convincing one), which suggests *deliberate* obscurity, because he did not believe, and therefore did not think that Plato believed, that the soul, or any part of it, was actually located in any part of the body. For his explanation of the Platonic texts in terms of the activation of the brain and other organs by powers of the omnipresent soul see IV. 3. 23.

top in the head ".[1] And his exhortation to separate ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—but refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our not having mental images, and our alienation from the body [2]—if by any chance one could make the remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with us to the heights that of it which is established here below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller of the body and is actively concerned with it.

11. Since, then, there exists soul which reasons about what is right and good, and discursive reasoning which enquires about the rightness and goodness of this or that particular thing, there must be some further permanent rightness from which arises the discursive reasoning in the realm of soul. Or how else would it manage to reason? And if soul sometimes reasons about the right and good and sometimes does not, there must be in us Intellect which does not reason discursively but always possesses the right, and there must be also the principle and cause and God of Intellect.[3] He is not divided, but abides, and as he does not abide in place he is contemplated in many beings, in each and every one of those capable of receiving him as another self,[4] just

[2] The exhortation to separation is probably Plato *Phaedo* 67C–D. Plotinus always interprets this text, as he does here, as referring to inner detachment, not spatial separation: cp. III. 6. 5.

[3] A striking affirmation of the transcendence of the One over Intellect. (For the problem involved see the beginning of the first chapter of V. 2 and n. 1 there.)

[4] Is Plotinus remembering here Aristotle's use of the same striking phrase for a friend, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός (*Nicomachean Ethics* IX 4. 1166a31–2; cp. 1169b6–7, 1170b6)?

δέχεσθαι οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο. τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐφαπτόμεθα καὶ σύνεσμεν καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα· ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ οἷ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ.

12. Πῶς οὖν ἔχοντες τὰ τηλικαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλά, οἱ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν; ἐκεῖνα μέν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείαις ἀεί, νοῦς καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἀεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ψυχὴ δέ—τὸ ἀεικίνητον—οὕτως. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἤδη αἰσθητόν, ἀλλὰ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς, ὅταν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἴῃ· ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργοῦν ἕκαστον μὴ μεταδιδῷ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, οὔπω δι' ὅλης ψυχῆς ἐλήλυθεν. οὔπω οὖν γιγνώσκομεν ἅτε μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντες καὶ οὐ μόριον ψυχῆς ἀλλ' ἡ ἅπασα ψυχὴ ὄντες. καὶ ἔτι ἕκαστον τῶν ψυχικῶν ζῶν[1] ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀεὶ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ γνωρίζειν, ὅταν μετάδοσις γένηται καὶ ἀντίληψις. δεῖ τοίνυν, εἰ τῶν οὕτω παρόντων ἀντίληψις ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπιστρέφειν, κἀκεῖ

[1] A^{3mg} (*quamdiu vixit* Ficinus), Creuzer *: ζῷων A^{ac}EBxUC.

[1] The metaphor of circle, centre and radii, referred to in ch. 7 (see n. 2) and often used elsewhere in the *Enneads* (cp. e.g. IV. 2. 1. 24–9, where it is used of the relationship of immaterial indivisible being to the divisible material quasi-reality of the sense-world). It can be used at any level of the hierarchy to describe the combination of immanent

as the centre of a circle exists by itself, but every one of the radii in the circle has its point in the centre and the lines bring their individuality to it.[1] For it is with something of this sort in ourselves that we are in contact with god and are with him and depend upon him; and those of us who converge towards him are firmly established in him.

12. Why then, when we have such great possessions, do we not consciously grasp them, but are mostly inactive in these ways, and some of us are never active at all? They are always occupied in their own activities, Intellect, and that which is before Intellect, always in itself, and soul, which is in this sense " ever-moving ". For not everything which is in the soul is immediately perceptible, but it reaches us when it enters into perception; but when a particular active power does not give a share in its activity to the perceiving power, that activity has not yet pervaded the whole soul.[2] We do not therefore yet know it, since we are accompanied by the perceptive power and are not a part of soul but the whole soul. And further, each soul-part, since it is always living, always exercises its own activity by itself; but the discovery of it comes when sharing with the perceptive power and conscious awareness takes place. If then there is to be conscious apprehension of the powers which are present in this way, we must turn our power of apprehension inwards,

presence and transcendent separateness which Plotinus sees when he is trying to describe the relationship of a relatively complex and multiple derived reality to its simpler and more unified source.

[2] For the doctrine of consciousness mentioned here see IV. 3. 30 and n. 1 there.

ποιεῖν τὴν προσοχὴν ἔχειν. ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀκοῦσαι ἀναμένων ἣν ἐθέλει φωνήν, τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν ἀποστὰς τὸ οὖς ἐγείροι πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον τῶν ἀκουστῶν, ὁπότε ἐκεῖνο προσέλθοι, οὕτω τοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ τὰς μὲν αἰσθητὰς ἀκούσεις ἀφέντα, εἰ μὴ καθόσον ἀνάγκη, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι δύναμιν φυλάττειν καθαρὰν καὶ ἕτοιμον ἀκούειν φθόγγων τῶν ἄνω.

and make it attend to what is there. It is as if someone was expecting to hear a voice which he wanted to hear and withdrew from other sounds and roused his power of hearing to catch what, when it comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard; so here also we must let perceptible sounds go (except in so far as we must listen to them) and keep the soul's power of apprehension pure and ready to hear the voices from on high.

V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST

Introductory Note

THIS very short treatise, the eleventh in Porphyry's chronological order, is by no means a mere fragment or sketch. It is a brief but carefully considered statement of the basic doctrine of the Three Hypostases, distinguished by a particular emphasis on their continuity. There is one life extending unbroken through all the descending stages from the One to the soul or life-principle in plants. At the beginning Plotinus shows himself vividly aware of the great difficulty which inevitably arises when any attempt is made to state a doctrine of the Transcendent Absolute in discursive philosophical language: how can we sufficiently emphasise the transcendence of the source of reality without cutting it off altogether from the reality of which it is the source? A rather disproportionate amount of the treatise (the last lines of the first of its two chapters and nearly the whole of the second) seems to be devoted to the lowest stage in the expansion of the one life, the "nature" or life-principle in plants. But, as Bréhier saw (see his introductory *Notice*, Vol. V, pp. 31–2 of his edition), this is because Plotinus thought that it was at this point that objections to his doctrine of continuity might most easily arise because of the apparent discontinuity and fragmentation of soul at this level.

Synopsis

The One is all things and none of them. How Intellect comes from the One and Soul from Intellect, and how

higher soul generates its own image, the sensitive and vegetative life-principle which extends as far as plants (ch. 1). The different levels of soul; a difficulty about the plant-soul: what happens to it when a piece of the plant is cut off? Again, all things are the One and not the One: it is all like one long continuous life (ch. 2).

V. 2. (11) ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΞΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὸ ἓν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως πάντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἷον ἐνέδραμε· μᾶλλον δὲ οὔπω ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἔσται. πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἁπλοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐν ταὐτῷ φαινομένης ποικιλίας, οὐ διπλόης οὔτινος ὁτουοῦν; ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα τὸ ὂν ᾖ, διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς οὐκ ὄν, γεννητὴς δὲ αὐτοῦ· καὶ πρώτη οἷον γέννησις αὕτη· ὂν γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ δεῖσθαι οἷον ὑπερερρύη καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστη πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. οὗτος οὖν ὢν οἷον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ δύναμιν προχέας πολλήν—εἶδος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ—

V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST

1. The One is all things and not a single one of them[1]: it is the principle of all things, not all things, but all things have that other kind of transcendent existence; for in a way they do occur in the One; or rather they are not there yet, but they will be. How then do all things come from the One, which is simple and has in it no diverse variety, or any sort of doubleness? It is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it: in order that being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator of being. This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple power—this is a likeness of it—just as

[1] Cp. Plato *Parmenides* 160B2–3.

ὥσπερ αὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε· καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς μένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα ἐγέννα εἴδωλον. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προελθοῦσα δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γεννᾷ εἴδωλον αὑτῆς αἴσθησιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀπήρτηται οὐδ' ἀποτέτμηται· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ ἄνω [1] ψυχὴ μέχρι φυτῶν φθάνειν· τρόπον γάρ τινα φθάνει, ὅτι αὐτῆς τὸ ἐν φυτοῖς· οὐ μὴν πᾶσα ἐν φυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ γιγνομένη ἐν φυτοῖς οὕτως ἐστίν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προέβη εἰς τὸ κάτω ὑπόστασιν ἄλλην ποιησαμένη τῇ προόδῳ καὶ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ χείρονος· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τὸ νοῦ ἐξηρτημένον μένειν τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾷ.

2. Πρόεισιν οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς ἔσχατον καταλειπομένου ἀεὶ ἑκάστου ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἕδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ γεννωμένου ἄλλην τάξιν λαμβάνοντος τὴν χείρονα· ἕκαστον μέντοι ταὐτὸν γίνεται ᾧ ἂν ἐπίσπηται, ἕως ἂν ἐφέπηται. ὅταν οὖν ψυχὴ ἐν φυτῷ γίνηται, ἄλλο ἐστὶν οἷον μέρος τὸ ἐν φυτῷ τὸ τολμηρότατον καὶ ἀφρονέστατον καὶ προεληλυθὸς μέχρι τοσούτου·

[1] Harder: ἀνθρώπων Enn., Perna—Volkmann: del. Bréhier.

that which was before it poured it forth. This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement generates its own image, which is sensation and the principle of growth in plants.[1] Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it. For this reason the higher soul seems to reach as far as plants; and in a way it does reach so far, for the life-principle in plants belongs to it; it is certainly not all in plants, but it has come to be in plants in the sense that it has extended itself down to their level, and produced another degree of being by that extension, in desire of its inferior. The part before this, which is immediately dependent on Intellect, leaves Intellect alone, abiding in itself.

2. So it goes on from the beginning to the last and lowest, each [generator] remaining behind in its own place,[2] and that which is generated taking another, lower, rank; and yet each becomes the same as that upon which it follows, as long as it does continue to follow upon it. When therefore soul comes to exist in a plant, what is in the plant is a kind of different part of it, the most audacious and stupid part of it and the one which has proceeded

[1] For the relationship of this immanent principle of life and growth, or "nature", to higher soul see III. 8. 1–5; for its relationship to body see IV. 4. 18–20.

[2] Cp. IV. 8. 10 (the phrase was perhaps suggested by Plato *Timaeus* 42E5–6).

ὅταν δ' ἐν ἀλόγῳ, ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις κρατήσασα ἤγαγεν· ὅταν δὲ εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ὅλως ἐν λογικῷ ἡ κίνησις, ἢ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὡς νοῦν οἰκεῖον ἐχούσης καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς βούλησιν τοῦ νοεῖν ἢ ὅλως κινεῖσθαι. πάλιν δὴ ἀναστρέφωμεν· ὅταν φυτοῦ ἢ τὰ παραφυόμενα ἢ κλάδων τὰ [1] ἄνω τις τέμῃ,[2] ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ψυχὴ ποῦ ἀπελήλυθεν; ἢ ὅθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀποστᾶσα τόπῳ· ἐν οὖν τῇ ἀρχῇ. εἰ δὲ τὴν ῥίζαν διακόψειας ἢ καύσειας, ποῦ τὸ ἐν τῇ ῥίζῃ; ἐν ψυχῇ· οὐ γὰρ [3] εἰς ἄλλον τόπον ἐλθοῦσα. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰ ἀναδράμοι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐν ἄλλῃ φυτικῇ, οὐ γὰρ στενοχωρεῖται· εἰ δ' ἀναδράμοι, ἐν τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς δυνάμει. ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ποῦ; ἐν τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς· ἡ δὲ μέχρι νοῦ, οὐ τόπῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ἦν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πολὺ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, ὥστε οὐδὲ αὕτη. οὐδαμοῦ οὖν οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὃ μηδαμοῦ, καὶ πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ προελθοῦσα εἰς τὸ ἄνω σταίη ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πρὶν πάντη εἰς τὸ ἀνωτάτω γενέσθαι, μέσον ἔχει βίον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει αὐτῆς ἔστηκε. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνος· ἐκεῖνος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου· οὐκ ἐκεῖνος δέ, ὅτι

[1] Kirchhoff *: τῶν $A^{pc}BxUC$: τοῦ $A^{ac}E$.
[2] ⟨τι⟩ τέμῃ Creuzer (ed. Paris.).
[3] οὐ γὰρ coniecimus: οὐκ Enn.

this far; when it comes to exist in an irrational animal, the power of sense-perception has prevailed and brought it there [1]: but when it comes to a man, either the movement is wholly in the soul's reasoning part or it comes from Intellect, since the soul has an intellect of its own and a self-originated will to think, or in general to be in motion. Now let us go back [to plant-souls]: when someone cuts off either the side-shoots or the tops of the branches, where has the soul in this part gone? Where it came from; for it did not move spatially away; so it is in its principle. But if you were to cut up or burn the root, where would the soul in the root be? In soul, for it has not gone to another place; but it could be in the same place—but in another if it ran up again [to the higher soul]; if it did not, it would be in another plant-soul, for it is not cramped for room; but if it ran up again, it would be in the power before it. But where is that power? In the power before itself; but that reaches as far as Intellect, not spatially; for none [of these soul-parts] was in space; but Intellect is still more emphatically not in space, so that neither is this [higher] soul. Since therefore it is nowhere, but in that which is nowhere, it is in this way also everywhere, but if as it proceeds upwards it stops in the middle before completely reaching the highest, it has a medium life and stays in that [middle] part of itself. All these things are the One and not the One: they are he because they come from him; they are not he, because it is in abiding by himself that he gives

[1] For a fuller exposition see III. 4. 2, where it is explained what sort of souls get into lower animals and plants, and why.

ἐκεῖνος ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένων ἔδωκεν. ἔστιν οὖν οἷον ζωὴ μακρὰ εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθεῖσα, ἕτερον ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐφεξῆς, συνεχὲς δὲ πᾶν αὑτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῇ διαφορᾷ, οὐκ ἀπολλύμενον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τὸ πρότερον. τί οὖν ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς γενομένη; οὐδὲν γεννᾷ; ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι. σκεπτέον δὲ πῶς ἀρχὴν ἄλλην λαβόντας.

them. It is then like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the later. What, then, about the soul which comes to exist in plants? Does it not generate anything? Yes, that in which it is. But we must investigate how it does so by taking a different starting-point.

V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, the forty-ninth in Porphyry's chronological order, was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus (*Life* ch. 6). With another very late work which Porphyry placed at the beginning of the *Enneads*, I. 1 (53) *What is the Living Being, and What is Man*, it represents the last, most fully developed and clarified stage of Plotinus's long reflection upon human nature and human thinking (Porphyry's observation at the end of Chapter 6 of the *Life* on the failing of his master's power apparent in these last treatises, written after Porphyry had left him, should not be taken too seriously). It is particularly concerned with the relationship of the intelligent soul which is our true self to the hypostasis Intellect which in one way transcends us, but which in another way we can become, and to the One beyond Intellect and being which the soul seeks to touch and to see by the light which is itself. The last eight chapters of the treatise are a demonstration as powerful as anything in Plotinus of the need to go beyond Intellect to find the first principle of reality and the soul's true end. The treatise shows, perhaps more clearly than any other in the *Enneads*, the stimulation of the thought of Plotinus by critical reflection on what Aristotle says about Intellect and the exposition of Aristotelian doctrine by the great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, a near-contemporary of his own. (For Plotinus's knowledge of Aristotle and of the commentaries of Alexander and other Peripatetics see *Life* chapter 14.)

Synopsis

If there is to be genuine self-thinking, there must be something simple which thinks itself: for one part of a thing to think another part is not really self-thinking. Perhaps soul does not think itself, but Intellect must do so (ch. 1). An investigation of the activity of reasoning soul, which is what we ourselves are, in its intermediate position between sense-perception below it and Intellect above it (chs. 2–3). How we can transcend ourselves and become Intellect (ch. 4). How the man who has become Intellect sees himself: he finds that Intellect is identical with intelligible reality; both are one single actuality (ch. 5). How we can teach our soul, when we have descended from Intellect, to understand what intellect is by observing its traces in our own intellectuality and recognising their derivation from the true Intellect, which is not a practical intellect (ch. 6). Intellect's knowledge of God implies its self-knowledge; its peace and quiet is its own self-directed activity. Soul acts and produces here below in and by its contemplation, which is an image of the entirely self-directed contemplation of Intellect (ch. 7). Intellect's vision of itself is not like perception here below: it is light seeing itself; this light of Intellect shines on the soul and makes it truly intelligent, so that by becoming like Intellect it is able to see Intellect (ch. 8). The highest part of soul is an image of Intellect, a light from Intellect, and by it we can know what Intellect is like and attain to it; but soul has many lives and levels, and one must start one's quest of Intellect from the level one has reached (ch. 9). Is there need to postulate an ultimate principle beyond Intellect? Intellect, since it sees itself, must be in some sense multiple, not absolutely one and simple. If it was absolutely without parts, it could not think itself or say anything intelligible about itself: the One can only be touched, not thought, and has no need to think itself (ch. 10). How Intellect as sight not yet seeing tries to apprehend the One, but only succeeds

in attaining a multiple image of it which is Intellect itself; the One or Good is not one of all things, but before all things (ch. 11). There must be unity before multiplicity, the One before the many activities of Intellect. The One remains absolutely at rest, and Intellect springs from it like light from the sun (ch. 12). The One is not a " something " and is therefore ineffable and unthinkable and does not think itself: only a complex whole can say " I am existent " (ch. 13). We cannot speak or think the One, but can be aware of it in the way which those who are possessed by a god are aware of the god possessing them (ch. 14). The One gives or makes Intellect, which is all things together in one; it is the productive power in which the things which are distinct in Intellect pre-exist in absolute unity; this is the opposite of the passive potency of matter (ch. 15). There must be something other than the First, which must be multiple: the perfect life of Intellect, which depends on the Good, better than life and intellect (ch. 16). This dependence on the Good is the reason for the perfect self-sufficiency of Intellect. The birth-pangs of the soul: utter inadequacy of thought and discursive reason to satisfy its longing or express what it experiences in its union with the One. The ultimate sudden illumination, when we see God by his own light, if we let everything go (ch. 17).

V. 3. (49) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ

1. Ἆρα τὸ νοοῦν ἑαυτὸ ποικίλον δεῖ εἶναι, ἵνα ἑνί τινι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα θεωροῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγηται νοεῖν ἑαυτό, ὡς τοῦ ἁπλοῦ παντάπασιν ὄντος οὐ δυναμένου εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ κατανόησιν; ἢ οἷόν τε καὶ μὴ σύνθετον ὂν νόησιν ἴσχειν ἑαυτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ διότι σύνθετον λεγόμενον νοεῖν ἑαυτό, ὅτι δὴ ἑνὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα νοεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνοιμεν αὑτῶν τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς νοεῖν αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν ἔσται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐγνωσμένον, μὴ κἀκείνου τοῦ νοήσαντος τὰ ἄλλα τὰ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ ἑαυτὸ νενοηκότος, ἔσται τε οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἄλλο. δεῖ τοίνυν θέσθαι καὶ ἁπλοῦ κατανόησιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο πῶς, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἢ ἀποστατέον τῆς δόξης τῆς τοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ νοεῖν τι ὄντως. ἀποστῆναι μὲν οὖν τῆς δόξης ταύτης οὐ πάνυ οἷόν τε πολλῶν τῶν ἀτόπων συμβαινόντων· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ψυχῇ δοίημεν τοῦτο ὡς ⟨οὐ⟩[1] πάνυ ἄτοπον ὄν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ νοῦ τῇ

[1] F[3s] (= Ficinus)R[2s].

V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

1. Does that which thinks itself have to be complex, in order that it may with one of its constituents contemplate the rest, and so be said to know itself, on the supposition that the absolutely simple would not be able to return to itself and the intellectual grasp of itself? Or is it possible for that which is not composite also to have an intellectual awareness of itself[1]? For that which is said to think itself because it is composite, just because it thinks the rest with one of its constituents, as in sense-perception we might grasp our own shape and the rest of our bodily nature, would not have true self-intellection; for it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and this will be, not what we are looking for, a thing which thinks itself, but one thing thinking another. One must, then, assume that a simple thing thinks itself, and investigate as far as possible how it does so, or else one must abandon the opinion that anything really thinks itself. Now to abandon this opinion is not very possible, since many absurdities follow from its abandonment; for even if we do not attribute self-thinking to the soul on the ground that this is not very absurd, yet it is absolutely

[1] For a fuller discussion of this see ch. 5.

φύσει διδόναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον, εἰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων γνῶσιν ἔχει, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐν γνώσει καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καταστήσεται. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἔξω ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἀντιλήψεται, καί, εἰ βούλει, διάνοια καὶ δόξα· εἰ [1] δὲ νοῦς τούτων γνῶσιν ἔχει ἢ μή, σκέψασθαι προσήκει· ὅσα δὲ νοητά, νοῦς δηλονότι γνώσεται. ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὰ μόνον ἢ καὶ ἑαυτόν, ὃς ταῦτα γνώσεται; καὶ ἆρα οὕτω γνώσεται ἑαυτόν, ὅτι γινώσκει ταῦτα μόνον, τίς δὲ ὢν οὐ γνώσεται, ἀλλ' ἃ μὲν αὐτοῦ γνώσεται ὅτι γιγνώσκει, τίς δὲ ὢν γινώσκει οὐκέτι; ἢ καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν; καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος καὶ μέχρι τίνος σκεπτέον.

2. Πρότερον δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ζητητέον, εἰ δοτέον αὐτῇ γνῶσιν ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τί τὸ γινῶσκον ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ὅπως. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὸν αὐτῆς αὐτόθεν ἂν φαῖμεν τοῦ ἔξω εἶναι μόνον· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν ἔνδον ἐν τῷ σώματι γινομένων συναίσθησις εἴη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἀντίληψις· τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι παθημάτων ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεται. τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ λογιζόμενον παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασμάτων παρακειμένων τὴν ἐπίκρισιν ποιούμενον καὶ συνάγον καὶ διαιροῦν· ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ

[1] Igal: ὁ Enn.

absurd not to attribute it to the nature of intellect, and suppose that it has knowledge of everything else but is not in a state of knowledge and understanding of itself.[1] For it will be, not intellect, but sense-perception (and, if you like, discursive thought and opinion) which is aware of external things; and it is appropriate to consider whether intellect has knowledge of them or not; but obviously intellect is going to know everything which is intelligible. Will it then know the intelligibles only, or itself as well, which is to know them? And will it know itself in such a way that it knows the intelligibles alone but does not know who it is, but will know that it knows the intelligibles which belong to it, but will not yet know who it is? Or will it know both what belongs to it and itself? And we must consider in what way and to what extent it knows itself.[2]

2. First we must enquire about the soul, whether we should grant it knowledge of itself, and what is that which knows in it, and how. We could say at once that its perceptive part is perceptive only of what is external; for even if there is a concomitant awareness of what goes on inside the body, yet even here the apprehension is of something outside the perceptive part; for it perceives the experiences in its body by its own agency, but the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing them; and, as for

[1] Ficino's inserted negative (see critical note) seems to me necessary to the sense here. There is an apparent reminiscence of this passage in Augustine *De Trinitate* IX 3, 3 (PL 42, 962).

[2] Cp. Augustine *De Trinitate* X 3, 5 (PL 42, 976).

τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἰόντων ἐφορᾷ οἷον τοὺς τύπους, καὶ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτους τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σύνεσιν ἔτι προσλαμβάνει ὥσπερ ἐπιγινώσκον καὶ ἐφαρμόζον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τύποις τοὺς νέους καὶ ἄρτι ἥκοντας· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀναμνήσεις φαῖμεν ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς μέχρι τοῦδε ἱστάμενος τῇ δυνάμει ἢ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στρέφεται καὶ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνενεκτέον τοῦτο. γνῶσιν μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ τούτῳ τῷ μέρει διδόντες—νοῦν γὰρ αὐτὸν φήσομεν—καὶ ὅπῃ διοίσει τοῦ ἐπάνω ζητήσομεν, μὴ δὲ διδόντες ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον ἥξομεν τῷ λόγῳ βαδίζοντες, καὶ τὸ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ" ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ σκεψόμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ κάτω δώσομεν, τίς ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ σκεψόμεθα· εἰ γὰρ μηδεμία, ἤδη τοῦτο νοῦς ὁ ἄκρατος. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἆρα ἐπιστρέφει ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ αὐτό; ἢ οὔ· ἀλλὰ ὧν δέχεται τύπων ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τήν σύνεσιν ἴσχει. καὶ πῶς τὴν σύνεσιν ἴσχει, πρῶτον ζητητέον.

3. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις εἶδεν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἔδωκε τὸν τύπον τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἡ δὲ τί φησιν; ἢ οὔπω οὐδὲν ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔγνω μόνον καὶ ἔστη· εἰ μὴ ἄρα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν διαλογίζοιτο "τίς οὗτος," εἰ

the things which come to it from Intellect, it observes what one might call their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with these; and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognising the new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it: this process is what we should call the " recollections " of the soul. And does the intellect of the soul come to the end of its power and stop at this point, or does it turn back upon itself and know itself? This must certainly be attributed to Intellect. If, then, we grant self-knowledge to this part of soul—for we shall admit that it is an intellect—we shall also enquire how it differs from the Intellect above; but if we do not grant it [to the intellect in soul] we shall come to that higher Intellect as we advance in our argument, and we shall consider what " itself knowing itself " means. But if we grant it here too, in the lower intellect, we shall investigate what the difference in self-thinking [between lower and higher intellect] is; for if there is none, this part of soul is already pure Intellect.[1] Does then this reasoning part of the soul itself return upon itself? No, it does not. It has understanding of the impressions which it receives from both sides. And we must first enquire how it has understanding.

3. Well, then, sense-perception sees a human being and gives its impression to discursive reason. What does reason say? It will not say anything yet, but only knows, and stops at that; unless perhaps it asks itself " Who is this? " if it has met the person

[1] For the phrase *νοῦς ἄκρατος* cp. Anaxagoras Diels A 15 and for the sense B 12.

πρότερον ἐνέτυχε τούτῳ, καὶ λέγοι προσχρωμένη τῇ μνήμῃ, ὅτι Σωκράτης. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐξελίττοι τὴν μορφήν, μερίζει ἃ ἡ φαντασία ἔδωκεν· εἰ δέ, εἰ ἀγαθός, λέγοι, ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἔγνω διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως εἴρηκεν, ὃ δὲ εἴρηκεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἤδη παρ' αὑτῆς ἂν ἔχοι κανόνα ἔχουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρ' αὑτῇ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν πῶς ἔχει παρ' αὑτῇ; ἢ ἀγαθοειδής ἐστι, καὶ ἐπερρώσθη δὲ εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐπιλάμποντος αὐτῇ νοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καθαρὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο καὶ νοῦ δέχεται ἐπικείμενα ἴχνη. διὰ τί δὲ οὐ τοῦτο νοῦς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ψυχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἀρξάμενα; ἢ ὅτι ψυχὴν δεῖ ἐν λογισμοῖς εἶναι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα λογιζομένης δυνάμεως ἔργα. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐ τούτῳ τῷ μέρει δόντες τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ ἀπαλλαξόμεθα; ἢ ὅτι ἔδομεν αὐτῷ τὰ ἔξω σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν, νῷ δὲ ἀξιοῦμεν ὑπάρχειν τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σκοπεῖσθαι. ἀλλ' εἴ τις φήσει "τί οὖν κωλύει τοῦτο ἄλλῃ δυνάμει σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ αὑτοῦ;" οὐ τὸ διανοητικὸν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐπιζητεῖ, ἀλλὰ νοῦν καθαρὸν λαμβάνει. τί οὖν κωλύει ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν καθαρὸν εἶναι; οὐδέν, φήσομεν· ἀλλ' ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν ψυχῆς τοῦτο; ἀλλ' οὐ ψυχῆς μὲν φήσομεν, ἡμέτερον δὲ νοῦν φήσομεν, ἄλλον μὲν ὄντα τοῦ διανοουμένου καὶ ἐπάνω βεβηκότα, ὅμως δὲ ἡμέτερον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συναριθμοῖμεν τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς. ἢ ἡμέτερον καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον· διὸ καὶ προσχρώμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ προσχρώμεθα—διανοίᾳ [1] δὲ ἀεί—καὶ ἡμέτερον μὲν

[1] R[2mg] (*cogitatione* Ficinus), Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff*: διάνοιαι Enn., H-S [1].

before, and says, using memory to help it, that it is Socrates. And if it makes the details of his form explicit, it is taking to pieces what the image-making power gave it; and if it says whether he is good, its remark originates in what it knows through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from itself, since it has a norm of the good in itself. How does it have the good in itself? Because it is like the good, and is strengthened for the perception of this kind of thing by Intellect illuminating it: for this is the pure part of the soul and receives the reflection of intellect coming down upon it. But why is this not intellect, and the rest, beginning from the power of sense-perception, soul? Because it must be soul that is engaged in reasoning; and all this is the work of a reasoning power. But why do not we give self-thinking to this part, and finish with the subject? Because we gave this part the task of observing what is outside it and busying itself with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to observe what belongs to itself and what is within itself. But if someone is going to say "What prevents this part of soul from observing what belongs to itself by another power?" he is not looking for the power of discursive reasoning or rationality, but is grasping pure Intellect. What then prevents pure Intellect from being in soul? Nothing, we shall reply. But ought we to go on to say that it belongs to soul? But we shall not say that it belongs to soul, but we shall say that it is our intellect, being different from the reasoning part and having gone up on high, but all the same ours, even if we should not count it among the parts of soul, yes, really, it is ours and not ours; for this reason we use it and do not use it—

χρωμένων, οὐ προσχρωμένων δὲ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. τὸ δὴ προσχρῆσθαι τί ἐστιν; ἆρα αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνο γινομένους, καὶ φθεγγομένους ὡς ἐκεῖνος; ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνον· οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς· κατ' ἐκεῖνο οὖν τῷ λογιστικῷ πρώτῳ δεχομένῳ. καὶ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα δι' αἰσθήσεως κἂν ⟨μὴ⟩ [1] ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· ἆρ' οὖν καὶ διανοούμεθα οὕτως καὶ διὰ ⟨νοῦ⟩ [2] νοοῦμεν οὕτως; ἢ αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦμεν τὰ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ νοήματα αὐτοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμεῖς. τὰ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἄνωθεν οὕτως, ὡς τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κάτωθεν, τοῦτο ὄντες τὸ κύριον τῆς ψυχῆς, μέσον δυνάμεως διττῆς, χείρονος καὶ βελτίονος, χείρονος μὲν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, βελτίονος δὲ τοῦ νοῦ. ἀλλ' αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ ἡμέτερον δοκεῖ συγκεχωρημένον—ἀεὶ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα—νοῦς δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ὅτι χωριστός· χωριστὸς δὲ τῷ μὴ προσνεύειν αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω βλέποντας. αἴσθησις δὲ ἡμῖν ἄγγελος, βασιλεὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνος.

[1] κἂν μὴ Igal: καὶ Enn.
[2] Igal: διανοοῦμεν Enn.

[1] See critical note. I agree with Igal in seeing here an etymological explanation of διανοούμεθα. Cp. ch. 6, 20–2, which makes it clear that for Plotinus διανοεῖσθαι = διὰ νοῦ νοεῖν.

[2] The term "separate" (χωριστός) comes from Aristotle *De Anima* 430a17. Here as elsewhere Plotinus takes Aristotle's thought about Intellect as the starting-point of his own reflections. Plotinus goes on to make it clear that his intellect is the divine Intellect which is "king of heaven and

but we always use discursive reason—and it is ours when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it. But what is this "using"? Is it when we become it and speak like it? No, in accord with it: for we ourselves are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord with it by our rational power which first receives it. For we perceive through perception, even if it is not we ourselves who are the perceivers: do we then reason like this, and think through Intellect like this [1]? No, it is we ourselves who reason and we ourselves make the acts of intelligence in discursive reasoning; for this is what we ourselves are. The activities of Intellect are from above in the same way that those of sense-perception are from below; we are this, the principal part of the soul, in the middle between two powers, a worse and a better, the worse that of sense-perception, the better that of Intellect. But it is generally agreed that sense-perception is always ours—for we are always perceiving—but there is disagreement about Intellect, both because we do not always use it and because it is separate; and it is separate because it itself does not incline towards us, but we rather look up towards it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king.[2]

earth" in Plato *Philebus* 28C7–8. Though this goes far beyond anything in the text of the *De Anima*, Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentaries Plotinus knew (*Life* ch. 14, 13), had identified the "active Intellect" of the *De Anima* with the divine Intellect which is Aristotle's First Cause, the Unmoved Mover (Alexander *De Anima* 89, 22–3 Bruns, cp. *Mantissa* 110–13 Bruns, where Alexander is to some extent following an earlier commentator, either Aristoteles of Messene or, according to Zeller's not certainly necessary emendation of the text, Aristocles).

4. Βασιλεύομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅταν κατ' ἐκεῖνον· κατ' ἐκεῖνον δὲ διχῶς, ἢ τοῖς οἷον γράμμασιν ὥσπερ νόμοις ἐν ἡμῖν γραφεῖσιν, ἢ οἷον πληρωθέντες αὐτοῦ ἢ καὶ δυνηθέντες ἰδεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι παρόντος. καὶ γινώσκομεν δὲ αὐτοὺς τῷ ⟨τῷ⟩ [1] τοιούτῳ ὁρατῷ τὰ ἄλλα μαθεῖν [τῷ τοιούτῳ] [2] ἢ κατὰ [3] τὴν δύναμιν τὴν γινώσκουσαν τὸ τοιοῦτον μαθόντες αὐτῇ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνο γινόμενοι, ὡς τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν διττὸν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα τῆς διανοίας τῆς ψυχικῆς φύσιν, τὸν δὲ ὑπεράνω τούτου, τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἐκεῖνον γινόμενον· κἀκείνῳ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν αὖ οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἔτι, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἄλλον γενόμενον καὶ συναρπάσαντα ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω μόνον ἐφέλκοντα τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄμεινον· ὃ καὶ δύναται μόνον πτεροῦσθαι πρὸς νόησιν, ἵνα τις ἐκεῖ παρακαθοῖτο ἃ εἶδε. τὸ δὴ διανοητικὸν ὅτι διανοητικὸν ἆρα οὐκ οἶδε,[4] καὶ ὅτι σύνεσιν τῶν ἔξω λαμβάνει, καὶ ὅτι κρίνει ἃ κρίνει, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κανόσιν, οὓς παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἔχει, καὶ ὡς ἔστι τι βέλτιον αὐτοῦ, ⟨ὃ⟩ οὐ [5] ζητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχει πάντως δήπου; ἀλλ' ἆρα τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ [ὃ] [6] οὐκ οἶδεν ἐπιστάμενον οἷόν ἐστι καὶ οἷα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ; εἰ οὖν λέγοι, ὅτι ἀπὸ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ δεύτερον μετὰ νοῦν καὶ εἰκὼν νοῦ, ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα οἷον γεγραμμένα, ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ γράφων καὶ ὁ γράψας, ἆρ' οὖν

[1] suspic. H-S[1], scr. B-T.
[2] del. Steinhart, Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff *.
[3] ἢ κατὰ H-S recte: κατὰ Stark: ἢ καὶ Enn.
[4] Creuzer * (*novit* Ficinus): εἶδε(ν) AJUC, H-S[1]: ἴδε(ν) EBR.
[5] ὃ οὐ A[3mg] (= Ficinus)R[2mg], Creuzer *: οὗ Enn. (ὃ nominativus, cf. V. 1. 4. 16).

4. But we too are kings, when we are in accord with it; we can be in accord with it in two ways, either by having something like its writing written in us like laws, or by being as if filled with it and able to see it and be aware of it as present. And we know ourselves by learning all other things by such a vision, either learning a vision of this kind according to the knowing power, by that very power itself, or ourselves becoming it; so that the man who knows himself is double, one knowing the nature of the reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above this man, who knows himself according to Intellect because he has become that Intellect; and by that Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as man, but having become altogether other and snatching himself up into the higher world, drawing up only the better part of soul, which alone is able to be winged for intellection,[1] with which someone there keeps by him what he sees. But really does not the part which reasons discursively know that it is the reasoning part, and that it gains understanding of the things outside it, and that it judges what it judges, and that it does so by the rules in itself which it has from Intellect, and that there is something better than itself, which does not seek, but totally possesses? But does it not know what this is itself, when it knows what kind of thing it is and what its works are? If, therefore, it says that it is from Intellect and second after Intellect and an image of Intellect, having in itself everything as if written [in it], as the one who writes and has written is

[1] One of Plotinus's continual allusions to the *Phaedrus* myth, Plato *Phaedrus* 246ff.

[6] del. Theiler, ut correctionem ad lin. 17 falso loco insertam.

στήσεται μέχρι τούτων ὁ οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλῃ δυνάμει προσχρησάμενοι νοῦν αὖ γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατοψόμεθα ἢ ἐκεῖνον μεταλαβόντες ἐπείπερ κἀκεῖνος ἡμέτερος καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐκείνου, οὕτω νοῦν καὶ αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα; ἢ ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως, εἴπερ γνωσόμεθα, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν νῷ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτό." ἔστι δὴ νοῦς τις αὐτὸς γεγονώς, ὅτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀφεὶς ἑαυτοῦ τούτῳ καὶ τοῦτον βλέπει, αὑτῷ δὲ ἑαυτόν. ὡς δὴ οὖν νοῦς ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾷ.

5. Ἆρ' οὖν ἄλλῳ μέρει ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο μέρος αὑτοῦ καθορᾷ; ἀλλ' οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἔσται ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ὁρώμενον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτό." τί οὖν, εἰ πᾶν τοιοῦτον οἷον ὁμοιομερὲς εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ ὁρῶν μηδὲν διαφέρειν τοῦ ὁρωμένου; οὕτω γὰρ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος αὑτοῦ ὃν ταὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἶδεν ἑαυτόν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος ὁ μερισμὸς ἑαυτοῦ· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριεῖ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ τύχην· καὶ ὁ μερίζων δὲ τίς; ὁ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τάττων ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι; εἶτα πῶς ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται ὁ θεωρῶν ἐν τῷ θεωρουμένῳ τάξας ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῷ θεωρουμένῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν. ἢ γνοὺς ἑαυτὸν οὕτω θεωρούμενον ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦντα νοήσει· ὥστε οὐ πάντα οὐδὲ ὅλον γνώσεται ἑαυτόν· ὃν γὰρ εἶδε, θεωρούμενον ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦντα εἶδε· καὶ οὕτως ἔσται ἄλλον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑαυτὸν ἑωρακώς. ἢ προσθήσει παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τεθεωρηκότα, ἵνα τέλεον αὐτὸν ᾖ νενοηκώς. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸν τεθεωρηκότα, ὁμοῦ καὶ τὰ ἑωραμένα. εἰ οὖν ἐν

there [in Intellect], will one who knows himself as far as this stop there, but shall we by using another power as well behold also the Intellect which knows itself, or, having a part in that Intellect, since that belongs to us and we belong to it, shall we in this way know Intellect and ourselves? Yes, we must so know, if we are to know what "self-knowledge" in Intellect means. A man has certainly become Intellect when he lets all the rest which belongs to him go and looks at this with this and himself with himself: that is, it is as Intellect he sees himself.

5. Does he then see himself with another part of himself? But in this way one would be the seer, and the other the seen; but this is not "self-knowledge". What, then, if everything of this kind is, in a way, composed of exactly similar parts, so that the seer does not differ in any way from the seen? First of all, the division of itself into parts is absurd: for how will it divide? Certainly not at random; and who is the divider? The one who sets himself on the contemplating or on the contemplated side? Then, how will the contemplator know himself in the contemplated when he has set himself on the contemplating side? For the contemplating is not in the contemplated. Knowing himself in this way, he will know himself as contemplated but not as contemplating; so that he will not know himself completely or as a whole; for what he saw, he saw as contemplated but not as contemplating: and so he will have been seeing another, but not himself. Or perhaps he will add from himself the one who has contemplated, in order that he may have perfect knowledge of himself. But if he adds the one who has contemplated, he at the same time adds what he

τῇ θεωρίᾳ ὑπάρχει τὰ τεθεωρημένα, εἰ μὲν τύποι αὐτῶν, οὐκ αὐτὰ ἔχει· εἰ δ' αὐτὰ ἔχει, οὐκ ἰδὼν αὐτὰ ἐκ τοῦ μερίσαι αὑτὸν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἦν πρὶν μερίσαι ἑαυτὸν καὶ θεωρῶν καὶ ἔχων. εἰ τοῦτο, δεῖ τὴν θεωρίαν ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ θεωρητῷ, καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μὴ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀλήθεια ἔσται· τύπον γὰρ ἕξει ὁ ἔχων τὰ ὄντα ἕτερον τῶν ὄντων, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια. τὴν ἄρα ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἑτέρου εἶναι δεῖ, ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι. ἓν ἄρα οὕτω νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ πρῶτον ὂν τοῦτο καὶ δὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς τὰ ὄντα ἔχων, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς οὖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἕν, πῶς διὰ τοῦτο τὸ νοοῦν νοήσει ἑαυτό; ἡ μὲν γάρ νόησις οἷον περιέξει τὸ νοητόν, ἢ ταὐτὸν τῷ νοητῷ ἔσται, οὔπω δὲ ὁ νοῦς δῆλος ἑαυτὸν νοῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ταὐτόν—ἐνέργεια γάρ τις τὸ νοητόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δύναμις οὐδέ γ' ἀνόητον[1] οὐδὲ ζωῆς χωρὶς οὐδ' αὖ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ζῆν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλῳ ὄντι, οἷον λίθῳ ἢ ἀψύχῳ τινί—καὶ οὐσία ἡ πρώτη τὸ νοητόν· εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια καὶ καλλίστη δή, νόησις ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐσιώδης νόησις· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθεστάτη· νόησις δὴ τοιαύτη καὶ πρώτη οὖσα καὶ πρώτως νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἡ δὲ

[1] Theiler, testatur Epistola 61: γε νοητόν Enn.*

sees. If then the things contemplated are in the contemplation, if what are in it are impressions of them, then it does not have them themselves; but if it has them themselves it does not see them as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it divided itself. But if this is so, the contemplation must be the same as the contemplated, and Intellect the same as the intelligible; for, if not the same, there will not be truth; for the one who is trying to possess realities will possess an impression different from the realities, and this is not truth. For truth ought not to be the truth of something else, but to be what it says. In this way, therefore, Intellect and the intelligible are one, and this is reality and the first reality, and also the first Intellect which possesses the real beings, or rather is the same as the real beings. But if the intellection and the intelligible are one, how because of this will that which thinks think itself? For the intellection will in a way encompass the intelligible, or be the same as the intelligible, and Intellect will not yet be clearly thinking itself. But if intellect and intelligible are the same—for the intelligible is something active and actual: for it is certainly not a potentiality (and not unintellectual either), nor is it without life, nor again are life and thought brought in from outside to something else, as if to a stone or something lifeless—then the intelligible is the primary substance. If then it is active actuality, and the first active actuality and the fairest, it is the first intellection and substantial intellection: for it is the truest; but an intellection of this kind which is primary and primarily intellective will be the first Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is

νόησις ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ δυνάμει. εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἓν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· ἓν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν. εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις αὐτοῦ τὸ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν αὐτός, αὐτὸς ἄρα ἑαυτὸν νοήσει· νοήσει γὰρ τῇ νοήσει, ὅπερ ἦν αὐτός, καὶ νοήσει τὸ νοητόν, ὅπερ ἦν αὐτός. καθ' ἑκάτερον ἄρα ἑαυτὸν νοήσει, καθότι καὶ ἡ νόησις αὐτὸς ἦν, καὶ καθότι τὸ νοητὸν αὐτός, ὅπερ ἐνόει τῇ νοήσει, ὃ ἦν αὐτός.

6. Ὁ μὲν δὴ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν εἶναί τι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κυρίως νοεῖν. νοεῖ οὖν ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ὄν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κυριώτερον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐνόει ἑαυτὴν ὅτι ἄλλου, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ οἷος αὐτὸς καὶ ὅστις καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως καὶ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς αὐτόν. τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁρῶν ἑαυτὸν ἑώρα καὶ ὁρῶν ἐνεργείᾳ ἦν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτός· νοῦς γὰρ καὶ νόησις ἕν· καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ, οὐ μέρει ἄλλο μέρος. ἆρ' οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἔδειξεν, οἷον καὶ ἐνέργειαν πιστικὴν ἔχειν; ἢ ἀνάγκην[1] μὲν οὕτως, πειθὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν νῷ, ἡ δὲ πειθὼ ἐν ψυχῇ. ζητούμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμεῖς πεισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῷ καθαρῷ θεᾶσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἕως ἡμεν ἄνω ἐν νοῦ φύσει, ἠρκούμεθα καὶ ἐνοοῦμεν

[1] A^{pc}, Kirchhoff *, cf. VI. 4. 4. 5: ἀνάγκη A^{ac}EBxUC, H-S^{1}.

it one and its intellection another: for in this way again its substantiality would be potential. If then it is actuality and its substance is actuality, it is one and the same with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are also one with the actuality. All together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelligible. If therefore Intellect's intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself think itself: for it will think with the intellection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which it is itself. In both ways, then, it will think itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is itself which it thinks in its intellection and which is itself.

6. The argument, then, has demonstrated that self-thinking in the proper and primary sense is something which exists. The thinking is different when it is in soul but is more properly thinking in Intellect. For the soul [we observed] thought itself as belonging to another, but Intellect did so as itself, and as what and who it is, and [it started its thinking] from its own nature and thought by turning back to itself. For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing it was in act, and its actuality was itself: for Intellect and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole with the whole of itself, not one part of itself with another. Has then our argument demonstrated something of a kind which has the power to inspire confidence? No, it has necessity, not persuasive force; for necessity is in Intellect but persuasion in the soul. It does seem that we seek to persuade ourselves rather than to behold truth by pure intellect. For while we were above in the nature of Intellect, we were satisfied and

καὶ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνάγοντες ἑωρῶμεν· νοῦς γὰρ ἦν ὁ νοῶν καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγων, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἡσυχίαν ἦγε συγχωροῦσα τῷ ἐνεργήματι τοῦ νοῦ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνταῦθα γεγενήμεθα πάλιν αὖ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, πειθώ τινα γενέσθαι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον ἐν εἰκόνι τὸ ἀρχέτυπον θεωρεῖν ἐθέλοντες. ἴσως οὖν χρὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν διδάξαι, πῶς ποτε ὁ νοῦς θεωρεῖ ἑαυτόν, διδάξαι δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, ὃ νοερόν πως, διανοητικὸν αὐτὸ τιθέμενοι καὶ τῇ ὀνομασίᾳ ὑποσημαίνοντες νοῦν τινα αὐτὸ εἶναι ἢ διὰ νοῦ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ παρὰ νοῦ αὐτὸ ἴσχειν. τούτῳ τοίνυν γιγνώσκειν προσήκει, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ ὅσα ὁρᾷ γινώσκει καὶ οἶδεν ἃ λέγει. καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ [1] εἴη ἃ λέγει, γινώσκοι ἂν ἑαυτὸ οὕτω. ὄντων δὲ ἢ ἄνωθεν αὐτῷ γινομένων ἐκεῖθεν, ὅθεν περ καὶ αὐτό, συμβαίνοι ἂν καὶ τούτῳ λόγῳ ὄντι καὶ συγγενῆ λαμβάνοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ἴχνεσιν ἐφαρμόττοντι [2] οὕτω τοι γινώσκειν ἑαυτό. μεταθέτω τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν τὴν εἰκόνα, ὃς ἦν ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς νοουμένοις ἀληθέσι καὶ ὄντως οὖσι καὶ πρώτοις, καὶ ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε τοῦτον τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι—ὥστε εἴπερ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστι καὶ σὺν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστί, νοῦς ἐστιν (ἀνόητος δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴη) ἀνάγκη συνεῖναι αὐτῷ τὴν γνῶσιν ἑαυτοῦ—καὶ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ οὗτος, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἢ τὸ νῷ μόνον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρακτικός γε οὗτος· ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντι τῷ πρακτικῷ καὶ μὴ ἐν αὐτῷ μένοντι εἴη ἂν τῶν μὲν ἔξω τις γνῶσις,

[1] R^{pc}, Kirchhoff *: αὐτὸς wBR^{ac}JUC.
[2] Kirchhoff*: -όττοντα Enn.

[really] thought and saw, gathering all things into one; for it was Intellect thinking and speaking about itself, and the soul kept quiet and went along with the working of Intellect. But since we have come to be here below again and in soul, we seek for some kind of persuasion, as if we wanted to contemplate the archetype in the image. Perhaps, then, we ought to teach our soul how Intellect contemplates itself, and to teach that part of the soul which is in some way intellectual, since we call it discursively intelligent and by this naming indicate that it is a kind of intellect or that it has its power through and from Intellect.[1] This therefore should know that in its own case too it comes to know what it sees and knows what it speaks. And if it was what it speaks, then it would in this way know itself. But since the things which it speaks are above, or come to it from above, whence it also comes itself, it could happen to it, since it is a rational principle and receives things akin to it, and fits them to the traces in itself, in this way to know itself. Let it then transpose the image to the true Intellect, the one [we observed] which was the same as the truths it thought which are really existent and primary, both because it was not possible for it, being of such a kind, to be outside itself—so that if it is in itself and with itself, and that which it is, is Intellect (there could not even be an unintelligent intellect), its knowledge of itself must necessarily accompany it—and because it is in itself and has no other function and no other substance than to be Intellect. For it is certainly not a practical intellect: as the practical intellect looks to the outside and does not stay in itself, it

[1] Cp. ch. 3, n. 1.

ἀνάγκη δὲ οὐκ ἔνεστιν, εἴπερ τὸ πᾶν πρακτικὸς εἴη, γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν. ᾧ δὲ μὴ πρᾶξις—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὄρεξις τῷ καθαρῷ νῷ ἀπόντος—τούτῳ ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὖσα οὐ μόνον εὔλογον ὑποδείκνυσιν, [τὴν ἑαυτοῦ][1] ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ⟨ἑαυτοῦ⟩[2] γνῶσιν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ εἴη πράξεως ἀπηλλαγμένῳ καὶ ἐν νῷ ὄντι;

7. Ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν θεωρεῖ, εἴποιμεν ἄν. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν θεὸν γινώσκειν αὐτόν τις ὁμολογήσει, καὶ ταύτῃ συγχωρεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅσα ἔχει παρ' ἐκείνου γνώσεται, καὶ ἃ ἔδωκε, καὶ ἃ δύναται ἐκεῖνος. ταῦτα δὲ μαθὼν καὶ γνοὺς καὶ ταύτῃ ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται· καὶ γὰρ ἕν τι τῶν δοθέντων αὐτός, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα τὰ δοθέντα αὐτός. εἰ μὲν οὖν κἀκεῖνο γνώσεται κατὰ[3] τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ μαθών, καὶ ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται ἐκεῖθεν γενόμενος καὶ ἃ δύναται κομισάμενος· εἰ δὲ ἀδυνατήσει ἰδεῖν σαφῶς ἐκεῖνον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἴσως αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ὁρώμενον, ταύτῃ μάλιστα λείποιτ' ἂν αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰδέναι, εἰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ὁρώμενον. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ δοίημεν αὐτῷ ἄλλο; ἡσυχίαν, νὴ Δία. ἀλλὰ νῷ ἡσυχία οὐ νοῦ ἐστιν ἔκστασις, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡσυχία τοῦ νοῦ σχολὴν

[1] del. Volkmann*.
[2] transposuimus.
[3] Stark: καὶ Enn.*: del. Theiler.

[1] The idea that God can only be known through his powers was widespread: cp. Cicero *De Divinatione* I 79; Philo *De Posteritate Caini* 167. It did not of course satisfy Plotinus, for whom direct vision of and union with God (the One or

could have a kind of knowledge of the things outside, but if it was altogether practical, there would be no necessity in it of knowing itself. But the Intellect which has no practical activity—pure Intellect does not even have a desire for what is absent from it—for this the return upon itself demonstrates that its knowledge of itself is not only probable but necessary. For [otherwise] what could its life be, being free from practical activity and in intellect?

7. "But it contemplates God", we might say. But if anyone is going to admit that it knows God, he will be compelled to agree that it also knows itself. For it will know all that it has from him, and what he gives, and what his power is. But when it has learnt and knows this, then in this way also it will know itself: for it is itself one of his gifts, or, rather, itself all of his gifts. If then it comes to know that [Good], learning by his powers, it will come to know itself since it comes from there and has received what it can[1]: but if it cannot see him clearly, since perhaps that seeing is the sight itself, then especially in this way it will remain for it to see and know itself, if this seeing is being the sight itself. For what else should we give it? Peace and quiet, of course. But peace and quiet for Intellect is not going out of Intellect, but the peace and quiet of Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all other

Good) was possible. The idea that knowledge of God and self-knowledge go together was also widespread and goes back to Plato [?] *Alcibiades* I 133C.

ἄγουσα ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνέργεια· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἷς ἐστιν ἡσυχία ἑτέρων, καταλείπεται ἡ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐνέργεια καὶ μάλιστα, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐ δυνάμει ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὸ εἶναι οὖν ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐδέν, πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια· πρὸς αὑτῷ ἄρα. ἑαυτὸν ἄρα νοῶν οὕτω πρὸς αὑτῷ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἴσχει. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἔδει γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν[1] ἑαυτῷ, εἶτα καὶ εἰς ἄλλο, ἢ ἄλλο τι ἥκειν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὁμοιούμενον αὐτῷ, οἷον καὶ πυρὶ ἐν αὑτῷ πρότερον ὄντι πυρὶ καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντι πυρὸς οὕτω τοι καὶ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ δυνηθῆναι ποιῆσαι ἐν ἄλλῳ. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐν αὑτῷ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τὸ μὲν ὅσον πρὸς νοῦν αὐτῆς οἷον εἴσω, τὸ δ' ἔξω νοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω. κατὰ θάτερα μὲν γὰρ ὡμοίωται ὅθεν ἥκει, κατὰ θάτερα δὲ καίτοι ἀνομοιωθεῖσα ὅμως ὡμοίωται καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἴτε πράττοι, εἴτε ποιοῖ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πράττουσα ὅμως θεωρεῖ καὶ ποιοῦσα εἴδη ποιεῖ, οἷον νοήσεις ἀπηρτισμένας, ὥστε πάντα εἶναι ἴχνη νοήσεως καὶ νοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον προϊόντων καὶ μιμουμένων τῶν μὲν ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον, τῶν δὲ ἐσχάτων ἀμυδρὰν ἀποσῳζόντων εἰκόνα.

8. Ποῖον δέ τι ὁρᾷ τὸ νοητὸν ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ποῖόν τι[2] ἑαυτόν; ἢ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν οὐδὲ[3] δεῖ ζητεῖν, οἷον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι χρῶμα ἢ σχῆμα· πρὶν

[1] J, Kirchhoff*: om. wBRUC, H-S [1].

[2] B-T: *ποιὸν δέ τι . . . ποιόν τι* Enn.*: *ποιὸν δὲ τί . . . ποιὸν τί* H-S [1].

[3] Perna*: *οὔτε* Enn., H-S [1].

[1] For the doctrine that all action is simultaneously contemplation, and the extension of contemplation down to the last and lowest activities of soul, see the first seven chapters of the treatise *On Contemplation* (III. 8).

activities, since for other beings also, which are left in peace and quiet by other things, there remains their own proper activity, above all for those whose being is not potential but actual. The Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is directed; so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself. For if anything comes from it, it is in itself and directed to itself. For it had to be first in itself, then also directed to something else, or with something else coming from it made like itself, just as it is since fire is previously fire in itself and has the activity of fire that it is able to produce a trace of itself in another. Again, Intellect is an activity contained in itself, and, as for soul, the part of it directed to Intellect is, so to speak, within, and the part outside Intellect directed to the outside. In one part, then, it is made like that from which it comes, in the other even in its unlikeness it is made like, even here below in its action and production; for its action is simultaneously contemplation, and in its production it produces forms, which are like intellections carried out in practice, so that all things are traces of intellection and Intellect proceeding according to their archetype, the ones near it representing it closely, and the last and lowest keeping a faint image of it.[1]

8. But as what sort of thing does Intellect see the intelligible, and as what sort of thing does it see itself? As for the intelligible, one should not look for something like colour or form in bodies; for

γὰρ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα· καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι τοῖς ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὐ ταῦτα· ἀόρατα γὰρ τῇ φύσει καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνα. καὶ ἔστι φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων, οἷον ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ ἡ ἔχουσα ψυχὴ ταῦτα. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οὐχ ὁρᾷ ἃ ἔχει· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐγέννησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ αὕτη εἴδωλον καὶ οἱ λόγοι· ὅθεν δὲ ἦλθε, τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τὸ πρώτως, ὅθεν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστι καὶ αὐτῷ· τοῦτο δ' ἐὰν μὴ ἄλλου γένηται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐδὲ μένει· εἰκόνι γὰρ προσήκει ἑτέρου οὖσαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ γίγνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη ἐκείνου ἐξηρτημένη· διὸ οὐδὲ βλέπει, ἅτε δὴ φῶς ἱκανὸν οὐκ ἔχον, κἂν βλέπῃ δέ, τελειωθὲν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο καὶ οὐχ αὐτὸ βλέπει. ἀλλ' οὖν τούτων ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὅρασις καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν αὐτῇ ὁμοῦ καὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ὁρατὸν οἷον ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις οἷον τὸ ὁρατόν. τίς οὖν αὐτὸ ἐρεῖ οἷόν ἐστιν; ὁ ἰδών· νοῦς δὲ ὁρᾷ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ὄψις φῶς οὖσα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἑνωθεῖσα φωτί, φῶς ὁρᾷ· χρώματα γὰρ ὁρᾷ· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ δι' ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῆς, ὅτι μηδὲ ἔξω. ἄλλῳ οὖν φωτὶ ἄλλο φῶς ὁρᾷ, οὐ δι' ἄλλου. φῶς ἄρα φῶς ἄλλο ὁρᾷ· αὐτὸ ἄρα αὐτὸ ὁρᾷ. τὸ δὲ φῶς τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ μὲν ἐλλάμψαν ἐφώτισε· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ νοερὰν ἐποίησε· τοῦτο δ'

[1] From Plato *Timaeus* 52C2–4.

the intelligibles exist before the existence of these; and the rational forming principle in the seeds which produce these are not form and colour; for both these and still more the intelligibles are naturally invisible. And they and those which possess them have the same nature, as do also the rational principle in the seed and the soul which possesses these [invisible principles of colour and form]. But the soul does not see what it possesses; for it did not even generate them, but this soul as well as the rational forming principles is an image; but that from which it came is the clear and the true and the primary, and so belongs to itself and exists for itself; but this [image], if it does not belong to something else and exist in something else, does not persist; for " it is proper to an image, since it belongs to something else, to come to exist in something else ",[1] unless it is in close dependence on that original. It does not even see, therefore, because it does not have enough light, but if it does see, it does not see itself but another thing perfected in something else. But there is none of this in the intelligible world, but there seeing and the seen coincide, and the seen is like the seeing and the seeing like the seen. Who then will tell what it is like? The seer: and Intellect is the seer. For here below also sight, since it is light, or rather united with light, sees light: for it sees colours; but in the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but through itself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect therefore sees one light with another, not through another. Light then sees another light: it therefore itself sees itself. And this light shining in the soul illuminates it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that

ἐστὶν ὡμοίωσεν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἄνω φωτί. οἷον οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἴχνος τὸ ἐγγενόμενον τοῦ φωτὸς ἐν ψυχῇ, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἔτι κάλλιον καὶ μεῖζον αὐτὸ νομίζων καὶ ἐναργέστερον ἐγγὺς ἂν γένοιο φύσεως νοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐπιλαμφθὲν τοῦτο ζωὴν ἔδωκε τῇ ψυχῇ ἐναργεστέραν, ζωὴν δὲ οὐ γεννητικήν· τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἐπέστρεψε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ σκίδνασθαι οὐκ εἴασεν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾶν ἐποίησε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγλαΐαν· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητικήν, αὕτη γὰρ ἔξω βλέπει καὶ [οὐ μᾶλλον] [1] αἰσθάνεται· ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀληθῶν λαβὼν οἷον βλέπει ⟨οὐ⟩ [2] μᾶλλον τὰ ὁρατά, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον. λείπεται τοίνυν ζωὴν νοερὰν προσειληφέναι, ἴχνος νοῦ ζωῆς· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὰ ἀληθῆ. ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ πρῶτον φῶς ἑαυτῷ λάμπον πρώτως καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ λαμπηδών, λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ λαμπόμενον, τὸ ἀληθῶς νοητόν, καὶ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὁρώμενον καὶ οὐ δεόμενον ἄλλου, ἵνα ἴδῃ, αὐτῷ αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ ἰδεῖν—καὶ γὰρ ὃ ὁρᾷ αὐτό ἐστι—γιγνωσκόμενον καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ὡς καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι· ἢ πόθεν ἂν ἔσχομεν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ; τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οἷον σαφέστερον μὲν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ, ἡμᾶς δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ· διὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λογισμῶν ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸ εἰκόνα θεμένην ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ἐκείνου, ὡς τὴν αὐτῆς [3] ζωὴν ἴνδαλμα καὶ ὁμοίωμα εἶναι ἐκείνου, καὶ ὅταν νοῇ, θεοειδῆ

[1] del. Igal.
[2] Kirchhoff.
[3] R[2mg], Kirchhoff* (*suam* Ficinus): αὐτὴν wBxU.

is, it makes it like itself, the light above. For if you consider that it is like the trace of light that comes to be in the soul and still more beautiful and greater and clearer, you will come near to the nature of Intellect and the intelligible. And again, this illumination gives the soul a clearer life, but a life which is not generative; on the contrary it turns the soul back upon itself and does not allow it to disperse, but makes it satisfied with the glory in itself; and it is certainly not a life of sense-perception either; for sense-perception looks outside and perceives the external world; but he who has received that light of the true realities sees, so to speak, the visible things no better, but their opposite. The remaining possibility, then, is for the soul to have received an intelligent life, a trace of the life of Intellect: for the true realities are there. But the life and activity [1] of Intellect is the first light shining primarily for itself and an outshining upon itself, at once illuminating and illuminated, the truly intelligible, both thinker and thought, seen by itself and needing no other that it may see, supplying itself with the power of seeing—for it is itself what it sees—known to us by that very power, so that the knowledge of it comes to us through itself; otherwise from where should we have the ability to speak about it? It is such a kind that it apprehends itself more clearly, but we apprehend it by means of it; by reasonings of this kind our soul also is led back up to it, considering itself to be an image of Intellect, as its life is a reflection and likeness of

[1] Again a reminiscence of Aristotle's description of divine Intellect: cp. *Metaphysics* Λ 7. 1072b27.

καὶ νοοειδῆ γίγνεσθαι· καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτὴν [1] ἀπαιτῇ ὁποῖον ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ τέλεος καὶ πᾶς, ὃ γινώσκων πρώτως ἑαυτόν, ἐν τῷ νῷ αὐτὴν πρῶτον γενομένην ἢ παραχωρήσασαν τῷ νῷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ὧν ἔσχε τὴν μνήμην ἐπ' αὐτῇ, ταῦτα δὴ [2] ἔχουσαν [3] δεικνύναι ἑαυτήν, ὡς δι' αὐτῆς εἰκόνος οὔσης ὁρᾶν δύνασθαι ἀμῃγέπῃ ἐκεῖνον, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνῳ πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβέστερον ὡμοιωμένης, ὅσον ψυχῆς μέρος εἰς ὁμοιότητα νῷ δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

9. Ψυχὴν οὖν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ ψυχῆς θειότατον κατιδεῖν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νοῦν εἴσεσθαι ὅ τι ἐστί. γένοιτο δ' ἂν τοῦτο ἴσως καὶ ταύτῃ, εἰ ἀφέλοις πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ δηλονότι σαυτοῦ, εἶτα καὶ τὴν πλάττουσαν τοῦτο ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν δὲ εὖ μάλα, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας φλυαρίας, ὡς πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν νευούσας καὶ πάνυ. τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν αὐτῆς τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ εἰκόνα ἔφαμεν νοῦ σῴζουσάν τι φῶς ἐκείνου, οἷον ἡλίου μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μεγέθους σφαῖραν τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς λάμπον. ἡλίου μὲν οὖν τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν ἥλιον εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ ὡρμημένον καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν μεῖναν, ἄλλο δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου ἀεὶ προϊὸν τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆν ἥκῃ· ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἥλιον θήσεται ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἵνα μὴ διάστημα διδῷ κενὸν τὸ μετὰ τὸν ἥλιον σώματος. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ νοῦ φῶς τι περὶ

[1] Kirchhoff*: αὐτὸν Enn., H-S [1].
[2] Kirchhoff*: δὲ Enn., H-S [1].
[3] Kirchhoff*: ἔχουσα Enn.

it, and when it thinks it becomes godlike and intellect-like; and if one asks it what sort of thing is that perfect universal Intellect which has primary knowledge of itself, it first comes to be in Intellect or makes room for Intellect to exercise its activity, and shows itself really in possession of the things of which it has the memory in itself, so that through soul which is its image one can in some way see Intellect, through the soul which is brought more precisely to its likeness, as far as a part of soul can come to likeness with Intellect.

9. It is probable, then, that he who intends to know what Intellect really is must know soul, and the most divine part of soul. This could happen also in this way, if you first of all separated the body from man (and, obviously, from yourself), and then the soul which forms it and, very thoroughly, sense-perception and desires and passions and all the rest of such fooleries,[1] since they incline so very much towards the mortal. What remains of soul is this which we said was an image of Intellect preserving something of its light, like the light of the sun which, beyond its spherical mass, shines around it and from it. Now one would not concede that the light of the sun exists by itself which is around the sun itself, springing from it and remaining around it, though one light comes from another, always going forth from that before it until it reaches us on the earth; but one will place all of it, including that which is around the sun itself, in something else, so as not to assume that there is a space, that under the sun, which is empty of body. But the soul has arisen from In-

[1] Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 66C3.

αὐτὸν γενομένη ἐξήρτηταί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνον, οὔτε τόπος αὐτῇ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἐν ἀέρι, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη καθαρά, ὥστε καὶ ἐφ' αὑτῆς ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπό τε αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλης τοιαύτης. καὶ αὐτῇ μὲν περὶ νοῦ συλλογιστέα οἷος ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς σκοπουμένῃ, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐ συλλογιζόμενος περὶ αὑτοῦ· πάρεστι γὰρ ἀεὶ αὐτῷ, ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅταν εἰς αὐτόν· μεμέρισται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἡ ζωὴ καὶ πολλαὶ ζωαί, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖται ἄλλης ζωῆς ἢ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἃς παρέχει ἄλλοις παρέχει, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖται τῶν χειρόνων, οὐδὲ αὑτῷ παρέχει τὸ ἔλαττον ἔχων τὸ πᾶν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἴχνη ἔχων τὰ πρῶτα, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα. εἰ δέ τις ἀδυνατεῖ [τὴν πρώτην][1] τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ἔχειν καθαρῶς νοοῦσαν, δοξαστικὴν λαβέτω, εἶτα ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀναβαινέτω. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο, αἴσθησιν ἐμπλατύτερα τὰ εἴδη κομιζομένην, αἴσθησιν δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μεθ' ὧν δύναται καὶ ἤδη ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν. εἰ δὲ βούλεταί τις, καταβαίνων καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γεννῶσαν ἴτω μέχρι καὶ ὧν ποιεῖ· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν ἀναβαινέτω ἀπὸ ἐσχάτων εἰδῶν εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα ἀνάπαλιν εἴδη, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς τὰ πρῶτα.

10. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ. εἰ δὲ[2] τὰ ποιηθέντα μόνον, οὐκ[3] ἂν ἦν ἔσχατα. ἐκεῖ δὲ πρῶτα τὰ ποιοῦντα, ὅθεν καὶ πρῶτα. δεῖ οὖν ἅμα καὶ τὸ

[1] del. Dodds (*Gnomon* 33, 1961, 708), ut glossam ad *τὴν τοιαύτην*.
[2] *εἰ δὲ* Enn.: *οὐδὲ* H-S [1] falso.
[3] Müller: *οὐ γὰρ* Enn.

tellect as a light around it and is immediately dependent on it and not in something else but around it, and has no place, for neither has Intellect. So the light of the sun is in the air, but the soul itself which is of this kind is pure, so that it itself and any other soul of the same kind can see it by itself. And soul must draw conclusions about what Intellect is like, starting its investigation from itself, but Intellect knows itself without drawing conclusions about itself; for it is always present to itself, but we are only so when we attain to it; for our life is divided and we have many lives, but Intellect has no need of another life or other lives, but the lives which it gives, it gives to others, not to itself: for it has no need of the worse, nor does it give itself the less when it has the all, nor the traces of reality when it has the primary realities, or rather does not have them, but is them itself. But if someone is unable to grasp this kind of soul which thinks purely, let him take the soul which forms opinions, and then ascend from this. But if he cannot even do this, let him take sense-perception which acquires the forms in broader extension and sense-perception by itself with its powers which is already in the forms. But if someone wants to, let him descend to the generative soul and go right on to what it makes, and then ascend from there, from the ultimate forms to the forms which are ultimate in the opposite sense, or, rather, to the primary forms.

10. So much for this. But if there were only the things which are made, there would be no ultimate realities. But in the intelligible world the principles which make are primary; it is because they make that they are primary. The primary principle, then,

ποιοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἄμφω· εἰ δὲ μή, δεήσει πάλιν ἄλλου. τί οὖν; οὐ δεήσει πάλιν ⟨τοῦ⟩ [1] ἐπέκεινα τούτου; ἢ ὁ μὲν νοῦς τοῦτο; τί οὖν; οὐχ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτόν; ἢ οὗτος οὐδὲν δεῖται ὁράσεως.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἰς ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ πάλιν λέγωμεν— οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ἡ σκέψις— λεκτέον δὲ πάλιν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν δεηθῆναι τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἑαυτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχειν τὸ ὁρᾶν ἑαυτόν, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ πολὺν εἶναι, εἶτα καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁρατικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὁρατικὸν ἐκείνου, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ ὅρασιν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὄντος τινὸς ἄλλου ὅρασιν δεῖ εἶναι, μὴ δὲ ὄντος μάτην ἐστί. δεῖ τοίνυν πλείω ἑνὸς εἶναι, ἵνα ὅρασις ᾖ, καὶ συνεκπίπτειν τὴν ὅρασιν τῷ ὁρατῷ, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πλῆθος εἶναι ἐν παντί. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἓν πάντη εἰς τί ἐνεργήσει, ἀλλὰ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον ὂν πάντη στήσεται· ᾗ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἴη ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, τί καὶ ποιήσει; ἢ ποῦ προβήσεται; διὸ δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν ἢ περὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸ πολύ τι εἶναι, εἰ μέλλοι ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὑτῷ. εἰ δὲ μή τι προελεύσεται ἐπ' ἄλλο, στήσεται· ὅταν δὲ πᾶσαν στάσιν, οὐ νοήσει. δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ νοοῦν, ὅταν νοῇ, ἐν

[1] Müller: ⟨ἄλλου⟩ Volkmann, H-S [1].

[1] Cp. Plato *Republic* I 352D5–6.

[2] An inappropriate reminiscence of Plato *Philebus* 63B7–8, where Plato seems to be saying that the " class " of pleasures should not be kept alone and isolated from the " class " of

and the making principle must coincide, and both must be one: if not, there will be need of yet another. What then? Is there not a need of that which is beyond Intellect? Or is Intellect this? What then? Does it not see itself? This one has no need of seeing.

But this we will deal with later. Now let us say again—for our investigation is not about some casual matter [1]—we ought to repeat that this Intellect needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of itself, first because it is multiple, and then because it belongs to another, and must necessarily be a seer, and a seer of that other, and its seeing is its substance; for the existence of something else is a necessary condition of seeing, and if there is nothing else seeing is useless. There must, then, be more than one, that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must be an universal multiplicity. For what is absolutely one has nothing to which to direct its activity but since it is " alone isolated "[2] will remain absolutely immobile. For in so far as it is active, there is one thing after another: but if there is not one thing and then another, what will it make, or where will it proceed? Therefore that which is active must either be acting on something else, or must itself be a multiple thing, if it is to be active within itself. But if a thing is not going to go forth to something else, it will be immobile; but when it is altogether immobile, it will not think. The thinking principle, then, when it thinks, must be in two parts, and either

kinds of knowledge. Plotinus does not always remember or advert to the context of the Platonic phrases which come into his mind.

δυσὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἔξω θάτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄμφω,
καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ἑτερότητι τὴν νόησιν εἶναι καὶ ἐν
ταὐτότητι δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καὶ εἶναι τὰ κυρίως
νοούμενα πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕτερα.
καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἕκαστον τῶν νοουμένων συνεκφέρει
τὴν ταὐτότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἑτερότητα· ἢ τί
νοήσει, ὃ μὴ ἔχει ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο; καὶ γὰρ εἰ
ἕκαστον λόγος, πολλά ἐστι. καταμανθάνει τοίνυν
ἑαυτὸ τῷ ποικίλον ὀφθαλμὸν εἶναι ἢ ποικίλων
χρωμάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ ἀμερεῖ προσβάλλοι,
ἠλογήθη· τί γὰρ ἂν ἔχοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν, ἢ τί
συνεῖναι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ ἀμερὲς πάντη εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν
δέοι, δεῖ πρότερον λέγειν ἃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὥστε καὶ
οὕτως πολλὰ ἂν εἶναι, ἵνα ἓν εἴη. εἶθ' ὅταν λέγῃ
"εἰμὶ τόδε", τὸ "τόδε" εἰ μὲν ἕτερόν τι αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ,
ψεύσεται· εἰ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, πολλὰ ἐρεῖ ἢ
τοῦτο ἐρεῖ "εἰμὶ εἰμὶ" καὶ "ἐγὼ ἐγώ." τί οὖν, εἰ δύο
μόνα εἴη καὶ λέγοι "ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο"; ἢ ἀνάγκη
πόλλ' ἤδη εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ὅπῃ ἕτερα
καὶ ἀριθμὸς ἤδη καὶ πολλὰ ἄλλα. δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ
νοοῦν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον
κατανοούμενον ὂν ποικίλον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἔσται νόησις
αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ θίξις καὶ οἷον ἐπαφὴ μόνον ἄρρητος
καὶ ἀνόητος· προνοοῦσα οὔπω νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ
τοῦ θιγγάνοντος οὐ νοοῦντος. δεῖ δὲ τὸ νοοῦν

[1] Again the "Platonic Categories"; cp. Plato *Sophist* 254D-E.

one must be external to the other or both must be in the same, and the thinking must be in otherness, and necessarily also in sameness; and the proper objects of thought must be the same and other in relation to the intellect. And, yet again, each of the things which are being thought brings out along with itself sameness and otherness[1]: or what will the thinker think which does not contain one and then another? For certainly if each one is a rational principle, it is many. So it comes to know itself by being an eye which sees a variety of images or by being an object of varied colours. For if it directed its gaze to a single object without parts, it would be without thought or word: for what would it have to say about it, or to understand? For if the absolutely partless had to speak itself, it must, first of all, say what it is not; so that in this way too it would be many in order to be one. Then when it says "I am this", if it means something other than itself by "this", it will be telling a lie; but if it is speaking of some incidental property of itself, it will be saying that it is many or saying "am am" or "I I". Well then, suppose it was only two things and said "I and this". It would already be necessary for it to be many: for, as the two things are diverse and in the manner of their diversity, number is present and many other things. Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing different from another and the object of thought in being thought must contain variety; or there will not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a sort of contact without speech or thought, prethinking because Intellect has not yet come into being and that which touches does not think. But

μηδὲ αὐτὸ μένειν ἁπλοῦν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸ νοῇ· διχάσει γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, κἂν σύνεσιν δῷ τὴν σιωπῶσαν.[1] εἶτα οὐδὲ δεήσεται οἷον πολυπραγμονεῖν ἑαυτό· τί γὰρ καὶ μαθήσεται νοῆσαν; πρὶν γὰρ νοῦν νοῆσαι ὑπάρξει[2] ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑαυτῷ. καὶ γὰρ αὖ πόθος τις καὶ ἡ γνῶσίς ἐστι καὶ οἷον ζητήσαντος εὕρεσις. τὸ τοίνυν διάφορον πάντη αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ μένει, καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ δ' ἐξελίττει ἑαυτό, καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη.

11. Διὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ πολύς, ὅταν τὸ ἐπέκεινα ἐθέλῃ νοεῖν, ἓν[3] μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἐπιβάλλειν θέλων ὡς ἁπλῷ ἕξεισιν ἄλλο ἀεὶ λαμβάνων ἐν αὑτῷ πληθυνόμενον· ὥστε ὥρμησε μὲν ἐπ' αὐτὸ οὐχ ὡς νοῦς, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄψις οὔπω ἰδοῦσα, ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἔχουσα ὅπερ αὐτὴ ἐπλήθυνεν· ὥστε ἄλλου μὲν ἐπεθύμησεν ἀορίστως ἔχουσα ἐπ' αὐτῇ φάντασμά τι, ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἄλλο λαβοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ αὐτὸ πολὺ ποιήσασα. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἔχει τύπον τοῦ ὁράματος· ἢ οὐ παρεδέξατο ἐν αὐτῇ γενέσθαι. οὗτος δὲ πολὺς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγένετο, καὶ οὕτως[4] γνοὺς εἶδεν αὐτό, καὶ τότε ἐγένετο ἰδοῦσα ὄψις. τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη νοῦς, ὅτε ἔχει, καὶ ὡς νοῦς ἔχει· πρὸ δὲ τούτου ἔφεσις μόνον καὶ

[1] Page: σιωπήν Enn.

[2] Schwyzer: πρὸ γὰῦ τοῦ νοῆσαι ὑπάρξει H–S²: πρὸ γὰρ νοῦ νοῆσαι ὑπάρχει Enn.

[3] Dodds (loc. cit.): εἰ Enn.: νοεῖ Kirchhoff*: εἰς suspic. Cilento: οὐ Theiler.

[4] Kirchhoff *: οὗτος ὡς Enn., H-S ¹.

[1] H–R Schwyzer now wishes to read in line 2, instead of ἐπιβάλλειν, the better attested MS reading ἐπιθάλλειν: "to flower upon the One in its simplicity" instead of "to attain to the One in its simplicity". His reasons seem to me strong

the thinker must not itself remain simple, especially in so far as it thinks itself: for it will duplicate itself, even if it gives an understanding which is silent. Then [the One] will not need to make a kind of fuss about itself: for what will it learn by thinking itself? For what it is will belong to itself before Intellect thinks. Also, knowledge is a kind of longing for the absent, and like the discovery made by a seeker. But that which is absolutely different remains itself by itself, and seeks nothing about itself; but that which explicates itself must be many.

11. Therefore this multiple Intellect, when it wishes to think that which is beyond, [thinks] that itself which is one, but in wishing to attain to it in its simplicity[1] comes out continually apprehending something else made many in itself; so that it moved to it not as Intellect but as sight not yet seeing, but came out possessing the multiplicity which that sight itself made; so that it desired one thing, having vaguely in itself a kind of image of it, but came out having grasped something else which it made many in itself. The sight, again, certainly has the impression of what is seen: otherwise it would not have allowed it to come into existence in itself. But this impression became many out of one, and so Intellect knew it and saw it, and then it became a seeing sight. It is already Intellect when it possesses this, and it possesses it as Intellect; but before this

but not certainly convincing, and the change might have considerable implications for our understanding of Plotinus's thought about the relationship of the One and Intellect. But it certainly deserves serious consideration.

ἀτύπωτος ὄψις. οὗτος οὖν ὁ νοῦς ἐπέβαλε μὲν ἐκείνῳ, λαβὼν δὲ ἐγένετο νοῦς, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐνδεόμενος [1] καὶ γενόμενος καὶ νοῦς καὶ οὐσία καὶ νόησις, ὅτε ἐνόησε· πρὸ γὰρ τούτου οὐ νόησις ἦν τὸ νοητὸν οὐκ ἔχων οὐδὲ νοῦς οὔπω νοήσας. τὸ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡ ἀρχὴ τούτων, οὐχ ὡς ἐννυπάρχουσα. τὸ γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ οὐκ ἐννυπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ ἕκαστον, οὐχ ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἁπάντων. οὐ τοίνυν ἕν τι τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ πάντων, ὥστε καὶ πρὸ νοῦ· καὶ γὰρ αὖ νοῦ ἐντὸς τὰ πάντα· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ νοῦ· καὶ εἰ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ τὴν τάξιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν πάντων, καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ πάντων. οὐ δὴ δεῖ, πρὸ ὧν ἐστι, τούτων ἕν τι εἶναι, οὐδὲ νοῦν αὐτὸν προσερεῖς· οὐδὲ τἀγαθὸν οὖν· εἰ σημαίνει ἕν τι τῶν πάντων τἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ πάντων, ἔστω οὕτως ὠνομασμένον. εἰ οὖν νοῦς, ὅτι πολύς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτὸ οἷον παρεμπεσόν, κἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ᾖ, πληθύει, δεῖ τὸ πάντη ἁπλοῦν καὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων ἐπέκεινα νοῦ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ νοήσει, οὐκ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἔσται· ἀλλὰ εἰ νοῦς ἔσται, καὶ αὐτὸ [τὸ] [2] πλῆθος ἔσται.

[1] Igal: ἐνδιάμενος BR^{ac}(prob., sed ιάμενος eras.)JUC: ἐνδιαθέμενος w, Perna*.
[2] del. Kirchhoff*.

[1] Of the many conjectures which have been made to replace the corrupt MSS reading ἐνδιάμενος (see H–S critical note) Igal's ἐνδεόμενος seems to me the best, and I adopt it in the text. Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the One and

it is only desire and unformed sight. So this Intellect had an immediate apprehension of the One, but by grasping it became Intellect, perpetually in need [of the One] and having become at once Intellect and substance and intellection when it thought [1]; for before this it was not intellection since it did not possess the intelligible object, nor Intellect since it had not yet thought. But that which is before these is their principle, not as immanent in them; for it is not that from which something comes which is immanent, but the parts of which it is constituted; but that from which each individual thing comes is not an individual thing, but other than all of them. It is not, then, one of all things but before all things, so that it is before Intellect; again, all things are certainly in Intellect; so in this way too it is before Intellect; and if what comes after it has the position of being all things, in this way too it is before all things. It must not be one of the things before which it is, and you are not to call it Intellect; not even the Good, then: no, not even this if " the Good " means one of all things; but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand. If, then, Intellect is Intellect because it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if it derives from Intellect, is a kind of internal occurrence which makes it many, that which is absolutely simple and first of all things must be beyond Intellect. And certainly if it is going to think, it will not be beyond Intellect, but will be Intellect; but if it is Intellect, it itself will be multiplicity.

therefore is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires the One: cp. III. 8. 11. 23–4 καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων.

12. Καὶ τί κωλύει οὕτω πλῆθος εἶναι, ἕως ἐστὶν οὐσία μία; τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος οὐ συνθέσεις, ἀλλ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ μὴ οὐσίαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔρχεται, οὐ πλῆθος μέν, ἀτελὲς δὲ πρὶν ἐνεργῆσαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος, τοσαύτη ἔσται ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ὅσον τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὲν νῷ συγχωροῦμεν, ᾧ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ ἀπεδίδομεν, τῇ δὲ ἀρχῇ πάντων οὐκέτι. δεῖται[1] δὲ πρὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ παντὸς τὸ ἓν πρῶτον. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὕτως φασί· σύνθεσις γὰρ τὰ ἑξῆς· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄντων τίς ἀνάγκη ἤδη καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἕν τι εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ πολλά; ἢ διεσπασμένα ἔσται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ πολλά, ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν ἐπὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν κατὰ τύχην ἰόν. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦ νοῦ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος φήσουσι τὰς ἐνεργείας προελθεῖν· ἤδη μέν τι ἁπλοῦν τὸ πρὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τίθενται. εἶτα τὰς ἐνεργείας μενούσας ἀεὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεις ἀεὶ θήσονται·[2] ὑποστάσεις δὲ οὖσαι ἕτεραι ἐκείνου, ἀφ' οὗ εἰσιν, ἔσονται, μένοντος μὲν ἐκείνου ἁπλοῦ, τοῦ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐφ'[3] ἑαυτοῦ πλήθους ὄντος καὶ

[1] Enn., defendit Theiler: δεῖ Kirchhoff*, H-S [1].
[2] ἀεὶ θήσονται coniecimus: αἰσθήσονται Enn.
[3] Kirchhoff*, Cilento, B-T: ἀφ' Enn., H-S [1].

12. But what prevents it from being a multiplicity in this sense, as long as it is one substance? For the multiplicity [of Intellect] is not a plurality of compositions, but its activities are the multiplicity. But if its activities are not substances, but it passes from potency to active actuality, it is not a multiplicity, but imperfect before it becomes actual and active in its substance. But if its substance is activity, and its activity is its multiplicity, then its substance is just as large as the multiplicity. But we allow this to Intellect, to which we attributed self-thinking, but not any more to the principle of all things. But there is a need for the One from which the many derives to exist before the many: for in every number-series the one comes first. But in the case of a number-series people do say this; for the successive numbers are [the result of] composition; but in the series of realities, what necessity is there now for there to be some one here too from which the many derive? [If there is not] the many will be separated from each other and will each come by chance from a different direction to their composition. But they will say that the activities proceed from the one Intellect which is simple[1]: so already they assume that what comes before the energies is something simple. Then of course they will always assume that the activities abide for ever and are substantial realities; but, being substantial realities, they will be other than that from which they come, since that remains simple, but what comes from it is in itself multiplicity and depends on

[1] "They" are the Peripatetics, who asserted the simplicity of the Divine Intellect: cp. Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* 109, 37–110, 3 Bruns.

ἐξηρτημένου ἀπ' ἐκείνου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου ποθὲν ἐνεργήσαντος αὗται ὑπέστησαν, κἀκεῖ πλῆθος ἔσται· εἰ δ' αὐταί εἰσιν αἱ πρῶται ἐνέργειαι, τὸ δεύτερον ποιήσασαι, εἰάσασαι[1] δὲ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μένειν, τῷ δευτέρῳ τῷ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν συστάντι τὰς ἐνεργείας ἂν παραχωρήσ⟨ει⟩αν·[2] ἄλλο γὰρ αὐτό, ἄλλο αἱ ἐνέργειαι αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὁ νοῦς· οὐ γὰρ οἷον προυθυμήθη νοῦν γενέσθαι, εἶτα ἐγένετο νοῦς τῆς προθυμίας μεταξὺ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ γεννηθέντος νοῦ γενομένης· οὐδ' αὖ ὅλως προυθυμήθη, οὕτω τε γὰρ ἦν ἀτελὴς καὶ ἡ προθυμία οὐκ εἶχεν ὅ τι προθυμηθῇ· οὐδ' αὖ τὸ μὲν εἶχε τοῦ πράγματος, τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶχεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τι, πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἔκτασις. ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι, εἴ τι ὑπέστη μετ' αὐτόν, μένοντος ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἤθει ὑπέστη. δεῖ οὖν, ἵνα τι ἄλλο ὑποστῇ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνο· εἰ δὲ μή, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ κινηθῆναι κινήσεται, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοῆσαι νοήσει, ⟨ἢ⟩[3] ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἀτελὴς ἔσται ὁρμὴ μόνον οὖσα. ἐπὶ τί οὖν ὡς ἀτυχοῦσά[4] του ἐφορμᾷ; εἰ κατὰ λόγον

[1] Igal: ποιήσασα Enn.
[2] Igal: ἂς παραχωρῆσαν Enn.
[3] R^{2s} (*vel* Ficinus), Creuzer, Kirchhoff*.
[4] Theiler: ὧδε τυχοῦσα Enn.*

[1] The text of this sentence is corrupt. I adopt provisionally Igal's conjectures in lines 23 and 25. See critical note.

[2] The reference is to *Timaeus* 42E5–6, where the Demiurge ends his own activity and leaves detailed work on the human body to the younger gods. It is interesting that Plotinus applies it to the One, who exercises no activity at all, though he is the source of all subsequent creativity.

that [simple principle]. For if these activities come into existence because the principle started to be active from some point, then there will be multiplicity there in the principle; but if they themselves are the first activities, then, making the second reality, and allowing that which is before these activities and exists by itself to remain [inactive], they would cede the activities to the second reality which has come together out of the activities[1]: for it itself is one thing, and the activities proceeding from it another, since they do not proceed from its activity. If this is not so, Intellect will not be the primary activity; for the One did not in some sort of way want Intellect to come into being, with the result that Intellect came into being with the wanting as an intermediary between the One and the generated Intellect; for if this was so, the One would be incomplete, and also the wanting would have nothing to want; and again, it could not have one part of the thing [which it wanted] and not have another; for there was not anything at all to which the impulse could be directed. But it is clear that, if anything came into existence after him, it came into existence " while he remained in his own proper state ".[2] Therefore, in order that anything else may exist, it is necessary that the One should keep absolutely quiet by itself: otherwise, it will move before there is movement, and think before there is thinking, or its first activity will be incomplete, since it will be only an [objectless] drive. For at what is it to aim, as if it was missing something? If we are to make

θησόμεθα, τὴν μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οἷον ῥυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν
ὡς ἀπὸ ἡλίου φῶς νοῦν [1] θησόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν
νοητὴν φύσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ νοητῷ
ἑστηκότα βασιλεύειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξώσαντα ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκφανές—ἢ ἄλλο φῶς πρὸ φωτὸς
ποιήσομεν—ἐπιλάμπειν δὲ ἀεὶ μένοντα ἐπὶ τοῦ
νοητοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτέτμηται τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδ'
αὖ ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ τοιοῦτον οἷον μὴ οὐσία εἶναι
οὐδ' αὖ οἷον τυφλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁρῶν καὶ γινῶσκον
ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρῶτον γινῶσκον. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ
ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, οὕτως καὶ ἐπέκεινα γνώσεως, οὐδὲν
δεόμενον ὥσπερ οὐδενός, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ γινώσκειν·
ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν δευτέρᾳ φύσει τὸ γινώσκειν. ἓν
γάρ τι καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν· τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἄνευ τοῦ
"τι" ἕν· εἰ γὰρ τὶ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοέν· τὸ γὰρ
"αὐτὸ" πρὸ τοῦ "τι."

13. Διὸ καὶ ἄρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν
εἴπῃς, τὶ ἐρεῖς. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἐπέκεινα πάντων καὶ
ἐπέκεινα τοῦ σεμνοτάτου νοῦ" ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι μόνον
ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὄνομα ὂν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὔτε τι τῶν
πάντων οὔτε ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μηδὲν κατ'
αὐτοῦ· ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνδέχεται, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σημαίνειν
ἐπιχειροῦμεν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀπορῶμεν
"ἀναίσθητον οὖν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐδὲ παρακολουθοῦν
ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲ οἶδεν αὑτό," ἐκεῖνο χρὴ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι,
ὅτι ταῦτα λέγοντες ἑαυτοὺς περιτρέπομεν ἐπὶ

[1] R[2mg] (*intellectum* Ficinus): τι οὖν Enn.*

[1] A free paraphrase of Plato *Republic* VI 509B9–10, with Νοῦς (quite naturally for Plotinus) replacing οὐσία. This is followed by a reference to the other great source-text in

a rational statement, we shall state that the first activity, which, so to speak, flows from it like a light from the sun, is Intellect and the whole intelligible nature, but that he himself, staying still at the summit of the intelligible, rules over it; he does not thrust the outshining away from himself—or we shall make another light before light—but he irradiates for ever, abiding unchanged over the intelligible. For what comes from him has not been cut off from him, nor is it the same as him, nor is it the sort of thing not to be substance, or to be blind, but it sees and knows itself and is the primary knower. But the One, as it is beyond Intellect, so is beyond knowledge, and as it does not in any way need anything, so it does not even need knowing; but knowing has its place in the second nature. For knowing is one thing; but that is one without the thing; for if it is one thing it would not be the absolute One: for " absolute " comes before " something ".

13. It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a " something ". But " beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect " is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and " has no name ",[1] because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it. But when we raise the difficulty " Then it has no perception of itself and is not even conscious of itself and does not even know itself ", we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves round and going in the opposite

Plato for the doctrine of the One, the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (142A3).

τἀναντία. πολὺ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιοῦμεν γνωστὸν καὶ γνῶσιν ποιοῦντες καὶ διδόντες νοεῖν δεῖσθαι τοῦ νοεῖν ποιοῦμεν· κἂν σὺν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν ᾖ, περιττὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὅλως τὸ νοεῖν πολλῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ [1] συνελθόντων συναίσθησις εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, ὅταν αὐτό τι ἑαυτὸ νοῇ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοεῖν· ἓν δὲ ἕκαστον αὐτό τί ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἔξω ἔσται ἡ νόησις, ἐνδεές τε ἔσται καὶ οὐ κυρίως τὸ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ πάντη ἁπλοῦν καὶ αὔταρκες ὄντως οὐδὲν δεῖται· τὸ δὲ δευτέρως αὔταρκες, δεόμενον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦτο δεῖται τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτό· καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς πρὸς αὐτὸ ὂν τῷ ὅλῳ πεποίηκε τὸ αὔταρκες ἱκανὸν ἐξ ἁπάντων γενόμενον, συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ νεῦον.[2] ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις πολλοῦ τινος αἴθησίς ἐστι· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τοὔνομα. καὶ ἡ νόησις προτέρα οὖσα εἴσω εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφει δηλονότι πολὺν ὄντα· καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον εἴπῃ "ὄν εἰμι," ὡς ἐξευρὼν λέγει καὶ εἰκότως λέγει, τὸ γὰρ ὂν πολύ ἐστιν· ἐπεί, ὅταν ὡς εἰς ἁπλοῦν ἐπιβάλῃ καὶ εἴπῃ "ὄν εἰμι," οὐκ ἔτυχεν οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος. οὐ γὰρ ὡς λίθον λέγει τὸ ὄν, ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ, ἀλλ' εἴρηκε μιᾷ ῥήσει πολλά. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὄντως εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἴχνος

[1] Harder B-T: αὐτὸ Enn.*
[2] Theiler: νοοῦν Enn.*

[1] The reference is to the συν- of συναίσθησις which is not literally translatable into English. At the beginning of his writing period Plotinus does not see this reference to multiplicity in συναίσθησις and uses it of the One (with an "as if"): cp. V. 4. 2. 18.

direction. For we are making it many when we make it object of knowledge and knowledge, and by attributing thought to it we make it need thought: even if thought goes intimately with it, thought will be superfluous to it. For in general thought seems to be an intimate consciousness of the whole when many parts come together in the same thing; [this is so] when a thing knows itself, which is knowing in the proper sense: each single part is just itself and seeks nothing; but if the thinking is of what is outside, the thoughts will be deficient, and not thought in the proper sense. But that which is altogether simple and self-sufficient needs nothing; but what is self-sufficient in the second degree, but needs itself, this is what needs to think itself; and that which is deficient in relation to itself achieves self-sufficiency by being a whole, with an adequacy deriving from all its parts, intimately present to itself and inclining to itself. For intimate self-consciousness is a consciousness of something which is many: even the name bears witness to this.[1] And thinking, which is prior, turns inward to Intellect which is obviously multiple; for even if it only says this, "I am existent", it says it as a discovery, and says it plausibly, for existence is multiple: since if it concentrated its gaze on itself as something simple and said "I am existent", it would not attain either itself or existence. For it does not mean something like a stone by existence, when it is speaking the truth, but says many things in one word.[2] For this being—which is meant to

[2] The emphasis here on the intrinsic multiplicity of Intellect is very striking.

ἔχον τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται, ὃ οὐδὲ ὂν διὰ τοῦτο λέγοιτ'[1] ἄν, ὥσπερ εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, πολλὰ ἔχει. τί οὖν; ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐ νοηθήσεται; ἢ ἔρημον καὶ μόνον ἐὰν ἐθελήσῃς λαβεῖν, οὐ νοήσεις· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἐν αὑτῷ πολύ ἐστι, κἂν ἄλλο τι εἴπῃς, ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἁπλούστατον ἁπάντων, οὐχ ἕξει νόησιν αὑτοῦ· εἰ γὰρ ἕξει, τῷ πολὺ[2] εἶναι ἕξει. οὔτ' οὖν αὐτὸ νοεῖν οὔτ' ἔστι νόησις αὐτοῦ.

14. Πῶς οὖν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἢ λέγομεν μέν τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ λέγομεν οὐδὲ γνῶσιν οὐδὲ νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ. πῶς οὖν λέγομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ αὐτὸ ἔχομεν; ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τῇ γνώσει, καὶ παντελῶς οὐκ ἔχομεν; ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ λέγομεν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὃ δέ ἐστιν, οὐ λέγομεν· ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν. ἔχειν δὲ οὐ κωλυόμεθα, κἂν μὴ λέγωμεν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες καὶ κάτοχοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον κἂν εἰδεῖεν, ὅτι ἔχουσι μεῖζον ἐν αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ εἰδῶσιν ὅ τι, ἐξ ὧν δὲ κεκίνηται καὶ λέγουσιν, ἐκ τούτων αἴσθησίν τινα τοῦ κινήσαντος λαμβάνουσιν ἑτέρων ὄντων τοῦ κινήσαντος, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς κινδυ-

[1] Kirchhoff*: λέγοι ARC^{pc}: λέγει EBJUC^{ac}.
[2] Kirchhoff*: ποῦ Enn.

[1] Again the inappropriate reference to *Philebus* 63B7–8 (cp. ch. 10, n. 2).
[2] Again a reminiscence of Plato *Parmenides* 142A1–5.
[3] This passage seems to owe something to Plato's description of the inspiration of poets in *Ion* 533–4 (cp. especially ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι 533E6–7). It is interesting that Plotinus finds this poetic possession (for Plato a state far

be real being and not what has a trace of being, which would not even be called being because of this trace, but is as image to archetype—contains many things. Well, then, will not each of these many things be thought? Now if you want to grasp the "isolated and alone",[1] you will not think; but absolute being is multiple in itself, and if you speak of something else, being contains it. But if this is so, if anything is the simplest of all, it will not possess thought of itself: for if it is to possess it, it will possess it by being multiple. It is not therefore thought, nor is there any thinking about it.

14. How then do we ourselves speak about it? We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, and we have neither knowledge or thought of it.[2] But if we do not have it in knowledge, do we not have it at all? But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. But just as those who have a god within them and are in the grip of divine possession may know this much, that they have something greater within them, even if they do not know what, and from the ways in which they are moved and the things they say get a certain awareness of the god who moves them,[3] though these are not the same as the mover; so we seem to be

inferior to the clear knowledge of the philosopher) a suitable analogy for our highest awareness, that of the One, and that it is for him a kind of knowledge (though not knowledge of the One) which it certainly is not for Plato.

νεύομεν ἔχειν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὅταν νοῦν καθαρὸν ἔχωμεν, χρώμενοι, ὡς οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον νοῦς, ὁ δοὺς οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τούτου τοῦ στοίχου, αὐτὸς δὲ οἷος ἄρα, ὡς οὐ ταῦτα, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον τούτου, ὃ λέγομεν "ὄν," ἀλλὰ καὶ πλέον καὶ μεῖζον ἢ λεγόμενον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς κρείττων λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα.

15. Ἀλλὰ πῶς παρασχών; ἢ τῷ ἔχειν ⟨ἢ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν⟩.[1] ἀλλ' ἃ μὴ ἔχει, πῶς παρέσχεν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχων, οὐχ ἁπλοῦς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχων, πῶς ἐ αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος; ἓν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἁπλοῦν τάχ' ἄν τις δοίη—καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ζητηθείη ἄν, πῶς ἐ τοῦ πάντη ἑνός· ἀλλ' ὅμως δὲ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οἷον ἐκ φωτὸς τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περίλαμψιν—πῶς δὲ πολλά; ἢ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἔμελλε τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ. εἰ οὖν μὴ ταὐτόν, οὐδέ γε βέλτιον· τί γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς βέλτιον ἢ ἐπέκεινα ὅλως; χεῖρον ἄρα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐνδεέστερον. τί οὖν ἐνδεέστερον τοῦ ἑνός; ἢ τὸ μὴ ἕν· πολλὰ ἄρα· ἐφιέμενον δὲ ὅμως τοῦ ἑνός· ἓν ἄρα πολλά. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἓν τῷ ἓν σῴζεται καὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ ἐστί, τούτῳ· μὴ γὰρ ἓν γενόμενον, κἂν ἐκ πολλῶν ᾖ, οὔπω ἔστιν ὃ ἂν[2] εἴποι τις αὐτό. κἂν ἕκαστον ἔχῃ λέγειν τις ὅ ἐστι,

[1] A[3mg] (*an potius non habendo* Ficinus), Creuzer, cf. Epistola 139: ἢ μὴ ἔχειν Perna, Kirchhoff*.

[2] ὃ ἂν de Strycker optime: ὄν Enn.: ἄν Kirchhoff: ὅ τι Igal.

[1] ἓν πολλά is from Plato *Parmenides* 144E5 (the Second Hypothesis, which Plotinus, following an older tradition of exegesis—probably Neopythagorean—referred to his second Hypostasis, Intellect).

disposed towards the One, divining, when we have our intellect pure, that this is the inner intellect, which gives substance and everything else which belongs to this level, but that he is not only of a kind not to be these, but something higher than what we call " being ", but is more and greater than anything said about him, because he is higher than speech and thought and awareness; he gives us these, but he is not these himself.

15. But how does he give them? By having them, or by not having them? But how did he give what he does not have? But if he has them, he is not simple; if he does not have them, how does the multiplicity come from him? One might perhaps grant that he gives one simple thing from himself—yet there would be room for enquiry how this could come from the absolute One; but all the same one can speak of the radiance from him, as from a light—but how can he give many things? Now what comes from him could not be the same as himself. If then it is not the same, it cannot of course be better: for what could be better than the One or in any way transcend him? It must then be worse; and this means more deficient. When then is more deficient than the One? That which is not one; it is therefore many; but all the same it aspires to the One: so it is a one-many.[1] For all that is not one is kept in being by the one, and is what it is by this " one ": for if it had not become one, even though it is composed of many parts, it is not yet what one would call " itself ".[2] And if it is possible to say of each individual part what it is, one says it because each

[2] Cp. III. 8. 10. 20–8.

τῷ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγει, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ [1] ἔστι. [2] τὸ δέ, ὃ μὴ πολλὰ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἤδη οὐ μετουσίᾳ ἑνὸς ἕν, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ ἕν, οὐ κατ' ἄλλου, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτο, παρ' οὗ πως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν τῷ ἐγγύς, τὰ δὲ τῷ πόρρω. ἐπεὶ [δὲ] [3] τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ [4] καὶ ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸ δῆλον ποιεῖ τῷ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτοῦ ἓν πανταχοῦ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ πλῆθος ὂν ὅμως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διακρῖναι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις, ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ζωῆς μετέχει, ἓν πολλά· ἀδυνατεῖ γὰρ δεῖξαι αὐτὸ ἓν πάντα. αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἓν πάντα, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν [5] ἀρχήν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἓν ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἕν· τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὧδέ πως ἐπιβρίσαντος τοῦ ἑνὸς πάντα μετέχον τοῦ ἕν, καὶ ὁτιοῦν αὐτοῦ πάντα αὖ καὶ ἕν. τίνα οὖν πάντα; ἢ ὧν ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖνο. ὅπως δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων; ἆρα, ὅτι αὐτὰ σῴζει ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ποιήσασα εἶναι; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὑπέστησεν αὐτά. πῶς δή; ἢ τῷ πρότερον ἔχειν αὐτά. ἀλλ' εἴρηται, ὅτι πλῆθος οὕτως ἔσται. ἀλλ' ἄρα οὕτως εἶχεν ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα· τὰ δ'

[1] sc. τῷ ἓν εἶναι.
[2] coniecimus: ἔτι Enn.
[3] del. Theiler.
[4] Harder: μὲν ταὐτὸ Enn.*
[5] Igal: μεγάλην Enn.

of them is one and it is it because of this very fact. But that which does not already have many parts in itself is not one by participation in the One, but is the One itself, not the " one " predicated of something else but because it is this One from which, somehow, the others derive their oneness, some [in a greater degree] because they are near and others [in a lesser degree] because they are far away. For that which comes immediately after it shows clearly that it is immediately after it because its multiplicity is a one-everywhere; for although it is a multiplicity it is at the same time identical with itself and there is no way in which you could divide it, because " all things are together " [1]; for each of the things also which come from it, as long as it participates in life, is a one-many: for it cannot reveal itself as a one-all. But [Intellect] does reveal itself as a one-all, because it comes after the origin: for its origin is really one and truly one. But that which comes after the origin is, somehow, under the pressure of the One, all things by its participation in the One, and each and every part of it is both all and one. What then are " all things "? All things of which that One is the principle. But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them exist? Yes, and because it brought them into existence. But how did it do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it had them in such a way as not to be distinct: they are distinguished on the second

[1] Anaxagoras Diels B 1 (the original mixture of all things, which was not in the least like the Plotinian World of Forms).

ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ. ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἤδη· τὸ δὲ δύναμις πάντων. ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς δυνάμεως; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἡ ὕλη δυνάμει λέγεται, ὅτι δέχεται· πάσχει γάρ· ἀλλ' οὗτος ἀντιτεταγμένως τῷ ποιεῖν· πῶς οὖν ποιεῖ ἃ μὴ ἔχει; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε· μηδ' ἐνθυμηθεὶς ὃ ποιήσει, ποιήσει ὅμως. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν, ὅτι, εἴ τι ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δεῖ παρ' αὐτό· ἄλλο δὲ ὃν οὐχ ἕν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνο. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, δύο δέ, ἀνάγκη ἤδη καὶ πλῆθος εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ ταὐτὸν ἤδη καὶ ποιὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ[1] μὴ ἓν τὸ ἐκείνου, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη· ὅτι δὲ πλῆθος καὶ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐν τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται, ἀπορῆσαι ἄξιον· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ ἔτι ζητητέα.

16. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλαχοῦ εἴρηται, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι δύναμίς ἐστι καὶ ἀμήχανος δύναμις, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πιστωτέον, ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι μηδὲ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὃ μὴ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ἔχει. ἐκεῖνα δὲ νῦν λεκτέον, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν καὶ

[1] w, Perna*: δεῖ BxUC, H-S[1].

[1] A good clarification of what Plotinus means when he uses the ambiguous phrase *δύναμις πάντων* of the One (cp. III. 8. 10. 1; V. 4. 1. 36; VI. 7. 32. 31).

[2] Again the "Platonic Categories": cp. Plato *Sophist* 254E5–255A1.

level, in the rational form. For this is already actuality; but the One is the potency of all things. But in what way is it the potency? Not in the way in which matter is said to be in potency, because it receives: for matter is passive; but this [material] way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to making.[1] How then does the One make what it does not have? It does not do it casually, nor reflecting on what it will make, but all the same it will make. Now it has been said that, if anything comes from the One, it must be something different from it; and in being different, it is not one: for if it was, it would be that One. But if it is not one, but two, it must necessarily also be many: for it is already the same and different and qualified and all the rest.[2] And that what comes from the One is certainly not one, may be taken as demonstrated; but it is worth querying the proposition that it is a multiplicity, and a multiplicity of the sort which is observed in what comes after it; and the necessity of there being anything after the One remains to be enquired into.

16. It has been said elsewhere that there must be something after the first, and in a general way that it is power, and overwhelming power[3]; and the point has also been made that this is to be believed on the evidence of all other things, because there is nothing, even among the things on the lowest level, which does not have power to produce. But we now have to add this further point, that, since in things which are generated it is not possible to go

[3] Cp. e.g. II. 9. 3; IV. 8. 6. For the One as *δύναμις* see n. 1 above.

μᾶλλον εἰς πλῆθος ἰέναι, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἑκάστων ἁπλουστέρα ἢ αὐτά.[1] κόσμον τοίνυν τὸ ποιῆσαν αἰσθητὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη κόσμος αἰσθητὸς αὐτό, ἀλλὰ νοῦς καὶ κόσμος νοητός· καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τοίνυν τὸ γεννῆσαν αὐτὸ οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε κόσμος νοητός, ἁπλούστερον δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἁπλούστερον κόσμου νοητοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολύ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτο πολύ, οὐκ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἄλλο πρὸ τούτου. συστῆναι οὖν δεῖ εἰς ἓν ὄντως παντὸς πλήθους ἔξω καὶ ἁπλότητος ἡστινοσοῦν, εἴπερ ὄντως ἁπλοῦν. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς, τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ λόγος; εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν, πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐκ λόγου λόγος; καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ; τί γὰρ ἔχον αὐτοῦ[2] ἀγαθοειδὲς λέγεται; ἆρ' ἔχον τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν; τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ζητοῦμεν ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἢ πρότερον ἐκεῖνο, οὗ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι δεήσει, ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μή, βέλτιον ἀποστῆναι· ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ζῆν ὡσαύτως μένοντα ἐπὶ τούτου ἑκουσίως; εἰ οὖν ἀγαπητὸν τούτῳ τὸ ζῆν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν ζητεῖ· ἔοικε τοίνυν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὡσαύτως, ὅτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ παρόντα. ἀλλὰ πάντων ἤδη παρόντων τούτῳ

[1] Kirchhoff*: ἡ αὐτὴ Enn., Cilento, H-S [1].
[2] R[pc], Kirchhoff* (*illius* Ficinus): ἑαυτοῦ wBR[ac]JUC, Perna, Creuzer, H-S.

upwards but only to go downwards and move further towards multiplicity, the principle of each group of things is simpler than they are themselves. Therefore that which makes the world of sense could not be a world of sense itself, but must be an intellect and an intelligible world; and that which is before this and generates it could not be intellect or an intelligible world, but simpler than intellect and simpler than an intelligible world. For many does not come from many, but this [intelligible] many comes from what is not many: for this would not be the principle if it was also many itself, but something else before it. There must therefore be a concentration into a real one outside all multiplicity and any ordinary sort of simplicity, if it is to be really simple. But how is what comes from it a multiple and universal rational form, when it is obviously not a rational form? And if it is not this why does rational form come not from rational form [but something else]? And how does what is like the Good come from the Good? What does it have from the Good in virtue of which it is called "like the Good"? Is it unchanging stability? What has this to do with the Good? For we seek stability because it is one of the goods. We seek that before stability from which it will not be necessary to depart, because it is the Good; but if it was not the Good, it would be necessary to go away from it. Is it then having a stable life and abiding willingly with it [which is "desirable"]? If then its life is satisfactory to it, it is clear that it seeks nothing; so its stability seems to be for this reason, that what is there present to it is sufficient for it. But its life is satisfactory because all things are present to it,

ἀγαπητὸν τὸ ζῆν καὶ δὴ οὕτω παρόντων, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλων ὄντων αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' ἡ πᾶσα ζωὴ τούτῳ καὶ ζωὴ ἐναργὴς καὶ τελεία, πᾶσα ἐν τούτῳ ψυχὴ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ οὔτε ζωῆς οὔτε νοῦ ἀποστατεῖ. αὐτάρκης οὖν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ζητεῖ, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃ ἐζήτησεν ἄν, εἰ μὴ παρῆν. ἔχει οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ὃ δὴ ζωὴν καὶ νοῦν εἴπομεν, ἢ ἄλλο τι συμβεβηκὸς τούτοις. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἐπέκεινα τούτων. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο, δηλονότι ζωὴ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ ἐξημμένη ἐκείνου καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσα ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ζῶσα· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἀρχή. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο ζωῆς εἶναι κρεῖσσον καὶ νοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἐπιστρέψει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκεινῷ ὄντος, καθὸ τοῦτο ζῇ, καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν τούτῳ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντος, ὅ τι δήποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο.

17. Τί οὖν ἐστι κρεῖττον ζωῆς ἐμφρονεστάτου καὶ ἀπταίστου καὶ ἀναμαρτήτου καὶ νοῦ πάντα ἔχοντος καὶ ζωῆς πάσης καὶ νοῦ παντός; ἐὰν οὖν λέγωμεν "τὸ ποιῆσαν ταῦτα," καὶ πῶς ποιῆσαν; καί, μὴ φανῇ τι κρεῖττον, οὐκ ἄπεισιν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ στήσεται αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀναβῆναι διά γε ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ αὔταρκες ἐκ πάντων

[1] If we keep here, as we should, the MSS reading καί, this sentence expresses very well that shrinking from the doctrine of the One beyond Intellect with which Plotinus was quite familiar (it was shared by his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origen the Platonist). It was probably felt by many Platonists (and of course all Aristotelians) in his time, as it was by Christian theologians then and later.

and present in such a way that they are not other than it. But if it has all life, and a clear and perfect life, then every soul and every intellect is in it, and no part of life or intellect is absent from it. It is sufficient then for itself and seeks nothing; but if it seeks nothing, it has in itself what it would have sought, if it was not present. Therefore it has in itself the Good, which is either something of the sort which we called life and intellect, or something else which is an incidental accompaniment of these. But if this is the Good, there would be nothing beyond life and intellect. But if there is that something beyond, it is clear that the life of this other is directed to that and dependent on that, and has its existence from that and lives towards that; for that is its principle. That, therefore, must be better than life and intellect; thus the other will turn towards it both the life which is in it, a kind of image of the life in that in so far as this lives, and the intellect in it, a kind of representation of what is in that, whatever this may be.

17. What then is better than the wisest life, without fault or mistake, and than Intellect which contains all things, and than universal life and universal Intellect? If we say "That which made them"—well, how did it make them? And, in case something better may appear,[1] our train of thought will not go on to something else but will stop at Intellect. But there are many reasons for going higher, particularly the fact that the self-sufficiency of Intellect which results from its being composed of

ἔξω ἐστίν· ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν δηλονότι ἐνδεές· καὶ ὅτι ἕκαστον [τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς][1] μετείληφε καὶ μετέχει ⟨τοῦ αὐτοῦ⟩[2] ἑνός, οὐκ αὐτὸ ἕν. τί οὖν τὸ οὗ μετέχει, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα; ἀλλ' εἰ ποιεῖ ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἑνὸς παρουσίᾳ αὔταρκες τὸ πλῆθος αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, δηλονότι ποιητικὸν οὐσίας καὶ αὐταρκείας ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ οὐκ ὂν οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα ταύτης καὶ ἐπέκεινα αὐταρκείας.

'Αρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτα λέγοντας ἀπαλλαχθῆναι; ἢ ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ ὠδίνει καὶ μᾶλλον. ἴσως οὖν χρὴ αὐτὴν ἤδη γεννῆσαι αἰξασαν πρὸς αὐτὸ πληρωθεῖσαν ὠδίνων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐπαστέον, εἴ ποθέν τινα πρὸς τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐπῳδὴν εὕροιμεν. τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων, εἰ πολλάκις τις ἐπάδοι, γένοιτο. τίς οὖν ὥσπερ καινὴ ἐπῳδὴ ἄλλη; ἐπιθέουσα γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι καὶ ὧν μετέχομεν ἀληθῶν ὅμως ἐκφεύγει,[3] εἴ τις βούλοιτο εἰπεῖν καὶ διανοηθῆναι, ἐπείπερ δεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἵνα τι εἴπῃ, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαβεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διέξοδος· ἐν δὲ πάντῃ ἁπλῷ διέξοδος τίς ἐστιν; ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ κἂν νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι· ἐφαψάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντη μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν λέγειν, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι. τότε

[1] delevimus: *τοῦ αὐτοενὸς* Harder, H-S [1], B-T.
[2] coniecimus: ⟨*τοῦ αὐτοῦ*⟩ H-S [2].
[3] Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff* (*aufugit* Ficinus): *εἰσφεύγει* wBUC, H-S [1]: *εἰσφεύγοι* x.

all things is something which comes to it from outside: each of the things of which it is composed is obviously insufficient; and because each of them has participated in the absolute One and continues to participate in it, it is not the One itself. What then is that in which it participates, which makes it exist, and all things along with it? If it makes each individual thing exist, and it is by the presence of the One that the multitude of individual things in Intellect, and Intellect itself, is self-sufficient, it is clear that it, since it is the cause of existence and self-sufficiency, is not itself existence but beyond it and beyond self-sufficiency.

Is that enough? Can we end the discussion by saying this? No, my soul is still in even stronger labour. Perhaps she is now at the point when she must bring forth, having reached the fulness of her birth-pangs in her eager longing for the One. But we must sing another charm to her, if we can find one anywhere to allay her pangs. Perhaps there might be one in what we have said already, if we sang it over and over again. And what other charm can we find which has a sort of newness about it? The soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the truths we know if someone tries to express them in words and discursive thought; for discursive thought, in order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after another: this is the method of description; but how can one describe the absolutely simple? But it is enough if the intellect comes into contact with it; but when it has done so, while the contact lasts, it is absolutely impossible, nor has it time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason about it. One must believe one has seen,

δὲ χρὴ ἑωρακέναι πιστεύειν, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ· τοῦτο γὰρ [τοῦτο τὸ φῶς] [1] παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός· καὶ τότε χρὴ νομίζειν παρεῖναι, ὅταν ὥσπερ θεὸς ἄλλος [ὅταν] [1] εἰς οἶκον καλοῦντός τινος ἐλθὼν φωτίσῃ· ἢ μηδ' ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐφώτισεν. οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφώτιστος ἄθεος ἐκείνου· φωτισθεῖσα δὲ ἔχει, ὃ ἐζήτει, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος τἀληθινὸν ψυχῇ, ἐφάψασθαι φωτὸς ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου φωτί, ἀλλ' αὐτό, δι' οὗ καὶ ὁρᾷ. δι' οὗ γὰρ ἐφωτίσθη, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ δεῖ θεάσασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιον διὰ φωτὸς ἄλλου. πῶς ἂν οὖν τοῦτο γένοιτο; ἄφελε πάντα.

[1] del. Kirchhoff*.

when the soul suddenly takes light [1]: for this is from him and he is it; we must think that he is present when, like another god whom someone called to his house, he comes and brings light to us: for if he had not come, he would not have brought the light. So the unenlightened soul does not have him as god; but when it is enlightened it has what it sought, and this is the soul's true end, to touch that light and see it by itself, not by another light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing. It must see that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his own. How then can this happen? Take away everything!

[1] The suddenness and unexpectedness of the final vision is an important feature of Plotinus's descriptions of it—it is not something one can plan for and bring about when one wishes: cp. VI. 7. 36. 18–9. It has antecedents in Plato *Symposium* 210E4–5 and *Letter VII* 341C7—D1.

V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS little treatise is the seventh in Porphyry's chronological order. It deals with much the same subject-matter as the tenth treatise in the chronological order, *On The Three Primary Hypostases* (V. 1), and may be a kind of preliminary study for it, but the treatment is very different, much more schematic and scholastic, and without the "protreptic" element, the exhortation to the soul to rediscover its true nature and origin and so ascend to the Good.

In the second chapter the One or Good is spoken of, in a way unusual in Plotinus, as the Intelligible, and is said to have a higher sort of thinking than that of Intellect. In his later writings Plotinus avoids this sort of language, and is careful to rule out any suggestion that the One is a sort of higher Intellect.

Synopsis

There must be a hierarchy of beings, ascending in order to the First Principle. This must be the absolutely simple One, and because it is absolutely perfect, and everything which is perfect produces, it must produce the next reality, the One-Many (ch. 1). How and why the One produces Intellect: explanation of the Platonic doctrine of the derivation of Forms and Numbers from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The conscious inner life

of the Intelligible (the First Principle). Besides its primary activity which is itself it has, like all things, a secondary activity distinct from itself: this is Intellect, which is all things, the whole world of living being; the One is therefore beyond being (ch. 2.).

V. 4. (7) ΠΩΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Εἴ τι ἔστι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἐκείνου εἶναι ἢ εὐθὺς ἢ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ ἔχειν, καὶ τάξιν εἶναι δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων, τοῦ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναγομένου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον. δεῖ μὲν γάρ τι πρὸ πάντων εἶναι ἁπλοῦν, τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἕτερον τῶν μετ' αὐτό, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, οὐ μεμιγμένον τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεῖναι δυνάμενον, ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν, καθ' οὗ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὗ μὴ λόγος μηδὲ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται εἶναι οὐσίας—εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἔσται συμβάσεως ἔξω πάσης καὶ συνθέσεως καὶ ὄντως ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἀρχὴ εἴη—αὐταρκέστατόν τε τῷ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων· τὸ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρῶτον ἐνδεὲς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τό τε μὴ ἁπλοῦν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἁπλῶν δεόμενον, ἵν' ᾖ ἐξ ἐκείνων. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἓν μόνον δεῖ εἶναι· ἄλλο γὰρ εἰ εἴη τοιοῦτον, ἓν ἂν εἴη τὰ

[1] Again the two foundation texts from Plato's dialogues

V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE

1. If there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between, and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back to the first and the third to the second. For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is "no concept or knowledge" of it; it is indeed also said to be "beyond being".[1] For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple is in need of its simple components so that it can come into existence from them. A reality of this kind must be one alone: for if there was another of this kind, both would be

for the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One beyond being; *Parmenides* 142A3–4 and *Republic* 509B9.

ἄμφω. οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώματα λέγομεν δύο, ἢ τὸ ἓν πρῶτον σῶμα. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα, γινόμενόν τε τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχή· ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀγένητος· μὴ σωματικὴ δὲ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ὄντως μία, ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη τὸ πρῶτον. εἰ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἁπλοῦν εἴη· ἓν ἄρα πολλὰ ἔσται. πόθεν οὖν τοῦτο; ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν, οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐκεῖνο πάντων ἀρχή. πῶς οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου; εἰ τέλεόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάντων τελεώτατον καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις καθάσον δύνανται μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο. ὅ τι δ' ἂν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς τελείωσιν ἴῃ, ὁρῶμεν γεννῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεχόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ποιοῦν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι ἂν προαίρεσιν ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα φύει ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὲ μεταδίδοντα ἑαυτῶν καθόσον δύναται· οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει, καὶ ψύχει ἡ χιών, καὶ τὰ φάρμακα δὲ εἰς ἄλλο ἐργάζεται οἷον αὐτά—πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπομιμούμενα εἰς ἀιδιότητά τε καὶ ἀγαθότητα. πῶς οὖν τὸ τελεώτατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὑτῷ σταίη ὥσπερ φθονῆσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν, ἡ πάντων δύναμις; πῶς δ' ἂν ἔτι

[1] Plato *Phaedrus* 245D1.

[2] The absence of *φθόνος*, the selfish, grudging wish to keep one's good to oneself which is the opposite of truly divine generosity, is a cardinal feature of Plato's thought about the

one. For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into being, but not the first principle; and "the first principle has not come into being"[1]; if then it was a principle which was not bodily, but was truly one, that [other of this kind] would be the First. If then there is something else after the First, it cannot still be simple: it will therefore be a One-Many. Whence, then, does this come? From the First: for it certainly does not come about by chance, and if it did the First would no longer be the principle of all things. How then does it come from the First? If the First is perfect, the most perfect of all, and the primal power, it must be the most powerful of all beings and the other powers must imitate it as far as they are able. Now when anything else comes to perfection we see that it produces, and does not endure to remain by itself, but makes something else. This is true not only of things which have choice, but of things which grow and produce without choosing to do so, and even lifeless things, which impart themselves to others as far as they can: as fire warms, snow cools, and drugs act on something else in a way corresponding to their own nature—all imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity. How then could the most perfect, the first Good, remain in itself as if it grudged to give of itself[2] or was impotent, when it is the productive power of all things? How would it then still be the

divine (and a conscious challenge to older Greek ideas): cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247A7 and *Timaeus* 29E1–2.

ἀρχὴ εἴη; δεῖ δή τι καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, εἴπερ ἔσται τι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παρ' αὐτοῦ γε ὑποστάντων· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη. [δεῖ δὴ καὶ τιμιώτατον εἶναι τὸ γεννῶν τὰ ἐφεξῆς][1] δεῖ δὴ καὶ τιμιώτατον εἶναι τὸ γεννώμενον καὶ δεύτερον ἐκείνου τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον εἶναι.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ νοῦς ἦν τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦ ἐνδεέστερον, προσεχέστερον δὲ νῷ καὶ ὅμοιον δεῖ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦν εἶναι ἀνάγκη. διὰ τί δὲ οὐ νοῦς, οὗ ἐνέργειά ἐστι νόησις; νόησις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὁρῶσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστραφεῖσα καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἷον ἀποτελειουμένη [καὶ τελειουμένη],[2] ἀόριστος μὲν αὐτὴ[3] ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται· ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς. διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά, σύνθεσίν τε ἐμφαίνων, νοητὴν μέντοι, καὶ πολλὰ ὁρῶν ἤδη. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῶν· διὸ δύο ἤδη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος; τὸ νοητὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένον καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐνδεές, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ νοοῦν—ἐνδεὲς δὲ λέγω τὸ νοοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο—οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον ἀναίσθητον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ζωὴ ἐν αὐτῷ

[1] om. C: del. Harder.
[2] ἀποτελειουμένη Volkmann: ἀποτελουμένη καὶ τελειουμένη Enn., H-S [1].
[3] Kirchhoff*: αὕτη Enn., H-S [1].

Principle? Something must certainly come into being from it, if anything is to exist of the others which derive their being from it: that it is from it that they come is absolutely necessary. That which is generated by it must certainly also be most honourable, and though it is second to the Principle must be better than all else.

2. If, then, the generator itself is Intellect, what is generated by it must be more defective than Intellect, but fairly close to it and like it; but since the generator is beyond Intellect, it is necessary that what is generated should be Intellect. But why is the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is thinking? Thinking, which sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is, in a way, being perfected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is defined by the intelligible. This is why it is said: from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the Forms and Numbers: that is, Intellect.[1] For this reason Intellect is not simple but many; it manifests a composition, of course an intelligible one, and already sees many things. It is, certainly, also itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is already two. And it is also a different intelligible by being posterior to the One itself. But how does this Intellect come from the Intelligible? The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, like that which sees and thinks—I call that which thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible, but it is not like something senseless; all things belong to it and are in it and with it. It is completely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and

[1] See note 1 to ch. 5 of V. 1.

καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ οἱονεὶ συναισθήσει οὖσα ἐν στάσει ἀιδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν. εἴ τι οὖν μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο μάλιστα ᾖ ὅ ἐστι. μένοντος οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται, μένοντος δὲ γίνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκεῖνο μένει νοητόν, τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται νόησις· νόησις δὲ οὖσα καὶ νοοῦσα ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο—ἄλλο γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει—νοῦς γίγνεται, ἄλλο οἷον νοητὸν καὶ οἷον ἐκεῖνο καὶ μίμημα καὶ εἴδωλον ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ πῶς μένοντος ἐκείνου γίνεται; ἐνέργεια ἡ μέν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δ' ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου· καὶ ἡ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτό ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης, ἣν δεῖ παντὶ ἕπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἤδη γινομένη ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου τὴν σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐν τῷ μένειν πῦρ. οὕτω δὴ κἀκεῖ· καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖ μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἤθει ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπό-

[1] This passage stands alone in the *Enneads* in the clarity with which it attributes a kind of thinking to the One: cp. *Introductory Note* and n. 1 (p. 119) to ch. 13 of V. 3. The view which Plotinus adopts here is close to that of Numenius, whose First God is an Intellect (frs. 16 and 17 des Places, 25 and 26 Leemans), but an Intellect, it would seem, whose thinking is ineffably superior to that of the Second God or Demiurge who contemplates the Forms and makes the world.

all things in itself, and its thinking of itself is itself, and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness, in everlasting rest and in a manner of thinking different from the thinking of Intellect.[1] If, then, something comes into being while the Intelligible abides in itself, it comes into being from it when it is most of all what it is. When, therefore, the Intelligible abides " in its own proper way of life ",[2] that which comes into being does come into being from it, but from it as it abides unchanged. Since, therefore, it abides as Intelligible, what comes into being does so as thinking: and since it is thinking and thinks that from which it came—for it has nothing else—it becomes Intellect, like another intelligible and like that Principle, a representation and image of it. But how, when that abides unchanged, does Intellect come into being? In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance, and another which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so there, while the Principle abides " in its own proper way of life ", the activity generated from the perfection in it and its coexistent activity acquires substantial existence, since it comes from

[2] Plato *Timaeus* 42E5–6 (quoted again below).

στασιν λαβοῦσα, ἅτε ἐκ μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μεγίστης μὲν οὖν ἁπασῶν, εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἦλθεν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἦν. καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν δύναμις πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πάντα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰ πάντα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπέκεινα τῶν πάντων· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα οὐσίας· καὶ εἰ τὰ πάντα, πρὸ δὲ πάντων τὸ ἓν οὐ τὸ ἴσον ἔχον τοῖς πᾶσι, καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τι νοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ οὐ ζωὴ οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν· νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὂν ταὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς—ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν—προόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἴδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἕν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα.

a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being and substance: for that Principle is "beyond being". That is the productive power of all things, and its product is already all things. But if this product is all things, that Principle is beyond all things: therefore "beyond being"; and if the product is all things but the One is before all things and not on an equality with all things, in this way too it must be "beyond being". That is, also beyond Intellect; there is, then, something beyond Intellect. For being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or not thinking; Intellect and being are one and the same thing; for Intellect does not apprehend objects which preexist it—as sense does sense-objects—but Intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms from somewhere (for where could it get them from?). But it is here with its objects and the same as and one with them: the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.[1]

[1] Here again Plotinus is taking Aristotle's doctrine of intellect as his starting-point: cp. *Categories* 7. 8a11 (on the priority of sense-objects to sense) and *De Anima* Γ 4. 430a2–5 and 7. 431b17 (on the identity of intellect with its objects).

V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT, AND ON THE GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the third section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33), which Porphyry divided and inserted in various places in the *Enneads* without regard to the original order (see Introductory Notes to II. 9 and III. 8). It is best read after V. 8 with which it is completely continuous: the last sentence of V. 8 directly introduces the argument which occupies the first three chapters of V. 5. The two treatises together form the second "ascent to the Good" in the great work. The first, in III. 8, starts at the bottom, with Nature, the lowest form of Soul. This one begins at the stage immediately below the Good, with Intellect, Real Being or the World of Forms, which we discover within ourselves as soon as we make any progress in genuine contemplation. In V. 8 the beauty of the intelligible world was considered in depth, and it was already clearly indicated that its intelligibility was non-discursive. In the first three chapters of the present treatise we pass from the beauty to the truth of Intellect, and its absolute identity with the intelligible objects, the Forms, is powerfully argued. Then follows a demonstration that the One or Good beyond Intellect and Being must exist, leading into one of the most impressive accounts in the *Enneads* of its transcendent and ineffable nature and the strange kind of direct awareness by which we apprehend it. In Chapter 12 there is a return to the

theme of intelligible beauty and it is shown how, wrongly apprehended, it can distract us from the Good. Chapter 13 sums up the argument, and prepares the way for the polemical appendix refuting Gnostic ideas of spiritual reality which occupies II. 9.

Synopsis

The truth of Intellect (and what can be truer than absolute Intellect) depends on its identity with its objects (ch. 1). These intelligible objects which are Intellect are real, living, thinking being: no proof of their absolute truth is necessary or possible (ch. 2). The image of the court procession in which Intellect immediately precedes the King (ch. 3). Demonstration that the One must exist from a consideration of the nature of number (chs. 4–5). That Being proceeds from the One is confirmed by etymology (ch. 5). The One is beyond form and substance, for if it was form or substance it would be a particular being, not the origin of all: it is therefore unknowable and ineffable (ch. 6). Intellect sees it by an inner light identical with itself (ch. 7). The mysterious coming and going of the vision of the One, which is not a movement of the One, but of Intellect (ch. 8). The One is not in anything, therefore it is everywhere: body is in Soul, Soul in Intellect, Intellect in the One (ch. 9). The One is the transcendent source of all else, unlike all which he produces (ch. 10). The infinity of the One: he is utterly unlike the sense-perceived objects which most people think are real (ch. 11). The Good and intelligible beauty: indifference of the Good to all he has made (ch. 12). We must not think that the Good has anything in himself, even good: this would detract from his absolute simplicity (ch. 13).

V. 5. (32) ΟΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΞΩ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ ΤΑ ΝΟΗΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ

1. Τὸν νοῦν, τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν καὶ ὄντως, ἆρ' ἄν τις φαίη ψεύσεσθαί ποτε καὶ μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοξάσειν; οὐδαμῶς. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἔτι νοῦς ἀνοηταίνων εἴη; δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸν ἀεὶ εἰδέναι καὶ μηδ' ἂν ἐπιλαθέσθαι ποτέ, τὴν δὲ εἴδησιν αὐτῷ μήτε εἰκάζοντι εἶναι μήτε ἀμφίβολον μηδ' αὖ παρ' ἄλλου οἷον ἀκούσαντι. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τινά τις φαίη δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἀλλ' οὖν αὐτόθεν αὐτῷ ἐναργῆ τιν' [1] εἶναι. καίτοι ὁ λόγος φησὶ πάντα· πῶς γὰρ καὶ διοριεῖ τις τά τε αὐτόθεν τά τε μή; ἀλλ' οὖν, ἃ συγχωροῦσιν αὐτόθεν, πόθεν φήσουσι τούτων τὸ ἐναργὲς αὐτῷ παρεῖναι; πόθεν δὲ αὐτῷ πίστιν, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, παρέξεται; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται, μή ποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ

[1] Cilento: τι Enn., H-S [1].

V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT, AND ON THE GOOD

1. Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and real Intellect, will ever be in error and believe the unreal? Certainly not. For how could it still be Intellect when it was being unintelligent? It must, then, always know and not ever forget anything, and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or ambiguous, or like that of someone who has heard what he knows from someone else. Nor, certainly, can it depend on demonstration. For even if anyone did say that some of the things it knows were known by demonstration, some, all the same, would be immediately self-evident to it. (The argument in fact says that all things it knows are self-evident: for how is one going to distinguish those which are from those which are not?) But anyhow, as regards the things of which they agree that Intellect's knowledge is immediate, where do they say that the self-evidence comes to it from? From where will it acquire the confidence that things are so? For there is a lack of confidence about even those objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire the strongest confidence in their self-evidence, whether their apparent existence may be not in the underlying realities, but in the ways the sense-organs are affected, and they need intellect or dis-

νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινούντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ συγκεχωρημένου ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις εἶναι αἰσθητοῖς, ὧν ἀντίληψιν ἡ αἴσθησις ποιήσεται, τό τε γινωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως τοῦ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει· μένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω. ὁ δὴ νοῦς γινώσκων καὶ τὰ νοητὰ γινώσκων, εἰ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα γινώσκει, πῶς μὲν ἂν συντύχοι αὐτοῖς; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μή, ὥστε ἐνδέχεται μὴ γινώσκειν ἢ τότε ὅτε συνέτυχε, καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἕξει τὴν γνῶσιν. εἰ δὲ συνεζεῦχθαι φήσουσι, τί τὸ συνεζεῦχθαι τοῦτο; ἔπειτα καὶ αἱ νοήσεις τύποι ἔσονται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐπακτοὶ καὶ πληγαί. πῶς δὲ καὶ τυπώσεται, ἢ τίς τῶν τοιούτων ἡ μορφή; καὶ ἡ νόησις τοῦ ἔξω ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις. καὶ τί διοίσει ἢ τῷ σμικροτέρων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι; πῶς δὲ καὶ γνώσεται, ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως; πῶς δέ, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαί, αἷς πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὗται ἔξω, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ. εἶτα κἀκεῖνα ἀναίσθητα καὶ ἄμοιρα ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ, ἢ νοῦν ἔχει. καὶ εἰ νοῦν ἔχει, ἅμα ἐνταῦθα ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ὠδί, καὶ ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς οὗτος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ζητήσομεν,

[1] Total confidence in sense-perception was characteristic of the Epicureans: cp. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Mathem.* VIII 9 and VII 203 (*Against the Logicians* II 9 and I 203 Bury) = Epicurea fr. 244 and 247 Usener. The Sceptics were naturally

cursive reason to make judgments about them; for even if it is agreed that they are in the underlying sense-realities which sense-perception is to grasp, that which is known by sense-perception is an image of the thing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself: for that remains outside.[1] Now when Intellect knows, and knows the intelligibles, if it knows them as being other than itself, how could it make contact with them? For it is possible that it might not, so that it is possible that it might not know them, or know them only when it made contact with them, and it will not always possess its knowledge. But if they are going to say that the intelligibles and Intellect are linked, what does this "linked" mean? Then the acts of intelligence will be impressions; but if this is what they are, they come to it from outside and are impacts. But then how will the impressions be made, and what shape are things like intelligibles? And intellection will be of what is external, just like sense-perception. And in what way will it differ from sense-perception, except by grasping smaller objects? But how, also, will it know that it really grasped them? And how will it know that this is good or beautiful or just? For each of these will be other than it, and the principles of judgment on which it will rely will not be in itself, but these too will be outside, and that is where truth will be. Then again, either the intelligibles are without perception and without any share of life or intelligence, or they have intelligence. And if they have intelligence, both are here in them at once, truth is here and this is the primary Intellect,

much concerned to refute this position. But the argument Plotinus uses here is Platonic rather than Sceptic.

πῶς ἔχει ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἀλήθεια, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μὲν καὶ ἅμα, δύο δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, ἢ πῶς; εἰ δ' ἀνόητα καὶ ἄνευ ζωῆς, τί ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ προτάσεις οὐδὲ ἀξιώματα οὐδὲ λεκτά· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν καὶ αὐτὰ περὶ ἑτέρων λέγοι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα εἴη, οἷον τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, ἄλλου τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὄντος. εἰ δ' ἁπλᾶ φήσουσι, δίκαιον χωρὶς καὶ καλόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἕν τι οὐδ' ἐν ἑνὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ διεσπασμένον ἕκαστον. καὶ ποῦ καὶ κατὰ τίνας διέσπασται τόπους; πῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς συντεύξεται ὁ νοῦς περιθέων; πῶς δὲ μενεῖ; ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς μενεῖ[1]; τίνα δ' ὅλως μορφὴν ἢ τύπον ἕξει; εἰ μὴ ὥσπερ ἀγάλματα ἐκκείμενα χρυσᾶ ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς ὕλης ὑπό τινος πλάστου ἢ γραφέως πεποιημένα; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ θεωρῶν νοῦς αἴσθησις ἔσται. διὰ τί δὲ τὸ μέν ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τι; μέγιστον δὲ πάντων ἐκεῖνο· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δοίη τις ταῦτα ἔξω εἶναι καὶ τὸν νοῦν αὐτὰ

[1] BU^{pc}, Creuzer*: *μένει* wxU^{ac}C, H-S [1].

[1] Here Plotinus is arguing against those who see the knowledge of Intellect in terms of discursive logic, whether Aristotelian or Stoic. For "premises" cp. Aristotle *Anal. Priora* A 1, 24a16: for "axioms" and "expressions" cp. *SVF* II 132 and 136.

[2] In this passage Plotinus is arguing against contemporary Platonists like Longinus, who held that the Platonic Forms were external to and separate from Intellect (cp. Proclus *In Tim.* I. 322. 24 Diehl and, for Porphyry's original acceptance

and we shall proceed to investigate how truth and the intelligible and Intellect are related [in this unity-in-duality]: are they together in one and the same reality, but also two and diverse, or how are they related? But if they are without intelligence and life, what sort of realities are they? They are certainly not "premises" or "axioms" or "expressions"; for then they would only say something about other things and would not be the things themselves, as when [one says] "Justice is beautiful", though justice and beauty are different [from the words used].[1] But if they are going to say that justice and beauty are simple realities, justice by itself and beauty by itself, then first of all, the intelligible will not be a unity or in a unity, but each intelligible will be cut off from the others. Well, then, where will they be, and over what regions will they be dispersed? And how will Intellect encounter them when it runs round looking for them? And how will it stay in its place? How will it remain identical with itself? Whatever sort of shape or imprint will it receive from them? Unless we assume that they are like images set up, made of gold or some other material by a sculptor or engraver? But if this is so, the intellect which contemplates them will be sense-perception. And why should one of things like these be righteousness, and another something else [2]? But the greatest objection of all is this. If one grants that the objects of thought are as completely as possible outside In-

of this position and conversion, *Life of Plotinus* 18). He seems to have in mind particularly a very literal interpretation of the vision of the Forms in his favourite Phaedrus myth: cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247D–E.

οὕτως ἔχοντα θεωρεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ μήτε τὸ ἀληθὲς αὐτῶν ἔχειν διεψεῦσθαί τε ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς θεωρεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινὰ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖνα· θεωρήσει τοίνυν αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτά, εἴδωλα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ λαβών. τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἴδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὑτῷ λαβὼν τὰ ψευδῆ ἕξει καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰδήσει, ὅτι τὰ ψευδῆ ἔχει, ὁμολογήσει ἄμοιρος ἀληθείας εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοήσει καὶ οἰήσεται τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχων, διπλάσιον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος γενόμενον πολὺ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτὸν ἀποστήσει. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἀλήθεια, ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δόξα οὖσα ἄλλο παραδέχεται ἄλλου ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο ὃ παραδέχεται ἔχει. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ νῷ, οὗτος μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς οὔτε ἀλήθεια ἔσται οὔτε ἀληθείᾳ νοῦς οὔτε ὅλως νοῦς ἔσται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλοθί που ἡ ἀλήθεια ἔσται.

2. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ οὔτε ἔξω τὰ νοητὰ ζητεῖν, οὔτε τύπους ἐν τῷ νῷ τῶν ὄντων λέγειν εἶναι, οὔτε τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποστεροῦντας αὐτὸν ἀγνωσίαν τε τῶν νοητῶν ποιεῖν καὶ ἀνυπαρξίαν καὶ ἔτι αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν ἀναιρεῖν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ καὶ γνῶσιν δεῖ καὶ ἀλήθειαν εἰσάγειν καὶ τὰ ὄντα τηρεῖν καὶ γνῶσιν τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον, ἅτε εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἴχνος ἴσχοντας,

[1] Plotinus is here deriving δόξα from δέχομαι, by way of the adjective δόχος.

tellect, and that Intellect contemplates them as absolutely outside it, then it cannot possess the truth of them and must be deceived in everything it contemplates. For they would be the true realities; and on this supposition it will contemplate them without possessing them, but will only get images of them in a knowledge of this sort. If then it does not possess the true reality, but only receives in itself images of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. If, then, it knows that what it has is false, it will admit that it has no part in truth; but if it does not know even this, and thinks it has the truth when it has not, the falsehood in it will be doubled and will set it far away from the truth. (This is the reason, I think, why there is no truth in the senses, only opinion: opinion is opinion because it receives, and what it receives is different from that from which it receives it.)[1] So if there is not truth in Intellect, then an intellect of this sort will not be truth, or truly Intellect, or Intellect at all. But then truth will not be anywhere else either.

2. One must not, then, look for the intelligibles outside, or say that there are impressions of the real beings in Intellect, or by depriving it of truth make the intelligibles unknowable and non-existent and finally abolish Intellect itself. But, since one must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve reality and the knowledge of what each thing is—but not [only] the knowledge of each thing's qualities,[2] since [if we only had that] we should have an image and a trace of realities, and not possess

[2] For the important distinction between the thing itself and its quality (or "what it is like") cp. Plato *Letter VII* 342Eff.

ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὰ ἔχοντας καὶ συνόντας καὶ συγκραθέντας αὐτοῖς, τῷ ἀληθινῷ νῷ δοτέον τὰ πάντα. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἰδείη, καὶ ἀληθινῶς εἰδείη, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιλάθοιτο οὐδ' ἂν περιέλθοι ζητῶν, καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἕδρα ἔσται τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ζήσεται καὶ νοήσει. ἃ δὴ πάντα περὶ τὴν μακαριωτάτην φύσιν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· ἢ ποῦ τὸ τίμιον καὶ σεμνὸν ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ αὖ οὕτως οὐδ' ἀποδείξεως δεῖ οὐδὲ πίστεως, ὅτι οὕτως—αὐτὸς γὰρ οὕτως καὶ ἐναργὴς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ—καὶ εἴ τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἴ τι μετ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι αὐτός—καὶ οὐδεὶς πιστότερος αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτοῦ—καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὄντως· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφωνοῦσα ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτὴν ἄλλο λέγει, ⟨ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει⟩,[1] καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ὅ ἐστι, τοῦτο καὶ λέγει. τίς ἂν οὖν ἐλέγξειε; καὶ πόθεν οἴσει τὸν ἔλεγχον; εἰς γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὁ φερόμενος ἔλεγχος τῷ προειπόντι, κἂν κομίσῃ ὡς ἄλλο, φέρεται εἰς τὸν ἐξαρχῆς εἰπόντα καὶ ἕν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο ἀληθέστερον ἂν εὕροις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

3. Μία τοίνυν φύσις αὕτη ἡμῖν, νοῦς, τὰ ὄντα πάντα, ἡ ἀλήθεια· εἰ δέ, θεός τις μέγας· μᾶλλον δὲ οὔ τις, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἀξιοῖ ταῦτα εἶναι. καὶ θεὸς αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ θεὸς δεύτερος προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἷον κρηπῖδος, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ

[1] Theiler.

and live with and be fused with the realities themselves—we must attribute all [real existences] to the true Intellect. For in this way it will also know them, and know them truly and will not forget them or go round looking for them, and the truth will be in it and it will be the foundation of all realities and they will live and think. All this must belong to the most blessed nature: or where will its honour and majesty be? And then again, it will need no proof and no confirmation that it is so, for it is so, and is manifest to itself—and if there is anything before it, Intellect knows clearly that this is what it derives from, and if there is anything after it, it knows clearly that this is itself—and nobody can confirm this about it better than itself—and it knows clearly that all this is there in the intelligible world, and really there. So that the real truth is also there, which does not agree with something else, but with itself, and says nothing other than itself, but it is what it says and it says what it is. Who then could contradict it, and where would he bring his contradiction from? For the contradictory answer would coincide with the preceding statement, and even if one introduces it as different, it is brought into conformity with and is one with the original statement: for you could not find anything truer than the truth.

3. We have here, then, one nature, Intellect, all realities, and truth: if so, it is a great god; or, better, not just a god, but it demands as of right that this which it is is universal god. This nature is god, and the second god revealing himself before we see that other one: he, the First, is enthroned above and set firm on high on Intellect in this its

ἐξήρτηται. ἔδει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινὸς μηδ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν, οἷον πρὸ μεγάλου βασιλέως πρόεισι μὲν πρῶτα ἐν ταῖς προόδοις τὰ ἐλάττω, ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ σεμνότερα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ περὶ βασιλέα ἤδη μᾶλλον βασιλικώτερα, εἶτα τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν τίμια· ἐφ' ἅπασι δὲ τούτοις βασιλεὺς προφαίνεται ἐξαίφνης αὐτὸς ὁ μέγας, οἱ δ' εὔχονται καὶ προσκυνοῦσιν, ὅσοι μὴ προαπῆλθον ἀρκεσθέντες τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ὀφθεῖσιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἄλλος, οἵ τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόντες ἄλλοι αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖ βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίων ἄρχων, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὴν δικαιοτάτην καὶ φύσει ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ βασιλείαν, ἅτε τῆς ἀληθείας βασιλεὺς καὶ ὢν κατὰ φύσιν κύριος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀθρόου γεννήματος καὶ θείου συντάγματος, βασιλεὺς βασιλέως καὶ βασιλέων καὶ πατὴρ δικαιότερον ἂν κληθεὶς θεῶν, ὃν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ταύτῃ ἐμιμήσατο τὴν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος θεωρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ προπάτορος οἷον ἐνέργειαν εἰς ὑπόστασιν οὐσίας.

4. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιήσασθαι εἰς ἓν καὶ ἀληθῶς ἕν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ἕν, ἃ πολλὰ ὄντα μετοχῇ ἑνὸς ἕν—δεῖ δὲ τὸ μὴ μετοχῇ

[1] The remarkable correction of the metaphor here should be noted. The First towers above Intellect like a statue on its pedestal or an Oriental king on his throne, but is in no way supported or elevated by it. Intellect is totally dependent for its existence on That of which it is called the "pedestal".

beauty, like a pedestal, and the pedestal, Intellect, hangs from it.[1] For the First in its progress could not take its stand upon something soulless, nor immediately upon Soul, but there must be an inconceivable beauty going out before it, as in the procession before a great king the lesser ranks go first, and then in succession the greater and after them the yet more majestic and the court which has still more of royal dignity, and then those who are honoured next after the king; and after all these the great king himself is suddenly revealed, and the people pray and prostrate themselves before him—those at least who have not gone away beforehand, satisfied with what they saw before the coming of the king. Now in our example the king is a different person from those who go before him; but the king there in the higher world does not rule over different, alien people, but has the most just, the natural sovereignty and the true kingdom; for he is king of truth and natural lord of all his own offspring and divine company, king of the king and of the kings, and more rightly than Zeus called the father of the gods; Zeus imitates him in this way also in that he is not satisfied with the contemplation of his father but aspires to, we might say, the active power with which his grandfather establishes reality in being.[2]

4. We have said, then,[3] that the ascent must be made to a one, and this means truly one, but not one like all other things which are multiple and one by participation in a one—the One must be grasped

[2] The usual identification of the Three Hypostases with the successive mythological chief gods, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus.

[3] In the first part of this work, III. 8. 10–11.

ἓν λαβεῖν μηδὲ τὸ οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ πολλά—καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν νοητὸς κόσμος καὶ ὁ νοῦς μᾶλλον ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐγγυτέρω αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐ μὴν τὸ καθαρῶς ἕν, εἴρηται. τί δὲ τὸ καθαρῶς ἓν καὶ ὄντως καὶ οὐ κατ' ἄλλο, νῦν θεάσασθαι ποθοῦμεν, εἴ πῃ δυνατόν. χρὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ᾖξαι πρὸς ἕν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἔτι προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ στῆναι παντελῶς δεδιότα αὐτοῦ ἀποστατῆσαι μηδὲ τοὐλάχιστον μηδὲ εἰς δύο προελθεῖν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσχες δύο, οὐκ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ ἄμφω ὕστερα. οὐ γὰρ θέλει μετ' ἄλλου οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε ὁποσουοῦν συναριθμεῖσθαι οὐδ' ὅλως ἀριθμεῖσθαι· μέτρον γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ μετρούμενον, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ οὐκ ἴσον, ἵνα σὺν αὐτοῖς· εἰ δὲ μή, κοινόν τι ἔσται ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναριθμουμένων, κἀκεῖνο πρὸ αὐτοῦ· δεῖ δὲ μηδέν. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ οὐσιώδης ἀριθμὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδέ γε ὁ ὕστερος τούτου, ὁ τοῦ ποσοῦ· οὐσιώδης μὲν ὁ τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ παρέχων, τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ὁ τὸ ποσὸν μετ' ἄλλων ἢ ἔτι [1] μὴ μετ' ἄλλων, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸς τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἓν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν ἀπομιμουμένη τὴν ἐν τοῖς προτέροις ἀριθμοῖς

[1] Theiler: ὅτι Enn., Perna, Creuzer: ὅ τι Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchhoff*: ἔτι ὅ A^{3mg}(= Ficinus): ἔτι ὁ Cilento.

[1] "Essential number" is Platonic Ideal Number. For the way in which Plotinus understands the Platonic Ideal Numbers, see the treatise *On Numbers* VI. 6 [34] to which he refers forward at the end of this chapter.

that is not one by participation and is not as much many as one—and that the intelligible universe and Intellect are more one than all other things, and there is nothing nearer the One itself, but all the same this is not the pure One. Now we long to see, if it is in any way possible, what is the pure, real One, unrelated to anything else. At this point, then, you must rush to one, and not any longer add anything to it, but stand absolutely still in fear of departing from it, and not progress the least little way towards two. If not, you get two, and not a two which contains the One, but [a two of which] both units are posterior to it. For it will not be included in the count with another one, or another number of any size; it will not be counted at all: for it is a measure and not measured, and it is not equal to the other units so as to be one of their company; otherwise, there will be something in common between it and those which are included in the count with it, and that something in common will be before the One itself; but there must be nothing [before the One itself]. It does not even belong to the category of essential number, and so certainly not to that which is posterior to it of quantitative number [1] (substantial number is that which continually gives existence, quantitative number is that which gives quantity when it is with other numbers, and still when it is not with other numbers, if this [which is not with other numbers] really is a number). Since the nature which belongs to the numbers in the class of quantitative number, imitating in relation to the one which is their principle the relationship of the nature in the prior [substantial]

φύσις πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἓν οὐκ ἀναλίσκουσα τὸ ἓν οὐδὲ κερματίζουσα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυάδος γενομένης ἔστι μονὰς ἡ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῇ δυάδι μονὰς ἑκατέρα οὐδ' ἑτέρα ἐκείνη. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁποτεραοῦν; εἰ οὖν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν, ἄλλη ἐκείνη καὶ μένουσα οὗ[1] μένει. πῶς οὖν ἕτεραι ἐκεῖναι; καὶ πῶς ἡ δυὰς ἕν; καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸ ἕν, ὅπερ ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ περιεχομένῃ. ἢ μετέχειν τῆς πρώτης φατέον, ἄλλας δὲ ἧς μετέχουσι, καὶ τὴν δυάδα δέ, καθὸ ἕν, μετέχειν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως στρατὸς ἓν καὶ οἰκία. καὶ αὕτη πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ὡς εἶναι ἕν, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἕν. ἆρ' οὖν αἱ μὲν μονάδες ἄλλως αἱ ἐν πεντάδι καὶ δεκάδι, τὸ δὲ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῇ πεντάδι πρὸς τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος τὸ αὐτό; ἤ, εἰ ναῦς πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶσαν, μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλην, καὶ πόλις πρὸς πόλιν, καὶ στρατὸς πρὸς στρατόν, ταὐτὸ ἓν καὶ ἐνταῦθα· εἰ δὲ μηδ' ἐκεῖ, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα. εἰ γάρ τινες περὶ τούτων ἀπορίαι, ὕστερον.

5. Ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἐπανιτέον λέγουσιν, ὅτι μένε τὸ πρῶτον τὸ αὐτό, κἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνηται ἕτερα. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς μένοντος μὲν τοῦ ἕν, ποιοῦντος δὲ ἄλλου, ὁ ἀριθμὸς γίνεται κατ' αὐτό·[2] ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν ὄντων μένει μὲν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἕν· μένοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐκ

[1] B-T: οὐ Enn., H-S [1].

[2] (idem atque 3 ἄλλου) w, Perna, Müller: κατὰ ταὐτὸ BxUC, H-S [1]: κατ' αὐτὸ ⟨τὸ ἕν⟩ Volkmann*: κατὰ τὸ ⟨ἕν⟩ Theiler.

numbers to the real One, does not exist by expending or breaking up its one, but when a dyad comes to be, the monad before the dyad exists, neither each of the two units in the dyad nor one of them is the monad in the dyad. For why should it be one of them more than the other? If then it is neither of them, it is different, and remains where it remains. How then are those [two units of the dyad] different? And how is the dyad one? and is it the same one, which is in each of the two terms comprised in the dyad? It must be maintained that they participate in the first monad, but are other than that in which they participate, and the dyad, in so far as it is one, also participates, but not in the same sense: for an army and a house are not one in the same way. A house is one in virtue of its continuous structure, not by substantial unity or quantitative unity. Are then the monads in the number five and the number ten different, but is the one in the number five the same as the one in the number ten? Now if every ship is the same as every other ship, small the same as great, and every city the same as another city or army the same as another army, then here also the one is the same; but if not in those other cases, then not here either. If there are any difficulties about this, we will deal with them later.

5. But we must go back to that point where we said that the First remains the same even if other things come into being from it. In the case of numbers, then, the one remains unchanged, but another one makes number, and number comes into existence on the model of it; but in the case of that which truly exists, here the One still more remains unchanged before the real beings; but

ἄλλο ποιεῖ, εἰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ αὐτὸ γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἦν τοῦ πρώτου—τῆς μονάδος—ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἶδος πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσης ἑκάστου μεταλαμβάνοντος τῶν ὕστερον αὐτῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἔχει τι ἐκείνου οἷον εἶδος ἐν αὑτῷ. κἀκεῖ μὲν ἡ μετάληψις τὸ ποσὸν ὑπέστησεν αὐτῶν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ [τὸ ἴχνος τοῦ ἑνὸς] [1] τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῖς ὑπεστήσατο, ὥστ' εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἴχνος ⟨τοῦ⟩ [2] ἑνός. καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο—ἡ τῆς οὐσίας δηλωτικὴ ὀνομασία—ἀπὸ τοῦ ἓν εἴ τις λέγοι γεγονέναι, τάχ' ἂν τύχοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. τὸ γάρ τοι λεγόμενον ὂν τοῦτο πρῶτον ἐκεῖθεν οἷον ὀλίγον προβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἔτι πρόσω ἐλθεῖν, μεταστραφὲν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἔστη, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐσία καὶ ἑστία [3] ἁπάντων· οἷον ἐν φθόγγῳ ἐναπερείσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φωνοῦντος ὑφίσταται τὸ ἓν δηλοῦν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ὂν σημαῖνον τὸ φθεγξάμενον, ὡς δύναται. οὕτω τοι τὸ μὲν γενόμενον, ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι, μίμησιν ἔχοντα ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ ῥυέντα· ἡ δὲ ἰδοῦσα καὶ ἐπικινηθεῖσα τῷ θεάματι μιμουμένη ὃ εἶδεν ἔρρηξε φωνὴν τὴν "ὄν" καὶ "τὸ εἶναι" καὶ "οὐσίαν" καὶ "ἑστίαν." οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ φθόγγοι θέλουσι σημῆναι τὴν ὑπόστασιν γεννηθέντος ὠδῖνι τοῦ φθεγγομένου ἀπομιμούμενοι, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτοῖς, τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ὄντος.

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] transpos. Theiler.
[3] Vitringa, Müller*: ἔστιν Enn.

while it remains unchanged, it is not another which makes, if the real beings are modelled on the One, but the one itself is sufficient to generate reality. And, as there in the case of numbers, the form of the first, the monad, was in all of them primarily or secondarily, and each of the numbers which come after the monad did not participate in it equally, so here too each of the beings which come after the First has in itself a kind of form of it. Their participation made the quantity of the numbers exist, but here it gives beings substantial existence, so that being is a trace of the One. And if someone says that this word *einai* [being]—which is the term which signifies substantial existence—has been derived from the word *hen* [one] he might have hit upon the truth. For this which we call primary being proceeded, so to speak, a little way from the One, but did not wish to go still further, but turned inwards and took its stand [*estē*] there, and became substance [*ousia*] and hearth [*hestia*] of all things; it is like what happens in the utterance of the sound: when the utterer presses on it *hen* is produced which manifests the origin from the One and *on* [being] signifying that which uttered, as best it can. Thus that which came to exist, substance and being, has an image of the One since it flows from its power; and the [soul] which sees it and is moved to speech by the sight, imaging what it saw, cried out "*on*" and "*einai*", and "*ousia*" and "*hestia*". For these sounds intend to signify the real nature of that produced by the birth-pangs of the utterer, imitating, as far as they are able, the generation of real being.

6. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὡς τις ἐθέλει, λελέχθω. τῆς δὲ γενομένης οὐσίας εἴδους οὔσης—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλο τι ἄν τις εἴποι τὸ ἐκεῖθεν γενόμενον—καὶ εἴδους οὐ τινός, ἀλλὰ παντός, ὡς μὴ ἂν ὑπολιπεῖν τι ἄλλο, ἀνάγκη ἀνείδεον ἐκεῖνο εἶναι. ἀνείδεον δὲ ὂν οὐκ οὐσία· τόδε γάρ τι δεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ὡρισμένον· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὡς τόδε· ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ὃ τόδε εἴρηκας εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ, τί τῶν ἐν τούτῳ ἐκεῖνο ἐρεῖς; οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὂν μόνον ἂν λέγοιτο ἐπέκεινα τούτων. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ὄν· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα ὄντος. τὸ γὰρ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος οὐ τόδε λέγει—οὐ γὰρ τίθησιν—οὐδὲ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγει, ἀλλὰ φέρει μόνον τὸ οὐ τοῦτο. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦν οὐδαμοῦ αὐτὸ περιλαμβάνει· γελοῖον γὰρ ζητεῖν ἐκείνην τὴν ἄπλετον φύσιν περιλαμβάνειν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο βουλόμενος ποιεῖν ἀπέστησεν αὑτὸν καὶ τοῦ ὁπωσοῦν καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ εἰς ἴχνος αὐτοῦ ἰέναι· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἠντινοητὴν φύσιν βουλόμενος ἰδεῖν οὐδεμίαν φαντασίαν αἰσθητοῦ ἔχων θεάσεται ὅ ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεάσασθαι θέλων τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοητοῦ τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν ἀφεὶς θεάσεται, ὅτι μὲν

6. But these [etymologies] are to be taken as anyone wishes. Since the substance which is generated [from the One] is form—one could not say that what is generated from that source is anything else—and not the form of some one thing but of everything, so that no other form is left outside it, the One must be without form. But if it is without form it is not a substance; for a substance must be some one particular thing, something, that is, defined and limited; but it is impossible to apprehend the One as a particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only that particular thing which you said it was. But if all things are in that which is generated [from the One], which of the things in it are you going to say that the One is? Since it is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond them. But these things are beings, and being: so it is "beyond being".[1] This phrase "beyond being" does not mean that it is a particular thing—for it makes no positive statement about it—and it does not say its name, but all it implies is that it is "not this". But if this is what the phrase does, it in no way comprehends the One: it would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature; for anyone who wants to do this has put himself out of the way of following at all, even the least distance, in its traces; but just as he who wishes to see the intelligible nature will contemplate what is beyond the perceptible if he has no mental image of the perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when

[1] Yet again the phrase from Plato *Republic* VI 509B9; its usual companion, the negative conclusion of the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, appears below (line 12).

ἔστι διὰ τούτου μαθών, οἷον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἀφείς. τὸ δὲ "οἷον" σημαίνοι ἂν τὸ οὐχ οἷον· οὐ γὰρ ἔνι οὐδὲ τὸ "οἷον," ὅτῳ μηδὲ τὸ "τὶ." ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς ταῖς ἡμετέραις ὠδῖσιν ἀποροῦμεν ὅ τι χρὴ λέγειν, καὶ λέγομεν περὶ οὐ ῥητοῦ, καὶ ὀνομάζομεν σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες, ὡς δυνάμεθα. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ "ἕν" ὄνομα τοῦτο ἄρσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ πολλά. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ συμβολικῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐσήμαινον ἀποφάσει τῶν πολλῶν. εἰ δὲ θέσις τις τὸ ἕν, τό τε ὄνομα τό τε δηλούμενον, ἀσαφέστερον ἂν γίνοιτο τοῦ εἰ μή τις ὄνομα ἔλεγεν αὐτοῦ· τάχα γὰρ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο, ἵνα ὁ ζητήσας, ἀρξάμενος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὃ πάντως[1] ἁπλότητός ἐστι σημαντικόν, ἀποφήσῃ τελευτῶν καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς τεθὲν μὲν ὅσον οἷόν τε καλῶς τῷ θεμένῳ οὐκ ἄξιον μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἰς δήλωσιν τῆς φύσεως ἐκείνης, ὅτι μηδὲ ἀκουστὸν ἐκεῖνο μηδὲ τῷ ἀκούοντι δεῖ συνετὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινί, τῷ ὁρῶντι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὁρῶν εἶδος ζητεῖ βλέπειν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἴσεται.

7. Ἡ ἐπειδὴ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπειν, οἷον ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ—τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὅραμα αὐτῷ, τὸ εἶδος τὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ὁρᾷ τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ἕτερον ὂν τοῦ εἴδους, αἴτιον δὲ τῷ εἴδει τοῦ[2] ὁρᾶσθαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἴδους συνορώμενον· διὸ

[1] Theiler: *πάντων* Enn.
[2] A^{pc}R^{pc}C^{2s}, Perna*: *τὸ* A^{ac}EBR^{ac}JUC.

[1] For this Pythagorean etymology cp. Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 381F.

he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that it is by means of the intelligible, but what it is like by letting the intelligible go. But this " what it is like " must indicate that it is " not like ": for there is no " being like " in what is not a " something ". But we in our travail do not know what we ought to say, and are speaking of what cannot be spoken, and give it a name because we want to indicate it to ourselves as best we can. But perhaps this name " One " contains [only] a denial of multiplicity. This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated it to each other by the name of Apollo, in negation of the multiple.[1] But if the One—name and reality expressed—was to be taken positively it would be less clear than if we did not give it a name at all: for perhaps this name [One] was given it in order that the seeker, beginning from this which is completely indicative of simplicity, may finally negate this as well, because, though it was given as well as possible by its giver, not even this is worthy to manifest that nature; since that cannot be heard, nor may it be understood by one who hears, but, if at all, by one who sees. But if the seer tries to look at a form, he will not know even that.

7. For, again, actual seeing is double; take the eye as an example, for it has one object of sight which is the form of the object perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium through which the form of its object is perceived, which is also itself perceptible to the eye; it is different from the form, but is the cause of the form's being seen; it is seen concurrently in the form and with the form; this is the

οὐκ ἐναργῆ τότε δίδωσι τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ, ἅτε τοῦ ὄμματος τετραμμένου πρὸς τὸ πεφωτισμένον· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο ᾖ παρ' αὐτό, ἀθρόᾳ εἶδε προσβολῇ, καίτοι καὶ τότε εἶδεν ἐπερειδόμενον ἄλλῳ, μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ γενόμενον, μὴ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ, οὐ δύναται ἡ αἴσθησις λαβεῖν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τάχ' ἂν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξέφυγεν, εἰ μὴ ὄγκος ὑπέκειτο [1] αὐτῷ στερεώτερος. εἰ δέ τις φῶς πᾶν εἶναι αὐτὸν λέγοι, τοῦτο ἄν τις λάβοι πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ λεγομένου· ἔσται γὰρ φῶς ἐν οὐδενὶ εἴδει τῶν ἄλλων ὁρωμένων, καὶ ἴσως ὁρατὸν μόνον· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ὁρατὰ οὐ φῶς μόνον. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψις· ὁρᾷ μὲν καὶ αὕτη δι' ἄλλου φωτὸς τὰ πεφωτισμένα ἐκείνῃ τῇ πρώτῃ φύσει, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντος ὁρᾷ· νεύουσα μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν καταλαμπομένων φύσιν ἧττον αὐτὸ ὁρᾷ· εἰ δ' ἀφήσει τὰ ὁρώμενα καὶ δι' οὗ εἶδεν εἰς αὐτὸ βλέποι, φῶς ἂν καὶ φωτὸς ἀρχὴν ἂν βλέποι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μὴ ὡς ἔξω ὂν δεῖ τὸν νοῦν τοῦτο τὸ φῶς βλέπειν, πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἰτέον, ὅς ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ τὸ ἔξω φῶς οὐδὲ τὸ ἀλλότριον εἴσεται, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ ἔξω οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ μᾶλλον στιλπνότερον ἐν ἀκαρεῖ θεᾶται, ἢ νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ [πρὸ αὐτοῦ] [2] ἐξ αὐτοῦ προπηδήσαντος, ἢ ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθελήσας τῶν ἄλλων βλέπειν προβάλλοιτο πρὸ

[1] Harder: ἐπέκειτο Enn.
[2] del. MacKenna, Harder, Theiler.

[1] Here Plotinus is assuming, for the purposes of his illustration, the common doctrine, that sight takes place through a medium. But in his fuller (and earlier) discussion of the problem in IV. 5 (29) he rejects the medium theory and holds that sense-perception takes place through the universal sympathy of the All.

reason why it affords no clear perception of itself, since the eye is directed to the illuminated object; but when there is nothing there but the medium, the eye sees it by an instantaneous immediate perception, though even then it sees it based upon something different, but if it is alone and not resting on something else the sense is not able to grasp it.[1] For even the light of the sun which it has in itself would perhaps escape our sense of sight if a more solid mass did not lie under it. But if someone said that the sun was all light, one might take this as contributing to the explanation of what we are trying to say; for the sun will then be light which is in no form belonging to other visible things, and will be, perhaps, purely visible: for the other visible objects are not pure light. This, then, is what the seeing of Intellect is like; this also sees by another light the things illuminated by that first nature, and sees the light in them; when it turns its attention to the nature of the things illuminated, it sees the light less; but if it abandons the things it sees and looks at the medium by which it sees them, it looks at light and the source of light. But since Intellect must not see this light as external, we must go back again to the eye; this will itself sometimes know a light which is not the external, alien light, but it momentarily sees before the external light a light of its own, a brighter one; it either springs out from itself at night in the dark or, when the eye does not want to look at anything else, it lowers the

αὐτοῦ τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν τὸ φῶς ὅμως προφέρων, ἢ καὶ πιέσαντος τοῦ ἔχοντος τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ φῶς ἴδοι. τότε γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶν ὁρᾷ καὶ μάλιστα τότε ὁρᾷ· φῶς γὰρ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄλλα φωτοειδῆ μὲν ἦν, φῶς δὲ οὐκ ἦν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ νοῦς αὑτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καλύψας καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἴσω μηδὲν ὁρῶν θεάσεται οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ φῶς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν ἐφ' αὑτοῦ ἐξαίφνης φανέν, ὥστε ἀπορεῖν ὅθεν ἐφάνη, ἔξωθεν ἢ ἔνδον, καὶ ἀπελθόντος εἰπεῖν "ἔνδον ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἔνδον αὖ."

8. Ἡ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν πόθεν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ πόθεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἔρχεται οὔτε ἄπεισιν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται· διὸ οὐ χρὴ διώκειν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ μένειν, ἕως ἂν φανῇ, παρασκευάσαντα ἑαυτὸν θεατὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνατολὰς ἡλίου περιμένει· ὁ δὲ ὑπερφανεὶς τοῦ ὁρίζοντος—ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί—ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν θεάσαθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὑτοσὶ δέ, ὃν μιμεῖται ὁ ἥλιος, ὑπερσχήσει πόθεν; καὶ τί ὑπερβαλὼν φανήσεται; ἢ αὐτὸν ὑπερσχὼν τὸν νοῦν τὸν θεώμενον· ἑστήξεται μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν θέαν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπων, ἐκεῖ ἑαυτὸν πᾶς τρέπων καὶ διδούς, στὰς δὲ καὶ οἷον πληρωθεὶς μένους εἶδε μὲν τὰ πρῶτα καλλίω γενόμενον ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστίλβοντα, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντος αὐτοῦ. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ᾔει, ὥς τις προσεδόκα, ἀλλ' ἦλθεν ὡς οὐκ ἐλθών· ὤφθη γὰρ ὡς οὐκ

eyelids before it and all the same sends out light, or the eye's possessor squeezes it and sees the light in it. For then in not seeing it sees, and sees then most of all: for it sees light; but the other things which it saw had the form of light but were not light. Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward, when it is not looking at anything will see a light, not a distinct light in something different from itself, but suddenly appearing, alone by itself in independent purity, so that Intellect is at a loss to know whence it has appeared, whether it has come from outside or within, and after it has gone away will say "It was within, and yet it was not within."

8. But one should not enquire whence it comes, for there is no "whence": for it does not really come or go away anywhere, but appears or does not appear. So one must not chase after it, but wait quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contemplate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun rising over the horizon ("from Ocean", the poets say)[1] gives itself to the eyes to see. But from where will he of whom the sun is an image rise? What is the horizon which he will mount above when he appears? He will be above Intellect itself which contemplates him. For Intellect will be standing first to its contemplation, looking to nothing but the Beautiful, all turning and giving itself up to him, and, motionless and filled somehow with strength, it sees first of all itself become more beautiful, all glittering, because he is near. But he did not come as one expected, but came as one who did not come:

[1] Cp. e.g. Homer *Iliad* 7. 421–2.

ἐλθών, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἁπάντων παρών, πρὶν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐλθεῖν. εἶναι δὲ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀπιόντα, ὅτι μὴ οἶδε ποῦ δεῖ μένειν καὶ ποῦ ἐκεῖνος μένει, ὅτι ἐν οὐδενί. καὶ εἰ οἷόν τε ἦν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ μένειν μηδαμοῦ—οὐχ ὅτι ἐν τόπῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐν τόπῳ ἀλλ' ὅλως μηδαμοῦ—ἦν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνον βλέπων· καίτοι οὐδὲ βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἓν ἐκείνῳ ὢν καὶ οὐ δύο. νῦν δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶ νοῦς, οὕτω βλέπει, ὅτε βλέπει, τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ. θαῦμα δή, πῶς οὐκ ἐλθὼν πάρεστι, καὶ πῶς οὐκ ὢν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὑτωσὶ αὐτόθεν θαυμάσαι, τῷ δὲ γνόντι, τὸ ἐναντίον εἴπερ ἦν, θαυμάσαι· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἵνα τις καὶ θαυμάσῃ. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε·

9. πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ τῷ πεποιηκότι ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ εἴη τι μετὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό· ἅτε γὰρ γενόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν δεηθὲν ἄλλου, ἄλλου δεῖται πανταχοῦ· διόπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ. πέφυκεν οὖν τὰ μὲν ὕστατα ἐν τοῖς πρὸ αὑτῶν ὑστάτοις, τὰ δ' [ἐν πρώτοις][1] ἐν τοῖς προτέροις καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἕως εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχὴν ὄν.[2] ἀρχὴ δέ, ἅτε μηδὲν ἔχουσα πρὸ αὑτῆς, οὐκ ἔχει ἐν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ·

[1] del. Page, Harder, B-T.

[2] *πρῶτον ἀρχὴν ὄν* coniecimus: *πρῶτον ἀρχῆς* Enn.*: *πρῶτον ἀρχὴ ὄν* Harder, H-S[1]: *πρὸ ἀρχῆς* Theiler: *πρῶτον ἔλθῃς* suspic. de Strycker.

[1] This passage is one of the most difficult in the *Enneads* to reconcile with the imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which we find elsewhere, notably in the

for he was seen, not as having come, but as being there before all things, and even before Intellect came. It is Intellect which comes, and again Intellect which goes away, because it does not know where to stay and where he stays, that is in nothing.[1] And if it was possible for Intellect to abide in that nowhere—I do not mean that Intellect is in place: it is no more in place than he is, but [in that sense] absolutely nowhere—it would always behold him, or rather not behold him, but be one with him, not two. But as it is, because it is Intellect, it sees him, when it does see him, with that of it which is not Intellect. It is really a wonder how he is present without having come, and how, though he is nowhere, there is nowhere where he is not. One can, certainly, be surprised in this way at the first moment, but one who knows would be surprised if the opposite was true; but, rather, the opposite could not even happen for one to be surprised at. For this is how it is:

9. Everything which is brought into being by something else is either in that which made it or in another thing, if there is something after what made it; for, in that it is brought into being by something else and needed something else for its coming into being, it needs something else at every point: and this is why it is also in something else. The last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those before them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle. But the Principle, since it has nothing before it, has not anything else to be in; but since it

first six chapters of the treatise *On Time and Eternity* III. 7. Plotinus here seems to be speaking directly from his own experience, without considering the metaphysical implications.

μὴ ἔχουσα δ' ἐν ὅτῳ αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἐν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ ἄλλα περιείληφε πάντα αὐτή· περιλαβοῦσα δὲ οὔτ' ἐσκεδάσθη εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐχομένη. ἔχουσα δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ οὐκ ἐχομένη οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔχει. δε δὲ μὴ ἔχεται, οὐκ ἔστιν· ὥστε ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, τῷ μὲν μὴ περιέχεσθαι οὐκ οὖσα, τῷ δ' εἶναι παντὸς ἐλευθέρα οὐδαμοῦ κωλυομένη εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ αὖ κεκώλυται, ὥρισται ὑπ' ἄλλου, καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἄμοιρα αὐτοῦ, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ θεός, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐφ' αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δουλεύων τοῖς μετ' αὐτόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔν τινι ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, οὗ ἐστιν· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ποῦ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μή. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνθαδί, δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλος αὐτὸν κατέχει τόπος, καὶ ἐνθαδὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὥστε ψεῦδος τὸ οὐ ποῦ. εἰ οὖν ἀληθὲς τὸ οὐ ποῦ καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ ποῦ, ἵνα μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀποστατοῖ. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ οὐ ποῦ ὤν, πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ὧδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδί· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὅλον ὡδί· ὥστε ὅλον πανταχοῦ οὐδενὸς [ἑνὸς][1] ἔχοντος αὐτὸ οὐδ' αὖ μὴ ἔχοντος· ἐχομένου ἄρα ὁτουοῦν. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὅτι, ἐπεὶ

[1] om. Q: del. Kirchhoff*.

has nothing else to be in, and the other things are in those which come before them, it encompasses all the other things. But in encompassing them it is not dispersed into them and it possesses them without being possessed. But certainly, if it possesses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in which it is not: for if it is not in anything, it does not possess it. But if it is not possessed, it is not there. So it is there and not there; it is not there because it is not in the grasp of anything, but because it is free from everything it is not prevented from being anywhere. For if, on the other hand, it was prevented, it would be limited by something else, and what comes next would be without a share in it, and God would go just so far, and would not be independent but a slave to the beings which come after him. The things, therefore, which are in something are there where they are; but everything which is not somewhere has nowhere where it is not. For if it is not here, it is clear that another place contains it, and it is here in something else, so that the " not somewhere " is false. If therefore the " not somewhere " is true and the " somewhere " is false (so that it may not be in something else), it will not be absent from anything. But if it is not absent from anything and is not anywhere, it is everywhere independent. And one part of it is not here and another there: it is not even here as a whole; so that it is everywhere as a whole; nothing possesses it or does not possess it; that is, everything is possessed by it.[1] Observe the universe also, that,

[1] The starting-point of this discussion of the placelessness of the One is to be found in phrases of Plato's *Parmenides*: cp. 138B5, 144B2, 131B.

μηδεὶς κόσμος πρὸ αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ αὐτὸς
οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τόπῳ· τίς γὰρ τόπος πρὶν κόσμον
εἶναι; τὰ δὲ μέρη ἀνηρτημένα εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν
ἐκείνῳ. ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἐν
αὐτῇ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τόπος τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ
ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν νῷ, σῶμα δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ, νοῦς δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ·
τούτου δὲ οὐκέτι ἄλλο, ἵν' ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἐν
ὁτῳοῦν ἄρα· ταύτῃ οὖν οὐδαμῇ. ποῦ οὖν τὰ
ἄλλα; ἐν αὐτῷ. οὔτε ἄρα ἀφέστηκε τῶν ἄλλων
οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχον
αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἔχει τὰ πάντα. διὸ καὶ ταύτῃ
ἀγαθὸν τῶν πάντων, ὅτι καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἀνήρτηται
πάντα εἰς αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλως. διὸ καὶ ἀγαθώτερα
ἕτερα ἑτέρων, ὅτι καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἕτερα ἑτέρων.

10. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μή μοι δι' ἑτέρων αὐτὸ ὅρα· εἰ δὲ
μή, ἴχνος ἂν ἴδοις, οὐκ αὐτό· ἀλλ' ἐννόει, τί ἂν εἴη
τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι λαβεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὂν καθαρὸν
οὐδενὶ μιγνύμενον μετεχόντων ἁπάντων αὐτοῦ
μηδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτό· ἄλλο μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν
τοιοῦτον, δεῖ δέ τι τοιοῦτον εἶναι. τίς ἂν οὖν τὴν
δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἕλοι ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὁμοῦ
πᾶσαν, τί ἄν τις αὐτοῦ διαφέροι; κατὰ μέρος ἄρα;
ἀλλὰ προσβαλεῖς μὲν ἀθρόως ὁ προσβάλλων, ὅλον
δὲ οὐκ ἀπαγγελεῖς· εἰ δὲ μή, νοῦς νοῶν ἔσῃ, κἂν

[1] That body is in soul is Platonic doctrine: cp. Plato *Timaeus* 36E. Plotinus here develops it powerfully to

since there is no universe before it, it is not itself in a universe, nor again in place: for what place could there be before a universe existed? But its parts are dependent on it and in it. But Soul is not in the universe, but the universe in it: for body is not the soul's place, but Soul is in Intellect and body in Soul,[1] and Intellect in something else; but there is nothing other than this for it to be in: it is not, then, in anything; in this way therefore, it is nowhere. Where then are the other things? In it. It has not, then, gone away from all other things, nor is God himself in them, nor is there anything which possesses the First, but it possesses everything. Therefore it is in this way also the Good of everything, because all things have their being directed towards it and depend upon it, each in a different way.[2] Therefore some things are better than others, because some things have more existence than others.

10. But do not, I beg you, look at it through other things: otherwise you might see a trace of it, not itself; but consider what this might be which it is possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed with nothing, in which all things have a share, though nothing has it: for there is nothing else like this, but there must be something like this. Who, then, could capture its power all together as a whole? For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why would one be different from it? Does one then grasp it partially? But when you concentrate on it, you will do so totally, but you will not declare

establish, again, the placeless omnipresence of the One.

[2] A remarkable example of the ease with which Plotinus interchanges masculine and neuter, "personal" and "impersonal" ways of speaking of the First Principle.

τύχῃς, ἐκεῖνός σε [1] ἐκφεύξεται, μᾶλλον δὲ σὺ αὐτόν. ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὁρᾷς, ὅλον βλέπε· ὅταν δὲ νοῇς, ὅ τι ἂν μνημονεύσῃς αὐτοῦ, νόει, ὅτι τἀγαθόν—ζωῆς γὰρ ἔμφρονος καὶ νοερᾶς αἴτιος δύναμις ὤν, ἀφ' οὗ ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς ὅ τί ⟨τε⟩ [2] οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ὄντος—ὅτι ἕν—ἁπλοῦν γὰρ καὶ πρῶτον—ὅτι ἀρχή—ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ πάντα· ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη—οὐ γὰρ [3] ἐν αὐτῷ—ἀπ' αὐτοῦ στάσις, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὴ ἐδεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται οὐδ' ἔστηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶχεν οὔτε ἐν ᾧ στήσεται οὔτε ἐν ᾧ κινηθήσεται· περὶ τί γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τί ἢ ἐν τίνι; πρῶτος γὰρ αὐτός. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πεπερασμένος [εἶναι]·[4] ὑπὸ τίνος γάρ; ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄπειρος ὡς μέγεθος· ποῦ γὰρ ἔδει προελθεῖν [5] αὐτὸν ἢ ἵνα τί γένηται αὐτῷ οὐδενὸς δεομένῳ; τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ᾗ [6] δύναμις ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ποτὲ οὐδ' ἐπιλείψει, ὅπου καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιλείποντα δι' αὐτόν.

11. Καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τούτῳ τῷ μὴ πλέον ἑνὸς εἶναι μηδὲ ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ ὁριεῖ τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· τῷ γὰρ ἓν εἶναι οὐ μεμέτρηται οὐδ' εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἥκει. οὔτ' οὖν πρὸς ἄλλο οὔτε πρὸς αὑτὸ πεπέρανται· ἐπεὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη καὶ δύο. οὐδὲ σχῆμα τοίνυν, ὅτι μηδὲ μέρη, οὐδὲ μορφή. μὴ τοίνυν ζήτει θνητοῖς ὄμμασι τοῦτο, οἷόν φησιν ὁ λόγος, μηδ'

[1] Müller*: ἐκεῖνος δὲ wBxUC, H-S [1]: ἐκεῖνο δὲ z.

[2] ὅ τί ⟨τε⟩ (*et quidquid*) coniecimus: ὅτι Enn.*: ἔτι Theiler.
[3] οὐ γὰρ Harder: οὐκ Enn.
[4] del. Beutler.
[5] z, Kirchhoff*: προσελθεῖν wBxUC, H-S [1].
[6] Harder, B-T: ἡ Enn.

the whole: otherwise, you will be [only] Intellect thinking, and, even if you attain, he will escape you, or rather you will escape him. But when you see him, look at him as a whole; but when you think him, think whatever you remember about him, that he is the Good—for he is the productive power of thoughtful, intelligent life, from whom come life and intelligence and whatever there is of substance and being—that he is One—for he is simple and first—that he is the Principle—for all things come from him: from him comes the first movement (for it is not in him); from him comes rest, because he had no need of rest: for "he does not move, nor does he stand still" [1]; for he has no place to stand still in and no place to move in: for round what or to what or in what [should he move]? For he is the First. But he is not limited: for by what? But he is not unlimited like a magnitude either: for where should he proceed to, or what should he intend to gain when he lacks nothing? But he has infinity in the sense of power: for he will never be otherwise, or fail, since the things which do not fail exist through him.

11. And this has infinity by not being more than one, and because there is nothing in which anything belonging to it will find its limit: for by being one it is not measured and does not come within range of number. It is therefore not limited in relation to itself or to anything else: since if it was it would be two. It has no shape, then, because it has no parts, and no form. Do not, then, seek to see with mortal eyes this as our account describes it, nor to

[1] The One's transcendence of the "Platonic Categories" of Intellect (cp. Plato *Sophist* 254D5) is expressed in the language of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (139B3).

ὅτι οὕτως ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε πάντα αἰσθητὰ ⟨ἃ⟩[1] εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ μάλιστα πάντων ἀναιρεῖ. ἃ γὰρ ἡγεῖταί τις εἶναι μάλιστα, ταῦτα μάλιστα οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέγα ἧττόν ἐστι. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ κυριώτερον αὖ τῆς οὐσίας· ὥστε ἀντιστρεπτέον τὴν δόξαν· εἰ δὲ μή, καταλελείψῃ ἔρημος θεοῦ, οἷον οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς ὑπὸ γαστριμαργίας πλήσαντες ἑαυτούς, ὧν οὐ θέμις λαβεῖν τοὺς εἰσιόντας πρὸς τοὺς θεούς νομίσαντες μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνα ἐναργέστερα εἶναι τῆς θέας τοῦ θεοῦ, ᾧ ἑορτάζειν προσήκει, οὐ μετέσχον τῶν ἐκεῖ ἱερῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ὁρώμενος ἀπιστεῖσθαι ποιεῖ ὡς οὐκ ὢν τοῖς ἐναργὲς νομίζουσι μόνον, ὃ τῇ σαρκὶ μόνον ἴδοιεν· οἷον εἴ τινες διὰ βίου κοιμώμενοι ταῦτα μὲν πιστὰ καὶ ἐναργῆ νομίζοιεν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείρασιν, εἰ δέ τις αὐτοὺς ἐξεγείρειεν, ἀπιστήσαντες τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνεῳγότων ὀφθεῖσι πάλιν καταδαρθάνοιεν.

12. Χρὴ δὲ βλέπειν ᾧ ἕκαστα δεῖ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἄλλα, ὠσὶ δὲ ἕτερα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τῷ νῷ πιστεύειν ἄλλα ὁρᾶν, καὶ μὴ τὸ νοεῖν ἀκούειν νομίζειν ἢ ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐπιτάττοιεν βλέπειν, καὶ τὰς φωνὰς οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ ὁρῶνται. χρὴ δὲ ἐννοεῖν, ὡς εἰσιν ἐπιλελησμένοι, οὗ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς νῦν ποθοῦσι καὶ ἐφίενται αὐτοῦ. πάντα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ, ὥσπερ ἀπομεμαν-

[1] Igal.

see that it is in the way in which someone would expect it to be who assumes that all things are perceived by the senses, by which supposition he eliminates that which is most real of all. For the things which one thinks are most real, are least real; and the [materially] large has less genuine existence. But the First is the principle of existence and, again, more authentic than substantial reality. So reverse your way of thinking, or you will be left deprived of God, like the people at festivals who by their gluttony stuff themselves with things which it is not lawful for those going in to the gods to take, thinking that these are more obviously real than the vision of the god for whom they ought to be celebrating the festival, and take no part in the rites within. Yes, in these our rites also the god, since he is not seen, creates disbelief in his existence in those who think that that alone is obviously real which they see only with the flesh; as if people who slept through their life thought the things in their dreams were reliable and obvious, but, if someone woke them up, disbelieved in what they saw with their eyes open and went to sleep again.

12. One must perceive each thing by the appropriate organ, some things with the eyes, others with the ears, and so on. One must believe, also, that one sees other things with the intellect, and not think that intellectual perception is seeing or hearing, which would be like insisting that the ears should see and that sounds do not exist because they are not visible. And we must consider that men have forgotten that which from the beginning until now they want and long for. For all things reach out to that and long for it by necessity of nature, as if

τευμένα, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οὐ δύναται εἶναι.[1] καὶ τοῦ μὲν καλοῦ ἤδη οἷον εἰδόσι καὶ ἐγρηγορόσιν ἡ ἀντίληψις καὶ τὸ θάμβος, καὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἡ ἔγερσις· τὸ δ' ἀγαθόν, ἅτε πάλαι παρὸν εἰς ἔφεσιν σύμφυτον, καὶ κοιμωμένοις πάρεστι καὶ οὐ θαμβεῖ ποτε ἰδόντας, ὅτι σύνεστιν ἀεὶ καὶ οὔποτε ἡ ἀνάμνησις· οὐ μὴν ὁρῶσιν αὐτό, ὅτι κοιμωμένοις πάρεστι. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὅταν παρῇ, ὀδύνας δίδωσιν, ὅτι δεῖ ἰδόντας ἐφίεσθαι. δεύτερος ὢν οὗτος ὁ ἔρως καὶ ἤδη συνιέντων μᾶλλον δεύτερον μηνύει τὸ καλὸν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἀρχαιοτέρα τούτου καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἔφεσις ἀρχαιότερόν φησι καὶ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ πρότερον τούτου. καὶ οἴονται δὲ τἀγαθὸν λαβόντες ἀρκεῖν αὑτοῖς ἅπαντες· εἰς γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἀφῖχθαι· τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὔτε πάντες εἶδον γενόμενόν [τὸ][2] τε καλὸν αὐτῷ οἴονται εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς, οἷα καὶ τὸ τῇδε κάλλος· τοῦ γὰρ ἔχοντος τὸ κάλλος εἶναι. καὶ καλοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖν ἀρκεῖ, κἂν μὴ ὦσι· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐ δόξῃ ἐθέλουσιν ἔχειν. ἀντιποιοῦνται γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ φιλονεικοῦσι καὶ ἐρίζουσι τῷ καλῷ, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ γεγονότι ὥσπερ αὐτοί· οἷον εἴ τις ὕστερος ἀπὸ βασιλέως τῷ μετὰ βασιλέα εἰς ἀξίωσιν ἴσην βούλοιτο ἰέναι, ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῳ γεγενημένος, ἀγνοῶν ὡς ἀνήρτηται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς

[1] F[3mg] (*esse* Ficinus)R[2mg]Q[pc]L[ac], Creuzer*: εἰδέναι wBx UCQ[ac]L[pc], Perna, H-S [1].
[2] del. Theiler: τὸ et καλὸν del. Müller*.

divining by instinct that they cannot exist without it. The grasp of the beautiful and the wonder and the waking of love for it come to those who, in a way, already know it and are awake to it. But the Good, since it was there long before to arouse an innate desire, is present even to those asleep and does not astonish those who at any time see it, because it is always there and there is never recollection of it; but people do not see it, because it is present to them in their sleep. But the passionate love of beauty, when it comes, causes pain, because one must have seen it to desire it. Beauty is shown to be secondary because this passionate love for it is secondary and is felt by those who are already conscious. But the more ancient, unperceived desire of the Good proclaims that the Good itself is more ancient and prior to beauty. All men think that when they have attained the Good it is sufficient for them: for they have reached their end. But not all see beauty, and when it has come into existence they think it is beautiful for itself and not for them; this applies also to beauty here: it belongs to the one who has it. And it is enough for people to seem to be beautiful, even if they are not really; but they do not want to have the Good in seeming only.[1] Then they dispute the first place with beauty and wrangle contentiously with it, considering that it has come into being like themselves. It is as if someone who holds the lowest rank at court were to want to attain equal honour with the man who stands next to the king, on the ground that they both derive from one and the same source; he does

[1] Cp. Plato *Republic* 505D.

εἰς βασιλέα, ἔστι δὲ ἐκεῖνος πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ τῆς πλάνης αἰτία τὸ μετέχειν ἄμφω τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πρότερον τὸ ἓν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι κἀκεῖ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ οὐ δεῖται τοῦ καλοῦ, τὸ δὲ καλόν ἐκείνου. καὶ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥπιον καὶ προσηνὲς καὶ ἁβρότερον καί, ὡς ἐθέλει τις, παρὸν αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ θάμβος ἔχει καὶ ἔκπληξιν καὶ συμμιγῆ τῷ ἀλγύνοντι τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἕλκει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πατρὸς τὸ ἐρώμενον· νεώτερον γάρ· τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐ χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, ὃ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν προτέραν ἔχει· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλ' ὅση μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. ὥστε ἐκεῖνος καὶ ταύτης κύριος, οὐ δεηθεὶς οὗτος τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενομένων, ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἀφεὶς το γενόμενον, ὅτι μὴ ἐδεῖτο μηδὲν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ αὐτός, οἷος καὶ πρὶν τοῦτο γεννῆσαι. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐμέλησεν αὐτῷ μὴ γενομένου· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλῳ δυνατὸν ἦν γενέσθαι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐφθόνησεν ἄν· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν γενέσθαι· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὃ μὴ γέγονε γενομένων τῶν πάντων. αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἦν τὰ πάντα, ἵν' ἂν ἐδεήθη αὐτῶν, ὑπερβεβηκὼς δὲ τὰ πάντα οἷός τε ἦν καὶ ποιεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐᾶσαι εἶναι αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὤν.

[1] For a full discussion of this remarkable account of how intelligible beauty can distract us from the Good and an attempted reconciliation of it with the equally remarkable VI. 7. 22, in which intelligible beauty considered without the

not realise that though he too depends on the king the other ranks before him. The cause of the error is that both participate in the same and the One is before both, and that in the higher world also the Good itself does not need beauty, though beauty needs it. The Good is gentle and kindly and gracious, and present to anyone when he wishes. Beauty brings wonder and shock and pleasure mingled with pain. It even draws those who do not know what is happening away from the Good, as the beloved draws a child away from its father; for Beauty is younger.[1] But the Good is older, not in time but in truth, and has the prior power: for it has all power; that which comes after it has not all power, but as much as can come after it and derive from it. The Good then is master also of this derived power. He does not need the things which have come into being from him, but leaves what has come into being altogether alone, because he needs nothing of it, but is the same as he was before he brought it into being. He would not have cared if it had not come into being; and if anything else could have been derived from him he would not have grudged it existence; but as it is, it is not possible for anything else to come into being: all things have come into being and there is nothing left. He was not all things: if he was he would have needed them; but since he transcends all things he can make them and let them exist by themselves while he remains above them.

light or grace which plays upon it from the Good is totally unattractive, see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" in *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy . . . offered to C. J. de Vogel* (Assen 1975) 160–62.

13. Ἕδει δὲ καὶ τἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῷ μηδέν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀγαθόν. ὃ γὰρ ἕξει, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἕξει ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ τῷ κυρίως καὶ πρώτως ἀγαθῷ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν μήτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχει. εἰ οὖν "οὐδὲν ἔχει," μόνον καὶ ἔρημον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ οὐ τἀγαθὸν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐδέτερα δὲ τούτων ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχων τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ δ' ἄρα τις ὁτιοῦν αὐτῷ προστίθησιν, ἢ οὐσίαν ἢ νοῦν ἢ καλόν, τῇ προσθήκῃ ἀφαιρεῖται αὐτοῦ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. πάντα ἄρα ἀφελὼν καὶ οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπὼν οὐδέ τι ψευσάμενος, ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῷ, εἴασε τὸ "ἔστιν" οὐδὲν καταμαρτυρήσας τῶν οὐ παρόντων, οἷον οἱ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ποιούμενοι, οἳ ἐλαττοῦσι τὴν τῶν ἐπαινουμένων δόξαν προστιθέντες αὐτοῖς ἃ τῆς ἀξίας αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐλάττω, ἀποροῦντες ἀληθεῖς εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων τοὺς λόγους. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς μηδὲν τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων προστιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα ἰὼν ἐκεῖνος τούτων αἴτιος ᾖ, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸς ταῦτα. καὶ γὰρ αὖ φύσις ἀγαθοῦ οὐ πάντα εἶναι οὐδ' αὖ ἕν τι τῶν πάντων· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἅπασιν, ὑπὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ὂν τοῖς πᾶσι διαφέροι ἂν τῷ

13. But since he is the Good and not a good, he must have nothing in himself, since he does not even have good in himself. For what he will have is either good or not good; but that which is not good cannot be in the Good, the authentically and primarily Good, nor does the Good have the good. If then he does not have what is not good or what is good, he has nothing. If then "he has nothing" he is "alone and isolated"[1] from all other things. If then the other things are either goods, but not the Good, or not goods, and he has neither of these, he has nothing and is the Good by having nothing. But then if anyone adds anything at all to him, substance or intellect or beauty, he will deprive him of being the Good by the addition. If then one takes away everything and says nothing about him and does not say falsely about anything that it is with him, he allows him his "existence" without attributing to him anything which is not there, as those do who compose inartistic panegyrics, and diminish the reputation of those who are being praised by adding matters inferior to their worth, since they are incapable of making true speeches about their subjects. We also, then, must not add any of the things which are later and lesser, but say that he moves above them and is their cause, but not that he is them. For, again, it is the nature of the Good not to be all things and not to be any one of them; for [if he were] he would come under one and the same classification as all of them, and if he came under the same classification, he would differ only

[1] Again the inappropriate reference to *Philebus* 63B7–8. See V. 3. 10, note 2.

ἰδίῳ μόνον καὶ διαφορᾷ καὶ προσθήκῃ. ἔσται τοίνυν δύο, οὐχ ἕν, ὧν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν. μικτὸν ἄρα ἔσται ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ· οὐκ ἄρα καθαρῶς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ πρώτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη πρώτως, οὗ μετέχον παρὰ τὸ κοινὸν γεγένηται ἀγαθόν. μεταλήψει μὲν δὴ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν· οὗ δὲ μετέλαβεν, οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων [οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν πάντων τὸ ἀγαθόν].[1] ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν—διαφορὰ γάρ, καθ' ἣν τοῦτο τὸ σύνθετον ἦν ἀγαθόν—δεῖ αὐτῷ παρ' ἄλλου εἶναι. ἦν δὲ αὐτὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ μόνον ἀγαθόν· πολλῷ ἄρα τὸ ἀφ' οὗ μόνον ἀγαθόν. τὸ ἄρα πρώτως καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὑπέρ τε πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀναπέφανται ἡμῖν καὶ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἀμιγὲς πάντων καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ αἴτιον τῶν πάντων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ κακοῦ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα οὐδ' αὖ ἐξ ἀδιαφόρων. κρεῖττον γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου· τελειότερον γάρ.

[1] del. Theiler, ut glossam.

by his individuality and specific difference and some added attribute. Then he would be two and not one, and one of the two, what was common to him and the others, would be not good, and one would good; he would, then, not be purely and primarily good, but that would be by participating in which, over and above what was in common, he became good. So the nature of the Good would be good by participation; and what it participated in would not be any one of all things. But if this Good was in the composite thing—for it would be the specific difference by which the composite was good—it would have to derive from something else. But it was simply and solely good; so, much more, that from which it derived was good. That which is primary and the Good has therefore been revealed to us as above all realities, and only good, and having nothing in itself, but unmixed with all things and above all things and cause of all things. For the beautiful and the real beings certainly do not come from the bad, or from things indifferent. For the maker is better than what is made, because more complete.

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, the twenty-fourth in Porphyry's chronological order, immediately follows in that order the great work VI. 4–5 (22–3): *On the Reason why Being is everywhere all present, One and the Same.* In this Plotinus had laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the *Enneads* on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very much into the background. In the present treatise he seems concerned to make clear that the distinctions between the hypostases were still real and important to him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation of the First Principle, the One which does not think, from the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a unity-in-duality with Being. He knew this to be one of the most controversial parts of his philosophy, and argues his position here, as he often does elsewhere in the *Enneads*, against both Aristotle and his followers and those Platonists who had made the First Principle a transcendent Intellect. The Third Hypostasis, Soul, is mentioned rather incidentally, and only to help his readers to see how the primary thinking of Intellect, from which the unthinking perfection of the One is to be distinguished, differs from the secondary thinking of human minds in their normal state.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

Synopsis

The difference between thinking something else and thinking oneself: the latter is more of a unity, though still a unity-in-duality (ch. 1). Reasons why before this self-thinking unity-in-duality there must be a pure unity, which because it is simply one does not think (ch. 2). There must be something absolutely simple before any one-in-many or whole of parts (ch. 3). Further reasons why there must be the Good before Intellect: comparison of Good, Intellect and Soul to light, the sun and the moon (ch. 4). The Good does not think itself because thought is always a movement of something else towards the Good in which the thinker is established in being and attains self-knowledge (ch. 5). The Good is pure actuality without any secondary activity; the essential multiplicity of the Second Hypostasis, at once being, living and thinking, which the Good transcends and is beyond thinking as he is beyond being; his gift to all others is not an impossible knowledge of him, but to be with him, who is their Good, and to grasp him as far as they can (ch. 6).

V. 6. (24) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΜΗ ΝΟΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΩΣ ΝΟΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ

1. Τὸ μέν ἐστι νοεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτό, ὃ ἤδη φεύγει μᾶλλον τὰ δύο εἶναι. τὸ δὲ πρότερον λεχθὲν βούλεται καὶ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἧττον δύναται· παρ' αὑτῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὃ ὁρᾷ, ἕτερόν γε μὴν ὂν ἐκείνου. τὸ δὲ οὐ κεχώρισται τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ συνὸν αὑτῷ ὁρᾷ ἑαυτό. ἄμφω οὖν γίνεται ἓν ὄν. μᾶλλον οὖν νοεῖ, ὅτι ἔχει, καὶ πρώτως νοεῖ, ὅτι τὸ νοοῦν δεῖ ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἕν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦν, ἄλλο τὸ νοούμενον ἔσται—οὐκ ἂν οὖν πρώτως νοοῦν εἴη, ὅτι ἄλλου τὴν νόησιν λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ πρώτως νοοῦν ἔσται, ὅτι ὃ νοεῖ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς αὑτοῦ, ὥστε οὐδ' αὑτό· ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὡς αὑτό, ἵνα κυρίως νοῇ, τὰ δύο ἓν ἔσται· δεῖ ἄρα ἓν εἶναι ἄμφω—εἴτε ἓν μέν, μὴ δύο δὲ αὖ ἔσται, ὅ τι νοήσει οὐχ ἕξει· ὥστε οὐδὲ νοοῦν ἔσται. ἁπλοῦν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν δεῖ εἶναι. μᾶλλον δ' ἄν τις αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν ἕλοι ἀπὸ

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

1. There is a difference between one thing thinking another and something thinking itself; the latter goes further towards escaping being two. The former wants to escape being two and think itself, but is less capable of it; for it has what it sees with itself, but none the less it is different from it. But the latter is not substantially distinct [from its object], but keeps company with itself and so sees itself. It becomes a pair, therefore, while remaining one. It thinks more genuinely, therefore, and thinks primarily, because the thinking principle must be one and two. For if it is not one, that which thinks and that which is thought will be different—it would not therefore be the primary thinker, because if the thought it had was of something else it will not be the primary thinker because it does not have what it thinks as [thought] of itself, so that it does not think itself; or if it has what it thinks as itself, so that it may think authentically, the two will be one: it must therefore be one and a pair—but if it is, on the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. It must, then, be simple and not simple.

τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβαίνων· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ διαιρεῖν ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ῥᾷον ἄν τις τὸ διπλοῦν ἴδοι. εἰ οὖν τις διπλοῦν φῶς ποιήσειε, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸ ἧττον, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ καθαρώτερον, εἶτα ποιήσειε καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἴσον εἶναι φῶς τῷ ὁρωμένῳ, οὐκ ἔχων ἔτι χωρίζειν τῇ διαφορᾷ ἓν τὰ δύο θήσεται νοῶν μέν, ὅτι δύο ἦν, ὁρῶν δὲ ἤδη ἕν· οὕτω νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν αἱρήσει. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ δύο ἓν πεποιήκαμεν, τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἐξ ἑνός ἐστι δύο, ὅτι νοεῖ, ποιοῦν αὐτὸ δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄν, ὅτι νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτό, ἕν.

2. Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρώτως νοοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἤδη ἄλλως νοοῦν, τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ πρώτως νοοῦντος οὐκ ἂν ἔτι νοοῖ· νοῦν γὰρ δεῖ γενέσθαι, ἵνα νοῇ, ὄντα δὲ νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἔχειν καὶ πρώτως νοοῦντα ἔχειν τὸ νοητὸν ἐν αὑτῷ. νοητὸν δὲ ὂν οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν καὶ νοοῦν ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχειν καὶ νοεῖν· ἔσται γὰρ οὐ μόνον νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοοῦν, πρῶτόν τε οὐκ ἔσται δύο ὄν. ὅ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν κυρίως ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ νοητὸν ἑτέρῳ ὅ τε νοῦς τὸ

One could get a better idea of its being like this if one made the ascent from soul; for in soul it is easy to make the distinction, and one could see the doubleness more easily. If then one were to imagine a double light, the soul as lesser and that which it thinks as purer light, and then imagine that the seeing light is equal to the seen, one would not be able any more to separate them by the difference [in quality] and would suppose the two to be one, thinking that they were two, but seeing them as one; in this way one will grasp Intellect and its object. Now we in our discourse have made one out of two; but [in reality] the reverse is true and two came from one, making itself two because it thinks, or, better, because it thinks it is two and because it thinks itself, one.

2. If then one is the primary thinking principle, and the other is already thinking in a different way, that which is beyond the primary thinking principle will no longer think; for in order to think it would have to become intellect, and if it was intellect it would have to have an object of thought, and if it was thinking in the primary sense it would have to have its object in itself. But it is not necessary for everything which is an object of thought to have a thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then] it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker, and, since it is two, will not be the first. And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is object for something else,

ἐπιβάλλον τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἑλεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ὃ νοεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ νοητοῦ. τότε οὖν τέλεον, ὅταν ἔχῃ; ἔδει δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τέλεον εἶναι παρ' αὑτοῦ τῆς οὐσίας. ᾧ ἄρα τὸ τέλεον ὑπάρξει, πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τοῦτο ἔσται· οὐδὲν ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ τοῦ νοεῖν· αὐτάρκης γὰρ πρὸ τούτου· οὐκ ἄρα νοήσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα οὐ νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ πρώτως νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ νοήσει δευτέρως. ἔτι εἰ νοήσει τὸ πρῶτον, ὑπάρξει τι αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἤδη καὶ πάντα ὅσα νοήσει· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον ἑαυτόν, πολλὰ ἔσται.

3. Εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν κωλύειν φήσουσιν, ἓν τούτοις ὑποκείμενον ἔσται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ πολλὰ μὴ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἀφ' οὗ ἢ ἐν ᾧ, ἢ ὅλως ἑνὸς καὶ τούτου πρώτου τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμουμένου, ὃ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ λαβεῖν μόνον. εἰ δὲ ὁμοῦ εἴη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, δεῖ τοῦτο συλλαβόντα αὐτὸ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὄν, ἐᾶν ὡς μετ' ἄλλων, ζητεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς ἄλλοις μηκέτι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτό. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτὸ ὅμοιον μὲν ἂν εἴη τούτῳ, οὐκ ἂν δὲ εἴη τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτὸ μόνον εἶναι, εἰ

and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought. Is [the One], then, perfect when it has it? But it must, before thinking, have a perfection derived from its own reality. That, then, to which perfection belongs will exist before thinking; it will therefore have no need of thinking; for he is sufficient to himself before this; so he will not think. This, then, does not think, and the other is the primary thinking principle, and another again will think in a secondary way.[1] Again, if the First thinks, something will belong to it; it will then not be the First, but second, and not one, but already many things, that is all the things which it thinks; for even if it only thinks itself it will be many.

3. But if people are going to say that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being many, there will be a one underlying these many; for there can be no many if there is not a one from which or in which these are, or in general a one, and a one which is counted first before the others, which must be taken alone, itself by itself. But if it was together with the others, since it was taken with the others but all the same was different from the others, we should have to let it go because it was with the others and look for what underlies the others and is no longer with the others, but itself by itself. For that one and the same which was in the others would be like this One by itself, but would not be it.

[1] The other which thinks in a secondary way is Soul, the primary thinking principle Intellect: cp. the end of ch. 1.

μέλλοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὁρᾶσθαι· εἰ μή τις αὐτοῦ λέγοι τὸ εἶναι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἁπλοῦν αὐτὸ ἔσται, οὐδὲ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ οὐ δυνάμενον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν οὐχ ἕξει, τό τε συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἁπλοῦ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἔσται. ἑκάστου γάρ ἁπλοῦ οὐ δυναμένου εἶναι οὐχ[1] ὑφεστηκότος τινὸς ἑνὸς ἁπλοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν],[2] οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν καθ' ἑαυτὸ [οὐ][2] δυναμένου οὐδὲ παρέχειν αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι τῷ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, πῶς ἂν τὸ ⟨συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν⟩[3] ἐκ πάντων εἴη σύνθετον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γεγενημένον, οὐ τὶ μὴ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ὅλως μὴ ὄντων; εἰ ἄρα πολλά τί ἐστι, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἓν εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τῷ νοοῦντι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ ⟨μὴ⟩[4] πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον. ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται.

4. Ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀνενδεὲς δεῖ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ νοεῖν δέοιτο· οὗ δὲ μὴ δεῖ αὐτῷ, οὐ παρέσται αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως οὐδὲν πάρεστιν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. καὶ νοεῖ[5] οὐδέν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἄλλο. ἔτι ἄλλο νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἀγαθοειδὴς γὰρ τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν. ἔτι ὡς ἐν τοῖς δυσὶν ὄντος ἑνὸς καὶ ἄλλου οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο τὸ ἓν τὸ μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔδει ἓν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ

[1] Kirchhoff*: οὐδ' Enn. [2] del. Kirchhoff*.
[3] Igal. [4] F^{3s} (= Ficinus): om. Enn.
[5] Volkmann*: εἰ Enn.

But it must be alone by itself if it is also to be seen in other things; unless someone is going to say that its being depends on its co-existence with other things; it will not then be simple, and the composite of many parts will not exist either; for that which is unable to be simple will have no existence, and the composite of many parts will not exist itself if the simple does not. For if each and every simple thing cannot exist, since there is no simple one coming into existence by its own agency, and no one of the parts is able to have existence by itself, or to give itself to be with another because it does not exist at all, how then could the composite of many parts be a compound of all [these parts] which has come into being from non-existent things—not from things that are not something particular, but from things that do not exist at all? If, then, something is many, there must be a one before the many. If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the thinking principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not a multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and Intellect, then, will be in what comes after.

4. Again, if the Good must be simple and without need, it will not need thinking; but what it has no need of will not be present with it: since nothing at all is present with it, thinking is not present with it. And it thinks nothing, because it does not need anything else. Again, Intellect is something other than the Good; for it has the form of the Good by thinking the Good. Again, just as in the number two there is a one and another, and it is not possible for this one with another to be the number one, but it is necessary for there to be a one by itself before the one with another; in the same way it is necessary

μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐννυπάρχον[1] ἁπλοῦν, καθ' αὑτὸ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν ὅσα ἐν τῷ μετ' ἄλλων. πόθεν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο, μὴ πρότερον χωρὶς ὄντος ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἄλλο; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἄλλου εἴη, ὃ δ' ἂν πολὺ ᾖ ἢ δύο, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀνηρτῆσθαι εἰς ἄλλο.

Καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνης ἄστρῳ κομιζομένῳ τὸ φῶς παρ' ἡλίου. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν ἔχει ἐπιχρωννύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὖσαν, νοῦς δ' ἐν αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον ἔχει οὐ φῶς ὢν μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅ ἐστι πεφωτισμένον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὂν φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν παρέχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν αὐτὸ δέοιτό τινος; οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐν ἄλλῳ· ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ὄντος.

5. Ἔτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ. ὃ δ' ἐστὶ πάντη ἕν, ποῦ χωρήσεται πρὸς αὑτό; ποῦ δ' ἂν δέοιτο συναισθήσεως; ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συναισθήσεως καὶ πάσης κρεῖττον νοήσεως. τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον οὔτε τῷ εἶναι οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεύτερον καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩[2] γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὑτό, τὸ δ' ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἶδε. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ

[1] Harder, Cilento, B-T: ἓν ὑπάρχον Enn.*, H-S[1].
[2] inseruimus.

that, when a thing has immanent in it something simple along with something else, the simple thing should be simple in and by itself, having nothing in itself of all that it has in its association with other things. For what could make it something else in something different, if there was not something before it from which this something else comes? For the simple could not derive from something else, but that which is many, or two, must itself depend on something else. The First, then, should be compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets its light from the sun. For Soul has intellect as an external addition which colours it when it is intellectual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is not only light but that which is enlightened in its own being; and that which gives it light is nothing else but is simple light giving Intellect the power to be what it is. Why then would it have need of anything? For it is not the same as that which is in something else: for that which is in something else is different from that which is in and by itself.

5. And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to converge on and be conscious of itself. But by what way will that which is altogether one go to itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is one and the same thing which is better than self-consciousness and better than all thinking. For thinking does not come first either in reality or in value, but is second and is what has come into being when the Good [already] existed and moved what had come into being to itself, and it was moved and saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good; for

ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ· ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὅρασις. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῇ, τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι νοεῖ καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν αὑτῷ γενόμενον νοεῖ καὶ οἷον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβάνον. εἰ δ' ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἀεὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν τῇ νοήσει αὐτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ νοεῖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπων αὐτὸν [1] νοεῖ. ἐνεργοῦντα γὰρ αὖ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν.

6. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι χώραν νοήσεως ἠντινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἄλλο γὰρ δεῖ τῷ νοοῦντι τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀνενέργητον οὖν. καὶ τί δεῖ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν; ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμία ἐνέργεια ἔχει αὖ πάλιν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ δέ γε ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς εἰς ἄλλο ἔχουσιν ἐπανενεγκεῖν, τήν γε πρώτην ἁπασῶν, εἰς ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι ἀνήρτηνται, αὐτὸ ἐᾶν [2] δεῖ τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ἔτι προστιθέντας. ἡ οὖν τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια οὐ νόησις· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ὃ νοήσει· αὐτὸ γὰρ πρῶτον. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίγνεται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῇ δύο.

[1] coniecimus: αὐτὸ Enn.

[2] coniecimus: εἶναι Enn.: εἶναι δεῖ ⟨νομίζειν⟩ Müller, Bréhier, B-T.

[1] Cp. Plato *Republic* VI 509A3 (knowledge and truth are "like the good" but not the Good).

[2] The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of "first and second actuality": cp. Aristotle *De Anima* B 412a–b. This applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is always completely active and actual, and no distinction of "first and second actuality" can apply to it.

the desire generates thought and establishes it in being along with itself: for desire of sight is seeing. The Good itself, then, must not think anything: for the Good is not other than itself. For when what is other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being "like the Good" [1] and having a resemblance to the Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by itself, and as if it had a mental image of the Good. And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for ever. And again, in thinking the Good it thinks itself incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself in actual activity; and the actual activity of all things is directed to the Good.

6. If this is correctly said, the Good would certainly not have any place for thinking: for the Good for the thinking principle must be something different [from itself]. So the Good is without activity. And why should actuality be active? For in general no active actuality has yet another actual activity. But even if some philosophers are able to attribute yet another activity to the other active actualities which are directed to something else,[2] yet the first one of all, on which the others depend, we must let be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So an actual activity of this kind is not thinking; for it has nothing to think: it is itself the first. And further, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has the thinking: so again there comes to be a two in

ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἴδοι ἄν τις τοῦτο, εἰ λάβοι, πῶς ἐν παντὶ τὸ νοοῦν σαφέστερον ὑπάρχει, ἡ διπλῆ φύσις αὕτη. λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ εἶναι οὐ μόνον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μένει ὡσαύτως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ῥεῖ καὶ οὐ μένει, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθήσει—τάχα γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔστι τὰ μένοντα—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ τέλεον τοῦ εἶναι παρ' αὑτῶν ἔχει. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πρώτως λεγομένην οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι σκιάν, ἀλλ' ἔχειν πλῆρες τὸ εἶναι. πλῆρες δέ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι, ὅταν εἶδος τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ ζῆν λάβῃ. ὁμοῦ ἄρα τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ζῆν, τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι. εἰ ἄρα ὄν, καὶ νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὄν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι. πολλὰ ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ νοεῖν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τῷ μὴ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι. καὶ καθέκαστα δὲ ἐπιοῦσιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ νόησις ⟨ἀνθρώπου καὶ νόησις⟩[1] ἵππου καὶ ἵππος καὶ δικαίου νόησις καὶ δίκαιον. διπλᾶ τοίνυν ἅπαντα καὶ τὸ ἓν δύο, καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο εἰς ἓν ἔρχεται. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὔθ' ἕν[2] ἕκαστον, οὐδὲ ἐκ πάντων τῶν δύο οὐδ' ὅλως δύο. ὅπως δὲ τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός,

[1] Igal.
[2] Creuzer, Kirchhoff, Müller, B-T: οὐθὲν Enn.: οὐδ' ἓν Volkmann*.

the thinking principle; but this [Good] is in no way two. Again, one would see this better if one grasped how in all thinking this double nature is more clearly there. We maintain that the real beings as real beings, and each individual one of them, the ones which truly exist, are in the " intelligible region ",[1] and we do so not only because they abide the same in essence but the other things, all of them which are in the realm of sense-perception, flow and do not abide—for perhaps there are things which abide among those perceived by the senses—but rather because they have the perfection of existence from themselves. For that which is called essence in the primary sense must not be a shadow of being, but have the fulness of being. And being is fulfilled when it has the form of thinking and living. So thinking, living and being are all together in what is real. If then it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect, it is also being, and the thinking and the being go together. Thinking therefore is many and one. That, then, which is not like this cannot be thinking. And as we go over things individually, there is man and thought of man, and thought of horse, and horse, and thought of righteousness, and righteousness. All things then are double, and the one is two, and again the two come together into one. But the Good is not one of all these things, nor is it the product of all the twos; it is not two at all. But how the twos come from the One has been discussed elsewhere.[2] But what is " beyond being "

[1] A phrase taken from Plato *Republic* VII 517B5.
[2] The question was discussed in the earlier treatise V. 4, ch. 2. Again a reference to the passage on the transcendence of the Good in Plato *Republic* VI 509B9 follows.

ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ὄν τι καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο ἄτοπον, εἰ μὴ οἶδεν ἑαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ ὃ μάθῃ, εἷς ὤν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι· κρεῖττον γάρ τι καὶ μεῖζον δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ εἰδέναι αὐτά—ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καθόσον δύναται, ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐκείνου.

must be beyond thinking; it is not then absurd if he does not know himself; for he has nothing in himself which he can learn about, since he is one. But other things need not know him either; for he gives them something better and greater than that they should know him—he is the Good of the others—he gives them rather to be in the same place with him and to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise, the eighteenth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the clearest statement in the *Enneads* that there are Platonic Ideas of particulars. (The general opinion of Platonists before Plotinus seems to have been that there were only Ideas of universals, not of particulars. The Stoics, though they did not believe in transcendent Ideas, held that no individual thing was exactly like any other; each had its own particular qualitative difference.) There has been much dispute about whether Plotinus held the doctrine expounded here, that there are Ideas or Forms of individuals, continually and consistently: there are a number of other passages in the *Enneads* which seem to deny it. Perhaps the safest conclusion is that he consistently held that there were Ideas of individual human selves in addition to (and included in) the Idea of Man. Socrates is something more than a mere instance of humanity (though he may be incarnate at various times as Pythagoras and many other empirical personalities). As regards Ideas of other individual things (including human bodies) his opinion may have varied: he was probably prepared to postulate them if and when he thought the facts required him to do so, but was not always sure that they did. In this treatise (especially in chapter 3) he goes further than anywhere else in the *Enneads* towards accepting the full Stoic position that each individual thing differs essentially from every other (acceptance of this by a Platonist would involve postulating a Form for each individual).

ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Synopsis

Is there an idea of each particular? It would seem so, in spite of all the difficulties which can be raised, at least in the case of individual men: this does not involve any objectionable kind of infinity in the intelligible world (ch. 1). Problems about differences between children of the same parents: if the children have different kinds of beauty this must be due to different forming principles (which are all present in the souls of the parents) (ch. 2). One needs to postulate different forming principles only where the individuals are really different; not perhaps therefore in cases where animals have litters of large numbers of apparently exactly similar offspring. But are two individuals ever really exactly the same? The Stoic doctrine of recurring world-periods, each exactly similar in every detail, will (as already suggested in ch. 1) make it unnecessary, even if there is a Form for every individual, to postulate an infinite number of Forms; but we must not be afraid of the infinity contained in a single intelligible reality (ch. 3).

V. 7. (18) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΘΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΕΙΣΙΝ ΙΔΕΑΙ

1. Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστόν ἐστιν ἰδέα; εἰ ἐγὼ καὶ ἕκαστος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἑκάστου ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖ. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ψυχὴ Σωκράτους, ἔσται Αὐτοσωκράτης, καθὸ ἦ[1] ψυχὴ καθέκαστα καὶ ⟨ὡς λέγεται⟩[2] ἐκεῖ [ὡς λέγεται ἐκεῖ].[2] εἰ δ' οὐκ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γίγνεται ὁ πρότερον Σωκράτης, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἤ τις ἄλλος, οὐκέτι ὁ καθέκαστα οὗτος κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστου ὧν διεξέρχεται τοὺς λόγους ἔχει πάντων, πάντες αὖ ἐκεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγομεν, ὅσους ὁ κόσμος ἔχει λόγους, καὶ ἑκάστην ψυχὴν ἔχειν. εἰ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἀνθρώπου μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν καθέκαστα ζῴων, καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἄπειρον οὖν τὸ τῶν λόγων ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει περιόδοις, καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἀπειρία ἔσται πεπερασμένη, ὅταν ταὐτὰ ἀποδιδῶται. εἰ οὖν ὅλως πλείω τὰ γινόμενα τοῦ παραδείγματος, τί δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ

[1] scripsimus: ἡ Enn.
[2] transposuimus.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

1. Is there an idea of each particular thing? Yes, if I and each one of us have a way of ascent and return to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is there. If Socrates, that is the soul of Socrates, always exists, there will be an absolute Socrates in the sense that, in so far as they are soul, individuals are also said to exist in this way in the intelligible world. But if Socrates does not always exist, but the soul which was formerly Socrates becomes different people at different times, like Pythagoras or someone else, then there will not be this particular person Socrates also in the intelligible world. But if the soul of each individual possesses the rational forming principles of all the individuals which it animates in succession, then again on this assumption all will exist there; and we do say that each soul possesses all the forming principles in the universe. If then the universe possesses the forming principles, not only of man but of all individual animals, so does the soul; there will therefore be an infinity of forming principles, unless the universe returns on itself in regular periods; this will put a limit to the infinity of forming principles, because the same things in this case recur. Well, then, if the things which come into being in all the periods together are more numerous than the models, why should there have to be forming

πάντων γινομένων λόγους καὶ παραδείγματα; ἀρκεῖν γὰρ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ καὶ ψυχὰς ὡρισμένας ἀνθρώπους ποιούσας ἀπείρους. ἢ τῶν διαφόρων οὐκ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, οὐδὲ ἀρκεῖ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς παράδειγμα τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τῇ ὕλῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς μυρίαις· οὐ γὰρ ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες Σωκράτους πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν διάφορον ποίησιν ἐκ διαφόρων λόγων. ἡ δὲ πᾶσα περίοδος πάντας ἔχει τοὺς λόγους, αὖθις δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους. τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπειρίαν οὐ δεῖ δεδιέναι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ.

2. Ἀλλ' εἰ αἱ μίξεις τῶν λόγων ἄρρενος καὶ θήλεος διαφόρους ποιοῦσιν, οὐκέτι τοῦ γινομένου ἑκάστου λόγος τις ἔσται, ὅ τε ἑκάτερος γεννῶν, οἷον ὁ ἄρρην, οὐ κατὰ διαφόρους λόγους ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕνα τὸν αὑτοῦ ἢ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κατὰ διαφόρους τῷ τοὺς πάντας ἔχειν αὐτούς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀεὶ προχείρους. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων διάφοροι; ἢ διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἴσην ἐπικράτησιν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὔ, κἂν[1] εἰ ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ὁτὲ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τὸ πλεῖστον, ὁτὲ

[1] οὔ, κἂν coniecimus: οὐκ Enn.

principles and models of all the things which come into being in one period? One man as model would do for all men, just as souls limited in number produce an infinity of men. No, there cannot be the same forming principle for different individuals, and one man will not serve as a model for several men differing from each other not only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special differences of form. Men are not related to their form as portraits of Socrates are to their original, but their different structures must result from different forming principles. The whole revolution of the universe contains all the forming principles, and when it repeats itself it produces the same things again according to the same forming principles. We ought not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces into the intelligible world: for it is all in an indivisible unity and, we may say, comes forth when it acts.

2. But if the mixtures of the forming principles of male and female produce different children, there will no longer be a forming principle of every individual child that is born, but one of the parents, the male, for instance, will produce it, not according to different forming principles but according to one, his own or his father's. No, nothing prevents it from being according to different principles, because the parent has them all, but different ones are ready for use at different times. But what are we to say when different children come from the same parents? It is because of unequal dominance [of the two parents]. But there is this further point, that it is not the case—even if it appears so—that sometimes the larger quantity of formative principle is on the male

δὲ κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον μέρος ἔδωκεν ἑκάτερος, ἀλλ' ὅλον μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ ἔγκειται, κρατεῖ δὲ τῆς ὕλης μέρος ἑκατέρου ἢ θάτερον. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὥρᾳ [1] πῶς διάφοροι; ἆρ' οὖν ἡ ὕλη τὸ διάφορον οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατουμένη; πάντες ἄρα χωρὶς ἑνὸς παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάφορον πολλαχοῦ καλόν, οὐχ ἓν τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τῷ αἴσχει μόνῳ ἀποδοτέον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὕλην κἀκεῖ τῶν τελείων λόγων κεκρυμμένων μέν, δοθέντων δὲ ὅλων. ἀλλ' ἔστωσαν διάφοροι οἱ λόγοι· τί δεῖ τοσούτους, ὅσοι οἱ γινόμενοι ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ, εἴπερ ἔνι τῶν αὐτῶν διδομένων διαφόρους ἔξωθεν φαίνεσθαι; ἢ συγκεχώρηται τῶν ὅλων διδομένων, ζητεῖται δέ, εἰ τῶν αὐτῶν κρατούντων. ἆρ' οὖν, ὅτι τὸ ταὐτὸν πάντη ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ περιόδῳ, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ οὐδὲν πάντη ταὐτόν;

[1] Igal: χώρᾳ Enn.

[1] This brings out clearly that matter for Plotinus is always a principle of resistance to nature (the immanent creative principle in the physical world which is the lowest form of soul). A child would be an unnatural creature if it owed its differences from the other members of its family to matter, not to the forms in nature.

[2] Plotinus is here considering as a possibility (not definitely accepting) the full Stoic doctrine of the *ἰδίως ποιόν*, the unique individual characteristic of every entity in any one world-period: cp. *SVF* II 395; Seneca *Epistulae Morales CXIII*, 16. Here and in the following chapter he is inclined to think

side, sometimes on the female, or that each contributes in equal proportion, but each of them gives their whole forming principle and it is present as a whole in the offspring, but it is either the part belonging to one of them or the other part which dominates the matter. But how does it come about that children conceived in different seasons are different? Is it then the matter which makes the difference since it is not dominated in the same way [in the different seasons]? If that were so, then all the children but one would be contrary to nature.[1] But if the difference is a great diversity of beauty, the form is not one. Only ugliness is to be attributed to the influence of matter, and even there the perfect forming principles are present, hidden but given as wholes. But, granted that the forming principles are different, why do there need to be as many as the individual human beings born in one world-period, if it is possible that when the same principles are given, individuals appear externally different? No, it has [only] been granted that the principles are given as wholes, but the question now is whether individuals can be different when the same forming principles dominate. Are, then, different forming principles necessary because the absolutely identical occurs in the other world-period, and in this world period there is nothing absolutely identical[2]?

that acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of recurrent world-periods in which every detail repeats itself exactly might be a useful way of accepting Forms of individuals while rejecting the idea that there is an infinite number of Forms, as he normally does, though at the end of chs. 1 and 3 in this treatise he seems at least prepared to consider it, and it was held by his closest associate Amelius (Syrianus *In Metaph.* 147. 1ff).

3. Πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν διδύμων διαφόρους φήσομεν τοὺς λόγους; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τις ἴοι καὶ τὰ πολύτοκα μάλιστα; ἤ, ἐφ' ὧν ἀπαράλλακτα, εἷς λόγος. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐχ, ὅσα τὰ καθέκαστα, τοσοῦτοι καὶ οἱ λόγοι. ἢ ὅσα διάφορα τὰ καθέκαστα, καὶ διάφορα οὐ τῷ ἐλλείπειν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιάφορα; εἴπερ τινὰ ὅλως ἐστὶ πάντη ἀδιάφορα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης, κἂν ἀδιάφορα ποιῇ, δεῖ ὅμως τὸ ταὐτὸν διαφορᾷ λαμβάνειν λογικῇ, καθ' ἣν ἄλλο ποιήσει προσφέρων διάφορόν τι τῷ αὐτῷ· ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει μὴ λογισμῷ γινομένου τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ λόγοις μόνον, συνεζεῦχθαι δεῖ τῷ εἴδει τὸ διάφορον· ἡμεῖς δὲ λαμβάνειν τὴν διαφορὰν ἀδυνατοῦμεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ποίησις ἔχει τὸ εἰκῇ τοῦ ὁποσαοῦν, ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ δὲ μεμέτρηται, ὁπόσα τινὰ εἴη, τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον ἔσται τῇ τῶν λόγων ἁπάντων ἐξελίξει καὶ ἀναπλώσει· ὥστε, ὅταν παύσηται πάντα, ἀρχὴ ἄλλη· ὁπόσον γὰρ δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ

3. How, then, can we assert that the forming principles are different in the case of many children born at one birth[1]? And suppose one also turns to the other living beings, and especially to the ones which have litters? Now in the cases where the offspring are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle. But if this is so, the forming principles are not equal in number to the individuals. Yes, they are equal to the number of individuals which are different, and different not by reason of failure [to dominate the matter] on the side of the form. Or what prevents [there being different forming principles] even when the individuals are not different? Supposing, that is, that there are any individuals at all totally without difference. For, as the craftsman, even if he is making things which do not differ from each other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a logical difference, according to which he will make the thing another by bringing some difference to its sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does not come into being by reasoning but only by rational forming principles, the difference must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the difference. And if [nature's production] contains a random number of individuals, that is a different story; but if it is precisely determined how many there are, the quantity will be defined by the unrolling and unfolding of all the forming principles; so that, when all things come to an end, there will be another beginning; for how large the universe ought to be, and all that it will pass through in its

[1] Cp. "Seven, Cousin Peter, and all of them twins!" (Beatrix Potter *The Tale of Mr. Tod* 23), which may do something to justify my translation of διδύμων here.

βίῳ διεξελεύσεται, κεῖται ἐξαρχῆς ἐν τῷ ἔχοντι τοὺς λόγους. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἐφ' ὧν πλῆθος ἐκ μιᾶς γενέσεως, τοσούτους τοὺς λόγους; ἢ οὐ φοβητέον τὸ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἄπειρον ψυχῆς τὰ πάντα ἐχούσης. ἢ καὶ ἐν νῷ, ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, τὸ ἄπειρον τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τῶν ἐκεῖ προχείρων.

life, is established from the beginning in that which contains the forming principles. Are we then in the case of the other living beings, which produce a great many offspring from one birth, to assume an equal number of forming principles? Now we have no need to be afraid of the infinity in seeds and forming principles, since Soul contains them all. Yes, in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of these principles which come out ready for use in Soul.

V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the second section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33) (see Introductory Notes to II. 9, III. 8 and V. 5). It should be read before V. 5, with which it is particularly closely linked (see Introductory Note to V. 5). Its purpose is to give us the most vivid and powerful understanding of the true nature of Intellect possible in a written work; not a merely external understanding but one which will enable us to become Intellect and see its world from inside. The two great linked themes by developing which Plotinus tries to bring us to this inner understanding are: (i) that all beauty and order, both of nature and art, here below are due to living form deriving immediately from Intellect: our material cosmos is an image or reflection of the world of Intellect; (ii) that both the creative activity of Intellect here below and its own inner life are totally non-discursive, an eternal productive life immediately aware of itself in a way which has nothing in common with the reasoning from premises to conclusions and planning which most people generally consider as thinking.

Synopsis

The beauty of art consists in living form, originating in the intelligible world, to which the mind of the artist has direct access (ch. 1). The beauty of nature is also due to form, and so to a still higher degree is moral beauty (ch. 2). How to rise to contemplation in Intellect, through the

contemplation of the purified soul, or, better, of the gods (ch. 3). The heaven of the intelligible gods displayed in all its glory, its perfect unity and its endless living moving diversity, a universe of supremely real beings, not of theorems and propositions (chs. 3–4). The higher wisdom of Intellect which knows realities more like images than propositions (ch. 5). Egyptian hieroglyphics as an example of the expression of non-discursive thought (ch. 6). The unplanned immediate spontaneity with which Intellect creates its image, this visible cosmos (ch. 7). The beauty of the intelligible world (ch. 8). The method of dematerializing our contemplation of the visible cosmos so that we see the intelligible (ch. 9). The true, godlike contemplation of the intelligible world from within (chs. 10–11). Kronos and Zeus as symbols of the intelligible and sensible worlds; necessity of the eternal existence of the sensible image of the intelligible (ch. 12). Further exposition of the way in which Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus and Aphrodite symbolise the Three Hypostases. All beauty comes from the world of Intellect. Transition to V. 5 (ch. 13).

V. 8. (31) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΗΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΛΟΥΣ

1. Ἐπειδή φαμεν τὸν ἐν θέᾳ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου γεγενημένον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ νοῦ κατανοήσαντα κάλλος τοῦτον δυνήσεσθαι καὶ τὸν τούτου πατέρα καὶ τὸν ἐπέκεινα νοῦ εἰς ἔννοιαν βαλέσθαι, πειραθῶμεν ἰδεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὡς οἷόν τε τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν, πῶς ἄν τις τὸ κάλλος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἐκείνου θεάσαιτο. κειμένων τοίνυν ἀλλήλων ἐγγύς, ἔστω δέ, εἰ βούλει, ⟨δύο⟩ [1] λίθων ἐν ὄγκῳ, τοῦ μὲν ἀρρυθμίστου καὶ τέχνης ἀμοίρου, τοῦ δὲ ἤδη τέχνῃ κεκρατημένου εἰς ἄγαλμα θεοῦ ἢ καί τινος ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ μὲν Χάριτος ἤ τινος Μούσης, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μή τινος, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐκ πάντων καλῶν πεποίηκεν ἡ τέχνη, φανείη μὲν ἂν ὁ ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης γεγενημένος εἰς εἴδους κάλλος καλὸς οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἶναι λίθος—ἦν γὰρ ἄν καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ὁμοίως καλός—ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ εἴδους, ὃ ἐνῆκεν ἡ τέχνη. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὸ εἶδος οὐκ εἶχεν ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλ' ἦν ἐν τῷ ἐννοήσαντι καὶ πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν λίθον· ἦν δ' ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ οὐ καθόσον ὀφθαλμοὶ ἢ χεῖρες ἦσαν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετεῖχε τῆς τέχνης. ἦν ἄρα

[1] Volkmann*, B-T, e Theol. IV. 4.

[1] There is a reference back here to the end of the first section (in Porphyry's division) of this same treatise, III. 8 (30). 11—i.e. the chapter in the original immediately preceding this one.

V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

1. Since we maintain that the man who has entered into contemplation of the intelligible world and understood the beauty of the true Intellect will be able also to bring into his mind its Father which is beyond Intellect,[1] let us try to see and to say to ourselves, as far as it is possible to say such things, how it is possible for anyone to contemplate the beauty of Intellect and of that higher world. Let us suppose, if you like, a couple of great lumps of stone lying side by side, one shapeless and untouched by art, the other which has been already mastered by art and turned into a statue of a god or of a man, of a Grace or one of the Muses if of a god, and if of a man not just of any man but of one whom art has made up out of every sort of human beauty. The stone which has been brought to beauty of form by art will appear beautiful not because it is a stone—for then the other would be just as beautiful—but as a result of the form which art has put into it.[2] Now the material did not have this form, but it was in the man who had it in his mind even before it came into the stone; but it was in the craftsman, not in so far as he had hands and eyes, but because he had some share of art. So this beauty was in the art,

CF V. 5.

[2] Compare and contrast the earlier treatise I. 6 (1). 2. 25–7, where sometimes art gives beauty to a whole house with its parts, and sometimes nature gives beauty to a single stone.

ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο ἄμεινον πολλῷ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν λίθον τὸ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν μένει, ἄλλο δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἔλαττον ἐκείνου· καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔμεινε καθαρὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ οἷον ἐβούλετο, ἀλλ' ὅσον εἶξεν ὁ λίθος τῇ τέχνῃ. εἰ δ' ἡ τέχνη ὃ ἔστι καὶ ἔχει τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ—καλὸν δὲ ποιεῖ κατὰ λόγον οὗ ποιεῖ—μειζόνως καὶ ἀληθεστέρως καλή ἐστι τὸ κάλλος ἔχουσα τὸ τέχνης μεῖζον μέντοι καὶ κάλλιον ἢ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἔξω. καὶ γὰρ ὅσῳ ἰὸν εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐκτέταται, τόσῳ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἐν ἑνὶ μένοντος. ἀφίσταται γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ πᾶν διιστάμενον, εἰ ἰσχύς, ἐν ἰσχύι, εἰ θερμότης, ἐν θερμότητι, εἰ ὅλως δύναμις, ἐν δυνάμει, εἰ κάλλος, ἐν κάλλει. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν πᾶν καθ' αὑτὸ κρεῖττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ ποιουμένου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀμουσία μουσικόν, ἀλλ' ἡ μουσική, καὶ τὴν ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἡ πρὸ τούτου. εἰ δέ τις τὰς τέχνας ἀτιμάζει, ὅτι μιμούμεναι τὴν φύσιν ποιοῦσι, πρῶτον μὲν φατέον καὶ τὰς φύσεις μιμεῖσθαι ἄλλα. ἔπειτα δεῖ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ ἁπλῶς τὸ ὁρώμενον μιμοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἀνατρέχουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἐξ ὧν ἡ φύσις. εἶτα καὶ ὅτι πολλὰ παρ' αὐτῶν ποιοῦσι καὶ προστιθέασι δέ, ὅτῳ τι ἐλλείπει, ὡς ἔχουσαι τὸ κάλλος· ἐπεὶ καὶ[1] ὁ Φειδίας τὸν Δία πρὸς οὐδὲν αἰσθητὸν ποιήσας, ἀλλὰ λαβὼν οἷος ἂν

[1] Kirchhoff*, testatur Theol. IV. 20: ἔπειτα Enn.

and it was far better there; for the beauty in the art did not come into the stone, but that beauty stays in the art and another comes from it into the stone which is derived from it and less than it. And even this does not stay pure and as it wants to be in the stone, but is only there as far as the stone has submitted to the art. If art makes its work like what it is and has—and it makes it beautiful according to the forming principle of what it is making—it is itself more, and more truly, beautiful since it has the beauty of art which is greater and more beautiful than anything in the external object. For a thing is weaker than that which abides in unity in proportion as it expands in its advance towards matter. Everything which is extended departs from itself: if it is bodily strength, it grows less strong, if heat, less hot, if power in general, less powerful, if beauty, less beautiful.[1] Every original maker must be in itself stronger than that which it makes; it is not lack of music which makes a man musical, but music, and music in the world of sense is made by the music prior to this world. But if anyone despises the arts because they produce their works by imitating nature, we must tell him, first, that natural things are imitations too. Then he must know that the arts do not simply imitate what they see, but they run back up to the forming principles from which nature derives; then also that they do a great deal by themselves, and, since they possess beauty, they make up what is defective in things. For Pheidias too did not make his Zeus from any model perceived by the senses,

[1] This is the normal doctrine of Plotinus: cp. especially III. 7. 11. 23–7 (on the soul's self-extension into time).

γένοιτο, εἰ ἡμῖν ὁ Ζεὺς δι' ὀμμάτων ἐθέλοι φανῆναι.

2. Ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀφείσθωσαν αἱ τέχναι· ὧν δὲ λέγονται τὰ ἔργα μιμεῖσθαι, τὰ φύσει κάλλη γινόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα, θεωρῶμεν, λογικά τε ζῷα καὶ ἄλογα πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα κατώρθωται αὐτῶν τοῦ πλάσαντος αὐτὰ καὶ δημιουργήσαντος ἐπικρατήσαντος τῆς ὕλης καὶ εἶδος ὃ ἐβούλετο παρασχόντος. τί οὖν τὸ κάλλος ἐστὶν ἐν τούτοις; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὰ καταμήνια· ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόα ἄλλη τούτων καὶ σχῆμα ἢ οὐδὲν ἤ τι ἄσχημον ἢ οἷον τὸ περιέχον ἁπλοῦν τι [οἷα ὕλη].[1] πόθεν δὴ ἐξέλαμψε τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης τῆς περιμαχήτου κάλλος, ἢ ὅσαι γυναικῶν Ἀφροδίτης ὅμοιαι κάλλει; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης αὐτῆς πόθεν, ἢ εἴ τις ὅλως καλὸς

[1] del. Armstrong, ut ineptum simplicitatis exemplum.

[1] The "Pheidias commonplace", on the basis of which Plotinus develops his own view of the artist's direct access to the intelligible world, goes back at least to the age of Cicero (cp. Cicero *Orator* II. 8–9 and, for the continuance of its use down to the time of Plotinus, Philostratus *Life of Apollonius* VI. 19. 2). Plotinus is of course here in disagreement with Plato, for whom the artist is a mere copyist of the realities of the sense-world (cp. Plato *Republic* X 597Bff.). On the question of whether this disagreement was conscious and deliberate, see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge 1967) 183–

but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible.[1]

2. But let us leave the arts; and let us contemplate those things whose works they are said to imitate, which come into existence naturally as beauties and are so called, all the rational and irrational living creatures and especially those among them which have succeeded since the craftsman who formed them dominated the matter and gave it the form he wished. What then is the beauty in these? Certainly not the blood and the menstrual fluid; rather, the colour of these is different and their shape is either no shape or a shapeless shape or like that which delimits something simple.[2] From what source, then, did the beauty of Helen whom men fought for shine out, or that of all the women like Aphrodite in beauty? Then again, what is the source of the beauty of Aphrodite herself, or of any

4 and my paper "Tradition, Reason and Experience in the Thought of Plotinus" (in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo*, Rome 1974) 179.

[2] The text and meaning of this passage must remain somewhat doubtful, but fairly good sense can be made of it in the way followed here, with the deletion of *οἷα ὕλη* as an inept gloss on *ἁπλοῦν τι* (matter cannot have an outline, even the simplest). *ἄσχημον* of course normally means "shapeless" in the sense of "misshapen", "ugly". Plotinus seems to correct himself twice in speaking of the shape of blood and menstrual fluid—first reflecting that if they are formed material realities, even of the most elementary kind, they cannot have *no* shape, and then finding an *ἄσχημον σχῆμα* somewhat too paradoxical. His final way of putting it, which seems to imply that a complex shape is necessary for beauty, again contrasts with the aesthetic perception of the beauty of simple things (light, a single stone) so strongly asserted in I. 6. 1–2 against the "good proportion" theory of beauty (see notes on ch. 1 there).

ἄνθρωπος ἢ θεὸς τῶν ἂν εἰς ὄψιν ἐλθόντων ἢ καὶ μὴ ἰόντων, ἐχόντων δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὁραθὲν ἂν κάλλος; ἆρ' οὐκ εἶδος μὲν πανταχοῦ τοῦτο, ἦκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἐλέγετο ἐπὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ ἰέναι παρὰ τῶν τεχνῶν; τί οὖν; καλὰ μὲν τὰ ποιήματα καὶ ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης λόγος, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι λόγος οὐ κάλλος, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἄυλος [ἀλλ' εἰς ἓν][1] οὗτος; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ ὄγκος ἦν καλός, καθόσον ὄγκος ἦν, ἐχρῆν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι μὴ ἦν ὄγκος, τὸν ποιήσαντα μὴ καλὸν εἶναι· εἰ δέ, ἐάν τε ἐν σμικρῷ ἐάν τε ἐν μεγάλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ᾖ, ὁμοίως κινεῖ καὶ διατίθησι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦ ὁρῶντος τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει, τὸ κάλλος οὐ τῷ τοῦ ὄγκου μεγέθει ἀποδοτέον. τεκμήριον δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅτι ἔξω μὲν ἕως ἐστίν, οὔπω εἴδομεν, ὅταν δὲ εἴσω γένηται, διέθηκεν. εἴσεισι δὲ δι' ὀμμάτων εἶδος ὂν μόνον· ἢ πῶς διὰ σμικροῦ; συνεφέλκεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος οὐ μέγα ἐν ὄγκῳ, ἀλλ' εἴδει γενόμενον μέγα. ἔπειτα ἢ αἰσχρὸν δεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ ἀδιάφορον ἢ καλὸν εἶναι. αἰσχρὸν μὲν οὖν ὂν οὐκ ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ποιήσειεν, ἀδιάφορον δὲ τί μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν; ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τὰ οὕτω καλὰ δημιουργοῦσα πολὺ πρότερον καλή, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἔνδον οὐδὲν ὁρᾶν εἰθισμένοι οὐδ' εἰδότες τὸ ἔξω διώκομεν ἀγνοοῦντες, ὅτι τὸ ἔνδον κινεῖ· ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ βλέπων

[1] del. Kirchhoff, Müller, B-T, ut variam lectionem ad ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν.

other beautiful human being or of any god of those who appear visibly, or even of those who do not appear but have in themselves a beauty which could be seen? Is not this beauty everywhere form, which comes from the maker upon that which he has brought into being, as in the arts it was said to come from the arts upon their works? Well, then, are the things made and the forming principle in matter beautiful, but the forming principle which is not in matter but in the maker, the first immaterial one, is that not beauty? But if it was the mass which was beautiful in so far as it was mass, it would necessarily follow that the forming principle which was the maker, since it was not mass, was not beautiful; but if the same form, whether it is in something small or something large, moves and influences the soul of one who sees it in the same way by its own power, beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the mass. It is further evidence of this that we do not yet see a thing while it is outside us, but when it comes within, it influences us. But it comes in through the eyes as form alone: or how could it get through something so small? But the size is drawn in along with it, since it has become not large in bulk but large in form. Further the maker must be either ugly or neutral or beautiful. Now if it was ugly it would not make the opposite, and if it was neutral why should it rather make something beautiful than something ugly? But certainly nature which produces such beautiful works is far before them in beauty, but we, because we are not accustomed to see any of the things within and do not know them, pursue the external and do not know that it is that within which moves us: as if someone looking at

ἀγνοῶν ὅθεν ἥκει ἐκεῖνο διώκοι. δηλοῖ δέ, ὅτι τὸ διωκόμενον ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγέθει τὸ κάλλος, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι κάλλος καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς· οὗ δὴ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ μᾶλλον κάλλος, ὅταν τῳ φρόνησιν ἐνίδῃς καὶ ἀγασθῇς οὐκ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον ἀφορῶν—εἴη γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο αἶσχος—ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μορφὴν ἀφεὶς διώκῃς τὸ ἔσω κάλλος αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ μήπω σε κινεῖ, ὡς καλὸν εἰπεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ σαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἔσω βλέψας ἡσθήσῃ ὡς καλῷ. ὥστε μάτην ἂν οὕτως ἔχων ζητοῖς ἐκεῖνο· αἰσχρῷ γὰρ καὶ οὐ καθαρῷ ζητήσεις· διὸ οὐδὲ πρὸς πάντας οἱ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγοι· εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ εἶδες σαυτὸν καλόν, ἀναμνήσθητι.

3. Ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος κάλλους ἀρχέτυπος τοῦ ἐν σώματι, τοῦ δ' ἐν τῇ φύσει ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλλίων, παρ' οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ φύσει. ἐναργέστατός γε μὴν ὁ ἐν σπουδαίᾳ ψυχῇ καὶ ἤδη προϊὼν κάλλει· κοσμήσας γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ φῶς παρασχὼν ἀπὸ φωτὸς μείζονος πρώτως κάλλους ὄντος συλλογίζεσθαι ποιεῖ αὐτὸς ἐν ψυχῇ ὤν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὁ οὐκέτι ἐγγιγνόμενος οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. διὸ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ποιητὴς τοῦ πρώτου λόγου κάλλους ἐν ὕλῃ ψυχικῇ ὄντος· νοῦς δὲ οὗτος, ὁ

[1] A reference to the story of Narcissus: cp. I. 6. 8. 9–12.
[2] Cp. Plato *Symposium* 210B–C.
[3] The relationship of soul and nature has been explained in the first chapters of this work, III. 8 (30). 1–4.

his image and not knowing where it came from should pursue it.[1] But the beauty also in studies and ways of life and generally in souls [2] makes clear that what is pursued is something else and that beauty does not lie in magnitude: it is truly a greater beauty than that when you see moral sense in someone and delight in it, not looking at his face—which might be ugly—but putting aside all shape and pursuing his inner beauty. But if it does not move you yet, so that you call someone like this beautiful, you will not when you look inward at yourself be pleased with your beauty. It would be in vain for you to seek beauty when you are in this state, for you will be seeking with something ugly and impure. This is why discussions about these sorts of things are not for everybody; but if you have seen yourself beautiful, remember them.

3. There is therefore in nature a rational forming principle which is the archetype of the beauty in body, and the rational principle in soul is more beautiful than that in nature, and is also the source of that in nature.[3] It is clearest in a nobly good soul and is already advanced in beauty: for by adorning the soul and giving it light from a greater light which is primarily beauty it makes us deduce by its very presence in the soul what that before it is like, which is no longer in anything else but in itself. For this reason it is not an expressed forming principle at all, but is the maker of the first forming principle which is the beauty present in the matter which is soul [4]; but this [primary principle of beauty]

[4] *λόγος* here must be taken in its special sense of " formative expression of a higher principle on a lower level of reality ". For Soul as matter cp. II. 4. 3. 4–5.

ἀεὶ νοῦς καὶ οὐ ποτὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἐπακτὸς αὐτῷ. τίνα ἂν οὖν εἰκόνα τις αὐτοῦ λάβοι; πᾶσα γὰρ ἔσται ἐκ χείρονος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐκ νοῦ γενέσθαι, ὥστε μὴ δι' εἰκόνος, ἀλλ' οἷον χρυσοῦ παντὸς χρυσόν τινα δεῖγμα λαβεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθαρὸς εἴη ὁ ληφθείς, καθαίρειν αὐτὸν ἢ ἔργῳ ἢ λόγῳ δεικνύντας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τοῦτό ἐστι χρυσός, ἀλλὰ τουτὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄγκῳ μόνον· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπὸ νοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κεκαθαρμένου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς. σεμνοὶ μὲν γὰρ πάντες θεοὶ καὶ καλοὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν ἀμήχανον· ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι δι' ὃ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν; ἢ νοῦς, καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον νοῦς ἐνεργῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ὁρᾶσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὅτι αὐτῶν καλὰ τὰ σώματα. καὶ γὰρ οἷς ἔστι σώματα, οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι θεοῖς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὗτοι θεοί. καλοὶ δὴ ᾗ θεοί.[1] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν φρονοῦσι, ποτὲ δὲ ἀφραίνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ φρονοῦσιν ἐν ἀπαθεῖ τῷ νῷ καὶ στασίμῳ καὶ καθαρῷ καὶ ἴσασι πάντα καὶ γινώσκουσιν οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ ὅσα νοῦς ὁρᾷ. τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ ὄντες—σχολὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς—θεῶνται ἀεί, οἷον δὲ πόρρωθεν, τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ αὖ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὑπεροχῇ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῇ. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντες, ὅσοις ἡ

[1] MacKenna: καλοὶ δὴ οἱ θεοί Enn.*, H-S [1]: καλοὶ δὲ ᾗ θεοί Cilento, B-T: del. Müller, Harder.

is Intellect, always and not just sometimes Intellect, because it does not come to itself from outside. What image of it, then, could one take? For every image will be drawn from something worse. But the image must be taken from Intellect, so that one is not really apprehending it through an image, but it is like taking a piece of gold as a sample of all gold, and, if the piece taken is not pure, purifying it in act or word by showing that not all this sample is gold, but only this particular portion of the whole mass [1]; here it is from the intellect in ourselves when it has been purified, or, if you like, from the gods, that we apprehend what the intellect in them is like. For all the gods are majestic and beautiful and their beauty is overwhelming [2]: but what is it which makes them like this? It is Intellect, and it is because Intellect is more intensely active in them, so as to be visible. They are certainly not like this because their bodies are beautiful. The godhead even of those who have bodies does not consist in this, but these too are gods because of their intellect. They are surely beautiful just because they are gods. For they certainly do not sometimes think rightly and sometimes perversely: their thinking is always right in the calm and stability and purity of Intellect, and they know all things and are acquainted, not with mortal matters, but with their own divine ones, with all which Intellect sees. The gods who are in heaven, since they are free for contemplation, continually contemplate, but as if at a distance, the things in that higher heaven into which they raise their

[1] Cp. the remarkable development of this image, where the "living gold" purifies itself, in IV. 7. 10. 47–52.

[2] Cp. Plato *Symposium* 218E5.

οἴκησις ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ οἰκοῦντες τῷ ἐκεῖ οὐρανῷ—πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ οὐρανὸς καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, πᾶν οὐράνιον ἐκείνου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—οἱ δὲ θεοὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀπαξιοῦντες ἀνθρώπους οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἐκεῖ, πᾶσαν μὲν διεξίασι τὴν ἐκεῖ χώραν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἀναπαυόμενοι

4. —καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥεῖα ζώειν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἀλήθεια δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ γενέτειρα καὶ τροφὸς καὶ οὐσία καὶ τροφή—καὶ ὁρῶσι τὰ πάντα, οὐχ οἷς γένεσις πρόσεστιν, ἀλλ' οἷς οὐσία, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἄλλοις· διαφανῆ γὰρ πάντα καὶ σκοτεινὸν οὐδὲ ἀντίτυπον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς παντὶ φανερὸς εἰς τὸ εἴσω καὶ πάντα· φῶς γὰρ φωτί. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αὖ ὁρᾷ ἐν ἄλλῳ πάντα, ὥστε πανταχοῦ πάντα καὶ πᾶν πᾶν καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν καὶ ἄπειρος ἡ αἴγλη· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν μέγα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μέγα· καὶ ἥλιος ἐκεῖ πάντα ἄστρα, καὶ ἕκαστον ἥλιος αὖ καὶ πάντα. ἐξέχει δ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἄλλο, ἐμφαίνει δὲ καὶ πάντα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κίνησις καθαρά· οὐ γὰρ συγχεῖ αὐτὴν ἰοῦσαν ὃ κινεῖ ἕτερον αὐτῆς ὑπάρχον· καὶ ἡ στάσις οὐ παρακινουμένη, ὅτι μὴ μέμικται τῷ μὴ στασίμῳ· καὶ τὸ καλὸν καλόν, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ ⟨μὴ⟩ [1] καλῷ. βέβηκε δὲ ἕκαστος οὐκ ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίας οἷον γῆς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν

[1] Bouillet, testatur Theologia.

[1] The starting-point here is, as so often, the *Phaedrus* myth (cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247ff.); and what immediately follows may be influenced by the description of the "true heaven and earth" in Plato *Phaedo* 109Dff. But the whole of this amazing description of the intelligible world which continues through chapter 4 seems to express some kind of direct

heads [1]: but the gods in that higher heaven, all those who dwell upon it and in it, contemplate through their abiding in the whole of that heaven. For all things there are heaven, and earth and sea and plants and animals and men are heaven, everything which belongs to that higher heaven is heavenly. The gods in it do not reject as unworthy men or anything else that is there; it is worthy because it is there, and they travel, always at rest, through all that higher country and region—

4. For it is "the easy life" [2] there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food—and they see all things, not those to which coming to be, but those to which real being belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest. Movement, too, is pure: for the mover does not trouble it in its going by being different from it. Rest is not disturbed, for it is not mixed with that which is not at rest. Beauty is just beauty, because it is not in what is not beautiful. Each walks not as if on alien ground, but each one's place is its very self and when it

visionary experience of Plotinus himself (cp. VI. 7. 12–3).

[2] θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζώοντες is a stock Homeric phrase for the gods: cp. e.g. *Iliad* 6. 138.

ἑκάστῳ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι, καὶ συνθεῖ αὐτῷ οἷον πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἰόντι τὸ ὅθεν ἐστί, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς μὲν ἄλλο, ἡ χώρα δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον νοῦς καὶ αὐτὸς νοῦς· οἷον εἴ τις κατὰ [1] τοῦτον τὸν οὐρανὸν τὸν ὁρώμενον φωτοειδῆ ὄντα τοῦτο τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φῦναι νοήσειε τὰ ἄστρα. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ μέρους ἄλλο ἄλλου γίνοιτο ἄν, καὶ εἴη ἂν μόνον ἕκαστον μέρος, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐξ ὅλου ἀεὶ ἕκαστον καὶ ἅμα ἕκαστον καὶ ὅλον· φαντάζεται μὲν γὰρ μέρος, ἐνορᾶται δὲ τῷ ὀξεῖ τὴν ὄψιν ὅλον, οἷον εἴ τις γένοιτο τὴν ὄψιν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἐλέγετο καὶ τὰ εἴσω τῆς γῆς ὁρᾶν τοῦ μύθου τοὺς ἐκεῖ αἰνιττομένου ὀφθαλμούς. τῆς δὲ ἐκεῖ θέας οὔτε κάματός ἐστιν οὔτ' ἐστὶ πλήρωσις εἰς τὸ παύσασθαι θεωμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ κένωσις ἦν, ἵνα ἥκων εἰς πλήρωσιν καὶ τέλος ἀρκεσθῇ, οὔτε τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο, ἵνα ἑτέρῳ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ ἀρέσκοντα ᾖ· ἄτρυτά τε τὰ ἐκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ ἀπλήρωτον τῷ μὴ τὴν πλήρωσιν καταφρονεῖν ποιεῖν τοῦ πεπληρωκότος· ὁρῶν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁρᾷ, καὶ καθορῶν ἄπειρον αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συνέπεται φύσει. καὶ ἡ ζωὴ μὲν οὐδενὶ κάματον ἔχει, ὅταν ᾖ καθαρά· τὸ δ' ἄριστα ζῶν τί ἂν κάμοι; ἡ δὲ ζωὴ σοφία, σοφία δὲ οὐ πορισθεῖσα λογισμοῖς, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἦν πᾶσα καὶ ἐλλείπουσα οὐδενί, ἵνα ζητήσεως δεηθῇ· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πρώτη καὶ οὐκ ἀπ'

[1] Dodds: καὶ Enn.

ascends (so to speak) the place it came from runs along with it, and it is not itself one thing and its place another. The thing itself is Intellect and its ground is Intellect; it is as if one were to suppose that in the case of this visible heaven of ours which is luminous that the light which comes from it was born to be the stars. Here, however, one part would not come from another, and each would be only a part; but there each comes only from the whole and is part and whole at once: it has the appearance of a part, but a penetrating look sees the whole in it, supposing that someone had the sort of sight which it is said that Lynceus [1] had, who saw into the inside of the earth, a story which speaks in riddles of the eyes which they have there. They do not grow weary of contemplation there, or so filled with it as to cease contemplating: for there is no emptiness which would result in their being satisfied when they had filled it and reached their end; and things are not different from each other so as to make what belongs to one displeasing to another with different characteristics; and nothing there wears out or wearies. There is a lack of satisfaction there in the sense that fullness does not cause contempt for that which has produced it: for that which sees goes on seeing still more, and, perceiving its own infinity and that of what it sees, follows its own nature. Life holds no weariness for anyone when it is pure: and how should that which leads the best life grow weary? This life is wisdom, wisdom not acquired by reasonings, because it was always all present, without any failing which would make it need to be

[1] For the legend of Lynceus see *Cypria* XI Allen and Apollonius Rhodius I 151–5.

ἄλλης· καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτὴ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτός, εἶτα σοφός. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία μείζων, καὶ ἡ αὐτοεπιστήμη ἐνταῦθα πάρεδρος τῷ νῷ τῷ συμπροφαίνεσθαι, οἷον λέγουσι κατὰ μίμησιν καὶ τῷ Διὶ τὴν Δίκην. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκεῖ οἷον ἀγάλματα παρ' αὐτῶν ἑνορώμενα, ὥστε θέαμα εἶναι ὑπερευδαιμόνων θεατῶν. τῆς μὲν οὖν σοφίας τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἄν τις κατίδοι, ὅτι μετ' αὐτῆς ἔχει καὶ πεποίηκε τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἠκολούθησε, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ συνεγένετο αὐτῇ, καὶ ἓν ἄμφω, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἐκεῖ σοφία. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς εἰς σύνεσιν οὐκ ἤλθομεν, ὅτι καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας θεωρήματα καὶ συμφόρησιν νενομίκαμεν προτάσεων εἶναι· τὸ δὲ οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστήμαις. εἰ δέ τις περὶ τούτων ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἐατέον ταύτας ἐν τῷ παρόντι. περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμης, ἣν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων κατιδὼν φησιν· οὐδ' ἥτις ἐστὶν ἄλλη ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὅπως δέ, εἴασε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀνευρίσκειν, εἴπερ ἄξιοι τῆς προσηγορίας φαμὲν εἶναι—ἴσως οὖν βέλτιον ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι.

5. Πάντα δὴ τὰ γινόμενα, εἴτε τεχνητὰ εἴτε φυσικὰ εἴη, σοφία τις ποιεῖ, καὶ ἡγεῖται τῆς ποιήσεως πανταχοῦ σοφία. ἀλλ' εἰ δή τις κατ'[1] αὐτὴν τὴν σοφίαν ποιοῖ, ἔστωσαν μὲν αἱ τέχναι τοιαῦται. ἀλλ' ὁ τεχνίτης πάλιν αὖ εἰς σοφίαν

[1] Müller*: καὶ Enn.

[1] Justice is throned beside Zeus in Sophocles *Oedipus Coloneus* 1381–2 (in *Antigone* 451, for obvious dramatic reasons, she dwells with the gods below, in the world of the dead). In Plato *Laws* IV 716A2 she is the constant follower of God. It is interesting that Plotinus distinguishes absolute

searched for; but it is the first, not derived from any other wisdom; the very being of Intellect is wisdom: it does not exist first and then become wise. For this reason there is no greater wisdom: absolute knowledge has its throne beside Intellect in their common revelation, as they say symbolically Justice is throned beside Zeus.[1] All things of this kind there are like images seen by their own light, to be beheld by " exceedingly blessed spectators ".[2] The greatness and the power of this wisdom can be imagined if we consider that it has with it and has made all things, and all things follow it, and it is the real beings, and they came to be along with it, and both are one, and reality is wisdom there. But we have not arrived at understanding this, because we consider that the branches of knowledge are made up of theorems and a collection of proportions; but this is not true even of the sciences here below. But if someone wants to dispute about these, let them go for the present; but about the knowledge there—which Plato observed and said " that which is not a knowledge different from that in which it is ", but how this is so, he left us to investigate and discover, if we claim to be worthy of our title [of Platonists]—perhaps it would be better to start from this point:

5. Some wisdom makes all the things which have come into being, whether they are products of art or nature, and everywhere it is a wisdom which is in charge of their making. But if anyone does really make according to wisdom itself, let us grant that the arts are like this. But the craftsman goes back

knowledge and Intellect even in their common revelation: they are clearly not quite the same thing for him.

[2] Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 111A3.

φυσικὴν ἔρχεται, καθ' ἣν γεγένηται, οὐκέτι συντεθεῖσαν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ἀλλ' ὅλην ἕν τι, οὐ τὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ πολλῶν εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀναλυομένην εἰς πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνός. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τις πρώτην θήσεται, ἀρκεῖ· οὐκέτι γὰρ ἐξ ἄλλου οὖσα οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐν τῇ φύσει, τούτου δὲ ἀρχὴν φήσουσι τὴν φύσιν, πόθεν ἕξει φήσομεν καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἄλλου ἐκείνου. εἰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, στησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ εἰς νοῦν ἥξουσιν, ἐνταῦθα ὀπτέον, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἐγέννησε τὴν σοφίαν· καὶ εἰ φήσουσι, πόθεν; εἰ δὲ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἢ αὐτὸν ὄντα σοφίαν. ἡ ἄρα ἀληθινὴ σοφία οὐσία, καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία σοφία, καὶ ἡ ἀξία καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ παρὰ τῆς σοφίας, καί, ὅτι παρὰ τῆς σοφίας, οὐσία ἀληθής. διὸ καὶ ὅσαι οὐσίαι σοφίαν οὐκ ἔχουσι, τῷ μὲν διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ γεγονέναι οὐσία, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ἐν αὑταῖς σοφίαν, οὐκ ἀληθιναὶ οὐσίαι. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ νομίζειν ἐκεῖ ἀξιώματα ὁρᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπερευδαίμονας, ἀλλ' ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων ἐκεῖ καλὰ ἀγάλματα, οἷα ἐφαντάζετό τις ἐν τῇ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ εἶναι, ἀγάλματα δὲ οὐ γεγραμμένα, ἀλλὰ ὄντα. διὸ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὄντα ἔλεγον εἶναι οἱ παλαιοὶ καὶ οὐσίας.

[1] The " images in the soul of the wise man " (and probably the " images " in ch. 4, line 43) come from the speech of Alcibiades in praise of Socrates at the end of the *Symposium*, where he speaks of the wonderful images which are concealed within his Silenus-like outside: Plato *Symposium* 215B1–3 and 216E6–217A1. The form of reference (" someone imagined ") is curious for a reference by Plotinus to a Platonic passage, but Plotinus is probably attributing the imagination of the Silenus-figure containing divine images to Alcibiades himself rather than to Plato. It brings out excellently that

again to the wisdom of nature, according to which he has come into existence, a wisdom which is no longer composed of theorems, but is one thing as a whole, not the wisdom made into one out of many components, but rather resolved into multiplicity from one. If then one is going to make this the first, that is enough: for it no longer comes from another and is not in another. But if people are going to say that the rational forming principle is in nature, but its origin is nature, from where shall we say that nature has it—is it perhaps from that other? If it is from itself, we shall stop there; but if they are going on to Intellect, we must see at this point if Intellect generated wisdom; and if they assent to this, from where did it get it? If from itself, this is impossible unless it is wisdom itself. The true wisdom, then, is substance, and the true substance is wisdom; and the worth of substance comes from wisdom, and it is because it comes from wisdom that it is true substance. Therefore all the substances which do not possess wisdom, because they have become substance on account of some wisdom but do not possess wisdom in themselves, are not true substances. One must not then suppose that the gods or the " exceedingly blessed spectators " in the higher world contemplate propositions, but all the Forms we speak about are beautiful images in that world, of the kind which someone imagined to exist in the soul of the wise man, images not painted but real.[1] This is why the ancients said that the Ideas were realities and substances.

the Forms in Intellect are concrete living realities, not mental abstractions like propositions, a point on which Plotinus is much concerned to insist in this treatise.

6. Δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων σοφοί, εἴτε ἀκριβεῖ ἐπιστήμῃ λαβόντες εἴτε καὶ συμφύτῳ, περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο διὰ σοφίας δεικνύναι, μὴ τύποις γραμμάτων διεξοδεύουσι λόγους καὶ προτάσεις μηδὲ μιμουμένοις φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωμάτων κεχρῆσθαι, ἀγάλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα ἐντυπώσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὴν ἐκείνου ⟨οὐ⟩[1] διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι, ὡς ἄρα τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἄγαλμα καὶ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ οὐ διανόησις οὐδὲ βούλευσις. ὕστερον δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀθρόας οὔσης εἴδωλον ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐξειλιγμένον ἤδη καὶ λέγον αὐτὸ ἐν διεξόδῳ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς οὕτω, ἐξεύρισκον, ὥστε[2] καλῶς οὕτως ἔχοντος τοῦ γεγενημένου θαυμάσαι εἴ τις οἶδε, θαυμάσαι ἔφη τὴν σοφίαν, πῶς αὐτὴ[3] αἰτίας οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς οὐσίας, δι' ἃς οὕτω, παρέχει τοῖς ποιουμένοις κατ' αὐτήν. τὸ καλῶς ἄρα οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἐκ ζητήσεως ἂν μόλις ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως φανέν, ὅτι δεῖ οὕτως, εἴπερ τις ἐξεύροι, πρὸ ζητήσεως καὶ πρὸ λογισμοῦ ὑπάρχειν οὕτως· οἷον—λάβωμεν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑνὸς μεγάλου ὃ λέγω, ὅπερ ἁρμόσει καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων—

7. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ πᾶν, ἐπείπερ συγχωροῦμεν παρ' ἄλλου αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἆρα οἰόμεθα

[1] ἐκείνου (sc. τοῦ ἀγάλματος) οὐ Igal: ἐκείνου Enn.: ἐκεῖ οὐ Theiler.
[2] coniecimus: ὡς τὸ Enn. [3] Theiler: αὕτη Enn.

[1] On the kind of images of which Plotinus is speaking here see E. de Keyser *La Signification de l'art dans les Ennéades de Plotin* (Louvain 1955) 60–2, who points out that Plotinus speaks of temples, not of sacred writings, and is therefore not misunderstanding the semi-alphabetic hieroglyphics of the sacred books but speaking of the purely ideogrammatic symbols which do appear on the temple walls.

6. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world,[1] that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and not discourse or deliberation. But [only] afterwards [others] discovered, starting from it in its concentrated unity, a representation in something else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively and giving the reasons why things are like this, so that, because what has come into existence is so beautifully disposed, if anyone knows how to admire it he expresses his admiration of how this wisdom, which does not itself possess the reasons why substance is as it is, gives them to the things which are made according to it. That, then, which is beautiful in this way, and which is with difficulty or not at all discovered by research to be necessarily like this, if one were to find it out, exists before research and before reasoning; for instance—for let us take one great example of what I am saying, which will also fit all other cases—

7. this All, if we agree that its being and its being what it is come to it from another, are we to think

τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπινοῆσαι παρ' αὑτῷ γῆν καὶ ταύτην ἐν μέσῳ δεῖν στῆναι, εἶτα ὕδωρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τάξει μέχρι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἶτα ζῷα πάντα καὶ τούτοις μορφὰς τοιαύτας ἑκάστῳ, ὅσαι νῦν εἰσι, καὶ τὰ ἔνδον ἑκάστοις σπλάγχνα καὶ τὰ ἔξω μέρη, εἶτα διατεθέντα ἕκαστα παρ' αὑτῷ οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ ἔργῳ; ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ ἐπίνοια δυνατὴ ἡ τοιαύτη—πόθεν γὰρ ἐπῆλθεν οὐπώποτε ἑωρακότι;—οὔτε ἐξ ἄλλου λαβόντι δυνατὸν ἦν ἐργάσασθαι, ὅπως νῦν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ποιοῦσι χερσὶ καὶ ὀργάνοις χρώμενοι· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ χεῖρες καὶ πόδες. λείπεται τοίνυν εἶναι μὲν πάντα ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐδενὸς δὲ μεταξὺ ὄντος τῇ ἐν τῷ ὄντι πρὸς ἄλλο γειτονείᾳ οἷον ἐξαίφνης ἀναφανῆναι ἴνδαλμα καὶ εἰκόνα ἐκείνου εἴτε αὐτόθεν εἴτε ψυχῆς διακονησαμένης—διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι—ἢ ψυχῆς τινος. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖθεν ἦν σύμπαντα ταῦτα, καὶ καλλιόνως ἐκεῖ· τὰ γὰρ τῇδε καὶ μέμικται καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα μέμικται, ἀλλ' οὖν εἴδεσι κατέσχηται ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ὕλη τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων εἴδεσιν, εἶτ' ἐπὶ εἴδεσιν εἴδη ἄλλα, εἶτα πάλιν ἕτερα· ὅθεν καὶ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὴν ὕλην ὑπὸ πολλοῖς εἴδεσι κρυφθεῖσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αὕτη εἶδός τι ἔσχατον,

[1] The insistence on the immediate and intimate relationship of the intelligible and sensible universes and the comparative unimportance of the mediation of soul should be noted. Soul in Plotinus never has a world of its own intermediate between the intelligible and sensible worlds; it belongs to both worlds, and is normally thought of as linking them; but

that its maker conceived earth in his own mind, with its necessary place in the centre, and then water and its place upon earth, and then the other things in their order up to heaven, then all living things, each with the sort of shapes which they have now, and their particular internal organs and outward parts, and then when he had them all arranged in his mind proceeded to his work? Planning of this sort is quite impossible—for where could the ideas of all these things come from to one who had never seen them? And if he received them from someone else he could not carry them out as craftsmen do now, using their hands and tools; for hands and feet come later. The only possibility that remains, then, is that all things exist in something else, and, since there is nothing between, because of their closeness to something else in the realm of real being something like an imprint and image of that other suddenly appears, either by its direct action or through the assistance of soul—this makes no difference for the present discussion—or of a particular soul.[1] All that is here below comes from there, and exists in greater beauty there: for here it is adulterated, but there it is pure. All this universe is held fast by forms from beginning to end: matter first of all by the forms of the elements, and then other forms upon these, and then again others; so that it is difficult to find the matter hidden under so many forms. Then matter, too, is a sort of ultimate form [2];

here it seems to be hardly necessary even as a link.

[2] This passing remark, which is very difficult to reconcile with Plotinus's normal view of ὕλη as the principle of evil (there are no evil Forms in Plotinus), is the nearest he ever comes to a totally positive valuation of matter.

πᾶν εἶδος τόδε [1] καὶ πάντα εἶδη· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα εἶδος ἦν· ἐποιεῖτο δὲ [2] ἀψοφητί, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ποιῆσαν καὶ οὐσία καὶ εἶδος· διὸ καὶ ἄπονος [καὶ οὕτως] [3] ἡ δημιουργία. καὶ παντὸς δὲ ἦν, ὡς ἂν πᾶν. οὐ τοίνυν ἦν τὸ ἐμποδίζον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐπικρατεῖ καίτοι ἄλλων ἄλλοις ἐμποδίων γινομένων· ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῇ οὐδὲ νῦν· μένει γὰρ ὡς πᾶν. ἐδόκει δέ μοι, ὅτι καί, εἰ ἡμεῖς ἀρχέτυπα καὶ οὐσία καὶ εἴδη ἅμα καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ποιοῦν ἐνταῦθα ἦν ἡμῶν οὐσία, ἐκράτησεν ἂν ἄνευ πόνων ἡ ἡμετέρα δημιουργία. καίτοι καὶ ἄνθρωπος δημιουργεῖ εἶδος αὑτοῦ ἄλλο ὅ ἐστι γενόμενος· ἀπέστη γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πᾶν νῦν ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος· παυσάμενος δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι μετεωροπορεῖ φησι καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ· γενόμενος γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. ἀλλ' οὗ χάριν ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἔχεις μὲν σὺ αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν δι' ἣν ἐν μέσῳ ἡ γῆ καὶ διὰ τί στρογγύλη καὶ ὁ λοξὸς διότι ὡδί· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὔ, διότι οὕτως ἐχρῆν, διὰ τοῦτο οὕτω βεβούλευται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἔστι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ταῦτα ἔχει καλῶς· οἷον εἰ πρὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὐ παρὰ τῶν προτάσεων· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκολουθίας οὐδ' ἐξ ἐπινοίας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀκολουθίας

[1] Ez, Perna, Kirchhoff*: εἶδος· τὸ δὲ ABR[ac]JUC, Perna[mg]: εἶδος τὸ δὲ Creuzer.

[2] suspic. H-S [1], scr. B-T: ἐποίει τὸ δὲ Enn.: ἐποίει τόδε Perna, Creuzer, Kirchhoff: ἐποίει ⟨δὲ⟩ τόδε Müller*.

[3] del. Theiler.

so this universe is all form, and all the things in it are forms; for its archetype is form; the making is done without noise and fuss, since that which makes is all real being and form. So this is another reason why the craftsmanship of Intellect is also without toil and trouble. And it is the fashioning of an All, so an All is the maker. There is nothing to hinder the making, and even now it has the mastery, and though one thing obstructs another, nothing obstructs it; for it abides as an All. But I think also that if we were archetypes and real being and forms all at once, and if the form which makes things here below was our real being, our craftsmanship would have the mastery without toil and trouble. And even now, man also is a craftsman, of a form other than himself since he has become something else, what he is; for he has ceased to be the All now that he has become man; but when he ceases to be man he "walks on high and directs the whole universe" [1]; for when he comes to belong to the whole he makes the whole. But to return to our main theme: you can explain the reason why the earth is in the middle, and round, and why the ecliptic slants as it does; but it is not because you can do this that things are so there; they were not planned like this because it was necessary for them to be like this, but because things There are disposed as they are, the things here are beautifully disposed: as if the conclusion was there before the syllogism which showed the cause, and did not follow from the premises; [the world-order] is not the result of following out a train of logical consequences and

[1] Cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 246C1–2.

καὶ πρὸ ἐπινοίας· ὕστερα γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ λόγος καὶ ἀπόδειξις καὶ πίστις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχή, αὐτόθεν πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ὧδε· καὶ τὸ μὴ ζητεῖν αἰτίας ἀρχῆς οὕτω καλῶς λέγεται, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς τῆς τελείας, ἥτις ταὐτὸν τῷ τέλει· ἥτις δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, αὕτη τὸ πᾶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀνελλιπής.

8. Καλὸν οὖν πρώτως, καὶ ὅλον δὲ καὶ πανταχοῦ ὅλον, ἵνα μηδὲ μέρη ἀπολείπηται τῷ καλῷ ἐλλείπειν, τίς οὖν οὐ φήσει καλόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὃ μὴ ὅλον αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὃ μέρος ἔχον [1] ἢ μηδέ τι αὐτοῦ ἔχον.[2] ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνο καλόν, τί ἂν ἄλλο; τὸ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ καλὸν ἐθέλει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ πρώτως εἰς θέαν παρελθὸν τῷ εἶδος εἶναι καὶ θέαμα νοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγαστὸν ὀφθῆναι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων, τοῦτο σημῆναι θέλων εἴς τι τῶν ἐνεργεστέρων ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀποδεξάμενον ποιεῖ τὸν δημιουργὸν τὸ ἀποτελεσθέν, διὰ τούτου ἐνδείξασθαι θέλων τὸ τοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τῆς ἰδέας κάλλος ὡς ἀγαστόν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ ἄλλο ποιηθὲν ὅταν τις θαυμάσῃ, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἔχει τὸ θαῦμα, καθ' ὅ ἐστι πεποιημένον. εἰ δ' ἀγνοεῖ ὃ πάσχει, θαῦμα οὐδέν· ἐπεὶ καὶ

[1] Kirchhoff*: ἔχων Enn., H-S [1].
[2] L, Kirchhoff*: ἔχων wBxUCQ.

[1] Cp. Aristotle *Physics* A 5. 188a27–30, though Plotinus is as usual very much adapting Aristotle's doctrine to his own sytem and his own purposes.

[2] The reference is to Plato *Timaeus* 37C7–D1. But there is nothing in Plato to suggest the interpretation given by Plotinus here, which is wholly based on his own doctrine that all perfect activity is contemplation, and that creation or

purposive thought: it is before consequential and purposive thinking; for all this comes later, reasoning and demonstration and the confidence [produced by them]. For since [the intelligible world-order] is a principle, all these follow immediately and just as they do; and in this sense it is well said that we should not enquire into the reason why of a principle,[1] and of a principle like this, the perfect one, which is the same as the goal; but that which is principle and goal is the whole all together and is without deficiency.

8. Who, then, will not call beautiful that which is beautiful primarily, and as a whole, and everywhere as a whole when no parts fail by falling short in beauty? Certainly [one would not call beautiful] that which is not as a whole beauty itself, but has a part of it, or not even any of it. Or if that is not beautiful, what else is? For that which is before it does not even want to be beautiful; for it is this which first presents itself to contemplation by being form and the contemplation of intellect which is also a delight to see. For this reason Plato, wishing to indicate this by reference to something which is clearer relatively to ourselves, represents the Craftsman approving his completed work, wishing to show by this how delightful is the beauty of the model, which is the Idea.[2] For whenever someone admires a thing modelled on something else, he directs his admiration to that on which the thing is modelled. But if he does not know what is happening to him, that is no wonder: since lovers also, and in general

action should be the spontaneous reflex of contemplation: this was fully expounded in the first part of the present work, III. 8, and applied to the creation of the universe in ch. 7 of this treatise.

οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ ὅλως οἱ τὸ τῇδε κάλλος τεθαυμακότες ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι δι' ἐκεῖνο· δι' ἐκεῖνο γάρ. ὅτι δὲ εἰς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀνάγει τὸ "ἠγάσθη," δῆλον ποιεῖ ἐπίτηδες τὸ ἑξῆς τῆς λέξεως λαβών· εἶπε γάρ· ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα αὐτὸ ἐβουλήθη ἀφομοιῶσαι, τὸ κάλλος τοῦ παραδείγματος οἷόν ἐστιν ἐνδεικνύμενος διὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτου τὸ γενόμενον καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὡς εἰκόνα ἐκείνου εἰπεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνο ἦν τὸ ὑπέρκαλον κάλλει ἀμηχάνῳ, τί ἂν τούτου τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἦν κάλλιον; ὅθεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ μεμφόμενοι τούτῳ, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καθόσον μὴ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι.

9. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸν κόσμον, ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν μένοντος ὅ ἐστι καὶ μὴ συγχεομένου, λάβωμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντα, ὡς οἷόν τε, ὥστε ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν προφαινομένου, οἷον τῆς ἔξω σφαίρας οὔσης, ἀκολουθεῖν εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ἡλίου καὶ ὁμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων τὴν φαντασίαν, καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ πάντα τὰ[1] ζῷα ὁρᾶσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ σφαίρας διαφανοῦς καὶ ἔργῳ ἂν γένοιτο πάντα ἐνορᾶσθαι. ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φωτεινή τις φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ, εἴτε κινούμενα εἴτε ἑστηκότα, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινούμενα, τὰ δ' ἑστηκότα. φυλάττων δὲ ταύτην ἄλλην παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφελὼν τὸν ὄγκον λάβε· ἄφελε δὲ καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἐν σοὶ φάντασμα, καὶ μὴ πειρῶ αὐτῆς ἄλλην σμικροτέραν λαβεῖν τῷ ὄγκῳ, θεὸν δὲ καλέσας τὸν πεποιηκότα ἧς ἔχεις τὸ φάντασμα

[1] wQ, Perna: om. BxUCL, H-S [1].

all the admirers of beauty here below, do not know that this is because of the intelligible beauty: for it is because of the intelligible beauty. Plato deliberately makes it clear that he refers the "was delighted" to the model by the words which follow: for he says, "he was delighted, and wanted to make it still more like its model", showing what the beauty of the model is like by saying that what originates from it is itself, too, beautiful because it is an image of the intelligible beauty: for, if that was not transcendently beautiful with an overwhelming beauty, what would be more beautiful than this visible universe? Those who blame it, then, do not do so rightly, except perhaps in so far as it is not the intelligible world.

9. Let us then apprehend in our thought this visible universe, with each of its parts remaining what it is without confusion, gathering all of them together into one as far as we can, so that when any one part appears first, for instance the outside heavenly sphere, the imagination of the sun and, with it, the other heavenly bodies follows immediately, and the earth and sea and all the living creatures are seen, as they could in fact all be seen inside a transparent sphere. Let there be, then, in the soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything within it, either moving or standing still, or some things moving and others standing still. Keep this, and apprehend in your mind another, taking away the mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter in yourself, and do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the original one, but calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him to

εὖξαι ἐλθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ἥκοι τὸν αὑτοῦ κόσμον φέρων μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θεῶν εἷς ὢν καὶ πάντες, καὶ ἕκαστος πάντες συνόντες εἰς ἕν, καὶ ταῖς μὲν δυνάμεσιν ἄλλοι, τῇ δὲ μιᾷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ πολλῇ πάντες εἷς· μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ εἷς πάντες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτός, ἦν πάντες ἐκεῖνοι γένωνται· ὁμοῦ δέ εἰσι καὶ ἕκαστος χωρὶς αὖ ἐν στάσει ἀδιαστάτῳ οὐ μορφὴν αἰσθητὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔχων—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ὁ μὲν ἄλλοθι, ὁ δέ που ἀλλαχόθι ἦν, καὶ ἕκαστος δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἐν αὑτῷ—οὐδὲ μέρη ἄλλα ἔχων ἄλλοις ἢ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ ἕκαστον οἷον [1] δύναμις κερματισθεῖσα καὶ τοσαύτη οὖσα, ὅσα τὰ μέρη μετρούμενα. τὸ δέ ἐστι [τὸ πᾶν] [2] δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς ἄπειρον μὲν ἰοῦσα, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ δυναμένη· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος μέγας, ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι. ποῦ γάρ τι ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅπου μὴ φθάνει; μέγας μὲν οὖν καὶ ὅδε ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσαι δυνάμεις ὁμοῦ, ἀλλὰ μείζων ἂν ἦν καὶ ὁπόσος οὐδ' ἂν ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μή τις αὐτῷ συνῆν σώματος δύναμις μικρά. καίτοι μεγάλας ἄν τις φήσειε πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων τὰς δυνάμεις· ἀλλὰ ἤδη ἀπειρίᾳ δυνάμεως ἀληθινῆς φαντάζονται καίουσαι καὶ φθείρουσαι καὶ θλίβουσαι καὶ πρὸς γένεσιν τῶν ζῴων ὑπουργοῦσαι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν φθείρει, ὅτι καὶ φθείρεται, καὶ συγγενᾷ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται· ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἡ ἐκεῖ μόνον τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ μόνον τὸ καλὸν εἶναι. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ καλὸν ἀποστερηθὲν τοῦ εἶναι; ποῦ δ' ἂν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ καλὸν εἶναι ἐστερημένη; ἐν τῷ γὰρ

[1] Harder, B-T: ὅλον Enn.*
[2] del. Kirchhoff*.

come. And may he come, bringing his own universe with him, with all the gods within him, he who is one and all, and each god is all the gods coming together into one; they are different in their powers, but by that one manifold power they are all one; or rather, the one god is all; for he does not fail if all become what he is; they are all together and each one again apart in a position without separation, possessing no perceptible shape—for if they did, one would be in one place and one in another, and each would no longer be all in himself—nor does each god have parts different from himself belonging to other gods than himself, nor is each whole like a power cut up which is as large as the measure of its parts. But this, the [intelligible] All, is universal power, extending to infinity and powerful to infinity; and that god is so great that his parts have become infinite. For what place can we speak of where he is not there before us? This [visible] heaven is indeed great, and so are all the powers together within it, but it would be greater, even indescribably great, if there was not present with it a petty power of body. One might certainly call the powers of fire and the other bodies great; but it is by mere inexperience of true power that they are imagined burning and destroying and crushing and working as servants for the production of living things. But these destroy, because they are destroyed, and help to generate because they are generated themselves; but the power in the intelligible world has nothing but its being and its being beautiful. For where would its beauty be if it was deprived of its being? And where would its reality be if it was stripped of its being beautiful?

ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ καλοῦ ἐλλείπει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ. διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθεινόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ταὐτὸν τῷ καλῷ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐράσμιον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι. πότερον δὲ ποτέρου αἴτιον τί χρὴ ζητεῖν οὔσης τῆς φύσεως μιᾶς; ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψευδὴς οὐσία δεῖται ἐπακτοῦ εἰδώλου καλοῦ, ἵνα καὶ καλὸν φαίνηται καὶ ὅλως ᾖ, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι, καθόσον μετείληφε κάλλους τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ λαβοῦσα, ὅσῳ ἂν λάβῃ, μᾶλλον τελειοτέρα· μᾶλλον γὰρ οὐσία [1] ᾗ [2] καλή.

10. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς καίπερ ὢν πρεσβύτατος τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ὧν αὐτὸς ἡγεῖται, πρῶτος πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὴν τούτου θέαν, οἱ δὲ ἕπονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι καὶ δαίμονες καὶ ψυχαί, αἳ ταῦτα ὁρᾶν δύνανται. ὁ δὲ ἐκφαίνεται αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος ἀοράτου τόπου καὶ ἀνατείλας ὑψοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῶν κατέλαμψε μὲν πάντα καὶ ἔπλησεν αὐγῆς καὶ ἐξέπληξε μὲν τοὺς κάτω, καὶ ἐστράφησαν ἰδεῖν οὐ δεδυνημένοι οἷα ἥλιον. οἱ μὲν ἄρ' [3] αὐτοῦ ἀνέχονταί τε καὶ βλέπουσιν· οἱ δὲ ταράττονται, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀφεστήκωσιν αὐτοῦ. ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ δυνηθέντες ἰδεῖν εἰς αὐτὸν μὲν πάντες βλέπουσι καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ· οὐ ταὐτὸν δὲ ἕκαστος ἀεὶ θέαμα κομίζεται, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀτενὲς ἰδὼν ἐκλάμπουσαν εἶδε τὴν τοῦ δικαίου πηγὴν καὶ φύσιν, ἄλλος δὲ τῆς σωφροσύνης ἐπλήσθη τοῦ θεάματος, οὐχ οἵαν ἄνθρωποι παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὅταν ἔχωσι· μιμεῖται γὰρ

[1] Theiler: οἰκεία Enn.*
[2] scripsimus: ἡ Enn.*: εἰ Theiler.
[3] coniecimus: ἀπ' wBxUCz: ὑπ' SN Vat., Creuzer.

For in deficiency of beauty it would be defective also in reality. For this reason being is longed for because it is the same as beauty, and beauty is lovable because it is being. But why should we enquire which is the cause of the other when both are one nature? This reality here below, which is not genuine, does indeed require a phantasm of beauty brought in from outside in order to appear and in any way to be beautiful, and it is beautiful in proportion as it has a share in the beauty which is according to form, and when it has it it is more perfect the more of it it has: for it is more reality in so far as it is beautiful.

10. For this reason Zeus, although the oldest among the gods whom he himself leads, advances first to the contemplation of this god, and there follow him the other gods and spirits and the souls who are capable of seeing these things.[1] But he appears to them from some invisible place and dawning upon them from high illuminates everything and fills it with his rays, and dazzles those of them who are below, and they turn away unable to see him, as if he was the sun. Some endure him and gaze upon him, but others are troubled in proportion to their distance from him. But all those who are able to see look at him and what belongs to him when they see; but each does not always gain the same vision, but one, gazing intensely, sees the source and nature of justice, another is filled with the vision of moral integrity, not the kind which men have here below, when they do have it (for this is some sort of imitation

[1] Again a reference to the *Phaedrus* myth, which Plotinus continues to interpret in what follows: cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 246Eff.

αὕτη ἀμηγέπη ἐκείνην· ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι περὶ πᾶν τὸ οἷον μέγεθος αὐτοῦ ἐπιθέουσα ⟨ἀγλαΐα⟩ [1] τελευταία ὁρᾶται, οἷς πολλὰ ἤδη ὤφθη ἐναργῆ θεάματα, οἱ θεοὶ καθ' ἕνα καὶ πᾶς ὁμοῦ, αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ πάντα ἐκεῖ ὁρῶσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν πάντων γενόμεναι, ὥστε πάντα περιέχειν καὶ αὐταὶ [2] ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος· καί εἰσιν ἐκεῖ καθόσον [3] ἂν αὐτῶν πεφύκῃ εἶναι ἐκεῖ, πολλάκις δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖ, ὅταν μὴ ὦσι διειλημμέναι. ταῦτα οὖν ὁρῶν ὁ Ζεύς, καὶ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῷ συνεραστής, τὸ τελευταῖον ὁρᾷ μένον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὅλον τὸ κάλλος, καὶ κάλλους μετασχὼν τοῦ ἐκεῖ· ἀποστίλβει γὰρ πάντα καὶ πληροῖ τοὺς ἐκεῖ γενομένους, ὡς καλοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς γενέσθαι, ὅποῖοι πολλάκις ἄνθρωποι εἰς ὑψηλοὺς ἀναβαίνοντες τόπους τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα ἐχούσης τῆς γῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ ἐπλήσθησαν ἐκείνης τῆς χρόας ὁμοιωθέντες τῇ ἐφ' ἧς ἐβεβήκεσαν. ἐκεῖ δὲ χρόα ἡ ἐπανθοῦσα κάλλος ἐστί, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶν χρόα καὶ κάλλος ἐκ βάθους· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ καλὸν ὡς ἐπανθοῦν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ ὅλον ὁρῶσιν ἡ προσβολὴ μόνη ἐνομίσθη, τοῖς δὲ διὰ παντὸς οἷον οἰνωθεῖσι καὶ πληρωθεῖσι τοῦ νέκταρος,

[1] Page, cum ἡ δὲ (lin. 16) coniungendum.
[2] Kirchhoff*: αὗται Enn.
[3] Theiler: καὶ ὅσον Enn.: ὅσον Kirchhoff*.

[1] I follow Schwyzer here in supplying τοῦ καλοῦ φῦσις with ἡ δὲ. After the soul has risen from the contemplation of the moral beauty in itself to that of the moral Forms (the starting-point of this contemplation in each individual case being different) it finally arrives at the vision of the beauty of the intelligible world as a whole.

[2] Here Plotinus seems to be thinking of men going up into the high desert which lies on each side of the valley of the

of that other), but that glory over all, playing upon what we may call the whole extension of that world,[1] is seen at the end by those who have already seen many clear visions, the gods individually and every one together, and the souls who see everything in the intelligible world and originate from everything, so as to include everything themselves from the beginning to the end; and they are there in the intelligible, in so far as they are naturally able to be there—but often the whole of them is there, when they are not divided. Zeus then sees these things, and with him any one of us who is his fellow-lover, and finally he sees, abiding over all, beauty as a whole, by his participation in the intelligible beauty; for it shines bright upon all and fills those who have come to be there so that they too become beautiful, as often men, when they go up into high places where the earth has a red-gold colour, are filled with that colour and made like that upon which they walked.[2] But there in the intelligible world the colour which blooms on the surface is beauty, or rather all is colour and beauty to its innermost part: for its beauty is not something different from itself, like a surface bloom. But those who do not see the whole only acknowledge the external impression, but those who are altogether, we may say, drunk and filled with the nectar,[3] since the beauty has pene-

Nile and, as the *Theologia Aristotelis* (VIII. 146. 26–9) and Bréhier in his *Notice* to the treatise interpret it, becoming suffused with the intense light so that they look the same colour as the red hills on which they walk (a less romantic explanation in terms of being covered with desert dust might also be possible but would be less appropriate to the context).

[3] Cp. Plato *Symposium* (the drunken Poros in the garden of Zeus, used for various allegorical purposes by Plotinus).

ἅτε δι' ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ κάλλους ἐλθόντος, οὐ θεαταῖς μόνον ὑπάρχει γενέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἔξω, τὸ δ' αὖ τὸ θεώμενον ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὸ ὀξέως ὁρῶν ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ ὁρώμενον, καὶ ἔχων τὰ πολλὰ ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἔξω ὂν βλέπει, ὅτι ὡς ὁρώμενον βλέπει καὶ ὅτι θέλει βλέπειν. πᾶν δὲ ὅ τις ὡς θεατὸν βλέπει ἔξω βλέπει. ἀλλὰ χρὴ εἰς αὐτὸν ἤδη μεταφέρειν καὶ βλέπειν ὡς ἓν καὶ βλέπειν ὡς αὐτόν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὑπὸ θεοῦ κατασχεθεὶς φοιβόληπτος ἢ ὑπό τινος Μούσης ἐν αὑτῷ ἂν ποιοῖτο τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν θέαν, εἰ δύναμιν ἔχοι ἐν αὑτῷ θεὸν βλέπειν.

11. Ἔτι[1] δέ τις ἡμῶν ἀδυνατῶν ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶν ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπὰν καταληφθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν προφέρῃ τὸ θέαμα, ἑαυτὸν προφέρει καὶ εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ καλλωπισθεῖσαν βλέπει· ἀφεὶς δὲ τὴν εἰκόνα καίπερ καλὴν οὖσαν εἰς ἓν αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν καὶ μηκέτι σχίσας ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐστὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ ἀψοφητὶ παρόντος, καὶ ἔστι μετ' αὐτοῦ ὅσον δύναται καὶ θέλει. εἰ δ' ἐπιστραφείη εἰς δύο, καθαρὸς μένων ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν αὐτῷ, ὥστε αὐτῷ παρεῖναι ἐκείνως πάλιν, εἰ πάλιν ἐπ' αὐτὸν στρέφοι. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ κέρδος τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἀρχόμενος αἰσθάνεται αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἕτερός ἐστι· δραμὼν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἔχει πᾶν, καὶ ἀφεὶς τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς τοὐπίσω τοῦ ἕτερος εἶναι φόβῳ εἷς ἐστιν ἐκεῖ· κἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ ὡς ἕτερον ὂν ἰδεῖν, ἔξω αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.

[1] Gollwitzer: εἰ Enn.

trated through the whole of their soul, are not simply spectators. For there is no longer one thing outside and another outside which is looking at it, but the keen sighted has what is seen within, although having it he for the most part does not know that he has it, and looks at it as if it were outside because he looks at it as if it was something seen, and because he wants to look at it. But one looks from outside at everything one looks at as a spectacle. But one must transport what one sees into oneself, and look at it as one and look at it as oneself, as if someone possessed by a god, taken over by Phoebus or one of the Muses, could bring about the vision of the god in himself, if he had the power to look at the god in himself.

11. Further, one of us, being unable to see himself, when he is possessed by that god brings his contemplation to the point of vision, and presents himself to his own mind and looks at a beautified image of himself; but then he dismisses the image, beautiful though it is, and comes to unity with himself, and, making no more separation, is one and all together with that god silently present, and is with him as much as he wants to be and can be. But if he returns again to being two, while he remains pure he stays close to the god, so as to be present to him again in that other way if he turns again to him. In this turning he has the advantage that to begin with he sees himself, while he is different from the god; then he hastens inward and has everything, and leaves perception behind in his fear of being different, and is one in that higher world; and if he wants to see by being different, he puts himself outside. While he is coming to know

δεῖ δὲ καταμανθάνοντα μὲν ἔν τινι τύπῳ αὐτοῦ μένοντα μετὰ τοῦ ζητεῖν γνωματεύειν αὐτόν, εἰς οἷον δὲ εἴσεισιν, οὕτω μαθόντα κατὰ πίστιν,[1] ὡς ἐπὶ χρῆμα μακαριστὸν εἴσεισιν, ἤδη αὐτὸν δοῦναι εἰς τὸ ἔσω καὶ γενέσθαι ἀντὶ ὁρῶντος ἤδη θέαμα ἑτέρου θεωμένου, οἷοις ἐκεῖθεν ἥκει ἐκλάμποντα τοῖς νοήμασι. πῶς οὖν ἔσται τις ἐν καλῷ μὴ ὁρῶν αὐτό; ἢ ὁρῶν αὐτὸ ὡς ἕτερον οὐδέπω ἐν καλῷ, γενόμενος δὲ αὐτὸ οὕτω μάλιστα ἐν καλῷ. εἰ οὖν ὅρασις τοῦ ἔξω, ὅρασιν μὲν οὐ δεῖ εἶναι ἢ οὕτως, ὡς ταὐτὸν τῷ ὁρατῷ· τοῦτο δὲ οἷον σύνεσις καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτοῦ εὐλαβουμένου μὴ τῷ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι θέλειν ἑαυτοῦ ἀποστῆναι. δεῖ δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς τῶν μὲν κακῶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰς πληγὰς ἔχουσι μείζους, ἧττους δὲ τὰς γνώσεις τῇ πληγῇ ἐκκρουομένας· νόσος γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔκπληξιν, ὑγίεια δὲ ἠρέμα συνοῦσα μᾶλλον ἂν σύνεσιν δοίη αὑτῆς· προσίζει[2] γὰρ ἅτε οἰκεῖον καὶ ἑνοῦται· ἡ δ' ἔστιν ἀλλότριον καὶ οὐκ οἰκεῖον, καὶ ταύτῃ διάδηλος τῷ σφόδρα ἕτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι δοκεῖν. τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀναίσθητοι· οὕτω δ' ὄντες μάλιστα πάντων ἐσμὲν αὐτοῖς συνετοὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἓν πεποιηκότες. κἀκεῖ τοίνυν, ὅτε μάλιστα ἴσμεν κατὰ νοῦν, ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦμεν, τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀναμένοντες τὸ πάθος, ἢ φησι μὴ ἑωρακέναι· οὐ γὰρ εἶδεν οὐδ' ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτά ποτε

[1] coniecimus: καὶ πίστιν Enn.: καὶ πιστεύσαντα Kirchhoff, Müller: καὶ πίστιν ⟨ἔχοντα⟩ Volkmann*: καὶ ⟨λαβόντα⟩ πίστιν Harder: καὶ πίστει Cilento.

[2] Theiler: προῖξει Enn.: παρίξει suspic. Volkmann.

the god he must keep to an impression of him and form distinct ideas of him as he seeks him and discern what he is entering into; and when he has learnt with confidence that it is into the highest blessedness, he must give himself up to what is within and become, instead of one who sees, an object of vision to another who contemplates him shining out with thoughts of the kind which come from that world. How then can anyone be in beauty without seeing it? If he sees it as something different, he is not yet in beauty, but he is in it most perfectly when he becomes it. If therefore sight is of something external we must not have sight, or only that which is identical with its object. This is a sort of intimate understanding and perception of a self which is careful not to depart from itself by wanting to perceive too much. We must consider this also, that the perceptions of evils have more violent impacts, but produce less knowledge because it is driven out by the impact; for illness strikes our consciousness harder, but the quiet companionship of health gives us a better understanding of it; for it comes and sits by us as something which belongs to us, and is united to us. Illness is alien and not our own, and therefore particularly obvious because it appears so very different from us. We have no perception of what is our own, and since we are like this we understand ourselves best when we have made our self-knowledge one with ourselves. In the higher world, then, when our knowledge is most perfectly conformed to Intellect, we think we know nothing because we are waiting for the experience of sense-perception, which says it has not yet seen: and it certainly has not seen, and never will see things

ἴδοι. τὸ οὖν ἀπιστοῦν ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ ἰδών· ἤ, εἰ ἀπιστοῖ κἀκεῖνος, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸν πιστεύσειεν εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς δύναται ἔξω θεὶς ἑαυτὸν ὡς αἰσθητὸν ὄντα ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ σώματος βλέπειν.

12. Ἀλλὰ εἴρηται, πῶς ὡς ἕτερος δύναται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ πῶς ὡς αὐτός. ἰδὼν δή, εἴτε ὡς ἕτερος, εἴτε ὡς μείνας αὐτός, τί ἀπαγγέλλει; ἢ θεὸν ἑωρακέναι τόκον ὠδίνοντα καλὸν καὶ πάντα δὴ ἐν αὑτῷ γεγεννηκότα καὶ ἄλυπον ἔχοντα τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐν αὑτῷ· ἡσθεὶς γὰρ οἷς ἐγέννα καὶ ἀγασθεὶς τῶν τόκων κατέσχε πάντα παρ' αὑτῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀγλαΐαν ἀσμενίσας· ὁ δὲ καλῶν ὄντων καὶ καλλιόνων τῶν εἰς τὸ εἴσω μεμενηκότων μόνος ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ζεὺς παῖς ἐξεφάνη εἰς τὸ ἔξω. ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὑστάτου παιδὸς ὄντος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἐξ εἰκόνος τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅσος ὁ πατὴρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ οἱ μείναντες παρ' αὐτῷ ἀδελφοί. ὁ δὲ οὔ φησι μάτην ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ αὐτοῦ ἄλλον κόσμον γεγονότα καλόν, ὡς εἰκόνα καλοῦ· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι θεμιτὸν εἰκόνα καλὴν μὴ εἶναι μήτε καλοῦ μήτε οὐσίας. μιμεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πανταχῇ· καὶ γὰρ ζωὴν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς μίμημα, καὶ τὸ καλλος εἶναι, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ

[1] In these last two chapters the myths of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus are explained as symbolically referring to the Three Hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul. Plotinus does not often indulge in this sort of allegorization, and when he does it is somewhat tortured and he finds it difficult to be consistent.

like these. It is sense-perception which disbelieves, but it is the other one who sees ; and for him to disbelieve would be to disbelieve in his own existence: for he cannot after all put himself outside and make himself visible so as to look at himself with his bodily eyes.

12. We have explained how he can do this as another and how as himself. But when he sees, whether as another or as one who remains himself, what does he report? He reports that he has seen a god in labour with a beautiful offspring all of which he has brought to birth within him, and keeping the children of his painless birth-pangs within himself; for he is pleased with what he has borne and delighted with his offspring and so keeps all with him in his enjoyment of his and their glory; all the others who are beautiful, even more beautiful, have remained within and Zeus, one son alone of all, has appeared outside.[1] From him, even though he is the youngest son, one can see as if from a likeness of him how great his father is and the brothers who have remained with him. But he says that it was not without purpose that he came forth from his father; for his other universe must exist, which has come into being beautiful, since it is an image of beauty; for it is utterly unlawful that there should be no beautiful image of beauty and reality. This image imitates its archetype in every way: for it has life and what belongs to reality as a representation of it should, and it has its being beauty since it comes from that higher beauty; and it has its everlastingness in the way

For another rather confusing and fluctuating allegorization see III. 5 *On Love.*

αὐτοῦ, ὡς εἰκών· ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἔξει εἰκόνα, ποτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐ τέχνῃ γενομένης τῆς εἰκόνος. πᾶσα δὲ φύσει εἰκών ἐστιν, ὅσον ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον μένῃ. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἳ φθείρουσι τοῦ νοητοῦ μένοντος καὶ γεννῶσιν οὕτως, ὡς ποτὲ βουλευσαμένου τοῦ ποιοῦντος ποιεῖν. ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος ποιήσεως τοιαύτης οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι, ὅσον ἐκεῖνο ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν· ἦν δ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται. χρηστέον γὰρ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῇ τοῦ σημαίνειν ἐθέλειν ἀνάγκῃ.

13. Ὁ οὖν θεὸς ὁ εἰς τὸ μένειν ὡσαύτως δεδεμένος καὶ συγχωρήσας τῷ παιδὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἄρχειν—οὐ γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς τρόπου τὴν ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν ἀφέντι νεωτέραν αὑτοῦ καὶ ὑστέραν μεθέπειν κόρον ἔχοντι τῶν καλῶν—ταῦτ' ἀφεὶς ἔστησέ τε τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα εἰς ἑαυτόν, καὶ μέχρις αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω· ἔστησε δ' αὖ καὶ τὰ εἰς θάτερα ἀπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενα εἶναι μετ' αὐτόν, ὥστε μεταξὺ ἀμφοῖν γενέσθαι τῇ τε ἑτερότητι τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀποτομῆς καὶ τῷ ἀνέχοντι ἀπὸ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸ κάτω δεσμῷ, μεταξὺ ὢν πατρός τε ἀμείνονος καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ μείζων ἦ κατὰ κάλλος ἦν, πρώτως αὐτὸς ἔμεινε καλός, καίτοι καλῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὔσης· ἀλλ' ἔστι καλλίων καὶ ταύτης, ὅτι ἴχνος αὐτῇ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶ καλὴ μὲν τὴν φύσιν, καλλίων δέ, ὅταν ἐκεῖ βλέπῃ. εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοῦ παντός, ἵνα γνωριμώ-

proper to an image; otherwise [the intelligible universe] will sometimes have an image and sometimes not—and this image is not the product of art, but every natural image exists as long as its archetype is there. For this reason those are not right who destroy the image-universe while the intelligible abides, and bring it into being as if its maker ever planned to make it. For they do not want to understand how this kind of making works, that as long as that higher reality gives its light, the rest of things can never fail: they are there as long as it is there; but it always was and will be. We must use these [temporal] words because we are compelled to want to signify our meaning.

13. The god therefore who is bound so that he abides the same, and has conceded the government of this universe to his son—for it would not have been in character for him to abandon his rule in the intelligible world and go seeking a later one because he had had enough of the beauties there—lets this world go and establishes his father in himself, extending as far as him on the upper side; and on the other side he has established what begins with his son in the place after himself, so that he comes to be between the two, by the otherness of his severance from what is above, and by the bond which keeps him from what comes after him on the lower side; he is between a better father and a worse son. But since his father was too great to be beauty, he remained primarily beautiful; soul is certainly beautiful, but he is more beautiful than soul, because soul has a trace of him and is naturally beautiful by reason of this, but still more beautiful when it looks to that which is above it. If then, to speak more

τερον λέγωμεν, καὶ ἡ Ἀφροδίτη αὐτὴ καλή, τίς ἐκεῖνος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτῆς, πόσον ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖνο; εἰ δὲ παρ' ἄλλου, παρὰ τίνος ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπακτὸν καὶ τὸ συμφυὲς τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς κάλλος ἔχει; ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν καὶ αὐτοὶ καλοί, τῷ αὐτῶν εἶναι, αἰσχροὶ δὲ ἐπ' ἄλλην μεταβαίνοντες φύσιν· καὶ γινώσκοντες μὲν ἑαυτοὺς καλοί, αἰσχροὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῦντες. ἐκεῖ οὖν κἀκεῖθεν τὸ καλόν. ἆρ' οὖν ἀρκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα εἰς ἐναργῆ σύνεσιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῦ νοητοῦ τόπου, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ὁδὸν πάλιν αὖ δεῖ ἐπελθεῖν ὧδε;

plainly, the Soul of the All is beautiful, that is Aphrodite is beautiful, what is Intellect[1]? For if Aphrodite's beauty comes from herself, how great must that higher beauty be? But if it comes from another, from whom does Soul have its beauty, that which comes to it from outside and that which belongs to its real nature? For when we ourselves are beautiful, it is by belonging to ourselves, but we are ugly when we change to another nature: when we know ourselves we are beautiful, but ugly when we are ignorant of ourselves. Beauty therefore is in that higher world and comes from there. Is what we have said, then, enough to lead to a clear understanding of the "intelligible region", or must we go back and take another way, like this[2]?

[1] Plotinus likes to identify Aphrodite with Soul (cp. III. 5. 2ff.). But so far in this treatise Zeus has been Soul, who leads the contemplation of Intellect (ch. 10) and comes out from the intelligible world to make the sense-world (ch. 12). Aphrodite manages to be daughter of Kronos as well as of Ouranos in III. 5. 2. 15–20, and perhaps Plotinus is also thinking of her as daughter of Kronos (Intellect) here, and has dropped Zeus out of the allegory for the moment.

[2] For the "intelligible region" cp. Plato *Republic* VII 517B5. This sentence leads straight into the beginning of V. 5 and makes it clear that the two treatises are parts of a single work.

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, the fifth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first of Plotinus's "ascents of the mind" from the material world to Intellect; the One or Good is only mentioned incidentally in this treatise and the subject of its relation to Intellect is left for future development (chs. 2 and 14). The object of the treatise is to display the true nature of Intellect, and to show how Soul and the material world in which our souls find themselves depend on it, and so to teach us to live in it as our true home. It stays fairly close to the traditional school-Platonism which Plotinus had inherited, but already shows clear evidence of his original development of the tradition, especially in his insistence throughout on the living unity of thought and the Forms in the Intellect which is also Being, and the clear indication in ch. 13 that souls and their virtues here below continue to belong to the higher world of Intellect which is everywhere, not spatially separated or cut off from the lower world. The treatise gives the impression of having been rather hurriedly written: the later chapters are very summary in their treatment of the contents of the world of Intellect, and the last (ch. 14) is little more than a series of notes for further discussion.

Synopsis

Three kinds of philosopher, Epicurean, Stoic and Platonist: only the Platonist is capable of seeing and rising to the world of Intellect (ch. 1). The Platonic ascent of the mind from the derived beauty below to the original beauty above: should it stop at Intellect? (ch. 2). The nature of Intellect and the Forms in Intellect, and the necessity that they must exist, argued from the works of human and divine art here below (ch. 3). Superiority of Intellect to Soul, and Soul's dependence on Intellect (ch. 4). The unity of thought and Forms in the living reality of Intellect (chs. 5–8). The contents of the world of Intellect: it is a true intelligible universe containing everything which exists as form in the world of sense (but not, therefore, any defect or evil) (chs. 9–10). The arts considered and distinguished according to the degree to which they exist in the intelligible world or derive their principles from it (ch. 11). If the Form of man and the intellectual arts are in the intelligible, then so must the universal Forms be which are the subject-matter of those arts; a quick glance at the problem of physical individuality (ch. 12). Soul and its excellences exist in both worlds: so everything which exists in the intelligible world is also here below (ch. 13). Notes on a variety of problems about the intelligible world—the origin of its multiplicity, the question of Forms of casual compounds and products of putrefaction etc. (ch. 14).

V. 9. (5) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ

1. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξαρχῆς γενόμενοι αἰσθήσει πρὸ νοῦ χρησάμενοι καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσβαλόντες πρώτοις ἐξανάγκης οἱ μὲν ἐνταυθοῖ καταμείναντες διέζησαν ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ ἔσχατα νομίσαντες, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαβόντες ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν διώκοντες, τὸ δ' ἀποικονομούμενοι διεγένοντο. καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην οἵ γε λόγου μεταποιούμενοι αὐτῶν ἔθεντο, οἷα οἱ βαρεῖς τῶν ὀρνίθων, οἳ πολλὰ ἐκ γῆς λαβόντες καὶ βαρυνθέντες ὑψοῦ πτῆναι ἀδυνατοῦσι καίπερ πτερὰ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβόντες. οἱ δὲ ἤρθησαν μὲν ὀλίγον ἐκ τῶν κάτω κινοῦντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδέος τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονος, ἀδυνατήσαντες δὲ ἰδεῖν τὸ ἄνω, ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἄλλο, ὅπου στήσονται, κατηνέχθησαν σὺν τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐκλογὰς τῶν κάτω, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπεχείρησαν τὸ πρῶτον αἴρεσθαι. τρίτον δὲ γένος θείων ἀνθρώπων δυνάμει τε κρείττονι καὶ ὀξύτητι ὀμμάτων εἶδέ τε

[1] This is a piece of stock Platonic school-polemic against Epicureans and Stoics, those lumpish fowl the Epicureans being as usual dismissed casually and scornfully, and the Stoics treated rather more respectfully. The "greater beauty" to which the Stoics have been urged on is of course

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

1. All men from the beginning, as soon as they are born, employ sense-perception before intellect and sense-objects are necessarily the first which they encounter. Some of them stay here and live through their lives considering these to be primary and ultimate, and since they consider what is painful and pleasant in them to be evil and good respectively, they think this is enough, and pass their lives pursuing the one and contriving to get rid of the other. And those of them who claim rationality make this their philosophy, like the heavy sort of birds who have taken much from the earth and are weighed down by it and so are unable to fly high although nature has given them wings. Others have risen a little from the things below because the better part of their soul has urged them on from the pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were unable to see what is above, as they have no other ground to stand on they are brought down, with the name of virtue, to practical actions and choices of the things below from which they tried to raise themselves at first.[1] But there is a third kind of godlike men who by their greater power and the sharpness of their eyes as if by a special keen-

virtue. For the Stoic doctrines of choice referred to here cp. *SVF* III 64 and 118.

ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ὀξυδορκίας τὴν ἄνω αἴγλην καὶ ἤρθη τε ἐκεῖ οἷον ὑπὲρ νεφῶν καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀχλύος καὶ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖ τὰ τῇδε ὑπεριδὸν πάντα ἡσθὲν τῷ τόπῳ ἀληθινῷ καὶ οἰκείῳ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πλάνης εἰς πατρίδα εὔνομον ἀφικόμενος ἄνθρωπος.

2. Τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ τόπος; καὶ πῶς ἄν τις εἰς αὐτὸν ἀφίκοιτο; ἀφίκοιτο μὲν ἂν ὁ φύσει ἐρωτικὸς καὶ ὄντως τὴν διάθεσιν ἐξαρχῆς φιλόσοφος, ὠδίνων μέν, ἅτε ἐρωτικός, περὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος δὲ τοῦ ἐν σώματι κάλλους, ἀλλ' ἔνθεν ἀναφυγὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλη, ἀρετὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμας καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμους, πάλιν αὖ ἐπαναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ καλῶν αἰτίαν, καὶ εἴ τι πάλιν αὖ πρὸ τούτου, ἕως ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἥκῃ τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ παρ' αὐτοῦ καλόν. ἔνθα καὶ ἐλθὼν ὠδῖνος παύσεται, πρότερον δὲ οὔ. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀναβήσεται, καὶ πόθεν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ, καὶ τίς λόγος τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα παιδαγωγήσεται; ἢ ὅδε· τοῦτο τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπακτόν ἐστι τοῖς σώμασι· μορφαὶ γὰρ αὗται σωμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ ὕλῃ αὐτοῖς. μεταβάλλει γοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν γίνεται. μεθέξει ἄρα, φησὶν ὁ λόγος. τί οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαν σῶμα καλόν; ἄλλως μὲν κάλλους παρουσία, ἄλλως δὲ ψυχή, ἢ ἔπλασέ τε καὶ μορφὴν τοιάνδε ἐνῆκε. τί οὖν; ψυχὴ παρ' αὑτῆς καλόν; ἢ οὔ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἦν φρόνιμός τε

[1] For the Homeric allusions here and their significance see I. 6. 8, n. 1.

[2] Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* are here, as often, combined: cp. *Phaedrus* 248D3–4 and *Symposium* 210B3–C6. For the possible passage from musician to lover and lover to philosopher in Plotinus cp. I. 3. 1–2 (Plotinus in these chapters does not simply identify the lover and the philosopher as he does in this earlier treatise).

sightedness see the glory above and are raised to it as if above the clouds and the mist of this lower world and remain there, overlooking all things here below and delighting in the true region which is their own, like a man who has come home after long wandering to his own well-ordered country.[1]

2. What, then, is this region? And how could one reach it? The man could reach it who is by nature a lover and truly disposed to philosophy from the beginning, in travail over beauty, since he is a lover, not enduring the " beauty of body " but escaping from it up to the " beauties of soul, virtues and kinds of knowledge and ways of life and laws "[2]; and again he ascends to the cause of the beauties in soul, and again to anything there may be beyond this, till he comes to the ultimate which is the first, which is beautiful of itself. When he has arrived there he ceases from his travail, but not before. But how will he ascend, and where will his power come from, and what reasoning will guide this Love on his way? This one: this beauty which rests on bodies comes to the bodies from elsewhere; for these beauties are forms of bodies which rest upon them as if on their matter. At any rate what underlies them changes, and becomes ugly instead of beautiful. Its beauty comes by participation, then, our reasoning says. What then is it which makes a body beautiful? In one way it is the presence of beauty, in another the soul, which moulded it and put this particular form in it. Well, then, is the soul beautiful of itself? No, it is not. For [if it was] one soul would

καὶ καλή, ἡ δὲ ἄφρων τε καὶ αἰσχρά. φρονήσει ἄρα τὸ καλὸν περὶ ψυχήν. καὶ τίς οὖν ὁ φρόνησιν δοὺς ψυχῇ; ἢ νοῦς ἐξανάγκης, νοῦς δὲ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν νοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄνους, ὅ γε ἀληθινός. παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄρα καλός. καὶ πότερον δὴ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ στῆναι ὡς πρῶτον, ἢ καὶ νοῦ ἐπέκεινα δεῖ ἰέναι, νοῦς δὲ προέστηκε μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐν προθύροις τἀγαθοῦ ἀπαγγέλλων ἐν αὑτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ ἐκείνου τύπος μᾶλλον ἐν πλήθει ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἑνί;

3. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ ταύτην τὴν νοῦ φύσιν, ἣν ἐπαγγέλλεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὄντως καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ οὐσίαν, πρότερον βεβαιωσαμένους κατ' ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἰόντας, ὅτι δεῖ εἶναί τινα τοιαύτην. ἴσως μὲν οὖν γελοῖον ζητεῖν, εἰ νοῦς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι· τάχα δ' ἄν τινες καὶ περὶ τούτου διαμφισβητοῖεν. μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ τοιοῦτος, οἷόν φαμεν, καὶ εἰ χωριστός τις, καὶ εἰ οὗτος τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν φύσις ἐνταῦθα, περὶ οὗ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰπεῖν πρόκειται. ὁρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα σύνθετα καὶ ἁπλοῦν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἕν, ἅ τε τέχνη ἐργάζεται ἕκαστα, ἅ τε συνέστηκε φύσει· τά τε γὰρ τεχνητὰ ἔχει χαλκὸν ἢ ξύλον ἢ λίθον καὶ παρὰ τούτων οὔπω τετέλεσται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τέχνη ἑκάστη ἡ μὲν ἀνδριάντα, ἡ δὲ κλίνην, ἡ δὲ οἰκίαν ἐργάσηται εἴδους τοῦ παρ' αὐτῇ ἐνθέσει. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ φύσει

not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. So beauty in the soul comes by wisdom. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the soul? Intellect, necessarily, an intellect which is not sometimes intellect and sometimes unintelligent, but the true Intellect. This, then, is beautiful of itself. Should we then stop at Intellect as the First, or must we go beyond Intellect, and does Intellect stand from our point of view in front of the first principle, as if in the porch of the Good,[1] proclaiming to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in greater multiplicity while the Good remains altogether in one?

3. We must consider the nature of this Intellect, which our reasoning tells us is the genuine reality and true substance, when we have first confirmed by following a different course that something of the sort must exist. It is perhaps ridiculous to enquire whether there is intellect in the world; though there are, it may be, people who would dispute even this. But it is more disputable if it is the sort of Intellect we say it is, and if it is a separate one, and if it is the real beings and if the nature of the Forms is there: this is our present subject. We certainly see that all the things that are said to exist are compounds, and not a single one of them is simple; [this applies to] each and every work of art, and all things compounded by nature. For the works of art have bronze or wood or stone, and they are not brought to completion from these until each art makes one a statue, another a bed, and another a house by putting the form which it has in them.

[1] Cp. Plato *Philebus* 64C1.

συνεστῶτα τὰ μὲν πολυσύνθετα αὐτῶν καὶ συγκρίματα καλούμενα ἀναλύσεις εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκριθεῖσιν εἶδος· οἷον ἄνθρωπον εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα. ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων σύνθετον εὑρὼν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦ μορφοῦντος —ὕλη γὰρ παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν στοιχείων ἄμορφος— ζητήσεις τὸ εἶδος ὅθεν τῇ ὕλῃ. ζητήσεις δ' αὖ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πότερα τῶν ἁπλῶν ἤδη, ἢ ἔνι τι ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁ μὲν ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ χαλκῷ μορφή, ὁ δὲ οἷος ὁ τὴν μορφὴν ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ποιήσας. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς μεταφέρων τις ἀναβήσεται καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ νοῦν ποιητὴν ὄντως καὶ δημιουργὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ φήσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον δεξάμενον μορφὰς τὸ μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, τὰς δὲ μορφὰς ταύτας παρ' ἄλλου ἥκειν. τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι ψυχήν· ψυχὴν δὲ αὖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτρασι τὴν κόσμου μορφὴν δοῦναι· ταύτῃ δὲ νοῦν χορηγὸν τῶν λόγων γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς τῶν τεχνιτῶν ψυχαῖς παρὰ τῶν τεχνῶν τοὺς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν λόγους· νοῦν δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν κατὰ τὴν μορφήν, τὸν δὲ τὸν τὴν μορφὴν παρέχοντα ὡς τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ᾧ πάντα ἐνυπάρχει, ἃ δίδωσιν. ἐγγὺς μὲν ἀληθείας, ἃ δίδωσι ψυχῇ· ἃ δὲ τὸ σῶμα δέχεται, εἴδωλα ἤδη καὶ μιμήματα.

[1] Plotinus seems to have left out the matter which is informed or the elements brought together under the form in this phrase, though they appear in the example which follows.

And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them which are multiple compounds and are called compositions, into the form imposed on all the elements of the composition[1]: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you have found that each of the elements is a compound of matter and what forms it—for the matter of the elements is in itself formless—you will enquire from where the form comes to the matter. And then again you will enquire whether the soul is one of the simple entities, or whether there is something in it like matter and something like form, the intellect in it, one intellect being like the shape on the bronze, and the other like the man who makes the shape in the bronze. And one will transfer these same observations to the whole universe, and will ascend there also to Intellect and suppose it to be the true maker and craftsman, and will say that the underlying matter receives the forms, and part of it becomes fire, and part water, and part air and earth, but that these forms come from another: and this other is soul; then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principles for their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape, like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are already images and imitations.

Some editors supply a phrase to make up the deficiency, but Plotinus is quite capable of such an omission.

4. Διὰ τί οὖν δεῖ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ ἀνιέναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὴν εἶναι τίθεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν νοῦς ψυχῆς ἕτερον καὶ κρεῖττον· τὸ δὲ κρεῖττον φύσει πρῶτον. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὡς οἴονται, ψυχὴ νοῦν τελεωθεῖσα γεννᾷ· πόθεν γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται, μὴ τοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγοντος αἰτίου ὄντος; εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τύχην, ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν. διὸ δεῖ τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργείᾳ τίθεσθαι καὶ ἀπροσδεᾶ καὶ τέλεια· τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ὕστερα ἀπ' ἐκείνων, τελειούμενα δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν γεγεννηκότων δίκην πατέρων τελειούντων, ἃ καταρχὰς ἀτελῆ ἐγέννησαν· καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαν τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτ' αὐτὴν ἔμμορφον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐμπαθὲς ψυχή, δεῖ δέ τι ἀπαθὲς εἶναι—ἢ πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπολεῖται—δεῖ τι πρὸ ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ἐν κόσμῳ ψυχή, ἐκτὸς δὲ δεῖ τι κόσμου εἶναι, καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ ψυχῆς δεῖ τι εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ τὸ ἐν σώματι καὶ ὕλῃ, οὐδὲν ταὐτὸν μενεῖ·[1] ὥστε ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντες λόγοι οὐκ ἀίδιοι οὐδὲ οἱ αὐτοί. καὶ ὅτι μὲν νοῦν πρὸ ψυχῆς εἶναι δεῖ, ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἄν τις θεωρήσειε.

[1] Dodds (Select Passages 15), Harder: *μένει* Enn.*

4. Why, then, must we go on up when we have reached the level of soul, and not suppose that it is the first reality? First of all, Intellect is other and better than soul: but the better is naturally the first. For certainly soul does not when it is made perfect generate intellect, as they think[1]; for in what way will the potential become actual, if there is no cause to bring it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, there is a possibility of its not coming to actuality. So we must assume that the first realities are actual and without deficiencies and perfect; but the imperfect ones come after and derive from the first, being perfected by their begetters as fathers perfect their originally imperfect offspring; and we must assume that soul is matter to the first reality which makes it and is afterwards given shape and perfected. But certainly if soul is a thing subject to affections, but there must be something not subject to being affected—otherwise everything will be destroyed by time—there must be something before soul. And if soul is in the universe, but there must be something outside the universe, in this way too there must be something before soul. For if what is in the universe is what is in body and matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be eternal or the same. One can see then from these and many other arguments that there must be an intellect before soul.

[1] "They" are the Stoics: cp. IV. 7. 8[3]. 8–9 and for the Stoic doctrine attacked here *SVF* I, 374, 377; II, 835–7, 839.

5. Δεῖ δὲ νοῦν λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ἐπαληθεύσομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ τὸν δυνάμει μηδὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης εἰς νοῦν ἐλθόντα—εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον πάλιν αὖ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ζητήσομεν—ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῦν ὄντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπακτὸν τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχει, εἴ τι νοεῖ, παρ' αὑτοῦ νοεῖ, καὶ εἴ τι ἔχει, παρ' αὑτοῦ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ παρ' αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὑτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτός ἐστιν ἃ νοεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἄλλη, ἃ δὲ νοεῖ ἕτερα αὐτοῦ, αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἀνόητος ἔσται· καὶ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ αὖ. οὐ χωριστέον οὖν οὐδέτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου. ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν κἀκεῖνα ταῖς ἐπινοίαις χωρίζειν. τί οὖν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τί νοεῖ, ἵνα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸν ἃ νοεῖ θώμεθα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι νοῦς ὢν ὄντως νοεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφίστησιν. ἔστιν ἄρα ὄντα. ἢ γὰρ ἑτέρωθι ὄντα αὐτὰ νοήσει, ἢ ἐν αὑτῷ ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα. ἑτέρωθι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον· ποῦ γάρ; αὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ὥσπερ οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον ἕκαστον οὐ τὸ αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος ἐπὶ ὕλῃ εἴδωλον ὄντος, πᾶν τε εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἔρχεται καί ἐστιν εἰκὼν ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ

5. But if we are to use the word in its true sense, we must take this intellect to be, not that in potentiality or that which passes from stupidity to intelligence—otherwise we shall have to look for another intellect before it—but that which is actually and always intellect. But if it does not have its thinking from outside, then if it thinks anything it thinks it from itself and if it has anything it has it from itself. But if it thinks from itself and derives the content of its thought from itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its substance was other [than its thinking] and the things which it thought were other than itself, its substance would itself be unintellectual: and, again, potential, not actual. Therefore one must not be separated from the other. But it is our habit, derived from the things in our world, to separate the things of that higher world in our conceptions of them. What then is its active actuality and its thinking, that we may assume it itself to be what it thinks? It is clear that, being Intellect, it really thinks the real beings and establishes them in existence. It is, then, the real beings. For it will either think them as being somewhere else, or in itself as being itself. Now elsewhere is impossible: for where could it be? It thinks, therefore, itself and in itself. For what it thinks is certainly not in the realm of sense-perception, as they suppose.[1] For each and every primary reality is not what is perceived by the senses: for the form on the matter in the things of sense is an image of the real form, and every form which is in something else comes to it from something else and is a likeness of that from which it comes. But also, if there

[1] The Stoics again: cp. *SVF* II 88.

παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ μήπω ὄντι οὕτος νοήσει, ἵνα αὐτὸ ποιῇ. πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, οὐ τύπους ἀφ' ἑτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶτα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν, ἀιδίους δῆλον· εἰ δὲ αἰδίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, ἐν νῷ δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοιούτῳ καὶ προτέρῳ ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα. ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ' αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ οἷον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι. ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστί τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὸν τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὸ ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιζησάμην ὡς ἓν τῶν ὄντων· καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις δέ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἐν τόπῳ, μένει δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ φθορὰν δεχόμενα· διὸ καὶ ὄντως ὄντα. ἢ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἐπακτῷ χρήσεται τῷ ὄντι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐκεῖνα ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὂν ἔσται. τὰ μὲν δὴ αἰσθητὰ μεθέξει ἐστὶν ἃ λέγεται τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως μορφὴν ἰσχούσης ἄλλοθεν· οἷον χαλκὸς παρὰ

[1] Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 28C3–4 (the famous and much used text about the difficulty of finding " the maker and father of this All ").

[2] Again a Platonic criticism of Stoic doctrine: cp. *SVF* II 1013 p. 302, 36–7 Arnim.

[3] The name " lawgiver " for Intellect may be taken from Numenius: cp. fr. 13 Des Places (22 Leemans), where it is used of his Second God or Demiurge, whom Numenius by the use of this name may be consciously trying to identify with the God of the Jews.

[4] An excellent example of how Plotinus collects texts from earlier philosophers of very varied significance in their original contexts to support his own doctrine: cp. Parmenides fr. B 3 Diels; Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 4. 430a3–4 and 7. 431a1–2; Heraclitus fr. B 101 Diels; and (e.g.) Plato *Phaedo* 72E5–6.

must be a " maker of this All ",[1] he will not think what is in the not yet existent universe in order to make it. The objects of his thought must exist before the universe, not impressions from other things but archetypes and primary and the substance of Intellect. But if they are going to say that rational forming principles are enough, they must clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not subject to affections, they must be in Intellect, and in an intellect of this kind, one which is prior to condition and nature and soul: for these are potential.[2] Intellect therefore really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the primary lawgiver,[3] or rather is itself the law of being. So the statements are correct that " thinking and being are the same thing " and " knowledge of immaterial things is the same as its object " and " I searched myself " (as one of the real beings); so also are " recollections "[4]; for no one of the real beings is outside, or in place, but they remain always in themselves and undergo no alteration or destruction: that is why they are truly real. If they come into being and perish, they will have their being from outside themselves, and it will not any more be they, but that being which will be reality. The objects of sense are what they are called by participation, since their underlying nature receives its shape from elsewhere: bronze, for instance, from

ἀνδριαντοποικῆς καὶ ξύλον παρὰ τεκτονικῆς διὰ εἰδώλου τῆς τέχνης εἰς αὐτὰ ἰούσης, τῆς δὲ τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔξω ὕλης ἐν ταὐτότητι μενούσης καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ ἀνδριάντα καὶ κλίνην ἐχούσης. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων· καὶ τόδε πᾶν ἰνδαλμάτων μετέχον ἕτερα αὐτῶν δείκνυσι τὰ ὄντα, ἄτρεπτα μὲν ὄντα ἐκεῖνα, αὐτὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα, ἱδρυμένα τε ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν, οὐ τόπου δεόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μεγέθη· νοερὰν δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκη ἑαυτοῖς ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα. σωμάτων γὰρ φύσις σῴζεσθαι παρ' ἄλλου θέλει, νοῦς δὲ ἀνέχων θαυμαστῇ φύσει τὰ παρ' αὑτῶν πίπτοντα, ὅπου ἱδρυθῇ αὐτὸς οὐ ζητεῖ.

6. Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων καὶ ἓν ὢν αὐτοῖς. πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον διακεκριμένα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲν ἔχει συγκεχυμένον, καὶ ἑκάστη πράττει τὸ αὑτῆς, ὅταν δέῃ, οὐ συνεφέλκουσα τὰς ἄλλας, νόημα δὲ ἕκαστον καθαρὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἔνδον αὖ νοημάτων κειμένων. οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ αὖ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδία. ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς περιέχει ὥσπερ γένος εἴδη καὶ ὥσπερ

[1] An interesting combination of Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus's own views on art. Examples of craftsmen, especially sculptors, are frequently used by Aristotle when discussing causation: cp. e.g. *Physics* B 1–3. The "true bed" (the Form of bed) comes from Plato *Republic* X 597C3. But

the art of sculpture and wood from the art of carpentry, the art passing into them through an image, but itself remaining in self-identity outside matter and possessing the true statue or bed.[1] This is also true of [natural] bodies; and this All shows by its participation in appearances that the real beings are other than they; the real beings are unchanging, but the appearances change, the real beings are set firm on themselves and need no place: for they are not magnitudes; they have an intelligent existence sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else, but Intellect upholds by its wonderful nature the things which fall down by themselves, and does not look for a place to be set in.

6. Let it be granted, then, that Intellect is the real beings, possessing them all not as if [they were in it] as in a place, but as possessing itself and being one with them. "All things are together"[2] there, and none the less they are separate. For even soul has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not contain any confusion, and each kind of knowledge does its own work[3] when the need arises without dragging in the others along with it, and each individual thought is clear of the other thoughts which remain within the mind when it comes into activity. In this way, and much more than this, Intellect is all things together and also not together, because each is a special power. But the whole Intellect

it is only in Plotinus that the art of the human artist possesses the true Forms: cp. V. 8. 1, n. 1 (p. 241).

[2] The phrase is taken from Anaxagoras fr. B 1 Diels.

[3] *τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν* is Plato's concise definition of justice (in city and soul): cp. *Republic* IV 433A–B.

ὅλον μέρη. καὶ αἱ τῶν σπερμάτων δὲ δυνάμεις εἰκόνα φέρουσι τοῦ λεγομένου· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ ἀδιάκριτα πάντα, καὶ οἱ λόγοι ὥσπερ ἐν ἑνὶ κέντρῳ· καὶ ὡς[1] ἐστιν ἄλλος ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἄλλος δὲ χειρῶν λόγος τὸ ἕτερος εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ' αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γνωσθείς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι δυνάμεις ἑκάστη αὐτῶν λόγος εἷς ὅλος μετὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμπεριεχομένων μερῶν τὸ μὲν σωματικὸν ὕλην ἔχει, οἷον ὅσον ὑγρόν, αὐτὸς δὲ εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψυχῆς εἴδει τῷ γεννῶντι, ἥ ἐστιν ἴνδαλμα ψυχῆς ἄλλης κρείττονος. φύσιν δέ τινες αὐτὴν ὀνομάζουσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν, ἣ ἐκεῖθεν ὁρμηθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρὸς φῶς, ἤστραψέ τε καὶ ἐμόρφωσε τὴν ὕλην οὐκ ὠθοῦσα οὐδὲ ταῖς πολυθρυλλήτοις μοχλείαις χρωμένη, δοῦσα δὲ τῶν λόγων.

7. Αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ οὖσαι αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν—εἰ δεῖ ἐπιστήμας τούτων λέγειν, πρέπει δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ τῆς δόξης ὄνομα—ὕστεραι τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσαι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τούτων· τῶν δὲ νοητῶν, αἳ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαι, παρὰ νοῦ εἰς λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὐδὲν νοοῦσι· καθόσον δέ εἰσιν ἐπιστῆμαι, εἰσὶν αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἃ

[1] καὶ ὡς (*nihilominus*) coniecimus: καὶ ὥσπερ Enn.: καὶ Kirchhoff*.

[1] An allusion to the Stoic doctrine from which Plotinus develops his own view of nature, the lowest immanent form of soul, fully expounded in the first chapters of III. 8; cp. *SVF* II 743.

encompasses them as a genus does its species and a whole its parts. The powers of seeds give a likeness of what we are talking about: for all the parts are undistinguished in the whole, and their rational forming principles are as if in one central point; and all the same there is one principle of the eye and another of the hand, known from the sense-object which is produced by it to be distinct. As for the powers in the seeds, then, each of them is one whole formative principle with the parts included in it; it has the corporeal as its matter, for instance all which is moist in the seed, but is itself form as a whole and a formative principle which is the same as the form of soul which produced it, which is the likeness of another better soul. Some people call the soul in the seed " nature ",[1] which starts from above, from the principles before it, like light from fire, and flashes out and shapes the matter, not pushing it or using all that levering they keep on talking about,[2] but giving it a share in its forming principles.

7. But as for the kinds of knowledge which exist in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects—if one ought to speak of " kinds of knowledge " of these; " opinion " is really the suitable name for them—are posterior to their objects and likenesses of them; but those which are of intelligible objects, which are certainly the genuine kinds of knowledge, come from Intellect to rational soul and do not think any sense-object; but in so far as they are kinds of knowledge, they are each and all of the active objects

[2] This seems to be an allusion to stock and often repeated Epicurean objections to the divine creation of the physical universe, for an example of which see Cicero *De Natura Deorum* I 8. 19, which may be paraphrased " Where did God get his construction machinery and labour force from? "

νοοῦσι, καὶ ἔνδοθεν τό τε νοητὸν τήν τε νόησιν ἔχουσιν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἔνδον—ὅ ἐστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα—συνὼν αὑτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχων καὶ οὐκ ἐπιβάλλων ὡς οὐκ ἔχων ἢ ἐπικτώμενος ἢ διεξοδεύων οὐ προκεχειρισμένα—ψυχῆς γὰρ ταῦτα πάθη—ἀλλ' ἕστηκεν ἐν αὑτῷ ὁμοῦ πάντα ὤν, οὐ νοήσας, ἵν' ὑποστήσῃ ἕκαστα. οὐ γάρ, ὅτ' ἐνόησε θεόν, θεὸς ἐγένετο, οὐδέ, ὅτε ἐνόησε κίνησιν, κίνησις ἐγένετο. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις. τὰ εἴδη, εἰ οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε, τόδε ἐγένετο ἢ ἔστι τόδε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· ταύτης γὰρ τῆς νοήσεως πρότερον δεῖ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔλθοι ἐπὶ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτό; οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν οὐδὲ ἐπέβαλεν εἰκῇ.

8. Εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις ἐνόντος, ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν· καὶ ἡ ἰδέα αὕτη. τί οὖν τοῦτο; νοῦς καὶ ἡ νοερὰ οὐσία, οὐχ ἑτέρα τοῦ νοῦ ἑκάστη ἰδέα, ἀλλ' ἑκάστη νοῦς. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ πάντα εἴδη, ἕκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη ἐπιστήμη τὰ πάντα θεωρήματα, ἕκαστον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης οὐχ ὡς διακεκριμένον τόπῳ, ἔχον δὲ δύναμιν ἕκασ-

which they think, and they have from within them the object of thought and the thought, because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to hand before any discursive process—these are experiences of soul—but it stands firm in itself, being all things together, and does not think each thing in order to bring it into existence. For it is not true that when it thought a god, a god came into existence or when it thought motion, motion came into existence. It is, then, incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it happen on it casually.[1]

8. If, then, the thought [of Intellect] is of what is within it, that which is within it is its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the intelligent substance; each individual Idea is not other than Intellect, but each is Intellect. And Intellect as a whole is all the Forms, and each individual Form is an individual intellect, as the whole body of knowledge is all its theorems, but each theorem is a part of the whole, not as being spatially distinct, but as having its particular power

[1] An important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the " thoughts of God ".

τον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστιν οὖν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ἔχων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ κόρος ἀεί. εἰ μὲν οὖν προεπενοεῖτο ὁ νοῦς πρότερος τοῦ ὄντος, ἔδει τὸν νοῦν λέγειν ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτελέσαι καὶ γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν τοῦ νοῦ προεπινοεῖν ἀνάγκη, ἐγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πῦρ ἤδη τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐνέργειαν, ἵν' ἓν ὄντα τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔχῃ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἐνέργεια· μία οὖν ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἄμφω ἕν. μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τό τε ὂν ὅ τε νοῦς· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ αἱ οὕτω νοήσεις τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἐπινοεῖταί γε μὴν μεριζομένων ὑφ' ἡμῶν θάτερα πρὸ τῶν ἑτέρων. ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ μερίζων νοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ πάντα.

9. Τίνα οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἐν ἑνὶ νῷ, ἃ νοοῦντες μερίζομεν ἡμεῖς; δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἠρεμοῦντα προφέρειν, οἷον ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἑνὶ οὔσης ἐπιθεωρεῖν τὰ ἐνόντα. κόσμου δὴ τοῦδε ὄντος ζῴου περιεκτικοῦ ζῴων ἁπάντων καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιῷδε εἶναι, παρ' οὗ δέ ἐστιν εἰς νοῦν ἀναγομένου,

in the whole. This Intellect therefore is in itself, and since it possesses itself in peace is everlasting fullness.[1] If then Intellect was thought of as preceding being, we should have to say that Intellect by coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected and produced the real beings; but since we must think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that the real beings have their place in the thinking subject, and that the active actuality of thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they may have Intellect in its unity in them as their active actuality. But being is active actuality: so both have one active actuality, or rather both are one thing. Being and Intellect are therefore one nature; so therefore are the real beings and the active actuality of being and Intellect of this kind; and the thoughts of this kind are the form and shape of being and its active actuality. But they are thought of by us as one before the other because they are divided by our thinking. For the dividing intellect is a different one, but the undivided Intellect which does not divide is being and all things.

9. What then are the things in the one Intellect which we divide in our thinking? For they are in repose, but we must bring them forward, as one examines in order the contents of a unified body of knowledge. Since this universe is certainly a living being containing all living beings and deriving its being and its being as it is from another, and the origin of that from which it derives is traced back to

[1] For the curious mythological etymology implied here and the Platonic reminiscence which lies behind it see V. 1. 4, n. 1 (p. 23).

ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν νῷ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πᾶν εἶναι, καὶ κόσμον νοητὸν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ὃν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων "ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστι ζῷον." ὡς γὰρ ὄντος λόγου ζῴου τινός, οὔσης δὲ καὶ ὕλης τῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν σπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῷον γενέσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως νοερᾶς καὶ πανδυνάμου οὔσης καὶ οὐδενὸς διείργοντος, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι δυναμένου, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν κοσμηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κοσμῆσαι. καὶ τὸ μὲν κοσμηθὲν ἔχει τὸ εἶδος μεμερισμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα.

10. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς εἴδη ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐστι, ταῦτα ἐκεῖθεν· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ. διὸ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τέχνην ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι χωλεία. ποδῶν δὲ χωλεία ἡ δὴ ἐν τῇ γενέσει οὐ κρατήσαντος λόγου, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τύχης λύμῃ τοῦ εἴδους. καὶ ποιότητες δὴ σύμφωνοι καὶ ποσότητες, ἀριθμοί

[1] Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 39E8; there is an allusion above (line 4) to 33B2–3.

[2] The doctrine of Plotinus in this chapter differs from that of Plato, whose dialogues contain many allusions to Forms of negation, defect and evil (see the full discussion in W. D. Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 167–9, where references are given to the passages where Forms of this kind are mentioned). What Plato meant by asserting their existence, and how they are to be fitted in with other aspects of his Theory of Forms, are questions which have often puzzled ancient and modern commentators. J. N. Findlay makes most interesting philosophical sense of Forms of this kind, and contrasts Plato's doctrine on this point with that of Plotinus, to Plato's

Intellect, its whole archetype must necessarily be in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelligible universe, which Plato says exists in " the absolute living being ".[1] For just as, if there exists the rational forming principle of a living creature, and the matter which receives the seminal forming principle, the living creature must necessarily come into being, in the same way also when an intelligent and all-powerful nature exists and nothing hinders it, since there is nothing between it and what is able to receive it, it is necessary that one should be formed into the order and beauty of the universe and the other should form it. And that which is formed into the universe has its form divided, man in one place and the sun in another; but the forming nature has all things in one.

10. All the things, then, which exist as forms in the world of sense come from that intelligible world; those which do not, do not. Therefore none of the things which are contrary to nature are there, just as there are none of the things which are contrary to art in the arts, and there is no lameness in seeds.[2] (Congenital lameness of the feet occurs when the forming principle does not master [the matter], accidental lameness by damage to the form.) There are certainly [in the intelligible world] qualities which harmonize [with nature] and quantities, and numbers and dimensions and relations, and actions

advantage: *Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines* (London 1974) 41–5 and 374–5. The Middle Platonists generally denied the existence of such Forms (cp. Alcinous [Albinus] *Didaskalikos* IX), and Plotinus is simply following the common opinion of the school (which he very often does not).

τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχέσεις, ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις αἱ κατὰ φύσιν, κινήσεις τε καὶ στάσεις καθόλου τε καὶ ἐν μέρει τῶν ἐκεῖ. ἀντὶ δὲ χρόνου αἰών. ὁ δὲ τόπος ἐκεῖ νοερῶς τὸ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων, ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃς αὐτῶν, οὐσία καὶ νοερά, καὶ ζωῆς ἕκαστον μετέχον, καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον, καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἑστώς, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιόν, καὶ πάντα οὐσία. καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον· ὥστε οὐ κεχώρισται τὸ ποιὸν ἑκάστης οὐσίας. ἆρ' οὖν μόνα τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω; ἀλλὰ πρότερον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην σκεπτέον· κακοῦ γὰρ οὐδενός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ στερήσεως καὶ ἐλλείψεως, καὶ ὕλης ἀτυχούσης πάθος καὶ τοῦ ὕλῃ ὡμοιωμένου.

11. Τὰ οὖν κατὰ τέχνην καὶ αἱ τέχναι; τῶν δὴ τεχνῶν ὅσαι μιμητικαί, γραφικὴ μὲν καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία, ὄρχησίς τε καὶ χειρονομία, ἐνταῦθά που τὴν σύστασιν λαβοῦσαι καὶ αἰσθητῷ προσχρώμεναι παραδείγματι καὶ μιμούμεναι εἴδη τε καὶ κινήσεις τάς τε συμμετρίας ἃς ὁρῶσι μετατιθεῖσαι οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐκεῖ ἀνάγοιντο, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ. εἰ δέ τις ἕξις ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα συμμετρίας ὅλως [1]

[1] Harder: ὅλων wBUCz: ὅρον R: ὅρων J.

and experiences which are according to nature, and both universal motion and rest and the motion and rest of parts of the intelligible. But there is eternity instead of time. And place there exists in the intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in another. There, then, since all things are together, whichever you take of them is substance and intelligent, and each shares in life, and is same and other, and motion and rest, and in motion and at rest, and substance and quality, and all of them are substance. For each real being is actual, not potential: so that the quality of each substance is not separated from it.[1] Are there, then, in the intelligible world only the things which are in the sense-world or are there others over and above them? But we must first enquire about works of art: for there is no Form of Evil; since evil here is the result of want and deprivation and failure and is a misfortune of matter and of that which becomes like matter.

11. Are the works of art and the arts there, then? As for all the imitative arts, painting and sculpture, dancing and mime, which are in some way composed of elements from this world and use a model perceived by sense and imitate the forms and movements and transpose into their own terms the proportions which they see, it would not be reasonable to trace them back to the intelligible world except as included in the forming principle of man. But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living

[1] On substance and quality in the intelligible world see the much fuller discussion in the treatise *On Substance, or on Quality* (II. 6); cp. also VI. 2. 14 and the very thorough investigation of the whole subject in Klaus Wurm *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin–New York 1973).

ζῴων ἐπισκοποῖτο, μόριον ἂν εἴη δυνάμεως τῆς κἀκεῖ ἐπισκοπούσης καὶ θεωρούσης τὴν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ περὶ πάντα συμμετρίαν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μουσικὴ πᾶσα [περὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσα καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἡ μὲν][1] περὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσα τὰ νοήματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν νοητὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσα. ὅσαι δὲ ποιητικαὶ αἰσθητῶν τῶν κατὰ τέχνην, οἷον οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ τεκτονική, καθόσον συμμετρίαις προσχρῶνται, ἀρχὰς ἂν ἐκεῖθεν ἔχοιεν καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ φρονήσεων· τῷ δὲ αἰσθητῷ ταῦτα συγκερασάμεναι τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γεωργία συλλαμβάνουσα αἰσθητῷ φυτῷ, ἰατρική τε τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὑγίειαν θεωροῦσα ἥ τε περὶ ἰσχὺν τήνδε καὶ εὐεξίαν· ἄλλη γὰρ ἐκεῖ δύναμις καὶ ὑγίεια, καθ' ἣν ἀτρεμῇ πάντα καὶ ἱκανά, ὅσα ζῷα. ῥητορεία δὲ καὶ στρατηγία, οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλική, εἴ τινες αὐτῶν τὸ καλὸν κοινωνοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, εἰ ἐκεῖνο θεωροῖεν, μοῖραν ἐκεῖθεν εἰς ἐπιστήμην

[1] delevimus: ἥ *μὲν* legendum, nam exorditur variam lectionem: ἥ *μὲν* Kirchhoff (*quatenus* Ficinus).

[1] On art in the intelligible world and the access of the artist's mind to the Forms cp. V. 8. 1. There is no reason to suppose that Plotinus intends to abandon there the distinction which he makes here between art which is simply unintelligent copying of sense-objects and the truly intellectual visual art and music which has its origin in the intelligible world.

[2] Forms of artefacts are mentioned several times in the Dialogues, but the question whether Plato really believed in their existence (or changed his mind about them) has been

things and goes on from there to consider the proportions of living things in general, it would be a part of the power which also in the higher world considers and contemplates universal proportion in the intelligible. And certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is concerned with intelligible number.[1] And as for the arts which produce artificial sense-objects, for instance building and carpentry, in so far as they make use of proportions, they would have their principles from the intelligible world and the practical thinking there; but since they mix these up with what is perceived by the senses they would not be altogether in the intelligible world, except in the [Form of] man.[2] There would certainly not be farming there which helps the plants of the sense-world to grow, or medicine which has as its object of contemplation health here below, or the art which is concerned with strength and good bodily condition; for power in the intelligible world is different, and so is the health by which all living things there are undisturbed and adequate. And rhetoric and generalship, and the arts of administration and kingship, if any of them communicate excellence in the field of action, supposing that they contemplate that intelligible excellence, they have some part for their knowledge derived from the

vigorously discussed since Aristotle: see the good summary of the discussion (with full references) in Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* 171–5 (cp. ch. 10, n. 2, p. 309). Most Middle Platonists rejected them: see the passage from Alcinous [Albinus] cited in ch. 10, n. 1. Plotinus is here again following school tradition in this rather summary early treatise.

ἔχουσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ἐκεῖ. γεωμετρία δὲ νοητῶν οὖσα τακτέα ἐκεῖ, σοφία τε ἀνωτάτω περὶ τὸ ὂν οὖσα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνας ταῦτα.

12. Εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖ καὶ λογικοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ τεχνικοῦ καὶ αἱ τέχναι νοῦ γεννήματα οὖσαι, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν καθόλου λέγειν τὰ εἴδη εἶναι, οὐ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ ὁ[1] καθέκαστα· τὸ δὲ καθέκαστον, ὅτι [μὴ][2] τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· οἷον ὅτι ὁ μὲν σιμός, ὁ δὲ γρυπός, γρυπότητα μὲν καὶ σιμότητα διαφορὰς ἐν εἴδει θετέον ἀνθρώπου, ὥσπερ ζῴου διαφοραί εἰσιν· ἥκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τὸν μὲν τοιάνδε γρυπότητα, τὸν δὲ τοιάνδε. καὶ χρωμάτων διαφορὰς τὰς μὲν ἐν λόγῳ οὔσας, τὰς δὲ καὶ ὕλην καὶ τόπον διάφρον ὄντα ποιεῖν.

[1] Blumenthal: ὁ Enn.*
[2] del. Müller.

[1] With the older punctuation of Perna and Creuzer, to which Henry–Schwyzer have now returned, the sense of this passage and its relevance to its context is clear, as Igal has pointed out (he has kindly communicated his conclusions to Schwyzer and me by letter, and published them in Spanish in *Emerita* XLI, 1973, 92–8). The subject of discussion is still intellectual and artistic man and his arts and sciences: Plotinus is pointing out that if they are there the universal Forms which intellectual and artistic man thinks about must necessarily be there also, but no necessary conclusion follows about individual Forms. We cannot assert their existence because the intellectual arts and sciences exist in the intelligible, but the question of their existence is left open. Plotinus is free to assert the existence of individual Forms on different grounds, as he did later in V. 7 (18), without any inconsistency with the present passage. It should be noted that in what immediately follows Plotinus is not considering men's souls, selves or personalities but the bodily differences between individuals, exemplified as usual by Socrates's snub nose. But in the next chapter he reminds us that, whether there are Forms of individual selves in the intelligible world (a question he does not raise here) or not, our souls have a permanent footing in the intelligible world. On the whole subject of Forms of individuals in Plotinus see my article "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" (*Dionysius* 1, 1977, 49–68) and the references to other literature there given.

knowledge there. And since geometry is concerned with intelligibles, it must be placed there, and wisdom, which is on the highest level and concerned with being. This is enough about the arts and their works.

12. But if the Form of man is there, and of rational and artistic man, and the arts which are products of Intellect, then one must say that the Forms of universals are there, not of Socrates but of man.[1] But we must enquire about man whether the form of the individual is there; there is individuality, because the same [individual feature] is different in different people: for instance, because one man has a snub nose and the other an aquiline nose, one must assume aquilinity and snubness to be specific differences in the form of man, just as there are different species of animal; but one must also assume that the fact that one man has one kind of aquiline nose and one another comes from their matter. And some differences of colour are contained in the formative principle but others are produced by matter and by different places of abode.

13. Λοιπὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ μόνα τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἢ καί, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος[1] ἕτερος, εἰ καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοψυχὴ ἐκεῖ ἑτέρα καὶ νοῦ αὐτονοῦς. λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δεῖ, ὅσα ἐνταῦθα, εἴδωλα νομίζειν ἀρχετύπων, οὐδὲ ψυχὴν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοψυχῆς, τιμιότητι δὲ ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ἴσως δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐνταῦθα, αὐτοψυχήν. εἶναι δὲ ψυχῆς ὄντως οὔσης ἑκάστης καὶ δικαιοσύνην δεῖ τινα καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχαῖς ἐπιστήμην ἀληθινήν, οὐκ εἴδωλα οὐδὲ εἰκόνας ἐκείνων ὡς ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντα ἐνταῦθα· οὐ γὰρ ἔν τινι τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένα ἐκεῖνα· ὥστε, ὅπου ψυχὴ σώματος ἐξανέδυ, ἐκεῖ κἀκεῖνα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μοναχοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοητὸς πανταχοῦ. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ψυχὴ ἔχει[2] ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνταῦθα, ταῦτα ἐκεῖ· ὥστε, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις λαμβάνοιτο, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείω· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λέγοιτο συμπεριλαμβανομένων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, πάντα ἐνταῦθα, ὅσα κἀκεῖ.

14. Τὴν οὖν τὰ πάντα περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ φύσιν ταύτην ἀρχὴν θετέον. καὶ πῶς, τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως ἑνὸς καὶ ἁπλοῦ πάντη οὔσης, πλήθους δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντος; πῶς παρὰ τὸ ἕν,

[1] R^{2mg}, Kirchhoff*: αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος Enn.
[2] R^{2s} (*habet* Ficinus): ἐκεῖ A^{1s} (nunc erasum)EBxUCz: om. A.

13. It remains to say whether only the Forms of things in the sense-world exist in the intelligible, or if also, just as there is an Absolute Man different from man, there is an Absolute Soul different from soul and an Absolute Intellect different from intellect. It must be said first that not all things which are here below ought to be considered as images of archetypes, and soul should not be considered as an image of Absolute Soul, but one soul differs from another in honour, and there is Absolute Soul here below, though perhaps not as if here below. And there must belong to an individual soul that is really a soul some kind of righteousness and moral integrity, and there must be true knowledge in the souls which are in us, and these are not images or likenesses of their Forms as things are in the sense-world, but those very Forms themselves existing here in a different mode: for they are not separated off in a particular place; so that when the soul emerges from the body, those virtues too are in the higher world. For the sense-world is in one place, but the intelligible world is everywhere. Everything then which a soul of this kind has here below is there in the intelligible world; so that if one takes " things in the sense-world " to mean " things in the visible realm ", there are not only the things in the sense-world there, but more; but if one means " things in the universe ", including soul and the things in soul, all the things are here below which are in the intelligible world.

14. This nature, therefore, which includes all things in the intelligible is to be taken as the principle. But how is this possible, when the real principle is one and altogether simple, but there is

καὶ πῶς πλῆθος, καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τί νοῦς ταῦτα καὶ πόθεν, λεκτέον ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἀρχομένοις.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ σήψεως καὶ τῶν χαλεπῶν, εἰ κἀκεῖ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ ῥύπου καὶ πηλοῦ, λεκτέον, ὡς, ὅσα κομίζεται νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, πάντα ἄριστα· ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν οὐ ταῦτα· οὐδ' ἐκ τούτων νοῦς, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴ παρὰ νοῦ, λαβοῦσα παρὰ ὕλης ἄλλα, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα.

Περὶ δὲ τούτων σαφέστερον λεχθήσεται ἐπανελθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς πλῆθος.

Ὅτι δὲ τὰ σύνθετα εἰκῇ ὄντα, οὐ νῷ, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν αἰσθητὰ συνελθόντα, οὐκ ἐν εἴδεσι· τά τε ἐκ σήψεως ψυχῆς ἄλλο τι ἴσως ἀδυνατούσης· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐποίησεν ἄν τι τῶν φύσει· ποιεῖ γοῦν, ὅπου δύναται.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτοανθρώπῳ περιέχονται, ὅσαι τέχναι ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ.

Πρότερον δὲ ἄλλην καθόλου, καὶ τῆς καθόλου αὐτοψυχὴν ἤτοι τὴν ζωήν; ἢ ἐν νῷ πρὶν γενέσθαι ψυχήν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται, αὐτοψυχὴν ἐκείνην λέγειν.

[1] The references forward here and at lines 12–13 may well be to V. 4 (7)—not that Plotinus thought that what he said in this little treatise by any means exhausted the subject, which he deals with again and again in later treatises.

[2] Here again Plotinus is following Middle Platonist school tradition, probably against Plato's real thought: cp. ch. 10, n. (p. 309) and ch. 11, n. 2. The much fuller and profounder discussion of Forms of animals in the intelligible world in VI. 7. 7–10 should be contrasted with the casual dismissal of "savage beasts" from that world here.

multiplicity on the level of the real beings? We must begin from another starting point our explanation of how there is anything besides the One, and how it is a multiplicity, and how it is all these [intelligible] beings, and why Intellect is all these beings and where it comes from.[1]

But about the creatures which originate from putrefaction and savage beasts, whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible, and if there is one of dirt and mud, we must say that all things which Intellect gets from the First are the best; and among these Forms there are not the things we have just mentioned[2]; nor does Intellect take them from these Forms, but Soul which derives from Intellect, which takes other things, including these, from matter.

We shall speak more clearly about these questions when we return to the problem of how multiplicity comes from one.

But we must say that casual composites, which are not produced by Intellect but are things of sense coming together by themselves, are not among the Forms; and the products of putrefaction occur, perhaps, because the soul was unable to produce anything else; if it had been it would have produced something natural; it does so, at any rate, wherever it can.

About the arts we must say that all the arts are included in the Absolute Man whose subject-matter is in accordance with human nature.

But is there, before the individual soul, another universal soul, and before the universal soul the Absolute Soul or Life? [We must] say that Absolute Soul must be in Intellect before Soul comes to be in order that it may come to be.

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VI

ENNEADS
VI. 1–5

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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI–VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera* III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

vol. VI	vol. VII
VI. 1. 12. 38	VI. 7. 1. 48–9
VI. 2. 5. 5	VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21	VI. 7. 7. 26–8
VI. 3. 4. 36	VI. 8. 1. 7
VI. 4. 3. 15	VI. 8. 14. 19
VI. 5. 8. 29–31	VI. 8. 18. 29
VI. 5. 10. 44	VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5. 12. 6	

Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published *Lexicon Plotinianum* (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera* III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

PREFACE

The preparation of Volumes VI and VII for publication has been assisted by grants from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust, which are gratefully acknowledged.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A^1 = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
E = exemplum alterum tractatus VI. 5 in codice E a posteriore scriba scriptum.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.

w = AE
x = RJ
z = QL

mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem

$H\text{-}S^1$ = Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
$H\text{-}S^2$ = Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)

ORDO ENNEADVM COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO

Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.
I 1	53	II 1	40	III 1	3
I 2	19	II 2	14	III 2	47
I 3	20	II 3	52	III 3	48
I 4	46	II 4	12	III 4	15
I 5	36	II 5	25	III 5	50
I 6	1	II 6	17	III 6	26
I 7	54	II 7	37	III 7	45
I 8	51	II 8	35	III 8	30
I 9	16	II 9	33	III 9	13

Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.
IV 1	21	V 1	10	VI 1	42
IV 2	4	V 2	11	VI 2	43
IV 3	27	V 3	49	VI 3	44
IV 4	28	V 4	7	VI 4	22
IV 5	29	V 5	32	VI 5	23
IV 6	41	V 6	24	VI 6	34
IV 7	2	V 7	18	VI 7	38
IV 8	6	V 8	31	VI 8	39
IV 9	8	V 9	5	VI 9	9

VI. 1–3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Introductory Note

THE work on the *Categories* (Nos. 42–44 in the chronological order) was composed late in Plotinus' writing life, towards the end of the six years during which Porphyry was with him (*Life* ch. 5). It is difficult not to feel as one reads it that he did not find the subject very congenial. In the first of the three treatises into which Porphyry has divided the work (Porphyry's editorial divisions correspond exactly here to the real divisions of the subject-matter, as they do not always do elsewhere) Plotinus seems to be doing his duty as a Platonic philosopher by making his contribution to the traditional polemic which some Platonists had been engaged in since, probably, the first century B.C. against the category-doctrine of Aristotle and the Peripatetics and to the joint attack by Peripatetics and Platonists on Stoic category-doctrine which had been going on since about the same period. (There were other Platonists, notably Alcinous (or Albinus) in the second century A.D. who took a more positive attitude which finally prevailed in the Platonic school, with Porphyry and Iamblichus.)

In the first twenty-four chapters of VI. 1 Plotinus seems to be very much dependent on the polemic against the Aristotelian categories of the Platonist of the second century A.D. Nicostratus (who took over the work of an otherwise unknown Lucius), about which we know something from the *Commentary on the Categories* of Simplicius: the passages of this which are relevant to the text of Plotinus are printed in the *editio maior* of Henry and

Schwyzer.[1] In the last six chapters of the treatise it is likely that he is making use of the anti-Stoic polemic of the Peripatetic Andronicus, the editor of Aristotle in the first century B.C. and his pupil Boethus. Ancient philosophers are not at their best in polemic, and Plotinus and his Platonic and Peripatetic sources are no exceptions. Very much of the criticism is carping, superficial and tendentious, and there is very little attempt to understand the positions of Aristotle and the Stoics or to discover what they are really trying to do. The philosophical point of view is throughout that of Platonism as Plotinus understood it. Aristotle is treated as if he were a bad and metaphysically unintelligent Platonist, and the Stoics as gross and crude materialists. (Plotinus can sometimes understand Aristotle at a very much deeper level, and, even when he is criticising him, develop genuinely Aristotelian thoughts: and his own thought in some areas is much influenced by Stoicism, in ethics and in his understanding of the organic unity of the universe.)

VI. 2 is on a considerably higher level and must rank as one of the major works of Plotinus on the One-Being, the Divine Intellect, Νοῦς. Here he turns from polemic against opponents to expound the true Platonic doctrine of the Categories of the Intelligible World. These are the "greatest genera" of Plato *Sophist* 254D–257A, Being, Rest, Motion, Same and Other. Plotinus uses them in a remarkable and original way, of which this treatise gives the fullest account to be found in the *Enneads*. It has not perhaps very much to do with logic in any ordinary Aristotelian or modern sense: the "categories" are not really used as logical categories or classes. Brêhier, in his *Notice* to VI. 1–3 in his edition (p.37), puts it very well when he speaks of it as a "reflective analysis which brings to light different aspects of the same whole." The ultimate

[1] On Nicostratus see further K. Praechter "Nikostratos der Platoniker" in *Hermes* 57 (1922), 481–517 and J. Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977), 233–6.

appeal, as always when Plotinus is speaking of the intelligible world and its source, is to a direct awareness or vision, for which discursive reasoning can only prepare us. This is very apparent in Chapter 8 and in the last three chapters of the treatise, especially Chapter 21.

In VI. 3 Plotinus returns from the intelligible to the sensible world, and does his best to provide it with a suitable Platonic set of categories. His attitude to Aristotle at this point becomes a good deal more positive, and this part of the work is more a critical adaptation than a refutation of Peripatetic doctrine. But he finds it difficult to arrive at any certain conclusions, and is more imprecise and undogmatic than usual. This is particularly apparent in the last eight lines of Chapter 3, where he suggests, though he does not pursue the suggestion, that we might be able to manage here below with only two categories, quasi-substance and relation, and in the rather impatiently agnostic last words of Chapter 27. We can see clearly in this treatise how a Platonist, who, following the *Timaeus*, does not believe that any certain and unchanging knowledge of the sense-world is possible, can be much more open and uncommitted to any particular account of the nature and structure of material things than an Aristotelian, who, while still believing that certain and unchanging knowledge is possible, must find its objects predominantly in the world of sense.

(Only Substance, Quantity, Quality, Motion and, incidentally, Relation are discussed in VI. 3. It is possible, but not certain, that Plotinus meant to continue with a fuller discussion of other categories than the summary remarks in the last chapter.)

Synopsis

VI. 1

Earlier opinions on the number of beings and kinds of being summarily considered. Do the ten Aristotelian categories apply to both sensible and intelligible worlds (ch. 1)? Substance: criticisms of Aristotelian doctrine: there cannot be one category of substance for both sensible and intelligible worlds (chs. 2–3). Quantity: difficulties about numbers and magnitudes, discontinuous and continuous quantity (ch. 4). Speech and time should not be classed as quantitative (ch. 5). Relation: difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine. Relations are not only in our thinking (chs. 6–9). Quality: difficulties about the Aristotelian account and the classification of qualities (chs. 10–12). When. Why make it a separate category: are not "whens" parts of time (ch. 13)? Where. Again, as with the "when", perversity of making a separate category, and putting place and what is in place in different categories (ch. 14). Action (or doing and making): critical discussion of the Aristotelian account (chs. 15–19). Affection (or passivity). Difficulties about making it a separate category, sharply distinguished from Action (chs. 20–21). Action-Affection as Relation (ch. 22). Having: is this category really necessary (ch. 23)? The same applies to Position (ch. 24).

The Stoic Categories: absurdity of the Stoic highest genus, "something": confusion in their materialistic account of substance-subject (ch. 25). Attack on Stoic materialism (chs. 26 and 27). The great Stoic mistake is reliance on sense-perception (ch. 28). Criticism of the materialistic Stoic account of Quality (ch. 29). Summary dismissal of the Stoic categories of State and Relation (ch. 30).

VI. 2

The Platonic genera. Genera and Principles. Being and Becoming (again, absurdity of the Stoic "something") (ch. 1). Being is one and many: its co-equal genera are also principles (ch. 2). The transcendent One cause of the genera: the genera in the unity of the One-Being: inadequacy of discursive reason to apprehend this (ch. 3). Bodily and intelligible being: Soul as a handy example of the intelligible (ch. 4). The unity and multiplicity of Soul, and of the One-Being (chs. 5 and 6). Movement as life in Soul and Intellect. Necessity also of the genus Rest (ch. 7). The discernment by direct vision of Being, Motion and Rest in Intellect: this brings with it the discernment of Same and Other (ch. 8). Are there more genera? Why the transcendent One is not a genus (ch. 9). Why the One in the One-Being is not a genus: how this One is in Being (chs. 9–11). All things, including mathematical entities, which appear to be soulless, strive towards the One and Good (chs. 11–12). Quantity and number are posterior to and derived from the five Platonic genera (ch. 13). So is quality: in the intelligible world it is the activity of substance (ch. 14). Being and the other four Platonic genera (ch. 15). There is no place for the other Aristotelian categories in the intelligible (ch. 16). The Good is not a genus: the activity, life or movement of the One-Being towards the transcendent Good is its good (ch. 17). The Beautiful belongs to Substance, Knowledge is Movement. Intellect is not a genus, but all that truly exists: and the virtues are its activities (ch. 18). The genera and their species: universal and particular in Intellect (chs. 19–20). The great vision of Intellect, in which, deriving from and along with the primary genera, Quality, Quantity, number and figure are discerned. The all-inclusiveness of Intellect (ch. 21). Exegesis of *Timaeus* 39E (the Complete Living Creature) in terms of this doctrine, with confirmatory texts from the *Parmenides* and *Philebus* (ch. 22).

VI. 3

Are the categories of the sense-world the same, analogously, as those of the intelligible, or different? Problems of classification in the sense-world (ch. 1). Sensible substance: matter, form and composite: the Platonic intelligible categories cannot be applied, even analogously, to sensible substance (ch. 2). Discussion of matter, form and composite continued: relation of other categories to them. Seven, five, or possibly only two categories of the sensible world (ch. 3)? What have matter, form and composite in common to make us put them in the category of "substance" (ch. 4)? Substance and substrate (chs. 4–5). What does "is" mean in the sense-world (ch. 6)? It is not matter from which things here below derive their being (ch. 7). Sensible substance as a combination of qualities and matter (ch. 8). How should the genus "sensible substance" be divided into species (chs. 9–10)? Quantity in the sense-world (chs. 11–15). Quality in the sense-world (chs. 16–20). Movement in the sense-world (chs. 21–26). Stillness in the sense-world is to be distinguished from the Platonic category Rest in the intelligible (ch. 27). Summary conclusion, with a few remarks on Relation (ch. 28).

VI. 1. (42) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα καὶ τίνα ἐζήτησαν μὲν καὶ οἱ πάνυ παλαιοί, ἕν, οἱ δὲ ὡρισμένα, οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστοι οἱ μὲν ἄλλο οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ ἕν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πεπερασμένα καὶ αὖ τὰ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες· καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοὺς ἐξετασθεῖσαι αὗται αἱ δόξαι ἱκανῶς ἀφετέαι ἡμῖν. ὅσα δ' ἐξετάσαντες τὰ ἐκείνων ἔθεντο ἐν γένεσιν ὡρισμένοις αὐτοί, περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον, οἳ οὔτε ἓν θέμενοι, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἑώρων, οὔτε ἄπειρα, ὅτι μήτε οἷόν τε μήτ' ἐπιστήμη ἂν γένοιτο, τά τε πεπερασμένα εἰς ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ[1] ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἷον στοιχεῖα, γένη δή[2] τινα οὗτοι εἰρήκασιν, οἱ μὲν δέκα, οἱ δὲ ἐλάττω· εἶεν δ' ἄν τινες οἱ πλείω τούτων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι

[1] αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ] αὐτῶν. ὅτι ⟨δὲ⟩ τὰ H–S[1].
[2] Theiler: δὲ Enn.: del. Volkmann, H–S[1].

[1] The "extremely ancient philosophers" are the Pre-Socratics. As usual, Plotinus takes his information about them from Aristotle and dismisses them very summarily. "One being": Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus; "a definite number": Empedocles; "an infinite number": Anaxagoras, Democritus.

[2] Aristotle and the Stoics.

[3] The reference may be to Peripatetic discussions of the Categories by Andronicus, Boethus, and their followers

VI. 1. ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

1. The extremely ancient philosophers investigated beings, how many there were and what they were: some said there was one being, some a definite number, and some an infinite number; and in each of these groups, some said the one being was one thing and some another, and the same applies to those who said the number of beings was limited and those who said that it was infinite.[1] And since these views have been sufficiently examined by those who came after them, we can let them go. But since these later philosophers,[2] after examining the views of the earlier ones, themselves placed beings in a number of definite kinds, we must consider them and see how many the kinds are; these philosophers did not posit one being, because they saw many even in the intelligible realm, nor an infinite number, because this was impossible and knowledge could not occur, and some of them posited ten of their numerically limited kinds and some fewer (they have said that the foundations of being are not rightly thought of as a sort of elements, but as genera of some kind); but there might have been some who posited more than these ten.[3] But there are differences in their genera

(first century B.C.): cp. Dexippus *In Categ.* I 37, p. 32,10–34.2. But the wording is vague, and Plotinus clearly did not know much about these people and was not very interested in them.

διαφορά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ γένη ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα τῷ γένει τοσαῦτα.

Πρῶτον τοίνυν τὴν διαιρουμένην εἰς δέκα τὰ ὄντα ληπτέον ἀνασκοποῦντας, πότερα δέκα γένη δεῖ νομίζειν αὐτοὺς λέγειν κοινοῦ ὀνόματος τυχόντα τοῦ ὄντος ἢ κατηγορίας δέκα. ὅτι γὰρ οὐ συνώνυμον τὸ ὂν ἐν ἅπασι, λέγουσι καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκεῖνο πρῶτον ἐρωτητέον, πότερα ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα, ἢ ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἅπαντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὰ μὲν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάπαλιν. οὗ δὴ ἐξεταστέον, τίνα κἀκεῖ τῶν δέκα, καὶ εἰ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὄντα ὑφ' ἓν γένος ὑπακτέον τοῖς ἐνταῦθα, ἢ ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ἐκεῖ οὐσία ἥ τε ἐνταῦθα· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, πλείω τὰ γένη. εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπί τε τῶν πρώτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων οὐκ ὄντος γένους κοινοῦ, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν οὐ λέγουσιν· οὐ πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὄντα διαιρεῖσθαι ἐβουλήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα παραλελοίπασι.

2. Πάλιν οὖν ἆρα γένη νομιστέον εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἓν γένος ἡ οὐσία; ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης πάντως ἀρκτέον. ὅτι μὲν ἓν ἐπί τε τῆς νοητῆς ἐπί τε τῆς αἰσθητῆς κοινὸν εἶναι

as well: for some of them make the genera principles of being, others the beings themselves, generically the same in number.

First, then, we must take the opinion which divides beings into ten, and see whether we think the philosophers are saying that there are ten genera which fall under the common name of "being", or ten categories. For they say, and say rightly, that being does not mean the same thing in all ten; but we should rather ask them this first, whether the ten are there in the same way in the intelligible beings and the beings perceived by sense, or whether they are all in the beings of the sense-world, but in the intelligibles some are there and some not: for it certainly cannot be the other way round. At this point we must examine which of the ten are also there in the intelligible, and if the things there can be brought under one genus with those here below, or whether the term "substance" is used ambiguously of that there and this here. But if this is so, then there are more than ten genera. But if "substance" is used in the same sense there as here, it will be absurd for it to mean the same thing when applied to primary beings and those which come after them, since there is no common genus of things among which there is priority and posterity. But in their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible beings: so they did not want to classify all beings, but left out those which are most authentically beings.

2. Again, then, are they really to be considered as genera? And how is substance one genus? For we must in any case begin with this. That there cannot be one common substantiality applying to both

ἀδύνατον τὸ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται. καὶ προσέτι ἄλλο τι ἔσται πρό τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρὸ τῆς αἰσθητῆς, ἄλλο τι ὂν κατηγορούμενον κατ' ἀμφοῖν, ὃ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη· ἔσται γὰρ ἢ τὸ σῶμα ἀσώματον, ἢ τὸ ἀσώματον σῶμα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν τῇδε οὐσιῶν ζητητέον, τί κοινὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐσίας λέγουσιν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἴσον εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχειν, ὅταν μᾶλλον λέγηται τὸ εἶδος οὐσία ἢ ἡ ὕλη· καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἱ δ' ἂν εἴποιεν τὴν ὕλην μᾶλλον. αἱ δὲ πρῶται λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰς δευτέρας τί ἂν ἔχοιεν κοινόν, ὁπότε παρὰ τῶν προτέρων ἔχουσιν αἱ δεύτεραι τὸ οὐσίαι λέγεσθαι; ὅλως δὲ τί ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἴδιόν τις ἀποδοίη, ἤδη ἔχει τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ "ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων" ἐπὶ πάντων ἁρμόσει.

3. Ἀλλ' ἆρα μίαν τινὰ κατηγορίαν λεκτέον ὁμοῦ συλλαβοῦσι τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; οἷον εἴ τις τὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος ἕν τι λέγοι, οὐχ ὡς κοινὸν κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀφ' ἑνός· πρώτως γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐκείνη, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ ἧττον τὰ ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει μίαν κατηγορίαν τὰ πάντα εἶναι; καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὰ λεγόμενα

[1] This seems to be a polemical reference to the widest Stoic category τι ("sort of something"), which included both corporeals (the only realities) and incorporeals (which existed only in thought): cp. *SVF* II 117, 329, 331–3; cp. ch. 25, 1–10.

[2] A critical reference to Aristotle *Categories* 5. 4a10–11.

intelligible and sensible substance has been said already. And besides, there will [if this is so] be something else before both intelligible and sensible substance, which *is* something else and is predicated of both, and this could not be either body or bodiless: for [if it is] body will be bodiless, or the bodiless body.[1] Of course we must also investigate this point about the substance here below themselves, what there is common to matter and form and the composite of both. For they say that all these are substances, but that they are not equal in respect of substance, when it is said that form is more substance than matter—quite correctly; but there are those who would say that matter is more substance. But what could the substances which they call primary have in common with the secondary ones, when the secondary ones derive their name of substances from those prior to them? But in general it is impossible to say what substance is: for even if one gives it its "proper characteristic", it does not yet have its "what it is", and perhaps not even the definition "that which is one and the same in number which is receptive of the opposites" will fit all cases.[2]

3. But ought we really to call substance one category, collecting together intelligible substance, matter, form and the composite of both? This would be like saying that the genus [or clan] or the Heraclids was a unity, not in the sense of a unity common to all its members, but because they all come from one ancestor: for the intelligible substance would be so primarily, and the others secondarily and less. But what prevents all things from being one category? For everything else which is said to exist

εἶναι. ἢ ἐκεῖνα μὲν πάθη, αἱ δ' οὐσίαι ἐφεξῆς ἄλλως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ οὕτως οὔπω ἔχομεν ἐπερείσασθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ, οὐδὲ τὸ κυριώτατον λαβεῖν, ἵν' ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. συγγενεῖς μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔστωσαν πᾶσαι αἱ λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι ἔχουσαί τι παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. τί ἄρα γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ "τι" καὶ τὸ "τόδε" καὶ τὸ "ὑποκείμενον" καὶ μὴ ἐπικείμενον μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μηδὲ ὅ ἐστιν ἄλλου ὄν, οἷον λευκὸν ποιότης σώματος καὶ ποσὸν οὐσίας, καὶ χρόνος κινήσεώς τι καὶ κίνησις τοῦ κινουμένου; ἀλλ' ἡ δευτέρα οὐσία κατ' ἄλλου. ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ "κατ' ἄλλου" ἐνταῦθα, ὡς γένος ἐνυπάρχον καὶ ἐνυπάρχον ὡς μέρος καὶ τὸ "τι" ἐκείνου· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν κατ' ἄλλου, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴδια ἄν τις λέγοι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἓν οὕτω συνάγοι καὶ οὐσίας λέγοι, ἓν δέ τι γένος οὐκ ἂν λέγοι, οὐδὲ δηλοῖ πω τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω· ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ ἴωμεν φύσιν.

4. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ πρῶτον ποσὸν λέγουσι καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἅπαν μέγεθος καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα

derives from substance. Now those other existents are affections [of substances] and substances are in successive order in a different way. But besides that, in this way we are not yet able to put any weight on substance or grasp the most essential thing about it, in order that the others may come from it. Let all the so-called substances, certainly, be akin in this way and have something over and above the other genera. But what *is* this very "something" and "this here", and the "substrate" and the not resting upon or being in something else as in a substrate, nor being what it is as belonging to another, as white is a quality of body and quantity belongs to substance, and time is something belonging to motion, and motion belongs to the moved? But second substance is predicated of something else. Now here it is predicated of something else in a different way, in the sense of an immanent genus, immanent as a part, and the "what it is" of that first substance; but the [quality] white is predicated of something else because it is in something else. But one might say that these are peculiar properties of substances as compared with other things, and for this reason one might collect them into one and call them substances, but one would not be speaking of one genus, nor would one yet be making clear the concept and nature of substance. Let this discussion rest here, and let us go on to the nature of the quantum.[1]

4. They say that the first quantum is number, also all continuous magnitude and place and time, and they refer all the other things they call quanta back

[1] Plotinus returns to the discussion of sensible "substance" at length in VI. 3.

εἰς ταῦτα ἀναφέρουσιν, ὅσα ποσὰ λέγουσι, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ποσὸν τῷ τὸν χρόνον, καίτοι ἴσως ἀνάπαλιν τοῦ χρόνου τὸ συνεχὲς παρὰ τῆς κινήσεως λαβόντος. εἰ μὲν δὴ τὸ συνεχὲς ᾗ συνεχὲς ποσὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι, τὸ διωρισμένον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποσόν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ συνεχές, τί κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἔσται τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι ὑπαρχέτω· καίτοι τοῦτο τὸ λέγεσθαι ποσοῖς ὑπάρχει, οὔπω δέ, τίς ἡ φύσις καθὸ λέγεται, δηλοῦται· ἀλλὰ γραμμή γε καὶ ἐπίπεδον καὶ σῶμα οὐδὲ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μεγέθη μὲν λέγεται, ποσὰ δὲ οὐ λέγεται, εἴπερ τότε προσλαμβάνει τὸ ποσὸν λέγεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἀχθῇ δίπηχυ ἢ τρίπηχυ· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυσικὸν μετρηθὲν γίγνεται ποσόν τι, καὶ ὁ τόπος κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ᾗ τόπος. δεῖ δὲ μὴ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ' αὑτό, οἷον ποσότητα· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς τρεῖς βοῦς ποσόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμόν· βόες γὰρ τρεῖς δύο κατηγορίαι ἤδη. οὕτως οὖν καὶ γραμμὴ τοσήδε δύο κατηγορίαι, καὶ ἐπιφάνεια τοσήδε δύο, καὶ ἡ ποσότης μὲν αὐτῆς ποσόν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια διὰ τί ποσόν; περατωθεῖσα γοῦν οἷον τρισὶ γραμμαῖς ἢ τέτρασι λέγεται εἶναι ποσόν. τί οὖν; μόνον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς φήσομεν ποσόν; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τοὺς καθ' αὑτοὺς ἀριθμούς, οὐσίαι λέγονται οὗτοι καὶ μάλιστα τῷ καθ' αὑτοὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ

[1] These are the Platonic Ideal Numbers, which Plotinus discusses in VI. 6.

to these, and they say that movement is quantified by the quantum of time, though perhaps, conversely, time takes its continuity from movement. But now, if they are going to say that the continuous is a quantum in so far as it is continuous, the discontinuous would not be a quantum; but if the continuous is a quantum incidentally, what is this being quantitative which is common to both? Now let us agree that numbers have the property of being quanta; yet this only gives them the property of being called quanta, and it is not yet made clear what their nature is in virtue of which they are called quanta; but a line and a surface and a body are not even called quanta, but are called magnitudes but not quanta, granted that they receive the additional appellation of quanta when they are brought to a number, two cubits or three cubits: since the natural body also becomes a quantum when it is measured, and place is so incidentally, not in so far as it is place. But one must not take what is incidentally a quantum, but the quantitative in itself, like quantity: since even the three oxen are not a quantum, but their number is: for three oxen are already two categories. In this way, therefore, a line of a certain length is two categories, and a surface of a certain area is two categories, and its quantity is a quantum, but why is the surface itself a quantum? It is, at any rate, only when it is limited, by three or four lines for instance, that it is said to be a quantum. Well then, shall we assert that only the numbers are quantitative? But if we mean the numbers in and by themselves,[1] these are called substances, and are called so particularly because they are in and by themselves. But if we mean the num-

τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν, καθ' οὓς ἀριθμοῦμεν, οὐ μονάδας, ἀλλὰ ἵππους δέκα καὶ βοῦς δέκα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον δόξει εἶναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι οὐσίαι, μὴ καὶ τούτους, ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ μετροῦντες τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔξω ὄντες ὥσπερ οἱ κανόνες καὶ τὰ μέτρα μετροῦσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντες λαμβάνονται εἰς τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα ποσὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ μετέχοντα ποσότητος, αὐτοί τε διὰ τί ποσόν; μέτρα γάρ· τὰ δὲ μέτρα διὰ τί ποσὰ ἢ ποσότης; ἢ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντες, εἰ μηδεμιᾷ τῶν ἄλλων ἁρμόττουσι, τοῦτο, ὃ λέγονται, ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τῇ λεγομένῃ ποσότητι κείσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς αὐτῶν ὁρίζει ἕν, εἶτ' ἔπεισι καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσα μηνύει, καὶ μετρεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἡ ψυχὴ προσχρωμένη. μετροῦσα οὖν οὐ τὸ τί ἐστι μετρεῖ· ἓν γὰρ λέγει καὶ δύο, κἂν ὁποιαοῦν καὶ ἐναντία ᾖ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἥντινα διάθεσιν ἔχει, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅσα. τοῦ ποσοῦ ἄρα, εἴτε καθ' αὑτόν, εἴτ' ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσι θεωροῖτο, αὐτός, οὐ τὰ μετέχοντα. οὐ τὸ τρίπηχυ τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία. διὰ τί οὖν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη; ἆρα, ὅτι ἐγγὺς τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγγίνηται, ποσὰ αὐτὰ λέγομεν, οὐ τῷ κυρίως ποσῷ,

bers in the things which participate in them, the numbers by which we count, not just units, but ten horses or ten oxen, first of all it will seem absurd that, if the numbers in themselves are substances, these [counting] numbers should not be so as well, and then [it will also seem absurd] if when they measure their subjects they exist in them, and do not exist outside them and measure them like rulers and measuring-pots. But if it is as existing on their own and not in their subjects that they are taken for measuring, those subjects will not be quanta since they will not participate in quantity, and why are the numbers themselves quantitative? For they are measures: but why are measures quanta or quantity? Presumably because, since they are among the things that exist, if they do not fit into any of the other categories, they will be what they are called and will be placed in the category called quantity. For their unit marks off one thing, and then goes on to another, and number indicates how many there are, and soul measures the multiplicity using number to help it. Therefore when it measures it does not measure what a thing is: for it says "one" and "two", whatever they are and even if they are opposites; but it does not measure what state a thing is in either, warm or beautiful for instance, but how many things there are. Number itself then, whether it is regarded in itself or in the things which participate in it, is quantitative, but its participants are not. So not the "three cubits long" but the "three". Why, then, are magnitudes also quantitative? Is it because they are near the quantum, and we call the things in which they occur quanta, not because they are quanta in the proper sense, but we call something big as if on

ἀλλὰ μέγα λέγομεν, ὥσπερ πολλοῦ μετέχον ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ μικρόν, ὅτι ὀλίγου; ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν οὐκ ἀξιοῦται ποσὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πρός τι· ἀλλὰ ὅμως πρός τι λέγουσι, καθόσον ποσὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι. σκεπτέον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον. ἔσται τοίνυν οὐχ ἕν τι γένος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς μόνος, τὰ δὲ δευτέρως. οὐ κυρίως τοίνυν ἓν γένος, ἀλλὰ κατηγορία μία συνάγουσα καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς πως τὰ πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως. ἡμῖν δὲ ζητητέον, πῶς οἱ καθ' αὑτοὺς ἀριθμοὶ οὐσίαι ἢ καὶ αὐτοὶ ποσόν τι· ὁποτέρως δ' ἂν ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ἂν κοινόν τι ἔχοιεν πρὸς τούτους ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλ' ἢ ὄνομα μόνον.

5. Ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις πῶς; πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου, εἰ βούλει [μετρεῖται μὲν γάρ].[1] ἀλλὰ λόγος ὢν τοσόσδε ἐστί[ν]—⟨μετρεῖται μὲν γάρ⟩[1]—ᾗ δὲ λόγος, οὐ ποσόν· σημαντικὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα. ὕλη δ' αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀήρ, ὥσπερ καὶ τούτων· καὶ γὰρ σύγκειται ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἡ δὲ πληγὴ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος, καὶ οὐχ ἡ πληγὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἡ τύπωσις ἡ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ μορφοῦσα· μᾶλλον οὖν ποίησις καὶ ποίησις σημαντική. τὴν δὴ κίνησιν ταύτην κατὰ[2] τὴν πληγὴν ποίησιν μᾶλλον ἂν εὐλόγως τις θεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀντικειμένως πάθος, ἢ ἑκάστην ἄλλου μὲν ποίησιν, ἄλλου δὲ πάθος, ἢ ποίησιν εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, πάθημα δ' ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν

[1] transposuimus.
[2] coniecimus: καὶ Enn.

the ground that it participates in a great deal of number, and small, because it participates in a little? But the big itself and the small are not considered to be quanta, but relations; but, all the same, they call them relations in so far as they appear to be quanta. But we must consider this more precisely. There will, then, not be one genus, but only number, and the other things as quanta secondarily. There is not, then, one genus in the proper sense, but one category which gathers in also the things that are somehow near quanta in a primary and secondary sense. But we [Platonists] must investigate how the numbers in and by themselves are substances, or whether they too are a kind of quantum; but, whichever way they are, those numbers would have nothing in common with these numbers here below, except the name alone.

5. But how are [articulate] speech and time and movement quanta? First of all, if you like, about speech. But it is speech and is of a certain quantity—for it is certainly measured—yet in so far as it is speech it is not a quantum: for it is something significant, like noun and verb. Like theirs, its matter is the air: for in fact it is composed of them; but it is rather the impact which is speech, and not just simply the impact but the resulting impression which so to speak shapes the air: it is therefore an action, and a significant action. Certainly one would more reasonably class this movement according to the impact as an action and the corresponding movement as an affection, or say that each of them was an action of one thing and an affection of another, or an action upon the substrate and an affection in the substrate. But if the voice is not considered in terms

ἡ φωνή, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα, δύο ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ μία ἡ κατηγορία ἐκ τῆς σημαντικῆς, εἰ ⟨τὸ σημαντικὸν ταύτης, τὸ δὲ⟩[1] συσσημαντικὸν ἐκείνης τῆς κατηγορίας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος, εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνοιτο, τί ποτε τὸ μετροῦν ληπτέον· ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἢ τὸ νῦν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοσόσδε εἶναι, οἷον ἐνιαύσιος, ἔστω ποσόν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ χρόνος εἶναι φύσις τις ἄλλη· τὸ γὰρ τοσόνδε ἄλλο ὂν τοσόνδε ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποσότης ὁ χρόνος· ἡ δὲ ποσότης οὐκ ἐφαπτομένη ἄλλου αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ κυρίως ποσόν. εἰ δὲ τὰ μετέχοντα πάντα τοῦ ποσοῦ ποσὰ θεῖτο, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποσόν. τὸ δὲ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, οὐ τῶν μετεχόντων, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα, ὥσπερ ὁ τρίπηχυς ποσός, συνῃρημένος καὶ οὗτος οὐκ εἰς γένος ἕν, ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἓν καὶ μίαν κατηγορίαν.

6. Τὸ δὲ πρός τι οὕτως ἐπισκεπτέον, εἴ τις κοινότης γενικὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰς ἕν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τούτου, εἰ ὑπόστασίς τις ἡ σχέσις ἐστὶν

[1] Igal.

of the impact but of the air, there would be two categories and not one to be extracted from the significant action, if the significant thing is to be placed in this category and the co-significant in that.[1] As for time, if it is understood in its measuring capacity, we must grasp what it is that measures: for it is either soul or the "now". But if it is understood as measured, let it be a quantum in respect of being of a certain length, a year's length for instance; but in respect of being time it is some different nature: for the so much is a something else which is so much. Quite certainly time is not quantity; but it is just exactly quantity which has no hold on anything else which is the quantum in the strict and proper sense. But if one classes all the things which participate in the quantitative as quanta, then substance will be the same thing as quantum. But that "equal and unequal are characteristic of the quantum"[2] must be understood of the quantum itself, not of the things which participate in it, except incidentally, not in so far as they are those things which they are, as the man three cubits tall is; he too is not brought together into one genus, but under one genus and one category.

6. As regards relation, we should enquire about it in this way: whether there is any generic community in it, or whether it comes together in another way into one. And it is particularly important when dealing with this category to ask whether this state of being related has any substantial existence, for

[1] We adopt here Igal's conjecture, which gives good sense and accords with Simplicius *In Categ.* 6, p. 131. 8–10.

[2] Aristotle *Categories* 6. 6a26–7

αὕτη, ὥσπερ ὁ δεξιὸς καὶ ἀριστερὸς καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕστερον λεχθέντος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος οὐδεμία, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ τοῦτο. τί δὴ ἐπὶ διπλασίου καὶ ἡμίσεος καὶ ὅλως ὑπερέχοντος καὶ ὑπερεχομένου, καὶ αὖ ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως, ἀνακλίσεως, καθίσεως, στάσεως, καὶ αὖ πατρὸς υἱέος, δεσπότου δούλου, καὶ πάλιν ὁμοίου ἀνομοίου, ἴσου ἀνίσου, ποιητικοῦ τε αὖ καὶ παθητικοῦ, καὶ μέτρου καὶ μετρουμένου; καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αἰσθητόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἔχοι ἂν πρὸς ἐπιστητὸν μίαν τινὰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑπόστασιν [πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ εἶδος],[1] καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις πρὸς αἰσθητὸν ὡσαύτως, τό τε ποιητικὸν πρὸς τὸ παθητικὸν κἂν ἔργον ἓν ἀπεργάσαιτο, καὶ τὸ μέτρον πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον τὴν μέτρησιν. ὅμοιον δὲ πρὸς ὅμοιον τί ἂν ἔχοι ἀπογεννώμενον; ἢ οὐκ ἀπογεννώμενον, ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχον, τὴν ταὐτότητα τὴν ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ ποιὸν οὐδέν. οὐδὲ τὰ ἴσα· τὸ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ποσῷ προϋπάρχει πρὸ τῆς σχέσεως. ἡ δὲ σχέσις τί ἄλλο ἢ ἡμετέρα κρίσις παραβαλλόντων τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα ἅ ἐστι καὶ λεγόντων "τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιότητα" καὶ "οὗτος πεποίηκε τοῦτον καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖ τούτου"; κάθισίς τε καὶ στάσις παρὰ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ ἑστηκὸς τί ἂν εἴη; ἡ δ' ἕξις [καὶ διάθεσις][2] ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἔχον λεγομένη ἔχειν ἂν μᾶλλον

[1] del. Dörrie.
[2] del. Kirchhoff.

instance the right and the left and the double and the half, or whether it is so in some cases, for instance the one last mentioned, but there is no substantiality in the first mentioned, or whether it is nowhere so. What, then, about double and half and in general exceeding and exceeded, and again about habitual state and [changeable] disposition, and lying, sitting, standing, and again about father, son, master, slave, and further about like, unlike, equal, unequal, and active also and passive, and measure and measured? And knowledge and sense-perception, of which one is related to the object known and the other to the object perceived. Knowledge would indeed have in relation to its object a single active substantial existence, and sense-perception in the same way in relation to its object, and so would the active to the passive, granted that they accomplish a single work, and the measure to the measured in respect of measuring it. But what product would like have in relation to like? It is not a question of a product, but of something which is there, of the sameness in the qualified. But there is nothing over and above the qualification in each of the like things. Nor is there in the case of equal things: for the sameness in the quantum is there before the state of being related. But what is this state of being related other than our judgement when we compare things which are what they are by themselves and say "this thing and this thing have the same size and the same quality", and "this man has produced this man, and this man controls this man"? And what would sitting and standing be over and above what sits and stands? But habitual state, when it refers to the possessor, would rather signify

σημαίνοι, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον ποιὸν ἂν εἴη· καὶ ἐπὶ διαθέσεως ὡσαύτως. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη παρὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ ἡμῶν τὴν παράθεσιν νοούντων; τὸ δ' ὑπερέχον τὸ μὲν τοσόνδε μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε· ἄλλο δὲ τόδε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ἡ δὲ παραβολὴ παρ' ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς. ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς πρὸς ἀριστερὸν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν μᾶλλον ἂν ἴσως ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι· ὁ μὲν ὠδί, ὁ δὲ ὠδί· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐνοήσαμεν, ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐδέν. τό τε πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον χρόνοι δύο· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἡμεῖς ὡσαύτως.

7. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ λέγοντες ψευδόμεθα, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴη, ἀλλὰ κενὸν ἡ σχέσις· εἰ δ' ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες "πρότερος ὅδε τοῦδε, ὁ δ' ὕστερος", χρόνους δύο παραβάλλοντες ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα αὐτῶν λέγοντες τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀριστεροῦ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῶν τὴν σχέσιν, καθὸ τὸ μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, τὸ δ' ὑπερβάλλεται, εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ λεγόντων ἡμῶν μηδὲ νοούντων ἔστιν οὕτως, ὥστε διπλάσιον εἶναι τόδε τοῦδε, καὶ ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἔχεται, καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἐπιστῆσαι, καὶ ἴσα πρὸ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιὰ εἶναι ἔστιν ἐν ταὐτότητι τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ὧν

possession, but when it refers to the possessed, would be a quale; and the same would be true of [changeable] disposition. What then would there be over and above these things which are related to each other except ourselves thinking their juxtaposition? Exceeding is a matter of one thing of one definite size and another of another definite size; and this one and that one are two different things; the comparison comes from us, but is not in them. But right in relation to left, and before and behind perhaps rather belong in the category of position: one is here and the other there; but we thought the right and left; there is nothing of it in the things themselves. And the before and after are two times; but it is we who think the before and after in the same way.

7. If then we are not saying anything, but our statements are deceptive, none of these would exist and "the state of being related" would be an empty phrase; but if we speak the truth when we say "this time is before this one, and this one after", comparing two times and saying that the "before" is something other than the underlying subjects, and it is the same with right and left, and if in the case of sizes [it is true to say] that their relationship is something over and above their quantitativeness, in that one exceeds and the other is exceeded; further, if, even when we do not speak or think, it is in fact so that this is the double of that, and one possesses and another is possessed, even before we notice it, and things are equal to one another prior to us, and, where being qualified is concerned, are in a relation of sameness to each other, and if in the case of all things which we say are related the state of being

λέγομεν πρός τι μετὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἔστι πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡ σχέσις, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὖσαν θεωροῦμεν καὶ ἡ γνῶσις πρὸς τὸ γινωσκόμενον—οὗ δὴ καὶ φανερώτερον τὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὸ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως—παυστέον μὲν τὸ ζητεῖν, εἰ ἔστι σχέσις, ἐπισημηναμένους δὲ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐπὶ μὲν ὧν, ἕως μένει τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὅπως εἶχε, κἂν χωρὶς γένηται, ὑπάρχει ἡ σχέσις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν, ὅταν συνέλθῃ, γίγνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καὶ μενόντων παύεται ἡ σχέσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἄλλη γίγνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ καὶ πλησίον, ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα ἡ ὑπόνοια τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπισημηναμένους χρὴ ζητεῖν τί ταὐτὸν ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ εἰ ὡς γένος, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμβεβηκός· εἶτα εὑρεθὲν τὸ ταὐτὸν ποίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. λεκτέον δὴ τὸ πρός τι οὐκ εἴ τι ἁπλῶς ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἕξις ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, οὐδ' ὅτι ψυχὴ τοῦδέ ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ' οἷς ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐδαμόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως παραγίγνεται· ὑπόστασις δὲ οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἀλλ' ἢ πρός τι λέγεται. οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ τὴν ὑπόστασιν δίδωσιν οὔτε τῷ διπήχει ἢ ὅλως δυσίν, οὔτε τῷ πηχυαίῳ ἢ ὅλως ἑνί, ἀλλὰ τούτων ὄντων κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τῷ δύο,[1] τὸ δὲ ἓν εἶναι, ἔσχε τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον λέγεσθαί τε

[1] πρὸς τῷ δύο Kirchhoff (πρὸς τῷ τὸ μὲν δύο F^{3mg}: *praeter id* Ficinus): πρὸς (παρὰ R^{2mg}) τὸ δύο Enn.

related to each other is subsequent to the subjects related, but we observe it as presently existent, and our knowledge is directed to the object being known—at this point the substantiality arising out of the state of relation is even more obvious—we should stop enquiring whether the state of relation exists; but we should also note that with some things in this state, as long as the subjects remain as they were, even if they become separated, the state of relation persists, but with others it comes into existence when they come together, and with others again, even when they remain as they are, the state of being related either comes to an end altogether or becomes different, as in the case of right and near, and it is from these particularly that our suspicion arises that in things of this kind relation is nothing. Having taken note of this, then, we must enquire what is the same in all, and if it is so as a genus, but not something incidental; then, when we have found what is the same, we must enquire what kind of existence it has. We must certainly speak of relation, not if something is simply said to belong to another, a state of soul or body for instance, nor because a soul belongs to this man or is in something different [from itself], but in things where the existence derives from nowhere else but the state of relation: existence here does not mean that of the [related] subjects, but that of the relation. For instance the relation double to half gives existence neither to the two-cubits-long nor in general to two things, nor to the one-cubit-long nor in general to one thing, but when these are in their state of being related, in addition to being two and one respectively, the first has the name and reality of double, and the one the

καὶ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἥμισυ ἔσχεν αὐτό. συνεγέννησεν οὖν ἄμφω ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄλλο εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ ἥμισυ, ἃ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐγεννήθη, καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τῷ μὲν διπλασίῳ παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχειν τὸ ἥμισυ, τῷ δὲ ἡμίσει παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα ὑφίσταται. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἅμα μένει; ἢ ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων πατρὸς ἀπελθόντος υἱός ἐστι, καὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἀδελφός· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ "ὅμοιος οὗτος τῷ τεθνηκότι" λέγομεν.

8. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρεξέβημεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ζητητέον τὸ διὰ τί ἐπὶ τούτων οὐχ ὁμοίως. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ παρ' ἀλλήλων τίνα ἔχει κοινὴν τὴν ὑπόστασιν εἰπάτωσαν. σῶμα μὲν οὖν τι τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. λείπεται δέ, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἀσώματον, καὶ ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις, συνώνυμος, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἄλλη ἄλλων, ὁμώνυμος· οὐ γὰρ δή, ὅτι σχέσις λέγεται, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν ἔχοι. ἆρ' οὖν τὰς σχέσεις ταύτῃ διαιρετέον, ᾗ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἀργὸν τὴν σχέσιν, οἷον κειμένην θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα πάντη ἡ ὑπόστασις, τὰ δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἔργου ἢ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν σχέσιν καὶ εἶχε

name and reality of half. They both together, therefore, generated from themselves something else, the existence of double and half, which came into existence in relation to each other, and their being is nothing else than being for each other; for the double it comes from exceeding the half and for the half from being exceeded; so that one of them is not prior and the other posterior, but they come into existence together. But do they remain in existence together? Now in the case of father and son and similar relations, when the father is gone the son is [still] son, and a brother [is a brother] when his brother is gone: for we say "he is like the dead man".

8. But we digressed here; and starting from this point we must investigate the question why there is dissimilarity in these relations. But let these philosophers[1] tell us what common substantiality this being from each other has. Well now, this common reality cannot be a body. So it remains that, supposing it exists, it is incorporeal, and is either in the things related or comes from outside. And if the state of being related is [always] the same, it is univocal, but if not, but different in different cases, it is equivocal: for it is certainly not just because it is called a state of being related that it would have the same essential character. Are then the states of being related to be distinguished in this way, in that some things have a relationship observable as inactive, just lying there, so to speak, and it only exists when they are entirely simultaneous, but others, along with their power and operation, are either always disposed to relationship and had their

[1] The Peripatetics.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὴν ἑτοιμότητα, ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπέστη, ἢ καὶ ὅλως τὰ μὲν πεποίηκε, τὰ δ' ὑπέστη, καὶ τὸ ὑποστὰν ὄνομα μόνον παρέσχε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱός· καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν δὲ καὶ παθητικὸν ἔχει τινὰ οἷον ζωὴν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. ἆρ' οὖν ταύτῃ διαιρετέον τὴν σχέσιν καὶ διαιρετέον οὐχ ὡς ταὐτόν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἐν διαφοραῖς, ἀλλ' ὅλως ὡς ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν σχέσιν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ λεκτέον ὁμώνυμον τὴν μὲν ποιοῦσαν ποίησιν καὶ πάθησιν, ὡς μίαν ἄμφω, τὴν δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσαν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν τὸ ποιοῦν ἄλλο; οἷον ἰσότητα τὴν τὰ ἴσα· ἰσότητι γὰρ ἴσα καὶ ὅλως ταὐτότητί τινι ταὐτά· τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ μὲν μεγέθους παρουσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ μικρότητος. ὅταν δὲ τὸ μὲν μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ μικρότερον, οἱ μὲν μεταλαβόντες ὁ μὲν μείζων ἐνεργείᾳ φανέντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μεγέθους, ὁ δὲ μικρὸς τῆς μικρότητος.

9. Χρὴ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρόσθεν εἰρημένων, οἷον ποιοῦντος, ἐπιστήμης, ἐνεργῇ τὴν σχέσιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λόγον τίθεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδους καὶ λόγου μετάληψιν εἶναι. καὶ γάρ,

preparedness for it beforehand, and it comes into existence in their coming together and actualisation, or, in a quite general way, one set of them have produced and the others come to exist, and what has come to exist only gives a name to the other, but the producer gives the existence? For the father and the son are like this; and the active and the passive have a kind of life and actualisation. Are we then to divide the state of being related in this way, and divide it not as something identical and common in its differentiations, but on the general assumption that the state of relationship is a different nature in each of the two classes, and we are to speak of it equivocally when we say that one kind produces action and affection as a united pair, but the other does not produce, but what produces the relationship in both the related things is something other than them? For instance, equality is the state of relationship which produces equals: for they are equal by equality, and in general same things are the same by some kind of sameness; as for large and small, one is large by the presence of largeness and the other small by the presence of smallness. But when it is a question of larger and smaller, one of the participants is larger by the actualisation of the largeness apparent in him, and the other smaller by the actualisation of the smallness.

9. We must therefore in the cases mentioned earlier, of the producer and of knowledge for instance, posit that the state of being related is active by reason of the activity of the actual agent and the rational forming principle operative in the activity, and in the other cases that it is a participation in form and rational forming principle. For certainly, if

εἰ μὲν σώματα ἔδει τὰ ὄντα εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἔδει λέγειν εἶναι ταύτας τὰς τοῦ πρός τι λεγομένας σχέσεις· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀσωμάτοις δίδομεν τὴν κυρίαν χώραν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις λόγους λέγοντες τὰς σχέσεις καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις αἰτίας—τοῦ γὰρ διπλάσιον εἶναι τὸ διπλάσιον αὐτὸ αἴτιον, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει, τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις εἶναι ἃ λέγεται· ἅμα οὖν τῷδε μὲν προσῆλθε τὸ διπλάσιον, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ, καὶ τῷδε μὲν τὸ μέγεθος, τῷδε δὲ ἡ μικρότης. ἢ ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ, καὶ ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης καὶ ὅλως ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον· διὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον. τί οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν αἰσχρός, ὁ δὲ αἰσχίων εἴδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετουσίᾳ; ἦ, εἰ μὲν παντάπασιν αἰσχροί, ἴσοι εἴδους ἀπουσίᾳ· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν τὸ μᾶλλον, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἧττον, μεταλήψει εἴδους οὐ κρατοῦντος ὁ ἧττον αἰσχρός, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ κρατοῦντος· ἢ τῇ στερήσει, εἴ τις βούλοιτο τὴν παραβολὴν ἔχειν, οἷον εἴδους αὐτοῖς ὄντος. αἴσθησις δὲ εἴδός τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ γνῶσις ὡσαύτως ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τι εἶδος· ἡ δὲ ἕξις πρὸς τὸ ἐχόμενον ἐνέργειά τις οἷον συνέχουσα, ὥσπερ ποίησίς τις· ἡ δὲ μέτρησις τοῦ

realities had to be bodies, it would be necessary to say that the states which are said to belong to a relation were nothing; but if we give the principal place to incorporeal things and rational principles, saying that the states of relationship are rational principles and participations in forms their causes .....[1] for [it is necessary to say] that the double itself is cause of being double, and for the other [related] thing the half [is cause of its being half]. And some are what they are called by the same form, but others by opposed forms: for the double comes to one thing and the half to another simultaneously, and largeness comes to one thing at the same time as smallness to the other. Or both are in each thing, both likeness and unlikeness and, in a general sense, sameness and otherness. What then is going on if one man is ugly, but another uglier by participation in the same form? Now, if they are altogether ugly, they are equal by the absence of form; but if there is a greater degree of ugliness in one, and a lesser degree in the other, the less ugly is so by participation in a form which is not in control and the more ugly by participation in it when it is still more not in control; or, if one would like to get one's comparison [in this way, one could do it] by privation, which would be like a kind of form for them. But sense-perception is a kind of form coming from both [the related things] and knowledge in the same way a kind of form from both; but the habitual state in relation to what is possessed by it is a kind of activity which in a way holds it together, like a kind of making; and measuring is an activity of the

[1] The apodosis of this sentence is missing.

μετροῦντος ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον λόγος τις. εἰ μὲν οὖν [ὡς εἶδος][1] γενικῶς τὴν τοῦ πρός τι σχέσιν ὡς εἶδός τις θήσεται, γένος ἓν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τις πανταχοῦ· εἰ δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἀντικείμενοι καὶ διαφορὰς ἔχοντες τὰς εἰρημένας, τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἓν γένος εἴη, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητά τινα πάντα ἀνάγεται καὶ κατηγορίαν μίαν. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εἰς ἓν δύναιτο ἀνάγεσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα, ἀλλ' εἰς γένος ἓν ἀδύνατον τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κατηγορίαν αὐτοῖς τεθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν εἰς ἓν ἀνάγουσι, καὶ τὰ παρονομαζόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ διπλάσιος. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὑφ' ἓν γένος αὐτό τι καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, καὶ πρός τι καὶ οὐ πρός τι; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζῷόν τις γένος θεὶς καὶ τὸ οὐ ζῷον ἐκεῖ τιθείη. καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ διπλάσιος ὥσπερ ἡ λευκότης καὶ ὁ λευκός, οὐχ ὅπερ ταὐτόν.

10. Τὴν δὲ ποιότητα, ἀφ' ἧς ὁ λεγόμενος ποιός, δεῖ λαμβάνειν πρῶτον τίς οὖσα τοὺς λεγομένους ποιοὺς παρέχεται, καὶ ⟨εἰ⟩[2] μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὰ εἴδη παρέχεται ἤ, εἰ πολλαχῶς αἱ

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] A^{3s} (*numquid* Ficinus), Perna.

measurer which is a rational principle in relation to the measured. If then one is going to consider the state belonging to relation generically as a form, it will be one genus and substantial reality, as there is a rational forming principle in all cases; but if the rational principles are both opposed and have the differences which have been stated, perhaps there would not be one genus, but all relatives are brought back to a certain likeness and a single category. But even if it was possible to bring back all the relatives we have mentioned into one, it would be impossible to bring into a single genus all the things which are grouped under the same category with them. For they bring back into one the denials of the relative terms and the things which derive their name from them, for instance the double and the double-sized man.[1] How then could one bring under one genus a thing itself and the denial of it, double and not double, and relative and not relative? It is just as if one made a genus "living being" and put the non-living being into it. And the double and the double-sized man are like whiteness and the white man, not at all identical.

10. And as for quality, from which what is called the qualified [or quale] derives, one must first grasp what is its real nature which enables it to produce what are called qualified beings, and whether, being one and the same according to what is common [to all kinds of quality], it produces its species by distinctive differences, or, if qualities are to be under-

[1] On ἀποφάσεις see Dexippus *In Categ.* 33. 8-13 (= Aristotle fr. 116 Rose^3, p. 106 Ross). παρονομαζόμενα are defined in Aristotle *Categories* 1. 1a12.

ποιότητες, οὐχ ἓν ἂν εἴη γένος. τί οὖν τὸ κοινὸν ἐπί τε ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ παθητικῆς ποιότητος καὶ σχήματος καὶ μορφῆς; καὶ λεπτόν, παχύ, ἰσχνόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν δύναμιν ἐροῦμεν, ᾗ ἐφαρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς διαθέσεσι καὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσιν, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ἔχον δύναται ἃ δύναται, οὐκέτι αἱ ἀδυναμίαι ἁρμόσουσιν. ἔπειτα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον πῶς δύναμις; εἶτα καὶ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν δύναμιν οὐδεμίαν ἕξει, ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτῷ προσέλθῃ τὸ ποιόν. αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι τῶν οὐσιῶν, ὅσαι μάλιστά εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὸ ποιοῦ καθ' αὑτὰς ἐνεργοῦσαι καὶ τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων ὅ εἰσιν. ἀλλ' ἆρα κατὰ τὰς ἐπ' αὐτὰς τὰς οὐσίας δυνάμεις; οἷον ἡ πυκτικὴ δύναμις οὐ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε οὐ ποιότης τὸ οὕτω λογικόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὃ ἐξ ἀρετῆς κτήσαιτο ἄν τις· ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ ποιότης δύναμις προστιθεῖσα ταῖς οὐσίαις μεθ' αὑτὰς τὸ ποιαῖς εἶναι. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ αἱ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς οὐσίας διιστᾶσαι ὁμωνύμως ποιότητες, ἐνέργειαι οὖσαι μᾶλλον καὶ λόγοι ἢ μέρη λόγων, τὸ τί οὐδὲν ἧττον δηλοῦσαι, κἂν δοκῶσι τὴν ποιὰν οὐσίαν λέγειν. αἱ δὲ ποιότητες αἱ κυρίως, καθ' ἃς ποιοί, ἃς δὴ λέγομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν εἶεν ἂν λόγοι τινὲς καὶ οἷον μορφαί, περί τε ψυχὴν κάλλη

[1] The passage of Aristotle under discussion in this chapter is *Categories* 8. 8b25 ff.

stood in many different senses, there would not be one genus of quality. What, then, is the common element in state and disposition and passive quality and figure and shape[1]? And what about rarefied and solid and lean? For if we are going to say that the common quality is power, which fits states and dispositions and natural powers, from which that which has it has the powers which it has, the incapacities will not fit in any more. Then, how are individual figure and shape power? And further, being *qua* being will have no power except when the quale comes to it. And the activities of substances, which are activities in the strictest sense, activate what belongs to the quale by themselves, and what they are belongs to their own powers. But does this mean that qualities are according to the powers intrinsic to the essences themselves? For instance, the power of boxing does not belong to man *qua* man, but rationality does; so that rationality in this sense is not a quality, but rather the rationality which one might acquire from virtue; so "rationality" is equivocal; so that quality would be a power which adds to substances, posterior to their being themselves, the being qualified. But the specific differences which distinguish substances in relation to each other are qualities in an equivocal sense, being rather activities and rational forming principles, or parts of forming principles, making clear what the thing is none the less even if they seem to declare that the substance is of a specific quality. And the qualities in the strict and proper sense, according to which beings are qualified, which we say are powers, would in fact in their general character be a sort of forming principles and, in a sense, shapes, beauties

καὶ αἴσχη καὶ περὶ σῶμα ὡσαύτως. ἀλλὰ πῶς δυνάμεις πᾶσαι; κάλλος μὲν γὰρ ἔστω καὶ ὑγίεια ἑκατέρα, αἶσχος δὲ καὶ νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ ἀδυναμία ὅλως; ἢ ὅτι καὶ κατὰ ταύτας ποιοὶ λέγονται; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει λεγομένους ποιοὺς ὁμωνύμως λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕνα λόγον, καὶ μὴ μόνον τετραχῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων τοὐλάχιστον διχῶς; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ κατὰ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν ἡ ποιότης, ὥστε ἄλλως μὲν τὸ δυνάμενον ποιεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ πάσχον; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν κατὰ[1] τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ποιὸν καὶ τὴν νόσον ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκέτι κοινὸν ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν ζητεῖν. οὐδ' αὖ λόγους πάσας· πῶς γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἢ ἐν ἕξει λόγος; ἀλλ' ἆρα τὰς μὲν ἐν εἴδεσι καὶ δυνάμεσι ποιότητας, ταύτας δὲ στερήσεις; ὥστε μὴ ἓν γένος, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἓν ὡς μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶδος καὶ δύναμιν, ἀνεπιστημοσύνην δὲ στέρησιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν. ἢ μορφή τις καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία· καὶ ἡ νόσος, καὶ δύναται δὲ καὶ ποιεῖ πολλά, ἀλλὰ φαύλως, καὶ ἡ νόσος καὶ ἡ κακία. ἢ ἔκπτωσις τοῦ σκοποῦ οὖσα πῶς δύναμις; ἢ τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη πράττει οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὀρθὸν βλέπουσα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησέ τι, ὃ μὴ δύναται. καὶ τἀκαλλὲς[2] δὲ δύναμιν ἔχει τινός. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲ πρὸς δύναμιν δεῖ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ὃ

[1] Igal, H–S²: καὶ Enn.
[2] Igal, H–S²: τὸ κάλλος Enn.

and uglinesses in the soul and in the body in the same way. But how can they all be powers? Let us grant that beauty and health are, of both kinds, but how can ugliness and illness and feebleness and in general incapacity be powers? Is it because beings are said to be qualified according to them? But what prevents the term "qualified" from being used equivocally and not according to one definition, and not only in four different senses, but in at least two in the case of each of the four? Now, first of all, is not quality [divided] according to active and passive, so that what is able to act is quality in one sense, and what is passive in another? And further, health determined by disposition and state is a quale, and illness in the same way, and strength and feebleness. But if this is so, power is no longer common [to all quality], but we must look for something else as the common element. Nor, again, are all qualities rational forming principles: for how can illness, a permanent state of illness, be a forming principle? But, then, are those which consist in forms and powers qualities, but these other ones privations? So there is not one genus, but they are brought into one as one category, as for instance knowledge is a form and power, but ignorance is a privation and incapacity. Now incapacity is a sort of shape, and so is illness, and both illness and vice are capable of and do many things, but badly. But when a quality is a missing of the mark, how is it a power? It does its own business, not having the correct end in view: for it would not have done anything which it could not do. And the unbeautiful has some sort of capacity. Well, then, does the triangle? Now in general we ought not even to look in the direction of power, but

διάκειται· ὥστε κατὰ τὰς οἷον μορφὰς καὶ χαρακτῆρας, καὶ κοινὸν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν πῶς αἱ δυνάμεις; ἢ καὶ ὁ φύσει πυκτικὸς τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἔχει τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ ἀδύνατος πρός τι. καὶ ὅλως χαρακτήρ τις ἡ ποιότης οὐκ οὐσιώδης, ὃ δ' ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ δοκῇ καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ εἰς μὴ οὐσίαν, οἷον θερμότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ ὅλως χρόα· τὸ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλο, οἷον ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅμοιον. ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν καὶ χαρακτῆρα καὶ λόγον, πῶς τὰ κατὰ ἀδυναμίαν καὶ αἴσχη; ἢ λόγους ἀτελεῖς λεκτέον, οἷον ἐν τῷ αἰσχρῷ. καὶ ἐν τῇ νόσῳ πῶς ὁ λόγος; ἢ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λόγον κινούμενον τὸν τῆς ὑγιείας. ἢ οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ πάντα, ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κοινὸν παρὰ τό πως διακεῖσθαι εἶναι

[1] Plotinus seems to be here concerned to exclude any recourse to the "negative Forms" which undoubtedly appear in Plato, but have generally been an embarrassment to Platonists: he explicitly denies their existence in V. 9,10. On negative Forms in Plato see W. D. Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 167–9. Plotinus' "theory of ideas" is of exactly the kind which Ross suggests on p. 169: "It *might* be possible for a theory of Ideas to dispense with an Idea of evil and with Ideas of its species, and to explain all evil in

rather to what [a quality] is disposed; so that quality is a matter of what one might call shapes and characteristics, and shape is the common element, and the form on the substance which is posterior to the substance. But again, how are there the powers? The natural boxer has this ability of his by being disposed in a certain way, and so does the man who is incapable of something. And in general quality is a kind of non-substantial characteristic; it is something which seems to be the same and to contribute both to substance and to non-substance, heat, for instance, and whiteness and in general colour: that which belongs to substance is one thing, a kind of activity of the substance, but that which does not has a secondary status and derives from that other and is one thing in another, an image of it and like it. But if quality corresponds to shaping and characteristic and rational forming principle, what about the cases of incapacity and ugliness? They must be said to be incomplete forming principles, as in the ugly. And how is the forming principle in illness? Here too we must speak about a disturbed forming principle, that of health.[1] Or perhaps all are not contained in rational forming principle, but the sufficient common element [of quality] is, besides being disposed in a particular way, being outside substance, and the

the sensible world as due to the fact that the relation of the phenomenal to the ideal is never one of perfect instantiation but always one of imitation which falls short of its pattern." Plotinus' close friend and colleague Amelius, however, took a different view, perhaps closer to Plato's own. He postulated Forms of Evils (Asclepius *In Nic. Arithm.* 44. 3–5 p. 32 Tarán; cp. Proclus *Platonic Theology* I. 21 p. 98 Saffrey-Westerink).

ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότης τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον ποιότης τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ καθόσον ἐμόρφωσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐμόρφωσεν; ἢ οὐσίωσεν.

11. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως, διὰ τί πλείω εἴδη ποιότητος, καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ διαφορὰ ποιότητος τὸ μόνιμον καὶ τὸ μή, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ ἡ διάθεσις ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸ παρασχέσθαι ποιόν· προσθήκη δ' ἔξωθεν τὸ μένειν· εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὰς μὲν διαθέσεις μόνον ἀτελεῖς οἷον μορφάς, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις τελείας. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀτελεῖς, οὔπω ποιότητες· εἰ δ' ἤδη ποιότητες, προσθήκη τὸ μόνιμον. αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ δυνάμεις πῶς ἕτερον εἶδος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότητες, οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει πάσαις τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ τῷ διακεῖσθαι τὸν φύσει πυκτικὸν ποιὸν λέγομεν, οὐδὲν ἡ δύναμις προστεθεῖσα ποιεῖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι δύναμις. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν τοῦ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην διοίσει; ἢ εἰ ποιοί, οὐδὲ διαφοραὶ ποιότητος αὗται, εἰ ὁ μὲν μελετήσας ἔχοι, ὁ δὲ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἡ διαφορά· κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς πυκτικῆς πῶς; καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν ἐκ πάθους, αἱ δὲ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ὁπόθεν ἡ ποιότης· λέγω δὲ

quality of the substrate is what comes upon it posterior to the substance. But the triangle is a quality of that in which it is, not simply and solely a triangle, but the triangle which is in this thing and in so far as it has shaped this thing. But did manhood also shape? Rather, it gave substance.

11. But if all this is so, why are there several species of quality, and why is there a difference between state and disposition? For there is no specific difference of quality involved in persistence and non-persistence, but any kind of disposition is sufficient to make something a quale; and persisting is an external addition; unless someone says that dispositions are only incomplete sort of shapes, but states are complete ones. But if they are incomplete, they are not yet qualities; but if they are already qualities, persistence is an addition. But how are natural powers another species [of quality]? For if they are qualities because of the powers, the power-characteristic does not fit all of them, as has been said; but if we say that the natural boxer is qualified by being so disposed, then the addition of "power" does nothing, since there is power in states also. Then why will [the boxer] by natural power differ from the [boxer] by knowledge? If they are both [pugilistically] qualified, these differences are not specific differences of quality, if one is a boxer by practice and one by nature, but the difference is external. But how [are they to be differentiated] in relation to the very form of boxing? And [the difference is external again] if some qualities derive from being affected, but others not: for the source of the quality does not make a specific difference; but what I am talking about is differentiation by vari-

ποιότητος παραλλαγαῖς καὶ διαφοραῖς. ἔχοι δ' ἂν ζήτησιν καί, εἰ ἐκ πάθους αἵδε, αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς ἐν εἴδει τῷ αὐτῷ· καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν τῷ γεγονέναι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, ὁμωνύμως ἂν εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον μορφή; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθὸ εἶδός ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οὐ ποιόν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ καλὸν μετὰ τὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἶδος ἢ αἰσχρόν, λόγον ἂν ἔχοι. τὸ δὲ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ποιά; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ⟨τῷ⟩[1] ἐγγὺς τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τραχύτης, καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ ἐξ ἀνωμαλίας θέσεως καὶ ὁμαλότητος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ὡς ποιὰ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ γνωσθὲν δηλώσει, ὅπου δεῖ αὐτὰ θεῖναι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁμωνυμία περὶ τὸ κοῦφον, εἰ μὴ τῷ σταθμῷ λέγοιτο τοῦ πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἰσχνὸν καὶ λεπτόν, ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἴδει παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα.

12. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ οὕτω τις ἀξιώσειε τὸ ποιὸν διαιρεῖν, τίνι ἂν διέλοι; ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν, εἰ δεῖ τὰς μὲν σώματος

[1] F[3s] (=Ficinus), Sleeman, Bréhier, Theiler: τὸ Enn.

[1] A critical reference to the discussion of "passive" qualities in Aristotle *Categories* 8. 9a35–b11.

ations and specific differences of quality. But there would also be room for enquiry how qualities are members of the same species if these particular ones derive from being affected, some in this way, but others not even belonging to the same things; and if some [derive from being affected] by coming into being, but others by producing [the affection], they would be called qualities equivocally.[1] And what about the shape of each individual thing? For if this is meant in the sense in which each thing is form, the thing is not [in this sense] a quale; but if it is meant in the sense in which a thing is beautiful or ugly in a way posterior to the form of its substrate, there would be some sense in it. And would not the rough and the smooth and the rare and the dense be correctly called qualia? For it is certainly not by the distances [of the parts] from each other or their nearness that something is subtle or dense or there is roughness, and it is not everywhere the result of the irregularity or regularity of the position [of the parts]; and even if these were their origins, nothing prevents them even so from being qualia. And knowledge of light and heavy will reveal where one ought to put them. But there might be an ambiguity about "light" if it is not used in the sense of more and less weight, since it has in it the idea of "lean" and "fine", which is in another species besides the four.[2]

12. But if one does not think it proper to divide the quale in this way, in what way could one divide it? We should consider, then, if we ought to say that some qualities belong to the body and some to the

[2] There seems to be a reference here to Andronicus, who according to Simplicius *In Categ.* 8, 263. 19–22 made a special genus for λέπτον, παχύ etc.

λέγοντα, τὰς δὲ ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ σώματος μερίζειν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰς μὲν ὄψει νέμοντα,[1] τὰς δ' ἀκοῇ ἢ γεύσει, ἄλλας ὀσφρήσει ἢ ἁφῇ. τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς; ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, θυμοειδοῦς, λογιστικοῦ. ἢ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, αἳ γίνονται κατ' αὐτάς, ὅτι γεννητικαὶ αὗται τούτων. ἢ τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ· καὶ πάλιν διαιρετέον τὰς ὠφελείας καὶ τὰς βλάβας. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορα ἢ τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ· οἰκεῖαι γὰρ διαφοραὶ ποιότητος. ἢ γὰρ δοκεῖ ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ τὸ βλάβος ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος καὶ ποιοῦ ἢ ζητητέον τρόπον ἄλλον. ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς καὶ ὁ ποιὸς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἓν γένος ἀμφοῖν. καὶ εἰ ὁ πυκτικὸς ἐν ποιότητι, πῶς οὐ καὶ ὁ ποιητικός; καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν· ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖ εἰς τὸ πρός τι τὸ ποιητικὸν οὐδ' αὖ τὸ παθητικόν, εἰ ὁ παθητικὸς ποιός. καὶ ἴσως βέλτιον ἐνταῦθα ὁ ποιητικός, εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν λέγεται, ἡ δὲ δύναμις ποιότης. εἰ δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἡ δύναμις ἤ τις δύναμις, οὐδ' οὕτω πρός τι οὐδὲ ποιὸν ἔτι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς τὸ μεῖζον τὸ ποιητικόν· τὸ γὰρ μεῖζον τὴν ὑπόστασιν, καθὸ μεῖζον, πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ δὲ ποιητικὸν τῷ τοιόνδε εἶναι ἤδη. ἀλλ' ἴσως κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε ποιόν, ᾗ δὲ δύναται εἰς ἄλλο ποιητικὸν

[1] Igal, H–S²: λέγοντα Enn.: δίδοντα Theiler, H–S¹.

soul, and classify the bodily ones according to the senses, allotting some to sight and some to hearing or taste, and others to smell or touch. But how are we to classify those of the soul? As belonging to the appetitive, emotional or rational part. Or by the differences of the activities which occur in accordance with them, because these qualities are such as to produce these activities. Or by helpfulness and harmfulness; and again one must divide the helps and the harms. But the same grounds of differentiation apply to bodily qualities, by doing different things or by helpfulness and harmfulness: for these are proper differences of quality. For one either thinks that help and harm come from quality and the quale or one must adopt a different method of investigation. But we must consider also how the qualified by the quality is in the same category [as the quality]: for there is certainly not one genus for both. And if the boxer is in the category of quality, why not also the doer and maker? And if this is so, then also the ability to do and make; so that there is no need to refer doing to the relative, nor again the ability to be affected [by the doing] if the one who is affected is qualified [by the doing]. And perhaps the doer and maker is better placed here, if he is called so in regard of power, and power is quality. But if power, or any power, appertains to substance, it is not in this way either a relative, and not, furthermore, a quale. For ability to do is not like more: for the more has its reality, in so far as it is more, in relation to the less, but ability to do by being such as it is already. But perhaps it is a quale by being such as it is, but in so far as it has power directed to something else it is called ability to do as a relative.

λεγόμενον πρός τι. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ πυκτικὸς πρός τι, καὶ ἡ πυκτικὴ αὐτή; πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ ὅλως ἡ πυκτική· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς θεώρημα, ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ τεχνῶν ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἐπισκεπτέον καὶ λεκτέον ἴσως· ἢ μὲν διατιθεῖσι τὴν ψυχήν, ποιότητες, ἢ δὲ ποιοῦσι, ποιητικαὶ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρός τι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον πρός τι, καθὸ ἕξεις λέγονται. ἆρ' οὖν ἄλλη τις ὑπόστασις κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ "ποιητικὸν" οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ὄντος ἢ καθόσον ποιόν; τάχα μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν προαίρεσιν ἐχόντων τῷ νενευκέναι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν[1] ὑπόστασιν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων δυνάμεων, ἃς ποιότητας εἴπομεν, τί τὸ ποιητικόν; ἢ ὅταν συντύχῃ αὐτῷ ἄλλο, ἀπέλαυσε καὶ μετέλαβε[2] παρ' ἐκείνου οὗ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς ἄλλο καὶ πάσχει, πῶς ἔτι τὸ ποιητικόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τρίπηχυ ὂν καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ἐν τῇ συντυχίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μεταλήψει μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο μεταλήψει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ εἰ αἱ τῇδε

[1] Kirchhoff (*ad faciendum* Ficinus): ποιὸν Enn.
[2] UF^{3mg} (= Ficinus), Creuzer: μετέβαλε wBxC, H–S.

[1] This is common Platonic doctrine: cp. *Phaedo* 100E5–6. But Plotinus is anxious, as appears in what follows, that it should not be interpreted in a way which asserts that there

Why then is not the boxer relative, and boxing itself? For boxing is altogether directed to somebody else: for certainly there is no part of the art which is not other-directed. And perhaps we should consider and speak of the other arts, or most of them, like this: in so far as they dispose the soul, they are qualities, but in so far as they do or make they belong to the category of doing and making, and in this way are other-directed and relative; since they are also relative in another way, in that they are called states. Is there then another reality of the doer and maker, according to its ability to do and make, when it is not another thing than it is in so far as it is a quale? Perhaps in the case of living things, and still more those which have the power of choice, one might say that there is a reality in them also according to their capacity to do and make, because of their inclination to act so; but in the case of lifeless powers, which we call qualities, why bring in doing and making? Now, whenever a thing encounters another, it gets something from it and takes a share from that other of what it has. But if the same thing both acts on and is affected by something else, how is doing and making still there? Since the more also is three cubits long in itself and is more or less on the occasions when it meets something else. But someone will say that the greater and the less are so by participation in largeness and smallness[1]; so this [acting on and being affected] will also be by participation in activity and passivity. But one must

are Forms of qualities, and contradicts his own doctrine that there are no qualities in the intelligible world, but what we call qualities here below are activities of substances there. See II. 6 and VI. 2. 14.

ποιότητες καὶ αἱ ἐκεῖ ὑφ' ἕν· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τιθεμένους κἀκεῖ· ἢ κἂν μὴ εἴδη τις διδῷ, ἀλλὰ νοῦν λέγων εἰ ἕξιν λέγοι, ἢ κοινόν τι ἐπ' ἐκείνης καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως· καὶ σοφία δὲ συγχωρεῖται. ἢ εἰ ὁμώνυμος πρὸς τὴν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἠρίθμηται δηλονότι ἐν τούτοις· εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἔσται τὸ ποιὸν κοινὸν ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ, εἰ μή τις τἀκεῖ λέγοι πάντα οὐσίας· καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τοίνυν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, [ἢ][1] εἰ τὸ διττὸν ὧδε κἀκεῖ, ἢ ὑφ' ἓν ἄμφω.

13. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτὲ ὧδε ἐπισκεπτέον· εἰ τὸ χθὲς καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη χρόνου, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται καὶ ταῦτα, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται, εἴδη ὄντα χρόνου, δίκαιον δήπου ἐν ᾧ ὁ χρόνος τετάχθαι. λέγεται δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ χρόνος· ὥστε τί δεῖ κατηγορίας ἄλλης; εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν ὡς οὐ μόνον χρόνος τὸ ἦν καὶ ἔσται,

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

[1] A Peripatetic would deny the Forms, but admit a transcendent incorporeal Νοῦς and σοφία (which Plotinus, as usual, interprets in his own way).

[2] In ch. 5 Plotinus makes it clear that time is not quantity, though definite lengths of time are quanta; cp. also VI. 3. 11. His doctrine of time in this treatise is by no means as developed and carefully thought out as it is in the

enquire here also if the qualities here and those in the intelligible world come under one genus: this is directed to those who posit qualities in the intelligible world as well; or even if someone does not grant that there are Forms, all the same when he speaks of intelligence,[1] if he is speaking of a state, he certainly [implies that there is] something common to the state in the intelligible world and this one here; and it is agreed that there is wisdom. Now if the term "wisdom" is used of it equivocally in relation to the wisdom here below, it is clearly not counted among the things of this world; but if it is used univocally then the quale will be common to both worlds, unless someone says that all the things in the intelligible world belong to the category of substance; in which case being intelligent will be substance there too. But this is a general question about the other categories as well, whether there are two genera here and there, or whether both fall under one.

13. About the "when" we must enquire in this way: if the "yesterday" and "to-morrow" and "last year" and such are parts of time, why are not these also in the same genus in which time is too? Since it is surely right that the "was" and the "is" and the "will be", being parts of time, should be classed in the same genus in which time is. But time is said to belong to the quantum[2]: so what need is there of another category? But if they were to say that it is not only time that the "was" and the "will be"

treatise which follows *On The Kinds of Being* in Porphyry's chronological order, III. 7 (45) *On Eternity and Time*, perhaps written because Plotinus did not feel that he had dealt with time adequately in *On The Kinds of Being*.

καὶ τὸ χθὲς καὶ πέρυσι, τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ ἦν—ὑποβεβλῆσθαι γὰρ δεῖ ταῦτα τῷ ἦν—ἀλλ' οὖν[1] οὐ μόνον χρόνος, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ χρόνος, πρῶτον μὲν ἔσται, εἰ τὸ "ποτὲ χρόνος", χρόνος· ἔπειτα, εἰ χρόνος παρεληλυθὼς τὸ χθές, σύνθετόν τι ἔσται, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ ἕτερον ὁ χρόνος· δύο οὖν κατηγορίαι καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ φήσουσι τὸ ποτὲ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ χρόνον, τοῦτο τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσιν, οἷον Σωκράτης ὅτι πέρυσιν ἦν, ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης ἔξωθεν ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ ἕν τι λέγουσιν. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐν μέρει τοῦ χρόνου; εἰ δ' ὅτι μέρος χρόνου λέγουσι, καὶ καθότι μέρος ἀξιοῦσι μὴ χρόνον ἁπλῶς τι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μέρος χρόνου παρεληλυθός, πλείω ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ᾗ μέρος πρός τι ὂν προσλαμβάνουσι. καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐγκείμενον τί αὐτοῖς ἔσται ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἦν, ὃ ἦν εἶδος χρόνου; ἀλλ' εἰ τῷ ἀόριστον μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἦν, τὸ δὲ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσιν ὡρίσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἦν ποῦ τάξομεν; ἔπειτα τὸ χθὲς ἔσται "ἦν ὡρισμένον", ὥστε ἔσται ὡρισμένος χρόνος τὸ χθές· τοῦτο δὲ ποσός τις χρόνος· ὥστε, εἰ χρόνος ποσόν, ποσὸν ὡρισμένον ἕκαστον τούτων ἔσται. εἰ δέ, ὅταν λέγωσι χθές, τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ παρεληλυθότι ὡρισμένῳ γέγονε τόδε, ἔτι πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον λέγουσιν· ἔπειτα, εἰ δεῖ ἐπεισάγειν ἄλλας κατηγορίας τῷ ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἄλλας πολλὰς

[1] R^{2mg} (*inquam* Ficinus): om. Enn.

are, and the "yesterday" and "last year"—for these must be classed under the "was"—but (as was just said) not only time but some time, then, first of all, if it is "some time" it will be time: then, if the "yesterday" is time past, it will be something composite, if past is one thing and time is another: two categories, then, and not something single and simple. But if they are going to assert that what is when is that which is in time, but not time, if they mean by this "in time" the state of affairs, for example that Socrates was last year, the "Socrates" would be brought in from outside, and they are not talking about one thing. But what would Socrates or the affair in this particular time be except in a part of time? But if because they say "a part of time", and in that it is a part claim that they are not saying that something is simply time, but a past part of time, they are making still more, and are adding on the part *qua* part, which is a relative. And will the past be for them either something included in or the same as the "was", which was a part of time? But if [they make their distinction] because the "was" is indefinite, but the "yesterday" and the "last year" are defined, first of all, where are we going to class the "was"? Since the "yesterday" will be a "definite was", so that the "yesterday" will be a definite time; but this is a time of a certain quantity: so that, if time is a quantum, each of these will be a definite quantum. But if, whenever they say "yesterday", we take this to mean that this particular thing happened in a past definite time, they are mentioning still more and more things; then, if one must introduce other categories by putting one thing in another, as in this case what is in time, we shall discover many others

ἀνευρήσομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. λεχθήσεται δὲ σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποῦ.

14. Τὸ δὲ ποῦ, ἐν Λυκίῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαδημία καὶ τὸ Λύκιον πάντως τόποι καὶ μέρη τόπου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ ὧδὶ εἴδη ἢ μέρη· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἀφωρισμένως μᾶλλον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ μέσον τόποι, οἷον Δελφοὶ τὸ μέσον, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ μέσον, οἷον Ἀθῆναι καὶ Λύκιον δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τί δεῖ παρὰ τὸν τόπον ζητεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντας τόπον ἐφ' ἑκάστου τούτων σημαίνειν; εἰ δὲ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγομεν, οὐχ ἓν λέγομεν οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν λέγομεν. ἔπειτα, εἰ τοῦτον ἐνταῦθα λέγομεν, σχέσιν τινὰ γεννῶμεν τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε καὶ τοῦ δεξαμένου πρὸς ὃ ἐδέξατο· διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πρός τι, εἰ ἐκ τῆς ἑκατέρου πρὸς ἑκάτερον σχέσεως ἀπεγεννήθη τι; εἶτα ⟨τί⟩[1] διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε τοῦ Ἀθήνησιν; ἀλλὰ τὸ ὧδε τὸ δεικτικὸν τόπον φήσουσι σημαίνειν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ Ἀθήνησιν· ὥστε τοῦ τόπου τὸ Ἀθήνησιν. εἶτα, εἰ τὸ Ἀθήνησι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ "ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστί", πρὸς τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τὸ ἔστι προσκατηγορεῖται· δεῖ δὲ οὔ· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ "ποιότης ἐστίν", ἀλλὰ τὸ "ποιότης" μόνον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ τὸ

[1] Creuzer.

from putting one thing in another. But this will be explained more clearly in the next discussion about the "where".

14. The "where", in the Lyceum and in the Academy. Now Academy and Lyceum are in every sense places, and parts of place, just as the "above" and the "here" are species or parts of place; the difference is only that Academy and Lyceum are more closely demarcated. If then the "above" and the "below" and the "middle" are places, Delphi, for instance, the middle,[1] and also the "to one side of middle", Athens and the Lyceum and the rest, for instance, why do we have to look for anything besides place, especially when we say that when we mention each and every one of them we are indicating a place? But if we are talking about one thing in another we are not talking about one thing and are not talking about anything simple either. Then further, when we say that this man is here, we are generating a relational state, of this man in this place and of the receptacle to what it receives: why then is there not a relation, if something was produced from the relatedness of one thing to the other? Then why is "here" different from "at Athens"? But they will assert that "here" signifies that which declares place; therefore so does "at Athens": so that "at Athens" belongs to place. Then, if this "in Athens" means "is in Athens", the "is" category is added to that of place; but it ought not to be added: just as one does not say "quality is", but only "quality". And, over and above all this, if what is in

[1] The ὀμφαλός, the navel-stone at Delphi, was in Greek tradition the central point of the earth.

ἐν χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ἄλλο παρὰ χρόνον καὶ τόπον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιήσει, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν μέρεσι, καὶ γένος ἐν εἴδεσι καὶ εἶδος ἐν γένει; καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν πλείους αἱ κατηγορίαι ἔσονται.

15. Ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν λεγομένῳ τάδ' ἂν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο. λέγεται γάρ· ὡς, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἦν ποσότης καὶ ἀριθμός, τὸ ποσὸν γένος ἕτερον ἦν, καὶ ποιότητος οὔσης περὶ αὐτὴν ἄλλο γένος τὸ ποιόν, οὕτω καὶ ποιήσεως οὔσης ἄλλο γένος τὸ ποιεῖν. ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ ἡ ποίησις, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότης, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ποίησις, ποιεῖν, ποιῶν, ἢ ποιεῖν καὶ ποίησις εἰς ἓν ληπτέα; ἐμφαίνει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἡ δὲ ποίησις οὔ· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν ποιήσει εἶναί τινι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. ὥστε ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν κατηγορίαν, ἢ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν[1] λέγεται θεωρεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐκεῖ ποιότης. καὶ ⟨εἰ⟩[2] αὐτὴ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὥσπερ

[1] *περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν* del. Theiler, H–S[1].
[2] Igal, H–S[2].

time is something else besides time and what is in place is something else besides place, why will not what is in a pot make another category, and why is not what is in matter something else, and what is in a substrate something else, and the part in the whole and the whole in the parts, and the genus in the species and the species in the genus? And so we shall have more categories.

15. But in what is called "acting" [or doing and making][1] these are the points which one would enquire into. For it is said that, since after substance there were the accompaniments of substance, quantity and number, the quantum was another genus, and because quality accompanies substance the quale was another genus; so, since there is activity, acting is another genus. Is the genus then the acting or the activity from which the acting comes, just like the quality from which the quale comes? Or in this case are activity, acting and the agent, or acting and activity, to be included in one genus? But acting indicates more clearly that there is also the agent, but activity does not; and acting is in some kind of activity, that is, of active actuality. So would active actuality rather be the category, which is said to be observed as an accompaniment of substance, like quality in the other case? And [is there a question] whether active actuality is an accompaniment of substance just like movement? And the movement of

[1] *ποιεῖν* and *ἐνέργεια* present considerable difficulties to the translator. "Doing and making" and "active actuality" go some way towards bringing out the full range of meaning of the two words, but are too cumbersome to use continually and not always necessary. Various more or less unsatisfactory compromises will be detected in what follows.

κίνησις, καὶ ἓν γένος ἡ κίνησις τῶν ὄντων. διὰ τί γὰρ ποιότης μὲν ἕν τι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ποσότης ἕν τι, καὶ πρός τι διὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο, κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔσης οὐκ ἔσται τι καὶ κίνησις ἓν γένος;

16. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν ἀτελῆ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐκώλυε τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν προτάττειν, εἶδος δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὡς ἀτελῆ οὖσαν ὑποβάλλειν, κατηγοροῦντά γε αὐτῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, προστιθέντα δὲ τὸ ἀτελές. τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς λέγεται περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίκηται εἰς ἐνέργειαν—ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη—ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐργάσηταί τι, ὃ ἕτερόν ἐστι μετ' αὐτήν. καὶ οὐκ αὐτὴ τελειοῦται τότε, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐστοχάζετο· οἷον βάδισις ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάδισις ἦν. εἰ δ' ἔδει στάδιον διανύσαι, οὔπω δὲ ἦν διανύσας, τὸ ἐλλεῖπον οὐ τῆς βαδίσεως οὐδὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἦν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ποσῆς βαδίσεως· βάδισις δὲ ἦν καὶ ὁποσηοῦν καὶ κίνησις ἤδη· ὁ γοῦν κινούμενος καὶ ἤδη κεκίνηται, καὶ ὁ τέμνων ἤδη ἔτεμε. καὶ ὡς ἡ λεγομένη ἐνέργεια οὐ δεῖται χρόνου, οὕτως οὐδ' ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' ἡ εἰς τοσοῦτον κίνησις· καὶ εἰ ἐν ἀχρόνῳ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ ὅλως κίνησις. εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ

[1] The reference here is to the "Platonic Category" of the intelligible world κίνησις (Plato *Sophist* 254D); see VI. 2. 7–8.

real beings is one genus.[1] For why is quality one single accompaniment of substance, and quality one, and the relative one because of the state of relatedness of one thing to another, but, when movement is an accompaniment of substance, will movement also not be a single genus?

16. But if someone were to say that movement was an incomplete active actuality,[2] nothing would prevent us from giving active actuality the priority and subordinating movement to it as a species as being incomplete, making its category active actuality, but adding the "incomplete". For the "incomplete" is said about it, not because it is not also active actuality, but it is altogether active actuality, but has also the "over and over again", not that it may arrive at active actuality—it is that already, but that it may do something, which is another thing subsequent to itself. And then [when it does do it] it is not itself brought to completion, but the business which was its object: walking, for instance, was walking from the beginning. But if one had to complete a lap, and had not yet arrived at the point of having completed it, what was lacking would not belong to walking or movement, but to walking a certain distance; but it was already walking, however short the walk was, and movement: for certainly the man who is in motion has already moved, and the man who is cutting, cut already. And just as what is called active actuality does not need time, so neither does movement, but [only] movement to a certain extent; and if active actuality is in timelessness, so is movement in that it is in a general way

[2] This is Aristotle's doctrine. See *Physics* Γ 2. 201b31–32; *Metaphysics* K 9. 1066a20–21.

συνεχὲς προσλαβοῦσα πάντως ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ ἡ ὅρασις μὴ διαλείπουσα τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλογία[1] ἡ λέγουσα ἀεὶ οἷόν τε εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἡστινοσοῦν κινήσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι μήτε τοῦ χρόνου ἀρχὴν ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο μήτε αὐτῆς ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτὴν διαιρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω· ὥστε ἐξ ἀπείρου συμβαίνοι ἂν τοῦ χρόνου κεκινῆσθαι τὴν ἄρτι ἀρξαμένην καὶ αὐτὴν ἄπειρον εἰς τὸ ἀρξάμενον εἶναι. τοῦτο γὰρ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ χωρίζειν ἐνέργειαν κινήσεως καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν ἀχρόνῳ φάσκειν γενέσθαι, τὴν δὲ χρόνου δεῖσθαι λέγειν μὴ τὴν τόσην μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅλως τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποσὴν λέγειν καίτοι ὁμολογοῦντας καὶ αὐτοὺς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῇ παρεῖναι, εἰ ἡμερησία εἴη ἢ ὁποσουοῦν χρόνου. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐνέργεια ἐν ἀχρόνῳ, οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κίνησιν ἦρχθαι ἐν ἀχρόνῳ, ὁ δὲ χρόνος τῷ τοσήνδε γεγονέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ μεταβολαὶ ἐν ἀχρόνῳ ὁμολογοῦνται γίγνεσθαι ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ οὐ καὶ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης μεταβολῆς. εἰ οὖν μεταβολή, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ κίνησις; εἴληπται δὲ μεταβολὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεταβεβληκέναι· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταβεβληκέναι ἐδεῖτο.

17. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μήτε τὴν ἐνέργειαν μήτε τὴν κίνησιν γένους δεῖσθαι καθ' αὑτά, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ πρός τι

[1] Theiler, Harder, Cilento: *ἀναλογία* Enn.

movement. But if it must be in every way in time because it has acquired the character of continuity, then sight which does not interrupt its seeing would be in continuity and in time. There is evidence for this in the stupid statement which says that it is always possible to take a piece of any movement whatever, and there is not a beginning of the time in which and from which it began, nor a beginning of the movement itself, but it is always possible to divide it up and back: so that it would result that the movement which has just begun has been in motion from infinite time, and that movement is infinite in respect of its beginning. This results because of separating of active actuality from movement and asserting that active actuality occurs in timelessness, but saying that movement needs time, not movement of a certain length only; but they are compelled to say that its nature is quantitative; and yet even they admit that the quantum is incidentally present to it, if it is a day long or of any time you like. Therefore, just as active actuality is in timelessness, so nothing prevents movement from originating in timelessness, but time has come by its becoming of a certain length. Since changes also are admitted to take place in timelessness, in the remark "as if there was not a change which takes place all at once".[1] If then change, why not also motion? But change has here been taken, not in the sense of completed change: for there was no need of change in completion of the process of change.

17. But if someone were to say that neither active actuality nor movement need a genus in and by

[1] Aristotle *Physics* A 3. 186a15–16.

ἀνάγειν τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι ἐνεργητικοῦ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει κινητικοῦ ἢ κινητοῦ, λεκτέον ὡς τὰ μὲν πρός τι αὐτὴ ἡ σχέσις ἐγέννα, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον μόνον λέγεσθαι. ὅταν δὲ ᾖ τις ὑπόστασις, κἂν ἑτέρου ᾖ κἂν πρὸς ἕτερον, τήν γε πρὸ τοῦ πρός τι εἴληχε φύσιν. αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις δὲ ἑτέρου οὖσα οὐκ ἀφῄρηται τὸ πρὸ τοῦ πρός τι εἶναί τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι καθ' αὑτά· ἢ οὕτω πάντα ἔσται πρός τι· πάντως γὰρ ἔχει ὁτιοῦν σχέσιν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. αὐτή τε ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν διὰ τί εἰς τὸ πρός τι οὐκ ἀναχθήσεται; ἢ γὰρ κίνησις ἢ ἐνέργεια πάντως ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν ποίησιν εἰς τὸ πρός τι ἀνάξουσι, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἓν γένος θήσονται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν μὲν κίνησιν εἰς τὸ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕν τι γένος θήσονται, καὶ διαιρήσονται τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἓν διχῇ ἐν εἴδεσι τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς νῦν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν λέγουσι, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν;

18. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας φήσουσι, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας λέγοντες εἶναι τὰς ἀθρόας, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, οἷον τὸ τέμνειν—ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τὸ τέμνειν—ἢ πάσας κινήσεις ἢ μετὰ κινήσεως, καὶ εἰ πάσας πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τὰς

themselves, but they are to be referred to the relative in that active actuality belongs to that which is potentially active and actual, and movement to that which is potentially moving or moved, one must answer that it is the very state of relatedness which produces relatives, and they are not produced by the mere statement that a thing is related to another. But when there is some substantial reality, even if it belongs to something else or is related to something else, it certainly possesses its nature prior to the relativity. This active actuality, then, and movement and state, though belonging to another, do not lose their priority to the relative and being thought in and by themselves; otherwise in this way everything will be relative: for absolutely everything has a relation to something, as in the case of the soul. And why are not activity and acting to be referred to the relative? For movement and active actuality will be altogether so. But if they are going to refer activity to the relative, but make one genus of acting, why will they not refer movement to the relative, but posit being in motion as one genus, and divide being in motion, as one genus, into two, into the species of acting and being acted upon, instead of, as they do now, saying that acting is one genus and being acted upon another?

18. But we must investigate whether they are going to assert that in acting some activities are active actualities and some are movements, saying that those which occur all at once are active actualities and the others are movements, cutting for instance—for cutting goes on in time—or whether they are all movements or accompanied by movement; and whether all activities are related to passi-

ποιήσεις ἢ τινας καὶ ἀπολύτους, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ λέγειν, καὶ εἰ τὰς πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν πάσας κινήσεις, τὰς δ' ἀπολύτους ἐνεργείας, ἢ ἐν ἑκατέροις ἑκάτερον. τὸ γοῦν βαδίζειν ἀπολελυμένον ὃν κίνησιν ἂν εἴποιεν, τὸ δὲ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔχον τὸ πάσχον καὶ αὐτὸ ἐνέργειαν, οἶμαι. ἢ οὐδὲ ποιεῖν φατέον τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ποῦ λεκτέον· τάχα δὲ τὸ νοεῖν πρὸς τὸ νοητόν, ὥσπερ τὴν νόησιν. καὶ γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν· ἀλλ' εἰ κἀκεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, διὰ τί αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν; καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις δέ, εἰ πρὸς ἕτερον, σχέσιν μὲν ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δέ τι παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν, τὸ ἢ ἐνέργεια ἢ πάθος εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ πάθος παρὰ τό τινος εἶναι καὶ ὑπό τινος ἔστι τι ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἡ δὲ δὴ βάδισις ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ τό τινος εἶναι καὶ ποδῶν εἶναι καὶ ὑπό τινος ἔχει τὸ κίνησις εἶναι. ἔχοι ἂν οὖν καὶ ἡ νόησις παρὰ τὸ πρός τι τὸ ἢ κίνησις εἶναι ἢ ἐνέργεια.

19. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ καί τινες ἐνέργειαι δόξουσιν ἀτελεῖς εἶναι μὴ προσλαβοῦσαι χρόνον, ὥστε εἰς ταὐτὸν

vity, or there are also some which are independent, walking and talking for instance, and whether all the activities which are related to passivity are movements, but the independent ones are active actualities, or whether there are some of each in each class. Walking at any rate, which is independent, they would say was a movement, but thinking, though it also has no passivity, an active actuality, I suppose. Or else it must be asserted that thinking and walking are not included in acting at all. But if they are not in acting, it must be said where they are; but perhaps the act of thinking is related to the object of thought just as thought [in general] is. For certainly sense perception is related to the sense-object; but if in that case sense-perception is related to the sense-object, why is not the actual [particular] act of sense-perception any longer related to the sense-object? And sense-perception, even if it is related to something else, has indeed a relatedness to that something, but has something over and above the relatedness, the being either an active actuality or a passive experience. If then the passive experience, over and above belonging to something and being caused by some agent, is something different so also is the active actuality. Certainly walking, which itself also has the characteristics of belonging to something, and in fact belonging to the feet, and of being caused by an agent, has the being a movement. Therefore thought also, over and above its relation, has the being either a movement or an active actuality.

19. But we must investigate whether some active actualities are going to appear as incomplete without acquiring an addition of time, so that they will

ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἐλθεῖν, οἷον τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἡ ζωή. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τελείῳ τὸ ζῆν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, ἀλλὰ οἷον ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι. ὥστε κινήσεις ἄμφω λεκτέον, καὶ ἕν τι τὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένος ἕν, θεωροῦντας παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ κίνησιν οὖσαν περὶ αὐτήν. καί, εἰ βούλει, τὰς μὲν σωματικάς, τὰς δὲ ψυχικάς, ἢ τὰς μὲν παρ' αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων εἰς αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μέν ἐξ αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιήσεις εἴτε εἰς ἄλλα εἴτε ἀπολελυμένας, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων πείσεις. καίτοι καὶ αἱ εἰς ἄλλα κινήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ ταῖς ἐξ ἄλλων· ἡ γὰρ τμῆσις, ἥ τε παρὰ τοῦ τέμνοντος ἥ τε ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ, μία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέμνειν ἕτερον καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ μία ἡ τμῆσις ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέμνοντος καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τέμνειν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἐνεργείας καὶ κινήσεως ἑτέραν ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ διάδοχον κίνησιν γίγνεσθαι. ἢ ἴσως οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τέμνεσθαι τὸ διάφορον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον κίνημα, οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχειν ἐν τούτῳ. τί οὖν, εἰ μή τι ἀλγοῖ; τί ἄλλο ἢ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐν τῷδε οὖσα; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον ποιεῖν. καὶ διττὸν οὕτως εἶναι τὸ

come into the same genus as movements, life and living for instance. For the life of every man is in a complete time, and his well-being is not in partlessness, but is like they maintain that movement also is. So that both are to be called movements, and movement is one thing and one genus, as we observe besides the quantum in the substance the quale as well, and a movement which appertains to the substance. And, if you like, some movements are of body and some of soul, or some are self-originated and others are produced in the moving things by the agency of others, or some come from themselves and some from others, and the ones which come from themselves are activities, whether they are directed to other things or independent, but those which come from others are passivities. And yet the movements to other things are the same as the movements from other things: for cutting, the cutting which comes from the cutter and the cutting which takes place in what is being cut, is one, but cutting and being cut are different. But perhaps even the cutting originating from the cutter and the cutting going on in the cut are not one, but what cutting is is the process in which, from an active actuality and movement of this particular kind, another successive movement comes to be in what is being cut. Or perhaps the difference does not lie in the actual being cut, but in something else, the subsequent movement, feeling pain for instance: for there is certainly passivity in this. Well then, what is the case if there is not any pain? What else is there than the active actuality of the agent existing in this particular thing? For in this way this description also fits acting. And in this way acting is double, one

ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ συνιστάμενον·
καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν
ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκε δύο νομίζειν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ
δὲ πάσχειν. οἷον καὶ τὸ γράφειν, καίτοι ὂν ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐκ
ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο τι ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ
ποιεῖ παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ γράφοντος οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν·
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι γεγράφθαι, οὐ τὸ πάσχειν λέγει. καὶ ἐπὶ
τοῦ βαδίζειν, καίτοι οὔσης γῆς ἐφ' ἧς, οὐ προσποιεῖται
τὸ πεπονθέναι. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐπὶ σώματος ζῴου βαίνῃ, τὸ
πάσχειν ἐπινοεῖ, ὃ ἐπιγίγνεται ἄλγημα συλλογιζόμενος,
οὐ τὸ βαδίζειν· ἢ ἐπενόησεν ἂν καὶ πρότερον. οὕτω καὶ
ἐπὶ πάντων κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποιεῖν ἓν λεκτέον μετὰ τοῦ
λεγομένου πάσχειν, τοῦ ἀντιθέτου. ὃ δὲ πάσχειν
λέγεται, τὸ γενόμενον ὕστερον, οὐ τὸ ἀντίθετον οἷον τῷ
καίειν τὸ καίεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ καίειν καὶ καίεσθαι
ἑνὸς ὄντος, τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἄλγημα ἤ τι ἄλλο,
οἷον μαραίνεσθαι. τί οὖν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐργάζοιτο,
ὥστε λυπεῖν, οὐχ ὁ μέν ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, κἂν ἐκ μιᾶς
ἐνεργείας τὰ δύο; [καὶ ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ, ὁ δὲ πάσχει][1] ἢ ἐν τῇ
ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ λυπεῖν, ἀλλὰ
ποιεῖ τι ἕτερον, δι' οὗ λυπεῖ, ὃ ἐν τῷ λυπησομένῳ
γενόμενον ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ἄλλο, τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι. τί οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν γενόμενον, πρὶν καὶ λύπην

[1] del. Kirchhoff: defendit Cilento.

kind which does and one kind which does not occur in another; and it is no longer a distinction of acting and being passive, but acting in another has produced the supposition that there are two, acting and being passive. Writing, for instance, although it is in something else, does not require [the concept of] passivity, because it does not produce anything else, feeling pain for instance, in the writing-tablet beyond the actual activity of the writer; but if someone says that the tablet has been written on, he is not referring to passive suffering. And in the case of walking, though there is ground on which one walks, [the concept of] its passive suffering is not included. But when one steps on the body of a living being, one does have passive suffering in mind, since one reasons about the pain which occurs, not the walking; otherwise one would have thought of it before also. In this way too in all cases, where action is concerned one genus must be mentioned together with passive suffering, that of the opposite of action. But what is called passive suffering is what occurs subsequently, not the opposite like being burnt to burning, but what results from burning and being burnt which are one, either the pain which occurs in the burnt object or something else, like shrivelling. Well then, if someone does this very thing in order to cause pain, does not one act and the other suffer, even if the two come from one actual activity? Now, in the actual activity what belongs to the will to hurt is no longer contained, but the agent does something else, by which he causes pain, which something else, being one and the same when it occurs in what is going to be hurt, produces another effect, that of being hurt. Why then is not the one

ποιῆσαι, ἢ ὅλως λύπην οὐκ ἐμποιοῦν, οὐ πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰς ὄν, οἷον τὸ ἀκοῦσαι; ἢ οὐ πάθος τὸ ἀκοῦσαι οὐδ' ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηθῆναί ἐστι γενέσθαι ἐν πάθει, ὃ μὴ ἀντίθετον τῷ ποιῆσαι.

20. Ἀλλ' ἔστω μὴ ἀντίθετον· ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον ὂν τοῦ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῇ ποιήσει. ἤ, εἰ κινήσεις ἄμφω, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀλλοίωσις κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. ἆρ' οὖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦν⟨τος ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν⟩[1] ἴῃ, ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ποίησις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἀπαθοῦς αὐτοῦ ὄντος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν ἀπαθὴς ᾖ, ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἄλλον, οἷον τύπτων, καὶ πάσχῃ, οὐκέτι ποιεῖ. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχειν. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταὐτὸ[2] τὸ πάσχειν, οἷον τὸ τρίβειν, διὰ τί ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχειν; ἤ, ὅτι ἀντιτρίβεται, καὶ πάσχει. ἆρ' οὖν, ὅτι ἀντικινεῖται, καὶ δύο κινήσεις φήσομεν περὶ αὐτόν; καὶ πῶς δύο; ἀλλὰ μία. καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ποίησις καὶ πεῖσις; ἢ[3] οὕτω μὲν ποίησις τῷ ἀπ' ἄλλου, εἰς ἄλλον δὲ πεῖσις ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα. ἀλλὰ ἄλλην φήσομεν; καὶ πῶς ἄλλο τι διατίθησι τὸν πάσχοντα ἀλλοιοῦσα καὶ ὁ ποιῶν ἀπαθὴς ἐκείνου; πῶς γὰρ ἂν πάθοι ὃ ποιεῖ ἐν ἄλλῳ; ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ

[1] Igal, H–S².
[2] Igal, H–S²: κατ' αὐτό Enn.
[3] Kirchhoff: καὶ Enn., H–S¹.

[1] Aristotle *Physics* E 3. 226a26.

thing which occurs, before it also causes pain, or if it does not cause pain in its object at all, not a passive affection of that object, like hearing? Now hearing is not a passive affection, nor is sense-perception in general, but being hurt is coming into a passive state, which is not opposite to action.

20. But granted that it is not opposite, yet all the same it is different from action and not in the same genus as doing and making. Now if both are movements, it is in the same genus, as, for instance, "qualitative change is movement in respect of quality".[1] Whenever, therefore, the movement in respect of quality, the qualitative change, proceeds from the agent is it an action and is it doing, if the maker is unaffected? If the agent is unaffected, it is in the category of doing, but if the agent is acting on someone else, hitting him for instance, and is affected, the agent is no longer doing. Now nothing prevents the doer from also being affected. If then the affection is in respect of the same thing, for instance rubbing, why is it doing rather than being affected? It is because it is reciprocally rubbed that it is also affected. Are we then to say that there are two movements in it because it is reciprocally moved? How can there be two? But there must be one. And how can the same movement be both a doing and a being affected? It is a doing in that it comes from one thing and a being affected because it acts on another, being the same movement. But are we to say that it is another? And how does the movement in producing qualitative change dispose what is affected in a different way and the agent remain unaffected by that change in disposition? For how could it be affected by what it does in another?

τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ποιεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ ἦν οὐ πάσχειν κατὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μὲν λευκαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ κύκνου, ὁ δὲ λευκαίνεται ὁ γιγνόμενος κύκνος, πάσχειν φήσομεν ἰόντα εἰς οὐσίαν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερον λευκαίνοιτο γενόμενος; καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν αὔξοι, τὸ δὲ αὔξοιτο, τὸ αὐξόμενον πάσχειν; ἢ μόνον ἐν τῷ ποιῷ τὴν πεῖσιν; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ποιοῖ, τὸ δὲ καλλύνοιτο, τὸ καλλυνόμενον πάσχειν; εἰ οὖν τὸ καλλῦνον χεῖρον γίγνοιτο ἢ καὶ ἀφανίζοιτο, οἷον ὁ καττίτερος, τὸ δὲ βέλτιον γίγνοιτο, ὁ χαλκός, πάσχειν τὸν χαλκὸν φήσομεν, τὸν δὲ ποιεῖν; τὸν δὲ μανθάνοντα πῶς πάσχειν τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐνεργείας εἰς αὐτὸν ἰούσης; ἢ πάθησις πῶς ἂν εἴη μία γε οὖσα; ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν οὐ πάθησις, ὁ δὲ ἔχων πάσχων ἔσται τοῦ πάσχειν τίνος λαμβανομένου; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἐνηργηκέναι αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν ὥσπερ τὸ πληγῆναι ἐν ἀντιλήψει ὂν καὶ γνωρίσει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν.

21. Τίνι οὖν γνωριοῦμεν τὸ πάσχειν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τῇ παρ' ἄλλου, εἰ ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν παραδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ ἐποιήσατο διαδεξάμενος. ἀλλ' ἆρα ὅπου μὴ ἐνέργεια, πεῖσις δὲ μόνον; τί οὖν, εἰ κάλλιον γίγνοιτο, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ χεῖρον ἔχοι; ἢ εἰ

Is it then the fact that the movement is in something else which produces being affected, which was not being affected in the case of the agent? But if on the one hand the rational form of the swan produces whiteness and [on the other] the swan coming into being is made white, are we going to say that the swan is affected as it proceeds to substantiality? But is it if it is made white afterwards when it has come into being? And if one thing is going to make something larger and the other is going to be made large, is that which is going to be made large affected? Or is being affected only in quality? But if one thing makes something beautiful and the other is made beautiful is that which is being made beautiful affected? If, then, that which makes beautiful becomes worse or even disappears, like the tin, and the other, the copper, becomes better, are we to say that the copper is affected and the tin acts? And how is the learner affected when the activity of the agent comes to him? How could the activity be a passivity when it is certainly one? But is this activity not a passivity, but will [the learner] who has it be passively affected, being affected being taken as somebody being affected? For it is not because the learner has not been active: for learning is not like being hit, since it consists in grasping and getting to know, and neither is seeing.

21. By what indication, then, are we to recognise being affected? Not, certainly, by the fact that the activity [affecting it] comes from another, if the one who received the activity took it over and made it his own. But is it when there is no activity and only passive affection? What then if it becomes more beautiful, and the activity has the worst of it? Or if

κατὰ κακίαν ἐνεργοῖ τις καὶ ἄρχοι εἰς ἄλλον ἀκολάστως; ἢ οὐδέν κωλύει ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φαύλην καὶ πεῖσιν καλήν. τίνι οὖν διοριοῦμεν; ἆρα τῷ τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄλλον παρ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρου ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ πάσχειν; τί οὖν, εἰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, μὴ εἰς ἄλλον δέ, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δοξάζειν; τὸ δὲ θερμανθῆναι παρ' αὐτοῦ διανοηθέντος ἢ θυμωθέντος ἐκ δόξης μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος; ἢ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν εἴτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἴτε εἰς ἄλλον ἰὸν κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ[1]; ἡ οὖν ἐπιθυμία τί καὶ πᾶσα ὄρεξις, εἰ ἡ ὄρεξις κινεῖται ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ; εἰ μή τις μὴ προσποιοῖτο ἀφ' οὗ κεκίνηται, ὅτι δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἐγήγερται. τί οὖν διαφέρει τοῦ πεπλῆχθαι ἢ ὠσθέντα κατενεχθῆναι; ἀλλ' ἆρα διαιρετέον τὰς ὀρέξεις λέγοντα τὰς μὲν ποιήσεις, ὅσαι νῷ ἑπόμεναι, τὰς δὲ ὁλκὰς οὔσας πείσεις, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν οὐ τῷ παρ' ἑτέρου ἢ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ—σαπείη γὰρ ἄν τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ—ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν συμβαλλόμενον αὐτὸ ὑπομείνῃ ἀλλοίωσιν τὴν μὴ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγουσαν, ἥτις ἐξίστησι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοίωσιν πεῖσιν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔχειν; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι θερμότητά ἐστιν ἴσχειν, εἴη δὲ τῷ μὲν εἰς οὐσίαν συντελοῦν, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν καὶ οὐ

[1] ἰὸν κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ Igal: τι ὄν, κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ Enn., H–S[1].

someone is viciously active and starts an unscrupulous attack on another? Now, there is nothing to prevent activity from being bad and passive affection good. So by what shall we distinguish them? Perhaps by the fact that the one is directed from the agent to another, and the other, passive affection, is in another but comes from a different source? What then if it comes from oneself but is not directed to another, thinking or opining for instance? And what about getting heated as a result of one's own thought or of being put into a passion by an opinion, when nothing comes to one from outside? Is action, whether in oneself or going on to another, a self-caused movement? Then what is concupiscence and every sort of desire, if desire derives its movement from the desired object? Unless of course one does not make the assumption that it has derived its movement from the object, but only that it has been awakened after [the appearance of] the object. How then does desire differ from being hit, or pushed and knocked down? But perhaps we should divide desires, saying that some of them are actions, all that follow intellect, but those which drag one are passive affections, and that passive affection is not a matter of deriving from another or from oneself—for a thing can rot in itself—but that when without any contribution of its own a thing undergoes an alteration which does not bring it to substantiality and changes it for the worse, or not for the better, an alteration of this kind has the characteristic of passivity and being passively affected? But if being heated is acquiring heat, and this contributes to one thing's substantiality but not to another's, being affected and not being affected will be the same

πάσχειν ἔσται. καὶ πῶς οὐ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι διττόν; ἢ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς οὐσίαν συντελῇ, καὶ τότε ἄλλου πάσχοντος εἰς οὐσίαν συντελέσει, οἷον θερμαινομένου τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος, ἡ δὲ οὐσία ὁ ἀνδριάς, ὃς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐθερμαίνετο, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ οὖν καλλίων ὁ χαλκὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύει πάσχειν λέγειν· διττὸν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάσχειν, τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ χεῖρον γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ βέλτιον, ἢ οὐδέτερον.

22. Οὐκοῦν γίγνεται τὸ πάσχειν τῷ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ κίνησιν [τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν][1] τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὁπωσοῦν· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ κίνησιν τὴν ἀπόλυτον παρ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τὴν τελευτῶσαν εἰς ἄλλο ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὁρμωμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένου ποιεῖν. καὶ κίνησις μὲν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἡ διαιροῦσα τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, καθόσον ποιεῖν, ἀπαθὲς τηροῦσα, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ διατίθεσθαι ἑτέρως ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, τῆς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὐσίας οὐδὲν εἰς οὐσίαν προσλαμβανούσης, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ πάσχοντος, ὅταν τις οὐσία γίνηται. γίνεται τοίνυν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν σχέσει τινὶ ποιεῖν, ἐν ἄλλῃ δὲ πάσχειν· παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷδε θεωρούμενον ποιεῖν ἔσται, κίνησις οὖσα ἡ αὐτή, παρὰ δὲ τῷδε πάσχειν, ὅτι τάδε οὕτως διατίθεται· ὥστε κινδυνεύειν ἄμφω πρός τι εἶναι, ὅσα τοῦ ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν, εἰ μὲν παρὰ τούτῳ τὸ αὐτό, ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ παρὰ τῷδε, πάσχειν. καὶ θεωρούμενον ἑκάτερον οὐ

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

thing. And, surely, being heated is double. Now being heated, when it contributes to substantiality, will then also contribute to substantiality by something else being affected; for instance when the bronze is heated and affected, but the substance is the statue, which was not heated itself except incidentally. If then the bronze is more beautiful as a result of being heated or according to the degree of heat, there is nothing against saying it is passively affected: for being passively affected is double, one kind consisting in becoming worse, the other in becoming better, or neither.

22. Passive affection, then, occurs by having in oneself an alterative motion of any kind; and action is either having in oneself an independent self-derived motion or one which starts from oneself and ends in another, [a motion, that is,] starting from that which is said to act. There is motion in both cases, but the difference which separates action and passive affection keeps action, in so far as it is action, unaffected, but makes passive affection consist in being disposed otherwise than it was before; the substance of what is affected gains nothing which contributes to its substantiality, but what is affected is different, when a substance comes to be. So the same is action in one relationship and passive affection in another. It is the same motion, but looked at on one side it will be action, but on the other passive affection, because this is disposed in this way; so it seems likely that both are relation, in all cases where action is related to passive affection; if one looks at the same on one side it is action, but if on the other, it is affection. And each of the two is looked at not by itself, but [one] along with that

καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχοντος· οὗτος κινεῖ καὶ οὗτος κινεῖται, καὶ δύο κατηγορίαι ἑκάτερον· καὶ οὗτος δίδωσι τῷδε κίνησιν, οὗτος δὲ λαμβάνει, ὥστε λῆψις καὶ δόσις καὶ πρός τι. ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὁ λαβών, ὥσπερ λέγεται ἔχειν χρῶμα, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἔχει κίνησιν; καὶ ἡ ἀπόλυτος κίνησις, οἷον ἡ τοῦ βαδίζειν, ἔχει βάδισιν, καὶ ἔχει δὲ νόησιν. ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ τὸ προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, εἰ καὶ τὸ προνοίας τυγχάνειν πάσχειν· εἰς ἄλλο γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἡ πρόνοια. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰ περὶ ἄλλου τὸ νοεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο πάσχειν. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ποιεῖν—οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ—οὐδὲ ποίησις ὅλως. οὐδὲ δεῖ πάσας ἐνεργείας ποιήσεις λέγειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν τι· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἡ ποίησις. τί οὖν; εἰ βαδίζων ἴχνη εἰργάσατο, οὐ λέγομεν πεποιηκέναι; ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἄλλο τι. ἢ ποιεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο ἑώρα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ποιεῖν λέγομεν οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνειν καὶ "ἐνήργησε τὸ φάρμακον". ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις.

23. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, εἰ τὸ ἔχειν πολλαχῶς, διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἔχειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχθήσονται; ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ὅτι ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὅτι ἔχει χρῶμα, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἔχει υἱόν, καὶ ὁ υἱός, ὅτι ἔχει πατέρα, καὶ ὅλως κτήματα. εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν ἐκείναις, ὅπλα

[1] The Peripatetics.

which acts, and [the other] with that which is affected: this one moves and this one is moved, and each is two categories; and this one gives motion to this, and this one receives it, so that there is taking and giving and this is relation. Or, if the recipient has, as in the phrase "have colour", why does it not also "have movement"? And independent movement, that of walking for instance, has walking, and also has thinking. But one must consider whether forethought is action, if being the object of forethought is being affected; since forethought is directed to something else and is about something else. Now forethought is not action, even if the thought is about something else, nor is being its object being affected. And thought is not action either—[it does not operate] in the object of thought itself, but is about it: it is not any kind of doing or making. And one should not call all activities doings or makings, or say that they do something. Doing is incidental. Well then, if someone walking produces footprints, do we not say he made them? But [he did so] because he was something else. Or [we may say that] the making is incidental and the activity [of footprint-making] is incidental, because he did not have this in view: since we speak of action in the case of lifeless beings, that fire heats, for instance, or "the drug acted". But that is enough of that.

23. But about having, if "having" is used in many different senses, why will they[1] not refer all the ways of having to this category? So the quantum, because it has size, and the quale, because it has colour, and the father and such, because he has a son, and the son because he has a father, and, in general, possessions. But if the other things are in

δὲ καὶ ὑποδήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, πρῶτον μὲν ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, διὰ τί, καὶ διὰ τί ἔχων μὲν αὐτὰ μίαν ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιεῖ, καίων δὲ ἢ τέμνων ἢ κατορύττων ἢ ἀποβάλλων οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ ἄλλας; εἰ δ' ὅτι περίκειται, κἂν ἱμάτιον κέηται ἐπὶ κλίνης, ἄλλη κατηγορία ἔσται, κἂν κεκαλυμμένος ᾖ τις. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κάθεξιν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν, δηλονότι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ⟨αὖ τὰ⟩[1] κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν λεγόμενα καὶ εἰς ἕξιν [αὐτά],[1] ὅπου ποτὲ ἡ ἕξις, ἀνακτέον· οὐ γὰρ διοίσει κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον. εἰ μέντοι ποιότητα ἔχειν οὐ δεῖ λέγειν, ὅτι ἤδη ποιότης εἴρηται, οὐδὲ ποσότητα ἔχειν, ὅτι ποσότης, οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχειν, ὅτι οὐσία εἴρηται, διὰ τί δὲ ὅπλα ἔχειν εἰρημένης οὐσίας, ἐν ᾗ ταῦτα; οὐσία γὰρ ὑπόδημα καὶ ὅπλα. πῶς δ' ὅλως ἁπλοῦν καὶ μιᾶς κατηγορίας "ὅδε ὅπλα ἔχει"; τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ὡπλίσθαι. ἔπειτα πότερον ἐπὶ ζῶντος μόνον ἢ κἂν ἀνδριὰς ᾖ, ὅτῳ ταῦτα; ἄλλως γὰρ ἑκάτερον ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ ἴσως ὁμωνύμως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ "ἕστηκεν" ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν οὐ ταὐτόν. ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις πῶς εὔλογον ἔχειν κατηγορίαν γενικὴν ἄλλην;

24. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κεῖσθαι—ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ αὐτὸ ὄν—ἀνακεῖσθαι, καθῆσθαι, καίτοι οὐ κεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς

[1] transposuit Schwyzer (*Gnomon* 42, 1970, 654): ⟨τὰ⟩ Kirchhoff.

those categories [of quantity, quality and relation] but weapons and shoes and things around the body [are in this one], first of all one might enquire why, and why the person who *has* these things makes another category, but, if he burns them or cuts them or buries them or throws them out, does not make another or others. But if it is because they are around the body, if a cloak lies on a bed there will be one category and if someone has wrapped himself in it another. But if it is in accordance with possession and the state of possessing, obviously again all the other things spoken of in connection with having are also to be referred to the state of possessing, wherever one puts it: for there will be no differentiation according to what is possessed. If then one must not say that one has a quality, because quality has been mentioned already, or that one has quantity, because quantity has been mentioned, or that one has parts, because substance has been mentioned, then why should one say one has weapons, when substance has been mentioned, and they are in this category? For a shoe and weapons are substance. And how, altogether, is "this man here has weapons" a simple statement belonging to one category? For this means being armed. Then, can one say this only about a living man, or also if it is a statue which has the weapons? For each of the two appears to "have" them in a different way, and perhaps "have" is equivocal: since "stand" is not the same in both cases. And again, how is it reasonable that something which occurs in a few cases should have another general category?

24. About position—which also only occurs in a few cases—lying on, sitting: though these terms do

λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ "πῶς κεῖνται" καὶ "κεῖται ἐν σχήματι τοιῷδε". καὶ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἄλλο· τοῦ δὲ κεῖσθαι τί ἄλλο σημαίνοντος ἢ "ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν", εἰρημένου τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ τόπου, τί δεῖ εἰς ἓν δύο κατηγορίας συνάπτειν; ἔπειτα, εἰ μὲν τὸ "κάθηται" ἐνέργειαν σημαίνει, ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τακτέον, εἰ δὲ πάθος, ἐν τῷ πεπονθέναι ἢ πάσχειν. τὸ δὲ "ἀνάκειται" τί ἄλλο ἢ "ἄνω κεῖται", ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ "κάτω κεῖται" ἢ "μεταξὺ κεῖται"; διὰ τί δὲ ἀνακλίσεως οὔσης ἐν τῷ πρός τι οὐχὶ καὶ ὁ ἀνακείμενος ἐκεῖ; ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὄντος ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἀριστερός. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων.

25. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τέτταρα τιθέντας καὶ τετραχῶς διαιροῦντας εἰς "ὑποκείμενα" καὶ "ποιὰ" καὶ "πῶς ἔχοντα" καὶ "πρός τί πως ἔχοντα", καὶ κοινόν τι ἐπ' αὐτῶν τιθέντας καὶ ἑνὶ γένει περιλαμβάνοντας τὰ πάντα, ὅτι μὲν κοινόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν γένος λαμβάνουσι, πολλὰ ἄν τις λέγοι. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀσύνετον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλογον τὸ τί τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόττον ἀσωμάτοις καὶ σώμασι. καὶ διαφορὰς οὐ καταλελοίπασιν, αἷς τὸ τί διαιρήσουσι. καὶ τὸ τί τοῦτο ἢ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ὄν, ἕν τι τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστιν·

[1] Again the Stoic τι; see ch. 2, n. 1, p. 16.

[2] For a good account of the Stoic Categories and of the misunderstandings about them which may have arisen

not simply express position, but "they are in a certain position" or "he is posed in such and such an attitude". And the attitude is something else; but what else does position signify but "is in place" and, when place and attitude have been mentioned, what need is there to join up two categories into one? Then further, if "sits" signifies an activity, it must be ranked among activities, but if a passive affection, it must be placed in the class of having been or being affected. But what does "he lies on" mean except "he lies above", like "he lies under", or "he lies between"? And why, when lying on is in the category of relation, is not the man who is lying on something there too? Since being on the right is there too, and the one on the right and the left. So much for that.

25. But as for those who posit the four genera and make a fourfold division into subjects and qualia and things in a certain state and things in a certain state in relation to others, and posit over them a common something[1] and include all things in one genus, there is much that one could say against them because they assume a common something and one genus over all. For, really, how incomprehensible and irrational this something of theirs is, and how unadapted to bodiless things and bodies.[2] And they have not left any room for differences with which they will be able to differentiate the something. And this something is either existent or non-existent; if, then, it is existent, it is one of its species; but if it is

from the hostile character of most of our sources of evidence, of which these chapters are an important part, see J. M. Rist *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) ch. 9, "Categories and their Uses", 152–72.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἔστι τὸ ὂν μὴ ὄν. καὶ μυρία ἕτερα. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐατέον, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἐπισκεπτέον. ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες τὴν πρώτην αὐτοῖς δοκοῦσαν ἀρχὴν συντάττουσι τοῖς μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον εἰς ἓν ἄγουσιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ὂν ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου λαμβάνει τὸ εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ἴσον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἕκαστον ἔχει παρὰ τοῦ γένους, εἴπερ τοῦτο δεῖ γένος εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορούμενον· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ φήσουσι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης, οἶμαι, τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἓν ἀριθμοῦντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἐξαριθμοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦσι· διαφέρει δὲ ἀρχὰς λέγειν καὶ αὐτά. εἰ δὲ ὂν μὲν μόνον τὴν ὕλην φήσουσι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάθη τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἐχρῆν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕν τι γένος προτάττειν· μᾶλλον δ' ἂν βέλτιον αὐτοῖς ἐλέγετο, εἰ τὸ μὲν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάθη, καὶ διῃροῦντο ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ καὶ λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὑποκείμενα, τὰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαφορὰν οὐκ ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μεμερίσθαι, ὥσπερ ὄγκον εἰς μέρη—καίτοι οὐδὲ μεμερίσθαι τῷ συνεχῆ λέγειν τὴν

non-existent, the existent is non-existent. And there are innumerable other objections. Well, we should leave these for the present and consider the division itself. They rank subjects first and at this point rank matter before the others, and so rank what they think is the first principle along with the things which come after their first principle. And first of all they bring prior things into one [genus] with posterior things, when it is not possible for that which is prior and that which is posterior to be in one genus. For in things in which there is prior and posterior, the posterior takes its being from the prior, but in things which come under the same genus each receives an equal contribution to its being from the genus, if the genus is what is predicated in speaking of the essential nature of the species: since they, I think, will agree that existence comes to the other things from matter. Then, when they count the subject as one, they do not enumerate existing things, but are looking for the principles of existing things. But it makes a difference whether one speaks of the principles or the things themselves. But if they are going to say that only matter exists, and that the other things are affections of matter, they ought not to place a single genus before being and the others: rather, it would have been better put if they had distinguished one thing as substance and the rest as affections and then divided these. And [it is unreasonable] to call some things subjects and [put] others in [categories], when the subject is one and has no differentiation except by being divided, like a mass, into parts—yet it cannot even be divided because they say that its substance is continuous—it would

οὐσίαν—βέλτιον λέγειν ἦν "τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον".

26. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ προτάττειν ἁπάντων τὴν ὕλην, ὃ δυνάμει ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐνέργειαν πρὸ δυνάμεως τάττειν, παντάπασιν ἀτοπώτατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ποτε τάξεως ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τοῦ δυνάμει· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἄξει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἢ πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἀρχή, ἤ, εἰ ἅμα λέγοιεν, ἐν τύχαις θήσονται τὰς ἀρχάς. ἔπειτα, εἰ ἅμα, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐκεῖνο προτάττουσι; καὶ διὰ τί τοῦτο μᾶλλον ὄν, ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; εἰ δὲ ὕστερον ἐκεῖνο, πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος γεννᾷ, ἡ ἄποιος τὸ ποιόν, οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ἐνέργεια· ἐνυπῆρχε γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι. καὶ ὁ θεὸς δεύτερος αὐτοῖς τῆς ὕλης· καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης ὢν καὶ εἴδους. καὶ πόθεν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὕλην ἔχειν ἀρχοειδὴς ὢν καὶ λόγος, ἀσώματος ἂν εἴη ὁ θεός, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σύνθετος, ἅτε σῶμα ὤν, ἄλλην ὕλην τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσάξουσιν. ἔπειτα πῶς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη σῶμα οὖσα; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σῶμα μὴ οὐ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος. εἰ δὲ ἄλλως τοῦτο σῶμα, ὁμωνύμως λέγουσι

have been better to say "the subject" [in the singular].

26. But, speaking generally, it is in every way superlatively absurd to rank matter, something which is potential, before all things, but not to put actuality before potency. For it is not even possible for what is in potency ever to come to actuality if the potential holds the rank of principle among beings: for it certainly will not bring itself to actuality, but the actual must be before it, and then this potential will no longer be a principle; or, if they say that [potential and actual] are simultaneous, they will put the principles in the realm of chance. And then, if they are simultaneous, why do they not give the actual the first rank? And why is this one, matter, the more existent, and not that one? But if the actual is later, how [did it come into being]? For, certainly, matter does not generate form, that which is without quality the qualified, nor does actuality come from the potential: for [if it did] the actual would exist in the potential, and it would no longer be simple. And God for them comes second after matter: for he is a body, and composed of matter and form. And where did he get his form from? But if [he had it] without having matter, having the nature of a principle and being a rational formative power, God would be bodiless and the creative bodiless. But if even without matter God is composite in his essential nature, in that he is a body, they will be introducing another matter, that of God. Then how is matter a principle if it is body? For it is not possible for a body not to be many; and every body is composed of matter and quality. But if this one is body in a different way,

σῶμα τὴν ὕλην. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπὶ σώματος τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν, μαθηματικὸν λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῇ, οὐχ ἓν λέγουσιν. ἔπειτα ἡ ἀντιτυπία ποιὸν ἢ παρὰ ποιότητος. καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀντιτυπία; πόθεν δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν ἢ τίς διέστησεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ τριχῇ διαστατοῦ ἡ ὕλη, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν. μετασχοῦσα τοίνυν μεγέθους οὐκέτ' ἂν ἁπλοῦν εἴη. ἔπειτα πόθεν ἡ ἕνωσις; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτοένωσις,[1] ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ ἑνότητος. ἐχρῆν δὴ λογίσασθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι δυνατὸν προτάττειν ἁπάντων ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄογκον καὶ τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξαμένους εἰς τὰ πολλὰ τελευτᾶν, καὶ ἐξ ἀμεγέθους εἰς μεγέθη, εἴ γε οὐκ ἔστι πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ἑνὸς ὄντος, οὐδὲ μέγεθος μὴ ἀμεγέθους· εἴ γε τὸ μέγεθος ἓν οὐ τῷ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἓν καὶ κατὰ σύμβασιν. δεῖ τοίνυν εἶναι τὸ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως πρὸ τοῦ κατὰ σύμβασιν· ἢ πῶς ἡ σύμβασις; καὶ ζητεῖν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς συμβάσεως· τάχα γὰρ ἂν εὗρον τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὃ τῷ μὴ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἄλλου.

[1] U, H–S²: αὐτὸ ἕνωσις wBxC, Perna: αὐτὸ ἓν Arnim (*SVF* II n. 315), H–S¹.

[1] This is the nearest Plotinus ever comes to any awareness that Stoic corporealism was not as gross and absurd as Platonist and Peripatetic opponents supposed. The Stoic conception of "body" was much subtler and more interesting than Plotinus represents it, here and elsewhere.

they are calling matter body equivocally.[1] But if three-dimensionality is the common characteristic of body, they are speaking of mathematical body; but if resistance accompanies three-dimensionality, then they are talking about something which is not one. And then resistance is a quale or derives from quality. And where did the resistance come from? And where the three-dimensional extension, and who extended it? For matter is not contained in the definition of three-dimensionality, nor three-dimensionality in the definition of matter. If then matter participates in magnitude, it would no longer be simple. Then where does its unification come from? For it is certainly not absolute unification, but by participation in unity. They should certainly have worked out that it is not possible to put mass in the first place of all, but that which is without mass and the one, and starting with the one to conclude in the many and starting with the sizeless to conclude in magnitudes, if it is not possible for many to be unless one is, nor size unless the sizeless is: if, that is, size is one not by being itself one but by participation in the one and a coming together. There must therefore be the primarily and properly [existent] before that [which exists] by coming together or how does the coming together occur? And one must enquire what is the manner of the coming together: for [if the Stoics had done so] they might perhaps have found the one which is not incidentally one. By "incidentally one" I mean that which is one not by being the one itself, but from another.

See S. Sambursky *The Physics of the Stoics* (London 1959), 29–44 (with interesting parallels to modern physics); A. A. Long *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London 1974), 152–8.

27. Ἐχρῆν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τηροῦντας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἐν τῷ τιμίῳ μὴ τὸ ἄμορφον μηδὲ τὸ παθητὸν μηδὲ τὸ ζωῆς ἄμοιρον καὶ ἀνόητον καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τίθεσθαι ἀρχήν, καὶ τούτῳ ἀναφέρειν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς αὐτοῖς εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκεν ἐπεισάγεται παρά τε τῆς ὕλης ἔχων τὸ εἶναι καὶ σύνθετος καὶ ὕστερος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. ἔπειτα εἰ ὑποκείμενον, ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν ἔξω ὂν αὐτῆς παρέχει αὐτὴν ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ πεμπομένοις εἰς αὐτήν. εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὸς εἴη ὑποκείμενος καὶ αὐτὸς σὺν αὐτῇ γενόμενος, οὐκέτι ὑποκείμενον τὴν ὕλην παρέξεται οὐδὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης αὐτὸς ὑποκείμενον· τίνι γὰρ ὑποκείμενα ἔσται οὐκέτι ὄντος τοῦ παρέξοντος ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ ἁπάντων καταναλωθέντων εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον ὑποκείμενον; πρός τι γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὸ κείμενον. καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὑπόκειται πρὸς τὸ οὐχ ὑποκείμενον· εἰ τοῦτο, πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ὥστε παραλελειμμένον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν δέονται ἄλλου ἔξωθεν, αὐτὸ δὲ πάντα δύναται γίγνεσθαι σχηματιζόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ τῇ ὀρχήσει πάντα αὐτὸν ποιῶν, οὐκέτ' ἂν ὑποκείμενον εἴη, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὰ πάντα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ ὀρχηστὴς οὐχ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς σχήμασιν—ἐνέργεια γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα—οὕτως οὐδὲ ἣν λέγουσιν ἔσται τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑποκείμενον, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα παρ' αὐτῆς εἴη· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα ὅλως ἔσται, εἴ γέ πως

[1] A brief allusion to one of Plotinus' favourite images, that of the cosmic dancer: cp. III. 2.16. 24–27 and 17. 8–11; IV. 4.33. 6–25.

27. And in other ways, also, they ought to keep the principle of all things in the place of honour, and not to posit as principle the shapeless nor that which is without share in life and unintelligent and dark and is the indefinite, and then to attribute substance to this. For they bring in God for the sake of appearances, [a God] who has his being from matter and is composite and posterior, or rather is matter in a certain state. Then if matter is the substrate [or subject] there must necessarily be something else which acts upon it, being external to it, and makes it to be subjected to the things which are sent into matter by it. But if God himself was subjected in matter and himself came into being along with it, he will no longer make matter a subject, nor will he be the subject [or substrate] along with matter: for to what will they be substrates, when there will be nothing to make them substrates since everything has been used up in the so-called substrate? For the substrate is substrate in relation to something, not to what is in itself but to what acts upon it as it lies subjected. And the substrate is subjected in relation to what is not substrate: that is, to what is external, so that this would just have been left out. But if they do not require anything from outside, but the substrate itself is capable of becoming everything by being figured, like the dancer who in his dance makes himself everything,[1] then it will no longer be the substrate, but itself everything. For as the dancer is not the substrate of the figures—for all the rest are his active actuality—so what they call matter will not be the subject of all things, if all the rest come from it; or rather, all the rest will not even exist, if matter in a certain state is all the rest, just

ἔχουσα ὕλη τὰ ἄλλα, ὡς πως ἔχων [ὁ][1] ὀρχούμενος τὰ σχήματα. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὅλως ὑποκείμενον αὕτη, οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ ὕλη μόνον οὖσα τούτῳ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὕλη· πρός τι γὰρ ἡ ὕλη. τὸ γὰρ πρός τι πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οἷον διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ, οὐκ οὐσία πρὸς διπλάσιον· ὂν δὲ πρὸς μὴ ὂν πῶς πρός τι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός; τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ ὕλη ὂν πρὸς ὄν. εἰ γὰρ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὃ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὴ οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὴ οὐσία· ὥστε συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτιωμένοις τοὺς ἐκ μὴ οὐσιῶν οὐσίας ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν ἐξ οὐσίας μὴ οὐσίαν· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος καθόσον κόσμος οὐκ οὐσία. ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ σώματα μὴ μᾶλλον οὐσίας, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον μὴ τὸν κόσμον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον, καθόσον μόριον αὐτοῦ, οὐσίαν· καὶ τὸ ζῷον μὴ παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχειν τὴν οὐσίαν, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ὕλης μόνον, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάθημα ὕλης καὶ ὕστερον. παρὰ τίνος οὖν ἔσχεν ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἐψυχῶσθαι, καὶ ὅλως τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ὑπόστασις; πῶς δὲ ἡ ὕλη ὁτὲ μὲν σώματα γίνεται, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτῆς ψυχή; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλοθεν προσίοι τὸ εἶδος, οὐδαμῇ ψυχὴ ἂν γένοιτο ποιότητος προσελθούσης τῇ ὕλῃ, ἀλλὰ σώματα ἄψυχα. εἰ δέ τι αὐτὴν πλάττοι καὶ ψυχὴν ποιοῖ, πρὸ τῆς γινομένης ψυχῆς ἔσται ἡ ποιοῦσα ψυχή.

[1] del. Igal, H–S².

as the dancer in a certain state is the figures. But if all the rest are not going to exist, this matter will not in any way be a substrate, and not the matter of existing things, but, since it is purely and simply matter, will by this very fact not be matter: for matter is relative. For the relative is in relation to something else, and something of the same genus, double to half for instance, not substance to double; but how is being to non-being a relation, except incidentally? But the relation of being in itself to matter is one of being. For if it is potentiality, which is going to be, and that is not substance, it will not be itself substance; so that this is what happens to the Stoics: they blame those who make substances out of non-substances, but themselves make non-substance out of substance; for their universe, in so far as it is universe, is not substance. But it is absurd that matter, the substrate, is substance, but bodies are not more substantial and the universe more substantial than bodies, [but the universe according to them] is only substance in so far as it is a part of the substrate; and that the Living Being does not have its substantiality from soul but only from matter, and that the soul is an affection of and posterior to matter. From what, then, did matter derive its ensoulment, and in general from what did the real existence of soul derive? And why does matter sometimes become bodies, but another part of it becomes soul? For, even if the form comes from somewhere else, soul would in no way come into being when quality comes to matter, but soulless bodies. But if something moulds matter and makes soul, the soul which makes will be prior to the soul which comes to be.

28. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην τούτων μὲν παυστέον, μὴ καὶ ἄτοπον ᾖ τὸ πρὸς οὕτω φανερὰν ἀτοπίαν φιλονεικεῖν, δεικνύντα, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ μάλιστα ὂν προτάττουσι καὶ τὸ ὕστατον πρῶτον. αἴτιον δὲ ἡ αἴσθησις αὐτοῖς ἡγεμὼν γενομένη καὶ πιστὴ εἰς ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θέσιν. τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα φοβηθέντες τὸ μένον ὑπ' αὐτὰ τοῦτο ᾠήθησαν τὸ ὂν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μᾶλλον τὸν τόπον ἢ τὰ σώματα νομίσειεν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὅτι οὐ φθείρεται ὁ τόπος νομίσας. καίτοι καὶ οὗτος αὐτοῖς μένει, ἔδει δὲ οὐ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μένον νομίσαι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἰδεῖν πρότερον, τίνα δεῖ προσεῖναι τῷ ἀληθῶς ὄντι, οἷς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ μένειν. οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ σκιὰ ἀεὶ μένοι παρακολουθοῦσα ἀλλοιουμένῳ ἄλλῳ, μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐκεῖνο. τό τε αἰσθητὸν μετ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τῷ πλήθει μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ὅλον ὂν εἴη ἢ ἕν τι τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον [ὑποβάθρα ἐκεῖνο][1] μὴ ὄν, πῶς ἂν ⟨ὑποβάθρα⟩[1] ἐκεῖνο; πάντων τε θαυμαστότατον τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει πιστουμένους ἕκαστα τὸ μὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἀλωτὸν τίθεσθαι ὄν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀντιτυπὲς αὐτῇ διδόασι· ποιότης γὰρ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ τῷ νῷ λέγουσι λαβεῖν, ἄτοπος ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ προτάξας καὶ τὸ ὂν αὐτῇ δεδωκώς, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὑτῷ. οὐκ

[1] Theiler.

28. But, though there are many things which are said against this hypothesis, we must stop here for fear that it may be absurd to strive for victory with so manifest an absurdity by showing that they give non-being the first rank as that which is most of all being and so rank the last first. The cause of this is that sense-perception became their guide and they trusted it for the placing of principles and the rest. For they considered that bodies were the real beings, and, since they were afraid of their transformation into each other, they thought that what persisted under them was reality, as if someone thought that place rather than bodies was real being, considering that place does not perish. Yet place also does persist for them, but they ought not to have considered that what persists in any kind of way was real being, but to see first what characteristics must belong to what is truly real, on the existence of which persistence for ever depends. For if a shadow always persisted which accompanied a being in process of alteration, it would not exist more than that being. And the sense-world with that [persistent substrate] and many other things would by its multiplicity be more real, being the whole, than any one of the things in it; but if indeed the whole is not real, how could that [substrate] be its foundation? But the most extraordinary of all is that, though they are assured of the existence of each and every thing by sense-perception, they posit as real being what cannot be apprehended by sense. For they do not rightly attribute resistance to it: resistance is a quality. But if they say they grasp it by intellect, it is an odd sort of intellect which ranks matter before itself and attributes real being to matter but not to itself. So,

ὧν οὖν ὁ νοῦς αὐτοῖς πῶς ἂν πιστὸς εἴη περὶ τῶν κυριωτέρων αὐτοῦ λέγων καὶ οὐδαμῇ αὐτοῖς συγγενὴς ὤν; ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.

29. Τὰ δὲ ποιὰ αὐτοῖς ἕτερα μὲν δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ λέγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ δεύτερα κατηρίθμουν. εἰ τοίνυν ἕτερα, δεῖ αὐτὰ καὶ ἁπλᾶ εἶναι· εἰ τοῦτο, μὴ σύνθετα· εἰ τοῦτο, μηδ' ὕλην ἔχειν, ᾗ ποιά· εἰ τοῦτο, ἀσώματα εἶναι καὶ δραστήρια· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν αὐτοῖς ὑπόκειται. εἰ δὲ σύνθετα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις ἁπλᾶ καὶ σύνθετα ἀντιδιαστέλλουσα καὶ ταῦτα ὑφ' ἓν γένος, ἔπειτα ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἄν τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι. εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιὰ ὕλην ποιὰν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ συνθέτου ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἔσονται· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἴδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν μηδὲν εἶναι τοὺς λόγους ἢ ὕλην πως ἔχουσαν, τὰ ποιὰ δηλονότι πως ἔχοντα ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ γένει τακτέον. εἰ δὲ ἥδε ἡ σχέσις ἄλλη, τίς ἡ διαφορά; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τό πως ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα ὑπόστασις μᾶλλον· καίτοι εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖ ὑπόστασις, τί

since their intellect is not real for them, how could it be trustworthy when it speaks about things more authentic than itself and is in no way related to them? But about this nature and about substrates we have spoken sufficiently elsewhere.

29. Qualia for them must be different from the subject-substrates, and this is what they mean; otherwise they would not have counted them second. If then they are different, they must also be simple; if this is so, not composite; and if this is so, they must not have matter, in so far as they are qualia; and if this is so, they must be bodiless and active: for matter is subjected to them for passivity. But if they are composite, first of all the division is absurd which sets simples and composites over against one another, and that under one genus, and then puts the other one in each of the species, as if someone dividing knowledge said that one kind was literary knowledge and another literary knowledge plus something else. But if they were to say that qualia are qualified matter, first of all their rational forming principles will be immanent in matter; they will not make something composite when they have come to be in matter, but before the composite which they make they will be composed of matter and form; they will not, then, themselves be forms or forming principles. But if they were to say that the forming principles are nothing but matter in a certain state, they obviously will be saying that qualia are things in a certain state, and they ought to be classed in the third genus. But if this is a different kind of state, what is the difference? Now clearly in this case being in a certain state is more of an existence. But if it is not an existence there too, why do they count it

καταριθμοῦσιν ὡς ἓν γένος ἢ εἶδος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὂν δύναται εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ πως ἔχον; ἢ γὰρ ὂν ἢ οὐκ ὄν· καὶ εἰ ὄν, πάντως ἀσώματον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ὄν, μάτην λέγεται, καὶ ὕλη μόνον, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐδέν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τό πως ἔχον· ἔτι γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐκ ὄν. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον λεχθὲν καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον. μόνον ὂν ἄρα ὕλη. τίς οὖν τοῦτό φησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὴ ἡ ὕλη. εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτή· πῶς γὰρ ἔχουσα ὁ νοῦς· καίτοι τὸ "πῶς ἔχουσα" προσθήκη κενή. ἡ ὕλη ἄρα λέγει ταῦτα καὶ καταλαμβάνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔλεγεν ἔμφρονα, θαῦμα ἂν ἦν, πῶς καὶ νοεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργα ποιεῖ οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε ψυχὴν ἔχουσα. εἰ δ' ἀφρόνως λέγοι αὐτὴν τιθεῖσα ὃ μὴ ἔστι μηδὲ δύναται, τίνι ταύτην δεῖ ἀνατιθέναι τὴν ἀφροσύνην; ἤ, εἰ ἔλεγεν, αὐτῇ· νῦν δὲ οὔτε λέγει ἐκείνη, ὅ τε λέγων πολὺ τὸ παρ' ἐκείνης ἔχων λέγει, ὅλος μὲν ὢν ἐκείνης, εἰ καὶ μόριον ψυχῆς[1] ἔχοι, ἀγνοίᾳ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως τῆς λέγειν τἀληθῆ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυναμένης.

30. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς πως ἔχουσιν ἄτοπον μὲν ἴσως τά πως ἔχοντα τρίτα τίθεσθαι ἢ ὁπωσοῦν τάξεως ἔχει, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα πάντα. ἀλλὰ διαφορὰν τῶν πως ἐχόντων φήσουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν τὴν ὕλην ὧδὶ καὶ οὕτως, ἄλλως δὲ ἐν τοῖς πως ἔχουσι, καὶ

[1] μόριον ψυχῆς Igal, H–S²: μόνον ψυχὴν Enn.: ψυχὴν Theiler, H–S¹.

as one genus or species? For certainly that which is and that which is not cannot be under the same genus. But what is this being in a certain state imposed upon matter? It is either existent or non-existent; and if it is existent, it is altogether bodiless; but if it is non-existent, it is an empty appellation and there is only matter, but the quale is nothing. But neither is the thing in a certain state anything: for it is still more non-existent. And the fourth class mentioned is even still more non-existent. So, then, only matter is existent. Who, then, asserts this? Not, presumably, matter. But perhaps matter does assert it: for matter in a certain state is intellect; though the "in a certain state" is a meaningless addition. Matter, then, says this and understands it. And if it talked sense, it would be surprising how it thinks and does the works of soul, when it has neither intellect nor soul. But if it was talking senselessly, making itself what it is not and cannot be, to whom should we attribute the senselessness? Well, if it did speak, to itself; but, as things are, matter does not speak, but the speaker speaks with a large contribution from matter, to which he entirely belongs; even if he has a bit of soul, he speaks in ignorance of himself and of the power which is able to speak the truth about such things.

30. In the case of things in a certain state, it is perhaps absurd to put things in a certain state third, or however they are placed in the order, since everything in a certain state is in relation to matter. But they will say that things in a certain state have a distinctive difference and that it is one thing for matter to be in this or that particular state, but something else in the case of things in a certain

ἔτι τὰ μὲν ποιὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δέ πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιά. ἀλλὰ τῶν ποιῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἢ ὕλης πως ἐχούσης ὄντων πάλιν τά πως ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῖς ἀνατρέχει καὶ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἔσται. πῶς δὲ ἓν τό πως ἔχον πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσης; πῶς γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἕν, τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ, τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως πως ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκίῳ καὶ Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πως ἔχων; οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς οὔτε τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ χρόνῳ, οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὔτε ὁ τόπος. τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πως ἔχον; ἔπειὶ οὐδ' ὁ ποιῶν πως ἔχων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως ποιῶν ἢ ὅλως οὔ πως,[1] ἀλλὰ ποιῶν μόνον· καὶ ὁ πάσχων οὔ πως ἔχων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως πάσχων ἢ ὅλως πάσχων οὕτως. ἴσως δ' ἂν μόνον ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κεῖσθαι τὸ "πὼς ἔχων" καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ "πὼς ἔχων", ἀλλὰ "ἔχων". τὸ δὲ πρός τι, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑφ' ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐτίθεσαν, ἕτερος λόγος ἦν ἂν ζητούντων εἴ τινα διδόασιν ὑπόστασιν ταῖς τοιαύταις σχέσεσι, πολλαχοῦ οὐ διδόντων. ἔτι δ' ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ ⟨τὸ⟩[2] ἐπιγινόμενον πρᾶγμα τοῖς ἤδη οὖσιν ἄτοπον συντάττειν [τὸ ἐπιγινόμενον][3] εἰς ταὐτὸν γένος τοῖς πρότερον οὖσι· δεῖ

[1] Gollwitzer: οὐκ ὤν BxUC, Creuzer: οὐκ ὄν w, Perna.
[2] H–S.
[3] del. Kirchhoff.

state, and, besides, that qualia are in a certain state in relation to matter, but the things which are specifically in a certain state are so in relation to qualia. But, if the qualia themselves are nothing but matter in a certain state, again the things in a certain state go back for the Stoics to matter and are so in relation to matter. But how is the class of things in a certain state one when there is a great deal of difference between them? For how can the "three-cubits-long" and the "white" [be got] into one class, when one of them is quantitative and the other qualitative? And how the when and the where? And how altogether are "yesterday" and "last year" and "in the Lyceum" and "in the Academy" in a certain state? And, generally speaking, how is time in a certain state? For time is not so, nor are the things in time itself, nor the things in place nor place. But how is doing being in a certain state? Since the doer is not existing in a certain state but doing in a certain way, or not at all in a certain way, but just doing; and the one who is affected is not existing in a certain state but rather being affected in a certain way or simply being affected like this. But perhaps "being in a certain state" will only fit position and possession; but in the case of possession one is not "in possession of a certain state" but "in possession". But as regards the relative, if they did not class it under one genus with the other [things in a certain state] it would take another discussion to enquire if they give any reality to such [relative] states, since they often do not do so. And again it is absurd to put a thing which is subsequent to things already existing into the same genus as the things

γὰρ πρότερον ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ διπλάσιον.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσοι ἄλλως τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἔθεντο, εἴτε ἄπειρα εἴτε πεπερασμένα, εἴτε σώματα εἴτε ἀσώματα, ἢ καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον, χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστων ἔξεστι ζητεῖν λαμβάνουσι καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων πρὸς τὰς δόξας αὐτῶν εἰρημένα.

which were there before: for one and two must be there first for there to be half and double.

But as for all the others who have made other assumptions about beings or the principles of beings, whether they said they were infinite or limited, bodies or bodiless, or both, one is free to enquire about each and every one of them, taking into account as well what the ancients said against their opinions.

VI. 2. (43) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων δέκα γενῶν ἐπέσκεπται, εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰς ἓν ἀγόντων γένος τὰ πάντα τέτταρα ὑπὸ τὸ ἓν οἷον εἴδη τιθεμένων, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων φαίνεται τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν πειρωμένοις εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγειν δόξαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἓν ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ζητεῖν, οὔτ' εἰ γένος ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, οὔτε εἰ γένη μὴ ὑφ' ἕν, οὔτ' εἰ ἀρχάς, οὔτε εἰ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ γένη τὰς αὐτὰς δεῖ τίθεσθαι, οὔτε εἰ τὰ γένη καὶ ἀρχὰς τὰ αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἁπάσας καὶ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ἢ ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τινὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καὶ γένη καί τινα γένη καὶ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἑτέρων πάντα καὶ θάτερα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων τινὰ καὶ θάτερα. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐχ ἕν φαμεν τὸ ὄν—διότι δέ, εἴρηται καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ ἑτέροις—ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως γίγνεται καὶ

[1] The critical discussion of the ten Aristotelian categories occupies the first 24 chapters of VI. 1, of the Stoic categories the last 6. Note the importance which Plotinus gives here to the highest Stoic genus, τι (cp. VI. 1. 25 and below lines 21–5), which he did not quite understand and which annoyed him particularly, perhaps because Severus the Middle Platonist, who was read in his school (*Life* ch. 14, 11), had taken it seriously and used it in his exegesis of the Timaeus: see below n. 1, p. 112.

VI. 2. ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

1. Now that our enquiry about what are called the ten genera has been completed, and we have spoken about those who bring all things into one genus and posit four species of a sort under the one,[1] the next thing would be to say how these things look to us, trying to lead back our own thoughts to the thought of Plato. Now if it was necessary to assume that being is one, there would be no need to investigate whether there is one genus over all, or whether the genera cannot be classed under one, or whether the principles [can or cannot be], or whether one should assume that principles are the same as genera or genera as principles, or whether all the principles are also genera but the genera not [all] principles, or the other way round, or whether in both groups some principles are also genera and some genera also principles, or whether in one group all are the others, but in the other some are also the others.[2] But since we maintain that being is not one—Plato and others have explained why[3]—it becomes, per-

[2] On the difference between principles and genera see ch. 2, 15–19. It is of great importance for Plotinus' exegesis of the *Sophist*.

[3] The reference to Plato is to *Sophist* 244B–245C and *Parmenides* 141C9–10. "Others": Aristotle and the Stoics; cp. VI. 1. 1. 5–9.

περὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψασθαι πρότερον εἰς μέσον θέντας, τίνα ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν καὶ πῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς διελέσθαι τάδε, τί τε τὸ ὂν λέγομεν, περὶ οὗ ἡ σκέψις ὀρθῶς γίνοιτο νυνί, καὶ τί δοκεῖ μὲν ἄλλοις εἶναι ὄν, γινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διῃρημένα οὐχ ὡς γένους τοῦ τὶ εἰς ταῦτα διῃρημένου, οὐδ' οὕτως οἴεσθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα πεποιηκέναι. γελοῖον γὰρ ὑφ' ἓν θέσθαι τὸ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις Σωκράτη ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ θεῖτο καὶ τὴν τούτου εἰκόνα. τὸ γὰρ "διελέσθαι" ἐνταῦθά ἐστι τὸ ἀφορίσαι καὶ χωρὶς θεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δόξαν ὂν εἶναι εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἶναι ὄν, ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς ἄλλο τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν εἶναι. καὶ προστιθεὶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ "ἀεὶ" ὑπέδειξεν, ὡς δεῖ τὸ ὂν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἷον μηδέποτε ψεύδεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὄντος φύσιν. περὶ δὴ τούτου τοῦ ὄντος λέγοντες καὶ περὶ τούτου ὡς οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντος σκεψόμεθα· ὕστερον δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ τοῦ γινομένου καὶ κόσμου αἰσθητοῦ τι ἐροῦμεν.

2. Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἕν φαμεν, ἆρα ἀριθμόν τινα ἢ ἄπειρον; πῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸ οὐχ ἕν; ἢ ἓν ἅμα καὶ πολλὰ λέγομεν, καί τι ποικίλον ἓν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν ἔχον. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῦτο τὸ οὕτως ἓν ἢ τῷ γένει ἓν εἶναι,

[1] *Timaeus* 27D5. The attack here is clearly on a Stoicising Platonist exegesis of this passage, probably that of Severus (Proclus *In Tim.* vol. I, p.227, 13–18 Diehl).

[2] In VI. 3.

haps, compulsory to enquire about these points, centring our discussion first on what number [of kinds of being] we intend and in what sense. Since, then, we are enquiring about being or beings, we must in our discussion first of all make a distinction between what we call being, about which at present our investigation would be correctly conducted, and what others think is being, but we call it becoming, and say that it is never really real. But in thinking of these two classes which are distinct from each other one must not think of them as if there was a genus of "something" divided into them, or suppose that Plato made this division. For it is absurd to put being under one genus with non-being, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one genus. For "making a distinction" here[1] means marking off and setting apart, and saying that what seems to be being is not being, [and by this Plato] indicates to them that what is truly being is something else. And by prefixing "always" to being he indicated that being must be of such a kind as never to belie the nature of being. So we are speaking of this being, and this is the being about which we shall enquire on the assumption that it is not one; afterwards,[2] if it seems proper, we shall say something about becoming and what comes to be and the universe perceived by the senses.

2. Since, then, we maintain that being is not one, do we say that it is a number or infinite? What do we really mean by "not one"? Now we say that it is at the same time one and many, and that it is a richly variegated one keeping its many together in one. It is therefore necessary that this, which is one in this way, should either be generically one, and the

εἴδη δ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄντα, οἷς πολλὰ καὶ ἕν, ἢ πλείω ἑνὸς γένη, ὑφ' ἓν δὲ τὰ πάντα, ἢ πλείω μὲν γένη, μηδὲν δὲ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον περιεκτικὸν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτό, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῶν γενῶν ἐλαττόνων ὄντων ἢ εἰδῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἀτόμων, συντελεῖν ἅπαντα εἰς μίαν φύσιν καὶ ἐκ πάντων τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, ὃν δὴ λέγομεν τὸ ὄν, τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, οὐ μόνον γένη ταῦτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἅμα ὑπάρχειν· γένη μέν, ὅτι ὑπ' αὐτὰ ἄλλα γένη ἐλάττω καὶ εἴδη μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄτομα· ἀρχὰς δέ, εἰ τὸ ὂν οὕτως ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχει. εἰ μέντοι πλείω μὲν ἦν ἐξ ὧν, συνελθόντα δὲ τὰ ὅλα ἐποίει τὸ πᾶν ἄλλο[1] οὐκ ἔχοντα ὑπ' αὐτά, ἀρχαὶ μὲν ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὐκ ἄν· οἷον εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἐποίει τὸ αἰσθητόν, πυρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὔ· εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως τὸ γένος. λέγοντες τοίνυν καὶ γένη τινὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀρχάς, ἆρα τὰ μὲν γένη, ἕκαστον μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά, ὁμοῦ μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντα, τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦμεν καὶ σύγκρασιν ποιοῦμεν ἁπάντων; ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ καθαρὸν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γένη ἐάσομεν, τὰ δὲ καθέκαστον μίξομεν; τίνα οὖν ἔσται ἐφ' αὐτῶν τὰ γένη; ἢ ἔσται κἀκεῖνα ἐφ' αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρά, καὶ τὰ μιχθέντα

[1] coniecimus: ἀλλ' wBxC: ἄλλ' Creuzer (*alia* Ficinus): om. U.

beings its species, by which it is many and one; or that it should be more genera than one, but all [grouped] under one; or that there should be more genera, but none of them subordinated to any other, but each including those below it (whether they themselves are lesser genera or species with individuals [grouped] under them) and all contributing to one nature; the intelligible universe, which is certainly what we call being, would be constructed from all of them. If this is so, these must certainly not only be genera but at the same time also principles of being: genera, because there are other lesser genera under them and subsequently species and individuals; principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these. If then there were a number of originative constituents and they came together as wholes and made the all while having nothing else subordinated to them, they would be principles, but not genera; as if someone made the sense-world out of the four elements, fire and such: for these would be principles, but not genera; unless "genus" is used equivocally. If we say, then, that they are a kind of genera, but that these same genera are also principles, then shall we achieve the completion of the whole by mixing the genera, all of them, together with each other, each with the things which come under it, and make a blend of everything? But then each and every thing will be potential and not actual, and each will not be itself in a pure state. But shall we let the genera go and mix up the individuals? What then will the genera by themselves be? They will be by themselves and pure and their mixed-up members will not abolish them. And how

οὐκ ἀπολεῖ αὐτά. καὶ πῶς; ἢ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς ὕστερον· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ συγκεχωρήκαμεν καὶ γένη εἶναι καὶ προσέτι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς καὶ τρόπον ἕτερον ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνθεσιν, πρῶτον λεκτέον πόσα λέγομεν γένη καὶ πῶς διίσταμεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ καὶ οὐχ ὑφ' ἓν ἄγομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τύχης συνελθόντα καὶ ἕν τι πεποιηκότα· καίτοι πολλῷ εὐλογώτερον ὑφ' ἕν. ἦ, εἰ μὲν εἴδη οἷόν τε ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἅπαντα εἶναι καὶ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις τὰ ἄτομα καὶ μηδὲν τούτων ἔξω, ἦν ἂν ἴσως ποιεῖν οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη θέσις ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν αὐτῆς—οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ εἴδη εἴδη ἔσται, οὐδ' ὅλως πολλὰ ὑφ' ἕν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἕν, μὴ ἑτέρου ἢ ἑτέρων[1] ἔξω ἐκείνου τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ ἐγένετο τὸ ἕν, ὥστε καὶ εἴδη γεννῆσαι, εἰ μή τι ἦν παρ' αὐτὸ ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ πολλά, εἰ μή τις ὡς μέγεθος κερματίζει[2]· ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἕτερον τὸ κερματίζον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κερματιεῖ ἢ ὅλως διαιρήσει, πρὸ τοῦ διαιρεθῆναι ἔσται διῃρημένον. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀποστατέον τοῦ "γένος ἕν", καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν ληφθὲν ἢ ὂν ἢ οὐσίαν λέγειν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὄν, τῷ συμβεβηκέναι φήσει, οἷον εἰ λευκὸν λέγοι τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ λευκὸν λέγει.

[1] Kirchhoff: ἑτέρου Enn.
[2] coniecimus: -σει wU (vix recte, sed cf. μερίσεις VI. 4. 8. 20): -σῃ BxC: -εἰ Volkmann.

can this be? We will discuss this later[1]; but now, since we have agreed that there are genera, and further that they are principles of substance and principles and a composition in another way, first it must be stated how many genera we say there are and how we distinguish them from each other and do not bring them under one, as if they came together by chance and made some one thing; yet it would be much more reasonable if they did come under one. Now, if it was possible for them all to be species of being, with the individuals immediately subsequent to them, and nothing outside these, it might perhaps be possible to proceed like this. But since such an arrangement would be the abolition of substance—for the species would not be species, nor altogether would there be many under one, but all would be one, and there would be no other or others outside that one: for how could the one become many, so as to generate species, unless there was something else besides itself? For it could not by its own means become many, unless somebody cuts it up like a magnitude; but even so the cutter would be another. But if it is going to do the cutting up, or in general the dividing, itself, it will be divided before the division. Thus, and for many other reasons, we must abandon the "one genus", also because it is not possible to take any and every individual thing and call it being or substance. But if one does call it substance, one will do so by incidental predication, as if one called substance white: for one is not speaking of what is [essentially] white.

[1] Ch. 19, 12–17.

3. Πλείω μὲν δὴ λέγομεν εἶναι καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην πλείω. οὐκοῦν ἀφ' ἑνός. ἤ, εἰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑνός, οὐ κατηγορουμένου δὲ κατ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἕκαστον οὐχ ὁμοειδὲς ὂν ἄλλῳ χωρὶς αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος. ἆρ' οὖν ἔξωθεν τοῦτο τῶν γενομένων γενῶν τὸ αἴτιον μέν, μὴ κατηγορούμενον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔξω· ἐπέκεινα γὰρ τὸ ἕν, ὡς ἂν μὴ συναριθμούμενον τοῖς γένεσιν, εἰ δι' αὐτὸ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ γένη εἶναι. καὶ πῶς ἐκεῖνο οὐ συνηρίθμηται; ἢ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦμεν, οὐ τὸ ἐπέκεινα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὕτως· τί δὲ τὸ συναριθμούμενον; ἐφ' οὗ καὶ θαυμάσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς συναριθμούμενον τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς. ἤ, εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἓν γένος αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ οἷς αἴτιον συναριθμεῖται, ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ γένος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς—καὶ ἔστι διάφορα τὰ ἐφεξῆς πρὸς αὐτό, καὶ οὐ κατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν ὡς γένος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι κατ' αὐτῶν—ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι ἔχοντα ὑφ' αὑτά. οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ σὺ τὸ βαδίζειν ἐγέννας, ὑπὸ σὲ ὡς γένος τὸ βαδίζειν ἦν ἄν· καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ὡς γένος αὐτοῦ, ἦν δὲ τὰ μετ' αὐτό, γένος ἂν ἦν τὸ

[1] This is the One-Being, the Second Hypostasis, sharply distinguished as usual from the Absolute One, the First Hypostasis; the subject of the One-Being and its relation to

3. We certainly say that there are several genera, and that it is not by accident that there are several. They derive therefore from one. Now, even if they do derive from one, but a one which is not included in the definition of their being, nothing prevents each one of them, since it has not the same specific form as another, from being itself a separate genus. Is then this one which is outside the genera which have come into being [from it] their cause, but not predicated in the definitions of what each of the others are? Yes, it is outside, for the One is transcendent, so as not to be numbered with the genera, if the others exist through it, which are on equal terms with each other as far as being genera goes. And how does it come about that it is not numbered with them? We are looking for beings, not what transcends being. So much, then, for this One; but what about the one which is numbered with the others[1]? One might wonder about this, how it is numbered with those caused by it. Now if it and the others were under one genus, it would be absurd; but if it is numbered with those of which it is the cause, as if it was the absolute genus and the others were subsequent—and the subsequents are different from it, and it is not predicated of them as their genus or anything else with reference to them—then they too must be genera, if they have things classed under them. For if you generated walking, walking would not be classed under you as its genus; and if there was nothing else before it as its genus, but there were things after it, walking would be a genus in the

beings, and why "one" is not a genus like "being", is taken up again in ch. 9.

βαδίζειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. ὅλως δὲ ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν φατέον αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἷον μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον στοιχεῖα αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντα μίαν φύσιν μεριζομένην ταῖς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίαις, αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι ὑπὸ δυνάμεως θαυμαστῆς ἓν εἰς πάντα, καὶ φαινόμενον πολλὰ καὶ γινόμενον πολλά, οἷον ὅταν κινηθῇ κατὰ[1] τὸ πολύνουν[2] τῆς φύσεως, ποιεῖν τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε οἷον μοίρας αὐτοῦ προφέροντας ταύτας ἓν ἕκαστον τίθεσθαι καὶ γένος λέγειν ἀγνοοῦντας ὅτι μὴ ὅλον ἅμα εἴδομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος προφέροντες πάλιν αὐτὰ συνάπτομεν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὰ κατέχειν σπεύδοντα πρὸς αὐτά. διὸ πάλιν μεθίεμεν εἰς τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἐῶμεν ἓν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἓν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως σαφέστερα ταῦτα ἔσται κἀκείνων ἐγνωσμένων, ἦν τὰ γένη λάβωμεν ὁπόσα· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ πῶς. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δεῖ λέγοντα μὴ ἀποφάσεις λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἔννοιαν καὶ νόησιν ἰέναι τῶν λεγομένων, ὠδὶ ποιητέον.

4. Εἰ τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἰδεῖν ἐβουλόμεθα, οἷόν τί ἐστιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὅλῳ ἡ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ φύσις, ἆρ' οὐ καταμαθόντες ἐπί τινος τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τὸ

[1] Igal, H–S²: καὶ Enn.

[2] Igal, H–S²: πολύχνουν EBUC, H–S¹: πολύχουν A (duo puncta supra χ) x, Perna.

[1] We thankfully accept here Igal's excellent emendation πολύνουν (cp. ch. 21, 4). The reading with most MSS authority πολύχνουν ("downiness" or "furriness"), printed in H-S¹, can surely on reflection only commend itself to cats, and the πολύχουν of other MSS, generally adopted by editors, is not used elsewhere by Plotinus and does not give as exactly appropriate a sense.

realm of real beings. But in general, perhaps not even the one should be asserted to be the cause of the others, but they are something like parts of it, and something like elements of it, and all one nature divided into parts by our conceptions, but [this one] itself is by a wonderful power one into all, both appearing all and becoming all, as if when it is in motion, and, by its nature's fullness of intelligence,[1] it makes the one be not one, and we bring forward as it were parts of it and posit these, each of them as one and call it a genus, being unaware that we do not know the whole all at once, but bring forward piece by piece and join them up again, being unable to hold them back for long as they hasten to themselves.[2] Therefore we let them go into the whole, and allow them to become one, or rather to be one. But perhaps all this will be clearer when we know what is coming next, if we grasp how many genera there are: for this will tell us how they are. But since in our discourse we should not just make statements,[3] but form some idea and come to some understanding of what is being said, we must proceed as follows.

4. If we wanted to see the nature of body, [and asked ourselves] something like what the nature of body itself was in this [perceptible] universe, when we had got to know thoroughly in the case of one of

[2] A good example of Plotinus' continual insistence on the inadequacy of discursive reason to give an adequate account of the One-Being: cp. V. 8 (31). 5–6; VI. 7 (38). 35. 28–30; III. 5 (50). 9. 26–29 and Klaus Wurm *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin & New York 1973).

[3] For Plotinus' use of ἀπόφασις in the sense of "declaration", "assertion", cp. III. 7.1.9.

μὲν ὡς ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐπὶ λίθου, τὸ δὲ ὁπόσον αὐτοῦ, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ὁποῖον, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἄλλου σώματος εἴποιμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῇ σώματος φύσει τὸ μέν ἐστιν οἷον οὐσία, τὸ δέ ἐστι ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ διαιρεθέντα εἰς τρία, καὶ σῶμα ἂν ἦν ἓν τὰ τρία; εἰ δὲ καὶ κίνησις αὐτοῦ παρῆν σύμφυτος τῇ συστάσει, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν συνηριθμήσαμεν, καὶ τὰ τέτταρα ἦν ἂν ἕν, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἓν ἀπήρτιστο πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῖς ἅπασι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ περὶ οὐσίας νοητῆς καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ γενῶν καὶ ἀρχῶν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀφελόντας χρὴ τὴν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι γένεσιν καὶ τὴν δι' αἰσθήσεως κατανόησιν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη—οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ χωρὶς καὶ τὸ διεστηκότα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἶναι—λαβεῖν τινα νοητὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὂν καὶ μᾶλλον ἕν. ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θαῦμα πῶς πολλὰ καὶ ἓν τὸ οὕτως ἕν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων συγκεχώρηται τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἕτερον τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ χωρίζεται. εἰ δέ τις λάβοι ψυχὴν μίαν ἀδιάστατον ἀμεγέθη ἁπλούστατον, ὡς δόξει τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβολῇ, πῶς ἄν τις ἐλπίσειε πολλὰ εὑρήσειν πάλιν αὖ; καίτοι νομίσας εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶν, ὅτε διῃρεῖτο τὸ ζῷον εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, καὶ σῶμα μὲν πολυειδὲς καὶ

its parts—a stone for instance—that there was what functioned as its substrate, and its quantity, the magnitude, and its quality, colour for instance, should we not say in the case of every other body that there was what might be called substance, and quantity, and quality, all together, but divided by our reasoning into three, and that body was the three as one? But if it also had movement as a natural part of its constitution, and we counted this in as well, then the four also would be one, and the one body would be brought to completion by them all in respect of its unity and its own nature. In the same way, certainly, when the discussion is about intelligible substance and the genera and principles there, one must remove the coming into being in the sphere of bodies and the understanding through sense-perception and the magnitudes—for it is [because bodies have size in] this way that there is separation and they stand apart from each other—and grasp an intelligible existence and that which really and truly is and is more one. In this it is also remarkable how that which is one in this way is many and one. For in the case of bodies it has been agreed that the same body is one and many; for the same one [can be divided] to infinity, and its colour is different from its shape; for they are in fact separated. But if someone takes one soul, without spatial separation of parts, without magnitude, supremely simple, as it will seem at the first application of the mind to it, how would one expect to find that it was after all many? For one would have thought that one could stop at this, when one had divided the living being into soul and body, and found the body multiform and composite and vari-

σύνθετον καὶ ποικίλον, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐθάρρει ὡς ἁπλοῦν εὑρὼν καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι τῆς πορείας ἐλθὼν ἐπ' ἀρχήν. ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ τόπου προεχειρίσθη ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, λάβωμεν, πῶς τὸ ἓν τοῦτο πολλά ἐστι, καὶ πῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἕν ἐστιν, οὐ σύνθετον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ μία φύσις πολλά· διὰ γὰρ τούτου ληφθέντος καὶ φανεροῦ γενομένου καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἔφαμεν ἀλήθειαν φανερὰν ἔσεσθαι.

5. Πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο ἐνθυμητέον ὡς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σώματα, οἷον τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πολλά ἐστι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ εἴδεσι μερῶν καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐξ ἑνός, ἢ [παντάπασιν][1] ἐξ ἑνὸς ἥξει[2] πάντη πάντως ἑνὸς ἢ μᾶλλον μὲν ἑνὸς ἢ οἷον τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντος ἢ τὸ γενόμενον—ὅσῳ γὰρ πρὸς ἓν ἡ ἀπόστασις, τόσῳ καὶ πρὸς ὄν—ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς μέν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἑνός, ὡς πάντη ἓν ἢ αὐτοέν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστηκὸς πλῆθος ἐποίει—λείπεται εἶναι ἐκ πλήθους ἑνός. τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ἦν ψυχή· τοῦτο ἄρα πλῆθος ἕν. τί οὖν; τὸ πλῆθος

[1] del. Igal.
[2] Igal: ἢ ἕξει Enn.: ἢ ἐξ ἔτι suspic. Theiler, scr. H–S.

[1] The phrase occurs in Plato *Republic* 508C1 and 517B5. Plotinus' use of it here, and the presentation of soul as the handiest example of a being " from the intelligible place", show clearly that the distinction between ψυχή and νοῦς was

ous, but was confident that one had found that the soul was simple and could rest from one's journey since one had come to the principle. Since, then, this soul has come ready to hand for us from the "intelligible place",[1] as in the former discussion the body did from the perceptible, let us apprehend how this one is many, and how the many are one, not a one compounded from many, but one nature which is many; for through this, when it has been apprehended and has become clear, we maintained that the truth about the genera in real being would become clear.

5. But first we should think about this: that since bodies, of animals and plants for instance, are, each and every one of them, many in virtue of the colours and shapes and sizes and specific forms of their parts, and the fact that one is in one place and one in another, but all come from one, they will come either from a one which is in every way and altogether one or from a one which is more one than is that which comes from it,[2] so that it is also more real than that which has come into being—for the extent of the departure from being is as great as that of the departure from unity—since, then, they are from a one, but not a one such as to be in every way one or the absolute One—for this would not have made a discrete plurality—it remains that they must be from a plurality which is one. But what made them is soul: this then is a plurality which is one. What then? Is the plurality the rational forming principles

not always for him very clear-cut (Plato, of course, makes no such distinction).

[2] I adopt Igal's emendations here (see critical notes): they seem to me to be required to give a tolerable sense.

οἱ λόγοι τῶν γινομένων; ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ λόγοι δὲ ἄλλοι; ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος καὶ κεφάλαιον τῶν λόγων, καὶ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνεργούσης οἱ λόγοι· ἡ δὲ οὐσία δύναμις τῶν λόγων. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τοῦτο τὸ ἓν ἐξ ὧν εἰς ἄλλα ποιεῖ δεδειγμένον. τί δ' εἰ μὴ ποιοῖ, ἀλλά τις αὐτὴν μὴ ποιοῦσαν λαμβάνοι ἀναβαίνων αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ μὴ ποιοῦν; οὐ πολλὰς καὶ ἐνταῦθα εὑρήσει δυνάμεις; εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν πᾶς ἄν τις συγχωρήσειεν· ἆρα δὲ ταὐτὸν ὡς εἰ καὶ λίθον ἔλεγεν εἶναι; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν. ἀλλ' ὅμως κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου τὸ εἶναι τῷ λίθῳ ἦν οὐ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λίθῳ εἶναι· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ εἶναι ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἔχει τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι. ἆρ' οὖν ἄλλο τὸ εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ λοιπόν, ὃ συμπληροῖ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄν, διαφορὰ δὲ ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχήν; ἤ τι ὂν μὲν ἡ ψυχή, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως, ὡς ἄνθρωπος λευκός, ἀλλ' ὡς τις οὐσία μόνον· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ μὴ ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας ἔχειν ὃ ἔχει.

6. Ἀλλ' ἆρα οὐκ ἔξωθεν μὲν ἔχει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, ἵνα ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ᾖ, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι; ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι καὶ ἔξωθεν τὸ τοιόνδε, οὐ τὸ ὅλον καθὸ ψυχὴ ἔσται οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατά τι, καὶ μέρος αὐτῆς οὐσία, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ὅλον οὐσία. ἔπειτα τὸ εἶναι

of the things which have come into being? Or is it rather itself one thing and the forming principles different from it? On the contrary, it is a forming principle itself and the sum of the forming principles, and the principles are its activity when it is active according to its substance; but the substance is the potentiality of the principles. It has then been demonstrated from what it does to other things that this one is indeed many. But what if it was not doing anything, but one was to consider it not doing by ascending to that of it which does not do? Will one not find many powers here too? For everyone would agree that the soul exists: but is this really the same thing as saying that a stone exists? Certainly not. But all the same there in the case of the stone also, existing for the stone is not [just] being but being a stone; so here, existing for soul has being soul along with being. Is then being one thing, and the rest something else, which contributes to the completion of the substance of the soul, and is there being [as such] and an essential difference makes the soul? No, the soul is a particular being but not in the way that a man is white, but only and simply like a particular substance; and this is the same as saying that it does not have what it has from outside its substance.

6. But, surely, does it not have [something] from outside its substance to make it in one respect existent but in another existent in a particular way? But if it is existent in a particular way, and the particularity comes from outside, it will not be substance as a whole and in so far as it is soul, but in a particular respect, and a part of it will be substance, but not the whole of it substance. Then what

αὐτῇ τί ἔσται ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ λίθος; ἢ δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἐντὸς εἶναι οἷον πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα, ὅσα αὐτή· καὶ ζωὴν τοίνυν· καὶ συνάμφω ἓν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ζωήν. ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἕν, ὡς ἕνα λόγον; ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἕν, οὕτω δὲ ἕν, ὡς αὖ δύο ἢ καὶ πλείω, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ πρῶτα. ἢ οὖν οὐσία καὶ ζωή, ἢ ἔχει ζωήν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἔχει, τὸ ἔχον καθ' αὑτὸ οὐκ ἐν ζωῇ, ἢ τε ζωὴ οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχει θάτερον τὸ ἕτερον, λεκτέον ἓν ἄμφω. ἢ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ τοσαῦτα, ὅσα ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῷ ἑνί· καὶ ἓν ἑαυτῷ, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα πολλά· καὶ ἓν μὲν ὄν, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτὸ αὐτὰ ἐν τῇ οἷον κινήσει πολλά· καὶ ὅλον ἕν, οἷον δὲ θεωρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν ἑαυτὸ πολλά· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνέχεται ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι πάντα δυνάμενον, ὅσα ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ θεωρία αἰτία τοῦ φανῆναι αὐτὸ πολλά, ἵνα νοήσῃ· ἐὰν γὰρ ἓν φανῇ, οὐκ ἐνόησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη ἐκεῖνο.

7. Τίνα οὖν ἐστι καὶ πόσα τὰ ἐνορώμενα; ἐπειδὴ ἐν ψυχῇ εὕρομεν οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ζωήν—καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν ἡ οὐσία ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ζωή, ζωὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν νῷ—ἐπεισαγαγόντες καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν τούτου ζωήν, κοινὸν τὸ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ζωῇ τὴν κίνησιν ἕν τι γένος θησόμεθα. οὐσίαν δὲ καὶ κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν οὖσαν δύο γένη θησόμεθα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἕν, χωρίζει αὐτὰ τῇ νοήσει ὁ ἓν οὐχ ἓν εὑρών· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη [1]

[1] Igal, H–S²: δυνηθῇ Enn.: δυνηθείη Kirchhoff: δυνηθείης Theiler.

[1] "The stone" as an image of lifelessness occurs several times in Plotinus: cp. VI. 5 (23). 11. 5–14 and possibly III. 2 (47). 17. 67 (see my note ad loc.). For further examples see *Lexicon Plotinianum* s. v. λίθος.

[2] Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9.

will existence be to it, without all the rest, different from a stone[1]? Now this being of soul must be within, like a "source and principle",[2] or rather must be all that it is; so it must be life; and both must be one, being and life. Is it then one like a single forming principle? No, the underlying reality is one, but so one that it is also two or even more, all that soul primarily is. It is therefore substance and life, or it has life. But if it has it, that which has is, in itself, not in life, and the life not in substance; but if one does not have the other, one must say that both are one. Or rather one and many, and as many as appear in the one; and one for itself, but many in relation to the others; and it is one being, but makes itself many by what we may call its movement; and it is one whole, but when it undertakes, one might say, to contemplate itself, it is many: as if it cannot bear its being to be one when it is capable of being all the things that it is. And its contemplation is the cause of its appearing many, that it may think: for if it appears as one, it did not think, but is that One.

7. What, then, are the constituents seen in soul, and how many are there? Since we find in soul substance and life together, and substance is common to all soul, and life also common, and life is also in Intellect, if we bring in also Intellect and its life, we shall posit as common to all life a single genus, movement. And we shall posit substance and movement, which is the primary life, as two genera. For even if they are one, [the observer] separates them in thought, finding the one not one; otherwise it would

χωρίσαι. ὅρα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σαφῶς τοῦ εἶναι τὴν
κίνησιν ἢ τὴν ζωὴν χωριζομένην, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ
ἀληθινῷ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῇ σκιᾷ καὶ τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τοῦ εἶναι.
ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ ἐλλείπει καὶ
μάλιστα τὸ κύριον, ἡ ζωή, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς
τὸ εἶναι σκιὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἀφῃρημένον τοῦ μάλιστα εἶναι, ὃ
ἐν τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ ἦν ζωή. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔσχομεν ἐντεῦθεν
χωρίσαι τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ ζῆν. ὄντος μὲν
δὴ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ γένος· κίνησις δὲ οὔτε ὑπὸ τὸ ὂν
τακτέα οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος,
εὑρεθεῖσα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· ἐνέργεια γὰρ
αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐδέτερον ἄνευ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἢ ἐπινοίᾳ, καὶ αἱ
δύο φύσεις μία· καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει. καὶ
εἰ χωρὶς μέντοι ἑκάτερον λάβοις, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι κίνησις
φανήσεται καὶ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ὄν, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
ἑνὸς ὄντος ἑκάτερον χωρὶς εἶχε θάτερον, ἀλλ' ὅμως
ἡ διάνοια δύο φησὶ καὶ εἶδος ἑκάτερον διπλοῦν ἕν.
κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὸ ὂν φανείσης οὐκ ἐξιστάσης τὴν
ἐκείνου φύσιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἷον τέλειον
ποιούσης, ἀεί τε τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἐν τῷ οὕτω
κινεῖσθαι μενούσης, εἴ τις μὴ στάσιν ἐπεισάγοι,
ἀτοπώτερος ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ κίνησιν διδόντος·
προχειροτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς στάσεως περὶ τὸ ὂν ἔννοια καὶ
νόησις τῆς περὶ τὴν κίνησιν οὔσης· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἕνα λόγον ἔχον ἐκεῖ. ἔστω
δὴ καὶ στάσις ἓν γένος ἕτερον ὂν κινήσεως, ὅπου καὶ

[1] Plato *Sophist* 248A12.

not have been possible to separate them. But observe in other things also how movement and life are clearly separated from being, even if not in the true being, yet in the shadow and that which has the same name as being. For as in the portrait of a man many things are wanting, and especially the decisively important thing, life, so in the things perceived by sense being is a shadow of being, separated from that which is most fully being, which was life in the archetype. But then, this gives us grounds for separating living from being and being from living. Now there are many species of being and there is a genus of being; but movement is not to be classed under being nor yet over being, but with being; it is found in being not as inhering in a subject; for it is its active actuality and neither of them is without the other except in our conception of them, and the two natures are one nature: for being is actual, not potential. And if, none the less, you take either of them separately, movement will appear in being and being in movement, as if in the "one-being" each taken separately had the other, but all the same discursive thought says that they are separate and that each form is a double one. But since movement appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the nature of being, but rather in being as if making it perfect, if one does not introduce rest as well one would be even more perverse than one who did not grant that there was movement; for the notion, and intellectual perception, of rest comes readier to hand where being is concerned than that of movement; for "existing in the same state and in the same way"[1] and having a single definition are there in being. So let rest be one genus, different from move-

ἐναντίον ἂν φανείη. τοῦ δὲ ὄντος ὡς ἕτερον, πολλαχῇ δῆλον ἂν εἴη καὶ διότι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ταὐτὸν εἴη, οὐ μᾶλλον τῆς κινήσεως ταὐτὸ τῷ ὄντι. διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ μὲν στάσις τῷ ὄντι ταὐτόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὔ, ζωή τις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι; ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐχωρίζομεν τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ ὡς ταὐτόν τε καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς δύο ἄμφω ἐλέγομεν καὶ αὖ ἕν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν στάσιν χωριοῦμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὖ οὐ χωριοῦμεν τοσοῦτον χωρίζοντες τῷ νῷ, ὅσον ἄλλο γένος θέσθαι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. ἢ εἰ συνάγοιμεν πάντη εἰς ἓν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὸ ὂν μηδὲν μηδαμῇ διαφέρειν λέγοντες, τό τε ὂν τῇ κινήσει ὡσαύτως, τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὄντος εἰς ταὐτὸν συνάξομεν, καὶ ἔσται ἡμῖν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ στάσις ἕν.

8. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ τρία ταῦτα τίθεσθαι, εἴπερ ὁ νοῦς χωρὶς ἕκαστον νοεῖ· ἅμα δὲ νοεῖ καὶ τίθησιν, εἴπερ νοεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ νενόηται. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι μετὰ ὕλης ἐστί, τούτων οὐκ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ εἶναι· [ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄυλα][1] ἃ δ' ἔστιν ἄυλα, εἰ νενόηται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι. ἴδε δὲ νοῦν καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ βλέψον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀτενίσας, μὴ ὄμμασι τούτοις δεδορκώς. ὁρᾷς δὴ οὐσίας ἑστίαν καὶ φῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ἄυπνον καὶ ὡς ἕστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς διέστηκεν, ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ ζωὴν μένουσαν καὶ νόησιν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἤδη, μᾶλλον δὲ "ἤδη καὶ ἀεὶ ἤδη", καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἀεί, καὶ ὡς νοῶν ἐν

[1] del. H–S.

ment, in that it would seem to be its opposite. But that it is different from being could be made clear in many ways, especially because, if it was the same as being, it could not be any more the same as being than motion. For why is rest the same as being, but motion not, when motion is its life and the active actuality of its substance and its very being? But, just as we separated movement from it as being the same and not the same as it, and spoke of them as two and yet again one, in the same way we shall also separate rest from it and yet again not separate it, separating it so far in the mind as to posit it as another genus among real beings. Otherwise, if we were to bring rest and being into one, saying that there was not in any way any difference between them, and bring being into one with movement in the same way, we shall bring rest and movement into identity through the medium of being, and movement and rest will be one for us.

8. But one must posit these three, if Intellect thinks each of them separately; but it does at once know and posit them, if it thinks, and they exist, if they have been thought. For the being of things whose being involves matter is not in the intellect; but if things which are without matter have been thought, this is their being. But behold Intellect, pure Intellect, and look upon it with concentrated gaze, not seeing it with these bodily eyes of ours. You see the hearth of substance and a sleepless light on it, and how they stand on it and how they stand apart, existing all together, abiding life and a thought whose activity is not directed towards what is coming but what is here already, or rather "here already and always here already", and the always

ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἔξω. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ νοεῖν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ κίνησις, ἐν δὲ τῷ "ἑαυτόν" ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν· ὢν γὰρ νοεῖ καὶ ὄντα ἑαυτόν, καὶ εἰς ὃ οἷον ἐπερείδετο, ὄν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐκ οὐσία, εἰς ὃ δὲ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ, τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ βλεπόμενον τὸ ὄν, οὐχ ἡ βλέψις· ἔχει δὲ καὶ αὕτη τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι ἀφ' οὗ καὶ εἰς ὄν, ὄν. ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει, συνάπτει πάλιν αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ οὐ χωρίζει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ ἑαυτὸν ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο ἑαυτόν. ὂν δὲ τὸ πάντων ἑδραιότατον καὶ περὶ ὃ τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν στάσιν ὑπεστήσατο καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐπακτόν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ νόησις οὐκ ἀρξαμένη στάσις, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ὥρμηται οὐχ ὁρμήσασα στάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδ' εἰς κίνησιν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰδέα ἐν στάσει πέρας οὖσα νοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς αὐτῆς ἡ κίνησις.

"Ωστε ὂν πάντα καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ δι' ὅλων ὄντα γένη, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὕστερόν τι ὂν καί τις στάσις καί τις κίνησις. τρία δὴ ταῦτα ἰδών τις, ἐν προσβολῇ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως γεγενημένος, καὶ τῷ παρ' αὐτῷ ὄντι τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰδὼν τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν κίνησιν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινήσει, καὶ τῇ στάσει τὴν στάσιν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ἐφαρμόσας, ὁμοῦ μὲν γενομένοις καὶ οἷον συγκεχυμένοις συμμίξας οὐ διακρίνων, οἷον δ'

present, and it is a thought thinking in itself and not outside. In its thinking, then, there is activity and motion, and in its thinking itself, substance and being: for, existing, it thinks itself as existent, and the being on which it is, so to speak, founded. For its self-directed activity is not substance, but being is that to which the activity is directed and from which it comes: for that which is looked at is being, not the look; but the look, too, possesses being, because it comes from and is directed to being. And since it is in act, not in potency, it gathers the two together and does not separate them, but makes itself being and being itself. And since being is the most firmly set of all things and that about which the other things [are set], it has made rest exist and possesses it not as brought in from outside but from itself and in itself. It is that in which thought comes to a stop, though thought is a rest which has no beginning, and from which it starts, though thought is a rest which never started: for movement does not begin from or end in movement. And again the Form at rest is the defining limit of Intellect, and Intellect is the movement of the Form.

So all things are being, rest and motion; these are all-pervading genera, and each subsequent thing is a particular being, a particular rest, and a particular motion. Now when anyone sees these three, having come into intuitive contact with the nature of being, he sees being by the being in himself and the others, motion and rest, by the motion and rest in himself, and fits his own being, motion and rest to those in Intellect: they come to him together in a sort of confusion and he mingles them without distinguishing them; then as it were separating them a little and

ὀλίγον διαστήσας καὶ ἐπισχὼν καὶ διακρίνας εἰσιδὼν ὄν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν, τρία ταῦτα καὶ ἕκαστον ἕν, ἆρ' οὐχ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἴρηκε καὶ διέστησεν ἐν ἑτερότητι καὶ εἶδε τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑτερότητα τρία τιθεὶς καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πάλιν δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ πάντα ἕν, εἰς ταὐτὸν αὖ συνάγων καὶ βλέπων ταὐτότητα εἶδε γενομένην καὶ οὖσαν; οὐκοῦν πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις ἀνάγκη δύο ταῦτα προστιθέναι, ταὐτόν, θάτερον, ὥστε τὰ πάντα γένη γίγνεσθαι πέντε πᾶσι, καὶ ταῦτα διδόντα τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἑτέροις καὶ ταὐτοῖς εἶναι· καί τι γὰρ ταὐτὸν καί τι ἕτερον ἕκαστον· ἁπλῶς γὰρ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον ἄνευ τοῦ "τι" ἐν γένει ἂν εἴη· καὶ πρῶτα δὲ γένη, ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτῶν κατηγορήσεις ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ ὂν κατηγορήσεις αὐτῶν· ὄντα γάρ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς γένος· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ὄν τι. οὐδ' αὖ τῆς κινήσεως οὐδὲ τῆς στάσεως· οὐ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ ὄντος· ὄντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὡς εἴδη αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ. οὐδ' αὖ τὸ ὂν μετέχον τούτων ὡς γενῶν αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπαναβέβηκεν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ πρότερα τοῦ ὄντος.

9. Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα γένη πρῶτα, ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, βεβαιώσαιτο· ὅτι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις, πῶς ἄν τις πιστεύσειε; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἕν; διὰ τί δ' οὐ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν δέ, τὸ δὲ πρός τι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἅπερ ἤδη ἕτεροι

holding them away from him and distinguishing them he perceives being, motion and rest, three and each of them one. Does he not then say that they are different from each other and distinguish them in otherness, and see the otherness in being when he posits three, each of them one? And again, when he brings them back to unity and sees them in a unity, all one, does he not collect them into sameness and, as he looks at them, see that sameness has come to be and is? So we must add these two, the same and the other, to those first three, so that there will be in all five genera for all things, and the last two also will give to subsequent things the characters of being other and same; for each individual thing is a particular "same" and a particular "other"; for "same" and "other" without the "particular" would apply to genera. These are the primary kinds because you cannot apply any predicate to them which forms part of the definition of their essence. You will certainly predicate being of them, for they exist, but not as their genus, for they are not particular beings. Nor can you predicate being as the genus of motion and rest, for they are not specific forms of being; for some things exist as species of being, others as participating in being. Nor again does being participate in these others as if they were its genera: for they do not transcend being and are not prior to it.

9. But that these genera are primary one could confirm from these arguments, and perhaps also from others; but how could one be confident that there are only these [primary genera] and not others in addition to them? For why not also the one? And why not the quale and the quantum and the relative and the others, which other philosophers have al-

κατηρίθμηνται; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕν, εἰ μὲν τὸ πάντως ἕν, [ἐν][1] ᾧ μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόσεστι, μὴ ψυχή, μὴ νοῦς, μὴ ὁτιοῦν, οὐδενὸς ἂν κατηγοροῖτο τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲ γένος. εἰ δὲ τὸ προσὸν τῷ ὄντι, ἐφ' οὗ τὸ ἓν ὂν λέγομεν, οὐ πρώτως ἓν τοῦτο. ἔτι ἀδιάφορον ὂν αὐτοῦ πῶς ἂν ποιήσειεν εἴδη; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μή, οὐ γένος. πῶς γὰρ καὶ διαιρήσεις; διαιρῶν γὰρ πολλὰ ποιήσεις· ὥστε αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ ἔσται καὶ ἀπολεῖ ἑαυτό, εἰ ἐθέλοι γένος εἶναι. ἔπειτά τι προσθήσεις διαιρῶν εἰς εἴδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶεν διαφοραὶ ἐν τῷ ἕν, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ τῆς οὐσίας. ὄντος μὲν γὰρ δέχεται ὁ νοῦς εἶναι διαφοράς, ἑνὸς δὲ πῶς; εἶτα ἑκάστοτε μετὰ τῆς διαφορᾶς δύο τιθεὶς ἀναιρεῖς τὸ ἕν, ἐπείπερ πανταχοῦ ἡ μονάδος προσθήκη τὸ πρότερον ποσὸν ἀφανίζει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι ἓν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ κινήσει ἓν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὸν εἶναι, εἰς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἄγων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἐν ᾧ λόγῳ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἐποίει τῶν ἄλλων γένος, ὅτι μὴ ὅπερ ⟨ὂν⟩ ὄντα,[2] ἀλλ' ἕτερον τρόπον ὄντα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν κοινὸν ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως. εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντων λέγοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλά ἕν τι ἐφ' αὑτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸν αὐτῷ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν, ἤδη τοῦ ὄντος

[1] delendum suspic. Müller, del. Volkmann.
[2] ⟨ὂν⟩ ὄντα Müller: ὄντα Enn.: ὄν τι Igal, H–S².

ready counted up[1]? Well then, as for the one, if it is the absolutely One to which nothing else is added, not soul, not intellect, not anything at all, this could not be predicated of anything, so that it is not a genus. But if it is the one added to being, that of which we speak as one-being, this is not primarily one. Again, if it is undifferentiated in itself how could it make specific forms? But if it cannot do this, it is not a genus. For how could there be divisions? For in dividing you will make many: so that the one itself will be many and will destroy itself—if it wanted to be a genus. Then, you will add something to it in dividing it into specific forms. For there could be no differentiations in the one, as there are of substance. For the mind accepts that there are differentiations of being, but how could there be of one? Then, every time [you differentiate] you abolish the one by positing two with the differentiation, since everywhere the addition of a unit makes the previous quantum disappear. But if someone were to say that the one in being and the one in movement and the others is a common term, bringing being and one into identity, then, as in the argument that did not make being the genus of the others, because they are not beings as being is,[2] but beings in another way, so the one also will not be a common term over them, but it will be one primarily, and the others one in a different way. But if he were to say that he does not make the one the genus of all [genera] but one [genus] by itself, like the others, if being and the one are identical for him, since being has already been

[1] The reference is to the Aristotelian categories.
[2] I retain the ⟨ὂν⟩ ὄντα of Müller here.

ἠριθμημένου ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ὄνομα εἰσάγει. εἰ δὲ ἓν ἑκάτερον, τινὰ φύσιν λέγει, καὶ εἰ μὲν προστίθησί ⟨"τι"⟩,[1] τι ἓν λέγει, εἰ δὲ μηδέν, ἐκεῖνο, ὃ οὐδενὸς κατηγορεῖται, πάλιν αὖ λέγει· εἰ δὲ τὸ τῷ ὄντι συνόν, εἴπομεν μὲν ὅτι οὐ πρώτως ἓν λέγει. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει πρώτως εἶναι τοῦτο ἐξῃρημένου ἐκείνου τοῦ παντελῶς ἕν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μετ' ἐκεῖνο λέγομεν ὂν καὶ ὂν πρώτως ὄν. ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὂν ἤ, εἴπερ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν πρώτως· τούτου δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἕν. ἔπειτα χωρισθὲν τῇ νοήσει τοῦ ὄντος διαφορὰς οὐκ ἔχει· ἔπειτα ἐν τῷ ὄντι, εἰ μὲν ἐπακολούθημα αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάντων καὶ ὕστερον· πρότερον δὲ τὸ γένος. εἰ δὲ ἅμα, καὶ πάντων· τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἅμα. εἰ δὲ πρότερον, ἀρχή τις καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνον· εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ, οὐ γένος αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ δέοι ἂν καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ ὄντι πλησιάζον τῷ ἑνὶ καὶ οἷον συνεκπῖπτον τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἐκείνῳ ἓν ὄντος, τὸ δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ὄντος, ᾧ δύναται καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μένον αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ οὐ θέλον μερίζεσθαι οὐδὲ γένος εἶναι βούλεσθαι.

[1] Bouillet, Harder, Theiler.

counted among the genera, he is introducing a [mere] name. But if each of them is one [different from the other], then he means [by the one] a nature, and if he adds "some" he means some particular one, but if he adds nothing, he means, yet again, the one which is predicated of nothing; but if he means the one which goes with being, we have said that he does not mean the primarily one. But what prevents this from being primarily one if that which is absolutely one is left out of account? For we do call the being which comes after it being and say that it is primarily being. Now we do so because that which is before it is not being, or, if what is before it was being, it would not be primarily being; but in this case what is before it is one. Then, when it is separated in thought from being it does not have differentiations; then, in being, if it is a consequence of being, it is a consequence of and posterior to all; but the genus is prior. But if it is simultaneous, it is simultaneous with all; but the genus is not simultaneous. But if it is prior, it is a principle, and a principle only of being; but if it is its principle, it is not its genus; but if it is not its genus, it is not the genus of the others either; or it would be necessary for being also to be the genus of all the other [genera]. For in general it appears likely that, since the one in being is near to the one and in a way coincides with being, and being in so far as it is close to that [absolute One] is one, but in so far as it is posterior to it, being, by which it is able also to be many, the one in being, remaining itself one and being unwilling to be divided into parts, does not want to be a genus either.

10. Πῶς οὖν ἕκαστον τοῦ ὄντος ἕν; ἢ τῷ τι ἓν οὐχ ἕν—πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη τῷ τι ἕν—ἀλλ' ὁμωνύμως ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος πλῆθος, ὥστε ἓν ἐνταῦθα ὡς στρατὸς ἢ χορός. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ ἐκεῖ ἓν ἐν τούτοις, ὥστε οὐ κοινὸν τὸ ἓν οὐδ' ἐθεωρεῖτο ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ τοῖς τι οὖσι τὸ αὐτό. ὥστε οὐ γένος τὸ ἕν· ἐπεὶ πᾶν γένος καθ' οὗ ἀληθεύσεται ⟨τὸ ἓν ὡς γένος⟩,[1] οὐκέτι καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα· καθ' οὗ δὲ παντὸς ὄντος ἀληθεύεται τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα [καθ' οὗ ἀληθεύσεται τὸ ἓν ὡς γένος],[2] κατὰ τούτου ἔσται οὐχ ὡς γένος. ὥστε οὔτε τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀληθεύσεται ὡς γένος, ἐπείπερ καὶ τὸ ἓν ὂν οὐ μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ πολλὰ οὐδέ τι τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν οὕτως ἓν ὡς μὴ πολλά, οὔτε κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὑστέρων ἃ πάντως πολλά. τὸ δ' ὅλον γένος οὐδὲν ἕν· ὥστε, εἰ τὸ ἓν γένος, ἀπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ ἕν· ἀριθμὸς δ' ἔσται γενόμενον γένος. ἔτι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ἕν· εἰ γὰρ γένει ἕν, οὐ κυρίως ἕν. ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἓν οὐχ ὡς γένος κατ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν λέγεται, οὐ γένος δὲ λέγεται, οὕτως οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἕν, γένος ἂν εἴη οὔτε τοῦ

[1] transpos. H–S².
[2] del. Page, Harder.

[1] Plotinus is here using the Stoic scale of degrees of unification; it appears more clearly in ch. 11, 8–9 and VI. 9.4–8; cp. also V. 5.4. 31. For the scale in the Stoics see *SVF* II 366–8 and 1013; Philo *On The Eternity of the World* 79; Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VIII 102 (= *Against the Logicians* I 102 in Bury's Loeb edition).

10. How then is each individual belonging to being one? Now by being a particular one it is not one—for it is already many by being a particular one—but each of the specific forms is equivocally one: for a specific form is a multiplicity, so that "one" here is [used as it is of] an army or a chorus.[1] So then the one there [in being] is not in these, so that the one is not a common term and it is not the same one which is observed in being and in particular beings. So that the one is not a genus; since every genus of which the one is truly predicated as genus can no longer have the opposites truly predicated of it; but in that the one and the opposites are truly predicated of every being, the one will not be predicated as their genus. So that it will not be truly predicated of the first genera either, since the one being also is not more one than many, nor is any one of the other genera one in such a way as not to be many, nor can [the one be truly predicated] of the others which come after, which are in every way many. But in general, no genus is one: so, if the one is a genus, it will destroy its unity. For "the one is not a number" [2]; but it will be a number if it has become a genus. Further, the one is one in number: for if it was one in genus, it would not be properly one. Further, just as in the numbers the one is not there as a genus predicated of them but is said to exist in them, but not said to be their genus, so, even if the one is in the beings, it would not be the genus either of being or of the other [genera] or of all of

[2] Aristotle *Metaphysics* N 1. 1088a6.

ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν πάντων. ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἀρχὴ μὲν ἂν εἴη τοῦ οὐχ ἁπλοῦ, οὐ μὴν τούτου καὶ γένος—ἁπλοῦν γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ἁπλοῦν—οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ τὸ ἓν ἀρχή, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ γένος. ἔσται οὖν οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔσται, τῶν "ἓν" ἑκάστων, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιώσειε χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἕν. τινῶν οὖν ἔσται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ὂν οὐ πάντων γένος, ἀλλὰ τῶν "ὄν" εἰδῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν "ἓν" ἑκάστων εἰδῶν. τίς οὖν διαφορὰ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο καθὸ ἕν, ὥσπερ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο ὄντος διαφορά; ἀλλ' εἰ συμμερίζεται τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ τὸ ὂν τῷ μερισμῷ καὶ τῷ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἓν τοσαῦτα φαινόμενον ὅσα ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἴσα μεριζόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος; ἢ πρῶτον οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ἐνυπάρχει πολλοῖς, γένος εἶναι οὔτε αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχει, οὔτε ἄλλων· οὐδ' ὅλως, εἴ τι κοινόν, πάντως γένος. τὸ γοῦν σημεῖον ἐνυπάρχον ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὐ γένος οὔτε αὐτῶν οὔτε ὅλως, οὐδέ γε, ὥσπερ ἐλέγετο, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἓν οὔτε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ ⟨ἓν⟩ ἐν[1] πολλοῖς καὶ διαφοραῖς οἰκείαις χρῆσθαι καὶ εἴδη ποιεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι. τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς τίνες ἂν εἶεν διαφοραὶ ἢ ποῖα

[1] ⟨ἓν⟩ ἐν Ficinus, suspic. Creuzer, scr. Theiler: ἐν BxUC, Kirchhoff: ἓν w, Perna, Creuzer.

them. Further, just as the simple might be principle of the non-simple, but could not also be its genus—for [if it were,] the non-simple would also be simple—so with the one, if the one is principle, it will not also be genus of the things posterior to it. It will not therefore be the genus either of being or of the other [genera]. But if it is going to be a genus, it will be the genus of the particular "ones", as if one were to think it right to separate the one from substance. It will be, then, a genus of particular things. For, just as being is not the genus of all things but of the specific forms which "are", so the one will be the genus of the particular specific forms which "are one". What then will be the difference of one from another in so far as they are one, as there is a difference of being of one from another? But if the one is divided along with being and substance, and being by the division and by being observed in many things as the same is a genus, why could not the one be a genus since it appears as many things as substance and is divided into an equal number of parts? Now, first of all it is not necessary, if something exists in many things, that it should be a genus, either of the things in which it exists or of other things; nor, in general, if something is common, is it at all necessary for it to be a genus. At any rate the point, which exists in the lines, is not a genus, either of them or generally speaking, nor, as was said, is the one in the numbers a genus either of the numbers or the other things. For that which is common and one in many things must employ differentiations which belong to itself and make specific forms and make them in its essential being. But what are the differentiations of the one or what

γεννᾷ εἴδη; εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ εἴδη ποιεῖ, ἃ περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὄνομα μόνον θάτερον, καὶ ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄν.

11. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἕν, καὶ πῶς ὁ λεγόμενος μερισμὸς καὶ ὅλως ὁ τῶν γενῶν, καὶ εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος ἑκάτερος. πρῶτον οὖν, πῶς ὅλως ἓν ἕκαστον ὁτιοῦν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν, εἶτα εἰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ὄντι λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖ λέγεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων ἓν οὐ ταὐτόν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν νοητῶν—ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν—οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμοίως· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἐν χορῷ καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ νηὶ καὶ οἰκίᾳ οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ. ἀλλ' ὅμως πάντα τὸ αὐτὸ μιμεῖται, τυγχάνει δὲ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐν τῷ νῷ· ψυχὴ γὰρ μία καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον νοῦς εἷς καὶ τὸ ὂν ἕν. ἆρ' οὖν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ λέγοντες ἓν λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἔχει ὄντος, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἑνός; ἢ συμβέβηκε μὲν τοῦτο, οὐ μέντοι, καθὸ ὄν, καὶ ἕν, ἀλλ' ἔστι μὴ ἧττον ὂν ὑπάρχον ἧττον εἶναι ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἧττον ⟨ὂν⟩[1] στρατὸς ἢ χορὸς οἰκίας, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἧττον ἕν. ἔοικεν οὖν τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἓν πρὸς ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον βλέπειν, καὶ καθόσον τυγχάνει ἀγαθοῦ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἕν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοῦ ἓν ἐν

[1] Igal, H–S².

specific forms does it generate? But if it makes the same specific forms as occur in the sphere of being, it would be the same as being, and one of the two would be only a name, and being is sufficient.

11. But we must investigate how the one is in being, and how what we speak of as division [works], and in general the division of the genera, and if it is the same [as the division of being] or different in each of the two cases. First, then, how in general each and every thing is called one, and then if we mean the same [by "one" when we speak of it] in the one being and as transcendent. Now the one over all things is not the same; for [we do not mean] the same [by "one"] in the case of perceptible and of intelligible things—and certainly being is not [one in the same sense as the others]—[and it does not mean] the same in the case of perceptible things in comparison with each other; for it is not the same in a chorus and an army and a ship and a house, and not the same in these last and in what is continuous. But nevertheless all try to represent the same [One], but some attain only a remote resemblance, some come nearer, and attain it already more truly in Intellect: for soul is one and Intellect and being are still more one. So we then in each thing when we say its being also say its "one", and is it with its "one" as it is with its being? This happens incidentally, but a thing is not therefore one in proportion to its being, but it is possible to have no less real an existence but to be less one. For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, but all the same it is less one. It seems then that the one in each thing looks more to good, and in so far as it attains to good it is also one, and being more or less one lies in this; for each thing

τούτῳ· εἶναι γὰρ θέλει ἕκαστον οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ μὴ ἓν ὡς δύναται σπεύδει ἓν γενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν φύσει αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει συνιόντα εἰς ταὐτὸν ἑνοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς θέλοντα· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων σπεύδει ἕκαστα, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ εἰς αὑτά· καὶ ψυχαὶ πᾶσαι εἰς ἓν ἂν βούλοιντο ἰέναι μετὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν. καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ εἰς ὅ· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἓν καὶ σπεύδει εἰς τὸ ἕν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπέστη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὁτιοῦν ὑποστάν τε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέχοιτο μὴ πρὸς τὸ ἓν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχον. τὰ μὲν δὴ φύσει οὕτω· τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις αὐτὴ ἑκάστη ἕκαστον πρὸς τοῦτο καθόσον δύναται καὶ ὡς δύναται ἐκεῖνα οὕτως ἄγει.[1] τὸ δὲ ὂν μάλιστα πάντων τούτου τυγχάνει· ἐγγὺς γάρ. ὅθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγεται ὃ λέγεται μόνον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος· καὶ γάρ, εἴ ποτε λέγοιμεν εἷς, πρὸς δύο λέγομεν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὸ ἓν λέγομεν, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προστιθέντες λέγομεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος λέγομεν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἓν ὂν καὶ ἀξιοῦμεν ὡς ἓν ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν σφόδρα αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν συνουσίαν. γίγνεται οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕν. τί οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ κοινὸν θεωρούμενον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς κοινὸν τὸ σημεῖον καὶ οὐ γένος τῶν γραμμῶν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς κοινὸν τὸ ἓν δὴ ἴσως τοῦτο καὶ οὐ γένος· οὐδὲ

[1] Sleeman, Theiler: λέγει BxUC: λέγοι w: ποιεῖ Müller: τελεῖ Seidel.

wishes not just for being, but for being together with the good. For this reason things which are not one strive as far as they can to become one, natural things by their very nature coming together, wishing to be united in identity with themselves; for all individual things do not strive to get away from each other, but towards each other and towards themselves; and all souls would like to come to unity, following their own nature. And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go; for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One. For in this way they also strive towards the Good; for nothing whatever among the real beings could have come to exist or endure in existence if its striving was not directed towards the One. This is how it is with the things in nature. But as for the things of art, each art brings each of its products to this as far as it can and as far as their capacity allows. Being attains this most of all: for it is near. For this reason the other things are called only what they are called, man for instance; for even if we do sometimes say "one man", we say this in comparison with two; but if we do use the one in other contexts, we do so by adding, beginning from itself. But in the case of being we call this whole "one-being" and by indicating it as one claim its close communion with the Good. So the one in it also is principle and goal, but not in the same way, but otherwise, as there is prior and posterior also in that which is one. What then is the one in it? Is it not observed to be alike in all the parts and common? Now, first of all the point is common in lines and is not the genus of lines; there is something common in numbers, very likely this one, and it is not a genus:

γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἓν τῷ[1] ἐπὶ μονάδος καὶ δυάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δ' ὕστερα εἶναι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸ ἓν τοῖς τοῦ ὄντος, διαφορὰ οὐκ οὖσα αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ εἴδη ποιεῖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἴδη, οὐδὲ γένος αὐτὸ δύναται εἶναι.

12. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω. πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ ἓν εἶναι ἕκαστον ἀψύχοις οὖσιν; ἢ κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ εἶναι ὅλως αὐτούς, ἡμεῖς περὶ ὄντων εἴπομεν, καθὸ ἓν ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ τὸ σημεῖον ζητοῖεν πῶς ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει, εἰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ φήσουσιν εἶναι, εἰ μὲν ἄψυχον φήσουσι, τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δ' ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ἐν κύκλῳ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐκείνου τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ σπεύδει ὡς δύναται διὰ τούτου ἐκεῖ. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὰ γένη ταῦτα; ἆρα κατακερματιζόμενα[2] ἕκαστα; ἢ ὅλον ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὧν γένος. καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἕν; ἢ τὸ γένει ἓν ὡς ἐν πολλοῖς ὅλον. ἆρ' οὖν μόνον ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν. ἀλλ' ἴσως σαφέστερον ἔσται ὕστερον.

13. Νῦν δέ, πῶς τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῖς πρώτοις, καὶ αὖ τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ποσὸν μὲν οὐ πρῶτον μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἅμα μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος. κίνησις

[1] Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.
[2] κατακ. U, Igal, H–S²: καὶ τὰ κ. wBxC.

for the one in the one itself is not the same as the one in the unit and the two and the other numbers. And then in being also nothing prevents some things from being prior and others posterior, and some simple and some composite. And if the one is the same in all things which belong to being, as there is no differentiation of it it does not make specific forms; but if there are no specific forms, it cannot itself be a genus.

12. And so much for this. But how does the good for numbers lie in their being each of them one when they are soulless? Now this is common also to other soulless things. But if anyone were to say that numbers do not exist at all, we for our part were speaking of existing things, in so far as each of them is one. But if they were to enquire how the point partakes of the good, if they are going to assert that it exists by itself, then, if they assert that it is soulless, their enquiry is the same as in the case of other things of the kind; but if in others, in the circle for instance, this is the good of the point and its desire is directed to this, and it will strive as far as it can towards the transcendent through this circle. But how can the genera be these things? Can they really be particulars, all chopped up small? No, the generic one is like a whole in many things. Does it exist only in the things which participate in it? No, but it exists both independently and in the things which participate in it. But perhaps this will be clearer later.

13. But now, why is the quantum not in the primary genera, and also the quale? Now, the quantum is not primary with the others because they are simultaneous with being. For movement is with

γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια ὄντος ζωὴ αὐτοῦ οὖσα· καὶ στάσις ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συνεισήει· μᾶλλον δὲ συνῆν τὸ εἶναι τούτοις ἑτέροις καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὥστε συνορᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτα. ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὕστερός τε ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ "ὕστερος" παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ὕστερα ἐν προτέροις· ὥστε ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις οὐκ ἂν καταριθμοῖτο· ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ὅλως γένος. τὸ μέντοι μέγεθος ἔτι μᾶλλον ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐν τῷδε καὶ γραμμὴ δύο τινὰ καὶ ἐπίπεδον τρία. εἰ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔχει καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς μέγεθος τὸ ποσόν, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὄντος γένους πῶς ἂν τοῦτο ἔχοι; ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν τὸ ποσοῖς, τί τοῦτό ἐστι ληπτέον, καὶ εὑρόντας θετέον γένος ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· καὶ εἰ γένος μὴ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, εἴς τι ἀνακτέον τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν εἰς τὰ πρῶτα. δῆλον τοίνυν ἴσως, ὅτι ὅσον τι δηλοῖ ἡ τοῦ ποσοῦ φύσις καὶ μετρεῖ τὸ ὅσον ἑκάστου αὐτή τε ὅσον τι. ἀλλ' εἰ κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους τὸ ὅσον, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρῶτος, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ἢ ὅλως ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν μίξει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος κίνησίς τις ἢ ἐκ κινήσεως, τῆς μὲν κινήσεως εἰς ἀόριστον προϊούσης, τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τῇ ἐποχῇ τοῦ προϊόντος μονάδα ποιούσης. ἀλλὰ περὶ γενέσεως

being as the activity of being, since it is its life; and rest came in as well in substance itself; and still more is being same and other associated with these three classes, so that sameness and otherness also are seen together with them. But number is posterior to these classes and posterior to itself, and the posterior comes from the prior and numbers come one after another in order, and the posterior exist in the prior; so number could not be counted among the first genera; and we should enquire whether it is a genus at all. But magnitude is still more subsequent and composite; for it is number in this particular thing—and a line is some sort of two and a surface three. If then the continuous magnitude has its quantitativeness from number, if number is not a genus how could this have [the status of a genus]? And there is prior and posterior also in magnitudes. But if it is common to both numbers and magnitudes to be quantitative, we must grasp what this [being quantitative] is and, when we have found it, posit it as a posterior genus, not among the primary genera; and if it is a genus not among the primary ones, it must be referred back to one of the primary genera or to one of those which go back to them. So it is perhaps clear that the nature of the quantum signifies a definite quantity and it measures how much each thing is and is itself a so much. But if definite quantity is common to number and magnitude, then either number is primary and magnitude comes from it, or number consists altogether in a mixture of movement and rest, but magnitude is a movement or derives from movement; movement goes forward into the indefinite, but rest in holding back what is going forward makes the unit. But we must consider later

ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑποστάσεως ὕστερον καὶ ἐπινοίας θεωρητέον. τάχα γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γένεσι, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ὕστερον ἐν συνθέσει· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἑστώτων, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἐν κινήσει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον, ὡς φαμεν.

14. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; ἢ ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ὕστερον καὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. [δεῖ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν παρακολουθοῦντα ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν πρώτην, μὴ ἐκ τούτων δὲ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν μηδὲ διὰ τούτων συμπληροῦσθαι· ἢ εἴη ἂν ὑστέρα ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος.][1] ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς συνθέταις οὐσίαις καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν, ἐν αἷς καὶ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ ποσότητες[2] διαλλαγὴν ἐποίησαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ποιότητες εἶεν ἂν καὶ κοινότης τις ἐν αὐταῖς θεωρηθήσεται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις γένεσι τὴν διαίρεσιν οὐχ ἁπλῶν καὶ συνθέτων δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶν καὶ τῶν τὴν οὐσίαν συμπληρούντων, οὐ τὴν τινὰ οὐσίαν. [τὴν μὲν γὰρ τινὰ οὐσίαν συμπληροῦσθαι καὶ ἐκ ποιότητος οὐδὲν ἴσως ἄτοπον, ἐχούσης ἤδη τὴν οὐσίαν πρὸ τῆς ποιότητος, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ἔξωθεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἃ ἔχει οὐσιώδη ἔχειν.][1] καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἠξιοῦμεν τὰ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας συμπληρωτικὰ ὁμωνύμως ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἔξωθεν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχοντα ποιά, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ μετ' αὐτὰς ἤδη πάθη. νῦν δὲ λέγομεν οὐκ οὐσίας ὅλως εἶναι συμπληρωτικὰ τὰ τῆς τινὸς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ οὐσίας προσθήκη γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος εἰς οὐσίαν· ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐσία ἄνωθεν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ζῷον ἤδη, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἥκειν.

[1] del. H–S² ut e Simpl. huc insertum (cf. Schwyzer, *Mus. Helv.* 26, 1969, 265).

the coming into being of number and magnitude, or rather their real or notional existence. For perhaps number is among the first genera, but magnitude comes later in a composition; and number is of static things, but magnitude is in movement. But, as we say, we will discuss these questions later.

14. But as for the quale, why is it not among the primary genera? It is because this also is posterior and comes after substance. In composite substances, then, which are made up of many elements, and in which numbers and quantities produce their differentiation, there might also be qualities, and a certain common element will be discerned in them; but in the primary genera the distinction which must be made is not between simples and composites but between simples and those which make an essential contribution to substance, not to a particular substance. All the same, we did think it right to say elsewhere that the elements which contributed to the essential completion of substance were qualities only in name, but those which came from outside subsequent to substance were qualities [in the proper sense], and that those which were in substances were their activities, but those which came after them were already passive affections. But now we are saying that the elements of particular substance make no contribution at all to the completion of substance as such; for there is no substantial addition to the substance of man by reason of his being man; but he is substance at a higher level, before coming to the differentiation, as is also the living being before coming to the "reasonable".

[2] Rieth: ποιότητες Enn.

15. Πῶς οὖν τὰ τέτταρα γένη συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔπω ποιὰν οὐσίαν ποιοῦντα; οὐδὲ γὰρ τινά. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ὂν πρῶτον, εἴρηται, καὶ ὡς ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο οὐδ' ἡ στάσις οὐδὲ θάτερον οὐδὲ ταὐτόν, δῆλον· καὶ ὅτι οὐ ποιότητα ἐνεργάζεται ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, ἴσως μὲν φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ μᾶλλον ποιήσει σαφέστερον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ τὸ ὂν καὶ ὅλως τὰ πρῶτα, οὐκ ἂν συμβεβηκὸς εἴη ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν συμπληρωτικὸν ἔτι λέγοιτο, ἀλλ' αὐτή· ὥστε οὐκ ἐμβέβηκεν εἰς ὕστερόν τι οὐδ' εἰς ποιότητα, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἅμα τέτακται. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα κεκίνηται, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄν, εἶτα ἔστη· οὐδὲ πάθος ἡ στάσις· καὶ ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ θάτερον οὐχ ὕστερα, ὅτι μὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο πολλά, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅπερ ἦν ἓν πολλά· εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἑτερότης, καὶ εἰ ἓν πολλά, καὶ ταὐτότης. καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀρκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ πρὸς τὰ κάτω προϊέναι, τότε ἄλλα, ἃ οὐκέτι οὐσίαν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ ποιὰν οὐσίαν καὶ ποσὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ γιγνέσθω γένη οὐ πρῶτα.

16. Τὸ δὲ "πρός τι" παραφυάδι ἐοικὸς πῶς ἂν ἐν πρώτοις; ἑτέρου γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ οὐ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ σχέσις [καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο].[1] "ποῦ" δὲ καὶ "πότε" ἔτι πόρρω. τό τε γὰρ "ποῦ" ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὥστε δύο· τὸ δὲ

[1] del. Harder, Theiler.

15. How then do the four genera contribute to the completion of substance when they do not yet make it a kind of substance? For they do not make it a particular substance. It has been said that being is primary, and it is clear that movement cannot be other [than primary], nor rest, nor other, nor same; and it is perhaps also obvious that this movement does not produce quality, but if we say something about this, it will perhaps be clearer. For if movement is the activity of substance, and being and the primary genera altogether are actively actual, movement could not be something incidental, but, being the activity of what is actively actual, could not any longer be called something which contributes to the completion of substance, but is substance itself: so that it has not entered some subsequent genus, not even quality, but is ranked as simultaneous. For being is not first being and then in movement, nor is it first being and then at rest; nor is rest a passive affection of it; and same and other do not come after it, because it did not become many afterwards, but was what it was, one-many; but if it is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is also sameness. And these are enough for its substance; but when it is going to proceed to the lower levels, then there are others, which no longer make substance, but qualified and quantified substance, and let us grant that these are non-primary genera.

16. But how could "relation", which is like a side-shoot, be among the first [genera]? For the state of being related is of one thing to another and not of a thing to itself. "Where" and "when" are still further away. For the "where" means one thing in another, so that there are two; but the genus must be one, and

γένος ἓν δεῖ εἶναι, οὐ σύνθεσιν· καὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἐκεῖ· νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατ' ἀλήθειαν. ὅ τε χρόνος εἰ ἐκεῖ, σκεπτέον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὔ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς μέτρον, ἀλλὰ κινήσεως, δύο καὶ σύνθετον τὸ ὅλον καὶ κινήσεως ὕστερον, ὥστε οὐχ ὅπου κίνησις ἐν ἴσῃ διαιρέσει. τὸ δὲ "ποιεῖν" καὶ τὸ "πάσχειν" ἐν κινήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἐκεῖ τὸ πάσχειν· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν δὲ δύο· ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πάσχειν· οὐδέτερον οὖν ἁπλοῦν. καὶ τὸ "ἔχειν" δύο καὶ τὸ "κεῖσθαι" ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ οὕτως, ὥστε τρία.

17. Ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἣν δὴ λέγομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ' ἣς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς μὴ ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημῆναι οὕτω λέγομεν, γένος οὐδενὸς ἂν εἴη. οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλων λέγεται ἢ ἦν ἂν καθ' ὧν λέγεται ἕκαστον ἐκεῖνο λεγόμενον. καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας δὲ ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δ' ὡς ποιὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅλως τὸ ποιὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. τί οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις οὐκ ἀγαθόν; ἢ

[1] A very curious and paradoxical kind of intelligible "place" does appear in V. 8.4. 15–19 (cp. VI. 7.31–33): but the intelligible χώρα there is very different from the Aristotelian τόπος here. Plotinus' unwillingness to dismiss the question of time in the intelligible as summarily as he dismisses that of place should be noted. Perhaps he was already planning the work *On Eternity and Time* (III. 7 [45]), which follows VI, 1–3 immediately in Porphyry's chronological order. There are passages in this and one or two elsewhere in the *Enneads* which anticipate and may have provided the starting-point for the doctrine of a higher time on the intelligible level in Iamblichus and his successors. See IV. 4 (28). 16. 13–16; VI. 7 (38). 1. 54–58; III.

not a compound; and there is not any place in the intelligible world; but now we are speaking of the things which truly exist. And we must consider whether time is there; but it is more likely that it is not.[1] But if it is a "measure", and not just a measure, but a "measure of movement", there are two [components] and the whole is composite and posterior to movement, so that it is not where movement is in a division on the same level. But "acting" and "being affected" are in movement—if being affected is really in the intelligible world at all; and "acting" involves two; and so likewise does "being affected"; neither, therefore, is simple. And "having" implies two, and "position" means one thing in another, so that there are three.

17. But why are not the beautiful and the good and the virtues among the primary genera—and knowledge and intellect? As for the good, if it is the first, the nature which we certainly do call that of the good, of which nothing is predicated, but we call it this because we cannot indicate it in any other way, it could not be the genus of anything. For it is not predicated of other things, or each of the other things of which it was predicated would be spoken of as the good. And that good is before substance, not in substance. But if it is the good as a quale, the qualified in general is not among the primary gen-

7 (45). 7. 7–10; on anticipations of the later doctrine in the much-discussed chapter 11 of III. 7 see Peter Manchester "Time and the Soul in Plotinus III 7 [45] 11" in *Dionysius* II, 1978; for the later doctrine itself see S. Sambursky and S. Pines *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (a collection of passages with introduction and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.

πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλως καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνως ὡς τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ ὡς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ὡς ποιόν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔφαμεν γένη ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι κοινόν τι ἦν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἑωρᾶτο, γένος. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾶται ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις, διὰ τί οὐ γένος καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; ἢ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι θάτερον παρὰ θατέρου, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, ἢ ὅτι παρ' ἑνὸς πάντα τοῦ ἐπέκεινα, ἄλλα δ' ἄλλως κατὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ γένος ἐθέλει τις θέσθαι, ὕστερον· ὕστερον γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, κἂν ἀεὶ συνῇ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὂν καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ ἡ οὐσία οὐ δύναται μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἔχειν ταῦτα, ἠριθμημένα γένη, καὶ εἶναι ἓν πολλά. εἰ μέντοι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄντι—μὴ ὀκνοῖμεν λέγειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ἓν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῦ, ἵν' ἐκεῖθεν ἀγαθοειδὲς ᾖ—ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τούτῳ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ ἡ κίνησις, ἢ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἕν τι τῶν γενῶν.

18. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ, εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἡ πρώτη καλλονή, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν καὶ παραπλήσια λέγοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ

era. Well then, is the nature of being not good? First, it is so otherwise, and not in that way in which the first is; and the way in which it is good is not as a quale, but in itself. But we said that the other genera also were in themselves, and it was because it was something common and was seen in many things that it was a genus. If then the good is seen in each part of substance or of being, or in most of them, why is it not a genus, and among the primary ones? Now it is not the same in all the parts, but is present primarily and secondarily and subsequently: either because one good comes from another, the posterior from the prior, or because all come from the one transcendent Good, but different ones partake of it in different ways according to their own nature. But if someone does want to posit it also as a genus, it will be posterior; for a thing's being good is posterior to its being and its being something, even if it always accompanies them, but those [primary genera] belong to being as being and enter into substance. For that is the reason for the "beyond being",[1] since being and substance cannot help being many, but it must contain these, the genera we have counted up, and be one-many. But if the good is the one in being—let us not shrink from saying that its natural activity towards the One is its good, that it may be by it in the form of good—the good for being is its activity towards the Good; but this is its life; but this is movement, which is already one of the genera.

18. As for the beautiful, if the primary beauty is that [transcendent First], what could be said about it

[1] This is one of the clearest indications in Plotinus of how he understood the *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* of Plato *Republic* 509B8; cp. V. 5.6. 5–13.

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λόγοις· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ οἷον ἀποστίλβον, ὅτι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον τὸ ἐπιστίλβειν. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ οὐσία αὐτή, ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἴρηται. εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ὁρῶντας τῷ τοιόνδε πάθος ποιεῖν ἐστι, τοῦτο τὸ ἐνεργεῖν κίνησις, καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἡ ἐνέργεια, κίνησις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτοκίνησις ὄψις οὖσα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξις· ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τὴν κίνησιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὑπὸ τὴν στάσιν, ἢ καὶ ὑπ' ἄμφω· εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω, ὡς μικτόν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὕστερον τὸ μικτόν. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὂν νοοῦν καὶ σύνθετον ἐκ πάντων, οὐχ ἕν τι τῶν γενῶν· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς νοῦς ὂν μετὰ πάντων καὶ ἤδη πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τὸ δὲ ὂν [μόνον] [1] ψιλὸν εἰς γένος λαμβανόμενον στοιχεῖον αὐτοῦ. δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὅλως ἀρετὴ ἐνέργειαί τινες νοῦ πᾶσαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἐν πρώτοις καὶ ὕστερα γένος [2] καὶ εἴδη.

19. Γένη δὴ ὄντα τὰ τέτταρα ταῦτα καὶ πρῶτα ἆρα καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἴδη ποιεῖ; οἷον τὸ ὂν διαιροῖτο ἂν ἤδη ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὔ· ἐπειδὴ ἔξωθεν τοῦ γένους λαβεῖν δεῖ τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ εἶναι μὲν τοῦ

[1] delevimus, ut glossam ad ψιλόν.

[2] A (γένου A^{38}) EBxUC, Igal, H–S^2: γένους A^{pc}, Kirchhoff.

[1] For the possibility of beauty being either the First or the Second Hypostasis cp. I, 6.9. 40–43. In the great work III, 8 (30)—V. 8 (31)—V. 5 (32)—II. 9 (33) beauty is firmly identified as on the level of οὐσία, the Second Hypostasis. V. 5. 12 brings out the difference between this and the First

would be the same and similar to what was said about the Good; and if it is that which, one might say, shines out upon the Idea, [we could say that it is not the same in all] the Forms and that the shining upon them is posterior. But if the beautiful is nothing else but substance itself, it has been included in what was said about substance.[1] But if it is the beautiful in relation to us who see it by affecting us in this kind of way, this active actuality is movement, and if the activity is directed towards the transcendent, it is [still] movement. And knowledge is self-movement, since it is a sight of being and an active actuality, not a state; so that it also comes under movement—but, if you like, under rest, or under both; but if under both, it is as something mixed; and if so, the mixed is posterior. But Intellect, since it is being as intelligent and a composite of all [the genera], is not one of the genera; and the true Intellect is being with all its contents and already all beings, but being in isolation, taken as a genus, is an element of it. But righteousness and self-control and virtues in general are all particular activities of Intellect; so that they are not among the primary [genera] and genus and species [of virtue] are posterior.

19. Granted that these four are genera, and primary genera, does each of them by itself make species? Does being, for instance, already divide by itself without the others? No: since it must take its differentiations from outside the genus, and they are

particularly sharply. For the "shining" of beauty on the Idea see VI. 7.21–22. Cp. my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (*Plotinian and Christian Studies* XIX).

ὄντος διαφορὰς ᾗ ὄν, οὐ μέντοι τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτό. πόθεν οὖν ἕξει; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων. εἰ δὴ ἐξ ὄντων, ἦν δὲ τὰ γένη τὰ τρία τὰ λοιπά, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων καὶ μετὰ τούτων προστιθεμένων καὶ συνδυαζομένων καὶ ἅμα γινομένων. ἀλλὰ ἅμα γινόμενα τοῦτο δὴ ἐποίει τὸ ἐκ πάντων. πῶς οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶ μετὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων; καὶ πῶς γένη πάντα ὄντα εἴδη ποιεῖ; πῶς δὲ ἡ κίνησις εἴδη κινήσεως καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα; ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνο δεῖ παραφυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀφανίζοιτο ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι, μηθ' αὖ τὸ γένος κατηγορούμενον ᾗ μόνον ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις θεωρούμενον, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἐκείνοις ἅμα καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ μιγνύμενον αὖ καθαρὸν καὶ μὴ μιγνύμενον ὑπάρχῃ, μηδ' ἄλλως συντελοῦν εἰς οὐσίαν αὐτὸ ἀπολλύῃ. περὶ μὲν δὴ τούτων σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφαμεν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ὄντων νοῦν εἶναι ἕκαστον, πρὸ δὲ πάντων ὡς εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τιθέμεθα νοῦν εἶναι, τὸν ἤδη νοῦν ὕστερον λέγομεν εἶναι. καὶ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ποιησώμεθα καὶ οἷον παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι εἰς γνῶσιν τῶν λεγομένων αὐτοὺς ἐμβιβάζωμεν.

20. Λάβωμεν οὖν τὸν μὲν εἶναι νοῦν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν ἐν μέρει οὐδ' ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ ὁτιοῦν, ἵνα μὴ τὶς νοῦς γίγνοιτο, ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέρει εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐν εἴδει δὲ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ μερῶν· πᾶσα μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύναμις πάντων,

differentiations of being as being, but the differentiations are not being itself. Where will it get them from, then? Certainly not from non-beings. But if it got them from being and the three remaining genera existed, it is clear that the differentiations arose from them and with them, applied to being and coupled with it and coming to be simultaneous with it. But by coming to be simultaneous with it they made what is composed of all. How then do the others exist along with that which is from all? And how if they are all genera do they make species? How does movement make species of movement, and rest, and the other ones? For we must be careful about this, that each genus does not disappear in its species, and that the genus is not only predicated as observed in them, but that it is both in the species and in itself, and must be at once mingled and pure and unmingled, and must not contribute uselessly to substance by destroying itself. We shall have to consider these questions. But since we asserted that what is composed of all beings is each individual intelligence, but posited that the being and substance prior to all as species and parts was Intellect, we are saying that Intellect as it is is posterior. Well then, let us make this difficulty profitable for our enquiry and by using it as a kind of example embark upon getting to understand what we are saying.

20. Let us then apprehend one Intellect which in no way applies itself to partial things and is not active about anything in particular, so that it may not become a particular intellect, like the knowledge before the specific partial forms of knowledge and the knowledge in specific form before the parts in it; for every body of knowledge is none of its partial

ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκεῖνο, καὶ δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως· αἱ μὲν ἐν εἴδει, αἱ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ δυνάμει κεῖνται, αἱ δὴ τὸ ἐν εἴδει λαβοῦσαι, δυνάμει εἰσὶν ἡ ὅλη· κατηγορεῖται γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα, οὐ μόριον τῆς πάσης· αὐτήν γε μὴν δεῖ ἀκέραιον ἐφ' αὑτῆς εἶναι. οὕτω δὴ ἄλλως μὲν νοῦν τὸν ξύμπαντα εἰπεῖν εἶναι, τὸν πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντων, ἄλλως δὲ νοῦς ἑκάστους,[1] τοὺς μὲν ἐν μέρει ἐκ πάντων πληρωθέντας, τὸν δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστα, δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τῷ καθόλου ἐκείνους, ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν μέρει οὖσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου, ὡς ἡ τὶς ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἐπιστήμην. καὶ εἶναι καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν τὸν μέγαν νοῦν καὶ ἑκάστους αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι αὖ τοὺς ἐν μέρει τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τοῖς ἐν μέρει, ἑκάστους ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάντας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντι δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντι τὰ πάντα ἅμα, δυνάμει δὲ ἕκαστον χωρίς, τοὺς δ' αὖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ὅ εἰσι, δυνάμει δὲ τὸ ὅλον. καθόσον μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ὃ λέγονταί εἰσιν, ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσὶν ἐκεῖνο ὃ λέγονται· ᾗ δ' ἐν γένει ἐκεῖνο, δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο. ὃ δ' αὖ, ᾗ μὲν γένος, δύναμις πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ εἰδῶν καὶ

[1] νοῦς ἑκάστους Igal, H–S²: ἐκ δὲ ἑκάστους A (exp. et in mg. scr. *aliter* ἑκάστου ἑκάστους δὲ A³) EBR^{ac}CU (δε): ἐκδεεκάστους J: ἑκάστους, ἑκάστους δὲ Creuzer: ἑκάστους R^{pc}, Kirchhoff.

contents but the potentiality of all of them, but each part is actually that part which it is, and potentially all of them, and the same is true of universal knowledge: the specific bodies of knowledge, which lie potentially in the whole, those, that is, which grasp the specific contents, are potentially the whole; for the whole is predicated of them, not a part of the whole; yet it must certainly be pure and independent. Thus we can certainly say that universal Intellect exists in one way—that is the one before those which are actually the particular intellects—and particular intellects in another, those which are partial and fulfilled from all things; but the Intellect over all of them directs the particular intellects, but is their potentiality and contains them in its universality; and they on the other hand in their partial selves contain the universal Intellect, as a particular body of knowledge contains knowledge. And [we can say that] the great Intellect exists by itself, and so do the particular intellects which are in themselves, and again that the partial intellects are comprehended in the whole and the whole in the partial; the particular ones are on their own and in another, and that great Intellect is on its own and in those particular; and all are potentially in that Intellect which is on its own, which is actually all things at once, but potentially each particular separately, and the particular intellects are actually what they are, but potentially the whole. For in so far as they are this which they are called, they are actually that which they are called; but in that they are generically that whole, they are potentially that whole. And it again, in that it is the genus, is the potentiality of all the species under it and none of

οὐδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἥσυχα· ἦ δὲ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνεργείᾳ, τῶν οὐ καθέκαστα. δεῖ δή, εἴπερ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσονται οἱ ἐν εἴδει, τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν αἰτίαν γίγνεσθαι.

21. Πῶς οὖν μένων αὐτὸς ἓν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ἐν μέρει ποιεῖ; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν πῶς ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ἐκείνων τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς. ὅρα τοίνυν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ νῷ καὶ ἀμηχάνῳ, οὐ πολυλάλῳ ἀλλὰ πολύνῳ νῷ τῷ πάντα νῷ καὶ ὅλῳ καὶ οὐ μέρει οὐδὲ τινὶ νῷ, ὅπως ἔνι τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ πάντως ἔχει ἐν τούτοις οἷς ὁρᾷ, καὶ ἔστι δὲ ἓν καὶ πολλά, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ θαυμασταὶ δυνάμεις οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἅτε καθαραὶ οὖσαι μέγισταί εἰσι καὶ οἷον σφριγῶσαι καὶ ἀληθῶς δυνάμεις, οὐ τὸ μέχρι τινὸς ἔχουσαι· ἄπειροι τοίνυν καὶ ἀπειρία καὶ τὸ μέγα. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ μέγα σὺν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καλῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀγλαΐᾳ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ ὡς ἐν νῷ ὄντα ἰδὼν ὁρᾷς καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἤδη ἐπανθοῦν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐνεργείας μέγεθος προφαινόμενον τῇ σῇ προσβολῇ ἐν ἡσύχῳ κείμενον, ἑνὸς δὲ καὶ δύο ὄντων καὶ τριῶν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τριττὸν ὂν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν πᾶν. τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ἑνορωμένου καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ἄμφω εἰς ἓν ἰόντων καὶ οἷον γινομένων καὶ σχῆμα ὅρα. εἰσπίπτοντος δὲ τοῦ θατέρου καὶ διαιροῦντος καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν σχημάτων τε διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητος ἄλλαι. καὶ ταὐτότης μὲν

them in actuality, but all rest quietly in it; but in that it is actually what it is before the species, it belongs to the non-particulars. But certainly, if the intellects in specific form are going to exist, the activity proceeding from universal Intellect must be the cause.

21. How then does Intellect itself, remaining one in its essential structure, produce the partial beings? This is the same [as asking] how from those four primary genera the things which we call subsequent proceed. Well then, see how in this great, this overwhelming Intellect, not full of talk but full of intelligence, this Intellect which is all things and a whole, not a partial or particular intellect, all things which come from it are present. It certainly has number in the things which it sees, and it is one and many, and the many are its powers, wonderful powers, not weak but because they are pure the greatest of powers, fresh and full of life, we may say, and truly powers, without any limit to their action: so they are infinite, and infinity [is there] and greatness. Then when you see existing in it in the way proper to Intellect this greatness, along with the beauty that there is in it of its substance and the glory and the light around it, you see quality also, already in flower on it; and with the continuity of its activity you see magnitude, quietly at rest, appearing to your gaze; there are one and two and three, magnitude and all that is quantitative being the third. And when you see quantity and quality in it, both tending to one and in a way becoming one, then observe figure also appearing. Then otherness tumbles in and separates quantity and quality, and there are differences of figures and other qualities. And

συνοῦσα ἰσότητα ποιεῖ εἶναι, ἑτερότης δὲ ἀνισότητα ἐν ποσῷ ἔν τε ἀριθμῷ ἔν τε μεγέθει, ἐξ ὧν καὶ κύκλους καὶ τετράγωνα καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀνίσων σχήματα, ἀριθμούς τε ὁμοίους καὶ ἀνομοίους, περιττούς τε καὶ ἀρτίους. οὖσα γὰρ ἔννους ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἀτελὴς οὐδὲν παραλείπει ὧν εὑρίσκομεν νῦν νοερὸν ἔργον ὄν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς δυνάμει ὄντα αὐτὰ ἔχουσα ὡς ἂν νοῦς ἔχοι. ἔχει δὲ νοῦς ὡς ἐν νοήσει, νοήσει δὲ οὐ τῇ ἐν διεξόδῳ· παραλέλειπται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα λόγοι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν εἷς οἷον λόγος, μέγας, τέλειος, πάντας περιέχων, ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων αὐτοῦ ἐπεξιών, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀεὶ ἐπεξελθών, ὥστε μηδέποτε τὸ ἐπεξιέναι ἀληθὲς εἶναι. ὅλως γὰρ πανταχοῦ, ὅσα ἄν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ λάβοι ἐν τῇ φύσει ὄντα, ταῦτα εὑρήσει ἐν νῷ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ὄντα, ὥστε νομίζειν τὸ ὂν νοῦν λελογισμένον οὕτω ποιῆσαι, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν τὰ ζῷα ποιούντων· ὡς γὰρ ἂν ὁ ἀκριβέστατος λογισμὸς λογίσαιτο ὡς ἄριστα, οὕτως ἔχει πάντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πρὸ λογισμοῦ οὖσι. τί χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἐν τοῖς ⟨ἀνωτέρω⟩[1] πρὸ φύσεως καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ [ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω][2] εἶναι; ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ νοῦς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτὸν οὔτε τὸ ὂν αὐτοῖς οὔτε ὁ νοῦς, ἀμογητὶ ⟨πᾶν⟩[1] ἂν εἴη ἄριστα ἔχον, εἴπερ κατὰ νοῦν κείσεται, καὶ τοῦτο ὄν, ὃ θέλει νοῦς καὶ ἔστι· διὸ καὶ ἀληθινὸν καὶ πρῶτον· εἰ γὰρ παρ' ἄλλου, ἐκεῖνο νοῦς. σχημάτων δὴ πάντων ὀφθέντων ἐν

[1] Igal, H–S².
[2] del. H–S: *ἐν τοῖς* del. Müller.

sameness, which is there as well, makes equality exist, and otherness, inequality, in quantity, number and magnitude, and from these derive circles and squares and figures with unequal sides, and like and unlike numbers, and odd and even. For since its life is intelligent and its activity without imperfection, it leaves out none of the things which we now find to be works of intelligence, possessing them as realities and in the manner proper to Intellect. Intellect possesses them as in thought, but not the discursive kind of thought; but nothing is left out of all the things of which there are intelligible forming principles, but Intellect is like one great complete intelligible principle embracing them all, and it goes through them starting from its own first principles, or rather it has always gone through them, so that it is never true that it is going through them. For in general everywhere, whatever one might apprehend by reasoning as being in nature one will find existing without reasoning in Intellect, so as to think that Intellect has made being as it is after reasoning—it is like the rational forming principles which make living beings: for as the most accurate reasoning would calculate was best, so are all things in the rational principles before reasoning. What, then, should one expect in the higher principles before nature and the principles in it? For in those of which the substance is nothing else than Intellect, and neither being nor intellect is brought to them from outside, there would be no trouble about everything being for the best, if it is disposed according to Intellect and is what Intellect wills and is; therefore it is true and primary: for if it came from another, that other would be Intellect. Now all figures have

τῷ ὄντι καὶ ποιότητος ἁπάσης—ἦν γὰρ οὔ τις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν εἶναι μίαν τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐνούσης, ἀλλὰ μία καὶ πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ταὐτότης ἦν· ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλά, καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ὥστε ἐν πᾶσιν εἴδεσι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά· μεγέθη δὴ διάφορα καὶ σχήματα διάφορα καὶ ποιότητες διάφοροι· οὐ γάρ ἦν οὐδέ θεμιτὸν ἦν παραλελεῖφθαι οὐδέν· τέλειον γάρ ἐκεῖ τὸ πᾶν ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν πᾶν—καὶ ζωῆς ἐπιθεούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ συνούσης πανταχοῦ, πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῷα ἐγίνετο, καὶ ἦν καὶ σώματα ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος ὄντων. γενομένων δὲ πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ μενόντων καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶναι αἰῶνι περιληφθέντων, χωρὶς μὲν ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν ὄντων, ὁμοῦ δ' αὖ ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντων, ἡ πάντων ἐν ἑνὶ ὄντων οἷον συμπλοκὴ καὶ σύνθεσις νοῦς ἐστι. καὶ ἔχων μὲν τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὑτῷ ζῷόν ἐστι παντελὲς καὶ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον, τῷ δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄντι παρέχων ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶσθαι νοητὸν γενόμενος ἐκεῖ νῷ[1] δίδωσιν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.

22. Καὶ ᾐνιγμένως Πλάτωνι τὸ ᾗπερ οὖν νοῦς ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ οἵαί τε ἔνεισι καὶ ὅσαι καθορᾷ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ μετὰ νοῦν, καθόσον ψυχὴ ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐν τῷ πρὸ αὐτῆς βέλτιον καθορᾷ· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν ἔχων ἐν τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ βέλτιον καθορᾷ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ καθορᾷ μόνον, ἐν

[1] Igal: ἐκείνῳ BxUC, H–S: ἐκείνων w.

been seen in being and all quality—not a particular quality; for it could not be one since the nature of the other is there, but one and many; for sameness is there also: one and many, and being is like this from the beginning, so that the one and many is in all its specific forms; magnitudes are various and figures various and qualities various; for it was not possible or lawful for anything to be left out; for the intelligible All is complete, or it would not be the All—and since life is running over it, or rather everywhere accompanying it, all things necessarily become living beings, and there are bodies there also since there is matter and quality. Since all things eternally come into being and eternally abide, and are in eternity comprehended in being, each of them being what it is and all again being in one, the complex and construction, as we may put it, of all in one is Intellect. And since it has the real beings in itself it is a "complete" living being and "the absolute living being" [1]; but by giving itself to that which comes from it to behold, by becoming intelligible, it allows the transcendent Intellect to be rightly so called.[2]

22. And Plato speaks riddlingly of "the way in which Intellect sees the Ideas in the complete living creature [observing] of what kind they are and how many they are". For Soul too, which comes after Intellect, though in so far as it is Soul it has [the Forms] in itself, sees them better in that which is before it; and our intellect, though it has them, sees them better in that which is before it; for in itself it

[1] Plato *Timaeus* 31B1 and 39E7–9.

[2] I adopt here Igal's ἐκεῖ νῷ for ἐκείνῳ, a very small change which gives a clearer sense.

δὲ τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ καθορᾷ ὅτι καθορᾷ. ὁ δὴ νοῦς οὗτος, ὃν φαμεν καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἀπαλλαγεὶς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὤν, ἅτε ὢν ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θατέρου φύσιν συνοῦσαν ἔχων, εἷς πολλὰ γίνεται. εἷς δὲ νοῦς καὶ πολλὰ ὢν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς νοῦς ποιεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς τοιαύτης. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λαβεῖν καὶ ἄτομον· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς, εἶδος· ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο αἰνιττόμενος ὁ Πλάτων εἰς ἄπειρά φησι κατακερματίζεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν. ἕως μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος, οἷον ἐκ γένους, οὔπω ἄπειρον· περατοῦται γὰρ τοῖς γεννηθεῖσιν εἴδεσι· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον εἶδος ὃ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς εἴδη, μᾶλλον ἄπειρον. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τότε δὲ ἤδη εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα ἐᾶν χαίρειν. ἀλλ' ὅσον μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἄπειρα· τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ περιληφθέντα εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἔρχεται ἤδη. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴν μέχρι τοῦ ἐσχάτου αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς ἤδη ἄπειρον παντάπασι. καὶ ἔστι νοῦς μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος μέρος, καίπερ τὰ πάντα ἔχων καὶ ὁ πᾶς, †καὶ οἱ αὐτοῦ μέρη ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ὄντες μέρος,† ψυχὴ δὲ μέρος μέρους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖ, τὰ ἐνεργούμενα οἱ ἄλλοι νοῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ψυχή. ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνεργούσης ὡς γένους ἢ εἴδους αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ ὡς εἴδη. καὶ τούτων αἱ ἐνέργειαι διτταί· ἡ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω νοῦς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω αἱ

[1] Plato *Parmenides* 144B4-C1.
[2] Plato *Philebus* 16E1–2.
[3] No satisfactory sense can be extracted either from

only sees, but in what is before it it also sees that it sees. Now this intellect of ours, which, we maintain, sees, is not separated from that before it, as it derives from it, and because it is many from one and has the nature of the other accompanying it, it becomes one-many. But the one Intellect, since it is also many, makes the many intellects as well by a necessity of this kind. But in general it is not possible to apprehend the numerical one and the individual; for whatever you apprehend is specific form; for it is without matter. So Plato makes this cryptic remark also, that "substance is cut up to infinity".[1] For as long as the division, of a genus for instance, arrives at another form, it is not yet infinite; for it is limited by the forms which have been generated; but the ultimate form which is not divided into forms is more infinite. This is the meaning of "at this point to let them go into the infinite and say goodbye to them".[2] But as far as they are on their own, they are infinite; but as soon as they are comprehended by the one they arrive at number. So then Intellect holds the soul which comes after it so that it is in number, and holds soul down to its last part, but its last part is altogether infinite. And an intellect of this kind is a part, although it contains all things, and the whole intellect ... but soul is a part of a part, but like an activity proceeding from it.[3] For when it is active in itself, the products of its activity are the other intellects, but when it acts outside itself, the product is Soul. And since Soul acts as genus or specific form, the other souls act as specific forms. And the activities of these are double: that which is directed above

Kirchhoff's text or that printed by Henry and Schwyzer in their first edition.

ἄλλαι δυνάμεις κατὰ λόγον, ἡ δὲ ἐσχάτη ὕλης ἤδη ἐφαπτομένη καὶ μορφοῦσα. καὶ τὸ κάτω αὐτῆς τὸ ἄλλο πᾶν οὐ κωλύει εἶναι ἄνω. ἢ καὶ τὸ κάτω λεγόμενον αὐτῆς ἴνδαλμά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παρῇ ἔξω. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν, πῶς τὸ ἔξω. καὶ μέχρι τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδώλου ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος ἅπας τέλεος ἐκ πάντων νοητῶν, ὥσπερ ὅδε μίμημα ὢν ἐκείνου, καθόσον οἷόν τε ἀποσῴζειν εἰκόνα ζῴου ζῷον αὐτό, ὡς τὸ γεγραμμένον ἢ τὸ ἐν ὕδατι φάντασμα τοῦ πρὸ ὕδατος καὶ γραφῆς δοκοῦντος εἶναι. τὸ δὲ μίμημα τὸ ἐν γραφῇ καὶ ὕδατι οὐ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοῦ μορφωθέντος ὑπὸ θατέρου. νοητοῦ τοίνυν εἰκὼν ἔχουσα ἰνδάλματα οὐ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, ἀλλὰ τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῷ πεποιηκότι, ὧν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ζῷον· ζῷον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, ἄλλως ἑκάτερον καὶ ἄμφω ἐν νοητῷ.

is intellect, that which is directed below is the other powers in proportion and order; the last of them is already grasping and shaping matter. And its underpart does not prevent all the rest from being above. Or rather, what we call its underpart is an image of it, but not cut off, but like images in mirrors, [which last] while the archetype is present outside. But one must understand what "outside" means. And as far as that which is before the image [extends] the total intelligible universe, completed from all intelligibles, like this universe here below, which is an image of that one, as far as it is possible for an image of the Living Being to preserve the Living Being itself, as a drawing or a reflection in water is the ghostly image of that which appears to be there before the water and the drawing. But the image in the drawing and the water is not of the composite, but of the one formed by the other. So then the image of the intelligible is not of its maker but of the things contained in the maker, which include man and every other living being: this here is a living being and so is that which made it, each in a different sense and both in the intelligible.

VI. 3. (44) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὅπῃ δοκεῖ, καὶ ὡς συμφώνως ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαν, εἴρηται. δεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερα τὰ αὐτὰ γένη θετέον, ἅπερ κἀκεῖ ἐθέμεθα, ἢ πλείω ἐνταῦθα πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἄλλα τιθέντας ἢ ὅλως ἕτερα, ἢ τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄλλως. δεῖ μέντοι τὸ "ταὐτὰ" ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ ὁμωνυμίᾳ λαμβάνειν· τοῦτο δὲ φανήσεται γνωσθέντων. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡμῖν ἥδε· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ περιείληπται, περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη [ζητεῖν διαιροῦντας][1] τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐστι ⟨ζητεῖν⟩[1] διαιροῦντας κατὰ γένη θεῖναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν φωνὴν διῃρούμεθα ἄπειρον οὖσαν εἰς ὡρισμένα ἀνάγοντες τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν εἰς ἕν, εἶτα πάλιν ἄλλο καὶ ἕτερον αὖ, ἕως εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα θέντες ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις εἶδος λέγοντες, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι γένος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα

[1] H–S².

VI. 3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

1. We have explained the way in which we think about substance and how it might accord with the thought of Plato. But we must also enquire about the other nature, whether we should posit the same genera which we posited in the intelligible, or more here below, adding others to those, or altogether different ones, or some as they were there but others otherwise. We must of course understand "the same" [genera] analogously and ambiguously: this will become obvious when we have got to know them. Our starting-point is this: since our discussion is about sense-objects and every sense-object is included in this universe of ours, it will be necessary in considering the universe to seek to divide its nature and distinguish its elements and arrange them by genera: as if we were to divide articulate sound,[1] which is unlimited, into limited sections by bringing back to one what is the same in many, and then to another one and again a different one, until we have brought each and every one of them into a definite number, calling the one under which individuals are classed a species, and the one under which species are classed a genus. Now in the case of articulate sound each and every species and all of them which

[1] This passage on the collection and division of sounds corresponds closely to Plato *Philebus* 17B-18C.

τὰ φανέντα εἰς ἓν ἦν ἀνάγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν πάντων στοιχεῖον ἢ φωνήν· ἐπὶ δὲ ὧν ζητοῦμεν οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὡς δέδεικται. διὸ δεῖ πλείω γένη ζητεῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἕτερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου καὶ οὐ συνώνυμον, ὁμώνυμον δὲ καὶ εἰκών. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ μίγματι καὶ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τὸ μέν ἐστι σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ψυχή—ζῷον γὰρ τὸ πᾶν—ἡ δὲ ψυχῆς φύσις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ νοητῷ καὶ οὐδ' ἁρμόσει οὐδ' εἰς οὐσίας τῆς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένης σύνταξιν, ἀφοριστέον, εἰ καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὅμως μὴν τῆς ἐνταῦθα πραγματείας, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος τοὺς πολίτας συντάξαι πόλεώς τινος, οἷον κατὰ τιμήσεις ἢ τέχνας, τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ξένους παραλίποι χωρίς. περὶ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων, ὅσα μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἢ διὰ τὸ σῶμα περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαίνει, περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον ὕστερον, ὅπως τακτέον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ζητῶμεν.

2. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας θεωρητέον συγχωροῦντας τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν ὁμωνύμως ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐφαρμόττειν τὴν ἔννοιαν ῥεόντων, ἀλλὰ γένεσιν οἰκείως λέγεσθαι. εἶτα τῆς γενέσεως τὰ μὲν τοιά, τὰ δὲ τοιά· καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἰς ἕν, τά τε ἁπλᾶ τά τε σύνθετα, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ἢ παρακολουθοῦντα, διαιροῦντας ἀπ'

[1] In VI. 1. 6 and 25.

have been discovered can be brought back to one, and we can predicate "letter" or "sound" of all; but in the case of the things we are investigating this is not possible, as has been shown.[1] Therefore we must look for more genera, and different ones in this All from those in the intelligible, since this All is different from that and it is not called the All in the same sense but in a different one, and is an image. But since here below also in the mixture and composition one element is body and the other soul—for the All is a living thing—and the nature of soul is in that intelligible All and will not fit into the classification of what is called substance here below, we must, even if it is difficult to do so, all the same leave soul out of the investigation in which we are at present occupied; just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance, left the resident foreigners out of account. But as regards the affections, which occur in soul with the body or because of the body, we must consider later how they are to be classed, when we are enquiring about things here below.

2. And first of all we should consider what is called substance, agreeing that the nature in the sphere of bodies can only be called substance ambiguously, or should not properly be called substance at all but coming into being, because it is adapted to the idea of things in flux. Then some of the things which belong to coming into being are of this kind, and some of that: there are bodies; these, both simple and composite, we put into one class; and then there are incidentals and consequentials, and these we should also distinguish from each

ἀλλήλων καὶ ταῦτα. ἢ τὸ μὲν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐπ' αὐτῇ, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ὡς γένος ἢ ὑφ' ἓν ἄμφω, ὡς οὐσίαν ἑκάτερον ὁμωνύμως ἢ γένεσιν. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους; πῶς δὲ γένος ἡ ὕλη καὶ τίνων; τίς γὰρ διαφορὰ ὕλης; ἐν τίνι δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τακτέον; εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἴη αὐτὸ ἡ σωματικὴ οὐσία, ἐκείνων δὲ ἑκάτερον οὐ σῶμα, πῶς ἂν ἐν ἑνὶ τάττοιτο καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ συνθέτου; πῶς δ' ἂν τὰ στοιχεῖά τινος μετ' αὐτοῦ; εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἀρχοίμεθα, ἀρχοίμεθ' ἂν ἀπὸ συλλαβῶν. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἀνάλογον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἡ διαίρεσις, λέγοιμεν ἂν ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὕλην, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ κινήσεως ἐνταῦθα τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ζωήν τινα καὶ τελείωσιν τῆς ὕλης, τῆς δὲ ὕλης τὴν οὐκ ἔκστασιν κατὰ τὴν στάσιν, καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον οὔσης καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἑτερότητος πολλῆς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος μᾶλλον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ὕλη οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ λαμβάνει τὸ εἶδος ὡς ζωὴν αὐτῆς οὐδὲ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἔπεισιν ἀλλαχόθεν οὐκ ὄν τι ἐκείνης. εἶτα ἐκεῖ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργεια καὶ κίνησις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἄλλο καὶ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ εἶδος στάσις αὐτῆς μᾶλλον καὶ οἷον ἡσυχία· ὁρίζει γὰρ ἀόριστον οὖσαν. τό τε ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ

other. Or there is one thing which is matter, and another which is the form upon it, and either each as a genus is separate or both fall under one genus, being each of them substance in the ambiguous sense or coming into being. But what is the common factor of matter and form? And how can matter be a genus, and a genus of what? For what essential differentiation is there belonging to matter? But in what genus is the product of both to be ranked? If the product of both is itself bodily substance, and each of them is not body, how could they be ranked in one and the same genus with the composite? And how could the elements[1] of a thing be ranked with the thing itself? But if we were to start with bodies, we should be starting with syllables. But why should we not say analogously, even if the division is not on the same lines, that instead of being in the intelligible there is matter here below, and instead of the intelligible movement there is form here below, a kind of life and perfection of matter, and that matter's not going out of itself corresponds to rest, and that there are sameness and otherness, since there is plenty of otherness, or rather unlikeness, here below? Now, first of all, matter does not hold or grasp form as its life or its activity, but form comes upon it from elsewhere and is not one of matter's possessions. Then, in the intelligible the form is activity and motion, but here below motion is something else and an incidental; but form is rather matter's rest and a kind of quietness: for it limits matter which is unlimited. And in the intelligible sameness and otherness belong to one thing, which

[1] Or "letters": cp. ch. 1, 18.

καὶ ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἕτερον μεταλήψει, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο, καί τι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον, οὐδ' ὡς ἐκεῖ εἴη ἄν τι ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τι ταὐτὸν καί τι ἕτερον. στάσις δὲ τῆς ὕλης πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἑλκομένης μεγέθη καὶ ἔξωθεν τὰς μορφὰς καὶ οὐκ αὐτάρκους ἑαυτῇ μετὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα γεννᾶν; ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀφετέον.

3. Πῶς δέ, λέγωμεν· ἔστι δὴ πρῶτον οὕτως, τὸ μὲν ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ μικτὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὰ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα· τῶν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὰ μὲν κατηγορούμενα μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότα· τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα. καὶ τὴν μὲν ὕλην κοινὸν μὲν καὶ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὐ μὴν γένος, ὅτι μηδὲ διαφορὰς ἔχει, εἰ μή τις τὰς διαφορὰς κατὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν πυρίνην, τὴν δὲ τὴν ἀέρος μορφὴν ἔχειν. εἰ δέ τις ἀρκοῖτο τῷ κοινῷ τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν οἷς ἐστιν ὕλην εἶναι, ἢ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρη, ἄλλως γένος ἂν εἴη· καὶ στοιχεῖον δὲ ἓν τοῦτο δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ στοιχείου γένους εἶναι. τὸ δὲ εἶδος προσκειμένου τοῦ "περὶ ὕλην" ἢ "ἐν ὕλῃ" τῶν μὲν ἄλλων εἰδῶν χωρίζει, οὐ μὴν περιλαμβάνει πᾶν εἶδος οὐσιῶδες. εἰ δὲ εἶδος λέγομεν τὸ

is both same and other, but here below a thing is other by participation and in relation to something else, and the same and other is some particular same and other, not as it might be in the intelligible but a particular same and a particular other which is something among the things which come later. But how can there be a rest of matter when it is being pulled into all sizes and gets its shapes from outside and is not sufficient in itself to generate the other things with these shapes? We must therefore reject this division.

3. But let us explain how we should divide; this is the way to begin with: it is one thing to be matter, another to be form, another to be the composite of both, and another to be the peripheral characteristics; and of these peripheral characteristics, some are only predicated, some are also incidental; and of the incidentals some are in these three [, matter, form and composite], but in other cases these three are in the incidentals; others are their activities, others their passive affections, and others consequences. And matter is common and in all the substances, but is certainly not a genus, because it has no essential differences, unless one understood the differences as one part having a fiery shape and one the shape of air. But if one was satisfied with what is common, that there is matter in all existing things, or that it is like a whole in relation to parts, it would be a genus in another sense; and this would be one element, and an element can be a genus. But the form, with the addition "about matter" or "in matter", separates from the other forms, but does not include all substantial form. But if we mean by form that which makes substance, and by rational forma-

ποιητικὸν οὐσίας καὶ λόγον τὸν οὐσιώδη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οὔπω τὴν οὐσίαν εἴπομεν πῶς δεῖ λαμβάνειν. τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰ τοῦτο μόνον οὐσίαν, ἐκεῖνα οὐκ οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ κἀκεῖνα καὶ τοῦτο, τί τὸ κοινὸν σκεπτέον. τὰ δὲ κατηγορούμενα μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι ἂν εἴη, οἷον αἴτιον εἶναι, στοιχεῖον εἶναι. τῶν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότων τὸ μὲν ποσὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν εἶναι, ἃ ἐν αὐτοῖς· τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα αὐτῶν καὶ πάθη ὡς κινήσεις, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, ὁ μὲν τῶν συνθέτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος. καὶ τὰ μὲν τρία εἰς ἕν, ⟨εἰ⟩[1] εὕροιμεν κοινόν τι τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὁμώνυμον οὐσίαν· εἶτα τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς, πρός τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, ἐν τόπῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ, κίνησις, τόπος, χρόνος. ἢ λειφθέντος[2] τόπου καὶ χρόνου περιττὸν τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ, ὥστε εἶναι πέντε, ὡς ἓν τῶν πρώτων τριῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς ἓν τὰ τρία, ἔσται ὕλη, εἶδος, συναμφότερον, πρός τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, κίνησις. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ πρός τι· περιεκτικὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον.

4. Τί οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τρισί, καὶ τί ἔσται, ὃ ταῦτα ποιεῖ οὐσίαν τὴν ἐν τούτοις; ἆρα ὑποβάθραν τινὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἕδρα δοκεῖ τῷ

[1] Igal, H–S².
[2] coniecimus: λῃφθέντος Enn.

tive principle that which is substantial according to the form, we have not yet said how substance is to be understood. But, as for that composed of both [matter and form], if this alone is substance, matter and form are not substances; but if they are also this, we must investigate what they have in common. But the characteristics which are only predicated would come under relation, being a cause or being an element for instance. And the incidental characteristics in the three would be quantitative or qualitative, in so far as they are in them; as for the cases where the three are in the incidentals, this would be like place and time; their activities and passive affections would be like movements; their consequences like place and time, the place a consequence of the composites, the time, the time of the movement. But the three will go into one, if we can find something common, the ambiguous substance here below; then the others will follow in order, relation, quantity, quality, in place, in time, movement, place, time. Or, if one leaves out place and time, "in place" and "in time" are superfluous, so that there are five, on the assumption that the first three are one; but if the first three do not go into one, there will be matter, form, composite, relation, quantity, quality, movement. Or these last also could go into relation: for it is more inclusive.

4. What is it, then, which is the same in the three, and what will it be which makes them substance, the substance in things here below? Is it a kind of base for everything else? But matter is thought to be a base and "seat"[1] for form, so that the form will not

[1] Plato *Timaeus* 52B1.

εἶδει εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἔσται ἐν οὐσίᾳ. τό τε σύνθετον ἄλλοις ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἕδρα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑποβεβλήσεται τοῖς συνθέτοις ἢ πᾶσί γε τοῖς μετὰ τὸ σύνθετον, οἷον ποσῷ, ποιῷ, κινήσει. ἀλλ' ἆρα τὸ "μὴ ἑτέρου" ὃ λέγεται; λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἄλλου τοῦ λελευκωμένου, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον δὲ ἑτέρου—λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἡμίσεος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ξύλον διπλάσιον—καὶ πατὴρ ἄλλου ᾗ πατήρ ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, καὶ τόπος δὲ πέρας ἄλλου, καὶ χρόνος μέτρον ἄλλου. πῦρ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου, οὐδὲ ξύλον καθὸ ξύλον ἄλλου, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἄλλου, οὐδὲ Σωκράτης, οὐδ' ὅλως ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶδος ἄλλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου πάθος ἦν. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὕλης εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ συναμφοτέρου μέρος· τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ταὐτόν· καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος ὅλου καὶ ἄλλου ὡς τοῦ ὅλου, οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρου ὄντος ἐκείνου, οὗ λέγεται· λευκὸν δὲ ὃ λέγεται εἶναι, ἑτέρου ἐστίν. ὃ οὖν ἄλλου ὂν ἐκείνου λέγεται, οὐκ οὐσία· οὐσία τοίνυν, ὃ ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ἢ μέρος ὂν τοιούτου συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι συνθέτου· ὄντος μὲν αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον μὲν ἢ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ

be included in substance. And the composite is a base and seat for other things, so that the form with the matter will be a base for the composites, or at least for all that come after the composites, quantity, quality, movement for instance. But then, is the same in the three what is called "not belonging to another"? For white and black belong to something else, that which has become white, and the double belongs to something else—I do not mean that it belongs to the half but I am speaking of a double-sized piece of wood—and a father is someone else's, in so far as he is a father; and knowledge belongs to another, in whom it is, and place is the boundary of another, and time the measure of another. But fire does not belong to something else, nor does a piece of wood in so far as it is a piece of wood, nor does man belong to something else, nor does Socrates, or "composite substance"[1] in general, or the substantive form belong to something else, because it is not an affection of something else. For form does not belong to matter, but is a part of the composite; and the form of man and man are the same thing; and matter is part of a whole, and belongs to another as belonging to the whole, and not in the sense that that of which it is said to be is another thing; but what is said to be white is the white of something else. That then which belongs to another and is said to be of that other is not substance: substance, that is, is what belongs to that which it is, or, if it is a part, is an essential completion of a composite of its own kind; for the composite is either or both parts of itself, but in relation to the composite each part is

[1] Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 3. 1043a30.

σύνθετον ἄλλον τρόπον ἐκείνου λεγόμενον· ἢ εἰ μὲν μέρος, πρὸς ἄλλο λεγόμενον, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ φύσει ἐν τῷ εἶναι ὅ ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου λεγόμενον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐπί τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη τῷ εἴδει, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον. ἢ οὔτε ἡ ὕλη ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἴδει—τελείωσις γὰρ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς καθόσον ὕλη καὶ καθόσον δυνάμει—οὐδ' αὖ τὸ εἶδος ἐν ταύτῃ· μεθ' οὗ γάρ τι ἀπαρτίζει ἕν τι, οὐκ ἔσται θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ, ἀλλ' ἄμφω ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοῦ ὑποκείμενα ἄλλῳ—οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ὑπόκεινται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ προϋπάρχουσι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν παρακολουθούντων—καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν τὰ ἄλλα καὶ περὶ ἣν[1] τὸ πάσχειν καὶ ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν.

5. Ἀκουστέον δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε οὐσίας λεγομένης· εἰ δέ πῃ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνης συμβαίνει, ἴσως μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμωνύμως. καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔσχατα ἄλλα πρῶτα μετ' ἐκεῖνα. καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλως, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν εἰ ἐκεῖ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ εἰ κἀκεῖ, ἄλλο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάσχειν. καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας, εἰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι δεῖ μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μηδ'

[1] Simplicius, Theiler: ὃ Enn., H–S.

[1] I adopt the περὶ ἣν of Simplicius and Theiler here rather than the reading of the MSS, περὶ ὅ.

[2] Aristotle *Categories* 5. 3a7–8.

[3] Ibid. 2. 1a24–25.

said to belong to it in another sense; or if it is a part, it is called so in relation to something else, but by itself its natural existence is said to be in being what it is, not in belonging to another. The substrate is also common to matter, form, and the composite; but the matter is substrate to the form in one sense, and the form [and the composite] to the affections in another. Or, alternatively, the matter is not substrate to the form—for the form is its perfection in so far as it is matter and in so far as it is potential—nor, again, is the form in it: for when something completes some one thing with something else, neither of them is in the other, but both the matter and the form together are substrates to something else—man and a particular man are substrates to the affections, and precede the activities and consequences—and [substance is] that from which the others come and through which the others exist and the subject which is affected[1] and the origin of doing and making.

5. This is to be understood as being said about what is called substance here below: if it applies in any way to that intelligible substance, it is perhaps analogously and ambiguously. Thus it is said to be the first in relation to what comes after it. For it is not the first in any unqualified sense, but substantial sensibles are last in relation to intelligibles but first after them. And "substrate" is used in a different sense, and it is disputed whether there is passive affection in the intelligible, and, if it is there, passivity there is something different. And the statement "not being in a substrate applies to all substance"[2] [is true] if that which is in a substrate must "not be there as a part of that in which it is",[3] nor in such a

οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲ συντελεῖν μετ' ἐκείνου εἰς ἕν τι· μεθ' οὗ γὰρ συντελεῖ εἰς σύνθετον οὐσίαν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μήτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει μέρος ὄντα Σωκράτους. ὃ οὖν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐσία· εἰ δὲ λέγομεν μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου, προσθετέον "ὡς ἄλλου", ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λεγόμενος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου περιλαμβάνηται τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τῇ προσθήκῃ τῇ "μὴ κατ' ἄλλου". ὅταν γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατηγορῶ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὕτως λέγω, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ λευκὸν λευκόν· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτη λέγων ἄνθρωπον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ τὸν Σωκράτη Σωκράτη λέγειν, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κατὰ ζῴου λογικοῦ τοιοῦδε τὸ ζῷον κατηγορεῖν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι, τὴν γὰρ διαφορὰν μηδ' αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, μέρος οὐσίας λαμβάνων τὸ δίπουν τοῦτο οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ φησὶν εἶναι· ἐπεί, εἰ μὴ τὸ δίπουν λαμβάνοι, ὅ ἐστι τοιάδε οὐσία, ἀλλὰ διποδίαν, μὴ οὐσίαν λέγων, ἀλλὰ ποιότητα, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται τὸ δίπουν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδ' ὁ τόπος. ἀλλ' εἰ μέν τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται

way as to contribute with it to the completeness of some one thing; for it could not be as in a substrate in that with which it contributes to a composite substance; so the form is not in the matter as in a substrate, nor is humanity in Socrates [in this way], since it is a part of Socrates. What is not in a substrate, therefore, is substance; but if we say that it is "not in a substrate nor predicated of a substrate",[1] we must add "as of something else", that the human also, predicated of a particular human being, may be included by the statement in the addition "not of something else". For when I predicate humanity of Socrates, I mean it not in the sense in which the wood is white, but in the sense that the white thing is white: for in saying that Socrates is human, I am saying that a particular human being is human, predicating humanity of the human in Socrates; but this is the same as calling Socrates Socrates, and again as predicating "living being" of this particular rational living being. But if someone says[2] that not being in a substrate is not a peculiarity of substance, for the essential differentiation is not itself one of the things in a substrate, it is by understanding [the differentiation] as "the two-footed" that he makes this assertion that it is not in a substrate: since, if he did not understand "the two-footed", which is a particular kind of substance, but "two-footedness", not meaning a substance but a quality, then the two-footed will be in a substrate. But time is not in a substrate either, nor is place. But if "the measure of movement" is understood as

[1] Ibid. 5. 2a12–15.
[2] Aristotle, in *Categories* 5. 3a21–28.

κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, τὸ μέτρον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ὑπάρξει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἢ τε κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνεται, ἐν τῷ μετροῦντι ἔσται τὸ μέτρον. ὁ δὲ τόπος, πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος ὤν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ. καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος; γίνεται ἐναντίως ἢ κατὰ ἓν τούτων ἢ κατὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα λαμβάνεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐφαρμοττόντων καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῶν εἰρημένων.

6. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ταῦτα μὲν ἔστω τεθεωρημένα περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὃ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ εἴρηται, αἰτεῖ ἔτι ἴσως αἰσθητὸν ἰδεῖν τοῦτο· τὸ δ' "ἔστι" τοῦτο καὶ τὸ "εἶναι" οὐκ ἂν ὁρῷτο. τί οὖν; τὸ πῦρ οὐκ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ; οὐσία οὖν ἑκάτερον, ὅτι ὁρᾶται; οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὕλην ἔχειν; οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶδος; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῷ συναμφότερον. ἀλλὰ τίνι δή; τῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς δὴ φήσομεν ἄρα, ὅτι ὁμωνύμως. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ⟨"ἔστιν"⟩[1] ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [τὸ ἔστι][2] καὶ τίς ἡ διαφορὰ τούτου τοῦ "ἔστι" καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εἶναι λέγει καὶ ἁπλῶς ὄν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι. τί οὖν; τὸ εἶναι τὸ προσκείμενον τῷ λευκῷ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἄνευ προσθήκης; οὐχί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως ὄν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάληψιν καὶ δευτέρως. τό τε γὰρ λευκὸν προστεθὲν πεποίηκε τὸ ὂν λευκόν, τό τε ὂν τῷ "λευκὸν" προστεθὲν πεποίηκε ⟨τὸ⟩[3] λευκὸν ὄν, ὥστε ἑκατέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὄντι

[1] Theiler.
[2] del. Kirchhoff, Müller, Theiler.
[3] Creuzer.

applying to what is measured, the measure will exist in the movement as in a substrate, and the movement in what is moved; but if it is taken as referring to the measurer, then the measure will be in the measurer. And place, being the "boundary of the surroundings", is in those surroundings. But what is to be said about this substance here which we are discussing? It comes about that this substance can be understood in contrary ways according to one or more or all of these statements, since the statements fit both matter and form and the composite as well.

6. But if anyone should say that, granted that these are observations about substance, what it is has not been said, he is perhaps still requiring to see this with his bodily eyes; but this "is" and this "being" could not be seen [in this way]. Well then, is not fire substance, and water? Is each of them substance because it is seen? No. But by having matter? No. But by having form? Not this either. And not by being a composite either. But by what, then? By being. But the quantum is, and the quale is. But, we shall insist, only in an ambiguous sense. But what is this "is" which applies to fire and earth and suchlike things, and what is the difference between this "is" and the "is" which applies to the others? It is that one means simply to be and simply existing, but the other means to be white. Well then, is the "is" which is added to the "white" the same as the "is" without addition? No, but one means primary being, the other being by participation and secondarily. For the "white" added to "being" makes the being white, and the "being" added to the "white" makes the white being, so that in both cases [there is something incidental], the "white" incidental to the

συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν, τῷ δὲ λευκῷ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὄν. καὶ οὐχ οὕτως λέγομεν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν Σωκράτη λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτη· ἐν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν οὐ ταὐτόν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ "τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτης" ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ λευκῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ "Σωκράτης λευκὸς" καθαρῶς συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα "τὸ ὂν λευκὸν" συμβεβηκὸς ἔχει τὸ λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ "τὸ λευκὸν ὄν" τὸ λευκὸν συνειλημμένον τὸ ὄν. καὶ ὅλως τὸ μὲν λευκὸν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ ἐν ὄντι· παρ' ἐκείνου οὖν τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ὂν παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ λευκόν, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὂν τὸ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ οὐ παρ' αὑτοῦ ὄν, λεκτέον, ὅτι παρὰ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος ἔχει τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ ὄντως λευκοῦ ἔχει τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι, κἀκείνου τὸ λευκὸν ἔχοντος κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι.

7. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης ἔχειν τὰ τῇδε ὅσα ἐπ' αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι, πόθεν ἕξει ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἀπαιτήσομεν. ὅτι δὲ μὴ πρῶτον ἡ ὕλη, εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις. εἰ δέ, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης, τὰ αἰσθητὰ φήσομεν. πρὸ τούτων δὲ οὖσαν ὕστερον πολλῶν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πάντων οὐδὲν

"being" and the "being" incidental to the "white". And we do not mean this in the sense in which one might say that Socrates is white and the white thing is Socrates; for in both these cases Socrates is the same, but perhaps the white is not the same; for in the statement "the white thing is Socrates", Socrates is included in "the white", but in the statement "Socrates is white" the white is simply and solely incidental. And here [in the case we are discussing] "being is white" has "white" as incidental, but in the statement "the white is being", "the white" has being included in it. And in general the white has being because it is about being and in being; it derives its existence therefore from being; but being has being from itself and white from the white, not because it is in the white, but because the white is in it. But, since this being in the sense-world does not exist of itself, it must be said that it has its being from the real being and has its being white from the real white; that also which has the white has its being by participation in the being of that other intelligible world.

7. But if anyone should say that the things here which are based on matter have their being from it we shall demand where matter gets being and the existent from. We have explained elsewhere that matter is not primary.[1] But if one says that the other things could not come into existence except on the basis of matter, we shall agree as far as sense-objects are concerned. But even if matter is prior to these, nothing prevents it from being posterior to many things and to all the things there in the intelligible,

[1] In VI. 1. 25–28 (the critique of Stoic corporealism).

κωλύει ἀμυδρὸν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν καὶ ἧττον ἢ τὰ ἐφ' αὑτῆς, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν λόγοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δ' ἄλογος παντελῶς, σκιὰ λόγου καὶ ἔκπτωσις λόγου· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὕτη δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ λευκῷ, λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον ὂν δοίη ἂν τῷ ἧττον ὄντι τὸ [ἧττον][1] εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἧττον ὂν οὐκ ἂν δοίη τῷ μᾶλλον ὄντι. ἀλλ' εἰ μᾶλλον ὂν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης, οὐκέτι κοινόν τι τὸ ὂν κατ' ἀμφοῖν, οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία γένος ἔχον τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ συναμφότερον, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοῖς ἔσται, ἅπερ λέγομεν, διάφορον δ' ὅμως τὸ εἶναι. περὶ γὰρ ἐλαττόνως ὂν μᾶλλον ὂν προσελθὸν τάξει μὲν πρῶτον ἂν εἴη, οὐσίᾳ δὲ ὕστερον· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ἐπίσης τὸ εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη ἡ οὐσία ὡς γένος. ἄλλως μέντοι ἕξει πρὸς τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὡς κοινόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔχουσα τῷ αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡς ζωῆς ἡ μέν τις ἀμυδρά, ἡ δὲ ἐναργεστέρα,[2] καὶ εἰκόνων ἡ μέν τις ὑποτύπωσις, ἡ δὲ ἐξεργασία μᾶλλον. εἰ δὲ τῷ ἀμυδρῷ τοῦ εἶναι μετροῖ τις τὸ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πλέον ἐῴη, τούτῳ πάλιν αὖ κοινὸν ἔσται τὸ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μήποτε οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἄλλο γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅλον, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινόν τι τὸ ἀμυδρόν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι ἐπὶ θρεπτικῆς καὶ αἰσθητικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο

[1] del. Kirchhoff.
[2] Perna[mg], Creuzer: *ἐνεργ-* Enn.

since the being it has is dim and less than the things based upon it, in so far as they are rational principles and derive more from the existent but matter is utterly irrational, a shadow of rational form and a falling away from rational form; but if one says that this matter gives being to the things based on it as Socrates does to the whiteness based upon him, we must say that what is more existent might give being to what is less existent, but the less existent could not give being to the more existent. But if the form is more existent than the matter, existence is no more something common to both, nor is substance a genus containing matter, form and the composite, but they have many things, those we are speaking of, in common, but their being is different. For when something which is more existent arrives about something which is less existent, [the latter] would be first in order, but posterior in substance; so that, if being is not equal for matter, form and the composite, substance would not still be common as a genus. It will, certainly, be otherwise disposed to the things which come after it, as having something common in relation to them by the fact of their being, as there is a dimmer and a clearer life, and one picture is a sketch and another a more finished work. But if one were to measure being by the dimness of being and let go what is more of it in the others, in this way again being will be common. But one should not perhaps proceed like this. For each [of the three, matter, form and composite] is different as a whole, and the dimness is not something common, just as in the case of life there would be nothing in common between nutritive, perceptive and intelligent life. So here also being is different in

τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, καὶ συνάμφω ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ῥυέντος. οὐ γὰρ μόνον δεῖ, εἰ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς χεῖρον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄμφω, ᾗ δὲ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον μετασχὸν πυρός, οἷον κέραμος, τὸ δὲ ἧττον, ὥστε μὴ κέραμος γενέσθαι. τάχα δὲ οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· διάφορα[1] γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις.

8. Ἀλλ' ἆρα τὸ μὲν διαιρεῖν εἰς στοιχεῖα ἐᾶν δεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας λέγοντα, ἣν δεῖ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι—οὐ γὰρ οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν αἰσθηταί γε οὐσίαι—ἑνὶ δὲ γένει περιλαμβάνοντα τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ λίθου καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων φυτῶν, ᾗ αἰσθητά, καὶ ζῴων ὡσαύτως; οὐ γὰρ παραλελείψεται ἡ ὕλη οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἔχει ταῦτα· ὕλη γὰρ καὶ εἶδος πῦρ καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα ἤδη πολλαὶ οὐσίαι εἰς ἕν. καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι τούτοις, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων κεχώρισται· ὑποκείμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλου· καὶ ὅσα εἴρηται, ὑπάρχει ταύτῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία οὐκ ἄνευ μεγέθους οὐδ' ἄνευ ποιότητος, πῶς ἔτι τὰ συμβεβηκότα χωριοῦμεν; χωρίζοντες γὰρ ταῦτα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ σχῆμα, τὸ χρῶμα, ξηρότητα, ὑγρότητα, τί τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν

[1] Igal, H–S²: διαφορὰ Enn.

matter and in form, and both together come from one which flows in all sorts of different ways. For it is not only necessary for one to exist more and the other worse and less if the second comes from the first and the third from the second, but even if both come from the same, in that one has a larger share in fire, like a pot, and the other less, so as not to become a pot. But perhaps matter and form do not even come from the same: for there are different things also in the intelligible world.

8. But ought one then to drop division into elements, especially when one is speaking about sensible substance, which one must grasp by sense rather than reason, and not to take into consideration the parts of which they are composed—for those parts are not substances, or at least not sensible substances—and include in one genus what is common to stone and earth and water and the plants which arise from these, in so far as they are sense-objects, and the animals likewise? For [if one does this] matter and form will not have been left out; for sensible substance has these; for fire and earth and the elements between are matter and form, and the composites are already many substances coming together into one. And what is common to all these is how they are separated from the other things; for these are substrates to the others and not in a substrate nor belonging to another; and everything else which has been said applies here. But if sensible substance does not exist without size or without quality, how shall we still be able to separate what is incidental? For when we separate off this, size, shape, colour, dryness, moistness, what are we going to establish as substance itself? For these [sensible]

θησόμεθα; ποιαὶ γὰρ οὐσίαι αὗται. ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι, περὶ ὃ συμβαίνει τὰ ποιοῦντα ἐκ τοῦ μόνον οὐσίαν εἶναι ποιὰν οὐσίαν εἶναι; καὶ ἔσται τὸ πῦρ οὐχ ὅλον οὐσία, ἀλλά τι αὐτοῦ, οἷον μέρος; τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη; ἢ ὕλη. ἀλλὰ ἆρά γε ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία συμφόρησίς τις ποιοτήτων καὶ ὕλης, καὶ ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα συμπαγέντα ἐπὶ ὕλης μιᾶς οὐσία, χωρὶς δὲ ἕκαστον λαμβανόμενον τὸ μὲν ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται, ἢ ποιὰ πολλά; καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐλλεῖπον μήπω ἀπηρτισμένην ἐᾷ γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν, μέρος τῆσδε τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ δ' ἂν γενομένῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐπισυμβῇ, τὴν οἰκείαν ἔχει τάξιν οὐ κρυπτόμενον ἐν τῷ μίγματι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὴν λεγομένην οὐσίαν; καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὡς ἐκεῖ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὂν ἔστιν οὐσία, συμπληροῦν ἕνα ὄγκον τοσόνδε καὶ τοιόνδε, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ μὴ συμπληροῦν ποιόν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐκεῖ ἕκαστον οὐσίαν, τὸ δ' ὅλον τὸ ἐκ πάντων οὐσίαν. καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, εἰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐξ οὐκ οὐσιῶν ποιοῦμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀληθὴς οὐσία, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενον τὴν ἀληθῆ, ἥτις ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἔχει τὸ ὂν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων, ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἦν· ὠδὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑποβεβλημένον ἄγονον καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὄν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, σκιὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ σκιᾷ αὐτῇ οὔσῃ ζωγραφία καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι.

substances are qualified substances. But is there something around which occur what make being simply substance into being qualified substance? And will fire be not as a whole substance, but something belonging to it, like a part? And what could this be? Just matter. But then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter, and are all these compounded together on one matter substance, but when each is taken separately will one be a quale and one a quantum, or will they be many qualia [1]? And will that which, if it is lacking, does not allow a completed coming into existence to take place be a part of this substance, but that which, when a substance has come to be, comes to it as an addition, have its own position and not be hidden in the mixture which makes up what is called substance? I do not mean this in the sense that when it is there with the others it is substance, completing one mass of a particular size and quality, but elsewhere when it is not contributing to completion it is a quality, but that even in the former case each particular one is not a substance, but the whole made up from them all is substance. And there is no need to object if we make sensible substance out of non-substances; for even the whole is not true substance but imitates the true substance, which has its being without the others which attend on it, and the others come into being from it, because it truly is; but here what underlies is sterile and inadequate to be being, because the others do not come from it, but it is a shadow, and upon what is itself a shadow, a picture and a seeming.

[1] Cp. ch. 15, 24–38 and II. 7.3.

9. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς καὶ γένους ἑνὸς ταύτῃ. εἴδη δ' αὐτοῦ τίνα ἄν τις θεῖτο καὶ πῶς διέλοι; σῶμα μὲν οὖν τὸ σύμπαν θετέον εἶναι, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑλικώτερα, τὰ δὲ ὀργανικά· ὑλικώτερα μὲν πῦρ, γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ· ὀργανικὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς τὰς παραλλαγὰς σχόντα. εἶτα εἴδη γῆς λαμβάνειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ὀργανικῶν τά τε φυτὰ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς διαιροῦντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ζῴων σώματα· ἢ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἐπίγεια καὶ ἔγγεια, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχεῖον τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· ἢ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν κοῦφα, τὰ δὲ βαρέα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι ἐν μέσῳ, τὰ δὲ περιέχειν ἄνωθεν, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ· καὶ ἐν τούτων ἑκάστῳ σώματα ἤδη σχήμασι διειλημμένα, ὡς εἶναι σώματα τὰ μὲν ζῴων οὐρανίων, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα· ἢ κατ' εἴδη διαστησάμενον τὰ τέσσαρα τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλον τρόπον ἤδη συμπλέκειν καταμιγνύντα[1] τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν κατὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τὰς μίξεις, οἷον πύρινα ἢ γήινα τῷ πλείονι καὶ ἐπικρατοῦντι λεγόμενα. τὸ δὲ πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας λέγειν—"τόδε τὸ πῦρ" καὶ "πῦρ"—ἄλλως μὲν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν καθέκαστον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου, οὐ μέντοι οὐσίας διαφοράν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ποιῷ "τι λευκὸν" καὶ "λευκὸν" καὶ "τὶς γραμματικὴ"

[1] Igal, H–S²: καὶ μιγνύντα Enn.

[1] The bodies of celestial living beings are, of course, spherical.

9. So much for what is called sensible substance and the one genus. But what species of it should one posit, and how should one divide them? Now the whole must be classed as body, and of bodies some are matterish and some organic; the matterish are fire, earth, water, air; the organic the bodies of plants and animals, which have their differences according to their shapes. Then one should take the species of earth and of the other elements, and in the case of organic bodies one should divide the plants, and the bodies of animals, according to their shapes; or by the fact that some are on and in the earth, and, element by element, [one should class separately] the bodies in each; or [one could class them on the ground that] some are light, some are heavy, and some in between, and that some stand in the middle, some surround them above, and some are in between; and in each of these the bodies are already differentiated by their outlines, so as to be some of them bodies of celestial living beings[1] and others appropriate to the other elements; or one should divide the four according to their species and afterwards proceed in another way to weave them together by blending their differences according to places and shapes and mixtures, classing them as fiery or earthly, called so according to the largest and predominant element [in the mixture]. But as for calling them "first" and "second"[2]—"this fire" and "fire"—these have a difference in another way, because one is individual and one universal, but not a difference of substance; under quality, also, there is "something white" and "white" and "a particular

[2] Aristotle *Categories* 5. 2a11–19.

καὶ "γραμματική". ἔπειτα τί ἔλαττον ἔχει ἡ γραμματικὴ πρὸς τινὰ γραμματικὴν καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τινὰ ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ ἡ γραμματικὴ ὕστερον τῆς τινος γραμματικῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὔσης γραμματικῆς καὶ ἡ ἐν σοί· ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐν σοί τίς ἐστι τῷ ἐν σοί, αὐτὴ δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ καθόλου. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε τῷ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Σωκράτει· μεταλήψει γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος. ἔπειτα ὁ Σωκράτης τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ἄνθρωπος τοιόσδε, τὸ δὲ "τοιόσδε" τί ἂν ἐργάζοιτο πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον οὐσίαν εἶναι; εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν "εἶδος μόνον ὁ ἄνθρωπος", τὸ δὲ "εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ", ἧττον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη· ἐν ὕλῃ γὰρ ὁ λόγος χείρων. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἐν ὕλῃ, τί ἔλαττον ἕξει τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς λόγος τοῦ ἔν τινι ὕλῃ; ἔτι πρότερον τῇ φύσει τὸ γενικώτερον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀτόμου· τὸ δὲ πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ ἁπλῶς πρότερον· πῶς ἂν οὖν ἧττον εἴη; ἀλλὰ τὸ καθέκαστον πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον ὂν πρότερον· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει. ἔπειτα οὕτως οὐχ εἷς λόγος τῆς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῦ πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως, οὐδ' ὑφ' ἓν γένος.

10. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως διαιρεῖν, θερμῷ καὶ ξηρῷ, καὶ ξηρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, καὶ ὑγρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, ἢ ὅπως βούλεται τὸν συνδυασμὸν εἶναι, εἶτα ἐκ τούτων σύνθεσιν

[1] Aristotle. The reference is probably to *De Gen. et Corr.* B 2–3. 330a24–35.

literary skill" and "literary skill". For what less does "literary skill" have in comparison with "a particular literary skill" and in general "body of knowledge" in comparison with "a particular body of knowledge"? For literary skill is not posterior to the particular literary skill but rather it is because literary skill exists that that in you exists; since that in you is particular by being in you, but in itself is the same as the universal. And Socrates did not in his own person give being human to the non-human but humanity gave being human to Socrates: the particular human is so by participation in humanity. Since what could Socrates be except "a man of a particular kind" and what could the "of a particular kind" do towards being more of a substance? But if it is because "humanity is only a form" but Socrates is "form in matter", he would be less human in this respect: for the rational form is worse in matter. But if humanity is not in itself form, but in matter, what less will it have than the particular human in matter, when it is itself the rational form of something in a kind of matter? Again, the more general is prior by nature, as the species is prior to the individual; but the prior by nature is also simply prior: how then could it be less? But the individual is prior in relation to us because it is more knowable; but this does not make a difference in actual fact. Then, if it were so, there would not be one definition of substance: for the definition of what is primarily and what is secondarily is not the same, nor do they come under one genus.

10. It is also possible to divide like this, by hot and dry, and dry and cold, and moist and cold, or whatever kind of coupling he[1] wants, and then a compo-

καὶ μίξιν· καὶ ἢ μένειν ἐνταῦθα στάντα ἐπὶ τοῦ
συνθέτου, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἔγγειον καὶ ἐπίγειον, ἢ κατὰ τὰς
μορφὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ζῴων διαφοράς, οὐ τὰ ζῷα
διαιροῦντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ὥσπερ
ὄργανα διαιροῦντα. οὐκ ἄτοπος δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς
διαφορά, εἴπερ οὐδ' ἡ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας αὐτῶν
διαίρεσις, θερμότης, ψυχρότης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰ δέ τις
λέγοι "ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταύτας ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα", καὶ κατὰ
τὰς μίξεις φήσομεν ποιεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ
σχήματα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ περὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος, οὐκ
ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη, διαφοραῖς εἰ λαμβάνοιτο ταῖς πρὸς τὴν
αἴσθησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὂν ἁπλῶς αὕτη, ἀλλ' αἰσθητὸν ὂν
τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῆς
σύνοδον τῶν πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἔφαμεν εἶναι καὶ ἡ πίστις
τοῦ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρος ἡ
σύνθεσις, κατ' εἴδη τῶν ζῴων διαιρεῖν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου
εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ποιότης γὰρ αὕτη σώματος,
τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος, ποιότησι δ' οὐκ ἄτοπον διαιρεῖν.
εἰ δ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἴπομεν, ἀντι-
διαιροῦντες τὸ σύνθετον τῷ ἁπλῷ, ὑλικώτερα εἴπομεν
καὶ ὀργανικὰ οὐ προσποιούμενοι τὸ σύνθετον. ἔστι δ'
οὐκ ἀντιδιαίρεσις τὸ σύνθετον πρὸς τὸ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρώτην διαίρεσιν τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων
θέντα μίξαντα αὐτὰ ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ὑποβεβηκυίας[1]

[1] Sleeman, H–S: -βεβλη- Enn.

sition and mixture of these; and either to stop there, coming to a halt at the composite, or [to go on dividing] according to whether things are in or on the earth, or according to the shapes and according to the differences of animals, not dividing the animals but dividing according to their bodies, which are like their tools. The division according to their shapes is not out of place, since the division according to their qualities is not either, hotness, coldness and such like. But if someone were to say "but bodies act by these", we shall reply that they also act according to the mixtures and the colours and the outlines. For since our discussion is about sensible substance the division would not be out of place if it was taken to be made by the differences which present themselves to sense-perception; for this sensible substance is not simply being, but is perceived by sense, being this whole world of ours; since we maintained that its apparent existence was a congress of perceptibles, and the guarantee of their being comes from sense-perception. But if the composition has no limits, one should divide according to the species-forms of living things, the bodily species of man, for instance. For this, a species-form of this kind, is a quality of body, and it is not out of place to divide by qualities. But if we said that some bodies are simple and some are composite, opposing the composite to the simple in our division, we were speaking of matterish and organic bodies, not taking the composite seriously into account. It is not a division by opposition which sets the composite against the simple, but, when one had placed the simple bodies by the first division, one mixed them and differentiated the composites starting from an-

διαφορὰν συνθέτων ἢ τόποις ἢ μορφαῖς ποιεῖσθαι, οἷον τὰ μὲν οὐράνια, τὰ δὲ γήινα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐσίας ἢ γενέσεως ταῦτα.

11. Περὶ δὲ ποσοῦ καὶ ποσότητος, ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ μεγέθει, καθόσον τοσοῦτον ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ διαστήματι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου—οὐ γὰρ περὶ χωριστοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ὃ ποιεῖ τρίπηχυ εἶναι τὸ ξύλον, καὶ ἡ πεμπὰς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἵπποις—εἴρηται πολλάκις, ὅτι ταῦτα ποσὰ μόνον λεκτέον, τόπον δὲ καὶ χρόνον μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν νενοῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν χρόνον τῷ μέτρον κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ τῷ πρός τι δοτέον αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ τόπον σώματος περιεκτικόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐν σχέσει καὶ τῷ πρός τι κεῖσθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ κίνησις συνεχὴς καὶ οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ ἐτέθη. μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ; ποσότητι γάρ τινι μέγα τὸ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τῶν πρός τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον τῶν πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον. διὰ τί οὖν ὄρος μικρόν, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ "μικρότερον" λέγεται. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ ὁμολογεῖται καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι, ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ "μικρότερον" λέγεται. καὶ μεγάλη κέγχρος οὐχ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη "μεγάλη", ἀλλὰ "κέγχρος μεγάλη"[1] τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν "τῶν ὁμογενῶν",

other subordinate principle, either by positions or shapes, some celestial and others earthly, for instance. And so much for substance or coming-to-be in the things perceived by sense.

11. But about the quantum and quantity, it has often been said how one should locate it in number and size, in so far as each individual thing which is in the number of things in matter and the extension of the substrate is of a certain size—for the discussion is not about separate quantity but about the quantity which makes the wood three cubits long and the five which applies to the horses—and that only these things should be called quanta, but that place and time should not be considered under quantity, but that time because it is the "measure of motion" should in its own nature also be given to the relative, and that place is what surrounds body, so that this too is put in relation and the relative; further, movement is continuous and so was not put in the class of quantity. But why are large and small not in quantity? For the large is large by some kind of quantity and size is not something relative, but larger and smaller belong to the relative; for they are so in regard to another, like the double. Why then is "the mountain small, but the millet-seed large"[1]? Now, first of all, this is said instead of "smaller". For if it is agreed that it is called small in regard to and from [comparison with] things of the same kind, it is agreed that it is said instead of "smaller". And a large millet-seed is not simply called "large" but "large millet-seed" and this is the same as "of things of the same kind", and it can

[1] Aristotle *Categories* 6. 5b18–19.

τῶν δὲ ὁμογενῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἂν λέγοιτο μείζων. ἔπειτα διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ καλὸν λέγοιτο ἂν τῶν πρός τι; ἀλλά φαμεν καλὸν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ ποιόν, κάλλιον δὲ τῶν πρός τι· καίτοι καὶ καλὸν λεγόμενον φανείη ἂν πρὸς ἄλλο αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου κάλλος πρὸς θεόν· πιθήκων, φησίν, ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρὸς συμβάλλειν ἑτέρῳ γένει· ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν καλόν, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἢ κάλλιον ἢ τοὐναντίον. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μέγα μετὰ μεγέθους, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ἢ ἀναιρετέον τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἄλλο κάλλιον αὐτοῦ· οὕτω τοίνυν οὐδ' ἀναιρετέον τὸ μέγα, ὅτι ἔστι τι μεῖζον αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ μεῖζον ὅλως ἂν εἴη μὴ μεγάλου ὄντος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κάλλιον μὴ καλοῦ.

12. Ἀπολειπτέον τοίνυν καὶ ἐναντιότητα εἶναι περὶ τὸ ποσόν· αἱ γὰρ ἔννοιαι τὴν ἐναντιότητα συγχωροῦσιν, ὅταν "μέγα" λέγωμεν καὶ ὅταν "μικρόν", ἐναντίας τὰς φαντασίας ποιοῦσαι, ὥσπερ ὅταν "πολλὰ" καὶ "ὀλίγα"· καὶ γὰρ τὰ παραπλήσια περὶ τοῦ "ὀλίγα" καὶ "πολλὰ" λεκτέον. "πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ" ἀντὶ τοῦ "πλείους"· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο· καὶ "ὀλίγοι ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ" ἀντὶ τοῦ "ἐλάττους". καὶ δεῖ ὅλως τὰ πολλὰ πολὺ λέγειν πλῆθος ἐν ἀριθμῷ—πλῆθος δὲ πῶς τῶν πρός τι;—τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ "ἐπέκτασις ἀριθμοῦ" τὸ

[1] Heraclitus fr. B 82 DK, as quoted by Plato *Hippias Major* 289A3–4.

naturally be called larger than things of the same kind. Next, why is "beautiful" not said to be one of the relatives? But we call something beautiful in itself; it has the quality of beauty, but "more beautiful" is one of the relative terms; and then what is called beautiful might appear ugly in relation to something else, like the beauty of a man compared to a god; "the most beautiful of monkeys", he[1] says, "is ugly in comparison with another kind"; but it is beautiful by itself, but in relation to something else it is more beautiful or the opposite. And in the case of size, then, a thing is large in itself by possession of size, but in relation to something else it is not so. Otherwise one would have to deny the "beautiful" because something else was more beautiful; so here one must not deny the "large" because there is something larger than it: since it could not be larger at all if it was not large, just as a thing could not be more beautiful if it was not beautiful.

12. We must allow then that there is opposition in the quantitative; for our notions admit the opposition, when we say "large" and when we say "small", and make our mental images opposite, just as when we say "many" and "few": for we ought to say much the same about "few" and "many". For "there are many people in the house" is instead of "more people"; but this is in relation to something else; and we say "few people in the theatre" instead of "fewer".[2] And one ought in general to call the many "many" as a multiplicity in number—and how can multiplicity be one of the relatives?—but this is the same as saying "an expansion of number" and

[2] Aristotle *Categories* 6. 5b24–25.

δὲ ἐναντίον "συστολή". τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐννοίας τὸ συνεχὲς προαγούσης εἰς τὸ πόρρω. ποσὸν μὲν οὖν, ὅταν τὸ ἓν προέλθῃ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ταχὺ στῇ ἑκάτερον, τὸ μὲν ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ μικρόν· ἐὰν δ' ἡ πρόοδος προϊοῦσα μὴ παύσηται ταχύ, τὸ μὲν πολύ, τὸ δὲ μέγα. τίς οὖν ὅρος; τίς δὲ καλοῦ; θερμοῦ δέ; καὶ ἔνι θερμότερον καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἀλλὰ λέγεται τὸ μὲν θερμότερον πρός τι, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἁπλῶς ποιόν. ὅλως δὲ λόγον τινά, ὥσπερ καλοῦ, οὕτω καὶ μεγάλου εἶναι, ὃς μεταληφθεὶς μέγα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ καλὸν ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ. ἐναντιότης τοίνυν κατὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ποσόν· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τόπον οὐκέτι, ὅτι μὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐπεὶ καί, εἰ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἦν ὁ τόπος, οὐκ ἦν ἐναντίον τὸ ἄνω τινὶ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω ἐν τῷ παντί. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω λεγόμενον ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ ἀνωτέρω καὶ κατωτέρω καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ "δεξιὸν" καὶ "ἀριστερόν"· ταῦτα δὲ τῶν πρός τι. συλλαβὴ δὲ καὶ λόγῳ συμβαίνει ποσοῖς εἶναι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ποσῷ· φωνὴ γὰρ ποσή· αὐτὴ[1] δὲ κίνησίς τις· εἰς κίνησιν οὖν ὅλως ἀνακτέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

13. Τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ διωρισμένου κεχωρίσθαι καλῶς τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ ὅρῳ εἴρηται·

[1] Ficinus (*ipsa*): αὕτη Enn., H–S[1].

the opposite "contraction". And the same applies to the continuous, in that our notion of it prolongs the continuous into the distance. So there is a quantum when the unit moves forward, and also when the point does. But if either of them comes to a stop quickly, one is few and the other small; but if the advance does not halt quickly in its progress, one is many and the other large. What then is the defining limit? What is it of the beautiful? Or the hot? And it is possible here also to be hotter. But "the hotter" is said in relation to something, but "the hot" is simply a quale. But in general there must be a rational form of the large just as there is of the beautiful, which when it is participated makes a thing large, as the form of the beautiful makes a thing beautiful. In these respects, then, there is an opposition in the quantitative; for there is no longer one in place, because place does not belong to the quantitative; since, even if place did belong to the quantitative, "up" would not be opposite to anything, since there is no "down" in the All. But when "up" and "down" are spoken of in the parts, they could not mean anything else but "higher up" and "lower down" and are like "right" and "left"; and these belong to the relatives. But "syllable" and "word" have a quantitative character and come under the quantitative; for they are a sound of a certain length[1]; but sound itself is a movement; so it must be generally referred to movement, as action is.

13. It has been well said[2] that the continuous is distinguished from the discrete by the common and

[1] On sound as quantitative cp. VI. 1. 5.
[2] By Aristotle: *Categories* 6. 4b.

τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἐπὶ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ περιττῷ, ἀρτίῳ. καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τινες διαφοραὶ τούτων ἑκατέρου, ἢ παραλειπτέον τοῖς περὶ ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσιν ἤδη, ἢ δεῖ ταύτας μὲν διαφορὰς τῶν μοναδικῶν ἀριθμῶν τίθεσθαι, τῶν δ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐκέτι. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀριθμοὺς χωρίζει ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ τούτων τὰς αὐτὰς νοεῖν διαφοράς. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς πῶς, εἰ τὸ μὲν γραμμή, τὸ δ' ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ στερεόν; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἕν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, οὐκ εἰς εἴδη διαιρουμένου δόξει, ἀλλὰ καταρίθμησιν μόνον ποιουμένου. εἰ[1] γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οὕτω λαμβανομένοις κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον κοινόν τι ἐπ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστι γένος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ πρώτης καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτης αὔξης κοινόν τι ἔσται. ἀλλὰ ἴσως καθόσον ποσὸν τὸ ἴσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον ποσά, τὰ δὲ ἧττον, κἂν τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλείω τὰς διαστάσεις ἔχῃ, τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἔλαττον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τοίνυν, καθόσον πάντες ἀριθμοί, τὸ κοινὸν ἂν εἴη· ἴσως γὰρ οὐχ ἡ μονὰς τὴν δυάδα, οὐδ' ἡ δυὰς τὴν τριάδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπινοοῦμεν γινόμενα, ἔστω ὁ μὲν ἐλάττων πρότερος, ὁ δὲ ὕστερος ὁ μείζων· ἀλλὰ καθόσον ἀριθμοὶ πάντες, ὑφ' ἕν. καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν τοίνυν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν μετενεκτέον· χωριοῦμεν δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων γραμμήν, ἐπίπεδον,

[1] Westerink, H–S²: ἀεὶ Enn.: ἐπεὶ Theiler, H–S¹.

the particular limit; and further, in the case of number, that it is distinguished by odd and even. And again, if there are distinctions in each of these [divisions] they should be left to those whose business is number, or we should posit that these are distinctions of the monodic [ideal] numbers, but no longer of those in sense-objects. But if logic separates the numbers in sense-objects [from the objects], nothing prevents us from making in thought the same distinctions of these. But how do we make distinctions in the continuous, if one kind is line, one plane and one solid? Now the distinctions one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional do not seem to be proper to one who is dividing into species, but rather to one who is simply making a count. For if in numbers also when they are taken like this according to the before and after, there is no genus common to them, there will be nothing common either to the first, second and third dimensions. But perhaps it is in so far as they are quantitative that they are one and the same, and some of them are not more quantitative and some less, even if some have wider extensions and some narrower. And numbers then would have what is in common to them in so far as they are all numbers; for perhaps the number one does not produce the number two or the number two the number three, but the same produces all. But if the number-series does not come into being, but is, but we think it as having come into being, let the lesser number be earlier and the greater later; but in so far as they are all numbers they are classed under one head. And now we must transfer what applied to numbers to magnitudes: we shall separate from each other line, sur-

στερεόν, ὃ δὴ κέκληκε σῶμα, τῷ διάφορα τῷ εἴδει μεγέθη ὄντα εἶναι. εἰ δὲ δεῖ ἕκαστον τούτων διαιρεῖν, γραμμὴν μὲν εἰς εὐθύ, περιφερές, ἑλικοειδές, ἐπίπεδον δὲ ⟨εἰς⟩[1] εὐθύγραμμον καὶ περιφερὲς σχῆμα, στερεὸν δὲ εἰς στερεὰ σχήματα, σφαῖραν, [εἰς][2] εὐθυγράμμους πλευράς, καὶ ταῦτα πάλιν, οἷα οἱ γεωμέτραι ποιοῦσι τρίγωνα, τετράπλευρα, καὶ πάλιν ταῦτα εἰς ἄλλα, ἐπισκεπτέον.

14. Τί γὰρ ἂν φαῖμεν εὐθεῖαν; οὐ μέγεθος εἶναι; ἢ ποιὸν μέγεθος τὸ εὐθὺ φαίη τις ἄν. τί οὖν κωλύει διαφορὰν εἶναι ἡ γραμμή;—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου τινὸς τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ γραμμῆς—ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐσίας διαφορὰς κομίζομεν παρὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ. εἰ οὖν γραμμὴ εὐθεῖα, ποσὸν μετὰ διαφορᾶς, καὶ οὐ σύνθετον διὰ τοῦτο ἡ εὐθεῖα ἐξ εὐθύτητος καὶ γραμμῆς· εἰ δὲ σύνθετον, ὡς μετὰ οἰκείας διαφορᾶς. τὸ δ' ἐκ τριῶν γραμμῶν—τὸ τρίγωνον—διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ; ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς τρεῖς γραμμαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ οὑτωσὶ ἐχουσῶν, καὶ τὸ τετράπλευρον τέσσαρες οὑτωσί· καὶ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ ἡ εὐθεῖα οὑτωσὶ καὶ ποσόν. εἰ γὰρ τὴν εὐθεῖαν οὐ ποσὸν μόνον, τί κωλύει καὶ τὴν πεπερασμένην μὴ ποσὸν μόνον λέγειν; ἀλλὰ τὸ πέρας τῆς γραμμῆς στιγμὴ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον τοίνυν ἐπίπεδον ποσόν, ἐπείπερ γραμμαὶ περατοῦσιν, αἳ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. εἰ οὖν τὸ πεπερασμένον ἐπίπεδον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, τοῦτο δὲ ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ

[1] Kirchhoff.
[2] delevimus: καὶ F^{3s} (= Ficinus), Müller.

face and solid (which Aristotle calls body) by their all being magnitudes specifically different. But we must investigate whether we should divide each of them, line into straight, circular and spiral, plane into rectangular and circular form, solid into solid forms, sphere and those bounded by straight-line sides, and these again, as the geometers do, into those with triangular and those with quadrilateral sides, and these again into others.

14. What, then, are we to say that a straight line is? Is it not that it is a magnitude? Now one could say that the straight is a magnitude of a certain quality. What then prevents it from being a specific differentiation of the line as line?—for the straight does not belong to anything else but a line—since we get our specific differentiations of substance also from the qualitative. If a line, then, is straight, it is a quantum with a specific difference, and the straight line is not for this reason a composite of straight and line; but if it is a composite, it is as with its specific difference. But the figure made of three lines—the triangle—why is it not in the quantitative? Now the triangle is not just three lines, but three lines in this particular disposition, and the quadrilateral four lines in this particular disposition; and indeed the straight line is both disposed in a particular way and quantitative. If then we say that the straight line is not only quantitative, what prevents us from saying that the limited straight line is not only quantitative? But the limit of the line is a point, and not in anything else. And so the limited surface is quantitative, since lines limit it, which are much more in the quantitative. If then the limited surface is in the quantitative, and this is either a quadrilateral or a

πολύπλευρον ἢ ἑξάπλευρον, καὶ τὰ σχήματα πάντα ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον λέγομεν ποιὸν καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον, ἐν ποιῷ θησόμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν πλείοσι κατηγορίαις θέσθαι τὸ αὐτό· καθὸ μὲν μέγεθος καὶ τοσόνδε[1] μέγεθος, ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, καθὸ δὲ τοιάνδε μορφὴν παρέχεται, ἐν ποιῷ. ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ[2] τοιάδε μορφὴ τὸ τρίγωνον. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ποιὸν λέγειν; εἰ οὖν τις ὁμόσε χωροῖ, τὴν γεωμετρίαν τοίνυν οὐ περὶ μεγέθη, ἀλλὰ περὶ ποιότητα καταγίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ πραγματεία αὕτη περὶ μεγέθη. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τὸ μεγέθη αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐκ οὐσίας τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι. ἔτι πᾶν ἐπίπεδον πεπερασμένον, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄπειρον εἶναί τι ἐπίπεδον. ἔτι ὥσπερ, ὅταν περὶ οὐσίαν ποιότητα λαμβάνω, οὐσιώδη ποιότητα λέγω, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅταν τὰ σχήματα λαμβάνω, ποσότητος διαφορὰς λαμβάνω. ἔπειτα, εἰ μὴ ταύτας διαφορὰς μεγεθῶν ληψόμεθα, τίνων θησόμεθα; εἰ δὲ μεγεθῶν εἰσι διαφοραί, τὰ γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν μεγέθη διάφορα ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτῶν τακτέον.

15. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἴδιον τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον; ὅμοια γὰρ τρίγωνα λέγεται. ἢ καὶ ὅμοια λέγεται μεγέθη, καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης λεγομένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποιῷ· ἴσως γὰρ

[1] Igal, H–S²: τοιόνδε Enn.

[2] ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ Igal, H–S²: ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ BUC: ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ wx, Perna.

polygon or a hexagon, then all figures are in the quantitative. But if, because we say that the triangle is a quale and the quadrilateral also, we are going to put them in the qualified, there is no objection to putting the same thing in several categories: in so far as it is a magnitude, and a magnitude of a certain size, it is in the quantitative, but in so far as it presents a shape of a certain quality, it is in the qualitative. Now the triangle is in itself a shape of a certain quality: what then prevents us from calling the sphere a quale? If then one comes to the real point at issue, geometry will not be concerned with magnitudes but with quality. But this does not appear to be so, but this activity is concerned with magnitudes. But the specific differences of magnitudes do not take away their being magnitudes, just as those of substances do not make them non-substances. Further, every surface is limited, for it is not possible for any surface to be unlimited. And further, just as when I grasp a quality of a substance, I call it a substantial quality, so, and much more, when I grasp figures, I grasp specific differences of quantity. Then, if we are not going to take these as specific differences of magnitudes, of what are we going to posit that they are differences? But if they are specific differences of magnitudes, the different magnitudes arising from the differences must be arranged in species of magnitudes.

15. But how do the "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative"? For triangles are spoken of as like. Now, magnitudes are also spoken of as "like" and the likeness which is spoken of does not abolish the fact that the like and the unlike are in the qualitative; for perhaps here in magnitudes

ἐνταῦθα ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ ὅμοιον ἄλλως καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. ἔπειτα οὐκ, εἰ ἴδιον εἶπε τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον, ἀνεῖλε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον κατηγορεῖν τινων· ἀλλ' εἰ εἶπε τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῦ ποιοῦ, ἄλλως λεκτέον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ ἰδιότητας ἄλλας ἑκατέρου τοῦ γένους, τοῦ τε ποσοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ. ἢ λεκτέον, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ λέγεσθαι, καθόσον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, καθόλου δέ, ὅτι συντάττειν δεῖ τὰς συμπληρούσας διαφορὰς τῷ[1] οὗ διαφοραί, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν μόνου ἐκείνου ᾖ διαφορὰ ἡ διαφορά. εἰ δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ μή, οὗ μὲν συμπληροῖ, συντακτέον, οὗ δὲ μὴ συμπληροῖ, μόνον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ληπτέον· συμπληροῦν δὲ λέγω τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ τὴν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιάνδε, τοῦ "τοιάνδε" προσθήκην οὐκ οὐσιώδη δεχομένου. κἀκεῖνο δὲ ἐπισημαντέον, ὅτι ἴσα μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ τετράγωνα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων σχημάτων, ἐπιπέδων τε καὶ στερεῶν· ὥστε ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον κείσθω ἐπὶ ποσοῦ ἴδιον. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοιον, εἰ ἐπὶ ποιοῦ, ἐπισκεπτέον.

[1] F^{pc}, Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.

"like" is used differently, and not as in the qualitative. Then, if he[1] said that "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative", he did not abolish the possibility of predicating likeness of some magnitudes; but if he said that "the like and unlike belong to the qualitative", then, as we asserted, likeness in the quantitative must be understood in a different way. But if "the like" is understood in the same way also in magnitudes, we must investigate other characteristics proper to each genus, the quantitative and the qualitative. Now we must say that the term "like" can be used also of the quantitative, in so far as the specific differences are present in it, and in general that one ought to class the differences which help to complete the essence under that of which they are the differences, and especially when the specific difference as specific difference belongs to that alone. But if in one it contributes to the completion of the essence, but in the other not, it must be classed where it contributes, but where it does not contribute, simply taken by itself: I mean that it contributes to the completion not simply of the essence, but of the essence of such a kind, since "of such a kind" allows a non-substantial addition. And we must note this as well, that we call both triangles and quadrilaterals "equal" and apply the term to all figures, plane and solid. So let it be established that "equal" and "unequal" properly belong to the quantitative. But we must investigate whether "like" and "unlike" belong to the qualitative.

[1] Aristotle. The statements about equality and inequality and likeness and unlikeness discussed here are *Categories* 6. 6a26 and 8. 11a18–19.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ ἐλέχθη, ὡς σὺν ἄλλοις μὲν ὕλῃ καὶ ποσῷ συμμιχθὲν συμπλήρωσιν ἐργάζεται αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ὅτι κινδυνεύει ἡ λεγομένη αὕτη οὐσία εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν, οὐ τὶ ἀλλὰ ποιὸν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὁ μέν λόγος εἶναι οἷον πυρὸς τὸ "τὶ" σημαίνων μᾶλλον, ἣν δὲ μορφὴν ἐργάζεται, ποιὸν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ "τὶ" εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἀποτελεσθὲν ἐν σώματος φύσει εἴδωλον ὂν τοῦ λόγου ποιόν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι. οἷον εἰ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ ὁρωμένου ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν γραφῇ χρώματα καὶ φάρμακα ὄντα Σωκράτης λέγοιτο· οὕτως οὖν καὶ λόγου ὄντος, καθ' ὃν Σωκράτης, τὸν αἰσθητὸν Σωκράτη ⟨ὀρθῶς λεκτέον οὐ Σωκράτη⟩,[1] ἀλλὰ[2] χρώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐκείνων τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μιμήματα εἶναι· καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ τοῦτον πρὸς τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἤδη λόγον τὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ αὐτὸ πεπονθότα εἶναι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως.

16. Ἕκαστον δὲ λαμβανόμενον χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τὴν λεγομένην οὐσίαν ποιότητα τὴν ἐν τούτοις εἶναι, οὐ τὸ "τὶ" οὐδὲ τὸ "ποσὸν" οὐδὲ "κίνησιν" σημαίνοντα, χαρακτῆρα δὲ καὶ τὸ "τοιόνδε" [καὶ τὸ οἷον][3] καὶ τὸ "ὁποῖον"[4] δηλοῦντα, ⟨οἷον⟩[3] καλὸν αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ καλὸν τὸ τῇδε κἀκεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ὁμώνυμον τῷ φαινομένῳ; καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖ

[1] Igal, H–S²: ⟨λέγομεν⟩ Müller: ⟨λέγομεν Σωκράτη⟩ H–S¹.
[2] Enn.: lac. † ἀλλὰ Kirchhoff: ἄλλα Harder, Cilento, Theiler.
[3] Müller.
[4] Enn.: ποιὸν Volkmann.

It was said about the qualitative that, mixed together with others, matter and the quantitative, it effects the completion of sensible substance, and that this so-called substance is this compound of many, and is not a "something" but a "something like"; and the rational form, of fire for instance, indicates rather the "something", but the shape it produces is rather a quale. And the rational form of man is the being a "something", but its product in the nature of body, being an image of the form, is rather a sort of "something like". It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted picture, being colours and painter's stuff, was called Socrates; in the same way, therefore, since there is a rational form according to which Socrates is, the perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations of those in the form; and this rational form in relation to the truest form of man is affected in the same way. And so much for that.

16. But when each of the categories which have to do with so-called substance is taken separately, quality [must be said] to be in sense-objects, not the terms signifying "something" or "how much" or "movement" but those indicating the distinctive characteristic and the "of such a kind" and "of what kind", for instance beautiful and ugly applied to the body; for there is only a verbal identity between the beautiful here and there in the intelligible, as there is also between the qualitative here and there; since black and white also are different here and there. But is the qualitative in the seed, that is in the rational principle of a particular kind, the same or only verbally identical with that which appears?

προσνεμητέον ἢ τοῖς τῇδε; καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ καλὸν ὅτι ἄλλο, ἤδη δῆλον. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, εἰ ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς. ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς, τὰς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς τέχνας λόγους οὔσας ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰ ἐν τοῖς τῇδε· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐν ὕλῃ λόγοι, ἀλλὰ ὕλη αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχή. ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ μετὰ ὕλης, πῶς ἐνταῦθα; οἷον κιθαρῳδία· καὶ γὰρ περὶ χορδὰς καὶ μέρος πως τῆς τέχνης ἡ ᾠδή, φωνὴ αἰσθητή, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐνεργείας ταύτας τις, ἀλλ' οὐ μέρη, θεῖτο. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐνέργειαι αἰσθηταί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ ἐν σώματι ἀσώματον· ἀλλ' ἀπέδομεν αὐτὸ αἰσθητὸν ὂν τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ σώματος. γεωμετρίαν δὲ καὶ ἀριθμητικὴν διττὴν θεμένους τὰς μὲν ὠδὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ ποιῷ τακτέον, τὰς δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς πραγματείας πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖ τακτέον. καὶ δὴ καὶ μουσικήν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ὡσαύτως. τὰς τοίνυν τέχνας περὶ σώματα ἐχούσας καὶ ὀργάνοις αἰσθητοῖς καὶ αἰσθήσει χρωμένας, εἰ καὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι διαθέσεις, ἐπειδὴ κάτω νευούσης εἰσίν, ἐν τῷδε τῷ ποιῷ τακτέον. καὶ δὴ

And is it to be assigned to the intelligibles there or the sense-objects here? And what about ugliness in the soul? For that beauty in the soul is something different [from bodily beauty] is already clear. But if [ugliness or vice in the soul] is in this qualitative here, the question arises if virtue is among the qualitatives here. Perhaps some virtues are among the qualitatives here, and some among those there. Since one might be in some difficulty whether the arts, which are rational forms, belong among those here [1]: for even if they are rational forms in matter, their matter is the soul. But when they are also with [bodily] matter, how are they here? Take lyre-playing for instance; for it has to do with the strings, and the tune, sensible sound, is in some way part of the art, unless perhaps one were to suppose that these are activities, not parts. But even so they are sense-perceived activities; since the beauty also which is in body is bodiless; but since it is perceived by the senses we allotted it to what has to do with body and belongs to body. But we suppose that geometry and arithmetic are double, and should rank one kind of them here in this qualitative, but the works of the soul itself directed to the intelligible should be ranked there. And indeed Plato says the same about music and astronomy. So then the arts which are concerned with body and use perceptible tools and sense-perception, even if they are dispositions of the soul, since they are dispositions of the soul inclining downwards are to be ranked in this qualitative here. And indeed there is nothing to

[1] On the status of the arts in the intelligible and sensible worlds see also V. 9.11–12.

καὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐνταῦθα τὰς οὕτω πραττούσας ὡς πολιτικῶς τὸ πράττειν ἔχειν, ὅσαι μὴ χωρίζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄγουσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ καλῶς ἐνεργοῦσι προηγούμενον τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον τιθέμεναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι τοίνυν καλὸν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τούτοις. τί οὖν; καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην, ἐν ᾗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι, ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ τῇδε τάξομεν; ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σώματα εἴπομεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ σωμάτων ποιήσεις οἱ λόγοι, ἐν ποιότητι ἐθέμεθα τῇ τῇδε· οὐσίαν δὲ αἰσθητὴν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων θέμενοι οὐδαμῶς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτῇ τάξομεν. ποιότητας δὲ ἀσωμάτους ἁπάσας λέγοντες ἐν αὐτῇ πάθη ὄντα νενευκότα τῇδε ἐνηριθμήσαμεν καὶ λόγους ψυχῆς τινος· τὸ γὰρ πάθος μεμερισμένον εἰς δύο, εἴς τε τὸ περὶ ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐδίδομεν ποιότητι οὐ σωματικῇ οὔσῃ, περὶ σῶμα δὲ οὔσῃ· οὐκέτι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τῇδε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ὅτι τὸ πρὸς σῶμα αὐτῆς πάθος ἤδη δεδωκότες ἦμεν ποιῷ· ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ λόγου νοουμένην τῷ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ἀποδεδώκαμεν οὐδεμίαν οὐσίαν ὁπωσοῦν νοητὴν ἐνταῦθα καταλιπόντες.

17. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω δοκεῖ, διαιρετέον τὰς μὲν ψυχικάς, τὰς δὲ σωματικάς, ὡς σώματος οὔσας ποιότητας. εἰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἁπάσας ἐκεῖ τις βούλεται,

[1] The terminology here is Stoic: cp. *SVF* III 280.

prevent us from ranking the practical virtues here below, those which act in such a way that their action is of a civic [or social] kind, all those which do not separate the soul and lead it to the things there above, but work the good life here below, regarding this as preferable but not as necessary.[1] Then the beautiful in the seed and still more the black and the white belong among these here below. Well then, shall we rank the soul of this particular kind, in which these rational forms are, with the substance here below? Now we did not say that these were bodies, but since the rational forms were concerned with bodies and bodies' doings, we put them in the quality here below; but when we take sensible substance to be that which is composed of all that we have mentioned, we shall certainly not rank an incorporeal substance in it. But, though we said that all the qualities were incorporeal, we counted them in the sensible since they are affections inclining to this world and forms belonging to a particular soul; for since the affection is divided into two, into that with which it is concerned and that in which it is, we allotted it to the quality which is not corporeal but in the sphere of body; but we do not go on to allot the soul to the substance here below because we had already allotted its body-directed affection to the qualitative; but when it was thought of without the affection and the rational form [we have been discussing] we have assigned it to the region from which it came and have left no substance in any way intelligible here below.

17. If we think this is so, we should divide qualities into soul-qualities and (as belonging to body) body-qualities. But if one wishes all souls to be in the

ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τῇδε ποιότητας ἔστι διαιρεῖν, τὰς μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων, τὰς δὲ δι' ὤτων, τὰς δὲ δι' ἁφῆς, γεύσεως, ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τούτων εἴ τινες διαφοραί, ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα, ἀκοαῖς δὲ φωνάς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι· φωνὰς δέ, ᾗ ποιαί, ἡδύ, τραχύ, λεῖον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότησι διαιρούμεθα καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ἢ αἰσχρὰς καὶ ὅλως τοιάσδε—τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν ἢ ὀλιγάκις εἰς τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς εἴδη ποιούσας ἢ οὐδαμοῦ—καὶ τὸ ποσὸν δὲ ποιότησι ταῖς αὐτῶν οἰκείαις, πῶς ἄν τις καὶ τὸ ποιὸν διέλοι κατ' εἴδη, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ποίαις χρώμενος διαφοραῖς καὶ ἐκ ποίου γένους. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διαφορὰς οὐσίας οὐσίας πάλιν αὖ λέγοι. τίνι οὖν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν; τίνι δὲ τὰ χρώματα ὅλως; ἀπὸ χυμῶν καὶ τῶν ἁπτικῶν ποιοτήτων; εἰ δὲ τοῖς διαφόροις αἰσθητηρίοις ταῦτα, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἡ διαφορά. ἀλλὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν πῶς; εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν συγκριτικόν, τὸ δὲ διακριτικὸν ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ διακριτικὸν γλώττης καὶ συγκριτικόν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν παθῶν, εἰ διακρίσεις τινὲς καὶ συγκρίσεις ταῦτα· ἔπειτα οὐκ αὐτὰ οἷς διαφέρει εἴρηκεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι οἷς δύνανται—καὶ οὐκ ἄλογον δὲ οἷς δύνανται—

[1] This way of explaining the differences of sense-perceived qualities seems to go back to the Atomists: cp. Democritus A 120 DK. It was adopted by Plato (*Timaeus* 67E5–6) and Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I 7. 1057b8–9, *Topica* H 3. 153a38–b1), who is criticised here.

intelligible one can divide the qualities here below by the senses, some [perceived] through the eyes, some through the ears, some through touch, taste, smell; and if there are any differentiations of these, [they are to be distinguished,] colours by sight, sounds by hearing and [others] by the other senses: sounds, in so far as they are qualified, are sweet, harsh, soft. But, since we distinguish the differentiations of substances by qualities, and activities and actions as fine or ugly and in general of some kind—for the quantitative comes into the differentiations which make species seldom or nowhere—and the quantitative by the qualities peculiar to quanta, one might be in some difficulty about how one should divide the qualitative by species, what kind of differentiations one should use and from what kind of genus one should take them. For it is absurd to divide it by its identical self, as if one said that differentiations of substances were again substances. By what then does one differentiate white and black? And by what colours in general? From tastes and tangible qualities? But if these differentiations are by different sense-organs, the distinction is not in its subjects. But how does one distinguish qualia perceived by the same sense? If it is because one concentrates and one diffuses the eyes, and one diffuses and one concentrates the tongue, first there is a dispute about the experiences themselves, whether these are diffusions and concentrations; and then Aristotle has not stated by what the experiences themselves are differentiated.[1] But if one says "by their powers"[2]—and "by their powers" is

[2] Aristotle *Categories* 8. 9a14–16.

ἐκεῖνο ἴσως λεκτέον, ὡς οἷς δύνανται διαιρετέον τὰ μὴ ὁρώμενα, οἷον τὰς ἐπιστήμας· αἰσθητὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὄντα διὰ τί ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖ; καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις δὲ διαιροῦντες οἷς δύνανται, καὶ ὅλως ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσι διαστησάμενοι ὡς ἕτεραι ἐξ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, ἔχομεν λόγῳ διαφορὰς αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν, οὐ μόνον περὶ ἃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγους αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες. ἢ τὰς μὲν τέχνας ἕξομεν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς θεωρήμασι, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ σώμασι ποιότητας πῶς; ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν διαφόρων πῶς ἕτεροι, ζητήσειεν ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος διαφέρειν· ἀλλὰ τίνι, ζητοῦμεν.

18. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἅπαντα τὰ ἀπορηθέντα δεικνύει ὡς τῶν ἄλλων δεῖ διαφορὰς ζητεῖν, αἷς χωριοῦμεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἕκαστα, τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν διαφορὰς καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄλογον· οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίας οὐσιῶν οὔτε ποσοῦ ποσότητας οὔτε ποιότητας ποιοτήτων οὔτε διαφορὰς διαφορῶν οἷόν τε. ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, οὗ ἐγχωρεῖ, τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἢ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις· οὗ δὲ μηδὲ ταῦτα, οἷον πράσιον ὠχροῦ, ἐπειδὴ[1] λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος λέγουσι, τί ἄν τις εἴποι;

[1] Vitringa: ἐπεὶ δὲ Enn.

not unreasonable—one should perhaps reply that invisible things are to be distinguished by their powers, branches of knowledge for instance; but why should these, which are perceptible, be distinguished by what they do? And when in the case of branches of knowledge we are distinguishing them by their powers, and in general with the powers of soul separating them as different by what they do, we are able to grasp their differentiations rationally, since we see not only what they are concerned with, but their rational forms. We shall be able to divide the arts by their rational forms and their theories, but how shall we divide the qualities in bodies? Now even in that case one might enquire how the differing rational forms are different. And white certainly does appear to differ from black: but by what, we are still enquiring.

18. But all these points of difficulty show that one should look for differentiations of other things, by which we separate them from each other, but to look for differentiations of differentiations is impossible and irrational: for it is not possible to look for substances of substances or quantities of quantity or qualities of qualities or differentiations of differentiations. But it is necessary, where the circumstances admit, [to distinguish them] by their powers to make or something of the sort; but where even these are not present, as [when distinguishing] leek-green from greenish-yellow (since they say[1] that these belong to white and black), what is one going to say? But the truth is that it is either sense-

[1] The Peripatetics: cp. Aristotle *De Sensu* 4. 442a24–25; *Categories* 10. 12a18.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅτι ἕτερα, ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ὁ νοῦς ἐρεῖ, καὶ οὐ δώσουσι λόγον, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ὅτι μηδ' αὐτῆς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μόνον μηνύσεις διαφόρους ποιήσασθαι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐν ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἐπιβολαῖς ἁπλαῖς καὶ οὐ λόγοις χρῆται πανταχοῦ, ὡς λέγειν ἕκαστον τόδε τόδε, τόδε τόδε· καὶ ἔστιν ἑτερότης ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτοῦ διαιροῦσα θάτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου οὐχ ἑτερότητος αὐτὴ δεομένη. αἱ τοίνυν ποιότητες πότερα διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι γένοιντο ἂν ἢ οὔ; λευκότης μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὅλως αἱ χρόαι καὶ ⟨αἱ⟩[1] περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ χυμοὺς γένοιντο ἂν διαφοραὶ ἑτέρων καὶ εἴδη ὄντα, γραμματικὴ δὲ καὶ μουσικὴ πῶς; ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν ψυχήν, τὴν δὲ μουσικήν, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ φύσει εἶεν, ὥστε καὶ εἰδοποιοὺς διαφορὰς γίνεσθαι. καὶ εἰ εἴη τις οὖν διαφορά, ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου· καὶ εἰ ἐκ ταὐτοῦ γένους, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οἷον ποιοτήτων ποιότητας. ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ κακία ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἕξις τοιάδε, ἡ δὲ τοιάδε· ὥστε ποιοτήτων οὐσῶν τῶν ἕξεων αἱ διαφοραὶ ποιότητες· εἰ μή τις φαίη τὴν μὲν ἕξιν ἄνευ τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ ποιότητα εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν τὴν ποιότητα ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ γλυκὺ ὠφέλιμον, βλαβερὸν δὲ τὸ πικρόν, σχέσει, οὐ ποιότητι, διαιρεῖ. τί δ' εἰ τὸ γλυκὺ παχύ, τὸ δὲ αὐστηρὸν λεπτόν; οὐ τί ἦν γλυκὺ ἴσως λέγει παχύ, ἀλλ'

[1] Müller, Cilento, Theiler.

[1] This sentence is one of the clearest statements in Plotinus of the close resemblance between *αἰσθήσις* and *νοήσις*: cp. VI. 7. 7. 29–31; he seems here to be developing the

perception or intellect which says that they are different, and they will not give a reason, sense-perception because the reason does not belong to it, but only giving different indications, but the intellect everywhere uses its own simple acts of attention, not reasons, so that it says of each thing "this is this and that is that"; and there is an otherness in its movements which distinguishes one thing from another and does not itself need an otherness.[1] Then will all qualities be differentiations or not? Whiteness, indeed, and colours in general and touch- and taste-qualities would be differentiations of other things even if they are species, but how could literature and music be? By the fact that one soul is literary and another musical, especially when they are so by nature, so that these become species-forming differentiations. And if quality, then, was a differentiation, it would be either from this genus or also from another; and if from the same genus, it would be a differentiation of what is from the same genus, qualities of qualities for instance. For virtue and vice are states, one of this kind and one of that; so that since states are qualities the differentiations are qualities; unless one were to say that the state without the differentiation was not a quality, but the differentiation made the quality. But if [one says] that the sweet is beneficial but the bitter harmful, one is distinguishing them by relation, not quality. But suppose [one says] that the sweet is dense and the sour rare? One does not perhaps mean that what the sweet is is dense, but that in which the sweetness

thought of Aristotle: cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 11. 1143a35–b5.

ᾧ ἡ γλυκύτης· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐστηροῦ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ὥστε εἰ πανταχοῦ μὴ ποιότητος ποιότης διαφορὰ σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οὐσίας οὐσία, οὐδὲ ποσοῦ ποσότης. ἢ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν διαφέρει δυσίν. ἢ ὑπερέχει δυσί, "διαφέρει" δ' οὐ λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ διαφέροι δυσὶν ἐν τοῖς τρισίν; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κίνησις κινήσεως κινήσει διαφέροι ἄν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄν τις εὕροι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ληπτέον, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοῖς διοίσει. τὸ δὲ ἐκ ταὐτοῦ γένους, τοῦ ποιοῦ, καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴ τις διαιροῖ τῷ τὴν μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς, τὴν δὲ περὶ ὀργάς, καὶ τὴν μὲν περὶ καρποῦ κομιδήν, καὶ οὕτω παραδέξαιτο καλῶς ὡρίσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι διαφορὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποιότητας.

19. Τῇ δὲ ποιότητι συντακτέον, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει, καὶ τοὺς κατ' αὐτὰς ποιούς, καθόσον ποιότης περὶ αὐτούς, οὐ προσποιουμένους αὐτούς, ἵνα μὴ κατηγορίαι δύο, ἀλλ' εἰς τοῦτο ἀνιόντας ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀφ' οὗ λέγονται. τὸ δὲ οὐ λευκόν, εἰ μὲν σημαίνει ἄλλο χρῶμα, ποιότης· εἰ δὲ ἀπόφασις μόνον εἴη, [πραγμάτων ἢ ἐξαρίθμησις][1] οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ φωνὴ ἢ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος γινομένου κατ'[2] αὐτοῦ πράγματος· καὶ εἰ μὲν φωνή, κίνησίς τις, εἰ δ' ὄνομα ἢ λόγος, πρός τι, καθὸ σημαντικά. εἰ δὲ μὴ μόνον πραγμάτων ἡ ἐξαρίθμησις κατὰ γένος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ σημαίνοντα, τίνος ἕκαστον

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] coniecimus: καὶ Enn.

is; and the same applies to the sour. So one must investigate whether everywhere quality is a differentiation of what is not quality, as substance is not a differentiation of substance or quantity of quantity. Now five differs from three by two. No, it exceeds by two and "difference" is not the word used: for how could it differ by "two" which is in the "three"? But neither would movement differ by movement from movement, nor would one find this in the other genera. But with vice and virtue one must compare the whole with the whole, and so one will distinguish the wholes by themselves. But as for the differentiations being derived from the same genus, the qualitative, and not from another, if one distinguished by one [virtue or vice] being concerned with pleasures, and one with tempers, and one with the acquisition of produce, and accepted that this was a good distinction, it is clear that it is possible for non-qualities also to be differentiations.

19. We should rank with quality, as it appeared, the differentiated qualia, in so far as there is quality in them, not bringing them themselves into consideration, to avoid having two categories, but going up from them, to that after which they are called qualia. But the "not-white", if it indicates another colour, is a quality; but if it was only a negation it would be nothing but a sound or a name or a definition of the thing to which it is applicable; and if it is a sound, it is a movement, but if it is a name or definition, it is relative in that these are significant. But if there is not only a counting-out of things according to their genus, but one must also count out the words and the significations, saying what genus each of them signifies, we shall say that

γένους σημαντικόν, ἐροῦμεν τὰ μὲν τίθεσθαι αὐτὰ μόνον δηλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ ἀναιρεῖν αὐτά. καίτοι βέλτιον ἴσως τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν μὴ συναριθμεῖν τάς γε καταφάσεις διὰ τὸ σύνθετον μὴ συναριθμοῦντας. τὰς δὲ στερήσεις πῶς; [τὰς δὲ στερήσεις][1] εἰ ὧν αἱ στερήσεις ποιότητες, καὶ αὐταὶ ποιότητες, οἷον νωδὸς ἢ τυφλός. ὁ δὲ γυμνὸς καὶ ἠμφιεσμένος οὐδέτερος ποιός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλόν πως ἔχων· ἐν σχέσει οὖν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. πάθος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ πάσχειν ἔτι οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλά τις κίνησις· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ πεπονθέναι καὶ ἔχειν μένον ἤδη τὸ πάθος ποιότης· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοι ἔτι τὸ πάθος, λέγοιτο δὲ πεπονθέναι, κεκινῆσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ "ἦν ἐν κινήσει". δεῖ δὲ μόνον κίνησιν νοεῖν ἀφαιροῦντα τὸν χρόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ "νῦν" προσλαμβάνειν προσήκει. τὸ δὲ "καλῶς" καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μίαν νόησιν τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀνακτέον. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐρυθριᾶν εἰς τὸ ποιὸν ἀνακτέον, τὸν δὲ ἐρυθρὸν μηκέτι, ἐπισκεπτέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρυθαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀνακτέον· πάσχει γὰρ ἢ ὅλως κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ μηκέτι ἐρυθαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἔστι, διὰ τί οὐ ποιός; οὐ γὰρ χρόνῳ ὁ ποιός—ἢ τίνι ὁριστέον;—ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῷδε, καὶ ἐρυθρὸν λέγοντες ποιὸν λέγομεν· ἢ οὕτως τὰς ἕξεις

[1] del. Creuzer.

positive terms posit things by simply indicating them, but negative terms take them away. Yet perhaps it is better not to count in the negations, at any rate if we do not count in the positive terms because they are composite. But what about privations? If what they are privations of are qualities, they themselves are qualities, "toothless" or "blind" for instance. But the "naked" and the "clothed" are neither of them qualified, but rather in a particular state: in a relation, therefore, to something else. An affection, as long as being affected continues, is not a quality but a kind of movement; but when affection means having been affected and having the affection still remaining, it is a quality, but if something does not still have the affection but is said to have been affected, this means to have been moved; and this is the same as "was in movement". But one must only think of the movement, taking away the time: for it is not even proper to bring in the "now". The "well done" and such-like are to be referred to the single notion of the genus. But we must enquire whether being of a red complexion is to be referred to the qualitative, but not as well the [temporarily] red-faced man. Now turning red in the face is correctly not so referred; for there is affection or in general movement; but if someone is not any more turning red, but is red in the face already, why is he not qualified? For being qualified does not depend on time—or by what interval of time would it be defined?—but by being of such a kind, and when we say "red-faced" we say "qualified"; or otherwise we shall only call [settled] states, and not any more

μόνας ποιότητας ἐροῦμεν, τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκέτι. καὶ θερμὸς τοίνυν οὐχ ὁ θερμαινόμενος, καὶ νοσῶν οὐχ ὁ ἀγόμενος εἰς νόσον.

20. Ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ, εἰ μὴ πάσῃ ποιότητί ἐστί τις ἄλλη ἐναντία· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῖς ἄκροις δοκεῖ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἐναντίον εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων τὰ μεταξὺ οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι μίξεις τῶν ἄκρων τὰ μεταξύ, ἔδει μὴ ἀντιδιαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ λευκῷ καὶ μέλανι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συνθέσεις. ἢ τῷ μίαν τινὰ ἄλλην ἐπὶ τῶν μεταξύ, κἂν ἐκ συνθέσεως ᾖ, θεωρεῖσθαι ἀντιτίθεμεν. ἢ ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐ μόνον διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖστον. ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει τὸ πλεῖστον διαφέρειν λαμβάνεσθαι ἐν τῷ θέσθαι ἤδη ταῦτα τὰ μεταξύ· ἐπεί, εἴ τις ταύτην τὴν διάταξιν ἀφέλοι, τίνι τὸ πλεῖστον ὁριεῖ; ἢ ὅτι τὸ φαιὸν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ λευκοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μέλαν· καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς ὄψεως μηνύεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χυμῶν ὡσαύτως ⟨καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν πικρὸν γλυκύ⟩,[1] θερμὸν ψυχρόν, τὸ μηδέτερον μεταξύ· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν εἰθίσμεθα, δῆλον, τάχα δ' ἄν τις ἡμῖν οὐ συγχωροῖ ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν ὁμοίως πάντη ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι καὶ ἕτερα

[1] H–S².

[temporary] dispositions, qualities. And then a warm man would not be a man who is getting warm, and a sick man not a man on the way to sickness.

20. But one must see if there is not to every quality another contrary one; since in the case of virtue and vice even the mean appears to be contrary to the extremes. But in the case of colours [he[1] says that] the intermediates are not so. Perhaps therefore, because the intermediate colours are mixtures of the extremes, we ought not to make a division of them by opposition, but [only] by white and black, [regarding] the others as compositions [of white and black]. Or else we divide them by opposition because one particular colour among the intermediates is different [from the others] even if they can be seen as resulting from composition. Or because the contraries do not only differ, but differ as much as possible. But it is likely that "differing as much as possible" is only apprehended in already positing these intermediates: since if one takes away this arrangement of intermediates, by what will one define "as much as possible"? Or because grey is nearer to white than black is; and we are informed of this by sight, and it is the same with tastes and touch-sensations, bitter, sweet, hot, cold, and what is neither in between; but that this is how we are accustomed to apprehend things is clear, but perhaps someone would not concede us this, that white and yellow and any colour in relation to any other are altogether different from each other, and since

[1] Aristotle. Plotinus is contrasting *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5. 1106b24–28 (on virtue and vice as mean and extremes) with e.g. *Categories* 8. 10b12–18 (on colours).

ὄντα ποιὰ ἐναντία εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι μεταξὺ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἡ ἐναντιότης. ὑγιείᾳ γοῦν καὶ νόσῳ οὐδὲν παρεμπέπτωκε μεταξύ, καὶ ἐναντία· ἢ ὅτι τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ ἑκατέρου πλείστην παραλλαγὴν ἔχει. καὶ πῶς πλείστην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν μὴ οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς μέσοις ἐλαττόνων; οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐπὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν. ἄλλῳ τοίνυν τὸ ἐναντίον, οὐ τῷ πλεῖστον, ὁριστέον. εἰ δὲ τῷ πολλῷ, εἰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον πρὸς ἔλαττον, πάλιν τὰ ἄμεσα ἐκφεύξεται· εἰ δ' ἁπλῶς πολύ, ἑκάστῃ φύσει πολὺ ἀφεστάναι συγχωρηθέντος, μὴ τῷ πλείονι μετρεῖν τὴν ἀπόστασιν. ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον. ἆρ' οὖν τὰ μὲν ἔχοντά τινα ὁμοιότητα—λέγω δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ γένος οὐδὲ πάντως τῷ μεμίχθαι ἄλλαις οἷον μορφαῖς αὐτῶν—ἢ πλείονα ἢ ἐλάττονα οὐκ ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οἷς μηδὲν ταὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἐναντία; καὶ προσθετέον δέ· ἐν γένει τῷ ποιῷ. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷς μηδὲν εἰς ὁμοίωσιν, οὐκ ὄντων ἄλλων τῶν οἷον ἐπαμφοτεριζόντων καὶ ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐχόντων, τῶν δέ τινων μόνων μὴ ἐχόντων. εἰ τοῦτο, οἷς μέν ἐστι κοινότης ἐν τοῖς χρώμασιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐναντία.

they are different qualia are contrary. For their contrariety is not due to the fact that there are intermediates, but to this being different. At any rate, no intermediate intervenes between health and sickness, and they are contraries: perhaps because the results of each have the greatest possible difference. And how is it possible to say "the greatest possible" if there are not lesser differences in the intermediates? One cannot therefore say "the greatest possible" in the case of health and sickness. So contrariety is to be determined by something else, not by the "as much as possible". But if it is determined by the "much", if "much" is said instead of "more" compared with "less", again the contraries without intermediates will get away; but if it means simply "much", when it is agreed that there is much distance between each and every thing, one cannot measure the distance by the "more". But we must investigate how there is contrariety. Is it, then, that things which have some likeness—I do not mean likeness according to genus, nor at all that which results from the mixture of something like other forms of them—either greater or lesser, are not contraries, but those are contraries which have nothing the same in their specific form? And one must add: in the genus of quality. For then also the contraries which have no intermediates [will be contrary], those which have nothing tending to likeness, as there are no others which so to speak face both ways and have a likeness to each other—but of some of them only some intermediates do not have a likeness. If this is so those among colours which have something in common will not be contraries. But there will be nothing to prevent, not

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύσει μὴ πᾶν μὲν παντί, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλῳ οὕτως εἶναι ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ χυμῶν ὡσαύτως. ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω διηπορήσθω. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐν μὲν τοῖς μετέχουσιν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἐδόκει, ὑγίεια δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἠπορεῖτο. εἰ δὴ πλάτος ἔχει τούτων ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις αὐτὰς δοτέον· ἐκεῖ δ' ἕκαστον τὸ ὅλον καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον.

21. Περὶ δὲ κινήσεως, εἰ δεῖ γένος θέσθαι, ὧδ' ἄν τις θεωρήσειε· πρῶτον μέν, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο γένος ἀνάγειν προσῆκεν, ἔπειτα, εἰ μηδὲν ἄνωθεν αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγοροῖτο, εἶτα, εἰ πολλὰς διαφορὰς λαβοῦσα εἴδη ποιήσει. εἰς ποῖόν τις γένος αὐτὴν ἀνάξει; οὔτε γὰρ οὐσία οὔτε ποιότης τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτήν· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν—καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν πολλαὶ κινήσεις—οὐδ' αὖ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι πολλαὶ κινήσεις ποιήσεις· ποιήσεις δὲ καὶ πείσεις εἰς ταύτην. οὐδ' αὖ εἰς τὸ πρός τι ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τινὸς ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' αὑτῆς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἐν τῷ πρός τι· τινὸς γὰρ ἡ ποιότης καὶ ἔν τινι· καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὡσαύτως. εἰ δ' ὅτι ὄντα ἐκεῖνά τινα, κἂν τινος ᾖ καθό ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ποιότης, τὸ δὲ ποσότης εἴρηται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐπειδή, κἂν τινος ἡ κίνησις ᾖ, ἔστι τι πρὸ τοῦ τινος εἶναι, ὅ ἐστιν ἐφ' αὑτοῦ

every colour being contrary to every colour, but one colour to another. And the same will apply to tastes. And let that be the end of this discussion. But as for the "more" it appeared that it is in the participants, but there was a difficulty about health and justice. Certainly if each of these has the breadth for it, the permanent states themselves must be granted to have it. But there in the intelligible each is the whole and does not have a "more".

21. About movement, whether one should posit it as a genus, one might look at it in this way: first, whether it would not be appropriate to refer it to another genus, and then whether nothing higher than it could be predicated of it in its essence, and then whether by receiving many differentiations it will make species. To what genus will one refer it? For it is neither substance or quality of the things which have it; one will certainly not refer it to active doing and making—for there are certainly many movements in passivity—nor to passivity because many movements are active doings and makings; but one should rather refer activities and passivities to this [genus of movement]. Nor again could it be correctly referred to relation, because movement is movement of something and not on its own; for in this way the qualitative would be in the category of relation; for quality is quality of something and in something; and the same will apply to the quantitative. But if it is because these are something particular, even if in so far as they exist they are of something else, that one is called quality and the other quantity, in the same way, since, even if movement is movement of something, it is something before it is of something, we should grasp what it is

ληπτέον ἂν εἴη. ὅλως γὰρ πρός τι δεῖ τίθεσθαι οὐχ ὅ ἐστιν, εἶτ' ἄλλου ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἡ σχέσις ἀπογεννᾷ οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἄλλου παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν καθὸ λέγεται, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον καθὸ λέγεται διπλάσιον ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ πηχυαῖον παραβολῇ τὴν γένεσιν λαβὸν καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὐδὲν νοούμενον πρὸ τούτου ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον παραβεβλῆσθαι ἔσχε τοῦτο λέγεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἑτέρου ὂν ἐστί τι, ἵνα καὶ ἑτέρου ᾖ, ὡς τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ ἡ οὐσία; ἢ πρότερον, ὅτι μηδὲν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὡς γένος κατηγορεῖται, ληπτέον. ἀλλ' εἰ τὴν μεταβολήν τις λέγοι πρὸ κινήσεως εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ταὐτὸν λέγει ἢ γένος λέγων ἐκεῖνο ποιήσει ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ πρόσθεν εἰρημένα· εἶτα δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν εἴδει τὴν κίνησιν θήσεται καί τι ἕτερον ἀντιθήσει τῇ κινήσει, τὴν γένεσιν ἴσως, μεταβολήν τινα κἀκείνην λέγων, κίνησιν δὲ οὔ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ κίνησις ἡ γένεσις; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι μήπω ἐστὶ τὸ γινόμενον, κίνησις δὲ οὐ περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν μεταβολὴ δηλονότι ἂν εἴη ἡ γένεσις. εἰ δ' ὅτι ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀλλοίωσίς τις καὶ αὔξη τῷ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν καὶ αὐξομένων τὴν

on its own. In general, one should posit as relative not what first is, and then is of something else, but what the relationship generates without there being anything else beside the relationship in virtue of which it gets its name, for instance the double, in so far as it is called double, has its origin and its existence in the comparison with the single cubits-length, and, without anything before this entering the mind, is called and is double in being compared with something else. What then [in the case of movement] is this, which, though it is of something, is something in order to be of something, like the qualitative and the quantitative and substance? Now first we must understand that nothing prior to it is predicated of it as its genus. But if someone were to say[1] that change is prior to motion, first of all he is either speaking of the same thing, or, if he is calling change a genus, he will be making another genus besides those previously mentioned; then it is clear that he will set movement among the species [of change] and set some other kind [of change] against movement, perhaps coming-to-be, saying that it also is a change, but not a movement. Why then is not coming-to-be a movement? If it is because what is coming into being does not yet exist, but movement has nothing to do with the non-existent, coming-to-be obviously could not be change either. But if it is because coming-to-be is nothing but a change of quality and an increase of quantity, because coming-to-be takes place when certain things are changed and increased, he is thinking

[1] Aristotle, *Physics* E 1. 225a34–b3; the discussion of Aristotle continues through the rest of the chapter.

γένεσιν εἶναι, τὰ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως λαμβάνει. δεῖ δὲ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τούτοις ἕτερόν τι εἶδος λαβεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παθητικῶς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἡ γένεσις, οἷον θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ λευκαίνεσθαι—ἔστι γὰρ τούτων γενομένων μήπω τὴν ἁπλῶς γένεσιν γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλά τι γίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἠλλοιῶσθαι—ἀλλ' ὅταν ⟨εἴδός τι λαμβάνῃ⟩[1] ζῷον ἢ φυτόν [ὅταν εἴδός τι λαμβάνῃ].[1] εἴποι δ' ἄν τις τὴν μεταβολὴν μᾶλλον ἁρμόττειν ἐν εἴδει τίθεσθαι ἢ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄλλο ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἐθέλει σημαίνειν, τὸ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἔχει καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οἰκείου μετάστασιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βούλεταί τις, ἀλλ' ἡ μάθησις καὶ ἡ κιθάρισις, ἢ ὅλως ἡ ἀφ' ἕξεως κίνησις. ὥστε εἶδός τι ἂν εἴη κινήσεως μᾶλλον ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἐκστατική τις οὖσα κίνησις.

22. Ἀλλ' ἔστω ταὐτὸν νοούμενον τὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως κατὰ τὸ παρακολουθεῖν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἄλλο. τί οὖν δεῖ λέγειν τὴν κίνησιν; ἔστω δὴ ἡ κίνησις, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἐκ δυνάμεως ὁδὸς εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ὃ λέγεται δύνασθαι. ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ⟨μὲν⟩[2] δυνάμει [τοῦ μέν],[2] ὅτι ἦκοι ἂν εἰς εἶδός τι, οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριάς, τοῦ δέ, ὅτι ἦκοι ἂν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, οἷον τὸ βαδιστικόν, ὅταν τὸ μέν προΐῃ[3] εἰς ἀνδριάντα, ἡ πρόοδος κίνησις, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ᾖ, τὸ βαδίζειν αὐτὸ κίνησις· καὶ ὄρχησις ἐπὶ τοῦ δυναμένου ὀρχεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀρχῆται. καὶ ἐπὶ μέν

[1] Theiler.
[2] H–S².
[3] Kirchhoff (*procedit* Ficinus): προσίῃ Enn.

about what is prior to coming-to-be. But one must consider coming-to-be in these things here to be a different species. For having come to be and becoming do not consist in being passively changed, like being heated or whitened—for it is possible when these changes occur that coming-to-be in the absolute sense has not yet occurred, but only coming to be something, that is, this very change we are talking about—but when an animal or a plant acquires a specific form. But someone might say that it is more appropriate to make change a species than movement, because change intends to signify one thing instead of another, but the range of meaning of movement includes transition which does not take a thing out of its proper nature, such as local movement. But if this is not what one intends, it must be learning and playing the lyre, or in general movement which comes from a state. So change would be rather a species of movement, being a movement which takes a thing out of itself.

22. But let us grant that the idea of change is the same [as that of movement] in that "different" is a consequence of movement. What, then, are we to say that movement is? Let us grant that movement, to describe it sketchily, is the passage from potentiality to that which it is said to be the potentiality of. For one thing is potential because it can arrive at a particular form, potentially a statue for instance, and another because it can arrive at an activity, the activity of walking for instance, and when one progresses to a statue, its progress is movement, and when the other is engaged in walking, the walking itself is movement; and, with someone who is a potential dancer, his dancing whenever he dances is

τινι κινήσει τῇ εἰς ἀνδριάντα εἶδος ἄλλο ἐπιγίγνεται, ὃ εἰργάσατο ἡ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἁπλοῦν εἶδος ὂν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἡ ὄρχησις, οὐδὲν ἔχει μετ' αὐτὴν παυσαμένης τῆς κινήσεως. ὥστε, εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶδος ἐγρηγορὸς ἀντίθετον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσι τοῖς ἑστηκόσιν, ἢ τὰ μὲν μένει, τὸ[1] δὲ οὔ, καὶ αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν, ὅταν μετ' αὐτήν τι γίνηται, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωήν τις λέγοι σωμάτων ταύτην, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος νῦν, τήν γε κίνησιν ταύτην ὁμώνυμον δεῖ λέγειν ταῖς νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κινήσεσιν. ὅτι δὲ γένος ἐστίν, οὐχ ἧττον ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ὁρισμῷ ἢ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι λαβεῖν πιστώσαιτο. ἀλλὰ πῶς εἰδός τι, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἡ κίνησις ἢ ὅλως παθητικὴ ἡ κίνησις; ἢ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν ἡ θέρμανσις τὰ μὲν αὔξῃ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὰ δ' εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄγῃ, καὶ ἢ κοινόν τι ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, τοῖς δὲ ὑποκειμένοις τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν δοκοῦσαν ἔχῃ. ὑγίανσις οὖν καὶ νόσανσις ταὐτόν; ἢ καθόσον μὲν κίνησις ταὐτόν· τίνι δὲ διοίσει; πότερα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἢ καὶ ἄλλῳ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὕστερον, ὅταν περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ἐπισκοπῶμεν. νῦν δὲ τί ταὐτὸν ἐν πάσῃ κινήσει σκεπτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένος εἴη. ἢ πολλαχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ οὕτως ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ὄν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι ἴσως δεῖ, ὅσαι μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγουσιν ἢ ἐνεργοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, ταύτας μὲν οἷον εἴδη εἶναι, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀγωγὰς ἀνάλογον τίθεσθαι τοῖς ἐφ' ἃ

[1] Harder, Theiler: τὰ Enn.

movement. And in one kind of movement, that to the statue, another form is acquired which the movement has made, but the other kind, dancing, as being a simple form of the potentiality, has nothing after it when the movement has stopped. So that it would not be inappropriate if one were to say that movement is a form awake, opposed to the other forms which are static, in that they abide but it does not, and is a cause to other forms, when something comes to be after it. But if someone were to say that this movement which we are now discussing is the life of bodies, one must give it the same name as the movements of Intellect and Soul. But one could be confident that movement is a genus no less because it is difficult, or even impossible, to comprehend it in a definition. But how can it be a form, in cases when the movement is to the worse, or in general passive? It is like when heating, the heating from the sun, makes some things grow and takes others the opposite way, and it is the same for both, but the apparent difference is in the subjects. Is it the same as becoming healthy or sick? Yes, in so far as they are movements it is the same; but in what will the difference lie? Will it be in the subjects, or in something else? But we will discuss this later, when we consider change. But now we must investigate what is the same in all movement: for in this way it could be a genus. Or perhaps it might be used in many senses, and be a genus in the way that being is. And [we must investigate] as well the difficulty that perhaps all the movements which lead to what is according to nature or are active in what is according to nature must be like species-forms, as has been said, but those which lead to what is against nature

ἄγουσιν. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ἐπί[1] τε τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς, καθὸ κινήσεις αὗται πᾶσαι; ἢ τὸ μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἕκαστον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον ἦν, εἶναι μηδ' ἠρεμεῖν μηδ' ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ παντελεῖ, ἀλλά, καθόσον κίνησις πάρεστιν, ἀεὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν· ἀπόλλυσθαι γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅταν μὴ ἄλλο· διὸ καὶ ἑτερότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ γεγονέναι καὶ μεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἑτερότης. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἕτερον ἀεί, διότι κίνησις αὐτὸν ποιεῖ· μεμετρημένη γὰρ κίνησις οὐ μένουσα· συνθεῖ οὖν αὐτῇ ὡς ἐπὶ φερομένης ὀχούμενος. κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν πρόοδον καὶ ἀγωγὴν εἶναι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον καθ' ὁποιανοῦν κίνησιν, προϋπάρχον δυνάμενον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι γίγνεται.

23. Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παρ' ἄλλου ἐνιεμένη σείουσα καὶ ἐλαύνουσα καὶ ἐγείρουσα καὶ ὠθοῦσα τὰ μεταλαβόντα αὐτῆς, ὥστε μὴ εὕδειν μηδ' ἐν ταὐτότητι εἶναι, ἵνα δὴ τῇ μὴ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ οἷον πολυπραγμονήσει ταύτῃ εἰδώλῳ συνέχηται ζωῆς. δεῖ δὲ οὐ τὰ κινούμενα τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι νομίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ πόδες ἡ βάδισις, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τοὺς πόδας ἐνέργεια ἐκ δυνάμεως. ἀοράτου δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης τοὺς

[1] Igal, H–S²: ἔτι Enn.

[1] In spite of the sharp contrast implied between the sense-world and the intelligible world, the function of *κίνησις* here below is described here in terms remarkably like those in which the functions of *ἑτερότης* and *κίνησις* in the intelligible world are described in VI. 7. 13. 11–16. And for Plotinus the function of movement and time in this world here below is positive. Such substantial existence

must be considered in the same way as what they lead to. But what is the common element in change of quality and quantity and coming-to-be and the opposites of these, and in change of place, in so far as these are all movements? It is that each thing is not in the same in which it formerly was, and is not at rest or in total quiet, but, in so far as movement is present, is always being led away to something else and its being other is not abiding in the same; for movement perishes when there is no other; for this reason otherness is not in the having come to be in and remaining in another [state], but perpetual otherness. So time is always another, because motion makes time; for it is measured movement which does not stay still; for it runs along with movement, as if riding on it as it goes. But common to all is being a progress and a leading from potentiality and the possible to active actuality; for everything that is moved according to any kind of movement has the pre-existing potentiality to do this when it comes into motion.

23. And the movement which is in sense-objects comes in from another and shakes and drives and wakes and pushes the things which have a share in it, so that they do not sleep and are not in sameness, in order that they may be held together by this inquietude and this sort of fussiness which is an image of life.[1] But one must not think that the things which are being moved are movement: for walking is not the feet but the activity in the feet which comes from their potentiality. But since the potentiality is

and coherence as the things here below have depend here on their being in motion and in III. 7.4. 19–29 on their being in time.

ἐνεργοῦντας πόδας ὁρᾶν μόνον ἀνάγκη, οὐ πόδας ἁπλῶς,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἡσύχαζον, ἀλλ' ἤδη μετ' ἄλλου, ἀοράτου
μὲν τούτου, ὅτι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
ὁρωμένου τῷ τοὺς πόδας ὁρᾶν ἄλλον τόπον ἔχοντας καὶ
ἄλλον καὶ μὴ ἠρεμεῖν· τὸ δ' ἀλλοιοῦσθαι[1] παρὰ τοῦ
ἀλλοιουμένου, ὅτι μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ποιότης. ἐν τίνι οὖν ἡ
κίνησις, ὅταν ἄλλο κινῇ, καὶ ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης
δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἴῃ; ἆρα ἐν τῷ κινοῦντι; καὶ πῶς
τὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον μεταλήψεται; ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
κινουμένῳ; διὰ τί οὖν ἐλθοῦσα οὐ μένει; ἢ δεῖ μήτε τοῦ
ποιοῦντος ἀπηλλάχθαι μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ
αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἀπο-
τετμημένην εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οἷον
πνοὴν εἰς ἄλλο. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν
βαδιστικὴ ᾖ, οἷον ὥσε καὶ πεποίηκεν ἄλλον ἀλλάττειν
ἀεὶ τόπον, ὅταν δὲ θερμαντική, ἐθέρμανε· καὶ ὅταν ἡ
δύναμις ὕλην λαβοῦσα εἰς φύσιν οἰκοδομῇ, αὔξησις,
ὅταν δ' ἄλλη δύναμις ἀφαιρῇ, μείωσις τοῦ δυναμένου
ἀφαίρεσιν παθεῖν μειουμένου· καὶ ὅταν ἡ γεννῶσα φύσις
ἐνεργῇ, γένεσις, ὅταν δὲ αὖτη ἀδυνατῇ, ἡ δὲ φθείρειν
δυναμένη ἐπικρατῇ, φθορά, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονότι,
ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ ὑγίανσις δὲ κατὰ τὰ
αὐτά, τῆς ποιεῖν δυναμένης ὑγίειαν ἐνεργούσης καὶ
κρατούσης [ὑγίανσις],[2] τῆς δ' ἐναντίας δυνάμεως

[1] Theiler: ἀλλοιούμενον Enn.
[2] del. H–S[1].

invisible, it is necessary to look only at the active feet, not simply the feet, as if they were at rest, but the feet already with something else; this is invisible, but because it is with something else, it is seen incidentally by looking at the feet occupying one place and then another and not staying still; but one sees the alteration from that which is altered, because its quality is not the same. In what, then, is the movement, when it moves something else, and indeed when it passes to actuality from an immanent potentiality? Is it in the mover? Then how will that which is moved and affected participate in it? But is it in that which is moved? Why then does it not stay when it has come? Now, it must not be separated from its producer nor in it, but from it and to that which is moved, and not be in that as cut off, but it comes from that and goes to that other, as a breath of wind goes to another. When, therefore, the potentiality of moving is a walking potentiality, it pushes, so to speak, and produces a continual change of place, but when it is a heating potentiality, it heats; and when the potentiality takes matter and builds it into a nature, it is growth, but when another potentiality takes away, it is diminution when that which has the potentiality of experiencing taking away is diminished; and when the generative nature is active, there is coming-to-be, but when this is impotent and that which has the potentiality of making things pass away is dominant, there is passing-away, not that which occurs in what has already come to be, but in that which is on the way; and becoming healthy works the same way, when that which has the potentiality of producing health is active (but the opposite potentiality produces the opposite re-

τἀναντία ποιούσης. ὥστε συμβαίνειν μὴ παρὰ τὰ ἐν οἷς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐξ ὧν καὶ δι' ὧν [καὶ τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἰδιότητα][1] ποιὰν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ ⟨τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἰδιότητα⟩[1] τοιάνδε εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις.

24. Περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, εἰ τὸ ἄνω φέρεσθαι τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον, καὶ τὸ κύκλῳ τοῦ ἐπ' εὐθείας διοίσει, πῶς ἡ διαφορά, οἷον τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καὶ ὑπὸ πόδας ῥίπτειν; καὶ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ὠστικὴ μία· εἰ μή τις ἄλλην τὴν ἄνω ὠθοῦσαν, καὶ ἄλλην λέγοι καὶ ἄλλως τὴν κάτω πρὸς τὴν ἄνω φοράν, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ φυσικῶς κινοῖτο, εἰ ἡ μὲν κουφότης εἴη, ἡ δὲ βαρύτης. ἀλλὰ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον φέρεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνταῦθα κινδυνεύειν παρὰ τὰ ἔξω τὴν διαφορὰν γίνεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κύκλῳ καὶ ἐπ' εὐθείας, εἰ οἷόν περ ἐπ' εὐθείας καὶ κύκλῳ περιθρέξαιεν, πῶς ἄλλη; ἢ παρὰ τὸ τῆς πορείας σχῆμα, εἰ μή τις μικτὴν λέγοι τὴν κύκλῳ, ὡς οὐ παντελῶς οὖσαν κίνησιν οὐδὲ πάντη ἐξισταμένην. ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὅλως μία τις εἶναι ἡ τοπικὴ τοῖς ἔξωθεν τὰς διαφορὰς λαμβάνουσα.

25. Σύγκρισις δὲ καὶ διάκρισις ἐπισκεπτέα πῶς. ἆρ' ἕτεραι κινήσεις τῶν εἰρημένων, γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως, τοπικῆς μεταβολῆς, ἀλλοιώσεως, ἢ εἰς ταύτας αὐτὰς ἀνακτέον, ἢ τούτων τινὰς συγκρίσεις

[1] Igal, H–S².

sult). So it happens that it is not only according to the things in which it is but according to what it comes from and through which it operates that the movement is qualified and the particular character of the movement is of such and such a kind in such and such things.

24. But about local motion, if moving upwards is contrary to moving downwards, and moving in a circle differs from moving in a straight line, how are we to differentiate, for instance, throwing something over the head and under the feet? For the pushful potentiality is one; unless someone says that the push upwards is different, and the push downwards is different and works differently in comparison with the movement upwards, especially if the movement is natural, if one is levity and one is gravity. But moving to one's own place is common and the same for both, so that it is likely that here the differentiation is according to externals. But as for movement in a circle and in a straight line, if running around in a circle is the same sort [of running] as in a straight line, how is it different? It is according to the shape of the course, unless someone says that movement in a circle is mixed, because it is not entirely movement and does not altogether go out of its place. But in general it seems that local movement is one movement taking its differentiations by externals.

25. But we must investigate how it is with composition and dissolution. Are these different movements from those already mentioned, coming-to-be and passing-away, growth and diminution, change of place, and qualitative alteration, or are they to be referred to these, or are some of these to be con-

καὶ διακρίσεις θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἔχει ἡ σύγκρισις, πρόσοδον ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ τὸ πελάζειν, καὶ αὖ ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τοὐπίσω, τοπικὰς ἄν τις κινήσεις λέγοι δύο κινούμενα[1] λέγων πρὸς ἕν τι, ἢ ἀποχωροῦντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. εἰ δὲ σύγκρισίν[2] τινα καὶ μίξιν σημαίνουσι καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ εἰς ἓν ἐξ ἑνὸς σύστασιν τὴν κατὰ τὸ συνίστασθαι γινομένην, οὐ κατὰ τὸ συνεστάναι ἤδη, εἰς τίνα ἄν τις ἀνάγοι τῶν εἰρημένων ταύτας; ἄρξει μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησις, ἕτερον δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῇ τὸ γινόμενον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς αὔξης ἄν τις εὖροι ἄρχουσαν μὲν τὴν τοπικήν, ἐπιγινομένην δὲ τὴν κατὰ ⟨τὸ⟩ ποσὸν[3] κίνησιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινηθῆναι, ἕπεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συγκριθῆναι οὐδ' αὖ διακριθῆναι, ἀλλὰ γενομένης μὲν συμπλοκῆς τοῖς ἀπαντήσασι συνεκρίθη, σχισθέντων δὲ τῇ συντεύξει διεκρίθη. πολλαχοῦ δ' ἂν καὶ διακρινομένων ἐφέποιτο ἂν ἡ τοῦ τόπου ἢ ἅμα συμβαίνοι τοῦ πάθους ἄλλου περὶ τὰ διακρινόμενα, οὐ κατὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοπικῶς, νοουμένου, ἔν τε τῇ συγκρίσει ἄλλου πάθους καὶ συστάσεως, ἐπακολουθοῦντος ἑτέρου τῆς τοπικῆς κινήσεως. ἆρ' οὖν ταύτας μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀλλοίωσιν εἰς ταύτας ἀνακτέον; πυκνὸν γὰρ γενόμενον ἠλλοίωται· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ "συγκέκριται". μανὸν δὲ αὖ ἠλλοίωται· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ "διακέκριται". καὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος μιγνυμένων ἄλλο ἢ πρότερον

[1] Kirchhoff: *-μένας* Enn.
[2] Sleeman, Igal, H–S²: *-κρασίν* Enn.
[3] ⟨*τὸ*⟩ *ποσὸν* Creuzer (cf. Arist. *Metaph.* Λ 2. 1069b11): *ποσὸν* EBxUC: *τόπον* A: *ποιὸν* A^{3mg}: *qualitatis* Ficinus.

sidered compositions and dissolutions? Well then, if composition is a matter of the approach of one thing to another and coming close, and on the other side [dissolution] of going away back, one could say that they are local movements, saying that two things are moving to one or going away from each other. But if they mean to signify a composition and a mixture, and a coming together into a unity from another unity, which occurs in the actual coming together, not as a result of having come together, to which of the movements already mentioned is one to refer these? Certainly local movement will make the beginning, but what follows upon it will be something else, as one would find that local movement makes the beginning of growth, but quantitative movement follows upon it; so here too local movement takes the lead, but being composed, or again dissolved, does not necessarily follow, but when the parts which meet become interwoven there is composition, and when they are split apart there is dissolution. But often local motion even follows on dissolution or is simultaneous with it, the way what is in process of dissolution is affected being thought of differently, and not as local motion; and in composition another affection, that is a coming together, is thought of, and something else follows, local motion. Should then these be thought of by themselves, and [qualitative] change be referred to them? For when a thing becomes dense it is changed; but this is the same as "it is composed [or compacted]"; but again when it becomes rarefied it is changed; but this is the same as "it is dissolved [or its texture is loosened]". And when wine and water are mixed something else comes into existence different from

ἦν ἑκάτερον ἐγένετο· τοῦτο δὲ σύγκρισις, ἢ πεποίηκε τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν. ἢ φατέον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις τινῶν ἀλλοιώσεων, ἑτέρας δὲ αὐτὰς εἶναι συγκρίσεων ἢ διακρίσεων· οὔτε γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας ἀλλοιώσεις εἶναι τοιαύτας, οὔτε τὴν ἀραίωσιν καὶ πύκνωσιν σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἢ ἐκ τούτων ὅλως εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ κενὸν παραδέχοιτο. ἐπὶ δὲ μελανίας ἢ λευκότητος πῶς; εἰ δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφισβητεῖ, πρῶτον μὲν τὰς χρόας καὶ τάχα τὰς ποιότητας ἀναιρεῖ ἢ τάς γε πλείστας, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσας· εἰ γὰρ πᾶσαν ἀλλοίωσιν, ἣν λέγομεν κατὰ ποιότητα μεταβολήν, σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν λέγοι, τὸ γινόμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ ἐγγὺς κείμενα καὶ διεστῶτα. ἔπειτα τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι πῶς συγκρίσεις;

26. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ περὶ τούτων καὶ ἤδη ζητητέον πάλιν αὖ τῶν κατ' εἴδη λεγομένων κινήσεων οἷον ἐπὶ τοπικῆς, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ εὐθείᾳ καὶ κύκλῳ, ὡς ἠπόρηται, ἢ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀψύχων κινήσει—οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ κίνησις τούτων—καὶ πάλιν ταύτας τῇ πεζῇ καὶ τῷ νεῖν καὶ πτήσει. ἢ καὶ τῷ φύσει γε καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τάχ' ἄν τις διέλοι καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν διαφορὰς κινήσεων· ἢ ποιητικαὶ τούτων αὗται,

[1] This is a *reductio ad absurdum*. For all ancient philosophers except Atomists and Epicureans, the existence of void was the ultimate physical absurdity.

what each of them was previously: and this is composition, which has produced change. Now here too we must assert that compositions and dissolutions take the lead in some changes, but these changes themselves are different from compositions and dissolutions; nor are the other changes of this kind, and rarefaction and condensation are not composition and dissolution and do not in any way result from them; for if they did one would even have to admit the existence of void.[1] But how about blackness or whiteness? But if one raises a doubt about these, first of all he abolishes colours and perhaps qualities, or at any rate most of them—but rather all of them; for if he says that all change, which we say is "alteration in quality", is composition and dissolution, the result is in no way quality but parts close set or widely spaced. Then how are learning and being taught compositions?

26. We should certainly consider these matters, and now we have to enquire again about what are described as specific kinds of movement, for instance in the case of local movement, if it is not to be distinguished by up and down and straight and circular, as the problem was stated,[2] or by the movement of living and non-living things—their movement is not alike—and again these [movements of living things] by walking and swimming and flying. Or one might distinguish movements in each species by whether they are natural or unnatural. But this would mean that the differentiations of movements do not come from outside; now the movements themselves produce these differentiations and

[2] In ch. 24, 1–11.

καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄνευ τούτων· καὶ ἡ φύσις δὲ ἀρχὴ δοκεῖ
τούτων. ἢ τὰς μὲν φύσει, τὰς δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰς δὲ
προαιρέσει· φύσει μὲν αὐξήσεις, φθίσεις, τέχνῃ δὲ
οἰκοδομεῖν, ναυπηγεῖν, προαιρέσει δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι,
μανθάνειν, πολιτεύεσθαι, ὅλως λέγειν, πράττειν. περὶ
αὐξήσεως αὖ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ γενέσεως κατὰ φύσιν
παρὰ φύσιν ἢ ὅλως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις.

27. Περὶ δὲ στάσεως, ὃ ἀντιτέτακται κινήσει, ἢ
ἠρεμίας τί ποτε χρὴ λέγειν; πότερα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν τι γένος
θετέον ἢ εἴς τι γένος τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακτέον; βέλτιον
δ' ἴσως στάσιν τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἀποδόντα ἠρεμίαν ἐνταῦθα
ζητεῖν. τὴν οὖν ἠρεμίαν ταύτην ζητητέον πρῶτον τί
ποτ' ἐστί. καὶ εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸν φανείη τῇ στάσει, οὐδ'
ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐνταῦθα ταύτην ζητοῖ οὐδενὸς ἑστηκότος,
ἀλλὰ τοῦ φαινομένου ἑστάναι σχολαιτέρᾳ τῇ κινήσει
χρωμένου. εἰ δ' ἕτερον ἠρεμίαν στάσεως λέγοιμεν τῷ
τὴν μὲν στάσιν περὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον παντελῶς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ
ἠρεμίαν περὶ τὸ ἑστώς, πεφυκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν μὴ
κινῆται, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἠρεμίζεσθαι λέγοι τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κίνησιν
οὔπω παυσαμένην, ἀλλ' ἐνεστῶσαν· εἰ δὲ τὴν οὐκέτι
περὶ τὸ κινούμενον οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ζητητέον, εἴ τί
ἐστι μὴ κινούμενον ἐνταῦθα. εἰ δὲ μὴ πάσας οἷόν τέ τι
τὰς κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ κινήσεις τινὰς μὴ

could not be without them, and nature appears to be the principle of them. Or [one might distinguish movements] as some natural, some artificial, and some deliberate. Natural would be growths and diminutions, artificial building houses and ships, deliberate inspecting, learning, engaging in politics, and in general speaking and acting. And with growth and change and coming-to-be [one can distinguish] by natural and unnatural or in general by the subjects.

27. But what should one say about rest, the genus which is opposed to motion, or stillness? Should it be posited as itself one genus, or referred to some genus of those already mentioned? But perhaps it would be better to allot rest to the intelligibles there, and to look for stillness here below. We must, therefore, first enquire what this stillness is. And if it should appear that it is the same as rest, it would not be correct to look for it here below, where nothing stands still, but that which seems to stand still is in more leisurely movement. But if we are going to say that stillness is something different from rest, because it applies to what is absolutely unmoved, but rest to what has come to a standstill, but is naturally in movement, when it is not moving, then if one is going to say that being still is becoming still, [one is saying] that it is motion which has not yet come to a stop, but is pausing; but if [one means] that it is a stillness which does not apply to what is in movement, one must enquire first if there is anything here below which is not in movement. But if it is not possible to move with all the movements, but there must be some ways in which there is no movement if it is to be possible to say that what is

κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῇ λέγειν τόδε τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι, τί ἄλλο χρὴ λέγειν τὸ μὴ κινούμενον κατὰ τόπον, ἀλλ' ἠρεμοῦν ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ ὅτι μὴ κινεῖται; ἀπόφασις ἄρα ἔσται ἡ ἠρεμία τοῦ κινεῖσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐν γένει. ἠρεμεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον τὴν τοπικήν· τὴν οὖν ἀφαίρεσιν τούτου λέγει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι· διὰ τί δ' οὐ τὴν κίνησιν ἀπόφασιν τῆς στάσεως φήσομεν; ὅτι, φήσομεν, ἥκει τι φέρουσα ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἐνεργοῦν καὶ οἷον ὠθοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ μυρία ἐργαζόμενον αὐτὸ καὶ φθεῖρον, ἡ δὲ ἠρεμία ἑκάστου οὐδέν ἐστι παρ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει μόνον, ὅτι κίνησιν οὐκ ἔχει. τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν στάσιν εἴπομεν ἀπόφασιν κινήσεως; ἢ ὅτι οὐδ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς κινήσεως τὴν στάσιν, ὅτι οὐ παυσαμένης τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὔσης ἐκείνης καὶ αὕτη ἐστί. καὶ οὐ πεφυκὸς κινεῖσθαι, καθόσον μὴ κινεῖται, ἡ στάσις ἐκεῖ, ἀλλά, καθὸ στάσις κατείληφεν, ἕστηκε, καθὸ δέ ἐστι κινούμενον, ἀεὶ κινήσεται· διὸ καὶ στάσει ἕστηκε καὶ κινήσει κινεῖται. ἐνταῦθα δὲ κινήσει μὲν κινεῖται, ἀπούσης δὲ ἠρεμεῖ ἐστερημένον τῆς ὀφειλομένης κινήσεως. ἔπειτα δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ, τί ἐστιν ἡ στάσις αὕτη, καὶ οὕτως· ὅταν ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν ἴῃ, ὑγιάζεται· τί οὖν τῇ ὑγιάνσει ταύτῃ ἠρεμίας εἶδος ἀντιτάξομεν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ, νόσος, ἀλλ' οὐ στάσις·

moving is this particular thing, what else should one say about that which is not in local movement but is still as regards this movement, except that it is not moving? So stillness will be a negation of movement; and that means, not among the genera. But a thing is still only in regard to this movement, local movement for instance: stillness therefore means only the taking away of this. But if someone were to say "Why are we not going to maintain that movement is a negation of rest?" we shall reply that movement comes bringing something with it, and is something else active and in a way pushing what is subjected to it and doing innumerable things to it and destroying it; but the stillness of each thing is nothing besides the thing, but only indicates that it does not have movement. Why then do we not say that rest is the negation of movement also among the intelligibles? This is because it is impossible to say that rest is the abolition of movement because it does not exist when movement has stopped, but when movement exists rest also exists. And rest there in the intelligible does not consist in the fact that something which is naturally adapted to move is not moving, but in so far as rest has a hold on it, it stands still, but in so far as it is in motion it will always be moving: therefore it stands still by rest and moves by movement. But here below it moves by movement, but when movement is not there it stays still because it is deprived of the movement which it ought to have. Further, we ought to see what this rest here below is in the following way: when one goes from sickness to health, one is becoming healthy; so what form of standstill shall we oppose to this process of becoming healthy? For if it is that from which it

εἰ δὲ τὸ εἰς ὅ, ὑγίεια· ὃ οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ὑγίειαν ἢ τὴν νόσον τινὰ στάσιν εἶναι, εἴδη στάσεως τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν νόσον εἶναι φήσει· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ συμβεβηκέναι τῇ ὑγιείᾳ τὴν στάσιν, πρὸ τῆς στάσεως ἡ ὑγίεια οὐχ ὑγίεια ἔσται; ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων, ὅπῃ δοκεῖ ἑκάστῳ.

28. Εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν κινήσεις λεκτέον, καὶ ἔστι τὰς μὲν τῶν κινήσεων ἀπολύτους, τὰς δὲ ποιήσεις, τὰς δὲ πείσεις λέγειν. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν λεγομένων, ὅτι εἰς ταῦτα. καὶ περὶ τοῦ πρός τι, ὅτι ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο σχέσις, καὶ ὅτι σύνεισιν ἄμφω καὶ ἅμα· καὶ τὸ πρός τι δέ, ὅταν σχέσις οὐσίας ποιῇ αὐτό, οὐχ ᾗ οὐσία ἔσται πρός τι, ἀλλὰ ᾗ καθὸ μέρος τινός—οἷον χεὶρ ἢ κεφαλὴ—ἢ αἴτιον ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ στοιχεῖον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ πρός τι διαιρεῖν, ὥσπερ διῄρηται τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, τὰ μὲν ὡς ποιητικά, τὰ δὲ ὡς μέτρα, τὰ δ' ἐν ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, τὰ δ' ὅλως χωρίζοντα ὁμοιότησι καὶ διαφοραῖς. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τῶν γενῶν ταῦτα.

starts, this is sickness, not rest; but if it is that to which it is directed, this is health; and this is not the same as rest. But if someone is going to say that health or sickness is a particular kind of rest, he will be asserting that health and sickness are species of rest: which is absurd. But if rest is incidental to health, will health before rest not be health? But everyone may think as he likes about these questions.

28. It has been said that active doing and making and passive experience are to be called movements, and one can say that some movements are absolute, some actions, and some experiences. And it has been said about the other so-called genera that they are to be referred to these. And about relation, that it is a disposition of one thing in relation to another, and that they enter into it both together and simultaneously; and there is relation when a disposition of a substance produces it; the substance will not be relative as substance, except in so far as it is a part of something—hand or head for instance—or a cause or a principle or an element. It is also possible to divide relation, as the ancients divided it,[1] distinguishing some relations as productive, some as measures, some consisting in excess and deficiency, some in general separating things by likenesses and differences. And so much for these genera.

[1] Plotinus seems to have Aristotle *Metaphysics* Δ 15. 1020b26–31 in mind.

VI. 4–5. ON THE PRESENCE OF BEING, ONE AND THE SAME, EVERYWHERE AS A WHOLE

Introductory Note

THIS work, the first written by Plotinus after Porphyry joined him (*Life* ch. 5), was divided by Porphyry into two *Ennead* treatises (22 and 23 in the chronological order) at a point where Plotinus himself makes a break and a new start. In VI. 4 the discussion of the omnipresence of real being starts from man's experience of being soul in body. In VI. 5 it starts again from man's common awareness of the presence of God. There is, perhaps, no work in the *Enneads* which it is more necessary to understand if we are really to grasp Plotinus' thought, and all Neoplatonically influenced thought about the nature and presence of spiritual being, in all its depth and breadth. Its influence, direct and indirect, has been very great. Plotinus explains in it, more fully and forcibly than elsewhere, what it means to be incorporeal and how an incorporeal divine being which is fullness of life and thought and power must be present immediately and as a whole in and to everyone and everything here below, at every point in space-time diffusion and dispersion. Because of his concentration on this main theme Plotinus does not make much in this work of the distinctions between the divine hypostases, Soul, Intellect and the One or Good. The boundary between Soul and Intellect is often not very well-defined in the *Enneads*, but it is unusual for so little stress to be laid on the transcendence of the One or Good. The transcendent Good is, however, by no means absent from the work, as a careful reading together of 4, ch. 11 and 5, chs. 1 and 4 will show.

The unity of the divine, the immediate presence of the higher in the lower, the unbroken continuity of the divine life from its source to its last diffusion (cp. V 2 [11] 2, 24–29) were always essential parts of the thought of Plotinus. This was the side of his thought which Porphyry developed. Iamblichus and his successors, though still maintaining the continuity of divine life and the presence of the higher in the lower, were more inclined to sharpen and harden distinctions and transcendence.

The stress on the unity and omnipresence of spiritual being leads to strong statements of a doctrine which Plotinus always maintains, that of the unity of all souls (especially 4, chs. 4 and 14). It also leads to a powerful critique of emanation-images (4, ch. 7, prepared for by the critique of the common idea of "presence by powers" in ch. 3), which makes it clear that for Plotinus emanation was an inadequate, though necessary, metaphor. The immediacy of the presence of the spiritual or intelligible to the world of sense, and the total dependence of the latter on this presence for such quasi-reality as it has, are well brought out by the important distinction made in 4, ch. 10 between natural images, shadows or reflections, and artificial images, statues or pictures.

The ultimate object of the work, as so often with Plotinus, is not just to solve problems or expound a doctrine but to move its readers to seek liberation or salvation; and in some chapters as powerful as anything in the *Enneads* (4, 14–15; 5, 12) he shows what liberation and salvation means for him: deliverance from the limitations of our petty, empirical ego, the "other man" who has added himself to us, and return to that unity in diversity of the divine All which, at the deepest level, we always are.

Synopsis

VI. 4

The omnipresence of soul: because it is not a body it is present as a whole everywhere in body (ch. 1). The really existent, intelligible universe is not in anything else, but in itself; its image, the sensible universe, is in the intelligible (ch. 2). Is the intelligible universe only present by its powers? No, where its powers are, it is itself immediately present as a whole, though not in place (ch. 3). The many beings, intellects and souls of which Plato speaks are all one together in the unity of Intellect-Being or of Soul (ch. 4). The greatness of Being is not a matter of material bulk (ch. 5). How many bodies come to and share in the one soul (ch. 6). The unity of immaterial power; critique of emanation-imagery (ch. 7). The participation of the sensible in the intelligible involves no division of the intelligible: it is present to each and every participant as a whole (chs. 8–10). The sense-world is a natural, not an artificial, image of the intelligible (chs. 9–10). Participation according to the capacity of the participant (ch. 11). The one sound or sight and the many hearers or seers; soul does not "come" to body, but body to soul (ch. 12). The extended participates in the unextended (ch. 13). The unity-in-diversity of Intellect and Soul: but who are we? The "other man" who came and attached himself to our true original self, which was and is in the intelligible unity-in-diversity (ch. 14). What approaches is living body, already with a share in soul; our higher and lower self like the Senate and the mob (ch. 15). The "descent" of soul as self-limitation and particularisation; its liberation is return to the whole and separation from its image (ch. 16).

VI. 5

The common opinion of all men about the One God within us is the firmest of all starting-points. We are one in Being and find our good in it (ch. 1). We must reason about unity and being from appropriate principles (ch. 2). Real Being cannot depart from itself but is present everywhere as a whole (ch. 3). The One God is totally omnipresent: the transcendent One and the One-Being (ch. 4). The image of the centre of the circle and the radii (ch. 5). Unity in multiplicity in the intelligible and sensible worlds (ch. 6). We are all one in the intelligible; many faces, one head (ch. 7). The unity of the one Form in the many particulars (ch. 8). The unity of the sense-world is given it by one unbounded life and soul, present to all the multiplicity as a whole without being possessed by it (ch. 9). The unity which all things desire and on which all things depend, and which gives itself as a whole to each and every thing (ch. 10). The One-Being is present as living power, without extension or size, according to the capacity of the recipients (ch. 11). How to attend to the All and become the All by liberation from the unreal addition of particularity. The One God who is everywhere, to whom all things turn (ch. 12).

VI. 4. (22) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΟΝ ΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΟΝ ΑΜΑ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΛΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Ἆρά γε ἡ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ τῷ παντὶ πάρεστιν, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι τοῦ παντὸς τοσόνδε, περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν ἔχουσα μερίζεσθαι; ἢ καὶ παρ' αὑτῆς πανταχοῦ ἐστιν, οὐχ οὗπερ ἂν ὑπὸ σώματος προαχθῇ, ἀλλὰ σώματος εὑρίσκοντος αὐτὴν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ οὖσαν, ὥστε, ὅπου ἂν τεθῇ, ἐκεῖ εὑρίσκειν ψυχὴν οὖσαν πρὶν αὐτὸ τεθῆναι ἐν μέρει τοῦ παντός, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα τεθῆναι ἐν ψυχῇ οὔσῃ; ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον πρὶν τὸ τοσόνδε σῶμα ἐλθεῖν πληροῦσα τὸ διάστημα πᾶν, πῶς οὐ μέγεθος ἕξει; ἢ τίς τρόπος ἂν εἴη τοῦ εἶναι ἐν τῷ παντὶ πρὶν τὸ πᾶν γενέσθαι τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ὄντος; τό τε ἀμερῆ λεγομένην καὶ ἀμεγέθη εἶναι πανταχοῦ εἶναι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσαν πῶς ἄν τις παραδέξαιτο; καὶ εἰ τῷ σώματι λέγοιτο συνεκτείνεσθαι μὴ σῶμα οὖσα, οὐδ' ὡς ἐκφεύγειν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀπορίαν τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῇ διδόναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ζητήσειεν εὐλόγως, ὅπως κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μεγεθύνεται. οὐ γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἡ ποιότης,

VI. 4. ON THE PRESENCE OF BEING, ONE AND THE SAME, EVERYWHERE AS A WHOLE I

1. Is the soul everywhere present to the All because the body of the All is of a certain size and it is naturally divisible in the sphere of bodies[1]? Or is it everywhere on its own, not wherever it may be brought out to by body, but since body finds it existing everywhere before itself, so that wherever a body is placed it finds soul there before it itself is placed in a part of the All, and the whole body of the All is placed in soul already existing? But if it is extended so far, before a body of corresponding size comes, as to fill the whole space, how will it not have size? Or in what way could it be in the All before the All came to be when the All did not exist? How could anyone accept that soul which is said to be something without parts and without size is everywhere when it has no size? And if it was said to be spread out with body though it is not a body, one would not in this way either escape the difficulty by giving it size incidentally. For just the same here too one could reasonably enquire how it acquires size incidentally. For soul is certainly not in the whole body

[1] The text of Plato on which this question is based is one of the foundation-texts of the Neoplatonic doctrine of Soul, *Timaeus* 35A1–6 (the composition of the World-Soul by the Demiurge).

οἷον γλυκύτης ἢ χρόα, κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχή. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη τῶν σωμάτων, ὥστε πᾶν τὸ πεπονθὸς ἔχειν τὸ πάθος, καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ σώματος ὄν τι καὶ γινωσκόμενον τότε· διὸ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοσοῦτον, τό τε ἄλλου μέρους λευκὸν οὐχ ὁμοπαθὲς τῷ ἄλλου. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν εἶδει τὸ ἐπ' ἄλλου πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' ἄλλου μέρους, οὐ μὴν ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, ὡς δηλοῦσιν αἱ ἀντιλήψεις. καὶ ὅλως[1] ἐν μὲν ταῖς ποιότησι τὸ αὐτὸ μεμερισμένον θεωρεῖται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μεμερισμένον, οὕτω δὲ μεμερίσθαι λεγόμενον, ὅτι πανταχοῦ. λέγωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς περὶ τούτων, εἴ τι ἡμῖν σαφὲς καὶ εὐπαράδεκτον γένοιτο, πῶς ἀσώματος καὶ ἀμεγέθης οὖσα δύναται εἰς πλεῖστον ἰέναι εἴτε πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἴτ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι. τάχα δέ, εἰ φανείη καὶ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων τοῦτο δύνασθαι, ῥᾴδιον ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων παραδέξασθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένοιτο.

2. Ἔστι δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀληθινὸν πᾶν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς μίμημα, ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ ὁρατοῦ φύσις. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄντως πᾶν ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ὃ δ' ἂν μετὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, τοῦτο ἤδη ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἔσται, καὶ μάλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνου ἠρτημένον καὶ οὐ δυνάμενον ἄνευ ἐκείνου οὔτε μένειν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ τις τιθεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸν τόπον νοῶν ἢ πέρας σώματος τοῦ περιέχοντος καθὸ

[1] Sleeman, Harder, Theiler: ὅμως Enn.

in the same way as quality, sweetness or colour for instance. For these are affections of body, so that the whole of what is affected has the affection, and this is nothing of itself since it is something belonging to a body and known as such when the body is affected; for this reason it is necessarily of a certain size, and the white of one part is not co-affected with the white of another. And with white, the white in one part is the same in form as the white in another, but not the same in number, but with soul, the soul in the foot and the soul in the hand is the same thing in number, as perceptions show. And in general, in qualities the same thing is seen divided into parts, but in soul the same thing is seen not divided into parts, but said to be divided in the sense that it is everywhere. Let us therefore speak about this from the beginning, to see if anything occurs to us which is clear and acceptable about how soul, which is incorporeal and sizeless, is able to reach the greatest extension either before bodies or in bodies. But perhaps if it appeared that it could do this also before bodies, it would become easier to accept that the same sort of thing happens in bodies.

2. There exist certainly both the true All and the representation of the All, the nature of this visible universe. The really existent All is in nothing: for there is nothing before it. But that which comes after it must necessarily then exist in the All, if it is going to exist at all, being as much as possible dependent on it and unable either to stay still or move without it. For even if one does not suppose this kind of being in to be like being in place (considering place either as the boundary or the surrounding body in so far as it surrounds, or as

περιέχει, ἢ διάστημά τι ὃ πρότερον ἦν τῆς φύσεως
τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ ἔτι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε οἷον ἐρείδεσθαι ἐπ'
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι πανταχοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου καὶ
συνέχοντος, τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀφεὶς κατηγορίαν τῇ
διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον λαμβανέτω. τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλου χάριν
εἴρηται, ὅτι τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ὂν οὐ ζητεῖ
τόπον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἔν τινι. πᾶν δὴ τὸ πᾶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως
ἀπολείπεται ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τε πεπληρωκὸς ἑαυτὸ
καὶ ὂν ἴσον ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὗ τὸ πᾶν, ἐκεῖ αὐτό· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν
αὐτό ἐστιν. ὅλως τε, εἴ τι ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἱδρύθη ἄλλο ὂν
παρ' ἐκεῖνο, μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ καὶ συντυγχάνει αὐτῷ
καὶ ἰσχύει παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐ μερίζον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' εὑρίσκον
αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ αὐτὸ προσελθὸν ἐκείνῳ ἐκείνου οὐκ ἔξω
ἑαυτοῦ γενομένου· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὂν
εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τῷ ὄντι. ὅλῳ οὖν
ἐντυγχάνει τῷ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀποσπᾶσθαι αὐτὸ ἀφ'
ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγεσθαι εἶναι αὐτὸ δῆλον,
ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὄντι· ὥστε ἐν ἑαυτῷ. καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ
τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· ἤδη γὰρ γίνεται
τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐν ἑνί. ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ ὂν ἐν αἰσθητῷ θέμενοι
καὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖ τιθέμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ
αἰσθητὸν ἀπορούμεν, πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ
ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται. τὸ δέ ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ

some extension which formerly belonged, and still belongs, to the nature of the void[1]) but to consist in being in a way based on the true All and resting in it, since that All is everywhere and holds it together, let him abandon the verbal signification and grasp the meaning of what is being said. This has been mentioned for the sake of something else, because that All, the first and the existent, does not go looking for place and is not at all in anything. It is certainly not possible for the All, being all, to fall short of itself, but it exists as self-fulfilled and as a being equal to itself[2]; and where the all is, there is itself: for it is itself the All. And altogether, if anything which is other than that All is set firm in the All, it participates in it and coincides with it and draws its strength from it, not dividing it into parts but finding it in itself as it itself approaches it without that All going outside itself; for it is not possible for being to be in not-being but, if at all, not-being in being. It encounters being, therefore, as a whole; for it was not possible for it to be torn away from itself, and to say that it is everywhere clearly means that it is in being: so, then, in itself. And there is nothing surprising in "everywhere" meaning "in being" and "in itself": for "everywhere" already means "in one". But since we put "being" in the perceptible, we also put "everywhere" there too, and since we think the perceptible is large we are puzzled about how that other nature spreads itself out in a largeness of this extent. But this which is

[1] Plotinus is working here with Aristotle's account of place: cp. *Physics* Δ 4. 212a5–11.

[2] Plotinus is possibly thinking here of Parmenides fr. B 8 23–24 DK.

λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρόν, ἐκεῖνο μέγα, εἴ γε ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ. ὅθεν ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκτάσει πλέον τι ληψόμενον—ἔξω γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐγίνετο—περιθεῖν αὐτῷ ἐβουλήθη, οὔτε δὲ περιλαβεῖν δεδυνημένον οὐδ' αὖ ἐντὸς γενέσθαι ἠγάπησε τόπον ἔχειν καὶ τάξιν οὗ σῴζοιτο γειτονοῦν αὐτῷ παρόντι καὶ οὐ παρόντι αὖ· ἔστι γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνο, κἄν τι αὐτῷ ἐθέλῃ παρεῖναι. ὅπου δὴ συνίοι[1] τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντός, εὑρίσκει τὸ πᾶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἔτι δεῖσθαι τοῦ πόρρω, ἀλλὰ στρέφεσθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὡς παντὸς ὄντος τούτου, οὗ κατὰ πᾶν μέρος αὑτοῦ ἀπολαύει ὅλου ἐκείνου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ἦν ἐκεῖνο αὐτό, προσχωρεῖν τε ἔδει ἐκεῖ καὶ εὐθυπορεῖν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ μέρει αὐτοῦ ἄλλῳ μέρει ἐφάπτεσθαι ἐκείνου καὶ εἶναι τὸ πόρρω καὶ ἐγγύθεν· εἰ δὲ μήτε τὸ πόρρω μήτε τὸ ἐγγύθεν, ἀνάγκη ὅλον παρεῖναι, εἴπερ πάρεστι. καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐκείνων ἑκάστῳ, οἷς μήτε πόρρωθέν ἐστι μήτε ἐγγύθεν, δυνατοῖς δὲ δέξασθαί ἐστιν.

3. Ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὸ φήσομεν παρεῖναι, ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πάντα, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ λέγεσθαι εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ τὰς ψυχὰς οἷον βολὰς εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μὲν ἱδρῦσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ. τὰς δ' ἐκπεμφθείσας κατ' ἄλλο καὶ κατ' ἄλλο ζῷον γίγνεσθαι. ἢ ἐφ' ὧν μὲν τὸ ἕν, τῷ μὴ

[1] Igal, H–S²: *συνιὸν* Enn.

[1] The idea of presence by power was widespread at the beginning of our era; cp. Pseudo-Aristotle *On The Cosmos* 6. 397b–398a. For souls as rays of light cp. Plutarch *On the*

called large is little; but what is thought little, that is large, if, as we suppose, it reaches as a whole every part of this [perceptible All]; or rather, this goes from everywhere with its parts to that and finds it everywhere as All and greater than itself. For this reason, because it would not get anything more by extension – for it would come to be outside the All – it wanted to run around it, and, since it was unable to embrace it or, again, get inside it, it was satisfied to have a place and rank where it would be kept safe, bordering upon it, which is present and, again, not present: for that All is on its own, even if something wants to be present to it. And where the body of the All meets it, it finds the All, so that it no longer needs to go further, but turns in the same place, because this [perceptible All] is All where with every part of itself it enjoys the whole of that other. For if that other was itself in a place, it would be necessary to approach it there and go in a straight line, and in one of its own parts to touch one part of that, and there would be far and near; but if there is neither far nor near, it must be present whole if it is present at all. And it is wholly present to each and every one of those for which it is neither far nor near, but they are able to receive it.

3. Are we then going to maintain that it is present itself, or that it is on its own but powers from it come to all things, and this is why it is said to be everywhere? For in this way they say that the souls are like rays, so that it is set firm in itself but the soul-rays sent out come now to one living thing and now to another.[1] Now in those where there is the one

Face which Appears in the Orb of the Moon 28, 943D; *Hermetica* XII 1.

πᾶσαν τὴν φύσιν ἀποσῴζειν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ἐνταῦθα δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ᾧ πάρεστι παρεῖναι· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἐκεῖνο μὴ ὅλως παρεῖναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται ἐκεῖνο τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, ἣν ἔδωκεν ἐκείνῳ· ἀλλ' ὁ λαβὼν τοσοῦτον ἐδυνήθη λαβεῖν παντὸς παρόντος. οὗ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις, αὐτὸ σαφῶς πάρεστι χωριστὸν ὅμως ὄν· γενόμενον μὲν γὰρ τοῦδε εἶδος ἀπέστη ἂν τοῦ τε πᾶν εἶναι τοῦ τε εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ πανταχοῦ, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλου. μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν τοῦ θέλοντος αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸ[1] ἐθέλῃ, ὡς δύναται πελάζει οὐ γενόμενον ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἐφιεμένου αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλου. θαυμαστὸν οὖν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι, ὅτι αὖ ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν αὐτῶν οὕτως ὡς ἐκείνων εἶναι. διὸ καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω λέγειν συμπαραθεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄτοπον ἴσως, εἰ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς λέγοιτο εἶναι οὐχ ὕλης γενομένη οὐδὲ σώματος, τὸ δὲ σῶμα πᾶν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ οἱονεὶ ἐλλάμποιτο. θαυμάζειν δὲ οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι πάρεστιν· ἦν γὰρ ἂν τοὐναντίον θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον πρὸς τῷ θαυμαστῷ, εἰ τόπον καὶ αὐτὸ ἔχον οἰκεῖον παρῆν ἄλλῳ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ, ἢ ὅλως παρῆν, καὶ παρῆν οὕτως, ὥς τοι ἡμεῖς φαμεν. νῦν δέ φησιν ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι ᾧ πάρεστι τούτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι,

[1] ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸ Igal: ὅ ἂν αὐτῷ H–S: ὅ BxUCz: ᾧ w, Perna: αὐτοῦ wBJ^{pc}UCQL^{pc}: αὐτὸ RJ^{ac}L^{ac} ("ὅ … δύναται locus nondum sanatus" H–S).

thing [only], because they do not preserve the whole nature which exists in that true All itself, there a power of it is present to that to which [the true All] is present; though it is not true even so that that is not altogether present, since then too it is not cut off from its power which it gave to that recipient; but the receiver was able to receive only so much, though all was present. But where all the powers are, itself is clearly present, though being all the same separate; for if it became the form of this particular thing it would have departed from being all and being everywhere in itself while belonging incidentally to another. But it belongs to no thing which wishes to belong to it, but, as far as it can, approaches whatever it itself wishes, not by its coming to belong to that, nor again to anything else, but by the desire of that for it. There is nothing, therefore, surprising in its being in all things in this way, because it is also in none of them in such a way as to belong to them. For this reason it is not perhaps inappropriate to say that the soul as well runs along incidentally with the body in this way, if it is said to be itself on its own, not belonging to matter or body, but all body over the whole of itself is in a way illuminated by it. But one should not be surprised if [the true All] itself, which is not in place, is present to everything which is in place; it would on the other hand be surprising, and impossible as well as surprising, if it had itself its own proper place and was present to another thing which was in place, or was present at all, and present in the way in which we say it is. But now the argument says that it is necessary for it, since it has not been allotted a place, to be present as a whole to that to which it is

παντὶ δὲ παρὸν ὡς καὶ ἑκάστῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι. ἢ ἔσται αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ἄλλοθι· ὥστε μεριστὸν ἔσται καὶ σῶμα ἔσται. πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ μεριεῖς; ἆρά γε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὸν νοῦν, ἵν' ὁ μὲν ᾖ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὁ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ; ἀλλ' οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν νοῦς ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος οὐκ ὂν ἔσται, εἰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ὂν ὑπῆρχε. τί οὖν, εἴ τις λέγοι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριζόμενον καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν σώματα ὄντα; ἢ ὁ μερισμὸς ἦν οὐ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦδε σώματος, καὶ σῶμα ἕκαστον ἐλέγετο τῷ εἴδει καθὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εἶχε τὸ "τοσόνδε τι", ἀλλὰ οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν τοσόνδε.

4. Πῶς οὖν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ νοῦς πολλοὺς καὶ ψυχὰς πολλάς, εἰ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἓν καὶ μὴ ὡς ὁμοειδές, καὶ νοῦς εἷς καὶ ψυχὴ μία; καίτοι ἄλλην μὲν τοῦ παντός, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας. ταῦτά τε γὰρ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν δοκεῖ καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴ τινα ἀνάγκην, ἀλλ' οὐ πειθώ γε ἔχει ἀπίθανον νομιζούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἓν οὕτω πανταχοῦ ταὐτὸν εἶναι. βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μερίσαντα τὸ ὅλον ὡς μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι ἀφ' οὗ ὁ μερισμὸς γεγένηται, ἢ καὶ γεννήσαντα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἵνα δὴ βελτίοσι χρώμεθα ὀνόμασιν, οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἐᾶσαι ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἶναι, τὰ δ' οἷον μέρη γενόμενα, ψυχάς, συμπληροῦν ἤδη τὰ πάντα. ἀλλ'

present, and to be present as a whole to an all as well as to each individual. Otherwise some of it will be here, and some elsewhere: so that it will be divisible into parts and will be body. For how indeed are you going to divide it? Will you divide its life? But if the whole was life, the part will not be life. But [will you divide] its intellect, so that one intellect is in one thing and one in another? But neither of them will be intellect. But [will you divide] its being? But the part will not be being, if the whole was being. What then, if someone were to say that the body when it is divided has parts which are bodies? Now the division was not of a body, but of a body of such a size, and each [division] was said to be a body by the form according to which it is body; but this did not have a particular quantity, but was not in any way quantitative.

4. How then [does Plato speak of] being and beings, and many intellects and many souls, if being is everywhere one and not only in the sense of specific unity, and intellect is one and soul is one? And [he does say] that the soul of the All is different from the other souls. This seems to be contrary evidence, and what we have said, even if it has a certain [logical] necessity, is not convincing, since the soul thinks it unconvincing that the one should be everywhere present in this way. Perhaps it would be better to divide the whole in such a way that that from which the division originates is in no way diminished, or, to put it better, to generate from it, and so to allow one thing[, the soul of the All,] to be derived from it, and the ones which have come to be like parts, souls, then to fill up the number of all things. But if that being remains on its own, because

εἰ ἐκεῖνο μένει τὸ ὂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὅτι παράδοξον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα ὅλον τι πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἔσται. ἐν οἷς γὰρ λέγονται σώμασιν ὅλαι ἐν ὅλοις εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσονται, ἀλλ' ἢ μερισθήσονται ἢ μένουσαι ὅλαι που τοῦ σώματος δύναμιν αὐτῶν δώσουσιν. ἐφ' ὧν καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία ἔσται ἡ ὅλου πανταχοῦ. καὶ ἔτι τὸ μέν τι ψυχὴν ἕξει τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ δύναμιν μόνον. ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῦ πολλοὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ὄντα; καὶ δὴ καὶ προϊόντα ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἀριθμοὶ ὄντα, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθη, ὁμοίως ἀπορίαν παρέξουσι πῶς πληροῦσι τὸ πᾶν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἡμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πλήθους οὕτω προϊόντος ἐξεύρηται εἰς εὐπορίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν πολλὰ συγχωροῦμεν εἶναι ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπῳ· ὁμοῦ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὄν, κἂν πολὺ οὕτως ᾖ· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει, καὶ πᾶν ὁμοῦ, καὶ νοῦς πολὺς ἑτερότητι, οὐ τόπῳ, ὁμοῦ δὲ πᾶς. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ψυχαί; ἢ καὶ ψυχαί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὸν λέγεται ἀμερὲς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, τὰ δὲ σώματα μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταύτης τῆς ψυχῆς φύσεως αὐτοῖς παρούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν σωμάτων ἐκεῖ γενομένων, ὅσον ἐστὶ μεμερισμένα, κατὰ πᾶν μέρος ἐκείνης ἐμφανταζομένης τῆς φύσεως, περὶ τὰ σώματα οὕτως ἐνομίσθη εἶναι μεριστή. ἐπεί, ὅτι οὐ συνδιείληπται τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅλη πανταχοῦ, φανερὸν ποιεῖ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀμέριστον ὄντως τῆς φύσεως. οὔτ' οὖν τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὰς πολλὰς ἀναιρεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

[1] Parmenides fr. B 8 25 and 5 DK.
[2] Again *Timaeus* 35A2–3.

it seems contradictory that a whole should be simultaneously present everywhere, the same argument will apply to the souls. For they will not be in the bodies in which they are said to be as wholes in wholes, but they will either be divided or, if they remain wholes, will be somewhere in the body and give it their power. And the same difficulty of the whole everywhere will arise with them and with their powers. And further, some one part of the body will have soul, and another only power. But how are there many souls and many intellects, and being and beings? And furthermore, since they come forth from what is before them as numbers, not as magnitudes, they will cause a difficulty in a similar way about how they fill the All. So, therefore, we have discovered nothing from a multiplicity proceeding in this way which helps to a solution; since we shall agree that being also is many things by difference, not by place. For being is all together one, even if it is many things in this way; for "being borders on being" and "all is together",[1] and intellect is many by difference, not by place, and all together. Are souls then also? Yes, souls also; since "what is divided in the sphere of bodies"[2] means that it is naturally partless, but, since the bodies have magnitude, and this nature of soul is present to them (or rather the bodies come to be there in it), in so far as they are divided into parts, that nature being imagined present in every part, in this way it was considered to be divided in the sphere of bodies. For because it is not divided up along with the parts, but is everywhere as a whole, it makes clear the unity and the true indivisibility of the nature. The soul's being one, then, does not do away with the many

τὸ ὂν τὰ ὄντα, οὔτε μάχεται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκεῖ τῷ ἑνί, οὔτε τῷ πλήθει συμπληροῦν δεῖ ζωῆς τὰ σώματα, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος δεῖ νομίζειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι καὶ πολλὰς καὶ μίαν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὅλῳ αἱ πολλαὶ ἤδη οὐ δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ ἑκάστη· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ μία καὶ[1] ὅλη κωλύει τὰς πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι, οὔτε αἱ πολλαὶ τὴν μίαν. διέστησαν γὰρ οὐ διεστῶσαι καὶ πάρεισιν ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαι· οὐ γὰρ πέρασίν εἰσι διωρισμέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστῆμαι αἱ πολλαὶ ἐν ψυχῇ μιᾷ, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μία τοιαύτη, ὥστε ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ πάσας. οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄπειρος ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις.

5. Καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτῆς οὕτω ληπτέον, οὐκ ἐν ὄγκῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ μικρόν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἰόν, εἴ τις ἀφαιροῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν, οὐδ' εἰ ἀφαιρεῖς ἐπιλείψει. εἰ δὴ "οὐκ ἐπιλείψει", τί δεῖ δεδιέναι, μή τινος ἀποστατῇ; πῶς γὰρ ἀποστατεῖ οὐκ ἐπιλείπουσα, ἀλλ' ἀέννaος οὖσα φύσις οὐ ῥέουσα; ῥέουσα μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔρχεται, ἐφ' ὅσον ῥεῖν δύναται, μὴ ῥέουσα δέ—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν, οὐδ' ὅπου ῥεύσειεν ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν κατείληφε, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτή[2] ἐστι τὸ πᾶν—καὶ μεῖζόν τι οὖσα ἢ κατὰ σώματος φύσιν ὀλίγον γ' ἂν εἰκότως νομίζοιτο τῷ παντὶ διδόναι, ὅσον δύναται τοῦτο αὐτοῦ φέρειν. δεῖ

[1] Porphyrius *Sent.*, Igal, H–S²: ἡ Enn.: om. Stobaeus.
[2] Kirchhoff: *αὕτη* Enn., H–S¹.

souls, any more than being does away with beings, nor does the multiplicity there in the true All fight with the one, nor does one need to fill up bodies with life by the multiplicity, nor ought one to think that the multitude of souls came into existence because of bodily magnitude, but souls were both many and one before the bodies. For the many are already in the whole, not in potency, but each and every one in active actuality; for neither does the one and whole hinder the many from being in it, nor do the many hinder the one. For they stand apart without standing aloof and are present to each other without being made other than themselves; for they are not bounded off [from each other] by limits, as neither are the many bodies of knowledge in one soul, and the one is of such a kind as to have all of them in it. It is in this way that a nature of this kind is unbounded.

5. And its greatness is to be understood in this way, not as consisting in bulk; for bulk is a little thing, going to nothing if one takes away from it. But there in the true All it is not possible to take away; and if you do take away, it will not fail. If then it will not fail, why should one be afraid that it may depart from anything? For how will it depart when it does not fail, but is a nature which springs up for ever and does not flow? For if it flowed, it would reach as far as it was able to flow, but as it does not flow – for it could not, and has nowhere it could flow to: for it has taken hold of the All, or rather is itself the All – and is something greater than accords with the nature of the body, it would reasonably be considered to give little of itself to the [perceptible] All, only as much of itself as this is able to bear. But

δὲ ἐκεῖνο μήτε ἔλαττον λέγειν, μηδὲ τιθέμενον ἔλαττον τῷ ὄγκῳ ἀπιστεῖν ἤδη, ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον αὐτοῦ ἰέναι τὸ ἔλαττον. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κατηγορητέον, οὐδὲ παραθετέον ὄγκον πρὸς ὄογκον ἐν μετρήσει—ὅμοιον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις ἰατρικὴν λέγοι ἐλάττω εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἰατροῦ—οὐδ' αὖ οὕτως μεῖζον νομιστέον τῇ ποσοῦ μετρήσει, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς· οὕτω τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ σώματος. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ μεγάλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ μείζονος τοῦ ὄγκου γινομένου φθάνειν ἐπὶ πᾶν αὐτοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχήν, ἣ ἐπ' ἐλάττονος ὄγκου ἦν. γελοῖον γὰρ πολλαχῇ, εἴ τις προσθείη καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ὄγκον.

6. Τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο σῶμα ἔρχεται; ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖνο δεῖ, εἰ δύναται, προσελθεῖν, τὸ δὲ προσεληλυθὸς καὶ δεξάμενον ἔχει. τί οὖν; τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ἔχον καὶ αὐτὸ ἣν ἔχει ψυχήν; τί γὰρ διαφέρει; ἢ καὶ ταῖς προσθήκαις. εἶτα πῶς ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷδε τῷ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ἐν τῷδε; εἰ δὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις διάφοροι, καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ συμπίπτοντα διάφορα λεκτέον εἶναι. ἄλλα οὖν ἐστι τὰ κρινόμενα, οὐ τὸ κρῖνον· ὁ δὲ κρίνων ὁ αὐτὸς δικαστὴς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλοις πάθεσι γινόμενος· καίτοι οὐχ ὁ πάσχων αὐτός, ἀλλ' ἡ σώματος τοιοῦδε φύσις· καὶ ἔστιν οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδονὴν κρίνει τὴν περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ἀλγηδόνα τὴν περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ συναισθάνεται ἡ ἑτέρα τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας κρίμα; ἢ ὅτι

we must not say that this is less, nor, because we assume that it is less in bulk, lose confidence at this stage because it is impossible for the less to extend to what is greater than itself. For "less" should not be predicated of it, nor should one set bulk and the bulkless side by side by measuring them – this would be like saying that the physician's art was less than the body of the physician – nor on the other side should one think that [the true All] is greater in the sense of quantitative measurement, since this does not apply to the soul either: this is how the great and small of body is. But there is evidence of the greatness of soul in the fact that when the bulk becomes greater the same soul reaches to the whole of it which was in the lesser bulk. For it would be ridiculous in many ways if one added bulk to soul as well.

6. Why then does it not also come to another body? It is because that body must approach the soul, if it can, but the one which has approached it and received it has it. Well then, does the other body have the same soul when it itself has the soul which it has? For what is the difference? It lies in the additions. And then, how does it come to pass that it is the same soul in foot and hand, but that the soul in this part of the universe is not the same as the soul in that? But if the perceptions are different, the occurrent experiences must also be said to be different. But then it is what is judged which is different, not what judges; but he who judges is the same judge in a variety of different experiences; yet it is not he who has the experiences, but the nature of a body appropriately qualified; it is as if he judges the pleasure in our finger and the pain in our head. Why then does not one soul share in the perception of what another

κρίσις ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάθος. εἶτα οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἡ κρίνασα "κέκρικα" λέγει, ἀλλ' ἔκρινε μόνον· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἡ ὄψις τῇ ἀκοῇ λέγει, καίτοι ἔκριναν ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν· τοῦτο δὲ ἕτερον ἀμφοῖν. πολλαχῇ δὲ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς εἶδε τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ κρίμα καὶ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἑτέρου πάθους. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.

7. Ἀλλὰ πάλιν λέγωμεν πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι πῶς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἄμοιρον τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολλαχῇ κείμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων μερίζειν εἰς τὰ πολλά, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ μεμερισμένα εἰς τὸ ἓν μᾶλλον ἀνάγειν, κἀκεῖνο οὐκ ἐληλυθέναι πρὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὅτι διέρριπται παρεσχηκέναι δόξαν ἡμῖν κατὰ ταῦτα κἀκεῖνο διειλῆφθαι, οἷον εἴ τις τὸ κρατοῦν καὶ συνέχον εἰς ἴσα τῷ κρατουμένῳ διαιροῖ. καίτοι κρατοῖ ἄν καὶ χεὶρ σῶμα ὅλον καὶ ξύλον πολύπηχυ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν μὲν τὸ κρατοῦν, οὐ διείληπται δὲ ὅμως εἰς ἴσα τῷ κρατουμένῳ ἐν τῇ χειρί, καθόσον ἐφάπτεται εἰς τοσοῦτον περιγραφομένης, ὡς δοκεῖ, τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλ' ὅμως τῆς χειρὸς ὁριζομένης τῷ αὐτῆς ποσῷ, οὐ τῷ τοῦ αἰωρουμένου καὶ κρατουμένου σώματος. καὶ εἰ προσθείης δὲ τῷ κρατουμένῳ σώματι μῆκος ἄλλο καὶ δύναιτο ἡ χεὶρ φέρειν, ἡ δύναμις κἀκεῖνο κρατεῖ οὐ διαληφθεῖσα εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη, ὅσα τὸ σῶμα ἔχει. τί οὖν, εἴ τις τὸν ὄγκον τὸν σωματικὸν τῆς χειρὸς ὑποθεῖτο ἀφῃρῆσθαι,

[1] The reference is possibly to IV. 9.2–3 (on the unity of individual souls); IV. 7.6–7 deals with the unity of soul in the diversity of sense-experiences.

judges? It is because it is a judgement, not an experience. And further, the soul itself which has made a judgement does not say "I have judged", but only judges; since not even in us does our sight say this to our hearing, though both have judged, but the reason over both. But the reason often sees the judgement in another and acquires an understanding of the other's experience. But we have also spoken of this elsewhere.[1]

7. But again let us ask how it is the same which is over all; but this is the same as asking how each and every one of the many perceptible things, though in many different places, is not without a share in the same. For, from what has been said, it is not correct to divide that same up into the many, but rather to bring back the divided many to the one, and that one has not come to these many, but these because they are scattered have given us the impression that also that has been taken apart, as if one were to divide what controls and holds together into parts equal to what is controlled. And yet a hand might control a whole body and a piece of wood many cubits long, or something else, and what controls extends to the whole, but is not all the same divided into parts equal to what is controlled in the hand; the bounds of the power, it appears, extend as far as the grip, but all the same the hand is limited in extent by its own quantity, not by that of the body it lifts and controls. And if you were to add another length to the body which is controlled and the hand was able to bear it, the power would control that too without being divided into as many parts as the body has. Well then, what if someone supposed the corporeal bulk of the hand to be taken away, but left the same

καταλείποι δὲ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀνέχουσαν καὶ πρότερον αὐτό, τὴν πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ οὖσαν; ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀμέριστος οὖσα ἐν παντὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ πᾶν μέρος εἴη; εἰ δὲ δὴ φωτεινὸν μικρὸν ὄγκον οἷον κέντρον ποιησάμενος μεῖζόν τι περιθείης σφαιρικὸν σῶμα διαφανές, ὥστε τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἔνδον ἐν παντὶ τῷ περιέχοντι φαίνειν, οὐκ οὔσης ἄλλοθεν αὐγῆς τῷ ἔξωθεν ὄγκῳ, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔνδον φήσομεν αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθόν, ἀλλὰ μένον ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν ἔξωθεν ὄγκον ἐληλυθέναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖ ἑνορώμενον ἐν τῷ μικρῷ ὄγκῳ φῶς κατειληφέναι τὸ ἔξω; ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ παρὰ τοῦ ὄγκου τοῦ σωματικοῦ τοῦ μικροῦ ἐκείνου ἦν τὸ φῶς— οὐ γὰρ ᾗ σῶμα ἦν εἶχε τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' ᾗ φωτεινὸν σῶμα, ἑτέρᾳ δυνάμει, οὐ σωματικῇ οὔσῃ—φέρε, εἴ τις τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ σώματος ὑφέλοι, τηροῖ δὲ τὴν τοῦ φωτὸς δύναμιν, ἆρ' ἂν ἔτι εἴποις που εἶναι τὸ φῶς, ἢ ἐπίσης ἂν εἴη καθ' ὅλην τε τὴν ἔξω σφαῖραν; οὐκέτι δὲ οὐδ' ἀπερείσῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὅπου πρότερον ἦν κείμενον, καὶ οὔτε ἔτι ἐρεῖς ὅθεν οὔτε ὅπῃ, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἄπορος ἔσῃ ἐν θαύματι ποιούμενος, ἅμα δὲ ὠδὶ τοῦ σφαιρικοῦ σώματος ἀτενίσας εἴσῃ τὸ φῶς καὶ ὠδὶ αὐτός. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου ἔχεις μὲν εἰπεῖν ὅθεν τὸ φῶς ἐπιλάμπει κατὰ πάντα τὸν ἀέρα εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἡλίου βλέπων, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ὅμως ὁρᾷς φῶς πανταχοῦ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μεμερισμένον. δηλοῦσι δὲ αἱ ἀποτομαὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα ἢ ὅθεν ἐλήλυθεν οὐ διδοῦσαι εἶναι οὐδὲ

power which also before held up what was formerly in the hand? Would not the same power, being without parts, be present in the same way in it all, in every part? And suppose you made a small luminous bulk a kind of centre, and put a larger transparent spherical body round it, so that the light of what was inside shone in the whole of what was round it, and no ray of light from anywhere else came to the outside bulk, shall we not affirm that what is inside has not itself been affected but has reached the whole of the outer bulk while remaining as it is, and that the light seen in the small bulk has taken possession of that outside? Now, since the light does not come from that small bodily bulk – for it is not in that it is body that it has the light, but in that it is luminous body, by another power which is not bodily[1] – suppose that someone took away the bulk of the body but kept the power of the light, would you still say that the light was somewhere, or would it be equally present over the whole outer sphere? You will no longer rest in your thought on the place where it was before, and you will not any more say where it comes from or where it is going, but you will be puzzled and put in amazement when, fixing your gaze now here and now there in the spherical body, you yourself perceive the light. For with the sun also you can say whence the light shines over all the air by looking at the body of the sun, but none the less you see the same light everywhere, and this light is not divided into parts either. And the cuttings-off of light make this clear; they do not allow it to be on the other side of them from that whence it came, but

[1] On the incorporeality of light cp. II. 1.7. 26–8; IV. 5.6–7.

μερίζουσαι. καὶ δὴ τοίνυν εἰ δύναμις μόνον ὁ ἥλιος ἦν
σώματος χωρὶς οὖσα καὶ φῶς παρεῖχεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐντεῦθεν
ἤρξατο οὐδ' ἂν εἶπες ὅθεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν τὸ φῶς πανταχοῦ
ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὂν οὐκ ἀρξάμενον οὐδ' ἀρχήν ποθεν ἔχον.

8. Τὸ μὲν οὖν φῶς, ἐπειδὴ σώματός ἐστιν, ὅθεν
ἐλήλυθεν εἰπεῖν ἔχεις ἔχων εἰπεῖν τὸ σῶμα ὅπου ἐστίν,
ἄυλον δὲ εἴ τί ἐστι καὶ δεῖται οὐδὲν σώματος πρότερον
ὂν τῇ φύσει παντὸς σώματος, ἱδρυμένον αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ,
μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἱδρύσεως δεόμενον οὐδὲν τῆς τοιαύτης,
τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τοιαύτην ἔχον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχον ἀρχὴν ὅθεν
ὁρμηθείη οὔτε ἔκ τινος τόπου οὔτε τινὸς ὂν σώματος,
πῶς αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὠδὶ φήσεις, τὸ δὲ ὠδί; ἤδη γὰρ ἂν καὶ
τὸ ὅθεν ὡρμήθη ἔχοι καὶ τό τινος εἶναι. λείπεται τοίνυν
εἰπεῖν ὡς, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ μεταλαμβάνει, τῇ τοῦ ὅλου
δυνάμει μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ πάσχοντος[1] μηδὲν μήτ'
οὖν ἄλλο τι μήτε μεμερισμένου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ σῶμα
ἔχοντι τὸ πάσχειν κἂν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ
ταύτῃ παθητὸν ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ μεριστόν, ἐπειδὴ
σώματός ἐστί τι οἷον πάθος ἢ εἶδος· ὃ δέ ἐστι μηδενὸς
σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐθέλει αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη
τοῦτο τά τε ἄλλα πάθη τοῦ σώματος μηδαμῶς αὐτὸ
πάσχειν μερίζεσθαί τε οὐχ οἷόν τε· σώματος γὰρ καὶ
τοῦτο καὶ πρώτως πάθος καὶ ᾗ σῶμα. εἰ δὴ ᾗ σῶμα τὸ
μεριστόν, ᾗ μὴ σῶμα τὸ ἀμέριστον. πῶς γὰρ καὶ

[1] Gollwitzer: παντὸς Enn.

they do not divide it either. And certainly, then, if the sun was only a power which was without a body, and gave light, the light would not have begun from there [where the sun was] and you would not be able to say whence it came, but it would be everywhere as one and the same; it would have no beginning and no starting-point anywhere.

8. Since light, then, belongs to a body you are able to say whence it came because you can say where the body is; but if there is something which is immaterial, and has no need whatever of body because it is naturally prior to body, itself set firm in itself, or rather not in any way needing a setting of this kind, how can you say that some of this is here and some of it there when it has a nature of this kind and has no point from which it started and does not come from any place or belong to any body? For [if you could say this] it would already have a place from which it started and a belonging to some body. It remains, then, to say that if anything participates in it, it participates by the power of the whole, while it itself is not at all affected, either in any other way or by being divided into parts. For that which has a body could be affected, even if only incidentally, and could in this way be called subject to affection and divisible into parts, since it is something like an affection or a form of body; but that which belongs to no body, but the body wishes to belong to it, must necessarily itself in no way be affected by the other bodily affections and cannot be divided into parts: for this is an affection of body, and primarily so, and of body in that it is body. If then the divisible is so in that it is body, the indivisible is so in that it is not body. For how will you divide that which has no

μερίσεις οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος; εἰ οὖν οὐκ ἔχοντος μέγεθος τὸ ἔχον τὸ μέγεθος ἀμῃγέπῃ μεταλαμβάνει, οὐ μεριζομένου αὐτοῦ ἂν μεταλαμβάνοι· ἢ μέγεθος αὖ ἕξει[1] πάλιν. ὅταν οὖν ἐν πολλοῖς λέγῃς, οὐκ αὐτὸ πολλὰ γενόμενον λέγεις, ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν τὸ πάθος περιάπτεις τῷ ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτὸ ἅμα ὁρῶν. τὸ δὲ "ἐν αὐτοῖς" οὕτω ληπτέον ὡς οὐκ αὐτῶν γενόμενον ἑκάστου οὐδ' αὖ τοῦ παντός, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι, αὐτὸ δὲ ὂν οὐκ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἑαυτοῦ. οὐδ' αὖ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον τὸ πᾶν αἰσθητόν, οὐδ' εἴ τι μέρος τοῦ παντός· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποσόν· πῶς ἂν οὖν τοσοῦτον; σώματι μὲν γὰρ "τοσοῦτον", τῷ δὲ μὴ σώματι, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας ὄντι φύσεως, οὐδαμῇ δεῖ προσάπτειν "τοσοῦτον", ὅπου μηδὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ποῦ· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν πολλάκις "ποῦ" εἴη. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ μερισμὸς τοῖς τόποις, ὅταν τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ὠδί, τὸ δὲ ὠδί, ὅτῳ τὸ ὠδὶ μὴ ὑπάρχει, πῶς ἂν τὸ μερίζεσθαι ἔχοι; ἀμέριστον ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὸ σὺν αὑτῷ εἶναι, κἂν τὰ πολλὰ αὐτοῦ ἐφιέμενα τυγχάνῃ. εἰ οὖν τὰ πολλὰ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ὅλου ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ καὶ δύναται μεταλαβεῖν, ὅλου ἂν αὐτοῦ καθόσον δύναται μεταλαμβάνοι. δεῖ οὖν τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὐ μετέλαβε, μὴ ἰδίου αὐτῶν ὄντος· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν μένοι αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὅλον καὶ ἐν οἷς ὁρᾶται ὅλον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅλον, οὐκ αὐτό, οὐδ' αὖ οὗ

[1] H–S²: ἕξει Enn.

magnitude? If then what has the magnitude in any way participates in what does not have magnitude it will participate in it without its being divided: or it will again have magnitude. Whenever then you say it is in many things, you are not saying that it has become many, but you are fitting what happens to the many to that one when you see it all at once in the many. But the "in them" must be taken in the sense that it does not come to belong to each one of them, or again to the totality, but it belongs to itself and is itself, and because it is itself does not depart from itself. Nor again is it of the same size as the perceptible All, or of any part of it; for it is altogether not quantitative: how then can it be of any size? For one attributes "of such a size" to body; but one should not in any way attach "of such a size" to what is not body but of another nature; one should not even attach "of such a kind" there; so then not "where" either; so then not "here and there" either; for that would already be "where" many times over. If then division is by places, when one part of it is here and another there, how can what has no "here" be divided? It must then be indivisible, itself with itself, even if the many aspire to and attain it. If then the many aspire to it, it is clear they aspire to it as whole: so that if they are also able to participate in it, they would participate in it as whole in so far as they can. The things therefore which participate in it must be so related to it as if they did not participate, since it is not their private property; for in this way it will remain whole itself by itself and whole in visible things. For if it is not whole, it is not itself, nor again will the partici-

ἐφίενται ἡ μετάληψις ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου, οὗ ἡ ἔφεσις οὐκ ἦν.

9. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ μέρος τὸ γενόμενον ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον οἷον τὸ πρῶτον—ἀποτετμημένον ἀεὶ ἕκαστον—πολλὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἕκαστον πρῶτον. εἶτα ταῦτα τὰ πολλὰ πρῶτα τί ἂν εἴη τὸ διεῖργον, ὥστε μὴ ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντα εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων οἷόν τε ἦν εἴδη αὐτὰ εἶναι, εἴπερ ὅμοια καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἀφ' οὗ. εἰ δὲ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα μέρη τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκέτι ὅλον ἕκαστον· ἔπειτα πῶς ἦλθον ἀποτμηθεῖσαι καὶ καταλείπουσαι; εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ κατέλιπον, δηλονότι κατέλιπόν που ἰοῦσαι. εἶτα πότερα ἔτι εἰσὶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ γεγενημέναι ἢ οὔ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή εἰσιν, ἄτοπον ἐλαττωθῆναι ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἀδύναμον γεγονέναι ἐστερημένον ὧν πρότερον εἶχε δυνάμεων, χωρίς τε τὰς δυνάμεις εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἑαυτῶν πῶς ἂν οἷόν τε ἦ ἀποτετμημένας; εἰ δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τέ εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἢ ὅλαι ἢ μέρη αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα ἔσονται. ἀλλ' εἰ μέρη, κἀκεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη. εἰ δὲ ὅλαι, ἤτοι αἴπερ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὐ μεμερισμέναι, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ οὐ μεμερισμένον· ἢ πολλὰ γενόμενον ὅλον ἕκαστον αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ ὅμοιαι ἀλλήλαις, ὥστε καὶ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστης ἡ δύναμις· ἢ μία μόνον ἔσται ἡ συνοῦσα

pation be in what men aspire to but in something else to which the aspiration was not directed.

9. For indeed if the part which came to be in each was a whole, and each individual thing was like the first – each individual thing in a state of continual severance – then the firsts would be many and each individual would be a first. Then what would it be which kept these many firsts apart, so as not to be one thing all together? It would certainly not be their bodies; for it would not be possible for them to be forms of the bodies, assuming that these firsts are like that first from which they came. But if what are called the parts in the many things are the powers of that whole, first of all each is no longer a whole; then how did they come here when they had been cut off from and left that first? For if they really did leave it, they were obviously going somewhere when they left it. Then, are the powers which have come to be here in the perceptible world still in that first or not? For if they are not, it is absurd that it should be diminished and become powerless by being deprived of the powers which it had before; and how would it be possible for the powers to exist separate or cut off from their substances? But if they are both in that first and elsewhere, then either they will be here as wholes or parts of them will be here. But if it is parts, then the other parts will be there [in the true All]. But if they are here as wholes, then either they are here what they are there, not divided, and again there will be the same everywhere, not divided; or the powers will each be one whole thing which has become many, and will be like each other, so that each substance will have its power with it; or the power accompanying substance will only be one,

τῇ οὐσίᾳ, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δυνάμεις μόνον· καίτοι οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὥσπερ οὐσίαν ἄνευ δυνάμεως, οὕτως οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἄνευ οὐσίας. ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐκεῖ ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία ἢ μεῖζον οὐσίας· εἰ δ' ἕτεραι ὡς ἐλάττους καὶ ἀμυδραὶ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐξ ἐκείνου, οἱονεὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς ἀμυδρὸν ἐκ φανοτέρου, καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐσίαι συνοῦσαι ταῖς δυνάμεσι ταύταις, ἵνα μὴ γίνηται ἄνευ οὐσίας δύναμις, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοειδῶν πάντως πρὸς ἀλλήλας γινομένων ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν πανταχοῦ συγχωρεῖν εἶναι, ἢ καί, εἰ μὴ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' οὖν πανταχῇ ἅμα τὴν αὐτὴν ὅλην, οὐ μεμερισμένην, οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ὅλῳ; εἰ δέ, μεμερίσθαι ἑκάστην εἰς ἄπειρον, καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδ' αὐτῇ ὅλη, ἀλλὰ τῷ μερισμῷ ἔσται ἀδυναμία. ἔπειτα ἄλλη κατ' ἄλλο οὖσα οὐ καταλείψει συναίσθησιν. ἔπειτα δέ, [εἰ][1] καθάπερ τὸ ἴνδαλμά τινος, οἷον καὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστερον φῶς, ἀποτεμνόμενον τοῦ παρ' οὗ ἐστιν οὐκέτ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅλως πᾶν τὸ παρ' ἄλλου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον ἴνδαλμα ὂν ἐκείνου οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀποτέμνοντα ἐν ὑποστάσει ποιεῖν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται αἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐλθοῦσαι ἀποτετμημέναι ἂν ἐκείνου εἶεν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὗ εἰσιν αὗται, κἀκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένοντο ἐκεῖ ἅμα ἔσται, ὥστε πανταχοῦ ἅμα πάλιν αὐτὸ οὐ μεμερισμένον ὅλον ἔσται.

10. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ εἴδωλόν του

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

and the others will only be powers; and yet, just as it is not possible to have substance without power, so it is not possible to have power without substance. For power there [in the true All] is real existence and substance, or greater than substance. But if the powers from that first are other because they are less and dim, like a dim light from a brighter light, and the same is true of the substances which accompany these powers, that there may not be power without substance, first of all, even with powers of this kind it is necessary, since they are in every way of like form to each other, either to agree that there is one and the same power everywhere, or, if not everywhere, at any rate present at once as a whole in every direction, not divided, as in one and the same body (but if this is so why not in all the whole universe?). But if this is so, each power will be divided to infinity, and will no longer be a whole even for itself, but will by being divided be a powerlessness. Then if one power is in one part and one in another, there will be no room for consciousness. And then further, just as the image of something, like the weaker light, if cut off from that from which it is, would no longer exist, and in general one cannot cut off and make exist [separately] anything at all which derives its existence from something else and is its image, these powers also which came from that first could not exist cut off from it. But if this is so, that from which they derived will be there simultaneously where they are, so that again it will be present itself everywhere all at once undivided as a whole.

10. But if someone were to say that it is not necessary for the image to be dependent on anything

συνηρτῆσθαι τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ—ἔστι γὰρ καὶ εἰκόνα εἶναι ἀπόντος τοῦ ἀρχετύπου, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ εἰκών, καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπελθόντος τὴν θερμότητα εἶναι ἐν τῷ θερμανθέντι— πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρχετύπου καὶ τῆς εἰκόνος, εἰ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ ζωγράφου εἰκόνα λέγοι τις, οὐ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον φήσομεν τὴν εἰκόνα πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ζωγράφον, οὐκ οὖσαν αὐτοῦ εἰκόνα οὐδ' εἰ αὐτόν τις γράφει· τὸ γὰρ γράφον ἦν οὐ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζωγράφου οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος τὸ μεμιμημένον· καὶ οὐ τὸν ζωγράφον, ἀλλὰ τὴν θέσιν τὴν οὕτωσὶ τῶν χρωμάτων λεκτέον ποιεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην εἰκόνα. οὐδὲ κυρίως ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ τοῦ ἐνδάλματος ποίησις οἷον ἐν ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις ἢ ἐν σκιαῖς— ἐνταῦθα ὑφίσταταί τε παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου κυρίως καὶ γίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀποτετμημένα τὰ γενόμενα εἶναι. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἀσθενεστέρας δυνάμεις παρὰ τῶν προτέρων ἀξιώσουσι γίνεσθαι. τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς λεγόμενον οὐκ εἰκόνα τὴν θερμότητα τοῦ πυρὸς λεκτέον εἶναι, εἰ μή τις λέγοι καὶ πῦρ ἐν τῇ θερμότητι εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, χωρὶς πυρὸς ποιήσει τὴν θερμότητα. εἶτα κἂν εἰ μὴ αὐτίκα, ἀλλ' οὖν παύεται καὶ ψύχεται τὸ σῶμα τὸ θερμανθὲν ἀποστάντος τοῦ πυρός. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ταύτας τὰς δυνάμεις σβεννύοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν ἓν μόνον ἄφθαρτον φήσουσι, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς καὶ τὸν νοῦν φθαρτὰ ποιήσουσιν. εἶτα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ ῥεούσης οὐσίας ῥέοντα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ποιήσουσι. καίτοι, εἰ μένοι[1] ἱδρυθεὶς ἥλιος ὁπουοῦν, τὸ αὐτὸ φῶς

[1] Vitringa: μὲν ὁ Enn.

[1] This must be the right sense, as Sleeman saw (*C.Q.* 24, 1930, 78); cp. II. 6.1. 50 and 53 (my translation there is incorrect).

in the original – for it is possible for a likeness to exist when the original is not there from which the likeness is taken, and, when the fire has gone away, for the heat to exist in what has been heated – first of all, as regards the original and the likeness, if one is talking about the likeness made by the painter, we shall affirm that it is not the original which made the likeness but the painter, since even if some painter makes a self-portrait it is not a likeness of himself; for what made the painting was not the body of the painter or the [bodily] form which was represented; and it is not the painter, but this particular disposition of the colours, which should be said to make this particular likeness. This is not in the strict and proper sense the making of likeness and image as it occurs in pools and mirrors, or in shadows – here the image has its existence in the strict and proper sense from the prior original, and comes to be from it, and it is not possible for what has come to be to exist cut off from it. But they will accept that this is the way in which the weaker powers come from the prior ones. But as for what is said about fire, the heat should not be called a likeness of the fire, unless one is going to say that fire is included in heat; for if this is so [the inclusive form of heat] will produce heat without fire. And then, even if not at once, the heated body does cease to be hot and does grow cold when the fire has gone away. But if these people were going to quench these powers, first of all they will be affirming that only the One is indestructible, and will make the souls and Intellect destructible. And then they will make flow away the things which come from a substance which does not flow away.[1] Yet, if the sun were to stay fixed in any particular

ἂν παρέχοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις· εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις μὴ τὸ αὐτό, τούτῳ ἂν πιστῷτο τὸ τὸ σῶμα ῥεῖν τοῦ ἡλίου. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν μὴ φθαρτὰ τὰ παρ' ἐκείνου, ἀθάνατοι δὲ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται.

11. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί, εἴπερ ὅλον πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὅλου πάντα μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ νοητοῦ; πῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἔτι δεύτερον καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἄλλα; ἢ τὸ παρὸν ἐπιτηδειότητι τοῦ δεξομένου ⟨παρ⟩εῖναι[1] νομιστέον, καὶ εἶναι μὲν πανταχοῦ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον ἑαυτοῦ, παρεῖναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ δυνάμενον παρεῖναι, καὶ καθόσον δύναται κατὰ τοσοῦτον αὐτῷ οὐ τόπῳ παρεῖναι, οἷον τῷ φωτὶ τὸ διαφανές, τῷ δὲ τεθολωμένῳ ἡ μετάληψις ἄλλως. καὶ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα τάξει καὶ δυνάμει καὶ διαφοραῖς, οὐ τόποις. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ὁμοῦ εἶναι τὰ διάφορα, οἷον ψυχήν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πάσας ἐπιστήμας μείζους τε καὶ ὑφιεμένας. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς εἶδε τὸ χρῶμα, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις τὸ εὐῶδες, ἄλλη δὲ αἴσθησις ἄλλο, ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἀλλ' οὐ χωρὶς ὄντων. οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο ποικίλον καὶ πολύ; ἢ τὸ ποικίλον ἁπλοῦν αὖ, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν. λόγος γὰρ εἷς καὶ πολύς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἕν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. καὶ τὸ ὂν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐ κεχωρισμένου, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ᾖ τὸ ὄν, πάρεστιν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕν,

[1] Vitringa, Müller.

place, it would give the same light to the same regions; but if anybody were to say, not the same light, he would confirm by this that the body of the sun was flowing away. But that the things that come from that first are indestructible, and that the souls and every intellect are immortal, has been stated at greater length elsewhere.

11. But why, if the intelligible is everywhere as a whole, do not all things participate in it as a whole? And why is there the first there, and the second as well, and after that others? Now one must suppose that what is present is present for the capacity of what is going to receive it, and that being is everywhere in being and does not fall short of itself, but that is present to it which is able to be present, and is present to it to the extent of its ability, not spatially; as the transparent is present to light, but the participation of the turbid is otherwise. And certainly things are first and second and third in rank and power and difference, not by their positions. For nothing prevents different things from being all together, like soul and intellect and all bodies of knowledge, major and subordinate. For the eye perceives the colour, the smell the fragrance, and other different senses different things, coming from the same body, which exist all together, but not separately. Is that first, then, variegated and many? Yes, but the variegated is also simple, and the many one. For it is a rational form which is one and many, and all being is one. For its other is in itself and its otherness belongs to itself; for it certainly could not belong to non-being. And being belongs to the one which is not separated from it, and wherever being is, its one is present to it, and the one, again, is in

καὶ τὸ ἓν ὂν αὖ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ παρεῖναι χωρὶς ὄν. ἄλλως δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅσα πάρεστιν αὐτῶν καὶ οἷς πάρεισιν, ἄλλως τὰ νοητὰ αὐτοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλως ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἄλλως ἐπιστήμη ψυχῇ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμῃ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἑκατέρα οὖσα· σῶμα δὲ σώματι παρὰ ταῦτα ἑτέρως.

12. Ὥσπερ δὲ φωνῆς οὔσης κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα πολλάκις καὶ λόγου ἐν τῇ φωνῇ οὗς μὲν παρὸν ἐδέξατο καὶ ᾔσθετο, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον θείης μεταξὺ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἦλθε καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ φωνή, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ οὗς ἦλθε πρὸς τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδον καὶ πάντες ἐπλήσθησαν τῆς θέας καίτοι ἐναφωρισμένου τοῦ θεάματος κειμένου, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμός, ὁ δὲ οὗς ἦν, οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἕξει καὶ ἄλλο αὖ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἦν δὲ ἡ φωνὴ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος οὐ μία μεμερισμένη, ἀλλὰ μία πανταχοῦ ὅλη· καὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως δέ, εἰ παθὼν ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν μορφὴν ἔχει, ἔχει οὐ μεμερισμένην· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὄψις τεθῇ, ἔχει ἐκεῖ τὴν μορφήν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ πᾶσα δόξα συγχωρεῖ, εἰρήσθω δ' οὖν δι' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ μετάληψις. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἀέρι ὅλον τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἤκουσε πᾶς τὸ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐκασταχοῦ ὅλου ὄντος

[1] For an even more impressive version of this sound-image cp. III. 8.9. 26–29.

itself being. For it is possible to be present while being separate. But the beings of the sense-world are present in one way to the intelligibles (those of them which are present, and to the intelligibles to which they are present), and the intelligibles to themselves in another; since also soul is present in one way to body, and a knowledge to soul, and a knowledge to another knowledge, differently, when both are in the same [mind]; and body is present to body in another way besides these.

12. Just as there is often a sound in the air, and a word in the sound, and an ear is there and receives and perceives it; and if you put another ear in the middle of the space between, the word and the sound would come also to it, or rather the ear would come to the word[1]; and many eyes would look towards the same thing and all be filled with the sight of it (though the object of sight would be separate because one was an eye and the other an ear); in this same way that which is able to have soul will have it, and another again and yet another from the same source. But the sound was everywhere in the air and not as one sound divided into parts, but as one whole sound everywhere; and with sight, if the air has the shape by being affected, it has it not divided into parts; for wherever the sight is placed, it has the shape there. But not every way of thinking [about vision] accepts this,[2] but let the mention of it stand, because the participation is of the same one thing. But with the sound it is clearer that the whole form is in all the air: for everyone would not have heard the same thing if the spoken word had not been in

[2] Plotinus himself does not: see IV. 5.6.

τοῦ φωνηθέντος λόγου καὶ ἑκάστης ἀκοῆς τὸ πᾶν ὁμοίως δεδεγμένης. εἰ δὲ μηδ' ἐνταῦθα ἡ ὅλη φωνὴ καθ' ὅλον τὸν ἀέρα παρατέταται, ὡς τόδε μὲν τὸ μέρος αὐτῆς τῷδε τῷ μέρει συνεζεῦχθαι, τόδε δὲ τῷδε συμμεμερίσθαι, τί δεῖ ἀπιστεῖν, εἰ ψυχὴ μὴ μία τέταται συμμεριζομένη, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ οὗ ἂν παρῇ πάρεστι καὶ ἔστι πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὐ μεμερισμένη; καὶ γενομένη μὲν ἐν σώμασιν, ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, ἀνάλογον ἕξει τῇ ἤδη ἐν τῷ ἀέρι φωνηθείσῃ φωνῇ, πρὸ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τῷ φωνοῦντι καὶ φωνήσοντι· καίτοι καὶ γενομένη ἐν σώματι οὐδ' ὡς ἀπέστη τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φωνοῦντα εἶναι, ὅστις φωνῶν καὶ ἔχει τὴν φωνὴν καὶ δίδωσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς φωνῆς ταὐτότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τοῖς πρὸς ἃ εἴληπται, ἔχει δ' οὖν ὁμοιότητα κατά τι· τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅτε καὶ φύσεως ὄντα τῆς ἑτέρας δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς οὐκ ὄντος αὐτῆς τοῦ μὲν ἐν σώμασι, τοῦ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὅλου ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς αὖ φανταζομένου. καὶ αὖ ἦλθεν ἄλλο εἰς τὸ λαβεῖν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐξ ἀφανοῦς αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω προητοίμαστο, ὥστε μέρος αὐτῆς ὠδὶ κείμενον εἰς τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἧκειν ἦν ἐν παντὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καίτοι δοκοῦν ἐνταῦθα ἐλθεῖν. πῶς γὰρ καὶ ἦλθεν; εἰ οὖν μὴ ἦλθεν, ὤφθη δὲ νῦν παροῦσα καὶ παροῦσα οὐ τῷ ἀναμεῖναι τὸ μεταληψόμενον, δηλονότι οὖσα ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πάρεστι καὶ τούτῳ. εἰ δ' οὖσα ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τούτῳ

each and every place as a whole, and each hearing had not alike received the whole. But if even here the whole sound is not spread over the whole air, because this one part of it is joined to this one part of the air and that other divided up with that other, why should one disbelieve that one soul is not spread out and divided up with the body, but is present everywhere where it is present and is everywhere in the All without being divided? And when it comes to be in bodies, in whatever way it does come to be in them, it will be analogous to the sound already sounded in the air, but before the bodies it will be like what makes or is going to make the sound; yet even when it comes to be in a body it has not even so departed from being like the one who makes the sound and both has it and gives it. Well then, what happens with sound is not exactly the same as that for which it was taken as an example, but it has a certain likeness to it; but what happens with soul, since it belongs to the other nature, must be understood in the sense, not that one part of it is in body and another on its own, but that it is in itself as a whole and, again, is imagined as a whole in many. And again another came to get soul, and again this too has from the unseen what was also in the others. For soul was not made ready before in such a way that a part of it placed here came to this particular thing, but what was said to come was in everything in itself and is in itself, though we think it has come here. For how could it have come? If then it did not come, but was seen now present, and present not by waiting for something to come and participate in it, clearly it is both on its own and present to this thing. But if when it is on its own it is present to this, this

πάρεστι, τοῦτο ἦλθε πρὸς αὐτήν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔξω ὂν τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος ἦλθε πρὸς τὸ οὕτως ὂν καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τῆς ζωῆς κόσμῳ, ἦν δὲ ὁ κόσμος ὁ τῆς ζωῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πᾶς δὴ ἦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐ διειλημμένος εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ὄγκον—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὄγκος ἦν—καὶ τὸ ἐληλυθὸς δὲ οὐκ εἰς ὄγκον ἦλθε· μετέλαβεν ἄρα αὐτοῦ οὐ μέρους [ὅλου][1]· ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλο ἥκῃ εἰς τὸν τοιοῦτον κόσμον, ὅλου αὐτοῦ μεταλήψεται. ὁμοίως ἄρα, εἰ λέγοιτο ἐκεῖνος ἐν τούτοις ὅλος, ἐν παντὶ ἑκάστῳ ἔσται. καὶ πανταχοῦ ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς εἷς ἀριθμῷ οὐ μεμερισμένος, ἀλλ' ὅλος ἔσται.

13. Πόθεν οὖν ἡ ἔκτασις ἡ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ζῷα; ἢ οὐκ ἐξετάθη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδέ φησιν οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετειληφέναι ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν τι μεταλήψεταί τινος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ αὑτοῦ μεταλήψεται· ἢ οὐ μετειληφὸς ἔσται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἔσται. δεῖ οὖν σῶμα μεταλαμβάνον τινὸς οὐ σώματος μεταλαμβάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη. σῶμα δὴ οὐ σώματος μεταλήψεται. οὐδὲ μέγεθος τοίνυν μεγέθους μεταλήψεται· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ προσθήκην λάβοι, τὸ μέγεθος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ πρότερον ἦν, μεγέθους μεταλήψεται· οὐ γὰρ τὸ δίπηχυ τρίπηχυ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλο ποσὸν ἔχον ἄλλο ἔσχεν· ἐπεὶ οὕτω

[1] delevimus, ut glossam ad *οὐ μέρους*.

came to it. But if this thing which was outside this kind of being came to that which exists in this way and came to be in the ordered beauty of life, and this ordered beauty of life was on its own, and was really on its own not divided over its own bulk – for there is no bulk – then what came to it also did not come to bulk; it did not therefore participate in a part of it; but if another thing as well comes to this kind of ordered beauty, it will participate in it as a whole. In the same way, then, if that is said to be present in these [two] things as a whole, it will be present as a whole in each and every thing. And so it will be everywhere, one in number and not divided into parts, but as a whole.

13. What, then, is the origin of its extension over all the heaven and all living things? Now, it is not extended. For it is sense-perception, to which we are paying attention when we disbelieve what is now being said, which says that it is here and there, but reason says that the "here and there" has not come about by its being extended but the whole of what is extended has participated in it, while it is not itself spaced out. If then anything is going to participate in anything, it is clear that it will not be participating in itself: otherwise it will not be a participant, but [just] itself. Body, then, if it participates in anything, cannot participate in body: for it has it already. A body certainly will not participate in a body. Nor, then, will magnitude participate in magnitude: for it has it already. For not even if it receives an addition will that magnitude which was there before participate in magnitude; for it is not the length of two cubits which becomes three cubits long, but the substrate which had one quantity has

γε αὐτὰ τὰ δύο τρία ἔσται. εἰ οὖν τὸ διειλημμένον καὶ τὸ ἐκτεταμένον εἰς τόσον ἄλλου γένους μεταλήψεται ἢ ὅλως ἄλλου, δεῖ τὸ οὗ μεταλαμβάνει μήτε διειλημμένον εἶναι μήτε ἐκτεταμένον μήτε ὅλως ποσόν τι εἶναι. ὅλον ἄρα δεῖ τὸ παρεσόμενον αὐτῷ πανταχοῦ ἀμερὲς ὂν παρεῖναι, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἀμερές, ὡς μικρόν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσται καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτῷ ἐφαρμόσει οὐδ' αὖ αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται. ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως, ὡς σημεῖον· οὐ γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ· ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ἄπειρα σημεῖα ἔσται, εἴπερ ἔσται, καὶ οὐ συνεχές· ὥστε οὐδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει. εἰ οὖν ὁ ὄγκος ὁ πᾶς ἕξει αὐτὸ ὅλον, ἕξει αὐτὸ κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ.

14. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ ἑκασταχοῦ ψυχή, πῶς ἰδία ἑκάστου; καὶ πῶς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθή, ἡ δὲ κακή; ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ ἑκάστῳ καὶ πάσας ψυχὰς ἔχει καὶ πάντας νοῦς. καὶ γὰρ ἓν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον αὖ καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ καὶ ἕκαστον ἔχει διακεκριμένον καὶ αὖ οὐ διακριθὲν χωρίς. πῶς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄπειρον ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτο, ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα ἔχει, πᾶσαν ζωὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ἅπαντα; ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν οὐ πέρασιν ἀφώρισται· διὰ τοῦτο αὖ καὶ ἕν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μίαν ζωὴν ἔδει αὐτὸ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρον, καὶ αὖ μίαν καὶ τὴν μίαν οὕτω μίαν, ὅτι πάσας ὁμοῦ οὐ συμφορηθείσας εἰς ἕν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἀρξαμένας καὶ μενούσας ὅθεν ἤρξαντο, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἤρξαντο, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν ἀεί· οὐδὲν γὰρ γινόμενον ἐκεῖ· οὐδὲ

another; for [otherwise] the two themselves will be three. If then that which is divided and extended to a certain distance is going to participate in another kind, or in general in something else, that in which it participates must not be divided or extended or in any way quantitative. So that which is going to be present to it must be present to it everywhere as a whole, without parts; but not without parts as being small; for in this way it will none the less be divisible and will not fit the participant, and will not be with it as the same if it grows. But it is not without parts like a point either; for the bulk is not a point, but there are infinitely many points in it; so this too, if it is going to be a point, will be infinitely many points, and not continuous: so that it will not fit in this way either. If then the whole bulk has it as a whole, it will have it in the whole of itself.

14. But if it is the same soul in each and every place, how is it the particular soul of each individual? And how is one soul evil and the other good? Now, it is sufficient for each and contains all souls and all intellects. For it is one and again unbounded and holds all things together and each distinct, and, again, not distinct in separation. For how could it be called unbounded except in this sense, that it has all things together, every life and every soul and every intellect? But each of them is not marked off by boundaries: for this reason, again, it is one. For it did not have to have [only] one life, but a life unbounded and again one, and the one life one in this way, that all the lives are together, not heaped together into one, but beginning from one and remaining where they began; or rather they did not even begin, but it was like this always; for nothing

μεριζόμενον τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μερίζεσθαι τῷ λαβόντι. τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ τὸ ἔκπαλαι καὶ ἐξαρχῆς· τὸ δὲ γινόμενον πελάζει καὶ συνάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξήρτηται ἐκείνου. ἡμεῖς δέ—τίνες δὲ ἡμεῖς; ἆρα ἐκεῖνο ἢ τὸ πελάζον καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν χρόνῳ; ἢ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν γενέσθαι ἦμεν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλοι ὄντες καί τινες καὶ θεοί, ψυχαὶ καθαραὶ καὶ νοῦς συνημμένος τῇ ἁπάσῃ οὐσίᾳ, μέρη ὄντες τοῦ νοητοῦ οὐκ ἀφωρισμένα οὐδ' ἀποτετμημένα, ἀλλ' ὄντες τοῦ ὅλου· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἀποτετμήμεθα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ νῦν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσελήλυθεν ἄνθρωπος ἄλλος εἶναι θέλων· καὶ εὑρὼν ἡμᾶς—ἦμεν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς οὐκ ἔξω—περιέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἡμῖν καὶ προσέθηκεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ ὃς ἦν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τότε· οἷον εἰ φωνῆς οὔσης μιᾶς καὶ λόγου ἑνὸς ἄλλος ἀλλοθεν παραθεὶς τὸ οὖς ἀκούσειε καὶ δέξαιτο, καὶ γένοιτο κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκοή τις ἔχουσα τὸ ἐνεργοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν παρόν· καὶ γεγενήμεθα τὸ συνάμφω καὶ οὐ θάτερον, ὃ πρότερον ἦμεν, καὶ θάτερόν ποτε, ὃ ὕστερον προσεθέμεθα ἀργήσαντος τοῦ προτέρου ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον οὐ παρόντος.

15. Ἀλλὰ πῶς προσελήλυθε τὸ προσεληλυθός; ἢ ἐπειδὴ ἐπιτηδειότης αὐτῷ παρῆν, ἔσχε πρὸς ὃ ἦν ἐπιτήδειον· ἦν δὲ γενόμενον οὕτως, ὡς δέξασθαι ψυχήν. τὸ δὲ γίνεται ὡς μὴ δέξασθαι πᾶσαν καίτοι παροῦσαν πᾶσαν, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτῷ, οἷον καὶ ζῷα τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τοσοῦτον ἔχει, ὅσον δύναται λαβεῖν· οἷον φωνῆς λόγον σημαινούσης τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῦ λόγου μετέσχε μετὰ τῆς κατὰ φωνὴν ἠχῆς, τὰ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τῆς πληγῆς

comes into being there; it is not then divided up into parts, but seems to be so divided to the recipient. But what is there is the primeval, that which was from the beginning; but that which comes to be draws near it and thinks to be joined to it and depends on it. But we – who are we? Are we that which draws near and comes to be in time? No, even before this coming to be came to be we were there, men who were different, and some of us even gods, pure souls and intellect united with the whole of reality; we were parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole; and we are not cut off even now. But now another man, wishing to exist, approached that man; and when he found us – for we were not outside the All – he wound himself round us and attached himself to that man who was then each one of us (as if there was one voice and one word and one here and another there turned their ears to it and heard and received it, and there came to be a hearing made actual, having that which acted on it present): and we have come to be the pair of them, not the one which we were before – and sometimes just the other one which we added on afterwards, when that prior one is inactive and in another way not present.

15. But how did that which approached approach? Since there was an adaptability present in it, it had that to which it was adapted. But what comes to exist in such a way as not to receive all soul, though all is present, but not to it, like the other animals and the plants receives as much as it can take: as when a voice says a word, and some partake of the word along with the noise of the voice, some only of the voice and its impact. So when a living thing

μόνον. γενομένου δὴ ζῴου, ὃ ἔχει μὲν παροῦσαν αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ψυχήν, καθ' ἣν δὴ ἀνήρτηται εἰς πᾶν τὸ ὄν, παρόντος δὲ καὶ σώματος οὐ κενοῦ οὐδὲ ψυχῆς ἀμοίρου, ὃ ἔκειτο μὲν οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐν τῷ ἀψύχῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον οἷον ἐγγὺς γενόμενον τῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι, καὶ γενομένου οὐκέτι σώματος μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶντος σώματος, καὶ τῇ οἷον γειτονείᾳ καρπωσαμένου τι ἴχνος ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκείνης μέρους, ἀλλ' οἷον θερμασίας τινὸς ἢ ἐλλάμψεως ἐλθούσης, γένεσις ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἀλγηδόνων ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξέφυ· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ γεγενημένου. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκ τοῦ θείου ψυχὴ ἥσυχος ἦν κατὰ τὸ ἦθος τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσα, τὸ δὲ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας τὸ σῶμα θορυβούμενον καὶ ῥέον τε αὐτὸ καὶ πληγαῖς κρουόμενον ταῖς ἔξω, πρῶτον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ζῴου ἐφθέγγετο, καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ταραχὴν ἐδίδου τῷ ὅλῳ. οἷον ἐκκλησίᾳ δημογερόντων καθημένων ἐφ' ἡσύχῳ συννοίᾳ δῆμος ἄτακτος, τροφῆς δεόμενος καὶ ἄλλα ἃ δὴ πάσχει αἰτιώμενος, τὴν πᾶσαν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς θόρυβον ἀσχήμονα ἐμβάλλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ἥκῃ εἰς αὐτοὺς λόγος, κατέστη εἰς τάξιν μετρίαν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ οὐ κεκράτηκε τὸ χεῖρον· εἰ δὲ μή, κρατεῖ τὸ χεῖρον ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος τοῦ βελτίονος, ὅτι μὴ ἠδυνήθη τὸ θορυβοῦν δέξασθαι τὸν ἄνωθεν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι πόλεως καὶ ἐκκλησίας κακία. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου

[1] Plotinus may be thinking here of the Roman Senate: a number of his circle were senators (Porphyry *Life* ch. 7); but it is not clear that there is a reference to any particular episode in Roman history or passage of Latin literature (Henry and Schwyzer suggest Virgil *Aeneid* 1. 148–53).

came to be, which had soul present to it from what [really] exists, and was linked by that soul to all reality, but also had a body which is not empty or without a share in soul, which did not lie in the soulless even before, it drew nearer still, one might say, by its adaptability and became no longer merely a body, but also a living body; and by what one might call its neighbourhood it gained a trace of soul, not a part of it, but something like a heating or illumination coming from it, and the coming-to-be of desires and pleasures and pains grew up in it; but the body of the living thing which has come into being was not alien to it. Now the soul which comes from the divine was quiet, standing in itself according to its character; but the body, in a tumult because of its weakness, flowing away itself and battered by the blows from outside, first itself cried out to the community of the living thing and imparted its disturbance to the whole. It is like when in an assembly the elders of the people sit in quiet consideration,[1] and the disorderly populace, demanding food and complaining of other sufferings, throws the whole assembly into an ugly tumult. Now if people like this keep quiet and a speech from a sensible man gets through to them, the multitude settles to a decent order and the worse has not gained the mastery; but if not, the worse is master and the better keeps quiet, because the tumultuous mob could not receive the word from above, and this is the vice of city and assembly. But this is also the vice of man; he too has

κακία αὖ ἔχόντος δῆμον ἐν αὑτῷ ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων κρατησάντων συνδόντος ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου δήμῳ τῷ τοιούτῳ· ὃς δ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ὄχλον δουλώσηται καὶ ἀναδράμῃ εἰς ἐκεῖνον, ὅς ποτε ἦν, κατ' ἐκεῖνόν τε ζῇ καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος διδοὺς τῷ σώματι, ὅσα δίδωσιν ὡς ἑτέρῳ ὄντι ἑαυτοῦ· ἄλλος δέ τις ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως, ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ζῇ, μικτός τις ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ἑτέρου γεγενημένος.

16. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κακὴ καὶ οὗτος τρόπος ψυχῆς εἰς σῶμα ἰούσης καὶ παρούσης, τίς ἡ κάθοδος ἡ ἐν περιόδοις καὶ ἄνοδος αὖ καὶ αἱ δίκαι καὶ αἱ εἰς ἄλλων ζῴων σώματα εἰσκρίσεις; ταῦτα γὰρ παρὰ τῶν πάλαι περὶ ψυχῆς ἄριστα πεφιλοσοφηκότων παρειλήφαμεν, οἷς πειρᾶσθαι προσήκει σύμφωνον ἢ μὴ διάφωνόν γε ἐπιδεῖξαι τὸν νῦν προκείμενον λόγον. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως ἦν οὐ τὸ ἐλθεῖν ἐκείνην εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἀποστᾶσαν ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τήνδε ἐν ἐκείνῃ γίνεσθαι καὶ μεταλαβεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνοι "ἥκειν" λεκτέον εἶναι τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἐκεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ μεταλαβεῖν ζωῆς καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅλως οὐ τοπικῶς τὸ ἥκειν, ἀλλ' ὅστις τρόπος τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας. ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατελθεῖν τὸ ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, ὡς φαμεν ψυχὴν ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, τὸ τούτῳ δοῦναί τι παρ' αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι, τὸ δ' ἀπελθεῖν τὸ μηδαμῇ τὸ σῶμα

in himself a populace of pleasures and lusts and fears, which gain the mastery when a man of this kind surrenders himself to a populace of this kind; but whoever enslaves this mob, and runs back up to that man he once was, lives according to that man and is that man and gives what he gives to the body as to something other than himself; but someone else lives now this way and now the other; he has become a person mixed from the good self and the evil other.

16. But if that nature could not become evil, and this is the way of soul's coming and presence to the body, what are the descent at fixed periods, and again the ascent, and the judgements, and the entries into the bodies of other animals? For we have received these from those who in ancient times have philosophised best about the soul; and it is proper to try to show that our present discourse is in agreement, or at least not in disagreement, with them.[1] Since, then, participation in that nature was not its coming to this world and abandoning itself, but this our nature's coming to be in that and participating in it, it is clear that the "coming" those ancient philosophers speak of must mean that the nature of body comes to be there and participates in life and soul, and in general is not meant spatially, but indicates whatever the manner of this kind of communion is. So that "descent" means coming to be in body as we say soul comes to be in body, the giving to this body of something from itself, not coming to belong to it, and "departure" means that body in no

[1] A very firm statement of the traditionalism of Plotinus; the ancient philosophers are of course Plato and, secondarily, the Pythagoreans.

ἐπικοινωνεῖν αὐτῆς· τάξιν δὲ εἶναι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας τοῖς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς μέρεσι, τὴν δὲ οἷον ἐν ἐσχάτῳ τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πλεονάκις διδόναι ἑαυτῆς ἅτε πλησίον τῇ δυνάμει οὖσαν καὶ ἐν βραχυτέροις διαστήμασι φύσεως τῆς τοιαύτης νόμῳ· κακὸν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν. διὰ τί; ὅτι, κἂν μὴ τοῦδε ᾖ, ἀλλ' οὖν ψυχὴ τοῦδε λεγομένη ὁπωσοῦν μερική πως ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς γίνεται· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ὅλον καίπερ τοῦ ὅλου οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπιστήμης ὅλης οὔσης κατά τι θεώρημα ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἐνεργεῖ· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἦν τῷ ἐπιστήμονι οὐ κατά τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει. καὶ τοίνυν αὕτη τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα κόσμου νοητοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος ἀποκρύπτουσα οἷον ἐξέθορεν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς εἰς μέρος, εἰς ὃ ἐνεργεῖ ἑαυτὴν μέρος ὄν, οἷον εἰ πῦρ πᾶν καίειν δυνάμενον μικρόν τι καίειν ἀναγκάζοιτο καίτοι πᾶσαν ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς πάντη οὖσα ἑκάστη οὐχ ἑκάστη, ὅταν δὲ διακριθῇ οὐ τόπῳ, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται τὸ καθέκαστον, μοιρά τίς ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶσα, καίτοι καὶ ὡς πᾶσα τρόπον ἄλλον· οὐδενὶ δὲ ἐπιστατοῦσα πάντη πᾶσα, οἷον δυνάμει τότε τὸ μέρος οὖσα. τὸ δὲ εἰς Ἅιδου

way has any community with it; and there is an order of this kind of communion for the parts of this All, but soul, which is as it were on the edge of the intelligible region, often gives them something of itself since it is close to them by its power and the distances are shorter by the law of a nature of this kind; but communion of this kind is an evil [for soul] and release from it a good. Why? Because, even if it does not belong to this particular body, yet when it is said to belong to this body, it in some way or other comes out of its All to be partial; for its activity is no longer directed to the whole although it belongs to the whole, just as if when a whole body of knowledge is there [in his mind] the one who knows is active about a particular subject of study; but the good for the knower himself is not in some particular point of his knowledge but in the whole body of knowledge which he has. And so this soul, which belongs to the whole intelligible universe and hides its part in the whole, leapt out, we might say, from the whole to a part, and actualises itself as a part in it, as if a fire able to burn everything was compelled to burn some little thing although it had all its power. For the soul when it is altogether apart is particular without being particular, but when it is separated – not spatially, but it becomes each particular thing in its activity – it is a part, not the whole, though even so it is in another way the whole; but when it is not in charge of anything it is altogether the whole, and then it is a part, one might say, in potency. But as for going to Hades, if this means in the unseen,[1] it is

[1] The word-play here is clear in Greek, but cannot be rendered in English.

γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται· εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον, τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν, οὗ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν καὶ ἐν ᾧ τόπῳ, κἀκείνη λέγεται ἐκεῖ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι τοῦ σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ, οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον; εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία, καὶ ἀπέλθοι τὸ εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐδενὸς ἐξῃρημένου αὐτῆς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε εἴδωλον γενόμενον οὕτως· ὅταν δ' αὐτὴ οἷον ἐλλάμψῃ πρὸς αὐτήν, τῇ νεύσει τῇ ἐπὶ θάτερα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συνέσταλται καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ οὐδ' αὖ ἀπόλωλεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ταῦτα· πάλιν δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τὸν ἐξαρχῆς λόγον λέγωμεν.

soul's being apart that is spoken of; but if going to some worse place, what is surprising in that? For even now, soul too is said to be there in that place where our body is. But what if the body no longer exists? If the image has not been torn away from it, how can it not be there where the image is[1]? But if philosophy has freed it completely, the image then too goes to the worse place alone, but the soul itself is purely in the intelligible without losing anything of itself. This is how it is with an image produced by this sort of process; but when the soul itself so to speak shines upon itself, by its inclination to the other [higher] side it is concentrated upon the whole, and it neither exists actually nor, again, does it perish. But this is enough about these matters: let us now take up the original discussion.

[1] For the relationship of soul and image or shade, illustrated by what is said about Heracles and his shade in *Odyssey* 11. 601–3, cp. I. 1.12 and IV. 3. 32–4. 1.

VI. 5. (23) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΟΝ ΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΟΝ ΑΜΑ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΛΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι κοινὴ μέν τις ἔννοιά φησιν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν θεὸν ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοὺς τὸν τρόπον μὴ ἀπαιτοῖ μηδὲ λόγῳ ἐξετάζειν τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν ἐθέλοι, οὕτως ἂν καὶ θεῖντο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες τοῦτο τῇ διανοίᾳ οὕτως ἀναπαύοιντο εἰς ἕν πως συνερείδοντες καὶ ταὐτόν, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ταύτης τῆς ἑνότητος ἀποσχίζεσθαι. καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, μὴ ἐκ τῶν καθέκαστα συγκεφαλαιωθεῖσα, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστα πάντων προελθοῦσα καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνης τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ὀρέγεσθαι τιθεμένης τε καὶ λεγούσης. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὕτη ἀληθὲς εἴη, εἰ τὰ πάντα εἰς ἓν σπεύδοι καὶ ἓν εἴη, καὶ τούτου ἡ ὄρεξις εἴη. τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο προϊὸν μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα, ἐφ' ὅσον

[1] This is one of Plotinus' rare appeals to the common experience of mankind as a good starting-point for a philosophical investigation (III. 7. 1 may be compared, though "we" there probably means "philosophers" rather

VI. 5. ON THE PRESENCE OF BEING, ONE AND THE SAME, EVERYWHERE AS A WHOLE II

1. A general opinion affirms that what is one and the same in number is everywhere present as a whole, when all men are naturally and spontaneously moved to speak of the god who is in each one of us one and the same.[1] And if someone did not ask them how this is and want to examine their opinion rationally, this is what they would assume, and with this active and actual in their thinking they would come to rest in this way somehow supporting themselves on what is one and the same, and they would not wish to be cut away from this unity. And this is the firmest principle of all, which our souls cry out, as it were, not summed up from individual instances, but preceding all the individuals and coming before that principle which lays down and says that all things desire the good. For this latter would be true if all things press on to the one and are one, and their desire is of this. For this one, proceeding to the others as far as, and in the way in which, it can

than "mankind in general"). The way in which he expresses this general consent may remind us of how much the centuries of Christianity and anti-Christianity have changed the common thinking of our own world. What he says here would probably still be true in India.

προελθεῖν αὐτῷ οἷόν τε, πολλὰ ἂν φανείη τε καί πως καὶ εἴη, ἡ δ' ἀρχαία φύσις καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, εἰς ἓν ὄντως ἄγει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο σπεύδει πᾶσα φύσις, ἐφ' ἑαυτήν. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ μιᾷ ταύτῃ φύσει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ εἶναι αὐτήν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μίαν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς εἶναι λέγεται οἰκεῖον· διὸ οὐδὲ ἔξω ζητεῖν αὐτὸ δεῖ. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος περιπεπτωκός; ἢ πῶς ἄν τις ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐξεύροι αὐτό; ἀλλὰ δηλονότι ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ὂν αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὲ ὂν καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη ἑκάστῳ. οὐκ ἀπέστημεν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐσμὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῶν· ἓν ἄρα πάντα τὰ ὄντα.

2. Λόγος δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας ἐξέτασιν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ λεγομένου οὐχ ἕν τι ὄν, ἀλλά τι μεμερισμένον, παραλαμβάνων τε εἰς τὴν ζήτησιν τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τὰς ἀρχὰς λαμβάνων ἐμέρισέ τε τὴν οὐσίαν τοιαύτην εἶναι νομίσας, καὶ τῇ ἑνότητι ἠπίστησεν αὐτῆς ἅτε μὴ ἐξ ἀρχῶν τῶν οἰκείων τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ζητήσεως πεποιημένος. ἡμῖν δὲ ληπτέον εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πάντη ὄντος λόγον οἰκείας εἰς πίστιν ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ νοητὰς νοητῶν καὶ τῆς ἀληθινῆς οὐσίας ἐχομένας. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ μέν ἐστι πεφορημένον καὶ παντοίας δεχόμενον μεταβολὰς καὶ εἰς πάντα τόπον ⟨ἀεὶ⟩[1] διειλημμένον, ὃ δὴ γένεσιν ἂν προσήκοι ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίαν, τὸ δὲ ὂν ἀεὶ

[1] Igal, H–S².

proceed, would appear as many and even, in a sense, be many; but the ancient nature and the desire of the good, that is of itself, leads to what is really one, and every nature presses on to this, to itself. For this is the good to this one nature, belonging to itself and being itself: but this is being one. It is in this sense that the good is rightly said to be our own; therefore one must not seek it outside. For where could it be if it had fallen outside being? Or how could one discover it in non-being? But it is obvious that it is in being, since it is not non-being. But if that good is being and in being, it would clearly be for each individual in himself. We have not, then, departed from being, but are in it, nor has it departed from us: so all things are one.[1]

2. But the reason which tried to make the investigation of what we are talking about, since it is not one thing but something divided and brings along to its enquiry the nature of bodies and takes its principles from them, both divided substance, thinking that it was of this [bodily] kind, and disbelieved in its unity, because it did not take the starting-point of its enquiry from the principles proper to substance. But we must take for our reasoning about the one and altogether existent principles which, being proper to it, will lead to conviction: that is, intelligible principles of intelligibles and those which belong to true substance. For since one [nature] is carried about and accepts every kind of change and is continually divided into every place, which it would be appropriate to call becoming, not substance, but the other

[1] On this passage and ch. 4, 17–24 see *Introductory Note*, pp. 270–271.

[διειλημμένον][1] ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον, οὔτε γινόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον οὐδέ τινα χώραν οὐδὲ τόπον οὐδέ τινα ἕδραν ἔχον οὐδ' ἐξιόν ποθεν οὐδ' αὖ εἰσιὸν εἰς ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ μένον, περὶ μὲν ἐκείνων λέγων ἄν τις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀξιουμένων συλλογίζοιτο ἂν εἰκότως δι' εἰκότων εἰκότας καὶ τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ποιούμενος. ὅταν δ' αὖ τοὺς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν λόγους τις ποιῆται, λαμβάνων τὴν τῆς οὐσίας φύσιν περὶ ἧς πραγματεύεται τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων δικαίως ἂν ποιοῖτο μὴ παρεκβαίνων ὥσπερ ἐπιλελησμένος ἐπ' ἄλλην φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἐκείνης περὶ αὐτῆς τὴν κατανόησιν ποιούμενος, ἐπειδὴ πανταχοῦ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀρχή, καὶ τοῖς καλῶς ὁρισαμένοις λέγεται καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ πολλὰ γινώσκεσθαι· οἷς δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις ἔχεσθαι δεῖ τούτου, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο πάντα ἀνενεκτέον.

3. Εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν ὄντως τοῦτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ γένεσις περὶ αὐτὸ οὐδεμία οὐδ' ἐν τόπῳ ἐλέγετο εἶναι, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ οὕτως ἔχον ἀεί τε σὺν αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διεστάναι ἀφ' αὑτοῦ μηδὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν ὧδί, τὸ δὲ ὧδὶ εἶναι, μηδὲ προϊέναι τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ εἴη, καὶ ὅλως ἕν

[1] del. Harder.

[nature] is being, always in exactly the same state, neither coming to be nor perishing nor having any space or place or base, nor going out from anywhere nor entering into anything, but remaining in itself, when one was speaking about those things [of the lower world] one would reason logically from that nature and from what is held to be true about it and, reasoning probably by means of probable principles, would frame syllogisms which are also [only] probable. But when, on the other hand, one engages in reasonings about the intelligibles, the right way would be to take the nature of substance about which one is concerned and so establish the principles of one's reasonings, without passing over, as if one had forgotten, to the other nature, but applying one's mind to that intelligible nature by means of itself; since everywhere the "what it is" is the starting-point, and it is said that those who have defined well know most of the incidental accompaniments; but in things where everything is included in the "what it is", one must much more hold fast to this and look to this and refer everything to this.[1]

3. Now if this is real being and remains the same and does not depart from itself and there is no coming-to-be about it and, as was said, it is not in place, it is necessary for it, being in this state, to be always with itself, and not to stand away from itself; one part of it cannot be here and another there, nor can anything come out of it; [for if it did] it would already be in different places, and, in general, would

[1] Plotinus is here developing an Aristotelian thought in a Platonic manner: cp. Aristotle on Socrates, *Metaphysics* M 4, 1078b24–25.

τινι εἴη, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδ' ἀπαθές· πάθοι γὰρ ἄν,
εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ· εἰ δ' ἐν ἀπαθεῖ ἔσται, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. εἰ οὖν μὴ
ἀποστὰν ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ μερισθὲν μηδὲ μεταβάλλον αὐτὸ
μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ἐν πολλοῖς ἅμα εἴη ἓν ὅλον ἅμα
ἑαυτῷ ὄν, τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς
εἶναι ἂν ἔχοι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὂν μὴ αὖ ἐφ'
ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι. λείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν οὐδενὶ
εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐκείνου μεταλαμβάνειν, ὅσα δύναται
αὐτῷ παρεῖναι, καὶ καθόσον ἐστὶ δυνατὰ αὐτῷ
παρεῖναι. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἢ τὰς ὑποθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
ἐκείνας ἀναιρεῖν μηδεμίαν εἶναι τοιαύτην φύσιν
λέγοντας ἤ, εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀδύνατον καὶ ἔστιν
ἐξανάγκης τοιαύτη φύσις καὶ οὐσία, παραδέχεσθαι τὸ
ἐξαρχῆς, τὸ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ μὴ μεμερισμένον,
ἀλλὰ ὅλον ὄν, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρ' αὐτὸ μηδενὸς
ἀποστατεῖν, οὐδὲν τοῦ χεῖσθαι δεηθὲν οὐδὲ τῷ μοίρας
τινὰς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐλθεῖν μηδ' αὖ τῷ αὐτὸ μὲν μεῖναι ἐν
αὑτῷ ὅλον, ἄλλο δέ τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονὸς καταλελοιπὸς
αὐτὸ ἥκειν εἰς τὰ ἄλλα πολλαχῇ. ἔσται τε γὰρ οὕτως τὸ
μὲν ἄλλοθι, τὸ δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἄλλοθι, καὶ τόπον ἕξει
διεστηκὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων αὖ, εἰ
ἕκαστον ὅλον ἢ μέρος—καὶ εἰ μὲν μέρος, οὐ τὴν τοῦ
ὅλου ἀποσώσει φύσιν, ὅπερ δὴ εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ ὅλον
ἕκαστον, ἢ ἕκαστον μεριοῦμεν ἴσα μέρη τῷ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν ἢ
ταὐτὸν ὅλον πανταχοῦ συγχωρήσομεν δύνασθαι εἶναι.

be in something and not on its own or unaffected; for it would be affected if it was in something else; but if it is going to be in a state of freedom from affection, it will not be in something else. If, therefore, without departing from itself or being divided into parts or itself undergoing any change, it is in many things at once, existing at the same time as one whole with itself, then, being the same everywhere, it will have an existence in many things: but this is being on its own and, again, not being on its own. It remains, then, to say that it is itself in nothing, but the other things participate in it, all those which are able to be present to it and in so far as they are able to be present to it. We must then either do away with these hypotheses and principles and say that there is no nature of this kind; or, if this is impossible and there is of necessity a nature and substance of this kind, we must accept what we have been saying from the beginning, that the one and the same in number which is not divided but exists as a whole does not depart from any of the things which exist beside it, with no need of any diffusion either by some portions coming from it or, alternatively, by its remaining as a whole in itself but something else generated from it leaving it and coming to the others in many ways. For in this way it will be in one place and what comes from it in another, and it will have a place separated from what comes from it. And again with the things which come from it, if each is a part or a whole – if it is a part it will not preserve the nature of the whole, as has been said already; but if each is a whole, we shall either divide each one into parts equal to that in which it is, or we shall agree that the same can be everywhere present as a whole. This,

οὗτος δὴ ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας.

4. Ἰδὲ δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τόνδε· τὸν θεὸν οὐ πῇ μὲν εἶναι, πῇ δ' οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀξιούμενόν τε παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἔννοιαν ἔχουσι θεῶν οὐ μόνον περὶ ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πάντων λέγειν θεῶν, ὡς πανταχοῦ πάρεισι, καὶ ὁ λόγος δέ φησι δεῖν οὕτω τίθεσθαι. εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ, οὐχ οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος τὸ μὲν ὠδί, τὸ δὲ ὠδὶ ἔσται, αὐτός τε οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλά, ἀπολλύμενόν τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα οὐκέτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα ἔσται. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν αὖ ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον ἐν πάσῃ φύσει ἀνθρώπου ὁμοῦ τῷ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι. πάλιν δέ, εἰ ἄπειρον λέγομεν ἐκείνην τὴν φύσιν—οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεπερασμένην—τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη, ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιλείψει; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιλείψει, ὅτι πάρεστιν ἑκάστῳ; εἰ γὰρ μὴ δύναιτο παρεῖναι, ἐπιλείψει τε καὶ ἔσται ὅπου οὔ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ λέγοιμεν ἄλλο μετ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὁμοῦ αὖ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ περὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ αὐτοῦ οἷον γέννημα συναφὲς ἐκείνῳ, ὥστε τὸ μετέχον τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ κἀκείνου μετειληφέναι. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ,

certainly, is an argument derived from the thing itself and its substance, dragging in nothing alien or derived from the other nature.

4. But, please, look at this argument also: we deny that God is in one place but not in another. For it is accepted among all who have a notion of gods that one says, not only about that [supreme God] but about all gods, that they are present everywhere, and the argument says that this must be assumed. If then God is everywhere, it is not possible that he should be divided; for then he would not still be everywhere, but each part of him would be one here and another there, and he would not still be one, as, if one cuts a magnitude into many parts, it will be destroyed and all the parts will no longer be that whole; and besides, he will be a body. But if all this is impossible, then again what is disbelieved in has reappeared; in every human nature believing in God goes with believing that the same thing is everywhere as a whole. And again, if we say that that [divine] nature is unbounded – it certainly is not limited – what could this mean other than that he will not fall short? But if he is not going to fall short, does this mean that he is present to each and every thing? Yes, for if he should not be able to be present, he will fall short and there will be somewhere he is not. For even if we may be talking about something else after the One itself, this again will be together with the One itself and what is after it will be around that One and directed to that One and like something generated from it in close touch with it, so that what participates in what comes after it has also participated in that One. For, since there are many things in the intelligible, firsts and seconds and

πρώτων τε καὶ δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων, καὶ οἷον σφαίρας μιᾶς εἰς ἓν κέντρον ἀνημμένων, οὐ διαστήμασι διειλημμένων, ἀλλ' ὄντων ὁμοῦ αὐτοῖς ἁπάντων, ὅπου ἂν παρῇ τὰ τρίτα, καὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τὰ πρῶτα πάρεστι.

5. Καὶ σαφηνείας μὲν ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος πολλάκις οἷον ἐκ κέντρου ἑνὸς πολλὰς γραμμὰς ποιήσας εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ γενομένου ἐθέλει ἄγειν. δεῖ δὲ τηροῦντας ὁμοῦ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα πολλὰ γεγονέναι λέγειν, ὡς κἀκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου οὐκ οὔσας γραμμὰς ἀφωρισμένας ἔστι λαμβάνειν· ἐπίπεδον γὰρ ἕν. οὗ δὲ οὐδὲ κατ' ἐπίπεδον ἓν διάστημά τι, ἀλλ' ἀδιάστατοι δυνάμεις καὶ οὐσίαι, πάντα ἂν εἰκότως κατὰ κέντρα λέγοιτο ἐν ἑνὶ ὁμοῦ κέντρῳ ἡνωμένα, οἷον ἀφέντα τὰς γραμμὰς τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν τὰ πρὸς τῷ κέντρῳ κείμενα, ὅτε δὴ καὶ ἓν ἐστι πάντα. πάλιν δέ, εἰ προσθείης τὰς γραμμάς, αἱ μὲν ἐξάψονται τῶν κέντρων αὐτῶν ἃ κατέλιπον ἑκάστη, ἔσται γε μὴν οὐδὲν ἧττον κέντρον ἕκαστον οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον τοῦ ἑνὸς πρώτου κέντρου, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ὄντα ἐκείνῳ ἕκαστον αὖ εἶναι, καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσαι αἱ γραμμαὶ αἷς ἔδοσαν αὐτὰ πέρατα εἶναι ἐκείνων, ὥστε ὅσων μὲν ἐφάπτεται γραμμῶν τοσαῦτα φανῆναι, ἓν δὲ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐκεῖνα εἶναι. εἰ δ' οὖν κέντροις πολλοῖς ἀπεικάσαμεν πάντα τὰ νοητὰ [εἶναι] [1] εἰς ἓν κέντρον ἀναφερομένοις καὶ ἑνουμένοις, πολλὰ δὲ φανεῖσι διὰ τὰς γραμμὰς οὐ τῶν γραμμῶν γεννησασῶν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ δειξασῶν, αἱ γραμμαὶ παρεχέτωσαν ἡμῖν χρείαν ἐν τῷ

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

thirds, and they are linked like one sphere to its one centre, not disparted by distances, but all existing together with themselves, wherever the thirds are present, the seconds and firsts are present as well.[1]

5. And for the sake of clarity our discourse often, by making, as it were, many lines proceed from one centre, wants to lead to a notion of the multiplicity which has come to be. But one must bear in mind when one says this that the things which are said to become many are all together at once, just as there in the example of the circle one cannot take the lines as being separated: for it is one surface. But where there is not even any spacing out on one surface, but only unspaced powers and substances, all may reasonably be spoken of in terms of their centres all united in one centre, as if their ends located in the centre dropped their lines, and then certainly all are one. But again, if you put the lines on, they are attached to their centres which each of them leaves, and none the less each and every centre will not be cut off from that one first centre, but they will be all together with that and each, again, individual, and they will be as many as the lines to which they gave themselves to be their ends, so that they appear to be as many as the lines with which they are in contact, but all of them are one together. But if we likened all the intelligibles to many centres all going back to and united in one centre, but appearing as many because of their lines – the lines do not generate them but show them – the lines might serve our purpose at present by providing an analogy to the

[1] On this passage see *Introductory Note*, pp. 270–271.

παρόντι ἀνάλογον εἶναι ὧν ἐφαπτομένη ἡ νοητὴ φύσις πολλὰ καὶ πολλαχῇ φαίνεται παρεῖναι.

6. Πολλὰ γὰρ ὄντα τὰ νοητὰ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἓν ὄντα τῇ ἀπείρῳ φύσει πολλά ἐστι, καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ μέρος αὖ μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου. δέχεται δὲ τὸ μέρος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ὡς μέρους πρῶτον ἐνέργημα, ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τὸ ὅλον· οἷον εἰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐλθὼν εἰς τόν τινα ἄνθρωπον τὶς ἄνθρωπος γίνοιτο ὢν αὖ ἄνθρωπος. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἀφ' ἑνὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν πολλοὺς ἐποίησε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν πολλοῖς οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν τι οἷον ἐνσφραγιζόμενον ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτό. αὐτὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ αὐτοέκαστον [1] καὶ ὅλον τὸ πᾶν οὐχ οὕτως ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτό. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστου ἐν παντὶ μέρει τοῦ σώματος ἡ αὐτή· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ.

7. Ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἀναβαίνομέν τε εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἐκεῖνα οὐκ εἴδωλα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τύπους ἔχοντες. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ὄντες ἐκεῖνα. εἰ οὖν ἀληθινῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχομεν, ἐκεῖνά ἐσμεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντες. ὄντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μόνον ἡμῶν, ἐκεῖνα, πάντες ἐσμὲν ἐκεῖνα. ὁμοῦ ἄρα ὄντες μετὰ πάντων ἐσμὲν

[1] H-S²: αὐτὸ ἕκαστον Enn.

things by contact with which the intelligible nature appears to be present as many and in many places.[1]

6. For the intelligibles are many and they are one, and, being one, they are many by their unbounded nature, and many in one and one over many and all together, and they are active towards the whole with the whole, and active towards the part again with the whole. But the part receives into itself the first activity as that of a part, but the whole follows; as if [the Form of] Man came to a particular man and became a particular man though being on the other hand [the Form of] Man. For the man in the matter made from the one man according to the Idea many men, all the same, and the same thing is one in the many in a way like that in which there is one seal-imprint in many things. But the thing itself, Man, and each thing itself, and the [intelligible] All as a whole are not in many in this way, but the many are in the thing itself, or rather around it. For there is a difference between the way in which the white is everywhere and that in which the soul of each individual is in every part of the body the same; for this latter is the way in which being is everywhere.

7. For we and what is ours go back to real being and ascend to that and to the first which comes from it, and we think the intelligibles; we do not have images or imprints of them. But if we do not, we are the intelligibles. If then we have a part in true knowledge, we are those; we do not apprehend them as distinct within ourselves, but we are within them. For, since the others, and not only ourselves, are those, we are all those. So then, being together with

[1] For the very important image of the circle and its radii in Plotinus see also, e.g., I. 7.1; V. 1.11; VI. 9.8.

ἐκεῖνα· πάντα ἄρα ἐσμὲν ἕν. ἔξω μὲν οὖν ὁρῶντες ἢ ὅθεν ἐξήμμεθα ἀγνοοῦμεν ἓν ὄντες, οἷον πρόσωπα [πολλὰ] [1] εἰς τὸ ἔξω πολλά,[2] κορυφὴν ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ εἴσω μίαν. εἰ δέ τις ἐπιστραφῆναι δύναιτο ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς αὐτῆς εὐτυχήσας τῆς ἕλξεως, θεόν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὄψεται· ὄψεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οὐχ ὡς τὸ πᾶν, εἶτ' οὐκ ἔχων ὅπῃ αὐτὸν στήσας ὁριεῖ καὶ μέχρι τίνος αὐτός ἐστιν, ἀφεὶς περιγράφειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἅπαντος αὐτὸν εἰς ἅπαν τὸ πᾶν ἥξει προελθὼν οὐδαμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ μείνας, οὗ ἵδρυται τὸ πᾶν.

8. Οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ εἴ τις ἐπισκέψαιτο τὴν τῆς ὕλης τῶν εἰδῶν μετάληψιν, μᾶλλον ἂν εἰς πίστιν ἐλθεῖν τοῦ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ ἂν ἔτι ὡς ἀδυνάτῳ ἀπιστεῖν ἢ αὖ ἀπορεῖν. εὔλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, οἶμαι, μὴ κειμένων τῶν εἰδῶν χωρὶς καὶ αὖ τῆς ὕλης πόρρωθεν ἄνωθέν ποθεν τὴν ἔλλαμψιν εἰς αὐτὴν γεγονέναι· μὴ γὰρ ἦ κενὸν τοῦτο λεγόμενον· τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ "πόρρω" ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ "χωρίς"; καὶ οὐκ αὖ τὸ δύσφραστον καὶ τὸ ἀπορώτατον ἦν τὸ τῆς μεταλήψεως λεγόμενον, ἀλλ' εἴρητο ἂν προχειρότατα γνώριμον ὂν τοῖς παραδείγμασιν. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἔλλαμψιν λέγωμέν ποτε, οὐχ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν λέγομεν εἰς αἰσθητὸν τὰς ἐλλάμψεις· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ εἴδωλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ,

[1] del. H–S[2].
[2] del. Kirchhoff.

[1] This is the clearest explanation in the *Enneads* of Plotinus' statement, which so much annoyed later Neoplatonists, that we are "each of us an intelligible

all things, we are those: so then, we are all and one.[1] So therefore when we look outside that on which we depend we do not know that we are one, like faces which are many on the outside but have one head inside. But if someone is able to turn around, either by himself or having the good luck to have his hair pulled by Athene herself,[2] he will see God and himself and the All; at first he will not see as the All but then, when he has nowhere to set himself and limit himself and determine how far he himself goes, he will stop marking himself off from all being and will come to all the All without going out anywhere, but remaining there where the All is set firm.

8. But I for my part think that also, if one were to consider the participation of matter in the Forms, one would be more inclined to have confidence in what is being said and not to disbelieve it as impossible or continue to be puzzled about it. For, I think, it is probable, and indeed necessary, that the ideas are not placed separately on one side and matter a long way off on the other and then illumination comes to matter from somewhere up there: I am afraid this would be empty words. For what would "far off" and "separately" mean in this context? And again, the business of participation would not be said to be hard to express and extremely perplexing, but the explanation would be extremely accessible and well known from the examples. But even if we do sometimes speak of illumination we do not mean it in the sense in which we speak of illuminations of a sense-object in the realm of sense; but, since the

universe" (III. 4.3. 22; cp. IV. 7.10. 34–36) and shows how literally it is to be taken.

[2] Like Achilles, *Iliad* I. 197–8.

ἀρχετύπων δὲ τάξιν ἔχει τὰ εἴδη, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐλλάμψεως τοιοῦτον οἷον χωρὶς ἔχειν τὸ ἐλλαμπόμενον, οὕτω λέγομεν. δεῖ δὲ νῦν ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντας μὴ οὕτω τίθεσθαι ὡς χωρὶς ὄντος τόπῳ τοῦ εἴδους εἶθ' ὥσπερ ἐν ὕδατι ἐνορᾶσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὴν ἰδέαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην [εἶναι] [1] πανταχόθεν οἷον ἐφαπτομένην καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἐφαπτομένην τῆς ἰδέας κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτῆς ἴσχειν παρὰ τοῦ εἴδους τῷ πλησιασμῷ ὅσον δύνατωι λαβεῖν οὐδενὸς μεταξὺ ὄντος, οὐ τῆς ἰδέας διὰ πάσης διεξελθούσης καὶ ἐπιδραμούσης, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ μενούσης. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστὶν οἷον πυρὸς ἡ ἰδέα—τὴν γὰρ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὕλην ὑποβεβλημένην ὁ λόγος λαμβανέτω—αὐτὸ δὴ πῦρ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐκ ἐγγενόμενον αὐτὸ [τῇ ὕλῃ] [2] μορφὴν πυρὸς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν πυρωθεῖσαν ὕλην παρέξεται. ὄγκος δὲ πολὺς πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον ἔνυλον ὑποκείσθω γενόμενον· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων ἁρμόσει. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο πῦρ ᾗ [3] ἰδέα ἐν πᾶσι θεωρεῖται παρέχον εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ ⟨οὐ⟩ [4] κατὰ [5] ⟨τὸ⟩ [4] τόπῳ χωρὶς ὂν οὐ παρέξει ὡς ἡ ἔλλαμψις ἡ ὁρωμένη· ἤδη γὰρ εἴη που πᾶν ⟨ὅπου ἂν⟩ [6] τοῦτο τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἐν αἰσθήσει, εἰ πᾶν αὐτὸ πολλὰ ᾗ [7] ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς μενούσης ἐν ἀτόπῳ αὐτὸ τόπους γεννῆσαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐπείπερ ἔδει τὸ αὐτὸ πολὺ γενόμενον φυγεῖν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἵν' ᾗ πολὺ οὕτως καὶ πολλάκις μεταλάβῃ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκε μὲν ἑαυτῆς οὐδὲν τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ

[1] del. Vitringa, Müller.
[2] del. H–S.
[3] Igal, H–S²: ἡ Enn.
[4] Igal.
[5] Igal: καὶ Enn., H–S.
[6] πᾶν ⟨ὅπου ἂν⟩ Igal: πᾶν Enn., H–S ("29–33 καὶ—αὐτοῦ locus nondum sanatus" H–S).
[7] wEBUCz: ἡ x: εἴη Kirchhoff: ᾗ H–S¹.

things in matter are images, and the Forms hold the rank of archetypes, and illumination is such that it keeps the illuminated object separate, we use the word in this sense. But now we must speak more precisely and not assume that the Form is spatially separate and then the Idea is reflected in matter as if in water, but that matter, from every side grasping (and again not grasping) the Idea, receives from the Form, over the whole of itself, by its drawing near to it all that it can receive, with nothing between; the Idea does not pass through and run over the whole of matter, but remains in itself. For if the Idea of Fire, for instance, is not in matter – let our discourse take the matter underlying the elements as an example – the fire itself which does not come to be in matter will give the character of fire to all the matter made fiery. (Let it be assumed that the first fire in matter comes to be a large bulk.) For the same argument will fit the other elements as they are called. If therefore that one fire in that it is the Idea is seen in all [the fires] giving an image of itself not in the way that it would if it was spatially separate, it will not give its image as the visible illumination does; for it would already be all wherever this fire in the sense-world is,[1] if [that one fire] was itself many as all, since, while the Idea itself of itself remained in the placeless, it would generate places out of itself if it was necessary for the same, having become many, to escape from itself that there might be many in this way and participate often in the same. And the Idea, not being scattered [like this], gave nothing of itself

[1] I adopt Igal's text and interpretation in this very difficult passage.

ἰδέα ἀσκέδαστος οὖσα, οὐ μὴν ἀδύνατος γέγονεν ἓν οὖσα τὸ μὴ ἓν τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτῆς μορφῶσαι καὶ παντὶ αὐτοῦ οὕτω τοι παρεῖναι, ὡς ⟨μὴ⟩ [1] ἄλλῳ μὲν μέρει αὐτῆς τόδε, ἄλλῳ δὲ ἄλλο μορφῶσαι, ἀλλὰ παντὶ ἕκαστον καὶ πᾶν. γελοῖον γὰρ τὸ πολλὰς ἰδέας πυρὸς ἐπεισφέρειν, ἵν' ἕκαστον πῦρ ὑφ' ἑκάστης ἄλλης, τὸ δὲ ἄλλης, μορφοῖτο· ἄπειροι γὰρ οὕτως ἔσονται αἱ ἰδέαι. εἶτα πῶς καὶ μεριεῖς τὰ γινόμενα συνεχοῦς ἑνὸς πυρὸς ὄντος; καὶ εἰ προσθείημεν τῇ ὕλῃ ταύτῃ ἄλλο πῦρ μεῖζον ποιήσαντες αὐτό, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ μέρος τῆς ὕλης φατέον τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν τὰ αὐτὰ εἰργάσθαι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλην.

9. Καὶ τοίνυν εἰ πάντα γενόμενα ἤδη τὰ στοιχεῖα τῷ λόγῳ τις εἰς ἓν σφαιρικὸν σχῆμα ἄγοι, οὐ πολλοὺς φατέον τὴν σφαῖραν ποιεῖν κατὰ μέρη ἄλλον ἄλλῃ ἀποτεμνόμενον αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μέρος, ἀλλ' ἓν εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ποιήσεως ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ποιοῦν οὐ μέρους αὐτοῦ ἄλλου ἄλλο ποιοῦντος· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν πολλοὶ εἶεν, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἓν ἀμερὲς ἀναφέροις τὴν ποίησιν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ ἓν ἀμερὲς τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν σφαῖραν εἴη οὐκ αὐτοῦ χυθέντος εἰς τὴν σφαῖραν τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τῆς

[1] Kirchhoff.

[1] Plotinus, like practically all ancient Platonists except his friend and colleague Amelius, maintained firmly that the number of the Ideas was finite; for Amelius' view that they were infinite in number see Syrianus *In Met.* 147. 2–6. For the bearing of this passage on the much-disputed question about Ideas of individuals in Plotinus see, in the

to the matter, but was certainly not incapable, being one thing, of forming what is not one by its one and being present to all of it in the way that it is not this piece of it which forms one part and that other another, but it forms each part with the whole of it and as a whole. For it would be absurd to introduce many Ideas of fire in order that each individual fire might be formed by a different one; for in this way the Ideas will be infinite in number.[1] And then how are you going to divide up the fires which have come into existence if there is one continuous fire? And if we were to apply another fire to this matter by making the fire bigger, we must say that again in this part of matter the same Idea is doing the same things: for it certainly could not be another one.

9. And further, if, when all the elements had come into existence, someone brought them in thought into one spherical figure, one would have to say that it was not many makers who made the sphere part by part, one cutting off a piece for himself in one place and one in another to make a part with, but that the cause of the making was one, making with the whole of itself, not one part of it making one part and one another; for in this way again the makers would be many, if you do not bring the making back to one partless thing, or, to put it better, unless it is one partless thing which makes the sphere, without the maker being diffused through the sphere,[2] but with

first instance, my "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" (*Dionysius* I, 1977, 49–68 = *Plotinian and Christian Studies* XX), where references are given to other literature.

[2] An allusion to the Stoic doctrine of "complete transfusion", which Plotinus discusses fully in II. 7.

σφαίρας ὅλης εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν ἀνηρτημένης. καὶ ζωὴ τοίνυν μία τὴν σφαῖραν ἔχει ἡ αὐτή, τῆς σφαίρας αὐτῆς τεθείσης ἐν ζωῇ μιᾷ· καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοίνυν πάντα εἰς μίαν ζωήν· καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ τοίνυν μία, οὕτω δὲ μία, ὡς ἄπειρος αὖ. διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀριθμὸν ἔλεγον, οἱ δὲ ⟨λόγον⟩[1] αὐτὸν αὔξοντα τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς, φαντασθέντες ταύτῃ ἴσως, ὡς οὐδενὶ ἐπιλείπει, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντα εἶσιν ὅ ἐστι μένουσα, καὶ εἰ πλείων ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπέλιπεν ἡ δύναμις μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα αὖ ἐλθεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτον ἐν πάσῃ αὐτῇ εἶναι. δεῖ δῆτα λαβεῖν τὸ "αὔξων"[2] οὐχ ὡς τῷ ῥήματι λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιλείπει εἰς τὸ πανταχοῦ ἓν οὖσα· τοιοῦτον γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ ἓν ὡς μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον μεμετρῆσθαι ὅσον· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσεως ἄλλης τῆς τὸ ἓν ψευδομένης καὶ μεταλήψει ἓν φανταζομένης. τὸ δ' ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον ἓν οἷον μήτε συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, ἵν' ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀπολωλὸς ᾖ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον ἕν, μήτε διειλῆφθαι πέρασιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐναρμοζομένων αὐτῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἐλαττοῖτο αὐτῶν μειζόνων ὄντων ἢ διασπῷτο βουλόμενον ἐπὶ πάντα ἰέναι, παρῇ τε οὐχ ὅλον πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐκείνων· καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖ ὅπου ἐστὶ γῆς εἰς μίαν τινὰ συντέλειαν οὐ δυνάμενον ἰέναι ἅτε διεσπασμένον ἑαυτοῦ. εἴπερ οὖν

[1] Roussos.
[2] Roussos: *αὖξον* Enn.

the whole sphere dependent on the maker. And so one and the same life holds the sphere, and the sphere itself is set in one life; and so all things in the sphere depend on one life; and so all the souls are one, but so one that it is also an unbounded soul. This is the reason why some people called it a "number" and some said that its nature was "a rational principle augmenting itself",[1] perhaps imagining it in this way, that it does not fail anything, but, remaining what it is, reaches to everything, and if the universe was larger its power would not fail to reach again to everything, or rather this universe would be in the whole of it. One must then not take the "augmenting" literally, but [understand that it means] that it does not fail in being everywhere one: for its one is of such a kind as not to be the kind of thing the size of which can be measured: for this belongs to another nature which feigns the one and is imagined as one by its participation. But the one which possesses truth is the kind which is not a one composed from many, so that if something was taken away from it the whole one would be destroyed, nor divided by boundaries, so that when other things fit themselves into it it would be diminished because they are too big for it, or torn apart because it wants to reach all, and would not be present as a whole to all, but with parts of itself to parts of those things; as the saying goes, it does not know where on earth it is since it is not able to come into one perfect whole because it is torn apart from itself. If therefore this one is going to be truly one,

[1] The allusions are to Xenocrates (fr. 60 Heinze) and Heraclitus (fr. B 115 DK).

ἀληθεύσει τὸ ἓν τοῦτο, καθ' οὗ δὴ καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐστιν ὡς οὐσίας τὸ ἕν, δεῖ αὐτὸ φανῆναι τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αὐτῷ φύσιν ἔχον τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἔξωθεν αὖ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦτο ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τούτῳ ἓν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἔχειν τὸ εἶναι ἄπειρόν τε καὶ πλῆθος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὂν πανταχοῦ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι ἕνα λόγον ὄντα ἑαυτὸν περιέχοντα, καὶ τὸν περιέχοντα αὐτὸν εἶναι [καὶ τὸν περιέχοντα αὐτὸν] [1] οὐδαμοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀποστατοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ πανταχοῦ ὄντα. οὐ δή ἐστιν αὐτὸ οὕτω ἄλλου τόπῳ διειλημμένον· πρὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων ἦν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐδεῖτο αὐτὸ τούτων, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνου, ἵνα ἱδρυθῇ. ἱδρυθέντα δὲ οὐκ ἀπέστησεν ἐκεῖνο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕδρας· κινηθείσης γὰρ ἐκείνης ἀπώλετο ἂν αὐτὰ ἀπολομένης αὐτῶν τῆς βάσεως καὶ τοῦ στηρίζοντος αὐτά, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἀνόητον ἦν, ὥστε ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ διασπασθῆναι καὶ σῳζόμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀπίστῳ δοῦναι ἑαυτὸ τόπῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ σῴζεσθαι δεομένῳ.

10. Μένει οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σωφρονοῦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ γένοιτο· ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνήρτηται εἰς αὐτὸ ὥσπερ οὗ ἐστι πόθῳ ἐξευρόντα. καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θυραυλῶν Ἔρως παρὼν ἔξωθεν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐφιέμενος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαπῶν εἰ [2] οὕτως [ὡς] [3] δύναιτο μετασχεῖν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ἐραστὴς οὐ δεχόμενος τὸ κάλλος, ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος οὕτως ἔχει. τὸ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένει,

[1] del. Kirchhoff.
[2] Theiler, H–S²: ἀεὶ Enn.
[3] del. Theiler, H–S².

about which it is possible to predicate the one as of substance, it must appear as in some way having the opposite nature to itself, that of multiplicity, in its power, but by not having this multiplicity from outside, but by itself and from itself, and in this way being really one, and in its one having unboundedness and multiplicity; and since it is like this it must appear everywhere as a whole, a single rational principle encompassing itself, and the encompassing principle must be nowhere parted from itself, but everywhere in itself. It certainly does not belong to another in the sense of being spatially divided; for it was before all the things in space and had no need of them, but they needed it, that they might be established. But in their establishment they did not move that one out of its seat in itself; for if that seat was moved they would perish with the perishing of their foundation and that which sets them firm, and on the other hand that one was not so stupid as to separate itself from itself and be torn to pieces, or, being kept safe in itself, to deliver itself to the untrustworthiness of place which needs it to be kept safe.

10. It has the good sense, then, to remain in itself, and would not come to be in another; but those other things hang from it as if by their longing they had found where it is. And this is "Love camping on the doorstep",[1] even coming from outside into the presence of beauty and longing for it, and satisfied if in this way he can have a part in it; since the lover here below also has beauty in this way, not by receiving it [into himself] but by lying with it. But that [one

[1] Cp. Plato *Symposium* 203C6–D3.

καὶ οἱ ἑνὸς ἐρασταὶ πολλοὶ ὅλου ἐρῶντες ὅλον ἔχουσιν οὕτως, ὅταν ἔχωσι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον ἦν τὸ ἐρώμενον. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἂν πᾶσιν ἀρκοῖ μένον; ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρκεῖ, ὅτι μένει, καὶ καλόν, ὅτι πᾶσιν ὅλον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν πᾶσιν ὅλον· διὸ καὶ ξυνὸν τὸ φρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ μὲν ὧδε, τὸ δὲ ὠδὶ ὄν· γελοῖον γάρ, καὶ τόπου δεόμενον τὸ φρονεῖν ἔσται. καὶ οὐχ οὕτω τὸ φρονεῖν, ὡς τὸ λευκόν· οὐ γὰρ σώματος τὸ φρονεῖν· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὄντως μετέχομεν τοῦ φρονεῖν, ἓν δεῖ [1] εἶναι [2] τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῷ συνόν. καὶ οὕτως ἐκεῖθεν, οὐ μοίρας αὐτοῦ λαβόντες, οὐδὲ ὅλον ἐγώ, ὅλον δὲ καὶ σύ, ἀποσπασθὲν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου. μιμοῦνται δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαι καὶ πᾶσα σύνοδος ὡς εἰς ἓν τὸ φρονεῖν ἰόντων· καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστος εἰς τὸ φρονεῖν ἀσθενής, συμβάλλων δὲ εἰς ἓν πᾶς ἐν τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς συνέσει τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγέννησε καὶ εὗρε· τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ διείρξει, ὡς μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι νοῦν ἀπ' ἄλλου; ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ὄντες ἡμῖν οὐχ ὁμοῦ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἷον εἴ τις πολλοῖς τοῖς δακτύλοις ἐφαπτόμενος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου ἐφάπτεσθαι νομίζοι, ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν χορδὴν μὴ ὁρῶν κρούοι. καίτοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐφαπτόμεθα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐχρῆν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου μὲν ἐγώ, ἄλλου δὲ σὺ ἐφάπτῃ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέν, προσελθόντος δέ μοι ῥεύματος ἐκεῖθεν ἄλλου, σοὶ δὲ

[1] wEBUC: δὴ x.
[2] coniecimus: εἰς wEBxUC: om. z.

beauty] remains by itself, and the many lovers of the one love the whole and have the whole like this, when they have it: for it was the whole that they loved. How, then, should that in its abiding not be sufficient for all? For it is for this reason that it suffices, because it abides, and it is beautiful because it is whole for all. For thought also is whole for all, that is why "thought is common",[1] not one thought here and another there: for that would be ridiculous, and thought would need space. And thought is not like white; for thought does not belong to the body; but if we truly have a part in thought, it must be one and the same, all together with itself. And so we have our part in it from thence, not receiving portions of it, nor I one whole and you another, each torn apart from each. Assemblies of the people imitate this, and all meetings, being of people moving to a unity of thought; and each member is weak in thought but when everyone in the meeting, and the true meeting of minds, comes together into one, he generates and finds [true] thought; for what will keep them apart, so that the minds of one and another do not meet in the same? But though they are together, they do not seem so to us; as if someone touching the same thing with a number of fingers thought that he was touching one thing after another, or if, without seeing it, he plucked the same string. And besides, we ought to have borne in mind how with our souls we touch the Good. For I do not touch one good and you another, but the same, and not the same in such a way that one stream comes from it to me and another to you, so that it is

[1] Heraclitus fr. B 113 DK.

ἄλλου, ὥστε τὸ μὲν εἶναί που ἄνω, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐνταῦθα. καὶ ⟨δίδωσι⟩ [1] τὸ διδὸν τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν, ἵνα ὄντως λαμβάνωσι, [καὶ δίδωσι τὸ διδὸν] [1] οὐ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐ πόμπιος ἡ νοερὰ δόσις. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διεστηκόσιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τοῖς τόποις σώμασιν ἡ δόσις ἄλλου ἄλλου συγγενής, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸ ἡ δόσις καὶ ἡ ποίησις, καὶ τό γε σωματικὸν τοῦ παντὸς δρᾷ καὶ πάσχει ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν εἰς αὐτό. εἰ δὴ ἐπὶ σώματος οὐδὲν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἐκ φύσεως οἷον φεύγοντος ἑαυτό, ἐπὶ πράγματος ἀδιαστάτου πῶς τὸ ἔξωθεν; ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄρα ὄντες καὶ ὁρῶμεν τἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφαπτόμεθα αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ ὄντες τοῖς ἡμετέροις νοητοῖς. καὶ κόσμος εἷς πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ· ἢ δύο κόσμοι αἰσθητοὶ ἔσονται ὅμοια μεμερισμένοι, καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ἡ νοητή, εἰ οὕτως ἕν, ὡς αὕτη· ὥστε διοίσει ἢ [2] γελοιοτέρα ἔσται, εἴπερ τῇ μὲν ἐξανάγκης ὄγκος καὶ εὔλογος, ἡ δὲ μηδὲν δεομένη ἐκτενεῖ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐκστήσεται. τί δὲ καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ εἰς ἕν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπωθεῖ θάτερον τόπον οὐ παρέχον—ὥσπερ οὐχ ὁρῶντες πᾶν μάθημα καὶ θεώρημα καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμας πάσας ἐπὶ ψυχῆς οὐ στενοχωρουμένας. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ οὐσιῶν φήσει τις οὐ δυνατόν. ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄν, εἴπερ ὄγκοι ἦσαν αἱ ἀληθιναὶ οὐσίαι.

11. Ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀδιάστατον παρήκει παρὰ πᾶν σῶμα μέγεθος τοσοῦτον ἔχον; καὶ πῶς οὐ διασπᾶται ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτό; ὃ πολλάκις ἠπόρηται, παύειν τοῦ λόγου τὸ ἄπορον τῆς διανοίας περιττῇ προθυμίᾳ βουλομένου.

[1] Kleist, *Studien* 91.
[2] scripsi: ἢ wEBR^{pc}UCz, H–S: ἤ R^{ac}J.

somewhere up there and what comes from it down here. And what gives gives to the recipients so that they may really receive, not to alien recipients, but to its own. For intelligible giving is not processional. For even in bodies distant from each other in their places, the giving of one is related to another, and the giving and making go to the same; and the bodily part of the All acts and is affected in itself, and nothing comes into it from outside. If then with body, which by nature in a way flees from itself, nothing comes from outside, how can there be anything from outside in a thing unspaced? We are, then, in the same with the Good and see it and touch it being together with our own intelligibles. And the universe there is far more one; otherwise there will be two universes perceived by sense, divided in the same way, and the intelligible sphere, if it is one in this way, will be like this one; so that it will differ in that it will be more ridiculous, if this one here has bulk of necessity and reasonably, but the other is going to stretch itself out and go outside itself when it has no need. But what can stand in the way of its unification? For certainly one will not push away the other by giving it no room – as if we do not see that every subject of study and observation and in general all bodies of knowledge are in the soul without being crowded. But, someone will say, this is not possible with substances. No, it would not be possible if true substances were bulks.

11. But how can the unspaced stretch over all body, which has so great a size? And how, being one and the same, is it not torn apart? This difficulty has often been raised, when the argument was excessively anxious to end the discursive reason's dif-

ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ἤδη πολλαχῇ, ὅτι οὕτως· δεῖ δέ τινων καὶ παραμυθίων, καίτοι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον εἰς πειθὼ ἣν ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οἵα ἐστὶ διδαχθεῖσα, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οἷα λίθος, οἷον κύβος τις μέγας κείμενος οὗ κεῖται τοσοῦτον ἐπέχων, ὅσος ἐστίν, ἐκβαίνειν οὐκ ἔχων τοὺς αὐτοῦ ὅρους μετρηθεὶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ καὶ τῇ συμπεριγραφείσῃ ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ τοῦ λίθου δυνάμει. ἀλλὰ οὖσα πρώτη φύσις καὶ οὐ μετρηθεῖσα οὐδὲ ὁρισθεῖσα ὁπόσον δεῖ εἶναι—ταύτῃ γὰρ αὖ ἑτέρᾳ [1] μετρηθήσεται—πᾶσά ἐστι δύναμις οὐδαμοῦ τοσήδε. διὸ οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδναμένου ἀεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦ δ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει ἀιδίῳ τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου, οἷον εἰ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι δοκούσης εἰς σημεῖον ἀνηρτημένης καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεούσης πανταχῇ οὗ ἂν δράμῃ τοῦ σημείου αὐτῇ ἐμφανταζομένου αὐτοῦ οὐ θέοντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτὸ ἐκείνης κυκλουμένης. εἰ τοίνυν χρόνος πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένον ἐν οὐσίᾳ ἔχει τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἔστι δὲ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις οὐ μόνον τῷ ἀεὶ ἄπειρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, χρὴ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῆς δυνάμεως ἀντιπαραθέουσαν ἀποδοῦναι φύσιν ἀνταιωρουμένην καὶ ἐξηρτημένην ἐκείνης· ταύτης τὰ ἴσα πως τῷ χρόνῳ θεούσης πρὸς μένουσαν δύναμιν πλείω οὖσαν τῷ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνῃ ἐστὶν ὅσον παρετάθη ἠτισοῦν [2] αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα ταύτης τῆς φύσεως καθόσον οἷόν τε αὐτῇ μεταλαβεῖν, πάσης μὲν παρούσης, οὐ παντὶ δὲ

[1] Igal, H–S²: ἑτέρα Enn.
[2] Theiler, H–S: τίς οὖν Enn.

ficulty. Well, it has already been demonstrated in many ways that it is so; but a bit of encouragement is required, though not the least but the greatest reason for confidence is that nature expounded as it is; it is not like a stone, like a great squared block of stone lying where it is and extending to the size it is, unable to exceed its bounds because it has been measured to this particular size both by its bulk and by the stone-power limited along with it. But since it is the first nature and is not measured or bounded to the size it ought to be – for in this way it would be again measured by another nature – it is all power, nowhere of this particular size. For this reason it is not in time either, but outside all time, for time is continually dispersed into distancing, but eternity abides in the same and has the mastery and is greater by its everlasting power than time which seems to go so far; it is like a line which seems to go on unlimitedly, but depends on a point, and as it runs round it the point is in the picture everywhere the line runs to, though the point does not run, but the line circles round it. If, then, time is related by analogy to that which abides in the same in substance, but that nature is not only unbounded because it is always but unbounded in power, one must also grant besides this unboundedness of power a nature running along over against it, swinging alongside that nature as it hangs from it; this nature runs, somehow in step with time, to the abiding power which is greater [than it] by making [it], and whatever it is is somewhat extended along it and participates in this nature as far as it is possible for it to participate; it is all present, but not all of it is seen in everything because of the incapacity of the

πάσης ἐνορωμένης ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. πάρεστι δὲ ⟨ἀριθμῷ⟩ [1] ταὐτὸν πάντη, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἔνυλον τρίγωνον ἐν πολλοῖς πλείω ὄν [ἀριθμῷ ταὐτόν],[1] ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ ἄυλον αὐτό, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕλῃ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ τρίγωνον ἔνυλον, εἴπερ πανταχοῦ τὸ ἄυλον; ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα μετέσχεν ὕλη, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι ἔχει, καὶ οὐ πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶν. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἡ πρώτη πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν, εἶτ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλα. παρῆν μέν τι παντί.

12. Πάρεστιν οὖν πῶς; ὡς ζωὴ μία· οὐ γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς ἐν ζῴῳ ἡ ζωή, εἶτ' οὐ δύναται εἰς ἅπαν φθάσαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ. εἰ δέ τις ζητεῖ πάλιν πῶς, ἀναμνησθήτω τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὴ ποσή, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρῶν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀεὶ ἔχει δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν βυσσόθεν ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ὕλην,[2] ἵνα τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ ὄγκου συνεπιλείπῃ εἰς μικρὸν ἐλθοῦσα. ἐὰν οὖν λάβῃς ἀένναον ἐν αὐτῇ ἀπειρίαν, φύσιν ἀκάματον καὶ ἄτρυτον καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἐλλείπουσαν ἐν αὐτῇ, οἷον ὑπερζέουσαν ζωῇ, ἤ που ἐπιβαλὼν ἢ πρός τι ἀτενίσας οὐχ εὑρήσεις ἐκεῖ, τοὐναντίον δ' ἄν σοι γένοιτο. οὐ γὰρ σύ γε ὑπερβήσῃ παρελθὼν οὐδὲ αὖ στήσῃ εἰς μικρὸν ὡς οὐκέτι ἐχούσης διδόναι ἐν τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπιλιπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἢ συνθεῖν δυνηθείς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις, ἢ ἀπειπὼν παρεκβήσῃ εἰς

[1] Theiler, H–S².

[2] *ἐκεῖ ὕλην* (sc. *ἔχει*) Igal: *ἐνει* (*ε*– B) *ὕλην* (*–νν* U) BUC, H–S ("locus nondum sanatus"): *ἐνὶ ὕλην E*: *ἐν* + lac. 4 litt. + *ὕλην* A: *ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει ὕλην* A³ (= Ficinus) E, Kirchhoff.

underlying recipient. But it is present the same in number everywhere, not like the triangle in matter which is multiplied by being in many, but like the immaterial triangle itself from which those in matter derive. Why then is not the triangle in matter everywhere, if the immaterial triangle is everywhere? Because not every matter participates in it, but every matter has something different, and not every matter is suitable for every Form. For even prime matter is not all adapted to every Form, but to the primary kinds [of bodily Form] and then others upon them. Form is certainly in some way present to everything.

12. How then is it present? As one life: for life in a living being does not reach only so far, and then is unable to extend over the whole, but it is everywhere. But if someone again enquires how, let him call to mind its power, that there is not a certain quantity of it, but if he divides it endlessly in his discursive thought he always has the same power, endless in depth; for it does not have matter there in the intelligible, that it might fall short along with the size of its bulk and come to little. If then you grasp the endlessness for ever welling up in it, the unwearying and unwearing nature which in no way falls short in it, boiling over with life, we may say, if you concentrate your attention somewhere or fix your gaze on a particular point you will not find it there, but the opposite will happen to you. For you will most certainly not step out of it and go past it, and again you will not stop at a littleness as if it had no more to give in its falling short little by little; but you will be able to run along with it, or rather come to be in All and seek nothing any more, or you will

ἄλλο καὶ πεσῇ παρὸν οὐκ ἰδὼν τῷ εἰς ἄλλον βλέπειν. ἀλλ' εἰ "οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις", πῶς ποτε τοῦτο πείσει; ἢ ὅτι παντὶ προσῆλθες καὶ οὐκ ἔμεινας ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ οὐδ' εἶπας οὐδὲ σὺ "τοσοῦτός εἰμι", ἀφεὶς δὲ τὸ "τοσοῦτος" γέγονας πᾶς, καίτοι καὶ πρότερον ἦσθα πᾶς· ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἄλλο τι προσὴν σοι μετὰ τὸ "πᾶς", ἐλάττων ἐγίνου τῇ προσθήκῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἦν ἡ προσθήκη— οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ προσθήσεις—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.[1] γενόμενος δέ τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀφῇ. αὔξεις τοίνυν σεαυτὸν ἀφεὶς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάρεστί σοι τὸ πᾶν ἀφέντι· εἰ δὲ πάρεστι μὲν ἀφέντι, μετὰ δὲ ἄλλων ὄντι οὐ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἦλθεν, ἵνα παρῇ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ἀπῆλθες, ὅτε οὐ πάρεστιν. εἰ δ' ἀπῆλθες, οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ—αὐτὸ γὰρ πάρεστιν—οὐδὲ τότε ἀπῆλθες, ἀλλὰ παρὼν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐστράφης. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοὶ πολλῶν παρόντων ἑνὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις, ὅτι ὁ εἷς ἐκεῖνος μόνος δύναται βλέπειν. ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν οἱ θεοί, ὅτι παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφῶσι τὰς πόλεις, εἰς ἐκεῖνον δὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐπιστρέφονται καὶ πᾶσα γῆ καὶ πᾶς οὐρανός, πανταχοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μένοντα καὶ ἔχοντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα μέχρι ψυχῆς καὶ ζωῆς ἐξηρτημένα καὶ εἰς ἓν ἄπειρον ἰόντα ἀμεγέθει τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

[1] Kirchhoff: *παντός* Enn.

give up and pass out of it to something else and fall by not seeing what is present because you are looking at another. But if "you will seek nothing any more", however will this happen to you? Now it is because you approached the All and did not remain in a part of it, and you did not even say of yourself "I am just so much", but by rejecting the "so much" you have become all – yet even before this you were all; but because something else came to you after the "all" you became less by the addition: for the addition did not come from being – you will add nothing to that – but from non-being. And when someone has come to be also from non-being he is not all except when he rejects the non-being. You will increase yourself then by rejecting all else, and the All will be present to you in your rejection; but if it is present in your rejection and does not appear when you are with the other things, it did not come in order to be present, but you went away when it was not present. But if you went away, it was not from it – for it is present – and you did not even go away then, but were present and turned the opposite way. For in this way the other gods also when many are present often appear to one, because that one alone is able to see them. But these are the gods who "in many forms travel round our cities"[1]; but to that god the cities turn, and all the earth and all the sky, who everywhere abides by himself and in himself and has from himself being and the things which really are down to soul and life depending on him and moving to an unbounded unity by his sizeless unboundedness.

[1] Homer *Odyssey* 17. 486, quoted (with disapproval) by Plato *Republic* II 381D4.

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK
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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VII

ENNEADS
VI. 6–9

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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI–VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera* III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

vol. VI	vol. VII
VI. 1. 12. 38	VI. 7. 1. 48–9
VI. 2. 5. 5	VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21	VI. 7. 7. 26–8
VI. 3. 4. 36	VI. 8. 1. 7
VI. 4. 3. 15	VI. 8. 14. 19
VI. 5. 8. 29–31	VI. 8. 18. 29
VI. 5. 10. 44	VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5. 12. 6	

Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published *Lexicon Plotinianum* (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera* III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of

Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

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A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

A	=	Laurentianus 87, 3.
A^1	=	codicis A primus corrector.
E	=	Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B	=	Laurentianus 85, 15.
R	=	Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J	=	Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U	=	Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C	=	Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q	=	Marcianus Gr. 242.
w	=	AE
x	=	RJ
mg	=	in margine
ac	=	ante correctionem
pc	=	post correctionem
$H\text{-}S^1$	=	Henry-Schwyzer, editio maior
$H\text{-}S^2$	=	Henry-Schwyzer, editio minor (= OCT)

VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is number 34 in Porphyry's chronological order. It immediately follows the work now generally referred to as the "*Gross-Schrift*" or "Great Work", which Porphyry so strangely divided into four and placed in three different Enneads (see Introductory Note to III, 8), so that in his Ennead edition it appears as III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33). V. 5 contains a brief account of what Plotinus thought about the One and numbers in chapters 4 and 5, and the present treatise is announced at the end of chapter 4: "If there are any difficulties about this, we will deal with them later." The status of numbers in the intelligible world and the generation of Numbers and Forms from ultimate principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad, had been matters of interest and importance to Platonists since the lifetime of Plato himself, especially to those who were influenced by that side of their traditional inheritance which goes back to the Pythagoreans. Between the time of the revival of Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the first century B.C. and the time of Plotinus a considerable numerological literature had developed. But his treatise on Numbers is not at all closely related to it. His thought here is outstandingly original and independent and his interest in numbers is subordinate to his great primary concerns, to show how all reality proceeds in due order from its source, the One or Good, and how the human spirit may find its way back to that source, which is also its goal. He looks back to the discussions about the Ideal Numbers which took place in the Academy in the lifetime of Plato (about which he does not appear to know more than the scanty

and baffling surviving evidence permits us to). And he takes account of Aristotle's discussions of the Ideal Numbers in Books A, M and N of the *Metaphysics* and of such limited light as the Aristotelian commentators read in his school, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias (see Porphyry *Life* chapter 14), could throw on these passages of Aristotle. But he does not seem to have been very much interested in or affected by the Pythagorean or Pythagoreanizing numerologists. The differences between their surviving works and the thought of Plotinus about the Ideal Numbers and the One are well described in the introduction to the recent Paris edition of VI. 6: "The two principal themes developed in this treatise, which are the problem of infinite number (chs. 1–3 and 17–18) and the status of number in the intelligible (chs. 4–16), do not derive from the current arithmological tradition. On the other hand, this tradition is distinguished by two very widespread characteristics: it includes a technical initiation into arithmetic and culminates in a theology and mysticism of numbers ... Now Plotinus shows himself very reserved about the number-mysticism which was so much in favour before, as after, his time. As for his arithmetical knowledge, it is indisputable, but it does not seem to have been encumbered by technical detail"[1] (cp. Porphyry *Life* ch. 14, 7–10).

There is however one passage from a Pythagorean numerological writer, Moderatus of Gades, who seems to have been of some philosophical importance and whose thought in some ways anticipated the Neoplatonism of Plotinus,[2] the beginning of which is worth quoting in conclusion as it has something in common with the approach of Plotinus and shows why he would have

[1] Plotin *Traité* Sur les Nombres (*Ennéade* VI 6 34), ed. with translation and commentary by Janine Bertier and others (Paris 1980), Introduction pp. 9–10.

[2] On Moderatus see J. Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 344–51.

thought it necessary to take speculation about numbers seriously. It is to be found in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* 48–53: "Moderatus says that the Pythagoreans, since they were not able to express clearly in words the first forms and the first principles because they were so hard to understand and hard to explain, turned to the numbers for the sake of intelligible instruction." For Plotinus not only the One but the realities of the intelligible world are strictly beyond the reach of discursive thought and language. But the traditional number-language, like other kinds of language, may instruct us and help us on our way to the direct apprehension of them which is our goal.

Synopsis

Is multiplicity, as a falling away from the One, and so infinity as innumerable multiplicity, evil? Yes, in so far as it is a self-dissipation of a thing's self, a going outwards instead of inwards. But it can be limited and made good and beautiful by unitary and unifying form (ch. 1). The "number of the infinite" is not in the sense-world. Number is not created by the numberer; it is limited in the intelligible world but we multiply it subjectively (ch. 2). How can the infinite really exist as infinite (or undetermined), when what exists is already determined by number? Multiplicity in the real intelligible world is not evil, though lower than the One, because it is determined and unified by the One; but it is the infinite (undetermined) which is limited. Infinity is not in motion or at rest: difficulty of focusing the mind on this slippery nature (ch. 3). Different ways of thinking about intelligible numbers: are they posterior to the Forms or co-ordinate with them or prior to them? Difficulties in the interpretation of Plato on number (ch. 4). Numbers cannot be simply incidental even if inevitable accompaniments of Forms: they must have some kind of prior independent existence (ch. 5). Refutation of a subjective-idealist view of Forms and

Numbers: thought does not make intelligible realities but they make our thought of them (ch. 6). The wonderful unity in diversity of Intellect, in which all realities are together, which Soul loves and aspires to; how to attain to contemplation of that reality (chs. 7–8). The order of the primary triad: Being before Intellect, Intellect before Life; the real numbers are in and prior to Being; quantitative number is an image of them (chs. 8–9). Continuing argument for the priority and independent existence of all number, not only the one (chs. 10–11). Refutation of the Stoic view that one and number have no real existence but are ways in which the soul is affected when it encounters things: the one and number are prior to thought and to substance (chs. 12–13). Number cannot be reduced to relation (ch. 14). Intellect is the true universal living being in which all living things exist together, and our universe imitates it; in both, numbers are prior to and generate beings (ch. 15). Quantitative number is secondary and depends for its existence on substantial number in Intellect and in the soul (ch. 16). The infinity or unlimitedness of intelligible number is not like the subjective unlimitedness of a line; line and figure are posterior to number, but have a real existence in the real living being and in Intellect (ch. 17). Number in the intelligible is unlimited only in the sense that it is absolute measure and cannot be measured by anything else. Concluding vision of the beauty and majesty of the intelligible world (ch. 18).

VI. 6. (34) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΘΜΩΝ

1. Ἆρ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀπόστασις τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία ἀπόστασις παντελὴς τῷ πλῆθος ἀνάριθμον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, ᾗ ἀπειρία, καὶ ἡμεῖς κακοί, ὅταν πλῆθος; καὶ γὰρ πολὺ ἕκαστον, ὅταν ἀδυνατοῦν εἰς αὐτὸ νεύειν χέηται καὶ ἐκτείνηται σκιδνάμενον· καὶ πάντη μὲν στερισκόμενον ἐν τῇ χύσει τοῦ ἑνὸς πλῆθος γίνεσθαι, οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος αὐτοῦ ἑνοῦντος· εἰ δέ τι γένοιτο ἀεὶ χεόμενον μένον, μέγεθος γίνεται. ἀλλὰ τί δεινὸν τῷ μεγέθει; ἢ εἰ ᾐσθάνετο, ἦν ἄν· ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ γινόμενον καὶ ἀφιστάμενον εἰς τὸ πόρρω ᾐσθάνετο. ἕκαστον γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖ, ἡ δ' ἔξω πορεία μάταιος ἢ ἀναγκαία. μᾶλλον δέ ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οὐχ ὅταν γένηται πολὺ ἢ μέγα, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἑαυτοῦ ᾖ· ἑαυτοῦ δ' ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ νενευκός. ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις ἡ πρὸς τὸ οὕτως μέγα ἀγνοοῦντός ἐστι τὸ ὄντως μέγα καὶ σπεύδοντος οὐχ οὗ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω· τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἔνδον ἦν. μαρτύριον δὲ τὸ γενόμενον μεγέθει, εἰ μὲν ἀπηρτη-

[1] Plotinus begins here with a traditional Neo-

VI. 6. ON NUMBERS

1. Is multiplicity a falling away from the One, and infinity a total falling away because it is an innumerable multiplicity and for this reason is evil in so far as it is infinity, and are we evil when we are multiplicity[1]? For a thing is multiple when, unable to tend to itself, it pours out and is extended in scattering; and when it is utterly deprived of the one in its outpouring it becomes multiplicity, since there is nothing to unite one part of it to another; but if something comes to be which abides in its outpouring, it becomes a magnitude. But what is there dreadful about magnitude? Now, if a thing perceived it, it would be dreadful; for it would perceive that it had come to be out of itself and had gone far away from itself. For everything seeks not another, but itself, and the journey to the exterior is foolish or compulsory. A thing exists more, not when it comes to be many or large, but when it belongs to itself: and it belongs to itself in tending to itself. But the desire to be great in this way is the property of something which does not know what true greatness is and is hastening not where it should but to the exterior; but the direction towards itself was inward. A sign of this is that when a thing comes to exist in magnitude, if it is by separation of parts, it exists as each

Pythagorean view of the evil of multiplicity and infinity (or indefiniteness), which, in his usual way, he modifies in the direction of a more positive valuation of multiplicity and number as the treatise continues. Cp. ch. 3, 7–9.

μένον, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἕκαστα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· εἰ δ' ἔσται αὐτό, δεῖ τὰ πάντα μέρη πρὸς ἕν· ὥστε εἶναι αὐτό, ὅταν ἀμηγέπῃ ἕν, μὴ μέγα, ᾖ. γίνεται τοίνυν διὰ μὲν τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει ἀπολλύμενον αὐτοῦ· ὅ τι δὲ ἔχει ἕν, ἔχει ἑαυτό. καὶ μὴν τὸ πᾶν μέγα καὶ καλόν. ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀφείθη φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἀλλὰ περιελήφθη ἑνί· καὶ καλὸν οὐ τῷ μέγα, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ· καὶ ἐδεήθη τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι ἐγένετο μέγα. ἐπεὶ ἔρημον ὂν τοῦτο, ὅσῳ μέγα, τόσῳ ἂν κατεφάνη αἰσχρόν· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μέγα ὕλη τοῦ καλοῦ, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ δεόμενον κόσμου. μᾶλλον οὖν ἄκοσμον τὸ μέγα καὶ μᾶλλον αἰσχρόν.

2. Τί οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἀριθμοῦ τῆς ἀπειρίας; ἀλλὰ πρῶτον πῶς ἀριθμός, εἰ ἄπειρος; οὔτε γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄπειρα, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμός, οὔτε ὁ ἀριθμῶν τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀριθμεῖ· ἀλλὰ κἂν διπλάσια ᾖ πολλαπλάσια ποιῇ, ὁρίζει ταῦτα, κἂν πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ᾖ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς λαμβάνῃ ἢ καὶ ὁμοῦ, ὁρίζει ταῦτα. ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἄπειρος, οὕτω δέ, ὥστε ἀεὶ ἐξεῖναι λαμβάνειν; ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦντι τὸ γεννᾶν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ὥρισται καὶ ἕστηκεν. ἢ ἐν μὲν τῷ νοητῷ ὥσπερ τὰ ὄντα οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος ὅσος τὰ ὄντα. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολλὰ ποιοῦμεν ἐφαρμόζοντες πολλάκις καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὕτω μετὰ τοῦ

[1] The text of Plato referred to here seems to be the mention of ἄπειρος ἀριθμός at *Parmenides* 144A6; cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* M 8. 1083b36–1084a1.

and every one of its parts, and they each of them exist, but not the original thing itself; but if it is going to be itself, all its parts must tend to one: so that it is itself when it is one in some way, not large. So through magnitude and as far as depends on magnitude it loses itself; but as far as it possesses a one, it possesses itself. Yet, all the same, the universe is large and beautiful. This is because it has not been left to escape into infinity, but has been circumscribed by one; and it is beautiful not by largeness but by beauty; and it needed beauty because it became large. For if this universe was destitute [of beauty] it would have appeared as ugly as it was large; and so largeness is the matter of beauty, because what needed ordered beauty was many. Therefore the largeness [of the universe] is rather lacking in ordered beauty and rather ugly [than beautiful].

2. What, then, about what is called the number of the infinite[1]? But first, how is it a number, if it is infinite? For the objects of sense are not infinite, so their number is not infinite either, and the numberer does not number infinity; but, even if he makes them twice or many times as many, he limits them, and even if he takes into account the past or the future or both at once, he limits them. Is then the number not simply infinite, but so that we can always take more? No, the generation of number is not in the power of the numberer, but it is already limited and stands fast. Or, in the intelligible, just as the real beings are limited so is the number limited to as many as the real beings. But we, just as we make "man" many by many times applying beauty and the rest to him, so along with each image we generate an

εἰδώλου ἑκάστου καὶ εἴδωλον ἀριθμοῦ συναπογεννῶμεν, καὶ ὡς τὸ ἄστυ πολλαπλασιοῦμεν οὐχ ὑφεστὸς οὕτως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πολυπλασίους ποιοῦμεν· καὶ εἰ τοὺς χρόνους δὲ ἀριθμοῖμεν, ἀφ' ὧν ἔχομεν ἀριθμῶν ἐπάγομεν ἐπὶ τοὺς χρόνους μενόντων ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκείνων.

3. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον δὴ τοῦτο πῶς ὑφέστηκεν ὂν ἄπειρον; ὃ γὰρ ὑφέστηκε καὶ ἔστιν, ἀριθμῷ κατείληπται ἤδη. ἀλλὰ πρότερον, εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντως πλῆθος, πῶς κακὸν τὸ πλῆθος; ἢ ὅτι ἥνωται τὸ πλῆθος καὶ κεκώλυται πάντη πλῆθος εἶναι ἓν ὃν πλῆθος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἐλαττοῦται τοῦ ἑνός, ὅτι πλῆθος ἔχει, καὶ ὅσον πρὸς τὸ ἓν χεῖρον· καὶ οὐκ ἔχον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ ἐκβεβηκός, ἠλάττωται, τῷ δ' ἑνὶ παρ' ἐκείνῳ τὸ σεμνὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἀνέστρεψε δὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἓν καὶ ἔμεινεν. ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπειρία πῶς; ἡ γὰρ οὖσα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἤθη ὥρισται, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὥρισται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ἴσως, ὡς κἂν[1] τῷ χρόνῳ. ἢ κἂν ὁρισθῇ, τούτῳ γε ἄπειρος· οὐ γὰρ τὸ πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ὁρίζεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄλλο τι μεταξὺ πέρατος καὶ ἀπείρου, ὃ τὴν τοῦ ὅρου δέχεται φύσιν. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄπειρον φεύγει μὲν αὐτὸ τὴν τοῦ πέρατος ἰδέαν, ἁλίσκεται δὲ περιληφθὲν ἔξωθεν. φεύγει δὲ οὐκ εἰς τόπον ἄλλον ἐξ

[1] Igal: καὶ Enn.

[1] The idea of subjective, imaginary multiplication here derives from Aristotle *Physics* Γ 8. 208a15–20.

image of number, and, as we multiply the town though it does not really exist as multiple, in the same way we also multiply the numbers[1]; and if we should be numbering times, we apply numbers to them from those which we have, and those numbers still remain within us.

3. But how can this infinite really exist as infinite? For what really exists and is, is already determined by number. But before we consider that, if there is really multiplicity in the real beings, how is multiplicity evil? Now [multiplicity there is not evil] because the multiplicity is unified and not allowed to be altogether multiplicity, being a one-multiple. And because of this it is less than the One, because it has multiplicity, and in so far as it is compared with the One, it is worse; and since it does not have the nature of that One, but has gone out from it, it has been diminished, but it keeps its majesty by the one in it, and it turned back its multiplicity to one and there it stayed. But how about infinity? For if it exists in the real beings it has already been limited, or if it has not been limited, it is not in the real beings, but perhaps in the things which come to be, as also in time.[2] Now even if it is limited, it is by this very fact infinite [or unlimited]; for it is not limit but the unlimited which is limited [or bounded]; for there is certainly nothing else between limit and unlimited which receives the nature of boundary. This infinity, certainly, in itself runs away from the idea of limit, but is caught by being surrounded externally. But it does not run away from one place to another: for it does not even

[2] Cp. Aristotle *Physics* Γ 7. 207b14–15.

ἑτέρου· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ἔχει τόπον· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἁλῷ, ὑπέστη τόπος. διὸ οὐδὲ τὴν λεγομένην κίνησιν αὐτῆς τοπικὴν θετέον οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τῶν λεγομένων αὐτῇ παρ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἕστηκεν αὖ· ποῦ γὰρ τοῦ ποῦ ὕστερον γενομένου; ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς τῆς ἀπειρίας οὕτω λέγεσθαι, ὅτι μὴ μένει. ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς μετέωρος εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ αἰωρεῖσθαι ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο; οὐδαμῶς· ἄμφω γὰρ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κρίνεται, τό τε μετέωρον οὐ παρεγκλῖνον [πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον][1] καὶ τὸ παρεγκλῖνον. τί ἂν οὖν τις ἐπινοήσειεν αὐτήν; ἢ χωρίσας τὸ εἶδος τῇ διανοίᾳ. τί οὖν νοήσει; ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ἅμα καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν νοήσει—γίνεται γὰρ ἄμφω—καὶ ἑστὼς καὶ κινούμενον—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα γίνεται. ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ γίνεσθαι δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδέτερον ὡρισμένως· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥρισας. εἰ οὖν ἄπειρος καὶ ταῦτα ἀπείρως καὶ ἀορίστως, φαντασθείη γ' ἂν ἑκάτερα. καὶ προσελθὼν ἐγγὺς μὴ ἐπιβάλλων τι πέρας ὥσπερ δίκτυον ὑπεκφεύγουσαν ἕξεις καὶ οὐδὲ ἓν εὑρήσεις· ἤδη γὰρ ὥρισας. ἀλλ' εἴ τῳ προσέλθοις ὡς ἑνί, πολλὰ φανεῖται· κἂν πολλὰ εἴπῃς, πάλιν αὖ ψεύσῃ· οὐκ ὄντος γὰρ

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

have any place; but when it is caught, place comes into existence. Therefore one cannot assume that what is called its movement is movement in place nor does any other one of what are called forms of movement belong to it of itself; so that it would not be in motion. But on the other hand it does not stand still either: for where could it, when "where" came to be afterwards? But the movement of infinity itself seems to mean that it does not stay still. Is it then in a state of being up above in the same place, or swinging to and fro? Certainly not: for both are judged in relation to the same place, what is up there and does not swing towards the same place and that which swings. In what way, then, could one conceive infinity? By separating its form in one's reasoning. What, then, will one conceive? One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the opposites: for one will conceive it as great and small[1]—for it becomes both—and at rest and moving—for it does really become these. But it is obvious that before becoming them it is neither definitely: otherwise, you have limited [or defined] it. If then it is infinite, and infinitely and indefinitely infinite, it could be imagined as either. And when you come up close to it and do not throw any limit over it like a net you will have it slipping away from you and will not find it any one thing: for [if you did] you would have defined it. But if you approach any of it as one, it will appear many; and if you say that it is many, you will be wrong again: for if each [part] of it is not

[1] Aristotle records that Plato spoke of the indefinite principle of multiplicity as a dyad "great and small": see *Physics* Γ 4. 203a15–16 and *Metaphysics* A 6. 987b26.

ἑκάστου ἑνὸς οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ πάντα. καὶ αὕτη ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς καθ' ἕτερον τῶν φαντασμάτων κίνησις, καὶ, καθὸ προσῆλθεν ἡ φαντασία, στάσις. καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι δι' αὐτῆς αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν, κίνησις ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ ἀπολίσθησις· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποδρᾶναι ἔχειν, εἴργεσθαι δὲ ἔξωθεν καὶ κύκλῳ καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι προχωρεῖν, στάσις ἂν εἴη· ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἐξεῖναι κινεῖσθαι λέγειν.

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅπως ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ σκεπτέον, πότερα ὡς ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἄλλοις εἴδεσιν ἢ καὶ παρακολουθούντων ἀεί· οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον πρῶτον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἐνοήσαμεν μονάδα, εἶτ' ἐπεὶ κίνησις ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ στάσις, τρία ἤδη, καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ συνεγεννήθη ἑκάστῳ μονὰς μία, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ὄντος μονάς, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ μετ' ἐκεῖνο, εἰ τάξις ἐστί, δυὰς ἢ καὶ ὅσον τὸ πλῆθος ἑκάστου, οἷον εἰ δέκα, δεκάς. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐνοήθη· καὶ εἰ οὕτως, πότερα πρότερος τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ ὕστερος. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀριθμοῦ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐληλυθέναι εἰπὼν ἡμερῶν πρὸς νύκτας τῇ παραλλαγῇ, τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἑτερότητι διδοὺς τὴν νόησιν, τάχ' ἂν τὰ ἀριθμητὰ πρότερον δι' ἑτερότητος ποιεῖν ἀριθμὸν λέγοι, καὶ εἶναι αὐτὸν συνιστάμενον ἐν μεταβάσει ψυχῆς ἐπεξιούσης ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα καὶ τότε γίνεσθαι, ὅταν ἀριθμῇ ψυχή· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὅταν αὐτὰ διεξίῃ καὶ

one, all of them cannot be many. And this nature of it according to one and another of your imaginations is movement, and, according as imagination has arrived at it, rest. And the impossibility of seeing it by itself is movement from intellect and slipping away; but that it cannot run away but is held fast from outside and all round and is not able to go on, this would be its rest: so that one may not say that it is only in motion.

4. But we must consider how the numbers are in the intelligible, whether as coming into existence after the other Forms or always accompanying them; for instance, since being is of such a kind as to be itself the first, we conceived it as monad, then, since movement and rest came from it, we at that stage conceived three, and a number for each of the other Forms. No, not like this, but one monad was generated along with each, or a monad for the first existent and for that after it, if there is an order, a dyad or as much as the plurality of each is, for instance a decad if it is ten. Or not like this, but number was conceived itself by itself; and if so, was it prior to the others or posterior to them? Now Plato says that men came to the idea of number by the alternation of day and night, attributing the concept to the difference of the objects; perhaps he is saying that the things numbered are prior and make number by their difference, and that it is coming into existence in the transition of soul as it goes on from one thing to another, and comes into existence when the soul numbers[1]: that is when it goes over things

[1] Plotinus is expounding here Plato *Timaeus* 39B–C and 47A on how we come to our knowledge of number and time.

λέγῃ παρ' αὑτῇ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ὡς, ἕως γε[1] ταὐτόν τι καὶ μὴ ἕτερον μετ' αὐτὸ νοεῖ, ἓν λεγούσης. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅταν λέγῃ "ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ" καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν οὐσίᾳ, πάλιν αὖ ὑπόστασίν τινα ἂν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ λέγοι καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἀριθμούσῃ ὑφίστασθαι ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ ἀνακινεῖσθαι ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παραλλαγῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ.

5. Τίς οὖν ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; ἆρα παρακολούθημα καὶ οἷον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἑκάστῃ οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὂν καὶ ἓν ὄν, καὶ τὰ πάντα ἕκαστα τὰ νοητὰ καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀριθμός; ἀλλὰ πῶς δυὰς καὶ τριὰς καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα καθ' ἓν καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμὸς εἰς ἓν ἂν συνάγοιτο; οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται πλῆθος μὲν ἑνάδων, εἰς ἓν δὲ οὐδεὶς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἕν· εἰ μή τις λέγοι, ὡς δυὰς μέν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρᾶγμα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι θεωρούμενον, ὃ δύο ἔχει δυνάμεις συνειλημμένας οἷον σύνθετον εἰς ἕν. ἢ οἵους ἔλεγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, οἳ ἐδόκουν λέγειν ἀριθμοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, οἷον δικαιοσύνην τετράδα καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλως· ἐκείνως δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πράγματος ἑνὸς ὄντος ὅμως καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν συζυγῆ, τοσοῦτον ἕν, οἷον δεκάδα. καίτοι

[1] Kirchhoff: τε Enn.

[1] The *Timaeus* passages might suggest that number only exists in the numbering soul and is posterior to the visible realities numbered. So Plotinus turns immediately to *Republic* VII 529C–D, where Socrates is insisting that true, philosophical astronomy is concerned not with the visible heavenly bodies but with "true" number and figure perceptible only to thought.

[2] Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* Γ 2. 1003b22–30.

and says in itself "this is one thing and that is another", as, for instance, as long as it thinks something the same and does not think another thing after it, it says "one". But then when Plato says "in the true number", and speaks of the number in substance,[1] he will, on the other hand, be saying that number has an existence from itself and does not have its existence in the numbering soul but the soul arouses in itself from the difference in sensible things the idea of number.

5. What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment of each substance and something observed in it—man and one man,[2] for instance, and being and one being, and so with all the individual intelligibles and the whole of number? But how is there a dyad and a triad, and how are all unified, and how could such and such a number be brought together into one? For in this way there will be a multiplicity of unities, but no number will be brought into unity except the simple one; unless someone were to say that the dyad is that thing there itself, or rather what is observed in that thing, which has two powers brought together, as if conjoined into one. Or numbers might be as the Pythagoreans said they were: they seem to have spoken of numbers analogically,[3] the tetrad as justice, for instance, and other numbers in other ways; but in that way the number would be coupled with the multiplicity of the thing, which all the same is one, a one which is so many, a decad for instance. We however do not

[3] Plotinus clearly has no source for early Pythagorean thought which he regards as more dependable than Aristotle. He is using here *Metaphysics* A 5. 985b23–51.

ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτω τὰ δέκα, ἀλλὰ συνάγοντες καὶ τὰ διεστῶτα δέκα λέγομεν. ἢ οὕτω μὲν δέκα λέγομεν, ὅταν δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν γίνηται ἕν, δεκάδα, ὡς κἀκεῖ οὕτως. ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ἆρ' ἔτι ὑπόστασις ἀριθμοῦ ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν αὐτοῦ θεωρουμένου; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι θεωρουμένου ὑπόστασιν τοῦ λευκοῦ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν εἶναι; ἐπεὶ καὶ κινήσεως ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι θεωρουμένης ὑπόστασις ἦν κινήσεως ἐν τῷ ὄντι οὔσης. [ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς ἡ κίνησις][1] ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ κίνησίς τι, οὕτως ἓν ἐπ' αὐτῆς ἐθεωρήθη· ⟨ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς ἡ κίνησις⟩[1] λέγεται. εἶτα καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπόστασις ἀφίστησι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ οὐσίαν εἶναι, συμβεβηκὸς δὲ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ. καίτοι οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ὅλως· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς δεῖ τι εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι, κἂν ἀχώριστον ᾖ, ὅμως εἶναί τι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν τινά, ὡς τὸ λευκόν, καὶ κατηγορεῖσθαι κατ' ἄλλου ἤδη ὂν ὃ κατηγορηθήσεται. ὥστε, εἰ περὶ ἕκαστον τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ "εἷς ἄνθρωπος", ἀλλ' ἕτερον τὸ ἓν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κοινὸν τὸ ἓν καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, πρότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων τύχῃ ἕκαστον τοῦ ἓν εἶναι. καὶ πρὸ κινήσεως τοίνυν, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἕν,

[1] transpos. Igal.

[1] I adopt this rendering of *κἀκεῖ* in agreement with Henry and Schwyzer; most translators take *ἐκεῖ* in the usual sense

conceive ten like this, but we bring together things that are separate and say "ten". This indeed is how we say "ten", but when a unity comes to be from many, we say "decad", because this is how it is also in the Pythagorean way of thinking.[1] But if this is so, will there still be any real existence of number when it is only observed in things? But, someone might say, what is there to prevent there being a real existence of white in things, though white also is only observed in things? For movement also was observed in being and there was a real existence of movement which is in being. But because movement is a something, in this way a unity was observed in it; but number is not spoken of in the same way as movement. And then a real existence of this kind would deprive number of being substance, and make it rather something incidental. Yet not even altogether an incidental; for the incidental must be something before incidentally occurring, and, even if it is inseparable, all the same be something by itself, a particular nature, like white, and be predicated of something else when it is already what it will be predicated as. So that, if "one" applies to each individual thing and "one man" is not the same as "man", but the "one" is other than the "man" and the "one" is common and belongs to all the other individual things, the "one" would be prior to "man" and all the other individual things, so that man and each of the others might succeed in being one. And so it is prior to movement, since movement also is one thing, and prior to being, so that being

for Plotinus, "in the intelligible world", which does not seem appropriate here.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τύχῃ· λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο, ὃ δὴ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος φαμέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἓν ὃ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν ἑκάστου. καὶ δεκὰς τοίνυν πρὸ τοῦ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται δεκάς· καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται αὐτοδεκάς· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ᾧ πράγματι ἐπιθεωρεῖται δεκὰς αὐτοδεκὰς ἔσται. ἀλλ' ἆρα συνεγένετο καὶ συνέστη τοῖς οὖσιν; ἀλλ' εἰ συνεγεννήθη ὡς μὲν συμβεβηκός, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑγίεια—δεῖ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑγίειαν εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ὡς στοιχεῖον δὲ συνθέτου τὸ ἕν, δεῖ πρότερον εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ἵνα σὺν ἄλλῳ· εἶτα [εἰ πρότερον εἶναι][1] συμμιχθὲν ἄλλῳ τῷ γενομένῳ δι' αὐτὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο ποιήσει ψευδῶς ἕν, δύο ποιοῦν αὐτό. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς δεκάδος πῶς; τί γὰρ δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τῆς δεκάδος, ὃ ἔσται διὰ τὴν τοσαύτην δύναμιν δεκάς; ἀλλ' εἰ εἰδοποιήσει αὐτὸ ὥσπερ ὕλην καὶ ἔσται παρουσίᾳ δεκάδος δέκα καὶ δεκάς, δεῖ πρότερον ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν δεκάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι οὖσαν ἢ δεκάδα μόνον εἶναι.

6. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἄνευ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ δεκὰς αὐτή, εἶτα τὰ πράγματα τὰ νοητὰ μετὰ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἑνάδες ἔσονται, τὰ δὲ καὶ δυάδες καὶ τριάδες, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ πῶς συστᾶσα; λόγῳ δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. πρῶτον τοίνυν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν καθόλου τῶν εἰδῶν, ὅτι ἐστὶν οὐχὶ νοήσαντος ἕκαστον τοῦ νενοηκότος, εἶτ'

[1] del. Kirchhoff.

itself may succeed in being one; but I mean not that One which we say is "beyond being"[1] but this other one which is predicated of each individual Form. So the decad also is prior to that of which decad is predicated; and this will be the absolute decad; for the thing in which decad is observed certainly will not be the absolute decad. Did this other one, then, come into being and exist along with the real beings? But if it was generated along with them, it would be incidental, like health to man—but health also must be something in itself. And if the one is like an element of a compound, there must be beforehand a one which is one in itself, that it may be compounded with another; then, if it is compounded with another which has become one through it, it will make that other spuriously one, by making it two. But how is it with the decad? For what need of the decad has the thing which is going to be a decad by the power of that amount? But if it is going to inform it like matter, and the thing is going to be ten and decad by the presence of decad, the decad must exist beforehand by itself and be nothing else but only decad.

6. But if the one itself and the decad itself exist without the things, and then the intelligible things, after being what they are, are going to be, some of them henads and some of them dyads or triads, what would be their nature, and how would it come into existence? But we must understand that we make them come into being only in thought. First, then, we must comprehend the substantial nature of the Forms in general, that it does not exist because the

[1] Plato *Republic* 509B9, the text which is one of the foundations of the doctrine of the One beyond Being.

αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῶν παρασχομένου. οὐ γάρ, ὅτι ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ὅτι ἐνόησε τί ποτ' ἐστὶ κίνησις, κίνησις ὑπέστη. οὕτω γὰρ ἔμελλε τοῦτο τὸ νόημα καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ τοῦ νοηθέντος—δικαιοσύνης αὐτῆς ἡ νόησις αὐτῆς—καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἡ νόησις προτέρα τοῦ ἐκ τῆς νοήσεως ὑποστάντος, εἰ τῷ νενοηκέναι ὑπέστη. εἰ δὲ τῇ νοήσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον μηδὲν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην ἢ τὸν οἷον ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς· τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ νενοηκέναι δικαιοσύνην ἢ κίνησιν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν λαβόντα; τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ μὴ ὑφεστῶτος πράγματος λόγον λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, ἐκείνως χρὴ νοεῖν τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγει εἶναι οὐδὲ τὸν λόγον τὸν θεωροῦντα τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπαλιν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ ἄνευ ὕλης ὂν νοητόν τε καὶ νόησιν εἶναι, οὐχ οἷαν λόγον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος οὐδ' ἐπιβολὴν πρὸς αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ὄν τί ἄλλο ἢ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐ μένουσαν, οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ πράγματος, ἑτέραν ἐποίησεν εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀληθινὴν ἐπιστήμην· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οὐκ εἰκόνα τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό. ἡ νόησις τοίνυν τῆς κινήσεως οὐ πεποίηκεν αὐτοκίνησιν, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτοκίνησις

[1] A clear statement that a Platonic Form is something very different from a hypostatised Aristotelian universal.

[2] Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 5. 430a2–3 and 7. 431a1–2.

thinker thinks each of them and so by that very thinking gives them their existence. For it is not because the thinker thought out what righteousness is that righteousness existed, or because he thought out what movement is that movement existed. For in this way this thought would be both posterior to the thing itself which was thought—the thought of righteousness posterior to righteousness itself—and on the other hand the thought would be prior to what existed as a result of thought, if it came into existence by thinking. But if righteousness is the same as the thought of righteousness, first of all it is absurd that righteousness should be nothing except something like its definition[1]: for what is thinking righteousness or movement except grasping their essential nature? And this is the same as grasping the conception of a non-existent thing, which is impossible. But if someone were to say that "in immaterial things the knowledge and the thing are the same",[2] one must understand what is said in the sense that it does not mean that the knowledge is the thing nor the reason contemplating the thing the thing itself, but the other way round, that the thing itself when it is without matter is object of thought and thought, not thought in the sense of being a definition of the thing or an intuition of it, but the thing itself in the intelligible is nothing else but intellect and knowledge. For the knowledge is not directed to itself, but the thing there makes the knowledge, which does not stay like the knowledge of a thing in matter, to be different: that is, makes it true knowledge: that is, not an image of the thing but the thing itself. So the thought of movement has not made absolute movement, but absolute move-

πεποίηκε τὴν νόησιν, ὥστε αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κίνησιν καὶ νόησιν· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἡ ἐκεῖ κἀκείνου νόησις, καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ κίνησις, ὅτι πρώτη—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη πρὸ αὐτῆς—καὶ ἡ ὄντως, ὅτι μὴ συμβέβηκεν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κινουμένου ἐνέργεια ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ. ὥστε αὖ καὶ οὐσία· ἐπίνοια δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ἑτέρα. καὶ δικαιοσύνη δὲ οὐ νόησις δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ νοῦ οἷον διάθεσις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνέργεια τοιάδε, ἧς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος 〈οὔτε ἑῷος οὕτω καλὰ〉[1] οὐδ' ὅλως τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄγαλμά τι νοερόν, οἷον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἑστηκὸς καὶ προφανὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὂν ἐν αὐτῷ.

7. Ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ νοῆσαι τὰ πράγματα ἐν μιᾷ 〈φύσει〉[2] καὶ μίαν φύσιν πάντα ἔχουσαν καὶ οἷον περιλαβοῦσαν, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἕκαστον χωρίς, ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιος καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα· αὕτη γὰρ νοῦ φύσις· ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ οὕτω μιμεῖται καὶ ἡ λεγομένη φύσις, καθ' ἣν καὶ ὑφ' ἧς ἕκαστα γεννᾶται ἄλλο ἄλλοθι, αὐτῆς ὁμοῦ ἑαυτῇ οὔσης. ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ὄντων ἕκαστον αὖ χωρίς ἐστιν· ἑνορᾷ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὁ [ἔχων][3] νοῦς οὐκ ἐπιβλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔχων, οὐδὲ χωρίζων ἕκαστον·

[1] Kirchhoff.
[2] Müller.
[3] del. Theiler.

[1] Euripides *Melanippe* fr. 486 Nauck², quoted by Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* E 3. 1129b28–9. Plotinus quotes it also at I. 6. 4. 11–12, where it connects in his mind, as perhaps it does here, with the vision of the beauty of the moral Forms in Plato *Phaedrus* 250B.

ment has made the thought of it, so that it has made itself as movement and thought; for movement there is also the thought of that thing itself, and it itself is movement, because it is the first movement—for there is no other before it—and real movement, because it is not incidental to something else, but is the active actuality of what is moved, which exists in actuality. So, again, it is substance; but the [mere] notion of being is different. And righteousness is not the thought of righteousness, but a kind of disposition of intellect, or rather an active actuality, of such a kind that "its face" is truly beautiful and "neither the morning nor the evening star are so fair",[1] not at all any object of sense, but like an intellectual statue, as if standing out from itself and manifesting in itself, or rather existing in itself.

7. In general one must think of the intelligible things as in one nature, and one nature holding them all and in a way encompassing them, not each one separate as in the things of sense, the sun in one place and something else in another, but all things together in one[2]; for this is the nature of Intellect; since Soul imitates it in this way, and what we call Nature, according to which and by which the individual things are generated one in one place and one in another, while it is all together in itself. But though all things are together each one, on the other hand, is separate; but Intellect sees them, the things that are in Intellect and Being, not by looking at them but by having them, and does not separate each

[2] ὁμοῦ πάντα is a phrase from the beginning of the book of Anaxagoras (fr. B 1 DK) which Plotinus finds particularly applicable to his intelligible world.

κεχώρισται γὰρ ἤδη ἐν αὐτῷ ἀεί. πιστούμεθα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τεθαυμακότας ἐκ τῶν μετειληφότων· τὸ δὲ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ψυχῆς ἔρωτι πρὸς αὐτὸν[1] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τὸν][2] εἰς ψυχὴν ἔρωτι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ τῷ ἔχειν ᾗ κατά τι ὡμοίωται. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄτοπον εἶναί τι ζῷον καλὸν αὐτοζῴου μὴ θαυμαστοῦ τὸ κάλλος καὶ ἀφαύστου ὄντος. τὸ δὴ παντελὲς ζῷον ἐκ πάντων ζῴων ὄν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ζῷα περιέχον καὶ ἓν ὂν τοσοῦτον, ὅσα τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἓν ὂν καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁρατὸν περιέχον πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ.

8. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν καὶ ζῷον πρώτως ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοζῷον καὶ νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐσία ἡ ὄντως καί φαμεν ἔχειν καὶ ζῷα τὰ πάντα καὶ ἀριθμὸν τὸν σύμπαντα καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα—ἄλλως γὰρ αὐτοάνθρωπόν φαμεν καὶ ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον αὐτό—σκεπτέον πῶς τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ τί ὄν, εἰς ὅσον οἷόν τέ τι εὑρεῖν περὶ τούτων. πρῶτον τοίνυν ἀφετέον πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν καὶ νοῦν νῷ θεωρητέον καὶ ἐνθυμητέον, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς οὐκ ἐν ὄγκῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει ἀόγκῳ, καὶ τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν

[1] Kirchhoff: αὐτὸ Enn.

[2] delevimus ut correctionem ad αὐτὸ falso hic insertam: τὸν EBxUQ: τῶν AC.

[1] The "complete living being" is the intelligible paradigm of the material universe in Plato *Timaeus* 30C. It is clear from ch. 8 that Plotinus, like most Platonists, takes it to be the whole intelligible universe. Life in Plotinus is often thought of as prior to intellect; but the intelligible living being as the formed, structured whole must be considered posterior to the intellect which eternally forms and structures its life.

individual thing: for they are already separated in it for ever. We confirm this for those who are surprised at it from the participants: its greatness and beauty by the love of soul for it and by the love of other things for soul because it has a nature of this kind and by its having a nature by which it is in some respect made like Intellect. For it is certainly quite absurd for there to be any beautiful living being if the absolute living being is not of wonderful and inexplicable beauty. It is truly the "complete living being" composed of all living beings, or rather encompassing in itself all living beings, being one as large as all things[1]; just as this All is one and is all that is visible, encompassing all things that are in the visible.

8. Since, then, it is the primary living being, and for this reason the absolute living being, and is Intellect and substance, real substance, and we claim that it contains all living things and the whole of number, and the absolutely righteous and beautiful and all other such things—we speak in a different way of absolute man and absolute number and absolute righteousness—we must enquire how each of these exists as an individual and what it is, as far as it is possible to discover anything about these things. First, then, we must put away all sense-perception and contemplate Intellect by intellect and consider that in us also there is life and intellect, not in bulk but in bulkless power, and that

ἐκδεδυκέναι ταῦτα καὶ δύναμιν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσαν, οὐκ ἀμενηνόν τι χρῆμα, ἀλλὰ πάντων ζωτικωτάτην καὶ νοερωτάτην, ἧς οὔτε ζωτικώτερον οὔτε νοερώτερον οὔτε οὐσιωδέστερον, οὗ τὸ ἐφαψάμενον ἔχει ταῦτα κατὰ λόγον τῆς ἐπαφῆς, τὸ μὲν ἐγγὺς ἐγγυτέρω, τὸ δὲ πόρρω πορρωτέρω. εἴπερ οὖν ἐφετὸν τὸ εἶναι, τὸ μάλιστα ὂν μᾶλλον ὅ τε μάλιστα νοῦς, εἴπερ τὸ νοεῖν ὅλως· καὶ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ὡσαύτως· εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα νοῦν, εἶτα τὸ ζῷον—τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν—ὁ δὲ νοῦς δεύτερον—ἐνέργεια γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας—οὔτ' ἂν κατὰ τὸ ζῷον ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἴη—ἤδη γὰρ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἓν καὶ δύο ἦν—οὔτε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν—πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἓν οὖσα καὶ πολλὰ ἦν.

9. Λείπεται τοίνυν θεωρεῖν, πότερα ἡ οὐσία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐγέννησε τῷ αὐτῆς μερισμῷ, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐμέρισε τὴν οὐσίαν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον αὐτὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ταῦτα. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως· ἆρ' οἷόν τε ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἢ δεῖ καὶ τὰ δύο ἐπὶ δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ τρία ὡσαύτως; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς; εἰ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν δύναιτο εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν ὄντων δύναιτο ἂν εἶναι. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ὄντος; ἢ τοῦτο ἐατέον καὶ πρὸ ἀριθμοῦ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ δοτέον ἀριθμὸν ἐξ ὄντος γίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὰ δύο ὄντα δύο ὄντα ἐστί, προηγήσεται τοῦ τε ὄντος τὸ ἓν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς

[1] These are the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254–255A which Plotinus understands as the categories of the intelligible world.

the true substance has stripped off these things and is a power standing on itself, no feeble shadowy thing but the most living and intelligent of all, than which nothing is livelier or more intelligent or more substantial; that which touches it has all this in proportion to [the closeness of] its touch, that which is near more nearly and that which is far from farther. If then being is an object of desire, that which is most of all being is still more desirable, and that which is most of all intellect, if intelligence in general is desirable; and the same with life. If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this contains all things)—but intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance; then number would not be on the level of the living being—for even before it both one and two existed—nor on the level of intellect—for substance was before it, which was already one and many.

9. It remains then to consider whether substance generated number by its own division, or number divided substance; for certainly either substance and movement and rest and same and other generated number or number generated them.[1] The starting-point of our investigation is: can number exist by itself, or must the two be observed in two things, and the three likewise? And, indeed, also the one which is among the numbers? For if it could exist by itself without the things numbered, it could exist before beings. Then also before being? Well, let us leave this and assume for the present that the one is before number and grant that number comes to exist from being. But if being is one being, and two beings are two beings, the one will precede being

τῶν ὄντων. ἆρ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐπιβολῇ ἢ καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει; σκεπτέον δὲ ὧδε· ὅταν τις ἄνθρωπον ἕνα νοῇ καὶ καλὸν ἕν, ὕστερον δήπου τὸ ἓν νοεῖ ἐφ' ἑκατέρῳ· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅταν ἵππον καὶ κύνα, καὶ δὴ σαφῶς τὰ δύο ἐνταῦθα ὕστερον. ἀλλ' εἰ γεννῴη ἄνθρωπον καὶ γεννῴη ἵππον καὶ κύνα ἢ ἐν αὑτῷ ὄντας προφέροι καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ἐπελθὸν μήτε γεννῴη μήτε προφέροι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐρεῖ· "εἰς ἓν ἰτέον καὶ μετιτέον εἰς ἄλλο ἓν καὶ δύο ποιητέον καὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἄλλο ποιητέον"; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἠριθμήθη· ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔδει[1] γενέσθαι δῆλον ἦν [ὅσα ἔδει].[2] πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄντων. ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἦν ὄντα. ἢ ἦν ἐν τῷ ὄντι, οὐκ ἀριθμὸς ὢν τοῦ ὄντος—ἓν γὰρ ἦν ἔτι τὸ ὄν—ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύναμις ὑποστᾶσα ἐμέρισε τὸ ὂν καὶ οἷον ὠδίνειν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν τὸ πλῆθος. ἢ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἢ ἡ ἐνέργεια ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ζῷον αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀριθμός. ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν ὂν ἀριθμὸς ἡνωμένος, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ἐξελιλιγμένος ἀριθμός, νοῦς δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινούμενος, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀριθμὸς περιέχων; ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γενόμενον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἦν ἓν ἐκεῖνο, δεῖ αὐτὸ οὕτως ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἔλεγον καὶ ἑνάδας καὶ ἀριθμούς. καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός· ἄλλος δὲ ὁ μοναδικὸς λεγόμενος εἴδωλον τούτου. ὁ δὲ οὐσιώδης ὁ μὲν ἐπιθεωρούμενος

[1] Harder: δεῖ Enn.
[2] del. Harder, ut correctionem ad 22 ὅσα δεῖ.

[1] Plotinus is working here with the speculation about Ideal Numbers in the Old Academy discussed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* M and N. For "monadic" (arithmetical) number see M 8. 1083b16–17.

and number will precede beings. Is this, then, in our idea and intuitive conception of it, or in its reality? But we should proceed with the investigation in this way: when someone thinks one man and one beauty, he presumably thinks the one later in each case; and also when he thinks a horse and a dog, it is perfectly obvious here that he thinks the two afterwards. But suppose he was generating man and generating horse and dog, or, when they existed in himself, bringing them out, and not just generating them or bringing them out as they casually occurred to him, will he not say "We must go to one, and pass to another one, and make two, and make another one along with me"? And certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came to be; but it was [already clear] how many there had to be. The whole number, therefore, existed before the beings themselves. But, if numbers were before beings, they were not beings. Now number was in being, not as the number of being—for being was still one—but the power of number which had come to exist divided being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth to multiplicity. For number will be either the substance or the actual activity of being, and the absolute living being is number, and Intellect is number. Is not Being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded, and Intellect number moving in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number? Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, Being must also in this way be number: this is why they called the Forms henads and numbers. And this is substantial number; but the other, which is called monadic, is its image.[1] But the substantial number is that con-

τοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ συγγενῶν αὐτά,πρώτως δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ ὄντι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων. βάσιν δὲ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ ἀρχήν. καὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ἐστὶν ὄν· σκεδασθείη γὰρ ἄν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἕν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἓν πρὶν τυχεῖν τοῦ ἕν, καὶ ἤδη τὸ τυγχάνον τῆς δεκάδος δεκὰς πρὶν τυχεῖν τῆς δεκάδος.

10. Ἑστὼς οὖν τὸ ὂν ἐν πλήθει ἀριθμός, ὅτε πολὺ μὲν ἠγείρετο, παρασκευὴ δὲ οἷον ἦν πρὸς τὰ ὄντα καὶ προτύπωσις καὶ οἷον ἑνάδες τόπον ἔχουσαι τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτὰς ἱδρυθησομένοις. καὶ γὰρ καὶ νῦν "τοσοῦτον βούλομαί" φησι "πλῆθος χρυσοῦ ἢ οἰκιῶν". καὶ ἓν μὲν ὁ χρυσός, βούλεται δὲ οὐ τὸν ἀριθμὸν χρυσὸν ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν χρυσὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἤδη ἔχων ἐπιθεῖναι ζητεῖ τοῦτον τῷ χρυσῷ, ὥστε συμβῆναι τῷ χρυσῷ τοσούτῳ γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα μὲν ἐγίνετο πρὸ ἀριθμοῦ, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐπεθεωρεῖτο τοσαῦτα κινηθείσης τῆς ἀριθμούσης φύσεως, ὅσα τὰ ἀριθμητά, κατὰ συντυχίαν ἦν ἂν τοσαῦτα καὶ οὐ κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοσαῦτα, ὅσα ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν μὴ εἰκῇ τοσαῦτα, ὁ ἀριθμὸς αἴτιος προὼν τοῦ τοσαῦτα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἤδη ὄντος ἀριθμοῦ μετέσχε τὰ γενόμενα τοῦ τοσαῦτα, καὶ ἕκαστον μὲν τοῦ ἓν μετέσχεν, ἵνα ἓν ᾖ. ἔστι δὲ ὂν παρὰ τοῦ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ὂν παρ' αὐτοῦ ὄν, ἓν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ[1] ἕν. ἕκαστόν τε ἕν, εἰ ὁμοῦ πολλὰ ἦν τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς

[1] Theiler: παρ' αὐτοῦ (vel αὐτοῦ) Enn.

templated in the Forms and sharing in their generation, and, primarily, the number in Being and with Being and before the beings. The beings have their foundation in it, and their source and root and principle. For indeed the One is the principle of Being, and the being of Being rests upon this; for otherwise it would be scattered; but the One does not rest upon Being; for then Being would be one before attaining the One, and what attains the decad would be a decad before attaining the decad.

10. Being, therefore, standing firm in multiplicity was number, when it woke as many, and was a kind of preparation for the beings and a preliminary sketch, and like unities keeping a place for the beings which are going to be founded on them. For even here and now one says "I want such and such an amount of gold or house-property." And gold is one, but he wants not to make number gold but gold number; and since he already possesses the number he tries to apply it to the gold, so that it will happen to the gold to become so much. But if the beings came into existence before number, and the number was observed in them as the numbering nature was moved to a total corresponding to the things numbered, they would be so many by chance, and not as many as they are by deliberate predisposition. If then they are not as many as they are just casually, number is a cause which pre-exists their being so many: that is, it was when number already existed that the things which came to be participated in the "so many" and each one of them participated in the "one", so that it might be one. It is a being from Being, as Being is being from itself, and one from the one. And each is one, if the one in them is many all

τριὰς ἕν, καὶ τὰ πάντα ὄντα οὕτως ἕν, οὐχ ὡς τὸ ἓν τὸ κατὰ τὴν μονάδα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν ἡ μυριὰς ἢ ἄλλος τις ἀριθμός. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ λέγων ἤδη πράγματα μύρια γενόμενα, εἰ εἶπε μύρια ὁ ἀριθμῶν, οὐ παρ' αὐτῶν φησι τὰ μύρια προσφωνεῖσθαι δεικνύντων ὥσπερ τὰ χρώματα αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας λεγούσης τοσαῦτα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ λέγοι, οὐκ ἂν εἰδείη, ὅσον τὸ πλῆθος. πῶς οὖν ἐρεῖ; ἢ ἐπιστάμενος ἀριθμεῖν· τοῦτο δέ, εἰ ἀριθμὸν εἰδείη· εἰδείη δ' ἄν, εἰ εἴη ἀριθμός. ἀγνοεῖν δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνην, ὅσα ἐστὶ τὸ πλῆθος, ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον. ὥσπερ τοίνυν εἰ λέγοι τις ἀγαθά, ἢ τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα λέγει, ἢ κατηγορεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῶν. καὶ εἰ τὰ πρῶτα λέγει, ὑπόστασιν λέγει τὴν πρώτην· εἰ δὲ οἷς συμβέβηκε τὸ ἀγαθόν, δεῖ εἶναι φύσιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλοις συμβεβήκῃ, ἢ[1] τὸ αἴτιον τὸ πεποιηκὸς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ δεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτοαγαθὸν ἢ γεγεννηκὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει οἰκείᾳ. οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων ὁ λέγων ἀριθμόν, οἷον δεκάδα, ἢ αὐτὴν ὑφεστῶσαν δεκάδα ἂν λέγοι, ἢ οἷς συμβέβηκε δεκὰς λέγων αὐτὴν δεκάδα ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν τίθεσθαι ἐφ' αὑτῆς οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δεκάδα οὖσαν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, εἰ τὰ ὄντα δεκάδα λέγοι, ἢ αὐτὰ δεκάδα εἶναι ἢ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἄλλην δεκάδα εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεκάδα οὖσαν.[2]

[1] Igal: ἤ Enn.
[2] Kirchhoff: εἶναι Enn., H–S[1].

together, as the triad is one, and all the beings are one, not like the one of the number one, but as the ten thousand or any other number is one. Since someone who says that things have now come to ten thousand, if he says "ten thousand" as he counts, he is not asserting that the things are called "ten thousand" of and from themselves, as if they were showing their colours, but it is the reason which says there are so many of them; for if it did not say so, he would not know how many there were. How, then, can he say how many? Because he knows how to number; but this is so if he knows number; but he could only know number if there was number. But it would be absurd, or rather impossible, to be ignorant of the nature of number, of how much the amount is. It is, then, as when someone speaks of good things: he either speaks of them as good of themselves, or predicates the good incidentally of them. And if he is speaking of primary goods, he is speaking of the first real existence; but if of things to which the good is incidental, there must be a nature of good in order for it to be incidental to other things, in that the cause which produces good also in another must be either the Good Itself or something which has generated the good in its own nature. In this way also one who speaks of a number in the real beings, a decad for instance, would be speaking either of the decad which exists as itself, or if he was speaking of the things to which decad is incidental he would be compelled to postulate the decad itself existing by itself and being nothing but decad. It is necessary, then, if one says that the real beings are decad, that they themselves must be the decad or there must be another decad prior to them which is nothing else

καθόλου τοίνυν δεκτέον,[1] ὅτι πᾶν, ὅτιπερ ἂν κατ' ἄλλου κατηγορῆται, παρ' ἄλλου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἢ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἐκείνου. καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον μὴ ποτὲ μὲν παρεῖναι, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου εἶναι, εἰ οὐσία ἐκεῖνο, οὐσία καὶ αὐτό, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο ἢ αὐτὸ οὐσία· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐσίαν διδοίη, ἀλλ' οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὄν. καὶ εἰ μὲν δύναιτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐκεῖνο νοεῖσθαι ἄνευ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, ἅμα μὲν εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνῳ, ὕστερον δὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τάττεσθαι παρ' ἡμῶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ παρεπινοεῖσθαι οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἐκείνου, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἄνευ τοῦ ἕν, ἢ οὐχ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ συνυπάρχον, ἢ πρότερον αὐτοῦ, ἵνα αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνο ὑπάρχῃ· ἡμεῖς δή φαμεν πρότερον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμόν.

11. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὴν δεκάδα μηδὲν εἶναί τις λέγοι ἢ ἑνάδας τοσαύτας, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἑνάδα συγχωροῖ εἶναι, διὰ τί μίαν μὲν συγχωρήσει ἑνάδα εἶναι, τὰς δὲ δέκα οὐκέτι; ὡς γὰρ ἡ μία τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ συνεζεῦχθαι δεῖ ἑνί τινι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μίαν ἑνάδα· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἴη. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι, κοινὸν τὸ ἕν· τοῦτο δὲ φύσις μία κατὰ πολλῶν κατηγορουμένη, ἣν ἐλέγομεν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι δεῖν καθ' αὑτὴν ὑπάρχειν. οὔσης δὲ ἑνάδος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρουμένης, εἰ μὲν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, οὐ μία μόνον ἑνὰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἕξει καὶ οὕτως πλῆθος ἔσται ἑνάδων· εἰ δ' ἐκείνην μόνην τὴν πρώτην, ἤτοι τῷ

[1] Sleeman: δεικτέον Enn.

but that very thing, decad. In general, then, it must be accepted that everything, whatever it is, which is predicated of something else came to it from something else or is the active actuality of the thing of which it is predicated. And if it is of such a kind as not to be sometimes present and sometimes not, but to be always with that thing, if that thing is substance, it also is substance, and what it is predicated of is no more substance than it is; but if one does not grant it substance, at least it belongs to the real beings and exists. And if that thing could be thought of without its actual activity, that activity could none the less be simultaneous to it, but ranked later by us in our thought. But if it cannot be thought except along with what is predicated of it, as "man" cannot be thought without the "one", it is either not posterior to but co-existent with it, or prior to it, so that the thing may exist through the activity; but we maintain that the one and number are prior.

11. But if someone says that the decad is nothing but so many henads [or units], if he agrees that the unit exists, why will he agree that one unit exists and not agree that the ten do? For why do not the other units have existence as the one does? For the one unit must not be yoked to any one being: for if it was, each of the others could no longer be one. But if each individual one of the others must also be one, the one is common: this means that there is one nature predicated of many, which we said must exist in itself before being observed in many. If then a unit exists in this thing and is again observed in another, if that other unit also really exists, it will not be only one unit which has existence, and so there will be a multiplicity of units; but if it is said that only that

μάλιστα ὄντι συνοῦσαν ἢ τῷ μάλιστα ἑνὶ πάντη. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τῷ μάλιστα ὄντι, ὁμωνύμως ἂν αἱ ἄλλαι ἑνάδες καὶ οὐ συνταχθήσονται τῇ πρώτῃ, ἢ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνομοίων μονάδων καὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν μονάδων καὶ καθόσον μονάδες· εἰ δὲ τῷ μάλιστα ἑνί, τί ἂν δέοιτο τὸ μάλιστα ἕν, ἵνα ἓν ᾖ, τῆς μονάδος ταύτης; εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, ἀνάγκη ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ ἓν ψιλόν, ἀπηρημωμένον τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἓν λεχθῆναι καὶ νοηθῆναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἓν ἄνευ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ λεγομένου ἓν κἀκεῖ ἔσται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἄλλο ἓν ὑποστήσεται; καὶ χωρὶς μὲν ἕκαστον πολλαὶ μονάδες, ἃ καὶ πολλὰ ἕν. εἰ δ' ἐφεξῆς οἷον γεννῴη ἡ φύσις, μᾶλλον δὲ γεννήσασα ἢ οὐ στᾶσα καθ' ἓν ὧν ἐγέννα, οἷον συνεχῆ ἕνα ποιοῦσα, περιγράψασα μὲν καὶ στᾶσα θᾶττον ἐν τῇ προόδῳ τοὺς ἐλάττους ἀριθμοὺς ἀπογεννήσαι, εἰς πλέον δὲ κινηθεῖσα, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς κινήσεσι, τοὺς μείζους ἀριθμοὺς ὑποστήσαι· καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἑκάστοις ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαρμόσαι τὰ πλήθη ἕκαστα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων εἰδυῖαν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ ἐφαρμοσθείη ἕκαστον ἀριθμῷ ἑκάστῳ, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν εἴη ἢ ἄλλο τι ἂν παρεκβὰν εἴη ἀνάριθμον καὶ ἄλογον γεγενημένον.

first unit exists, it will do so as coupled either to that which in the highest degree exists or to that which is in the highest degree one in every way. But if to that which exists in the highest degree, then the other units will have merely their name in common with the first, and will not be ranked on the same level with it, or number will consist of unlike unities and there will be intrinsic differences between unities even in so far as they are unities; but if it is coupled to that which is one in the highest degree, why would what is one in the highest degree need this unity in order to be one? If these suggestions are impossible, there must be a one which is nothing else but bare one, isolated in its essential nature, before each individual one is spoken and thought. If, then, the one without the thing which is called one is going to exist also there in the intelligible, why should not another one as well come into existence? And each individual taken separately will be many unities, that is, many "ones". But if that nature generates in a kind of succession, or rather has generated, or does not stand still at one thing of those which it has generated, but makes a kind of continuous one, when it draws a line and stops more quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser numbers, but when it moves further, not in other things but in its very own movements, it brings the greater numbers into existence; and so it would fit the particular multiplicities and each particular being to the particular numbers, knowing that, if each particular thing was not fitted to each particular number, it could not exist at all or would get away and be something else by becoming innumerate and irrational.

12. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν μονάδα μὴ ὑπόστασιν λέγοι ἔχειν—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕν, ὃ μὴ τί ἕν—πάθημα δέ τι τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, πρῶτον μὲν τί κωλύει, καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὄν, πάθημα λέγειν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι ὄν; εἰ δ' ὅτι νύττει τοῦτο καὶ πλήττει καὶ φαντασίαν περὶ ὄντος ποιεῖ, νυττομένην καὶ φαντασίαν λαμβάνουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ὁρῶμεν. ἔπειτα πότερα καὶ τὸ πάθημα καὶ τὸ νόημα τῆς ψυχῆς ἓν ἢ πλῆθος ὁρῶμεν; ἀλλ' ὅταν λέγωμεν "μὴ ἕν", ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχομεν τὸ ἓν—φαμὲν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ἕν—ἔχομεν ἄρα ἕν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ψυχῇ ἄνευ τοῦ "τι ἕν". ἀλλ' ἔχομεν τὸ ἓν ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν λαβόντες τινὰ νόησιν καί τινα τύπον, οἷον ἐννόημα ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐννοημάτων ἓν εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τιθέντες ὑποστάσεις ἂν τοιαύτας τιθεῖεν, εἴπερ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐν ὑποστάσει, πρὸς οὓς περὶ αὐτῶν καιρίως ἂν λέγοιτο. ἀλλ' οὖν εἰ τοιοῦτον οἷον ὕστερον ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων λέγοιεν γεγονέναι ἐν ἡμῖν πάθημα ἢ νόημα, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τί καὶ δὴ καὶ ὄχλον καὶ ἑορτὴν καὶ στρατὸν καὶ πλῆθος—καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος παρὰ τὰ πράγματα τὰ πολλὰ λεγόμενα οὐδέν

[1] Plotinus is arguing here against the Stoics: cp. *SVF* II 864 and 866.

12. But if someone says that the one and the unit have no real existence—for there is nothing that is one which is not some one thing—but the one is a way the soul is affected in regard to each of the real beings, first of all, what is the obstacle to saying that whenever one says "being" one is speaking of a way in which the soul is affected and there is no such thing as being? But if it is because this stabs and strikes and takes a mental image of being, we see that the soul is also stabbed by and takes a mental image of the one.[1] Then, do we see this way of being affected and this thinking of the soul as one or many? But when we say "not one", we do not have the one from the thing itself—for we say that the one is not in it—but we do have the one, and it is in the soul without the "some one thing". But we have the one by taking some kind of thought and impression from the things outside us, a sort of idea derived from the thing. For those who posit the idea of number and the idea of the one as one species of what are called in their philosophy ideas,[2] should posit existences of this kind, if any of such things are in existence; and there is much that could appropriately be said against them about this. But if they were to say that this way of being affected or thought arises in us as a kind of after-consequence of the things, like the "this" and the "something" and, for that matter, "crowd" and "feast" and "army" and "multitude"—for just as the multitude is nothing over and above the things which are said to be

[2] *ἐννόημα* is a Stoic term; for the Stoics *ἐννοήματα* had no extra-mental existence: cp. *SVF* I 65 and Diogenes Laertius VII 61.

ἐστιν οὐδ' ἡ ἑορτὴ παρὰ τοὺς συναχθέντας καὶ εὐθυμουμένους ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν μόνον τι καὶ ἀπηρημωμένον τῶν ἄλλων νοοῦντες, ὅταν λέγωμεν ἕν· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα εἶναι, οἷον καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τούτοις· τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὑπόστασιν ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ ἢ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠδί, ὁ δ' ὠδὶ ἕστηκεν ἢ κάθηται; καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνω ὡσαύτως, τὸ μὲν τοιαύτην θέσιν ⟨ἔχειν⟩[1] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τοῦ παντὸς μᾶλλον, ὃ λέγομεν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον κάτω— πρὸς δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρῶτον μὲν ἐκεῖνο λεκτέον, ὡς ὑπόστασίς τις τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων, οὐ μέντοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ πάντων οὔτε αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἁπάντων. χωρὶς μέντοι πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν λεχθέντων ἐπιστατέον.

13. Τὸ δὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου γενέσθαι τὴν νόησιν τοῦ ἑνός, τοῦ ὑποκειμένου [καὶ][2] τοῦ ἐν αἰσθήσει ἀνθρώπου ὄντος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ζῴου ἢ καὶ λίθου, πῶς ἂν εἴη εὔλογον, ἄλλου μὲν ὄντος τοῦ φανέντος—τοῦ ἀνθρώπου—ἄλλου δὲ καὶ οὐ ταὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ ἕν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἓν ἡ διάνοια κατηγοροῖ. ἔπειτα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὐ μάτην κινουμένη, ἀλλ' ὁρῶσα θέσιν διάφορον ἔλεγε τὸ ὠδί, οὕτωσί τι ἐνταῦθα ὁρῶσα λέγει ἕν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κενὸν πάθημα καὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ τὸ ἓν λέγει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ "καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο" ἄλλο ἓν λέγει. ἔπειτα τὸ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον

[1] Theiler.
[2] del. Beutler.

many, nor the feast anything over and above those assembled and enjoying themselves at the ceremonies, so, when we say "one", we do not think of the one as something alone and quite apart from the other things; and there are many others like this, like "right" and "up" and their opposites; for what would there be of real existence about "right" other than that one stands or sits here and the other there? And it would be just the same with "up", that a thing has this kind of position and is more in that part of the universe which we call "up", and another more in that called "down"—in answer to this sort of argument we must first say this, that there is some kind of real existence in each of these things mentioned, but not the same in all, either of themselves in relation to each other or in the relation of all to the one. So we must consider each of the arguments separately.

13. How could it be reasonable to suppose that the thought of the one originated from what underlies it, which is a man or some other living thing, or even a stone, in the realm of sense, since what appears is one thing—the man—and the one is another and not the same? Otherwise reason would not predicate "one" in the case of a thing which is not man. And then, just as in the case of "right" and the like reason was not moved without any cause, but because it saw a different position it said "here", so in this case it is because it sees something that it says "one"; for it is not reporting an empty way of being affected and saying "one" about nothing. For it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and there is no other thing; for in the "no other thing" it is saying another "one". And then the "other" and

ὕστερον· μὴ γὰρ ἐρείσασα πρὸς ἓν οὔτε ἄλλο ἐρεῖ ἡ διάνοια οὔτε ἕτερον, τό τε "μόνον" ὅταν λέγῃ, ἓν μόνον λέγει· ὥστε τὸ ἓν λέγει πρὸ τοῦ "μόνον". ἔπειτα τὸ λέγον, πρὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ ἄλλου "ἕν", ἐστὶν ἕν, καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει, πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἢ νοῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐστὶν ἕν· ἢ γὰρ ἓν ἢ πλείω ἑνὸς καὶ πολλά· καὶ εἰ πολλά, ἀνάγκη προϋπάρχειν ἕν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν πλῆθος λέγῃ πλείω ἑνὸς λέγει· καὶ στρατὸν πολλοὺς ὡπλισμένους καὶ εἰς ἓν συντεταγμένους νοεῖ, καὶ πλῆθος ὂν οὐκ ἐᾷ πλῆθος εἶναι· ἡ διάνοια δῆλόν που καὶ ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ ἡ διδοῦσα τὸ ἕν, ὃ μὴ ἔχει τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ[1] ὀξέως τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως ἰδοῦσα τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ φύσιν συνήγαγεν εἰς ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἓν ψεύδεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ οἰκίας τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν λίθων ἕν· μᾶλλον μέντοι τὸ ἓν ἐπ' οἰκίας. εἰ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ μεριστοῦ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντος τινὸς φύσεως τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑφεστώσης. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὴν οὐσίαν κατηγοροῦντες καθ' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητῶν, κατηγοροῦντες δὲ καὶ κατὰ τῶν νοητῶν κυριώτερον κατὰ τῶν νοητῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιούμεθα ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ κυριώτερον τιθέντες, καὶ τὸ ὂν μᾶλλον ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ αἰσθητῇ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν μᾶλλον καὶ κυριώτερον ἕν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αὐτοῖς διάφορον κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὁρῶντες εἶναι— κατὰ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους εἰς ἀναφορὰν μέντοι ἑνὸς

[1] ἢ (*vel*) U, Creuzer: ἡ wBCQ: εἰ x: ἤ H-S[1].

the "different" come later; for if the reason does not rest on the one it will not say "other" or "different", and when it says "alone" it says "one alone"; so that it says the "one" before the "alone". And then what speaks is one before it says "one" of something else, and that about which it speaks, before anyone speaks or thinks about it, is one, for it is either one or more than one and many; and if many, one must exist before it. For also when it says "multitude" it says "more than one"; and it thinks an army as many men armed and brought together into one order, and does not allow what is a multitude to be a multitude; the reason which gives the "one" which the multitude does not have makes it clear [that it is not only a multitude], or, by seeing the "one" which results from its order, gathers the nature of the many into one; for the one is not falsely predicated here any more than it is of a house which is one from many stones; though the "one" of the house is more one. If then it is more one in the continuous and [still] more one in the indivisible, it is clearly because the one is a particular nature which has existence. For it is not possible for there to be a "more" in non-existents, but just as when we predicate substance of each individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the intelligibles, we predicate it more appropriately of the intelligibles, putting the "more" and the "more appropriately" in the realm of real beings, and say that there is more being in the category of substance, even sensible substance, than in the other genera, in the same way also we see that the one, which differs in respect of more [and less] also in the sense-objects, is also more and more appropriately in the intelligibles—and in all these ways it must be

εἶναι φατέον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι νοητὸν καὶ οὐκ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, κἂν μετέχῃ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἓν περὶ αἰσθητὸν μὲν ἂν κατὰ μετοχὴν θεωροῖτο, νοητὸν μέντοι καὶ νοητῶς ἡ διάνοια αὐτὸ λαμβάνει· ὥστε ἀπ' ἄλλου ἄλλο νοεῖ, ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· προῄδει ἄρα· εἰ δὲ προῄδει ὂν τόδε τι, ταὐτὸν τῷ ὄν. καὶ ὅταν τι, ἓν αὖ λέγει· ὥσπερ ὅταν τινέ, δύο· καὶ ὅταν τινάς, πολλούς. εἰ τοίνυν μηδέ[1] τι νοῆσαι ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἓν ἢ τοῦ δύο ἤ τινος ἀριθμοῦ, πῶς οἷόν τε ἄνευ οὗ οὐχ οἷόν τέ τι νοῆσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι; οὗ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος μηδ' ὁτιοῦν δύνασαι[2] νοῆσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν, λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' οὗ χρεία πανταχοῦ πρὸς παντὸς νοήματος ἢ λόγου γένεσιν, προϋπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ λόγου καὶ νοήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τὴν τούτων γένεσιν παραλαμβάνοιτο. εἰ δὲ καὶ εἰς οὐσίας ἑκάστης ὑπόστασιν—οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν, ὃ μὴ ἕν—καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας ἂν εἴη καὶ γεννῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. διὸ καὶ ἓν ὄν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, εἶτα ἕν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ "ὄν" καὶ ἓν πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, ἐν δὲ τῷ "ἕν" οὐκ ἔνι τὸ "ὄν", εἰ μὴ καὶ ποιήσειεν αὐτὸ προσνεῦσαν αὐτοῦ τῇ γενέσει. καὶ τὸ "τοῦτο" δὲ οὐ κενόν· ὑπόστασιν γὰρ δεικνυμένην λέγει

[1] H–S: *μήτε* Enn.
[2] Igal: *δύνασθαι* wBUCQ: *δύναται* Kirchhoff: *δύνατον* H–S[1]: om. x.

affirmed that there is a reference to one. But just as substance and being is intelligible and not perceptible, even if the perceptible participates in it, in this way also the one might be perceived in the perceptible by participation, but the reason grasps it as intelligible and does so intellectually; so that it thinks one thing, which it does not see, from another; so it knew it before. But if it knew it before as being this particular thing, it is the same as being. And when it says it is something, it says as well that there is one; just as when it says "some" in the dual, it says that there are two; and when in the plural, that there are many.[1] If, then, it is not possible to think anything without the one or the two or some number, how is it possible for that not to exist without which it is not possible to think or speak? For it is impossible to say that something does not exist of which, since it does not exist, you cannot think or say anything at all. But that which is needed everywhere for the coming into existence of every thought and statement must be there before statement and thinking: for this is how it can be brought to contribute to their coming into existence. But if it is needed for the existence of each and every substance—for there is nothing which is which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason also it is one-being, but not first being and then one; for in that which was being and also one there would be many; but being is not present in the one except in the sense that it might make it by inclining to its generation. And the "this" is not an empty word; for

[1] Cp. Plato *Sophist* 237D6–10.

ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ καὶ παρουσίαν τινά, οὐσίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· ὥστε τὸ "τοῦτο" σημαίνοι ἂν οὐ κενόν τι οὐδ' ἔστι πάθημα τῆς διανοίας ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὄντι, ἀλλ' ἔστι πρᾶγμα ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ τινος ὄνομα λέγοι.

14. Πρὸς δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πρός τι λεχθέντα ἄν τις εὐλόγως λέγοι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἓν τοιοῦτον οἷον ἄλλου παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἀπολωλεκέναι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ, εἰ μέλλοι ἐκ τοῦ ἓν ἐκβῆναι, πεπονθέναι τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς στέρησιν εἰς δύο ἢ πλείω διαιρεθέν. εἰ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ὄγκος διαιρεθεὶς δύο γίνεται οὐκ ἀπολόμενος ὡς ὄγκος, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ προσὸν τὸ ἕν, ὃ ἀπέβαλε τῆς διαιρέσεως αὐτὸ φθειράσης. ὃ δὴ ὁτὲ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ πάρεστιν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀπογίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τάξομεν, ὅπου ἂν ᾖ; καὶ συμβεβηκέναι μὲν τούτοις, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ εἶναι, ἕν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὅταν φαίνηται ἕν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς, τοῖς μὲν ὑστέροις συμβεβηκός, ἐφ' αὑτοῦ δὲ ἐν [τοῖς νοητοῖς][1] τῷ πρώτῳ, ὅταν ἕν, εἶτα ὄν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἓν μηδὲν παθὸν προσελθόντος ἄλλου αὐτῷ οὐκέτι ἕν, ἀλλὰ δύο ἔσται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖ. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἓν ἐγένετο δύο, οὔτε ᾧ προσετέθη οὔτε τὸ προστεθέν, ἀλλ' ἑκάτερον μένει ἕν, ὥσπερ ἦν· τὰ δὲ δύο κατηγορεῖται

[1] delevimus, ut glossam ad τῷ πρώτῳ.

it is used to speak of a real existence which is pointed out instead of its name, and of a presence, a substance or some other of the things which really are; so that the "this" would indicate something which is not empty, and it is not a way in which the reason is affected about nothing existent, but a thing underlying the thought, just as if it said the proper name of a thing itself.

14. One might reasonably reply to what has been said under the head of relation, that the one is not the kind of thing to lose its own nature when something else is affected and it is affected in no way; but if it is going to escape from the one it must experience the deprivation of the one by being divided into two or more. If therefore the same bulk becomes two by being divided without being destroyed as bulk, it is clear that besides the underlying bulk the one was in it as something added, which it lost when the division destroyed it. Now, how can we avoid ranking among things which exist, wherever it may be, what is sometimes present to and sometimes absent from one and the same thing? And we shall affirm that it is present to these things incidentally, but exists by itself, when it appears both in perceptible and intelligible things, incidentally to the later order, but on its own in the first [order of being], when it is first one and then being. But if someone were to say that the one also, without being affected in any way, when something else comes to it will no longer be one but two, he will not be speaking correctly. For it was not the one which became two, neither the one which was added nor the one it was added to, but each of them remains one, as it was; but the "two" is predicated of both, but the

κατ' ἀμφοῖν, χωρὶς δὲ τὸ ἓν καθ' ἑκατέρου μένοντος. οὔκουν τὰ δύο φύσει ἐν σχέσει καὶ ἡ δυάς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν σύνοδον καὶ τὸ συνόδῳ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῷ δύο ποιεῖν, τάχ' ἂν ἦν ἡ τοιαύτη σχέσις τὰ δύο καὶ ἡ δυάς. νῦν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ πάθει θεωρεῖται πάλιν αὖ δυάς· σχισθέντος γὰρ ἑνός τινος γίνεται δύο· οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε σύνοδος οὔτε σχίσις τὰ δύο, ἵν' ἂν ἦν σχέσις. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ. ὅταν γὰρ σχέσις ᾖ ἡ γεννῶσά τι, ἀδύνατον τὴν ἐναντίαν τὸ αὐτὸ γεννᾶν, ὡς τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν σχέσιν. τί οὖν τὸ κύριον αἴτιον; ἓν μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἓν παρουσίᾳ, δύο δὲ δυάδος, ὥσπερ καὶ λευκὸν λευκοῦ καὶ καλὸν καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου δίκαιον. ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα θετέον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ σχέσεις καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἰτιατέον, ὡς δίκαιον μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς τάδε τοιάνδε σχέσιν, καλὸν δέ, ὅτι οὕτω διατιθέμεθα οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ οἷου διαθεῖναι ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἥκοντος ἐπακτοῦ τῷ καλῷ φαινομένῳ. ὅταν τοίνυν ἴδῃς τι ἓν ὃ λέγεις, πάντως δήπου ἐστὶ καὶ μέγα καὶ καλὸν καὶ μυρία ἂν εἴη εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὡς οὖν τὸ μέγα καὶ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἄλλαι

[1] Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 96E8–97B1. Plotinus here is following the *Phaedo* very closely, i.e. he is treating numbers simply as a particular kind of Forms, with the same objective reality and causative power as other Forms.

"one" separately of each, which remains what it is. The two and the dyad is not therefore naturally relative. But if two was by coming together, and coming together was the same thing as making two, perhaps the two and the dyad would be a relation of this kind. But as it is the dyad is also observed on the other hand in the opposite way of being affected; for when some one thing is cut, it becomes two; so that the two is neither a coming together nor a cutting, so as to be a relation. And the same argument applies to every number. For, when it is a relation which produces something, it is impossible for the opposite relation to produce the same thing so that this thing can be the relation. What then is the proper cause of number? A thing is one by the presence of the one and two by the presence of the dyad, just as it is white by the presence of the white and beautiful by that of the beautiful and just by that of the just.[1] Otherwise, one would not be able to maintain that these exist either, but would have to make relations responsible for these two, as if the just was so because of this particular relation to these particular things, and the beautiful because we are so disposed, with nothing existing in the underlying reality of a kind to dispose us, and nothing coming from outside to what appears beautiful. Whenever, then, you see something which you call one, it is of course also in every way great and beautiful and there would be a vast number of other things to say about it. Therefore, as the great and greatness are in it, and sweet and bitter and other

ποιότητες, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἕν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποιότης μὲν ἔσται πᾶσα ἠτισοῦν, ποσότης δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδὲ ποσότης μὲν τὸ συνεχές, τὸ δὲ διωρισμένον οὐκ ἔσται, καίτοι μέτρῳ τὸ συνεχὲς χρῆται τῷ διωρισμένῳ. ὡς οὖν μέγα μεγέθους παρουσίᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ἓν ἑνὸς καὶ δύο δυάδος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς μεταλαμβάνει κοινὸν πρὸς πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τὴν ζητουμένην μετάληψιν. φατέον δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς διῃρημένοις ἄλλως θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν [δεκάδα][1] ἐνοῦσαν δεκάδα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συνεχέσιν ἄλλως, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολλαῖς εἰς ἓν τοσαύταις δυνάμεσιν ἄλλως· καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἤδη ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἔτι δὲ ἐκεῖ μηκέτι ἐν ἄλλοις θεωρουμένους, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἐφ' αὑτῶν ὄντας τοὺς ἀληθεστάτους ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι, αὐτοδεκάδα, οὐ δεκάδα τινῶν νοητῶν.

15. Πάλιν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τούτων ἤδη λεχθέντων λέγωμεν τὸ μὲν ξύμπαν ὂν τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὂν εἶναι καὶ νοῦν καὶ ζῷον τέλεον εἶναι, ὁμοῦ δὴ πάντα ζῷα εἶναι, οὗ δὴ τὸ ἓν ἑνί, ὡς ἦν αὐτῷ δυνατόν, μεμίμηται καὶ τόδε τὸ ζῷον τὸ πᾶν· ἔφυγε γὰρ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ φύσις τὸ ἐκεῖ ἕν, εἴπερ καὶ ἔμελλεν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι. ἀριθμὸν δὴ δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι σύμπαντα· εἰ γὰρ μὴ τέλεος εἴη, ἐλλείποι ἂν ἀριθμῷ τινι· καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς ζῴων ἐν αὐτῷ εἴη, παντελὲς ζῷον οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστιν

[1] del. Igal.

qualities, why not also the one? For there will certainly not be every possible kind of quality, but not quantity, in the real things; nor will the continuous be quantity and the discrete not, although the continuous uses the discrete as a measure. As therefore a thing is great by the presence of greatness, so it is one by the presence of one and two by the presence of dyad, and the rest in the same way. But the problem of how the thing participates [in number] is common to the enquiry about participation in all the Forms. But we must affirm that the decad is observed in one way in things that are discrete and in another in things that are continuous, and in other ways in the many unified powers of this particular number; and that we have already ascended among the intelligibles; and that there are the true numbers, no longer observed in other things but existing themselves on their own, the absolute decad, not the decad of some intelligibles.

15. Now that this has been said, let us say again, starting at the beginning, that total being, that true being, is both being and intellect and perfect living thing, and is all living things together; this universal living thing here below has imitated its one, as far as it could by [its own] one; for the nature of the perceptible escaped the one there, since it was going to be perceptible by the senses. It must certainly be total number; for if it was not perfect, it might be deficient in some number; and if the whole number of living things was not in it, it would not be the "complete living thing".[1] Number therefore exists

[1] Again Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

οὖν ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρὸ ζῴου παντὸς καὶ τοῦ παντελοῦς ζῴου. ὁ μὲν δὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα καθό ἐστι, καὶ ᾗ ζῷον παντελές ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἐνταῦθα ἄνθρωπος, ᾗ ζῷον τὸ πᾶν, μέρος αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἕκαστον, ᾗ ζῷον, ἐκεῖ ἐν ζῴῳ ἐστίν. ἐν δὲ τῷ νῷ, καθόσον νοῦς, ὡς μὲν μέρη οἱ[1] νοῖ πάντες καθ' ἕκαστον· ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ τούτων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐν νῷ ἀριθμὸς πρώτως· ὡς δὲ ἐν νῷ, ὅσα νοῦ ἐνέργειαι· καὶ ὡς νοῦ, δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ὅσα νοῦς ἔχων νοῦς ἐστιν ὄντως. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἡ ἐπιστήμη; ἢ ὅτι ἔστι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὁμοῦ ὁ ἐπιστήμων, τὸ ἐπιστητόν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως· διὸ καὶ πρώτως ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ψυχῇ δέ, καθόσον ψυχή, συμβεβηκός· δυνάμει γὰρ μᾶλλον ταῦτα, ἐνεργείᾳ δέ, ὅταν πρὸς νοῦν καὶ σὺν νῷ.[2] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἤδη τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ ἀριθμός, μεθ' οὗ τὰ ὄντα γεννᾷ κινούμενον κατ' ἀριθμόν, προστησάμενον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἓν συνάπτον αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον, οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὂν συνημμένον. τὸ δὲ ὂν γενόμενον ἀριθμὸς συνάπτει τὰ ὄντα πρὸς αὑτό· σχίζεται γὰρ οὐ καθὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ μένει τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ· σχιζόμενον δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ

[1] Creuzer: ὡς Enn.
[2] R^{2mg}: συνῇ Enn.

prior to every living thing and to the "complete living thing". Man is certainly in the intelligible, and the other living things in that they exist, and that intelligible exists in that it is the "complete living thing". For in fact the man here below also, in that the All is a living thing, is part of it; and each individual thing, in that it is a living thing, is there in the intelligible living thing. And in Intellect, in so far as it is Intellect, all the intellects exist individually as parts; but then there is a number of these also. Not even in Intellect then does number exist primarily; but it is in Intellect as the sum of the active actualities of Intellect; and, as it is the number of Intellect, it is righteousness and self-control and the other virtues and knowledge and all the things by the possession of which Intellect is really Intellect. How then is knowledge not in something else? It is because the knower, the known and the knowledge are the same and all together, and it is just the same with the rest; for this reason each exists primarily and righteousness is not incidental but is incidental to soul in so far as it is soul; for in soul these things are rather potential, but are actual when it is directed to Intellect and with Intellect. But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this, and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number, setting the numbers before their existence as the One stands before its own, joining being itself to the first (but the numbers no longer join the other beings to the first; for it suffices that being is joined to it). But being, when it has become number, joins the beings to itself; for it splits (not in so far as it is one, but its one abides); and when it has split according to its

φύσιν εἰς ὅσα ἠθέλησεν, εἶδεν εἰς ὅσα κατὰ[1] τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐγέννησεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἄρα ὄντα· ταῖς γὰρ δυνάμεσι τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἐσχίσθη καὶ τοσαῦτα ἐγέννησεν, ὅσα ἦν ὁ ἀριθμός. ἀρχὴ οὖν καὶ πηγὴ ὑποστάσεως τοῖς οὖσιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἀληθής. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα μετὰ ἀριθμῶν ἡ γένεσις ἑκάστοις, κἂν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν λάβῃ τι, ἢ ἄλλο γεννᾷ ἢ γίνεται οὐδέν. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν πρῶτοι ἀριθμοί, ὡς ἀριθμητοί· οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἤδη ἀμφότερα ἔχουσιν· ᾗ μὲν παρὰ τούτων, ἀριθμητοί, ᾗ δὲ κατὰ τούτους τὰ ἄλλα μετροῦσι, καὶ ἀριθμοῦντες τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητά· τίνι γὰρ δέκα ἂν λέγοιεν ἢ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀριθμοῖς;

16. Τούτους δή, οὕς φαμεν πρώτους ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ποῦ ἄν τις φαίη θείητε καὶ εἰς τί γένος τῶν ὄντων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ποσοῦ μνήμην ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐποιεῖσθε ἀξιοῦντες ὁμοίως [ἐν][2] τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τιθέναι. πάλιν τε αὖ λέγετε, ὡς πρώτων ὄντων οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθμοί, ἄλλους τε αὖ ἀριθμοὺς παρ' ἐκείνους εἶναι λέγετε ἀριθμοῦντας. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα διατάττεσθε, λέγετε ἡμῖν. ἔχει γὰρ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πότερα ποσόν τι ἢ

[1] coniecimus: καὶ Enn.
[2] expunctum in A, del. Kirchhoff.

[1] In this chapter Plotinus has moved from the simple Platonism of the *Phaedo* to a position more in accord with the later discussions in the Academy, alluded to by

nature into as many as it wished, it looked to see how many it had generated according to number, which were therefore in it; for it was split by the powers of number and generated as many as the number was. Therefore the first and true number is the principle and spring of existence for the real beings.[1] And so here below too the coming into being of every individual thing takes place with the help of numbers, and when something takes another number it generates something else or nothing comes to be at all. And these are the first numbers, as numbered; but those in the other things already have both; in that they come from these first, they are numbered numbers, but in that they are according to these, they measure the other things, numbering both the numbers and the things numbered; for by what could they say "ten" except by the numbers in themselves?

16. Now, these which we affirm are the first and true numbers—someone might ask "Where do you put them, and in which of the genera of beings? For everybody puts them in the quantitative, and you did mention the quantitative in what you said before, when you claimed that one must put the discrete like the continuous among beings.[2] But again on the other side you say that these are the numbers of the first real beings, and again you say that there are other numbering numbers beside these. So tell us how you arrange all this. For there is a great deal of difficulty here; since the one also which is in per-

Aristotle, in which the Ideal Numbers are prior to the Forms.

[2] In ch. 14, 38–40.

πολλάκις μὲν τὸ ἓν ποσόν, αὐτὸ δὲ μόνον ἀρχὴ ποσοῦ καὶ οὐ ποσόν; καὶ πότερα ἀρχὴ οὖσα συγγενὲς ἢ ἄλλο τι; ταῦτα ἡμῖν πάντα δίκαιοι διασαφεῖν ἐστε. λεκτέον οὖν ἀρξαμένοις ἐντεῦθεν περὶ τούτων, ὡς ὅταν μέν— πρῶτον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ποιητέον τὸν λόγον—ὅταν τοίνυν ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλου λαβὼν εἴπῃς δύο, οἷον κύνα καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπους δύο ἢ πλείους, δέκα εἰπὼν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δεκάδα, ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὗτος οὐκ οὐσία οὐδ' ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλὰ καθαρῶς ποσόν. καὶ μερίζων[1] καθ' ἕνα καὶ τῆς δεκάδος ταύτης μέρη ποιῶν τὰ ἕνα ἀρχὴν ποιεῖς καὶ τίθεσαι ποσοῦ· εἷς γὰρ τῶν δέκα οὐχ ἓν καθ' αὑτό. ὅταν δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λέγῃς ἀριθμόν τινα, οἷον δυάδα, ζῷον καὶ λογικόν, οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ὁ τρόπος ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν διεξοδεύεις καὶ ἀριθμεῖς, ποσόν τι ποιεῖς, ἢ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενά ἐστι δύο καὶ ἑκάτερον ἕν, εἰ τὸ ἓν ἑκάτερον συμπληροῦν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἡ ἑνότης ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀριθμὸν ἄλλον καὶ οὐσιώδη λέγεις. καὶ ἡ δυὰς αὕτη οὐχ ὕστερον οὐδὲ ὅσον λέγει μόνον ἔξωθεν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ συνέχον τὴν τοῦ πράγματος φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖς ἀριθμὸν σὺ ἐνταῦθα ἐν διεξόδῳ ἐπιὼν πράγματα καθ' αὑτὰ ὄντα οὐδὲ συνιστάμενα ἐν τῷ ἀριθμεῖσθαι· τί γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο εἰς οὐσίαν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ μετ' ἄλλου ἀριθμουμένῳ; οὐδὲ γάρ τις ἑνάς, ὥσπερ ἐν χορῷ, ἀλλ' ἢ

[1] Creuzer: μερίζον Enn.

ceptible things—is it something quantitative, or is a number of times one quantitative, but it itself the principle of the quantitative and not quantitative? And, being the principle, is it of the same genus, or something else? You owe us an explanation of all this." So, starting from this point, we must say about all this that when—we must base our discussion first on perceptible things—when, therefore, you take one thing after another and say "two", a dog and a man for instance, or two men, or more when you say "ten" and "a decad of men", this number is not a substance, not even the kind of substance which occurs among perceptible things, but purely quantitative. And when you divide into ones and make them part of this decad you make and posit the ones as principle of the quantitative, for a one of the ten is not one in itself. But when you say that man in himself is a particular number, a dyad for instance, animal and rational, your way of proceeding here is not one single way, but in so far as you are counting and numbering you are making something quantitative, but in so far as the underlying realities are two and each of them is one, if each one is an essential completion of the substance and unity is in each, you are speaking of a different and substantial number. And this dyad is not posterior, nor just as much as it says merely, outside the thing, but that which is in the substance and holds the nature of the thing together. For you certainly do not make number here below when you go through one after another things which have their own existence and do not come together in the numbering: for what difference does it make in substance to one man if he is counted along with another? For there is no unity either, as

δεκὰς αὕτη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν σοὶ τῷ ἀριθμοῦντι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἂν ἔχοι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς δέκα οὓς ἀριθμεῖς μὴ συντεταγμένοις εἰς ἓν οὐδὲ δεκὰς ἂν λέγοιτο, ἀλλὰ δέκα σὺ ποιεῖς ἀριθμῶν, καὶ ποσὸν τοῦτο τὸ δέκα· ἐν δὲ τῷ χορῷ καὶ ἔστι τι ἔξω καὶ ἐν τῷ στρατῷ. πῶς δ' ἐν σοί; ἢ ὁ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ ἀριθμεῖν ἐγκείμενος ἄλλως· ὁ δ' ἐκ τοῦ φανῆναι ἔξωθεν πρὸς τὸν ἐν σοὶ ἐνέργεια ἢ ἐκείνων ἢ κατ' ἐκείνους, ἀριθμοῦντος ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν γεννῶντος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπόστασιν ποιοῦντος ποσοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ὑπόστασίν τινος κινήσεως. πῶς οὖν ἄλλως ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν; ἢ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν· μετέχουσά φησιν ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ἀριθμὸς αὖ καὶ ἁρμονία· οὔτε γὰρ σῶμά φησί τις οὔτε μέγεθος· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα ἡ ψυχή, εἴπερ οὐσία. ὁ μὲν δὴ τοῦ σώματος ἀριθμὸς οὐσία, ὡς σῶμα, ὁ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαι, ὡς ψυχαί. καὶ δὴ ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν, εἰ ἔστι τὸ ἐκεῖ ζῷον αὐτὸ πλείω, οἷον τριάς, αὕτη ἡ τριὰς οὐσιώδης ἡ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ. ἡ δὲ τριὰς ἡ μήπω ζῴου, ἀλλ' ὅλως τριὰς ἐν τῷ ὄντι, ἀρχὴ οὐσίας. εἰ δ' ἀριθμεῖς ζῷον καὶ καλόν, ἑκάτερον

[1] Plato *Timaeus* 36E6–37A1. In considering Pythagorean and Platonic thought about numbers it is most important always to remember that, from Pythagoras onwards, the numbers are musical numbers, the numbers of melody and rhythm.

[2] A Pythagorean doctrine accepted by Plato's pupil

there is in a chorus, but this decad of men would have its existence in you, the numberer, but in the ten which you number, which are not ordered together into one, one could not even speak of a decad, but you make ten by numbering, and this ten is quantitative; but in the chorus there is also something outside you, and also in the army. But in what way is the number in you? Now, that which is latent in you before the numbering is there in a different way; but that which comes from the outward appearance to the number in you is the actualisation either of those numbers in you or according to them, when you number and at the same time generate number and in this actualisation produce a real existence of the quantitative, just as in walking you produce a real existence of a kind of movement. What, then, about the number which is in us in a different way? It is the number of our substance; for, Plato says, since it participates in number and melody[1] it is again number and melody; for, one says, it is not body or magnitude; the soul therefore is a number,[2] if it is a substance. The number of body is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the number of soul is substances in the way souls are. And indeed generally among the intelligibles, if the living being there is itself more than one, a triad for instance, this triad in the living being is substantial. But the triad which does not yet belong to the living being, but is in a general way a triad in real being, is a principle of substance. But if you number "living being" and "beautiful", each of them is one, but you

Xenocrates: see Aristotle *Metaphysics* A 5. 985b30 and Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze; for Xenocrates the soul was a *self-moving* number.

μὲν ἕν, σὺ δὲ γεννᾷς ἀριθμὸν ἐν σοὶ καὶ ἐνεργεῖς ποσὸν καὶ δυάδα. εἰ μέντοι ἀρετὴν τέτταρα λέγοις—καὶ τετράς ἐστί τις οἷον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς εἰς ἕν—καὶ ἑνάδα τετράδα οἷον τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ σὺ τετράδα ἐφαρμόττεις τὴν ἐν σοί.

17. Ὁ δὲ λεγόμενος ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πῶς; πέρας γὰρ οὗτοι αὐτῷ διδόασιν οἱ λόγοι. ἢ καὶ ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἔσται ἀριθμός· τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον μάχεται τῷ ἀριθμῷ. διὰ τί οὖν λέγομεν "ἄπειρος ὁ ἀριθμός"; ἆρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἄπειρον λέγομεν γραμμήν—λέγομεν δὲ γραμμὴν ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὅτι ἐστί τις τοιαύτη, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ τῇ μεγίστῃ, οἷον τοῦ παντός, ἐπινοῆσαι μείζω—οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ; γνωσθέντος γὰρ ὅσος ἐστὶν ἔστιν αὐτὸν διπλασίονα ποιῆσαι τῇ διανοίᾳ οὐκ ἐκείνῳ συνάψαντα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ μόνῳ νόημα καὶ φάντασμα πῶς ἂν τοῖς οὖσι προσάψαις; ἢ φήσομεν ἄπειρον ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς εἶναι γραμμήν; ποσὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκεῖ γραμμή· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ποσή τις ἐν ἀριθμῷ, ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη. ἢ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλον τρόπον, οὐχ ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἄπειρος; ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς αὐτογραμμῆς οὐκ ἔνι προσνοούμενον πέρας. τί οὖν ἐκεῖ γραμμὴ καὶ ποῦ; ὕστερον μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοῦ· ἑνοράται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς μίαν διάστασιν· ποσὸν δὲ τὸ

[1] Here Plotinus returns to the question raised in ch. 2 and deferred at the beginning of ch. 3.

generate number in yourself and actualise the quantitative and the dyad. If however you say that virtue is form—and it is a kind of tetrad, as its parts come together into one—and a tetradic [or fourfold] unity like the underlying reality, then you are fitting to it the tetrad which is in you.

17. But what about the number called unlimited[1]? For these arguments of ours give it limit. And this is correct, if it is going to be a number; for unlimitedness clashes with number. Why, then, do we say "The number is unlimited"? Is it with number as it is when we say a line is unlimited?—but we say a line is unlimited not because there is any line of this kind but because it is possible with the longest line, that of the universe for instance, to think of a longer.[2] For when it is known how much a number is it is possible to double it in thought without connecting it to that original number. For how could you attach a thought and mental image which is only in you to things which really exist? Or are we going to assert that there is an unlimited line among the intelligibles? For [otherwise] the line there will be of a certain length; but if it was not of a certain numbered length, it would be unlimited. But its unlimitedness may be of another kind, not like something which you cannot get to the end of. But how is it unlimited? Now in the definition of the absolute line limit is not thought as included. What then is the line there in the intelligible, and where? It is certainly posterior to number; for the one is observed in it: it proceeds from one point and over one

[2] This is Aristotle's account of mathematical infinity: see *Physics* Γ 7. 207b28–34.

τῆς διαστάσεως μέτρον οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ ποῦ τοῦτο; ἆρα μόνον ἐν ἐννοήσει οἷον ὁριστικῇ; ἢ καὶ πρᾶγμα, νοερὸν μέντοι. πάντα γὰρ οὕτως, ὡς καὶ νοερὰ καί πως τὸ πρᾶγμα. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ στερεοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν σχημάτων, ποῦ καὶ ὅπως· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡμεῖς τὰ σχήματα ἐπινοοῦμεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τό τε τοῦ παντὸς σχῆμα πρὸ ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα φυσικὰ σχήματα ἐν τοῖς φύσει οὖσιν, ἃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι ἀσχημάτιστα ἐκεῖ καὶ πρῶτα σχήματα. οὐ γὰρ μορφαὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ αὑτῶν ὄντα οὐκ ἐδεῖτο ἐκταθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ ἐκταθέντα ἄλλων. πάντοτε οὖν σχῆμα ἓν ἐν τῷ ὄντι, διεκρίθη δὲ ἤτοι ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ζῴου. λέγω δὲ "διεκρίθη" οὐχ ὅτι ἐμεγεθύνθη, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕκαστον ἐμερίσθη πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὡς τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐδόθη τοῖς ἐκεῖ, οἷον πυρί, εἰ βούλει, τῷ ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖ πυραμίς. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι θέλει μὴ δυνάμενον ὕλης αἰτίᾳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάλογον, ὡς λέγεται περὶ τῶν τῇδε. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ καθ' ὃ ζῷον; ἢ ἐν τῷ νῷ πρότερον· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ· εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῷον

[1] The pyramid is the "unit and seed" (στοιχεῖον καὶ σπέρμα) of fire in the mathematical physics of the *Timaeus*: see 56B4–5. Plotinus' whole way of thinking about the

distance; but it does not have a quantitative measure of that distance. But where is this? Is it only in a kind of defining thought? No, it is a thing, but an intellectual thing. For all [beings there] are like this, so as to be intellectual and, in some way, the real thing. And indeed [we must also ask] where and how about plane and solid and all the figures: for it is certainly not we who merely think the figures. The figure of the universe, which was before us, is evidence of this, and the other natural figures in the things which exist by nature, which must exist before the bodies as unfigured figures there in the intelligible, and primary figures. For they are not shapes in something else, but since they are themselves belonging to themselves there was no need for them to be extended: the extended figures belong to other things. Figure, then, is always one in real being, but it has distinctions in it either in the living being or before the living being. But I mean "has distinctions" not in the sense that it has acquired size, but because it has been divided, each part of it in correspondence to each being, and given to the bodies there in the intelligible, as to fire there, if you like, to the pyramid there.[1] This is why this fire here below wants to imitate it, though it cannot by reason of matter, and the other elements in a similar way, as is said about the elements here below. But is figure, then, in the living being in that it is living being? No, it is in Intellect before. For it is certainly in the living being; if therefore the living being was inclusive of Intellect, it would be primarily in the living

intelligible world requires the presence of bodies there, though they cannot be extended in space.

περιεκτικὸν ἦν τοῦ νοῦ, ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ πρώτως, εἰ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ τὴν τάξιν πρότερος, ἐν νῷ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τῷ παντελεῖ καὶ ψυχαί, πρότερος νοῦς. ἀλλὰ νοῦς φησιν ὅσα ὁρᾷ ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ· εἰ οὖν ὁρᾷ, ὕστερος. ἢ δυνατὸν τὸ "ὁρᾷ" οὕτως εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐν τῇ ὁράσει τῆς ὑποστάσεως γινομένης· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἕν, καὶ ἡ νόησις δὲ ψιλὸν ἔχει σφαῖραν, τὸ δὲ ζῷον ζῴου σφαῖραν.

18. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐκεῖ ὥρισται· ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπινοήσομεν πλείονα τοῦ προτεθέντος, καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον οὕτως ἀριθμούντων. ἐκεῖ δ' ἐπινοῆσαι πλέον οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ ἐπινοηθέντος· ἤδη γάρ ἐστιν· οὐδ' ἐλείφθη τις οὐδὲ λειφθήσεται, ἵνα τις καὶ προστεθῇ αὐτῷ. εἴη δ' ἂν κἀκεῖ ἄπειρος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μεμετρημένος· ὑπὸ τίνος γάρ; ἀλλ' ὅς ἐστι, πᾶς ἐστιν ἓν ὢν καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ὅλος δὴ καὶ οὐ περιειλημμένος πέρατί τινι, ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ ὢν ὅς ἐστι· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ὅλως οὐδὲν ἐν πέρατι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ μεμετρημένον τὸ εἰς ἀπειρίαν κωλυθὲν δραμεῖν καὶ μέτρου δεόμενον· ἐκεῖνα δὲ πάντα μέτρα, ὅθεν καὶ καλὰ πάντα. καὶ γάρ, ᾗ ζῷον, καλόν, ἀρίστην τὴν ζωὴν ἔχον, οὐδεμιᾷ ζωῇ ἐλλεῖπον, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς θάνατον συμμιγῆ ἔχον τὴν ζωήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ θνητὸν οὐδ' ἀποθνῇσκον· οὐδ' αὖ ἀμενηνὴ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ ζῴου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἐναργεστάτη καὶ τὸ τρανὸν

being; but if Intellect has priority in rank, it is primarily in Intellect. But if in the complete living being there are also souls, Intellect is prior. But, Plato says, "as many as Intellect sees in the living being"[1]; if then it sees, it is posterior. But it is possible that the "sees" is meant in this sense, that the real existence of the living being comes about in the seeing; for Intellect is not other, but all are one, and intellection has the bare sphere but the living being the sphere of the living being.

18. But certainly number there in the intelligible is limited; but we think of a number greater than that which is before us, and the unlimited belongs to us numbering in this way. But there it is not possible to think of more than what is thought of; it is already there; no number is deficient, nor will any be deficient, so that any number could be added to it. But number might be unlimited there also, because it is not measured: for what could it be measured by? But what it is it all is, being one and all together and, certainly, a whole, and not bounded by any limit but by its own agency being what it is; for in general none of the real beings is in a limit, but what is limited and measured is what is prevented from running on into indefiniteness and needs a measure; but those real beings are all measures, and therefore are all beautiful. For in that it is a living being it is beautiful, having the best of life, deficient in no life, nor again having life mixed with death; for nothing is mortal or dying; nor again is the life of the living being itself strengthless, but the first and clearest life, having the pure essence of living, like the first

[1] *Timaeus* 39E7–9.

ἔχουσα τοῦ ζῆν, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον φῶς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ ζῶσί τε ἐκεῖ καὶ αἱ δεῦρο ἰοῦσαι κομίζονται. οἶδε δὲ καὶ ὅτου χάριν ζῇ καὶ πρὸς ὃ ζῇ, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ζῇ· ἐξ οὗ γάρ, καὶ εἰς ὃ ζῇ. ἡ δὲ πάντων φρόνησις καὶ ὁ πᾶς νοῦς ἐπὼν καὶ συνὼν καὶ ὁμοῦ ὢν ἀγαθώτερον αὐτὸ ἐπιχρώσας καὶ συγκερασάμενος φρόνησιν σεμνότερον αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος παρέχεται. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα φρόνιμος ζωὴ τὸ σεμνὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν κατὰ ἀλήθειάν ἐστι, καίτοι ἀμυδρῶς ὁρᾶται. ἐκεῖ δὲ καθαρῶς ὁρᾶται· δίδωσι γὰρ τῷ ὁρῶντι ὅρασιν καὶ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ζῆν καὶ μᾶλλον εὐτόνως ζῶντα ὁρᾶν καὶ γενέσθαι ὃ ὁρᾷ. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ἡ προσβολὴ καὶ πρὸς ἄψυχα ἡ πολλή, καὶ ὅταν πρὸς ζῷα, τὸ μὴ ζῶν αὐτῶν προβέβληται, καὶ ἡ ἔνδον ζωὴ μέμικται. ἐκεῖ δὲ ζῷα πάντα καὶ ὅλα ζῶντα καὶ καθαρά· κἂν ὡς οὐ ζῷόν τι λάβῃς, ἐξέλαμψεν αὐτοῦ εὐθέως καὶ αὐτὸ τὴν ζωήν. τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβᾶσαν, ἀκίνητον εἰς μεταβολὴν παρέχουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν ζωήν, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην θεασάμενος τὴν κάτω φύσιν ἅπασαν γελάσει τῆς εἰς οὐσίαν προσποιήσεως. παρὰ γὰρ ταύτης μένει μὲν ζωή, μένει νοῦς, ἕστηκε δὲ ἐν αἰῶνι τὰ ὄντα· ἐξίστησι δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδέ τι τρέπει οὐδὲ παρακινεῖ αὐτό· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὂν μετ' αὐτό, ὃ ἐφάψεται αὐτοῦ· εἰ δέ τι ἦν, ὑπὸ τούτου ἂν ἦν. καὶ εἰ ἐναντίον τι ἦν, ἀπαθὲς ἂν ἦν τοῦτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὂν δὲ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἂν τοῦτο

light, from which the souls live there, and those which come down here bring it with them. But it knows for what reason it lives and towards what it lives, towards that from which also it lives; for that from which its life comes is also that to which it goes. But the thought of all [the beings in it] and universal Intellect is upon it and accompanies it and is closely together with it and by giving it a colour of greater goodness and mixing thought into it makes its beauty more majestic. For even here below a thoughtful life is majesty and beauty in truth, though it is dimly seen. But there it is seen clearly; for it gives to the seer sight and power to live more, and by living more intensely to see and become what he sees. For here below most of our attention is directed to lifeless things, and when it is directed to living beings what is lifeless in them stands in the way, and the life within them is mixed. But there all are living beings, living as wholes and pure; and if you take something not to be a living being it immediately itself flashes out its life. But when you contemplate the substance running through them, giving them a life which does not move by changing, and the thought and the wisdom and knowledge in them, you will laugh at the lower nature for its pretension to substantiality. For by this substance life abides and intellect abides, and the real beings stand still in eternity; nothing puts it out of itself or alters it or makes it deviate; for there is nothing beside it to get a grip on it; but if there was anything, it would exist because of it. And if there was anything opposed to it, it would be unaffected by this very opposed thing; but, existing itself, it would not have made this opposite exist, but some other com-

ἐποίησεν ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον πρὸ αὐτοῦ κοινόν, καὶ ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄν· ὥστε ταύτῃ Παρμενίδης ὀρθῶς ἓν εἰπὼν τὸ ὄν· καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρημίαν ἄλλου ἀπαθές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὄν· μόνῳ γὰρ τούτῳ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐστιν εἶναι. πῶς ἂν οὖν τις τὸ ὂν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀφέλοιτο ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο, ὅσα ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ὅσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ᾖ, χορηγεῖ· ἔστι δ' ἀεί· ὥστε κἀκεῖνα. οὕτω δ' ἐστὶν ἐν δυνάμει καὶ κάλλει μέγα, ὥστε θέλγειν καὶ τὰ πάντα ἀνηρτῆσθαι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχοντα ἀγαπᾶν καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τἀγαθὸν[1] ζητεῖν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πρὸ ἐκείνου ὡς πρὸς ἡμᾶς. καὶ ὁ πᾶς δὲ κόσμος οὗτος καὶ ζῆν καὶ φρονεῖν, ἵνα ᾖ, θέλει, καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς ὅ ἐστιν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὔταρκες ἑαυτῷ.

[1] Kirchhoff: μετὰ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν Enn.: μετ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν H–S[1].

mon cause before it, and that would be the really existent; so that Parmenides[1] in this way was right in saying that being was one; and it is not unaffected because of the absence of anything else, but because it really exists; for real being alone can exist of and by itself. How then could anyone take being from it, or anything else of all the things which exist by being's activity and come from itself? For as long as it exists, it gives of its store of being; but it exists for ever, so that they do also. But in this way it is great in power and beauty, so that it is enchanting and all things depend on it and are happy when they have a trace of it and seek the Good with it; for being stands in front of the Good from our point of view. And this whole universe wants to live and think that it may be, and every soul and every intellect wants to be what it is; but being is sufficient to itself.

[1] The reference is a general one to the Second Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*, beginning at 142B.

VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND ON THE GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, perhaps the greatest of the single works of Plotinus, is number 38 in Porphyry's chronological order. It is separated in that order by only three short works on minor questions from its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 6 *On Numbers*, and is immediately followed by its successor in the *Enneads*, VI. 8, the great treatise on divine freedom. The chronological order and the Ennead order coincide here more closely than anywhere else in Porphyry's edition. VI. 7 is the most intellectually and spiritually powerful of all Plotinus' "ascents of the mind to God". It begins in this world here below, and in the philosophical lecture-room, with a discussion of what for Plotinus (and other late Platonists) was the most important question raised by Plato's mythical account of the making of the world in the *Timaeus*: how far is Plato's description of that making in terms of the activity of a Demiurge or craftsman to be taken literally? Does God plan the world and then make it? Is divine wisdom to be understood in terms of the sort of intelligent, purposive, over-all planning characteristic of a good architect or civic designer? In showing that it is not, and in displaying the true nature of the creativity of the Divine Intellect, Plotinus builds up his fullest and most impressive account of the nature and contents of the intelligible world, showing us how everything here below is there too, and only here because it is there, and not there in the form of a system of abstractions but in a more vital reality than we apprehend it here: it is a world "boiling with life", an eternal world

which somehow contains time and movement and change and process. In the end we are left with the very strong impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but one real world apprehended in different ways on different levels. It is from our highest and truest apprehension of this intelligible world of which we ourselves are parts that we ascend to the Good. For, as Plotinus shows here with particular care and clarity, ascend we must. The intelligible world which he has displayed in all its beauty is not our goal. Intellect and the intelligible cannot finally satisfy us. The demonstration of transcendence culminates in Plotinus' fullest and strongest account of the soul's union with the Good in the self-transcendence of Intellect, an account which shows more clearly than anything else in the *Enneads* the consonance of his mysticism and his metaphysics. The treatise concludes with a section which confirms the transcendence of the One or Good above Intellect by a full demonstration that the One does not think.

Synopsis

When God or the gods were making man, did they plan his senses with a view to self-preservation in the sense-world? No, there is no planning in the intelligible; but everything is there in such a way that when it is unfolded into time here below it looks as if it had been perfectly planned (ch. 1). In the intelligible the thing and the reason why it is are one (ch. 2). Man in the intelligible has senses so that the whole may be complete and everything may be there; but does not this mean that Intellect inclines to and plans for the sense-world (ch. 3)? The complexity of man, not just a soul but also the formative principle of body and the form in body (chs. 4 and 5). All his complexity exists in the intelligible, including senses and perhaps bodies, and the possibility of existing on different levels, from god to beast (ch. 6). There is nothing unnatural about the making of the lower animals; co-operation of universal and

individual souls in making things here below; sense-perceptions here below imitate intellections in the intelligible (ch. 7). But how can there be irrational animals in the intelligible? Intellect is not the One and so must be multiple; and its multiplicity must be all-inclusive (ch. 8). All is living thought there; so what are irrational animals here below are living thought there (ch. 9). Horns and teeth and claws, which are to supply deficiencies here below, are there in the intelligible as part of the richly varied perfection of the whole (ch. 10). Plants and the four elements are in the intelligible world as well as animals: the elements are alive in their own way here below, and more intensely alive there (ch. 11). The glorious unity-in-diversity of the intelligible world, containing all that is in the universe of sense, in perfect unity and boiling with life (ch. 12). Only the last and lowest forms are single and simple. Intellect is vastly complex because it is all activities. How the Platonic categories of Otherness and Movement operate in Intellect to produce endless change, variety and movement all contained in its substance of living thought (ch. 13). Analogy from the complexity of lower forms, e.g. the form of a face. The unity in love without confusion of Intellect (ch. 14). Beginning of the ascent from Intellect to the Good. Intellect receives everything in it from the Good, but in receiving it breaks up the primal unity into its own unity-in-diversity (ch. 15). The need to go higher than Intellect: how Intellect comes from the Good and the Good is cause both of its substance and its vision (ch. 16). The giver is greater than the gift: the Good gives Intellect what it does not have; it is the giver of form, itself beyond form and limit (ch. 17). What "being in the form of good" means when applied to Intellect and the Forms in Intellect; why the Good is supremely desirable so that we must go beyond Intellect to find it (chs. 18–21). Intellect and the Forms in Intellect need another light from the Good to be desirable besides the glory immanent in themselves (which they received from it); without this light and life they would be uninteresting and undesirable (chs.

21–2). Necessity of the supreme Good, before all evils, which is before all things and makes all things (ch. 23). But what, after all, is this Good? What does it do for us and why do we desire it (ch. 24)? Exegesis of Plato's conclusion about pleasure in the *Philebus*: ascent through the scale of goods to the ultimate (ch. 25). The Good cannot be an illusion or a subjective feeling (ch. 26). The good for anything is not simply what is most akin to it (ch. 27). Could matter, which is evil, choose and desire the Good (ch. 28)? Difficulty of the unintellectual man with talk about Intellect as good; perhaps he has some dim awareness of a Good beyond Intellect (ch. 29). Return to and full explanation of Plato's mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the *Philebus* (ch. 30). The light and life which come to Intellect and Soul from the Good; the soul, moved by the Good to love, is carried by its love from bodies to the Forms in Intellect (ch. 31). The unbounded, formless source of the beauty of the Forms (ch. 32). Rejection of discursive reasoning about the Forms as a hindrance to the love which must go on beyond form to the formless (ch. 33). The experience of the final union or vision, in which the soul attains to the Good in the eternal self-transcendence of Intellect (chs. 34–6). The Good does not think: rejection of the Peripatetic idea that the First Principle thinks its own thinking, and full working out of the implications of saying that the Good is beyond being and intellect (chs. 37–42).

VI. 7. (38) ΠΩΣ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ ΥΠΕΣΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ

1. Εἰς γένεσιν πέμπων ὁ θεὸς ἢ θεός τις τὰς ψυχὰς φωσφόρα περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἔθηκεν ὄμματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὄργανα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἑκάσταις ἔδωκε προορώμενος, ὡς οὕτως ἂν σῴζοιτο, εἰ προορῷτο καὶ προακούοι καὶ ἁψαμένη τὸ μέν φεύγοι, τὸ δὲ διώκοι. πόθεν δὴ προϊδὼν ταῦτα; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρότερον γενομένων ἄλλων, εἶτα δι' ἀπουσίαν αἰσθήσεων φθαρέντων, ἔδωκεν ὕστερον ἃ ἔχοντες ἔμελλον ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τὸ παθεῖν φυλάξασθαι. ἢ εἴποι ἄν τις, ἤδει, ὅτι ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς ἔσοιτο τὸ ζῷον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σωμάτων πάθεσι· ταῦτα δὲ εἰδώς, ὅπως μὴ φθείροιτο ῥᾳδίως τῶν ζῴων τὰ σώματα, τὸ

[1] Plotinus is here commenting on the whole account of the making of the material universe, the sending of souls into it, and the preparation of their bodies, in the *Timaeus*. He writes "God or one of the gods" because in the *Timaeus* (44E5 ff.) it is not the great Craftsman but his children, the younger gods, who make the human body and its organs (the "light-bearing eyes" 45B3). Plato's whole description of the activity both of Craftsman and of younger gods is in terms of reasoning (e.g. 34A8–B1) and planning. The exegetical problem for Plotinus is to show that this is not to be taken literally.

VI. 7. HOW THE MULTITUDE OF THE FORMS CAME INTO BEING, AND ON THE GOOD

1. When God or one of the gods was sending the souls to birth he put "light-bearing eyes" in the face and gave them the other organs for each of the senses, foreseeing that safety would be ensured in this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by touching could avoid one thing and pursue another.[1] But really, where did this foreseeing come from? For it certainly was not because others had come into existence before and then perished because of the absence of senses that he afterwards gave what human beings and other living things were going to avoid suffering by having.[2] Now someone might say that he knew that the living being would be in heats and colds and other affections of bodies[3]; and because he knew this, so that the bodies of living things might not be easily destroyed he gave them

[2] Plotinus may have in mind here the curious "natural selection" of Empedocles as reported by Aristotle *Physics* B 8. 198b29–33, in a context (the discussion of the appearance of purposiveness in the processes of nature) very relevant to his argument here.

[3] This is exactly what Plato does say in *Timaeus* 33A, though he is speaking here not of individual human bodies but of the necessity of including all of each of the four elements in the body of the universe.

αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔδωκε, καὶ δι' ὧν ἐνεργήσουσιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐχούσαις τὰς δυνάμεις ἔδωκε τὰ ὄργανα ἢ ἄμφω. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, οὐκ ἦσαν αἰσθητικαὶ πρότερον ψυχαὶ οὖσαι· εἰ δ' εἶχον, ὅτε ἐγένοντο ψυχαί, καὶ ἐγένοντο, ἵν' εἰς γένεσιν ἴωσι, σύμφυτον αὐταῖς τὸ εἰς γένεσιν ἰέναι. παρὰ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ εἶναι, καὶ πεποίηνται δή, ἵνα ἄλλου ὦσι καὶ ἵνα ἐν κακῷ εἶεν· καὶ ἡ πρόνοια, ἵνα σῴζοιντο ἐν τῷ κακῷ, καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος καὶ ὅλως λογισμός. ἀρχαὶ δὲ λογισμῶν τίνες; καὶ γάρ, εἰ ἐξ ἄλλων λογισμῶν, δεῖ ἐπί τι πρὸ λογισμοῦ ἢ τινά γε πάντως ἰέναι. τίνες οὖν ἀρχαί; ἢ γὰρ αἴσθησις ἢ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ αἴσθησις μὲν οὔπω· νοῦς ἄρα. ἀλλ' εἰ νοῦς αἱ προτάσεις, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐπιστήμη· περὶ αἰσθητοῦ οὐδενὸς ἄρα. οὗ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ, τελευτὴ δὲ εἰς νοητὸν ἀφικνεῖται, πῶς ἔνι ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν πρὸς αἰσθητοῦ διανόησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι; οὔτ' οὖν ζῴου πρόνοια οὔθ' ὅλως τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐγένετο· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὅλως λογισμὸς ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ λέγεται λογισμὸς εἰς ἔνδειξιν τοῦ πάντα οὕτως, ὡς [ἄλλος σοφὸς][1] ἐκ λογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, καὶ προόρασις, ὅτι οὕτως, ὡς ἄν τις σοφὸς [ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον][2] προΐδοιτο. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μὴ γενομένοις πρὸ

[1] del. Harder.
[2] del. Theiler.

sense-perception and organs for the senses to work through. But he either gave the organs to souls which already had the powers or gave both at once. But if he gave the senses also, then, although they were souls before, they did not have sense-perception; but if they had sense-perception when they came into being as souls, and came into being that they might go to birth, then going to birth was connatural to them. So it would be against nature for them to be away from birth and in the intelligible, and they would actually have been made in order to belong to something else and to be in evil; and the purpose of the forethought would be that they might be kept safe in the evil, and this would be God's planning, and it would be altogether planning. But what are the principles of plans? For even if they derive from other plans, they must be directed to an end or ends prior to planning. What then are the principles? They are either sense-perception or intellect. But there is no sense-perception yet, therefore intellect. But if the premises are intellect the conclusion is knowledge: not, then, about any sense-object. For how can that of which the beginning is from the intelligible and which comes in its end to the intelligible, being a disposition of this kind, come to the understanding of a sense-object? Therefore neither forethought for a living thing nor forethought for this universe in general derived from a plan; since there is no planning there at all, but it is called planning to show that all things there are as they would be as a result of planning at a later stage, and foresight because it is as a wise man would foresee it. For in things which did not come to be before planning, planning is useful because of the

λογισμοῦ ὁ λογισμὸς χρήσιμον ἀπορίᾳ δυνάμεως τῆς πρὸ λογισμοῦ, καὶ προόρασις, ὅτι μὴ ἦν δύναμις τῷ προορῶντι, καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἐδεήθη προοράσεως. καὶ γὰρ ἡ προόρασις, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, καὶ οἷον φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον. οὗ δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, οὐ προόρασις. καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς τοῦτο ἀντὶ τούτου. μόνου δ' ὄντος θατέρου τί καὶ λογίζεται; πῶς οὖν τὸ μόνον καὶ ἓν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἔχει ἀναπτυττόμενον τὸ "τοῦτο, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "ἔμελλε γὰρ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο" καὶ "χρήσιμον τοῦτο ἀνεφάνη καὶ σωτήριον τοῦτο γενόμενον"; προείδετο ἄρα καὶ προελογίσατο ἄρα καὶ δὴ καί—τὸ νῦν ἐξαρχῆς λεχθέν—τὰς αἰσθήσεις διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔδωκε [τὰς δυνάμεις],[1] εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἄπορος ἡ δόσις [καὶ πῶς].[2] οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ ἑκάστην ἐνέργειαν μὴ ἀτελῆ εἶναι, μηδὲ θεμιτὸν θεοῦ ὁτιοῦν ὂν ἄλλο τι νομίζειν ἢ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν, δεῖ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐνυπάρχειν. δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι.[3] δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἤδη παρόντος εἶναι. οὐ δὴ ὕστερόν τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἤδη ἐκεῖ παρὸν ὕστερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γίνεται. εἰ οὖν ἤδη πάρεστι τὸ μέλλον, ἀνάγκη οὕτω παρεῖναι, ὡς προνενοημένον εἰς τὸ ὕστερον· τοῦτο δέ

[1] delevimus, ut glossam e lin. 13 arcessitam.
[2] delevimus.
[3] δεῖ . . . εἶναι om. H–S².

lack of the power before planning, and foresight, because the one who foresees did not have the power by which there would be no need of foresight. For foresight is in order that there should not be this but that, and there is in it a kind of fear of what is not just so. But where there is only this, there is not foresight. And planning is "this instead of that". But when there is only one of them, why should there be a plan? How then can the alone and the one and the simple contain explicitly the "this that there should not be that", and "there had to be this if not that" and "this appeared useful and this preservative when it came to be"? So then it saw beforehand and planned beforehand, and indeed—as was said at the beginning of the present discussion—also gave the senses because of this, no matter how puzzling the giving. But all the same, if every divine activity must not be incomplete, and it is not permitted to suppose that anything which is of God is other than whole and all, then everything must exist in any thing which is his. So existing for ever must be there also.[1] So the future must also be already present there. For there is certainly nothing which comes later in that [divine world], but what is already present there comes to be later in another [world]. If then the future is already present, it must necessarily be present as if it had been thought out beforehand with a view to what comes later; but this means so

[1] δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι is found only in the quotation in Philoponus *De Aeternitate Mundi* II 5 p. 39 8. H–S¹ print it in the text. H–S² omit it as being a comment of Philoponus, but there seems no sufficient reason for being certain that it is so.

ἐστιν, ὡς μηδὲν δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς τότε, τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μηδὲν ἐλλείψοντος. πάντα ἄρα ἤδη ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ οὕτως ἦν, ὡς εἰπεῖν ὕστερον τόδε μετὰ τόδε· ἐκτεινόμενον μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἷον ἁπλούμενον ἔχει δεικνύναι τόδε μετὰ τόδε, ὁμοῦ δὲ ὂν πᾶν τόδε· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν.

2. Διὸ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις οὐχ ἧττον καταμάθοι τὴν νοῦ φύσιν, ἣν καὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ὁρῶμεν· οὐδ' ὡς ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ νοῦ χρῆμα ὁρῶμεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ "ὅτι" δίδομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ "διότι" οὐκέτι, ἤ, εἰ δοίημεν, χωρίς. καὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ τύχοι, ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἢ ἀγάλματος· τὸ δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωπος καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος, εἴπερ καὶ νοερὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸν ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς[1] καὶ διὰ τί· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ὅλως εἴη, εἰ μὴ διὰ τί. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὥσπερ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν χωρίς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί". ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα, ὥστε ταὐτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" τοῦ πράγματος. πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ "διὰ τί" ταὐτόν, οἷον τί ἐστιν ἔκλειψις. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ ἕκαστον διὰ τί εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου; μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνάγκη· καὶ

[1] Theiler: ὀφθαλμὸν Enn.

[1] This passage (line 49 to end), together with IV. 4. 16, anticipates the doctrine of Iamblichus and other later Neoplatonists of the pre-existence of time in the higher world. On this see S. Sambursky and S. Pines *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (a selection of texts with

that there will be no need of anything then, and this means that there will be no deficiency. All things, then, existed already and existed for ever, and existed in such a way that one could say later "this after that"; for when it is extended and in a sense unfolded it is able to display this after that, but when it is all together it is entirely this; but this means having its cause also in itself.[1]

2. And so even starting from here one could none the less come to know the nature of Intellect, which we see even more clearly than the others; but not even so do we see how great Intellect is. For we grant that it has the "that" but not the "why", or, if we do grant it the "why", it is as separate. And we see man, or, if it happens so, eye, as an image or belonging to an image. But in reality there in the intelligible there is man and the reason why there is man, if the man there must also himself be an intellectual reality, and eye and the reason why there is eye; or they would not be there at all, if the reason why was not. But here below, just as each of the parts is separate, so also is the reason why. But there all are in one, so that the thing and the reason why of the thing are the same. But often here below also the thing and the reason why are the same, as for instance "what is an eclipse".[2] What then prevents each and every thing being its reason why, in the case of the others too, and this being its substance? Rather, this is necessary; and when we try in

translation and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.

[2] Plotinus in what follows is characteristically developing an Aristotelian distinction for his own purposes. Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 4. 1044b9–15 and *Posterior Analytics* B 2. 90a15.

πειρωμένοις οὕτως τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λαμβάνειν ὀρθῶς συμβαίνει. ὃ γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον, διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀληθές—ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναπτύττοις, εὑρήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ "διὰ τί". ἀργὸν μὲν γὰρ ὂν καὶ ζωὴν ⟨μὴ⟩[1] ἔχον τὸ "διὰ τί" οὐ πάντως ἔχει, εἶδος δὲ ὂν καὶ νοῦ ὂν πόθεν ἂν λάβοι τὸ "διὰ τί"; εἰ δὲ παρὰ νοῦ τις λέγοι, οὐ χωρίς ἐστιν, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτό ἐστιν· εἰ οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν ταῦτα μηδενὶ ἐλλείποντα, μηδὲ τῷ "διὰ τί" ἐλλείπειν. νοῦς δὲ ἔχει τὸ διὰ τί οὕτως ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ αὐτὸς ἕκαστον ἂν εἴη [τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ],[2] ὥστε μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ διὰ τί γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ γέγονε καὶ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως αἰτίαν. γεγονὸς δὲ οὐκ εἰκῇ οὐδὲν ἂν παραλελειμμένον ἔχοι τοῦ "διὰ τί", ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔχον ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλῶς ὁμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας. καὶ τοῖς ἄρα μεταλαμβάνουσιν οὕτω δίδωσιν, ὡς τὸ "διὰ τί" ἔχειν. καὶ μήν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστηκότι συνείρεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἐν τῷ πάντα εἶναι ἔστι καὶ τὸ διότι ἕκαστον—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστου τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἔχον ὁρᾶται—οὐ τούτου γενομένου, εἶτα τούτου μετὰ τόδε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν συνιστάντων, οὕτω χρὴ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖ τά τε πάντα πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ἕκαστα καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς αὐτό. εἰ οὖν ἡ συνυπόστασις

[1] Theiler.
[2] delevimus.

this way to grasp the essential nature of a thing, it comes out right. For what a thing is is the reason why it is. But I do not mean that the form is cause of existence for each thing—this is of course true—but that, if also you open each individual form itself back upon itself, you will find the reason why in it. For a thing which is inert and does not have life does not at all have the reason why, but if it is a form and belongs to Intellect, where would it get its reason why from? But if someone were to say "from Intellect", it is not separate, supposing that it is also itself Intellect; if then Intellect must have these things in no way deficient, they must not be deficient in the reason why. But Intellect in this way has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually all the things in it, so that none of them has come to be in need of a reason why, but it has come to be along with it and has in itself the cause of its existence. But since there is nothing casual in its coming to be it would not have any of its reason why left out but in having everything it has that of its cause which makes it exist beautifully. So it also gives to the things which participate in it in such a way that they possess their reason why. And truly, just as in this All here below, which is composed of many things, all of them are linked to each other, and each individual reason why is contained in their being all—just as in each individual the part is seen relating to the whole—it is not that this comes to be, and then this after that, but they jointly establish cause and caused together in relation to each other, so much more there in the intelligible must all things be each of them related to the whole and each to itself. If therefore there is a joint

ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ οὐκ εἰκῇ πάντων καὶ δεῖ μὴ ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἂν ἔχοι τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς αἰτίας, καὶ τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον, οἷον ἀναιτίως τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔχει αἰτίαν τοῦ εἶναι, αὐτάρκη δέ ἐστι καὶ μεμονωμένα αἰτίας ἐστίν, εἴη ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα σὺν αὐτοῖς τὴν αἰτίαν. καὶ γὰρ αὖ εἰ μηδέν ἐστι μάτην ἐκεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστί, πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι ἕκαστον. προῆν ἄρα καὶ συνῆν τὸ διότι ἐκεῖ οὐκ ὂν διότι, ἀλλ' ὅτι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἄμφω ἕν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ περιττὸν εἶχε νοῦ, ὡς ἂν νοῦ νόημα μὴ τοιοῦτον ὄν, οἷον μὴ τέλεον γέννημα; εἰ οὖν τέλεον, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτῳ ἐλλείπει, οὐδὲ διὰ τί τοῦτο οὐ πάρεστι. παρὸν ἄρα ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν διότι πάρεστιν· ἐν ἄρα τῇ ὑποστάσει τὸ διὰ τί· ἐν ἑκάστῳ τοίνυν νοήματι καὶ ἐνεργήματι οἷον καὶ ἀνθρώπου πᾶς προεφάνη ὁ ἄνθρωπος συμφέρων ἑαυτὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ἐξαρχῆς ὁμοῦ ἔχων ἕτοιμός ἐστιν ὅλος. εἶτα, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι αὐτῷ προσθεῖναι, γεννήματός ἐστιν. ἔστι δ' ἀεί· ὥστε πᾶς ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ὁ γινόμενος ἄνθρωπος γενητός.

3. Τί οὖν κωλύει προβουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὔτε τι ἀφελεῖν δεῖ οὔτε

existence of all things together, of all things with nothing random about it, and there must be no separation, then the things caused would have their causes in themselves, and each would be of such a kind as to possess its cause causelessly. If then the intelligibles have no cause of their being but are self-sufficient and independent of cause, they would be in possession of their cause in themselves and with themselves. For again, if nothing there is purposeless, and there are many things in each, you could say that all the things which each individual has are each individual reason why. So there in the intelligible the reason why was before and with the things and was not a "why", but a "that"; but rather both are one. For what could an intelligible have over and above Intellect, so as not to be of such a kind being a thought of Intellect, as to be a perfect production? If then it is perfect, it is impossible to say in what it is deficient, nor why this is not present in it. If then something is present, you could tell the reason why it is present; so the reason why is contained in its existence; in each thought, then, and active actualisation of Intellect, man for instance, the whole man is manifest, bringing himself along with the thought of him, and, since all he has he has all together from the beginning, he is all ready as a whole. Then, if he is not whole there, but something has to be added to him, this belongs to something generated; but he exists for ever; and so he is all complete. But the man who has come to be is generated.

3. What, then, is there to prevent there being previous deliberation about him? Now he is according to that intelligible man, so that one must not

προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι καὶ λελογίσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· ὑπέθετο γὰρ γινόμενα. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἡ βούλευσις[1] καὶ ὁ λογισμός· τῷ δ' "ἀεὶ γινόμενα" ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ ὅτι λογίζεται ἀνεῖλεν. οὐ γὰρ ἔνι λογίζεσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀεί· καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐπιλελησμένου ἦν, ὅπως καὶ πρότερον. εἶτα, εἰ μὲν ἀμείνω ὕστερον, οὐκ ἂν καλὰ πρότερον· εἰ δ' ἦν καλά, ἔχει τὸ ὡσαύτως. καλὰ δ' ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν καλόν τι, ὅτι πάντα—τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ εἶδος τὸ πάντα—καὶ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην κατέχει· κατέχει δέ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῆς ἀμόρφωτον καταλείποι· καταλείπει δέ, εἴ τις μορφὴ ἐλλείποι, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ἢ ἄλλο τι· ὥστε αἰτιολογῶν πάντα λέγεις. διὰ τί οὖν ὀφθαλμοί; ἵνα πάντα. καὶ διὰ τί ὀφρύες; ἵνα πάντα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἕνεκα σωτηρίας λέγοις, φυλακτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας λέγεις ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχον· τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι συμβαλλόμενον. οὕτως ἄρα οὐσία ἦν πρὶν καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἄρα μέρος τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ ἄλλο τοίνυν τοῦτο, ὃ δ' ἐστί, τῆς οὐσίας. πάντα τοίνυν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἡ ὅλη καὶ τελεία καὶ πᾶσα καὶ τὸ καλῶς μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ, καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ διότι

[1] R^{2mg} (*deliberatio* Ficinus): βούλησις Enn.

[1]The reference is to Plato's distinction between the realm of real being and the realm of becoming in *Timaeus*

take away or add anything, but deliberation and reasoning are due to [Plato's] assumption: for he assumed that things had come into being. And this is why there is deliberation and reasoning; but by saying "always coming into being" he also abolishes the idea that God reasons.[1] For it is not possible to reason in what is always; for to do so would belong to someone who had forgotten how it was before. And then if things were better afterwards, they would not have been beautiful before; but if they were beautiful, they keep the same. But they are beautiful because they are with their cause; since now also a thing is beautiful, because it is everything—for this is what form is, being everything—and because it controls matter; but it controls matter if it leaves no part of it unshaped; but it does so leave it if any shape is wanting, an eye, for instance, or something else; so that when you tell the cause, you tell all. Why then eyes? That there shall be everything. And why eyebrows? That there shall be everything. For even if you say "for preservation", you are speaking of a safeguard of the substance which exists in it; but this means you are saying that it contributes to its essential nature. Thus, then, the substance existed before this safeguard and the cause therefore was a part of the substance; and this safeguard, then, is something other, but what it is belongs to substance. All things therefore are for each other, and the whole is perfect and all-complete and its existing beautifully is with the cause and in the cause, and the substance and

27D5–28A4. It is Plotinus, not Plato, who draws the conclusion from it that God does not reason.

ἕν. εἰ τοίνυν ἔγκειται τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι καὶ οὕτως αἰσθητικὸν ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ ἀιδίου ἀνάγκης καὶ τελειότητος νοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντος, εἴπερ τέλειος, τὰς αἰτίας, ὥστε ἡμᾶς ὕστερον ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἄρα ὀρθῶς οὕτως ἔχει—ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἓν καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὐχὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖ μόνον νοῦς ἦν, προσετέθη δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὅτε εἰς γένεσιν ἐστέλλετο—πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇδε ῥέποι; τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ἀντιληπτικὸν αἰσθητῶν; πῶς δ' οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἐκεῖ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν ἐξ ἀιδίου, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν πληροῦσθαι ἐνταῦθα, ὅτε χείρων ἡ ψυχὴ γίγνεται;

4. Πάλιν οὖν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἄνωθεν ληπτέον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅστις ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν. ἴσως δὲ πρότερον χρὴ τὸν τῇδε ἄνθρωπον ὅστις ποτέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν—μήποτε οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες ὡς ἔχοντες τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον ζητοῦμεν. φανείη δ' ἂν ἴσως τισὶν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτός τε κἀκεῖνος εἶναι. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἐντεῦθεν· ἆρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος λόγος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἕτερος τῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον ποιούσης καὶ ζῆν αὐτὸν καὶ λογίζεσθαι παρεχομένης; ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν; ἢ ἡ τῷ σώματι τῷ τοιῷδε ψυχὴ προσχρωμένη; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῷον λογικὸν ὁ

[1] The Platonic text with which Plotinus is concerned here is the conclusion drawn in *Alcibiades* I 129E–130A that man is a soul using a body, which acquired a rather disproportionate weight and importance in later Greek thought. It was an important source of sharp body-soul dualism not only for later Platonists but for Stoics and

the essential nature and the reason why are one. If, therefore, having senses, and senses of this kind, is contained in the form by eternal necessity and the perception of Intellect which, if it is perfect, possesses the causes in itself, so that we afterwards see that this then is the right way for things to be—for there in the intelligible the cause is one with and an essential completion of the substance—and if man is there not only an intellect, sense-perception being added when he was sent to birth, how could that Intellect not incline to the world here below? For what could sense-perception be except the apprehension of sense-objects? But how would it not be absurd for there to be sense-perception from eternity, but for it to do its perceiving here below, and for the power there in the intelligible to accomplish its activity here below, when the soul becomes worse?

4. To deal with this difficulty, therefore, we must go back and take up the question of who that man in the intelligible world is. But perhaps we should first say exactly who this man here below is—in case we go looking for that man on the supposition that we have got this one, though we do not even know this one accurately. But perhaps it might seem to some people that this man and that man are the same. This is the starting-point of our investigation: is this man a rational forming principle belonging to soul other than the soul which makes this man and provides him with life and reason? Or is the soul of this kind the man? Or the soul which uses a body of such a kind[1]? But if man is a rational living being, but a

Gnostics. On its history in Greek philosophy see J. Pépin *Idées Grecques sur l'Homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971), Part I *La Tradition du I^er Alcibiade*.

ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον δὲ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ αὐτός. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πῶς ἂν εἴη ὑπόστασις ἀίδιος, τούτου τοῦ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου γινομένου, ὅταν σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴ συνέλθῃ; ἔσται γὰρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος δηλωτικὸς τοῦ ἐσομένου, οὐχ οἷος ὃν φαμεν αὐτοάνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐοικὼς ὅρῳ, καὶ τοιούτῳ οἵῳ μηδὲ δηλωτικῷ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴδους ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνύλου, ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον δηλῶν, ὅ ἐστιν ἤδη. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὔπω εὕρηται ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἦν γὰρ ὁ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι "τὸν λόγον δεῖ τὸν τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι συναμφότερόν τι, τόδ' ἐν τῷδε", καθ' ὅ ἐστιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ἀξιοῖ λέγειν· χρὴ δέ, καὶ εἴ ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ μετὰ ὕλης τοὺς λόγους χρὴ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν τὸν πεποιηκότα, οἷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, λαμβάνειν καὶ μάλιστα, ὅσοι τὸ[1] τί ἦν εἶναι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐφ' ἑκάστου ὁρίζεσθαι, ὅταν κυρίως ὁρίζωνται. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ; τοῦτο δ' ἐστί, τί ἐστι τὸ πεποιηκὸς τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνυπάρχον, οὐ χωριστόν; ἆρ' οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ζῷόν ἐστι λογικόν, ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον, αὐτὸς δέ τις ποιητικὸς ζῴου λογικοῦ; τίς ὢν αὐτός; ἢ τὸ ζῷον

[1] Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.

living being is what is composed of soul and body, this rational form would not be the same as soul. But if what is composed of rational soul and body is the rational form of man, how could it be something eternally existent, since this rational form of this kind of man comes into existence when body and soul come together? For this rational form will be explanatory of what is going to be, not the sort we say is absolute man, but more like a definition, and the kind of definition which does not explain the essential nature. For it is not even a definition of the form in matter, but explains the composite, which already exists. But if this is so, the man is not yet found; for he was going to be the one according to the rational form. But if someone were to say "The rational form of such beings must be something composite, this in this", he does not think fit to say by what each exists; but one must, however much one must also speak of the rational forming principles of forms in matter as including matter, grasp the forming principle itself which makes, for instance, man; this applies especially to those who claim to define the essential nature in each case, when they define strictly and properly.[1] What is it, then, to be a man? That is, what is it which has made this man here below, which exists in him and is not separate? Is, then, the rational forming principle itself a rational living being, or is the living being the composite, but the principle itself one which makes the rational living being? What is it then

[1] Plotinus is here critically concerned with Aristotle's discussion of essence and definition in *Metaphysics* Z 4–5. 1029b1–1030a14.

ἀντὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ζωὴ τοίνυν λογικὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἆρ' οὖν ζωὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς; ἢ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ παρέξεται τὴν ζωὴν τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία, ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ λογικὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται, ὅταν εἰς ἄλλο ζῷον ἴῃ[1] ἡ ψυχή, πῶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος;

5. Λόγον τοίνυν δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. τί κωλύει συναμφότερόν τι τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐν τοιῷδε λόγῳ, ὄντος τοῦ λόγου οἷον ἐνεργείας τοιᾶσδε, τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας μὴ δυναμένης ἄνευ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος εἶναι; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι λόγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔτε ψυχαὶ ἁπλῶς. οἱ γὰρ λόγοι οἱ ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἄψυχοι, καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν τὰς τοιαύτας οὐσίας λόγους εἶναι. οἱ οὖν δὴ[2] ποιοῦντες ἄνθρωπον λόγοι ποίας ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαι; ἆρα τῆς φυτικῆς; ἢ τῆς ζῷον ποιούσης, ἐναργεστέρας τινὸς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζωτικωτέρας. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐγγενομένη τῇ τοιαύτῃ ὕλῃ, ἅτε οὖσα τοῦτο, οἷον οὕτω διακειμένη καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος, ἄνθρωπος, ἐν σώματι δὲ μορφώσασα κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλο εἴδωλον ἀνθρώπου ὅσον ἐδέχετο τὸ σῶμα ποιήσασα, ὥσπερ καὶ τούτου αὖ ποιήσει ὁ ζωγράφος ἔτι ἐλάττω ἄνθρωπόν τινα, τὴν μορφὴν ἔχει καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ τὰ ἤθη, τὰς διαθέσεις, τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀμυδρὰ πάντα, ὅτι μὴ οὗτος πρῶτος· καὶ δὴ καὶ [εἴδη αἰσθήσεων ἄλλων][3] αἰσθήσεις ἄλλας ἐναργεῖς δοκούσας εἶναι, ἀμυδροτέρας δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ εἰκόνας. ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄνθρωπος

[1] Creuzer (*transit* Ficinus, et testatur *Theologia*): ᾖ Enn.
[2] Orth: μὴ Enn.
[3] delevimus, ut glossam ad αἰσθήσεις ἄλλας.

itself? Or does "living being" stand for "rational life" in the form? Then man is rational life. Is he then life without soul? For either soul will provide the rational life and the man will be an activity of soul and not a substance, or the soul will be the man. But if the rational soul is going to be the man, how is the soul not man when it goes into another living being?

5. Man, therefore, must be a rational forming principle other than soul. What is there to prevent man from being a composite, a soul in a particular kind of forming principle, the principle being a sort of particular activity, and the activity being unable to exist without that which acts? For this is how the forming principles in seeds are; for they are neither without soul nor simply souls. For the rational forming principles which make things are not soulless, and there is nothing surprising in substances of this kind being rational forming principles. Of what kind of soul, then, are the forming principles which make man activities? Of the growth-soul? Rather of that which makes a living being, a clearer one and just because of that more alive. And the soul of this kind which enters into matter of this kind, just because this is what it is, being in a way disposed like this even without the body, is man; it makes shapes in body according to itself, and makes another image of man as far as body allows, just as the painter in his turn makes yet another image of this, a kind of still lesser man; it has the shape and the forming principles or traits of character, the dispositions, the powers, all dim because this man is not the first; and it also has other senses, which seem to be clear, but are dimmer in comparison with those before them and are images. But the man over this

ψυχῆς ἤδη θειοτέρας, ἐχούσης βελτίω ἄνθρωπον καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐναργεστέρας. καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτον ὁρισάμενος, προσθεὶς δὲ τὸ χρωμένην σώματι, ὅτι ἐποχεῖται τῇ ἥτις προσχρῆται πρώτως σώματι, ἡ δὲ δευτέρως ἡ θειοτέρα. ἤδη γὰρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ γενομένου ἐπηκολούθησεν αὕτη τρανοτέραν ζωὴν διδοῦσα· μᾶλλον δ' οὐδ' ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἷον προσέθηκεν αὐτήν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἀλλὰ συναψαμένη οἷον ἐκκρεμαμένην ἔχει τὴν κάτω συμμίξασα ἑαυτὴν λόγῳ πρὸς λόγον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀμυδρὸς οὗτος ὢν ἐγένετο φανερὸς τῇ ἐλλάμψει.

6. Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῇ κρείττονι τὸ αἰσθητικόν; ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῶν ἐκεῖ ἂν αἰσθητῶν,[1] καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὰ αἰσθητά. διὸ καὶ οὕτως αἰσθάνεται τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἁρμονίαν, τῇ δὲ αἰσθήσει παραδεξαμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἄνθρώπον καὶ συναρμόσαντος εἰς ἔσχατον πρὸς τὴν ἐκεῖ ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πυρὸς ἐναρμόσαντος πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ πῦρ, οὗ αἴσθησις ἦν ἐκείνῃ τῃ ψυχῇ ἀνάλογον ⟨τῇ⟩[2] τοῦ πυρὸς τοῦ ἐκεῖ φύσει. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖ σώματα ταῦτα, ἦσαν αὐτῶν τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀντιλήψεις· καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκεῖ, ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχή, ἀντιληπτικὴ τούτων, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μίμημα, εἶχε τοὺς λόγους ἐν μιμήσει· καὶ ὁ ἐν νῷ ἄνθρωπος τὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπον. ἐλλάμπει δ' οὗτος τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ οὗτος τῷ τρίτῳ· ἔχει δέ πως πάντας ὁ

[1] Schwyzer, testatur *Theologia*: τῶν ἐκεῖ ἀναισθήτων A^{ac} (ἀν exp.) EBUCQ: τῷ ἐκεῖ ἀναισθήτῳ x.

[2] Beutler.

one belongs to a soul already more divine which has a better man and clearer senses. And this would be the man Plato was defining, and by adding "using a body" he indicated that it rides upon the one which primarily uses a body, and the one which does so secondarily is diviner.[1] For when the man who came to be already had sense-perception, this soul followed on and gave a brighter life; or rather it did not follow, but in a way attached itself; for it does not go out of the intelligible, but united to it has the lower soul in a way hanging from it, mixing itself in, forming principle to forming principle. And so this man, who is dim, becomes clearly visible by the illumination.

6. How, then, is there a power of sense-perception in the better soul? It would be a power of perceiving the sense-objects there, and would correspond to the sense-objects there. This is the way, therefore, in which the better soul perceives the melody of sense, when the man of the sense-world receives it by sense-perception and comes into tune, to the last and lowest degree, with the melody there in the intelligible, and fire is tuned to the fire there, of which that better soul had a perception which corresponded to the nature of the fire there. For if there were bodies there, the soul had perceptions and apprehensions of them; and the man there, the soul of this kind, was able to apprehend these bodies; and that is why the later man, the imitation, had their forming principles in imitation; and the man in Intellect apprehends the man before all men. But this man shines on the second, and this second on the third; and the

[1] Again *Alcibiades* I 129E–130A.

ἔσχατος, οὐ γινόμενος ἐκεῖνοι,[1] ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος ἐκείνοις. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον, τῷ δέ τι καὶ παρὰ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ τρίτου ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἔστιν ἕκαστος καθ' ὃν ἐνεργεῖ, καίτοι πάντας ἕκαστος ἔχει καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἔχει. τοῦ δὲ σώματος χωρισθείσης τῆς τρίτης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ τρίτου ἀνθρώπου, εἰ συνέποιτο τῇ δευτέρᾳ,[2] συνέποιτο δὲ μὴ χωρισθεῖσα τῶν ἄνω, οὗ ἐκείνη καὶ αὕτη λέγεται εἶναι. μεταλαβούσης δὲ θήρειον σῶμα θαυμάζεται δέ, πῶς λόγος οὖσα ἀνθρώπου. ἦ πάντα ἦν, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἐνεργεῖ κατ' ἄλλον. καθαρὰ μὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ πρὶν κακυνθῆναι ἄνθρωπον θέλει καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ κάλλιον τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ κάλλιον ποιεῖ. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ δαίμονας προτέρους, ὁμοειδεῖς τῇ ⟨ἧ⟩[3] ἄνθρωπον· καὶ ὁ πρὸ αὐτῆς δαιμονιώτερος, μᾶλλον δὲ θεός, καὶ ἔστι μίμημα θεοῦ δαίμων εἰς θεὸν ἀνηρτημένος, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος εἰς δαίμονα·[4] οὐ γὰρ λέγεται θεός, εἰς ὃν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἔχει γὰρ διαφοράν, ἣν ἔχουσι ψυχαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, κἂν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦσι στοίχου·[5] λέγειν δὲ δεῖ δαίμονας εἶδος δαιμόνων, οὕς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων δαίμονας. ὅταν δὲ συνέπηται τῇ[6] θήρειον φύσιν ἐλομένῃ ψυχῇ[7] ἡ συνηρτημένη [τῇ][8] ὅτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ

[1] Geiger, testatur *Theologia*: ἐκείνοις Enn.
[2] coniecimus: ἡ δευτέρα Enn.
[3] τῇ ⟨ἧ⟩ H–S[1]: τῇ wBUCQ: τὸν x.
[4] Volkmann: ἄνθρωπον Enn.
[5] Volkmann: στίχου Enn.
[6] Theiler: τὴν Enn.
[7] F[3mg] (= Ficinus): ψυχὴ Enn. [8] del. Kirchhoff.

[1] Plotinus is probably thinking of two passages in Plato: *Symposium* 202D–E and *Timaeus* 90A. These give rather

last man somehow possesses all men, not becoming those other men, but set alongside them. And one of us is active according to the last and lowest man, but another has something also from the one before him, and another's active actuality comes even from the third, and each is the man according to whom he is active, though each of us has all of them—and again does not have them. And when the third life and the third man are separated from the body, if the third life follows the second, and follows it without being separated from the things above, then this life is said to be also where that life above is. But when the soul takes the body of a beast one wonders how it does it when it is the forming principle of man. Now it was all things, but is active at different times according to different ones. When it is pure, then, and before it is spoilt it wills man and is man; for this is finer, and it does what is finer. But soul makes the spirits which come before man, which are of the same kind as the soul which makes man; and he who is before the soul is more of a spirit, or rather is a god, and a spirit is an imitation of a god, dependent on the god as man is on the spirit; for the being on whom man is dependent is not called a god. He has the difference from a god which souls have from each other, even if they belong to the same order. But one must call spirits that kind of spirits whom Plato calls spirits.[1] But when the soul which was joined to it when it was a man follows the soul which has chosen the nature of a beast, it gives the forming principle in it which

different accounts of the nature of spirits: in the *Timaeus* the personal δαίμων or guardian spirit is demythologised and said to be the highest part of our soul, the immortal reason. Plotinus reconciles the two in III. 4. 5.

λόγον ἐκείνου τοῦ ζῴου ἔδωκεν. ἔχει γάρ, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὕτη χείρων.

7. Ἀλλ' εἰ κακυνθεῖσα καὶ χείρων γενομένη πλάττει θήρειον φύσιν, οὐκ ἦν ὃ ἐξαρχῆς βοῦν ἐποίει ἢ ἵππον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἵππου καὶ ἵππος παρὰ φύσιν. ἢ ἔλαττον, οὐ μὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό πως καὶ ἐξαρχῆς ἵππος ἢ κύων. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἕξει, ποιεῖ τὸ κάλλιον, εἰ δὲ μή, ὃ δύναται, ἤ γε ποιεῖν προσταχθεῖσα· οἷα καὶ οἱ πολλὰ εἴδη ποιεῖν εἰδότες δημιουργοί, εἶτα τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὃ προσετάχθησαν, ἢ ὃ ἡ ὕλη ἐθέλει τῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι. τί γὰρ κωλύει τὴν μὲν δύναμιν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς προϋπογράφειν, ἅτε λόγον πάντα οὖσαν, πρὶν καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς ἥκειν τὰς ψυχικὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὴν προϋπογραφὴν οἷον προδρόμους ἐλλάμψεις εἰς τὴν ὕλην εἶναι, ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἴχνεσιν ἑπακολουθοῦσαν τὴν ἐξεργαζομένην ψυχὴν κατὰ μέρη τὰ ἴχνη διαρθροῦσαν ποιῆσαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἑκάστην τοῦτο, ᾧ προσῆλθε σχηματίσασα ἑαυτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν ἐν ὀρχήσει πρὸς τὸ δοθὲν αὐτῷ δρᾶμα; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπισπόμενοι τῷ ἐφεξῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἥκομεν. ἦν δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ὅπως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς γένεσιν βλέπει· καὶ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐδείκνυεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὰ τῇδε βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνα ἀνηρτῆσθαι καὶ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνα, καὶ

[1] Here and in what follows in ch. 7 Plotinus is explaining Plato's doctrine of animal reincarnation as stated in *Timaeus* 42B–C.

belongs to that living thing in the intelligible world. For it possesses it, and this is its worse form of activity.[1]

7. But if it is when it is spoilt and has become worse that the soul makes a beast-nature, it was not from the beginning the principle which made horse or ox, and the forming principles of horse, and horse, were against nature. No, a lesser thing, certainly not an unnatural one, but that which made them was somehow from the beginning horse or dog. And if the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but if not, what it can; it is foreordained to make in any case: it is like the craftsmen who know how to make many forms and then make just this one, for which they had the order or which their material by its particular characteristics required. For what is there to prevent the power of the Soul of the All from drawing a preliminary outline, since it is the universal forming principle, even before the soul-powers come from it, and this preliminary outline being like illuminations running on before into matter, and the soul which carries out the work following traces of this kind and making by articulating the traces part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by figuring itself, as the dancer does to the dramatic part given him? Well, by following up one line of thought after another we have arrived at this point. But our discussion was about how the power of sense-perception belongs to man and how those intelligible realities do not look to coming to birth; and it appeared to us, and our argument showed, that those realities do not look to the things here below but these are dependent on those and imitate those, and that this man here below has his

τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχοντα τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ συνεζεῦχθαι ταῦτα τὰ αἰσθητὰ τούτῳ, ἐκεῖνα δ' ἐκείνῳ· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά, ἃ οὕτως ὠνομάσαμεν, ὅτι σώματα,[1] ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐν ἀντιλήψει· καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν[2] ἀμυδροτέραν εἶναι[3] τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀντιλήψεως, ἣν ὠνομάζομεν αἴσθησιν ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν[4] ἐναργεστέραν οὖσαν.[5] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτον αἰσθητικόν, ὅτι ἐλαττόνως καὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀντιληπτικὸς εἰκόνων ἐκείνων· ὥστε εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταύτας ἀμυδρὰς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκεῖ νοήσεις ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις.

8. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν οὕτως. τὸ δὲ "ἵππος" ὅμως[6] καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων ἐκεῖ πῶς οὐ πρὸς τὰ ἐνταῦθα ἐθέλει βλέπειν; ἀλλ' εἰ μέν, ἵνα ἐνταῦθα ἵππος γένοιτο ἢ ἄλλο τι ζῷον, ἐξεῦρε νόησιν ἵππου; καίτοι πῶς οἷόν τε ἦν βουλόμενον ἵππον ποιῆσαι νοῆσαι ἵππον; ἤδη γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ὑπῆρχεν ἵππου νόησις, εἴπερ ἠβουλήθη ἵππον ποιῆσαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν, ἵνα ποιήσῃ, νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον εἶναι τὸν μὴ γενόμενον ἵππον πρὸ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσομένου. εἰ οὖν πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἦν καὶ οὐχ, ἵνα γένηται, ἐνοήθη, οὐ πρὸς τὰ τῇδε βλέπων εἶχε παρ' ἑαυτῷ ὃς εἶχε τὸν ἐκεῖ ἵππον, οὐδ' ἵνα

[1] R[2s] (*corpora* Ficinus): ἀσώματα AEBxUCQ, H–S[2].
[2] post αἴσθησιν transp. ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν Steinhart, H–S[2].
[3] Theiler: οὖσαν Enn., H–S[2].
[4] αἴσθησιν ὅτι σωμάτων ἦν del. H–S[2].
[5] Theiler: εἶναι Enn., H–S[2].
[6] Igal: ὅλως EBxUCQ: ὅλος A.

[1] In this difficult passage I remain closer to the MSS (and H–S[1]) than to H–S[2]. But in line 25 I read σώματα with Ficino (who translates *corpora*) and in lines 26 and 28 I transpose οὖσαν and εἶναι with Theiler. The presence of bodies in the intelligible world is suggested in the previous chapter, lines 7–9, and clearly affirmed in VI. 2. 21. 52–53.

powers from that intelligible man and looks to those realities, and these sense-objects are linked to this man and those others to that; for those sense-objects, which we called so because they are bodies, are apprehended in a different way; and that this sense-perception here below is dimmer than the apprehension there in the intelligible, which we called sense-perception because it is of bodies and which is clearer.[1] And for this reason this man here has sense-perception, because he has a lesser apprehension of lesser things, images of those intelligible realities; so that these sense-perceptions here are dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions.

8. But so much for the power of sense-perception. But all the same, how do "horse" and each and every one of the animals not intend to look to the things here below? But supposing God discovered the thought of horse in order that a horse (or some other animal) might come into being here below? Yet how would it be possible for him when he wanted to make a horse to think a horse? For it is already clear that the thought of horse existed if he wanted to make a horse; so that it is not possible for him to think it in order to make it, but the horse which did not come into being must exist before that which was to be afterwards. If then it existed before its generation and was not thought of that it might be generated, he who possessed the horse there in the intelligible did not possess it in himself in looking to the things here below, nor that he might make the things here

τὰ τῇδε ποιήσῃ, εἶχε τοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ ἦν μὲν ἐκεῖνα, ταῦτα δὲ ἐπηκολούθει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκείνοις· οὐ γὰρ ἦν στῆναι μέχρι τῶν ἐκεῖ. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἔστησε δύναμιν μένειν τε καὶ προϊέναι δυναμένην; ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἐκεῖ ζῷα ταῦτα; τί γὰρ ἐν θεῷ ταῦτα; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λογικὰ ἔστω· ἀλόγων δὲ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος τί τὸ σεμνὸν ἔχει; τί δὲ οὐ τοὐναντίον; ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἓν εἶναι ὂν μετὰ τὸ πάντη ἕν, δῆλον· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν μετ' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο. μετ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὂν ὑπὲρ μὲν ἐκεῖνο πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον ἓν γενέσθαι οὐκ ἦν, ἐλλεῖπον δ' ἐκείνου· τοῦ δ' ἀρίστου ὄντος ἑνὸς ἔδει πλέον ἢ ἓν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος ἐν ἐλλείψει. τί οὖν κωλύει δυάδα εἶναι; ἢ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐν τῇ δυάδι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἓν παντελῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάλιν αὖ δύο τοὐλάχιστον εἶναι, καὶ ἐκείνων αὖ ὡσαύτως· εἶτα καὶ κίνησις ἦν ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ καὶ στάσις, ἦν δὲ καὶ νοῦς, καὶ ζωὴ ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ·[1] καὶ τέλεος νοῦς καὶ ζωὴ τελεία. ἦν τοίνυν οὐχ ὡς νοῦς εἷς, ἀλλὰ πᾶς καὶ πάντας τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστα νοῦς ἔχων καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσοι πάντες, καὶ πλείων· καὶ ἔζη οὐχ ὡς ψυχὴ μία, ἀλλ' ὡς πᾶσαι, καὶ πλείω[2] δύναμιν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ψυχὰς ἑκάστας ἔχων, καὶ ζῷον παντελὲς ἦν, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἐν αὐτῷ μόνον ἔχων· μόνον γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐνταῦθα ἦν.

9. Ἀλλ' ἔστω, φήσει τις, τὰ τίμια τῶν ζῴων· πῶς

[1] Harder, testatur *Theologia*: αὐτῷ Enn.
[2] AJ^{pc}, H–S^{2}: πλείων EBRUQ, H–S^{1}: om. C.

below, but those intelligibles existed and these things here necessarily followed upon them; for it was not possible to stop at the intelligibles there. For who could bring to a stop a power able both to abide and to go forward? But why these animals there in the intelligible? For why should they be in God? Rational animals, yes; but what majesty does so great a multitude of irrational ones have? Why does it not have just the opposite? Now it is clear that this one must be many, because it exists after the altogether One; or it would not have been after that One, but it would have been that One. But, being after it, it could not be above it in the direction of being more one, but had to fall short of it; but, as the best was one, it had to be more than one; for multiplicity is deficient. But what prevents it from being a dyad? Now each of the ones in the dyad could not be absolutely one, but must again be at least two, and again it is the same with each of those; and then there was in the first dyad movement as well as rest, and there was also intellect, and life was in it: and perfect intellect and perfect life.[1] Then it was not one as Intellect but all, and possessing all the particular intellects, and as many as all of them and more; and it lived not as one soul, but as all, and as possessing more power to make all the individual souls, and it was the "complete living being",[2] not having only man in it: for otherwise there would only be man here below.

9. "But yes," someone will say, "I grant the valuable living beings, but on the other hand, how could

[1] Cp. Plato *Sophist* 249A–C.
[2] Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

αὖ τὰ εὐτελῆ καὶ τὰ ἄλογα ἦν; τὸ εὐτελὲς δηλονότι τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἔχοντα, εἰ τῷ λογικῷ τὸ τίμιον· καὶ εἰ τῷ νοερῷ τὸ τίμιον, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ τὸ ἐναντίον. καίτοι πῶς ἀνόητον ἢ ἄλογον ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν ᾧ ἕκαστα ἢ ἐξ οὗ; πρὸ δὴ τῶν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα λεχθησομένων λάβωμεν, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷος ἐκεῖνος, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐχ οἷα τὰ ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖ, ἀλλὰ μειζόνως δεῖ ἐκεῖνα λαμβάνειν· εἶτα οὔτε τὸ λογικὸν ἐκεῖ· ὧδε γὰρ ἴσως λογικός, ἐκεῖ δὲ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ λογίζεσθαι. διὰ τί οὖν ἐνταῦθα λογίζεται οὗτος, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὔ; ἢ διαφόρου ὄντος ἐκεῖ τοῦ νοεῖν ἔν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, διάφορον καὶ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ἔνι γάρ πως καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις πολλὰ διανοίας ἔργα. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσης λογικά; διὰ τί δὲ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἐπίσης; δεῖ δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς τὰς πολλὰς ζωὰς οἷον κινήσεις οὔσας καὶ τὰς πολλὰς νοήσεις οὐκ ἐχρῆν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζωὰς διαφόρους καὶ νοήσεις ὡσαύτως· τὰς δὲ διαφοράς πως φωτεινοτέρας καὶ ἐναργεστέρας, κατὰ[1] τὸ ἐγγὺς δὲ τῶν πρώτων πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας. διόπερ τῶν νοήσεων αἱ μὲν θεοί, αἱ δὲ δεύτερόν τι γένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸ λογικὸν ἐπίκλην ἐνταῦθα, ἑξῆς δ' ἀπὸ τούτων τὸ ἄλογον κληθέν. ἐκεῖ δέ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον λεγόμενον λόγος ἦν, καὶ τὸ ἄνουν

[1] H–S[1]: καὶ Enn.

the cheap and irrational ones be there?" Their cheapness obviously comes by irrationality, if being valuable comes by rationality; and if they are valuable by their intellectual quality, they are the reverse by their unintellectuality. And yet how can anything be unintellectual or irrational when it is that Intellect in which each and every one exists or from which they come? Before, then, beginning the arguments about and against this position, let us grasp that man here is not like that intelligible man, so that the other living beings are not the same here and there, but one must have a greater and nobler apprehension of those there; and then too there is no rationality there: for here perhaps man is rational but in that world there is the man before reasoning. Why, then, does this man here reason, but the others do not? Now, there in the intelligible, intelligence is different in man and the other living beings, and reasoning is also different; for there are present somehow also in the other living beings many works of deliberate thought. Why then are they not equally rational? And why are men not equally so in comparison to each other? But one must consider that the many lives, which are like movements, and the many thoughts should not have been the same, but different lives and in the same way different thoughts; and the differences are, somehow, in brilliance and clarity, firsts and seconds and thirds according to their nearness to the first principles. And for this reason some of the thoughts are gods, and some of a second kind, in which is included what we call rational here below, and in sequence from these what is called irrational. But there what we say is irrational was also a rational principle, and

νοῦς ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ νοῶν ἵππον νοῦς ἐστι, καὶ ἡ νόησις ἵππου νοῦς ἦν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νόησις μόνον, ἄτοπον οὐδὲν τὴν νόησιν αὐτὴν νόησιν οὖσαν ἀνοήτου εἶναι· νῦν δ' εἰ ταὐτὸν ἡ νόησις τῷ πράγματι, πῶς ἡ μὲν νόησις, ἀνόητον δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα; οὕτω γὰρ ἂν νοῦς ἀνόητον ἑαυτὸν ποιοῖ. ἢ οὐκ ἀνόητον, ἀλλὰ νοῦς τοιόσδε· ζωὴ γὰρ τοιάδε. ὡς γὰρ ἠτισοῦν ζωὴ οὐκ ἀπήλλακται τοῦ εἶναι ζωή, οὕτως οὐδὲ νοῦς τοιόσδε ἀπήλλακται τοῦ εἶναι νοῦς· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατὰ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον ἀπήλλακται αὖ τοῦ νοῦς εἶναι πάντων, οἷον καὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἴπερ ἕκαστον μέρος, ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃς, πάντα ἀλλ' ἴσως ἄλλως. ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, δύναται δὲ πάντα· λαμβάνομεν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσχατον, ὥστε τοῦδε τοῦ νοῦ τὸ ἔσχατον ἵππον εἶναι, καὶ ᾗ ἔληξε προϊὼν ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάττω ζωήν, ἵππον εἶναι, ἄλλον δὲ κατωτέρω λῆξαι. ἐξελιττόμεναι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις καταλείπουσιν ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ ἄνω· προΐασι δέ τι ἀφιεῖσαι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλαι[1] διὰ τὸ ἐνδεὲς τοῦ ζῴου τοῦ φανέντος ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος ἕτερον ἐξευροῦσαι προσθεῖναι· οἷον ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ ἱκανὸν εἰς ζωήν, ἀνεφάνη ὄνυξ καὶ τὸ γαμψώνυχον ἢ τὸ

[1] H–S[1]: ἄλλα· ἀλλὰ Enn.

[1] Cp. Aristotle *Metaphysics* Λ 9. 1075a1–5. Both in Aristotle and Plotinus it is divine thought which is being considered, but the conclusions they draw from the

the mindless was mind, since the thinker of horse is mind and the thought of a horse was mind. But if it was only a thought, there would be nothing out of the way in the thought itself as a thought being of something thoughtless; but as things are, if the thought is the same as the thing,[1] how can the thought be thought and the thing thoughtless? For in this way thought would make itself thoughtless. But now it is not thoughtless but a particular kind of intellect: for it is a particular kind of life. For just as any particular life does not cease to be life, so neither does an intellect of a particular kind cease to be intellect: since the intellect appropriate to any particular living being does not on the other hand cease to be the intellect of all, of man also, for instance, granted that each part, whichever one you take, is all things, but perhaps in different ways. For it is actually one thing, but has the power to be all; but we apprehend in each what it actually is; and what it actually is, is the last and lowest, so that the last and lowest of this particular intellect is horse, and being horse is where it stopped in its continual outgoing to a lesser life, but another stops lower down. For as the powers unfold they always leave something behind on the higher level; and as they go out they lose something, and in losing different things different ones find and add on something else because of the need of the living being which appeared as a result of the deficiency; for instance, since there is not yet enough for life's purpose, nails appeared, and having claws and fangs, and the na-

principle of the identity of perfect immaterial thought with its object are startlingly different.

καρχαρόδον ἢ κέρατος φύσις· ὥστε, ᾗ κατῆλθεν ὁ νοῦς, ταύτῃ πάλιν αὖ τῷ αὐτάρκει τῆς φύσεως ἀνακύψαι καὶ εὑρεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος κειμένην ἴασιν.

10. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκεῖ ἐνέλειπε; τί γὰρ κέρατα ἐκεῖ πρὸς ἄμυναν; ἢ πρὸς τὸ αὔταρκες ὡς ζῴου καὶ τὸ τέλεον. ὡς γὰρ ζῷον ἔδει τέλεον εἶναι, καὶ ὡς νοῦν δὲ τέλεον, καὶ ὡς ζωὴν δὲ τέλεον· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο. καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῷ ἄλλο ἀντὶ ἄλλου, ἵνα ἐκ πάντων μὲν τὸ τελειότατον ζῷον καὶ ὁ τέλειος νοῦς καὶ ἡ τελειοτάτη ζωή, ἕκαστον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστον τέλειον. καὶ μήν, εἰ ἐκ πολλῶν, δεῖ εἶναι αὖ ἕν· ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν μὲν εἶναι, τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ πάντων· ἢ αὔταρκες ἦν ἂν ἕν. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐξ ἑτέρων ἀεὶ κατ' εἶδος, ὥσπερ καὶ πᾶν σύνθετον, καὶ σῳζομένων ἑκάστων, οἷαι καὶ αἱ μορφαὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. αἵ τε γὰρ μορφαί, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἐξ ὅσων διαφορῶν, καίτοι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἕν. καὶ βελτίω καὶ χείρω ἀλλήλων, ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ δάκτυλος, ἀλλ' ἑνός· καὶ οὐ χεῖρον τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὕτω, βέλτιον· καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ζῷον καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ μὴ ταὐτὸν τῷ "ζῷον". καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ἀδιαφόρου τοῦ κοινοῦ ὄντος.

11. Λέγεται δὲ οὐδ' ὁ οὐρανός—καὶ πολλὰ δὲ φαίνεται—οὐκ ἀτιμάσαι τὴν τῶν ζῴων πάντων φύσιν,

ture of horn; so that where the intellect came down to, at that very point it comes up again by the self-sufficiency of its nature and finds stored in itself the cure for the deficiency.

10. But how was it deficient there in the intelligible? For why should there be horns for defence there? They are for its self-sufficiency as a living being and its completeness. For it had to be complete as living being and complete as intellect and complete as life; so that if it did not have this, it must have that. And the difference is by having one thing instead of another, so that from all living beings [there may be composed] the most perfect living being and the perfect intellect and the perfect life, and each individual may be perfect as an individual. And certainly, if it is composed of many, it must on the other hand be one; now it is not possible for it to be composed of many and all of them the same: if it was, it would be a self-sufficient one. It must then be composed of things again and again differing in form, like every composite being, and each individual must be preserved, as their shapes and forming principles are. For the shapes also, of man for instance, are composed of so many different elements, though that over all is one. And they are better and worse than each other, eye and finger, but they belong to one; and the whole is not worse but, because it is so, is better; and the rationally defined forming principle is living being and something else, which is not the same as "living being". And it is a virtue to be both general and particular, and the whole beautiful—the general is not differentiated.

11. But it is said that even the heaven—and many living beings are manifest in it—does not think

ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν πάντα ἔχει. πόθεν οὖν ἔχει; πάντα οὖν ἔχει ὅσα ἐνταῦθα τἀκεῖ; ἢ ὅσα λόγῳ πεποίηται καὶ κατ' εἶδος. ἀλλ' ὅταν πῦρ ἔχῃ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ πάντως καὶ φυτά. πῶς οὖν τὰ φυτὰ ἐκεῖ; καὶ πῶς πῦρ ζῇ; καὶ πῶς γῆ; ἢ γὰρ ζῇ ἢ οἷον νεκρὰ ἔσται ἐκεῖ, ὥστε μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐκεῖ ζῆν. καὶ τί ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ καὶ ταῦτα; τὰ μὲν οὖν φυτὰ δύναιτ' ἂν τῷ λόγῳ συναρμόσαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῇδε φυτὸν λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενος. εἰ δὴ ὁ ἔνυλος λόγος ὁ τοῦ φυτοῦ, καθ' ὃν τὸ φυτόν ἐστι, ζωή τίς ἐστι τοιάδε καὶ ψυχή τις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἕν τι, ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον φυτόν ἐστιν οὗτος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυτὸν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἕν, ταῦτα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δεῖ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖνο ζῆν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο φυτὸν εἶναι, ἀπ' ἐκείνου δὲ ταῦτα δευτέρως καὶ τρίτως καὶ κατ' ἴχνος ἐκείνου ζῆν. γῆ δὲ πῶς; καὶ τί τὸ γῇ εἶναι; καὶ τίς ἡ ἐκεῖ γῆ τὸ ζῆν ἔχουσα; ἢ πρότερον τίς αὕτη; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τί τὸ εἶναι ταύτῃ; δεῖ δὴ μορφήν τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ λόγον. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ ἔζη καὶ ὁ τῇδε αὐτοῦ λόγος. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ γῇ; ἢ εἰ λάβοιμεν τὰ μάλιστα γήινα γεννώμενα καὶ πλαττόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ, εὕροιμεν ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν γῆς φύσιν. λίθων τοίνυν

worthless the nature of all living things, since also this All here has all of them. From where, then, does it have them? Does then the world there have everything that is here? Yes, everything that is made by forming principle and according to form. But when it has fire, it also has water, and it most certainly also has plants. How then are there plants there? And how does fire live? And how does earth? For it either lives or it will be a kind of dead body there, so that not everything there lives. And how in general can these things here be there in the intelligible? Well, the plants could fit into the argument; for the plant here is a rational forming principle resting in life. If then indeed the forming principle in matter, that of the plant, by which the plant exists, is a particular life and a soul, and the forming principle is some one thing, then this principle is either the first plant or it is not, but the first plant is before it, and this plant here derives from it. For that first plant is certainly one, and these plants here are many, and necessarily come from one. If this is really so, that plant must be much more primarily alive and be this very thing, plant, and these here must live from it in the second and third degree and from its traces. But how does earth live? And what is it to be earth? And what is the earth there which has life? Or rather, first, what is this earth here? That is, what being does it have? It must certainly even here below be a pattern and a forming principle. Well, in that case of the plant, its forming principle here too was alive. Does it then so live in the earth here? Now, if we were to take the most earthly things generated and shaped in it, we should find here below too the nature of earth. The growth, then, and shaping of

αὐξήσεις τε καὶ πλάσεις καὶ ὀρῶν ἀναφυομένων ἔνδον μορφώσεις πάντως που λόγου ἐμψύχου δημιουργοῦντος ἔνδοθεν καὶ εἰδοποιοῦντος χρὴ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι· καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶδος τῆς γῆς τὸ ποιοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δένδροις τὴν λεγομένην φύσιν, τῷ δὲ ξύλῳ τοῦ δένδρου ἀνάλογον τὴν λεγομένην εἶναι γῆν, καὶ ἀποτμηθέντα τὸν λίθον οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς εἰ ἐκ τοῦ δένδρου τι κοπείη, μὴ παθόντος δὲ τούτου, ἀλλ' ἔτι συνηρτημένου, ὡς τὸ μὴ κοπὲν ἐκ τοῦ ζῶντος φυτοῦ. τὴν ⟨δὴ⟩[1] δημιουργοῦσαν ἐγκαθημένην τῇ γῇ φύσιν ζωὴν ἐν λόγῳ ἀνευρόντες πιστοίμεθα ἂν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ῥᾳδίως τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν πολὺ πρότερον ζῶσαν εἶναι καὶ ζωὴν ἔλλογον γῆς, αὐτογῆν καὶ πρώτως γῆν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ἐνταῦθα γῆ. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ λόγος τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου πῦρ—πόθεν γάρ; οὐ γὰρ ἐκ παρατρίψεως, ὡς ἄν τις οἰηθείη· ἤδη γὰρ ὄντος ἐν τῷ παντὶ πυρὸς ἡ παράτριψις ἐχόντων τῶν παρατριβομένων σωμάτων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὕτως δυνάμει, ὥστε παρ' αὐτῆς—εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι ὡς μορφοῦν, τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ψυχὴ ποιεῖν πῦρ δυναμένη; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ λόγος, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ ἄμφω. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ψυχήν φησιν εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ποιοῦσαν τοῦτο δὴ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πῦρ. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα ποιοῦν πῦρ ζωή τις

[1] R^{2s} (*nimirum* Ficinus), Kirchhoff.

[1] In IV. 4. 27 (where Plotinus also speaks, as he does here, of the living rock growing) it is strongly asserted that earth here below not only has a soul, but a divine soul. She is, in accordance with all Greek tradition, a goddess.

stones and the inner patterning of mountains as they grow one must most certainly suppose take place because an ensouled forming principle is working within them and giving them form; and this is the active form of the earth, like what is called the growth-nature in trees, and what we call earth corresponds to the wood of the tree, and when the stone is cut out it is in the same state as if something is chopped from a tree, but if this does not happen to it and it is still joined on it is like what has not been chopped off from a living plant.[1] Now surely when we have discovered the working nature seated in earth as a life in a forming principle we shall easily be confident about what comes next, that the earth there in the intelligible is much more primarily alive and is the life of earth in its forming principle, absolute earth and primary earth, from which the earth here below derives. But if fire also is a forming principle in matter, and so are the other things of this kind, and fire is not spontaneously generated—for where could it come from? Not from friction, as one might think: for friction occurs when fire is already in the All and the bodies being rubbed together have it; also, matter is not able to be fire in such a way that fire can come from it—if then what makes fire must do so by forming principle, as structuring it, what could it be except a soul able to make fire? But that is a life and a forming principle, both one and the same. This is why Plato says that there is a soul in each of these elements,[2] in no other way than as making this perceptible fire. So then what

[2] Plotinus here appears to be thinking of *Epinomis* 981B–C and 984B–C.

πυρίνη, ἀληθέστερον πῦρ. τὸ ἄρα ἐπέκεινα πῦρ μᾶλλον ὂν πῦρ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ἐν ζωῇ· ζῇ ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔμψυχα καὶ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ; ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ζῴῳ τῷ παντί, δῆλόν που, καὶ ὅτι μέρη ζῴου· οὐ φαίνεται δὲ ζωὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· συλλογίζεσθαι δὲ ἦν κἀκεῖ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων ἐν αὐτῇ· ἀλλὰ γίνεται καὶ ἐν πυρὶ ζῷα, καὶ ἐν ὕδατι δὲ φανερώτερον· καὶ ἀέρινοι δὲ ζῴων συστάσεις. γινόμενον δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἕκαστον καὶ ταχὺ σβεννύμενον τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ψυχὴν παρέρχεται εἴς τε ὄγκον οὐ γεγένηται μένον, ἵν' ἔδειξε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχήν· ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡσαύτως· ἐπεί, εἰ παγείη πως κατὰ φύσιν, δείξειεν ἄν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔδει εἶναι κεχυμένα, ἣν ἔχει οὐ δείκνυσι. καὶ κινδυνεύει ὅμοιον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, οἷον αἵματος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σὰρξ ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ ὅ τι ἂν σὰρξ γένηται ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος, τὸ δ' αἷμα αἴσθησιν οὐ παρεχόμενον ἔχειν οὐ δοκεῖ—καίτοι ἀνάγκη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ—ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι βίαιον γινόμενον περὶ αὐτό. ἀλλ' ἕτοιμόν ἐστι διεστάναι τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης ψυχῆς, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τριῶν δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀέρος συστάντος μᾶλλον ζῷα ἔχει τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ

makes the fire here below is also a fiery life, a truer fire. The transcendent fire, then, since it is more fire would be more in life; so then absolute fire also lives. And the same argument applies to the others, water and air. But why are these too not ensouled like the earth? Now it is clear, I suppose, that these are in the universal living being, and that they are parts of the living being; but life is not apparent in them, as it is not in the case of the earth; but one could deduce the presence of life there too from the things which came into being from it; but in fire also living things come to be, and more obviously in water; and there are living organisms in the air. But the individual fire which comes to be and is quickly quenched moves past the soul in the whole and has not come to be static in a bulk, when it would have shown the soul in it; and it is the same with air and fire; since, if they were naturally fixed, they would show their soul; but since they had to be flowing, they do not show the soul which they have. It is likely that their state resembles that of the liquids in us, blood for instance; for the flesh and whatever becomes flesh from the blood seems to have soul, but the blood because it does not give a sense-perception does not seem to have it—though it must exist in it also—since also nothing violent happens to it. But it is easily liable to separate from the soul which exists in it, as one must think is so with the three elements; since all the living beings which are composed of air[1] coming together do not have any sense-perception which affects them. For just as the air

[1] These are *δαίμονες*, who, Platonists generally believed, had bodies of air. Cp. III. 5. 6. 37 and the passages there referred to.

ἀὴρ τὸ φῶς ἀτενὲς ὂν καὶ μένον, ἕως μένει, αὐτὸς παρέρχεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πάρεισι[1] καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ καὶ οὐ πάρεισι· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

12. Ἀλλὰ πάλιν ὧδε λέγωμεν· ἐπεὶ γάρ φαμεν πρὸς οἷον παράδειγμα ἐκείνου τόδε τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, δεῖ κἀκεῖ πρότερον τὸ πᾶν ζῷον εἶναι καί, εἰ π α ν τ ε λ ὲ ς τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ, πάντα εἶναι. καὶ οὐρανὸν δὴ ἐκεῖ ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔρημον τοίνυν ἄστρων τῶν ἐνταῦθα τοῦτο λεγομένων οὐρανόν, καὶ τὸ οὐρανῷ εἶναι τοῦτο. ἔστι δ' ἐκεῖ δηλονότι καὶ γῆ οὐκ ἔρημος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐζωωμένη, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ζῷα ξύμπαντα, ὅσα πεζὰ καὶ χερσαῖα λέγεται ἐνταῦθα, καὶ φυτὰ δηλονότι ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἱδρυμένα· καὶ θάλασσα δέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ, καὶ πᾶν ὕδωρ ἐν ῥοῇ καὶ ζωῇ μενούσῃ, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι ζῷα πάντα, ἀέρος τε φύσις τοῦ ἐκεῖ παντὸς μοῖρα, καὶ ζῷα ἀέρια ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνάλογον αὐτῷ τῷ ἀέρι. τὰ γὰρ ἐν ζῶντι πῶς ἂν οὐ ζῶντα, ὅπου δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα; πῶς οὖν οὐ πᾶν ζῷον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκεῖ; ὡς γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μεγάλων μερῶν ἐστιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ἐν αὐτοῖς φύσις. ὅπως οὖν ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐρανός, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ζῷα πάντα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι· ἢ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα ἔσται. ὁ οὖν ζητῶν πόθεν ζῷα, ζητεῖ πόθεν οὐρανὸς ἐκεῖ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζητεῖν πόθεν ζῷον, τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν πόθεν ζωὴ καὶ ζωὴ πᾶσα

[1] Kirchhoff: *πάρεστι* Enn.

itself moves past the light which does not give way and abides as long as it abides, in this way it passes round its soul and does not pass; and the same with the other elements.

12. But again, let us put it this way: since we maintain that this All exists after the pattern (so to call it) of that, the universal living being must exist there too first, and, if its existence is to be complete,[1] must be all living beings. And certainly the sky there must be a living being, and so a sky not bare of stars, as we call them here below, and this is what being sky is. But obviously there is earth there also, not barren, but much more full of life, and all animals are in it, all that walk on and belong to the land here below, and, obviously, plants rooted in life; and sea is there, and all water in abiding flow and life, and all the living beings in water, and the nature of air is part of the universe there, and aerial living things are there just as the air itself is. For how could the beings in what lives not be living, when they most certainly are so even here below? How then can every living being not be there of necessity? For as each of the great parts of the universe is there, so is of necessity the nature of the living beings in them. As, therefore, the sky is there, and in the way in which it is there, so and in that way all the living beings in the sky are there, and it is impossible for them not to be; or else those great parts would not be there. If one enquiries, therefore, where the living beings come from, one is enquiring where the sky there comes from; and this is to enquire where the [universal] living being comes from, and this is the same as where life comes from, and universal life and

[1] An allusion to *Timaeus* 31B1.

καὶ ψυχὴ πᾶσα καὶ νοῦς ὁ ξύμπας, μηδεμιᾶς ἐκεῖ πενίας μηδ' ἀπορίας οὔσης, ἀλλὰ πάντων ζωῆς πεπληρωμένων καὶ οἷον ζεόντων. ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν ἡ οἷον ῥοὴ ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς, οὐχ οἷον ἑνός τινος πνεύματος ἢ θερμότητος μιᾶς, ἀλλὰ οἷον εἴ τις ἦν ποιότης μία πάσας ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχουσα καὶ σῴζουσα τὰς ποιότητας, γλυκύτητος μετὰ εὐωδίας, καὶ ὁμοῦ οἰνώδης ποιότης καὶ χυλῶν ἁπάντων δυνάμεις καὶ χρωμάτων ὄψεις καὶ ὅσα ἁφαὶ γινώσκουσιν· ἔστωσαν δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἀκοαὶ ἀκούουσι, πάντα μέλη καὶ ῥυθμὸς πᾶς.

13. Ἔστι γὰρ οὔτε νοῦς ἁπλοῦν, οὔτε ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα ὅσῳ ἁπλᾶ, τοῦτο δὲ ὅσῳ μὴ σύνθετα καὶ ὅσῳ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσῳ ἐνέργειαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς ἂν λήγουσα ἁπλῆ, τοῦ δὲ πρώτου πᾶσαι· νοῦς τε κινούμενος κινεῖται μὲν ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοια ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕν τι ἐν μέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν μέρει αὖ οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄπειρον διαιρούμενον. ἀπὸ τίνος δέ φαμεν ἂν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ τί ὡς ἔσχατον; τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ πᾶν ἆρα ὥσπερ γραμμή, ἢ ὥσπερ ἕτερον σῶμα ὁμοιομερές τι καὶ ἀποίκιλον; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ σεμνόν;

[1]This remarkably powerful phrase is perhaps suggested to Plotinus by *De Anima* A 2. 405b26–29, where Aristotle says that Pre-Socratic ideas about soul and life followed their etymologies: some connected ζῆν (live) with ζεῖν (boil) and so thought of soul as something hot.

[2] Plotinus may be suggesting here that the life of the intelligible world in its complex unity is not to be thought of in terms of Stoic πνεῦμα.

universal Soul and universal Intellect, when there is no poverty or lack of resource there, but all things are filled full of life, and, we may say, boiling with life.[1] They all flow, in a way, from a single spring, not like one particular breath or one warmth,[2] but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities in itself, of sweetness along with fragrance, and was at once the quality of wine and the characters of all tastes, the sights of colours and all the awarenesses of touch, and all that hearings hear, all tunes and every rhythm.

13. For neither is Intellect simple, nor the soul which derives from it, but all are varied in proportion to their simplicity, that is, in so far as they are not composites and in so far as they are principles and in so far as they are activities. For the activity of the last and lowest is simple as coming to a stop, but of the first is all activities; and Intellect in its movement moves along in the same way and on one same and identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing, but all things: since also the partial thing is in its turn not one, but this too is infinite when it is divided. But from what should we say that it began, and to what does it move as the ultimate point? And is all in between like a line or like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But what majesty would there be in that[3]? For if it has

[3] There may be an allusion here to Plato *Sophist* 249A1. Plotinus is certainly much concerned in this chapter with the discussion in the *Sophist* which begins there, and, as he often does, describes the living world of Intellect in terms of the "very important kinds" (*Sophist* 254D4) which appear in the course of that discussion, Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other.

εἰ γὰρ μηδεμίαν ἔχει ἐξαλλαγὴν μηδέ τις ἐξεγείρει αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἑτερότης, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις μὴ ἐνεργείας διαφέροι. κἂν κίνησις δὲ ᾖ τοιαύτη, οὐ πανταχῶς, μοναχῶς δ' ἂν εἴη ζωή· δεῖ δὲ πάντα ζῆν καὶ πανταχόθεν καὶ οὐδὲν μὴ ζῆν. ἐπὶ πάντα οὖν κινεῖσθαι δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ κεκινῆσθαι. ἁπλοῦν δὴ εἰ κινοῖτο, ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἔχει· καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ προὔβη εἰς οὐδέν, ἢ εἰ προὔβη, ἄλλο μένον· ὥστε δύο· καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ, μένει ἓν καὶ οὐ προελήλυθεν, εἰ δ' ἕτερον, προῆλθε μετὰ ἑτερότητος καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ τινος καὶ ἑτέρου τρίτον ἕν. γενόμενον δὴ ἐκ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου τὸ γενόμενον φύσιν ἔχει ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι· ἕτερον δὲ οὐ τί, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πᾶν. πᾶν δὲ ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ πᾶν ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἀπολείπει τῶν ἑτέρων. φύσιν ἄρα ἔχει ἐπὶ πᾶν ἑτεροιοῦσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἕτερα πάντα, ἤδη πάσχοι ἂν ὑπ' αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, οὗτος τὰ πάντα ἐγέννα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάντα ἦν. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι μὴ νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος, ἐνεργήσαντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο καὶ οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ πλανηθέντος, οἷα νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι· πέφυκε δ' ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις. πανταχοῦ δ' αὐτός ἐστι· μένουσαν οὖν

no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to life, it would not even be an active actuality: for such a state would be undistinguishable from non-actual inactivity. And even if it were a movement of this [simple and straightforward] kind it would be life not in all ways, but in one way only; but it must live all things and from all directions and there must be nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to all, or rather have moved to all. Certainly if it moves a simple movement it has that one alone; and it is either itself and it has not gone forward to anything, or, if it has gone forward, it is another thing as staying behind; so there are two; and if this [one of the two] is the same as that, it remains one and has not gone forth; but if it is other, it has gone forth with otherness and from a same and another has made a third one. Now certainly if what has come to be has come to be from the same and the other, it is its nature to be the same and the other; and not just any other, but universal other: for its same also is universal. But since it is all that is the same and all that is other, there is no one of the others that it leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other in every way. If then all the other things exist before it, it would already be affected by them; but if they do not, then this Intellect generated them all, or rather was them all. It is not then possible for the real beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work, for ever working one thing after another and, we may say, wandering down every way and wandering in itself, as it is natural for the true Intellect to wander in itself; and it is natural for it to wander among substances while the substances run along with its wanderings. But it is everywhere itself; so its wan-

ἔχει τὴν πλάνην. ἡ δὲ πλάνη αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίῳ, οὗ οὐκ ἐκβαίνει. ἔχει δὲ καταλαβὼν πᾶν καὶ αὐτῷ ποιήσας εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι οἷον τόπον, καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ οὗ τόπος. ποικίλον δέ ἐστι τὸ πεδίον τοῦτο, ἵνα καὶ διεξίοι· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν καὶ ἀεὶ ποικίλον, καθόσον μὴ ποικίλον, ἔστηκεν. εἰ δ' ἔστηκεν, οὐ νοεῖ· ὥστε καί, εἰ ἔστη, οὐ νενόηκεν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἔστιν. ἔστιν οὖν νόησις· ἡ δὲ κίνησις πᾶσα πληροῦσα οὐσίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία νόησις πᾶσα ζωὴν περιλαβοῦσα πᾶσαν, καὶ μετ' ἄλλο ἀεὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ὅ τι αὐτοῦ ταὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ διαιροῦντι ἀεὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἀναφαίνεται. πᾶσα δὲ διὰ ζωῆς ἡ πορεία καὶ διὰ ζώων πᾶσα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ διὰ γῆς ἰόντι πάντα, ἃ διέξεισι, γῆ, κἂν διαφορὰς ἔχῃ ἡ γῆ. καὶ ἐκεῖ ἡ μέν ζωή, δι' ἧς, ἡ αὐτή, ὅτι δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ ἡ αὐτή. ἀεὶ δ' ἔχων τὴν αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν διέξοδον, ὅτι μὴ ἀμείβει, ἀλλὰ σύνεστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά· ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ἀργεῖ πάντη καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐδαμοῦ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτός, ὥστε πᾶς αὐτός. καὶ εἴπερ αὐτός, πᾶς, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ αὐτός. εἰ δὲ πᾶς αὐτὸς καὶ πᾶς, ὅτι τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὅ τι μὴ συντελεῖ εἰς τὰ

dering is an abiding one. And its wandering is in "the plain of truth",[1] which it does not leave. And it encompasses and possesses it all, and makes a kind of place for its movement, and the place is the same as that of which it is the place. But this plain is varied so that Intellect may travel through it; but if it was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far as it was not varied, Intellect would stand still. But if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to a standstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it does not even exist. It is, then, thought; that is, all movement filling all substance, and all substance is all thought encompassing all life, and always one thing after another, and whatever of it is the same is also other, and as one is dividing it the other is always appearing. But all its journeying is through life, and all through living beings, as when someone travels through the earth, all he travels through is earth, even if the earth has its differences. And there in the intelligible, through which [the journey goes,] the life is the same, but because it is always other, not the same. But Intellect keeps always the same journeying through the things which are not the same, because it does not change, but unaltering sameness is present with the things which are other; for if unaltering sameness is not in the things which are other, Intellect is altogether inactive and its actuality and activity are nowhere. But it is also itself the other things, so that it is all itself. And if it is itself it is all, and if it is not, it is not itself. But if it is itself all, and all because it is all things, and there is no thing which does not make its contribution to

[1] Plato *Phaedrus* 248B6.

πάντα, οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, ὅ τι μὴ ἄλλο, ἵνα ἄλλο ὂν καὶ τοῦτο συντελῇ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ ἄλλῳ ταὐτόν, ἐλαττώσει αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἰδίαν οὐ παρεχόμενον εἰς συντέλειαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν.

14. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ παραδείγμασι νοεροῖς χρώμενον εἰδέναι οἷόν ἐστι νοῦς, ὡς οὐκ ἀνέχεται οἷον κατὰ μονάδα μὴ ἄλλος εἶναι. τίνα γὰρ καὶ βούλει εἰς παράδειγμα λαβεῖν λόγον εἴτε φυτοῦ εἴτε ζῴου; εἰ γὰρ ἕν τι καὶ μὴ ἓν τοῦτο ποικίλον, οὔτ' ἂν λόγος εἴη, τό τε γενόμενον ὕλη ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου μὴ πάντα γενομένου εἰς τὸ πανταχοῦ τῆς ὕλης ἐμπεσόντα μηδὲν αὐτῆς ἐâσαι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. οἷον πρόσωπον οὐκ ὄγκος εἷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥῖνες καὶ ὀφθαλμοί· καὶ ἡ ῥὶς οὐχὶ οὖσα ἕν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, τὸ δ' ἕτερον αὖ πάλιν αὐτῆς, εἰ ἔμελλε ῥὶς εἶναι· ἓν γάρ τι ἁπλῶς οὖσα ὄγκος ἂν ἦν μόνον. καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον οὕτως ἐν νῷ, ὅτι ἓν[1] ὡς ἓν πολλά, οὐχ ὡς ὄγκος[2] εἷς, ἀλλ' ὡς λόγος πολὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν ἑνὶ σχήματι νοῦ οἷον περιγραφῇ ἔχων περιγραφὰς ἐντὸς καὶ σχηματισμοὺς αὖ ἐντὸς καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ νοήσεις καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν μὴ κατ' εὐθύ, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς ἀεί, οἷον τοῦ παντὸς ζῴου ἐμπεριεχομένας ζῴων φύσεις, καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ μικρότερα τῶν ζῴων καὶ εἰς τὰς ἐλάττους δυνάμεις, ὅπου στήσεται εἰς εἶδος ἄτομον. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις ἔγκειται οὐ συγκεχυμένων, καίτοι εἰς ἓν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ

[1] Porphyrius *Sent.*, testatur *Theologia*: ἂν Enn.
[2] Porphyrius *Sent.*, testatur *Theologia*: οἶκος Enn.

the totality of things, then there is nothing of it which is not other, that by being other it may make this contribution. For if it is not other, but the same as something else, it will diminish the substance of Intellect by not bringing to its completeness its own particular nature.

14. But it is also possible by using examples taken from the intellectual realm to understand what Intellect is like, that it does not endure to be not other like a unit. For what forming principle of plant or animal would you like to take as an example? For if it was one thing and not this one varied thing, it would not be a forming principle, and what came to be would be matter, if the principle did not become all things so that by penetrating every point of the matter it allowed nothing of it to be the same. A face, for instance, is not one lump, but has both nostrils and eyes; and the nose is not one thing, but there is one part and again another of it, if it is going to be a nose; for if it was simply and solely one thing it would be a lump. And the unbounded is in Intellect in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one lump but like a rational forming principle multiple in itself, in the one figure of Intellect holding as within an outline outlines inside itself and again figurations inside and powers and thoughts; and its division does not go on in a straight line, but moves always to the interior, as the natures of living beings are included in and belong to the universal living being, and again other natures going on to the smaller living things and the weaker powers, where it will come to a stop at the indivisible form. But the division which is in Intellect is not of things confused, though of things existing in unity, but this is

λεγομένη ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία τοῦτο, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντί· μιμεῖται γὰρ αὕτη ἐκ διεστηκότων οὖσα φίλη· ἡ δὲ ἀληθὴς πάντα ἓν εἶναι καὶ μήποτε διακριθῆναι. διακρίνεσθαι δέ φησι τὸ ἐν τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ.

15. Ταύτην οὖν τὴν ζωὴν τὴν πολλὴν καὶ πᾶσαν καὶ πρώτην καὶ μίαν τίς ἰδὼν οὐκ ἐν ταύτῃ εἶναι ἀσπάζεται τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀτιμάσας; σκότος γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κάτω καὶ σμικραὶ καὶ ἀμυδραὶ καὶ εὐτελεῖς[1] καὶ οὐ καθαραὶ καὶ τὰς καθαρὰς μολύνουσαι. κἂν εἰς αὐτὰς ἴδῃς, οὐκέτι τὰς καθαρὰς οὔτε ὁρᾷς οὔτε ζῇς ἐκείνας τὰς πάσας ὁμοῦ, ἐν αἷς οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅ τι μὴ ζῇ καὶ καθαρῶς ζῇ κακὸν οὐδὲν ἔχον. τὰ γὰρ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι ἴχνος ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ ἴχνος· ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τὸ ἀγαθοειδές φησιν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τὸ ζῆν ἔχων· θεωρεῖ δὲ ἀγαθοειδῆ ὄντα τὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ἃ ἐκτήσατο, ὅτε ἐθεώρει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. ἦλθε δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖ ἦν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς ἔσχεν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ὁ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνου. οὐ γὰρ ἦν θέμις βλέποντα εἰς ἐκεῖνον μηδὲν νοεῖν οὐδ' αὖ τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐγέννα. δύναμιν οὖν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν εἶχε

[1] w: ἀτελεῖς BxUCQ, H–S[1].

what is called[1] the love in the All, not the love in this All; for this is an imitation, since it is a loving of things which are separate; but the true love is all things being one and never separated. But Empedocles says that what is within this our sky is separated.

15. This life then, multiple and universal and primary and one—who is there who when he sees it does not delight to be in it, despising every other life? For the other lives, the lives below, are darkness and little and dim and cheap; they are not pure and pollute the pure lives. And if you look at them you no longer either see or live the pure lives, those lives all together in which there is nothing which does not live, and live purely, having no evil. For the evils are here below, because there is [only] a trace of life and a trace of Intellect; but there, Plato says, is the archetype, which "has the form of good"[2] because it possesses the Good in the Forms. That then is the Good, but Intellect is good by having its life in that contemplation; and it contemplates the objects of its contemplation as having the form of good and as the ones which it came to possess when it contemplated the nature of the Good. But they came to it, not as they were there, but as Intellect itself possessed them. For that Good is the principle, and it is from that that they are in this Intellect, and it is this which has made them from that Good. For it was not lawful in looking to him to think nothing, nor again to think what was in him; for then Intellect itself would not have generated them. In-

[1] By Empedocles; cp. e.g. frs. B 17. 7 and 26. 5 DK.
[2] Plato *Republic* 509A3.

παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ πληροῦσθαι γεννημάτων διδόντος ἐκείνου ἃ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τούτῳ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκομίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν συνέθρανε καὶ πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ἵν' οὕτω δύναιτο κατὰ μέρος φέρειν. ὅ τι οὖν ἐγέννα, ἀγαθοῦ ἐκ δυνάμεως ἦν καὶ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἦν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθοειδῶν, ἀγαθὸν ποικίλον. διὸ καὶ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἀπεικάζει σφαίρᾳ ζώσῃ ποικίλῃ, εἴτε παμπρόσωπόν τι χρῆμα λάμπον ζῶσι προσώποις εἴτε ψυχὰς τὰς καθαρὰς πάσας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνδραμούσας φαντάζοιτο οὐκ ἐνδεεῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ αὑτῶν ἐχούσας, καὶ νοῦν τὸν πάντα ἐπ' ἄκραις αὐταῖς ἱδρυμένον, ὡς φέγγει νοερῷ καταλάμπεσθαι τὸν τόπον—φανταζόμενος μὲν οὕτως ἔξω πως ἄλλος ὢν ὁρᾷη ἄλλον· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν[1] ἐκεῖνο γενόμενον τὴν θέαν ἑαυτὸν ποιήσασθαι.

16. Χρὴ δὲ μηδ' ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ πολλῷ τούτῳ καλῷ μένειν, μεταβαίνειν δ' ἔτι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀίξαντα, ἀφέντα καὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνου, θαυμάσαντα τίς ὁ γεννήσας καὶ ὅπως. ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν εἶδος, ἕκαστον καὶ ἴδιος οἷον τύπος· ἀγαθοειδὲς δὲ ὂν

[1] Igal: ἑαυτὸν Enn.

[1] Cp. V. 3. 11. In the next chapter (16, lines 10–24) Plotinus carefully criticises and refines this account of the pluralising contemplation of Intellect.

[2] There is a reminiscence here of Plato's description of

tellect therefore had the power from him to generate and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the Good gave what he did not himself have. But from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect; for it was unable to hold the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part.[1] Whatever it generated, then, was the power of the Good and had the form of good, and Intellect itself is good from [the many] which have the form of good, a good richly varied. And so, if one likens it to a living richly varied sphere,[2] or imagines it as a thing all faces, shining with living faces, or as all the pure souls running together into the same place, with no deficiencies but having all that is their own, and universal Intellect seated on their summits so that the region is illuminated by intellectual light—if one imagined it like this one would be seeing it somehow as one sees another from outside; but one must become that, and make oneself the contemplation.

16. But we must not remain always in that manifold beauty but go on still darting upwards, leaving even this behind, not out of this sky here below, but out of that, in our wondering about who generated it and how. Now each thing there is a form, and each has a kind of distinctive character of its own; but, being in the form of good, all of them have in

the true surface of the earth in the myth of the *Phaedo* (110B7). What follows is strangely reminiscent of Indian many-faced representations of the gods (it is possible, though of course by no means certain, that Plotinus might have seen some small Indian image of this kind in Alexandria or elsewhere).

κοινὸν τὸ ἐπιθέον ἐπὶ πᾶσι πάντα ἔχει. ἔχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ ὂν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἕκαστον ζωῆς κοινῆς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσης, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθὰ καὶ δι' ὅτι ἀγαθά, τί ἂν εἴη; πρὸς δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην σκέψιν τάχ' ἂν εἴη προὔργου ἄρξασθαι ἐντεῦθεν. ἆρα, ὅτε ἐώρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνόει ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἓν ὂν αὐτὸς ἐνόει αὐτὸν πολλά, μερίζων αὐτὸν παρ' αὑτῷ τῷ νοεῖν μὴ ὅλον ὁμοῦ δύνασθαι; ἀλλ' οὔπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως. ἢ φατέον ὡς οὐδὲ ἐώρα πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἔζη μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνήρτητο αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπέστραπτο πρὸς αὐτό, ἡ δὴ κίνησις αὕτη πληρωθεῖσα τῷ ἐκεῖ κινεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκέτι κίνησις ἦν μόνον, ἀλλὰ κίνησις διακορὴς καὶ πλήρης· ἐξῆς δὲ πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνω τοῦτο ἐν συναισθήσει αὑτοῦ καὶ νοῦς ἤδη ἦν, πληρωθεὶς μέν, ἵν' ἔχῃ, ὃ ὄψεται, βλέπων δὲ αὐτὰ μετὰ φωτὸς παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἐκεῖνα καὶ τοῦτο κομιζόμενος. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι αὐτὴν αἴτιος ἐκεῖνος εἶναι. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἥλιος τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἴτιος ὢν αἰτιός πως καὶ τῆς ὄψεώς ἐστιν—οὔκουν οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε τὰ γινόμενα—οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αἰτία οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ οὖσα καὶ φῶς κατὰ[1] τὸ ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὁρατοῖς καὶ τῷ ὁρῶντι οὔτε τὰ ὄντα

[1] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): καὶ Enn.

[1] Here Plotinus begins to develop from Plato's analogy of the Sun (*Republic* 509B2–8) the idea of the light which

common what runs over them all. They of course have also being over them all, and each has the living being as there is a common life over all, and perhaps they have other things [in common]. But what is it according to which and by which they are good? For this kind of enquiry perhaps it would be profitable to begin from here. Did Intellect, when it looked towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being think him as many, dividing him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually. Or rather we should say that it did not ever see the Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and turned to it, and its movement was fulfilled because it moved there and round that Good and filled Intellect, and was not just movement but movement satiated and full; and thereupon it became all things, and knew this in its own intimate self-consciousness and was now at this point Intellect, filled full that it might have what it was going to see, but looking at them in a light, receiving this light too from the giver of them.[1] This is why that Good is said to be the cause not only of substance but of its being seen. And just as the sun, which is cause for sense-objects both of their being seen and their coming into being, is also in some way cause of sight—and therefore is neither sight nor the things which have come to be—in this way also the nature of the Good, which is cause of substance and intellect and light, according to our analogy, to the things seen there and the seer,

shines upon Intellect from the Good, which becomes important later (chs. 21 and 22).

οὔτε νοῦς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ αἴτιος τούτων καὶ ⟨νοεῖν καὶ⟩[1] νοεῖσθαι φωτὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ εἰς τὸν νοῦν παρέχων. πληρούμενος μὲν οὖν ἐγίνετο, πληρωθεὶς δὲ ἦν, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἀπετελέσθη καὶ ἑώρα. ἀρχὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνό τε ὃ[2] πρὶν πληρωθῆναι ἦν, ἑτέρα δὲ ἀρχὴ οἱονεὶ ἔξωθεν ἡ πληροῦσα ἦν, ἀφ' ἧς οἷον ἐτυποῦτο πληρούμενος.

17. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ταῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτός, οὐκ ὄντων ἐκεῖ ἐν τῷ πληρώσαντι οὐδ' αὖ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πληρουμένῳ; ὅτε γὰρ μήπω ἐπληροῦτο, οὐκ εἶχεν. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὅ τις δίδωσι, τοῦτο ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ μὲν διδὸν μεῖζον νομίζειν, τὸ δὲ διδόμενον ἔλαττον τοῦ διδόντος· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι, τὰ δ' ὕστερα εἶναι δυνάμει τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν· καὶ τὸ πρῶτον δὲ ἐπέκεινα τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τοῦ διδομένου τὸ διδὸν ἐπέκεινα ἦν· κρεῖττον γάρ. εἴ τι τοίνυν ἐνεργείας πρότερον, ἐπέκεινα ἐνεργείας, ὥστε καὶ ἐπέκεινα ζωῆς. εἰ οὖν ζωὴ ἐν τούτῳ, ὁ διδοὺς ἔδωκε μὲν ζωήν, καλλίων δὲ καὶ τιμιώτερος ζωῆς. εἶχεν οὖν ζωὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐδεῖτο ποικίλου τοῦ διδόντος, καὶ ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἴχνος τι ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἐκείνου ζωή. πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα ἀόριστος ἦν, βλέψασα δ' ἐκεῖ ὡρίζετο ἐκείνου ὅρον οὐκ ἔχοντος. εὐθὺς γὰρ πρὸς ἕν τι ἰδοῦσα ὁρίζεται τούτῳ καὶ ἴσχει ἐν αὑτῇ ὅρον καὶ πέρας καὶ εἶδος· καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ μορφωθέντι, τὸ δὲ μορφῶσαν ἄμορφον ἦν. ὁ δὲ

[1] Igal.
[2] τε ὃ Igal: τὸ Enn.

is neither the real beings nor intellect but cause of these, giving by its own light thinking and being thought to the real beings and to intellect. So then Intellect came to be by being filled, and when it was filled it was, and simultaneously it was perfected and saw. Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it, from which it received its character in being filled.

17. But how can these be in Intellect, and be Intellect, when they are not there in what fills it, nor, again, in it itself which is filled? For when it was not yet filled, it did not have them. Now, there is no necessity for anyone to have what he gives, but in this kind of situation one must consider that the giver is greater, and that what is given is less than the giver; for that is how coming to be is among the real beings. For that which is actual must be first, and those that come after must be potentially those before them; and the first transcended the seconds and the giver transcended the gift: for it was stronger. So if there is anything prior to actuality, it transcends actuality, so that it also transcends life. If then there is life in this Intellect the giver gave life, but is nobler and worth more than life. Intellect therefore had life and had no need of a giver full of variety, and its life was a trace of that Good and not his life. So when its life was looking towards that it was unlimited, but after it had looked there it was limited, though that Good has no limit. For immediately by looking to something which is one the life is limited by it, and has in itself limit and bound and form; and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is

ὅρος οὐκ ἔξωθεν, οἷον μεγέθει περιτεθείς, ἀλλ' ἦν πάσης ἐκείνης τῆς ζωῆς ὅρος πολλῆς καὶ ἀπείρου οὔσης, ὡς ἂν παρὰ τοιαύτης φύσεως ἐκλαμψάσης. ζωή τε ἦν οὐ τοῦδε· ὥριστο γὰρ ἂν ὡς ἀτόμου ἤδη· ἀλλ' ὥριστο μέντοι· ἦν ἄρα ὁρισθεῖσα ὡς ἑνός τινος πολλοῦ—ὥριστο δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν—διὰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς πολλὰ ὁρισθεῖσα, διὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν ὅρον ἕν. τί οὖν τὸ "ἓν ὡρίσθη"; νοῦς· ὁρισθεῖσα γὰρ ζωὴ νοῦς. τί δὲ τὸ "πολλά"; νόες πολλοί. πάντα οὖν νόες, καὶ ὁ μὲν πᾶς νοῦς, οἱ δὲ ἕκαστοι νοῖ. ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς ἕκαστον περιέχων ἆρα ταὐτὸν ἕκαστον περιέχει; ἀλλ' ἕνα ἂν περιεῖχεν. εἰ οὖν πολλοί, διαφορὰν δεῖ εἶναι. πάλιν οὖν πῶς ἕκαστος διαφορὰν ἔσχεν; ἢ ἐν τῷ καὶ εἷς ὅλως γενέσθαι εἶχε τὴν διαφοράν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὁτουοῦν νοῦ τὸ πᾶν. ἦν οὖν ἡ μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ ὅρασις ἡ ἐκεῖθεν δύναμις πάντων, ὁ δὲ γενόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα. ὁ δὲ ἐπικάθηται αὐτοῖς, οὐχ ἵνα ἱδρυθῇ, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἱδρύσῃ εἶδος εἰδῶν τῶν πρώτων ἀνείδεον αὐτό. καὶ νοῦς δὲ γίνεται πρὸς ψυχὴν οὕτως φῶς εἰς αὐτήν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος εἰς

not from outside, as if it was surrounded by a largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life which is manifold and unbounded, as a life would be which shines out from a nature of this kind. And it was not the life of this or that; or it would be limited to being the life of an indivisible minimum; but all the same it was limited and defined; it was therefore defined as the life of one manifold thing—and each individual of the many things in the manifold was certainly also defined—and it was defined as many because of the multiplicity of its life, but on the other hand as one because of the defining limit. What then does "it was defined as one" mean? Intellect: for life defined and limited is intellect. And what "as many"? Many intellects. All then are intellects, and all as a whole Intellect, and the individuals intellects. But does the whole Intellect in comprehending each individual comprehend each as the same? But if it did, it would comprehend only one. If then the intellects are many, there must be difference. Again, then, how did each one have difference? It had its difference in altogether becoming one: for what is the same in any intellect is not the all. The life of Intellect, then, is all power, and the seeing which came from the Good is the power to become all things, and the Intellect which came to be is manifest as the very totality of things. But the Good sits enthroned upon them, not that it may have a base but that it may base the "Form" of the first "Forms",[1] being formless itself. And in this way Intellect is to soul a light upon it, as that Good is a

[1] Νοῦς is said to be εἶδος εἰδῶν by Aristotle, *De Anima* Γ 8. 432a2.

νοῦν· καὶ ὅταν καὶ οὗτος ὁρίσῃ τὴν ψυχήν, λογικὴν ποιεῖ δοὺς αὐτῇ ὧν ἔσχεν ἴχνος. ἴχνος οὖν καὶ νοῦς ἐκείνου· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐν ἐκτάσει[1] καὶ πλήθει, ἐκεῖνος ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος· οὕτω γὰρ εἰδοποιεῖ. εἰ δ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ἦν ἂν λόγος. ἔδει δὲ τὸ πρῶτον μὴ πολὺ μηδαμῶς εἶναι· ἀνήρτητο γὰρ ἂν τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἕτερον αὖ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.

18. Ἀλλ' ἀγαθοειδῆ κατὰ τί τὰ ἐν τῷ νῷ; ἆρα ᾗ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἢ ᾗ καλὰ ἢ τί; εἰ δὴ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἦκον πᾶν ἴχνος καὶ τύπον ἔχει ἐκείνου ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἴχνος πυρὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ γλυκέος γλυκέος ἴχνος, ἦκει δὲ εἰς νοῦν καὶ ζωὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου—ἐκ γὰρ τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου ἐνεργείας ὑπέστη—καὶ νοῦς δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰδῶν κάλλος ἐκεῖθεν, πάντα ἂν ἀγαθοειδῆ εἴη καὶ ζωὴ καὶ νοῦς καὶ ἰδέα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ ταὐτόν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἢ καὶ δοθὲν ὡσαύτως ἐν τοῖς δεξομένοις ἄλλο γίνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλο τὸ εἰς πρώτην ἐνέργειαν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τῇ πρώτῃ ἐνεργείᾳ δοθέν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄλλο ἤδη. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι, μᾶλλον μὴν κατ' ἄλλο. τί οὖν καθὸ μάλιστα; ἀλλὰ πρότερον ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκαῖον ἰδεῖν· ἆρά γε

[1] Theiler: ἐκστάσει Enn.

light upon Intellect; and when Intellect also defines and limits the soul it makes it rational by giving it a trace of what it has. Therefore Intellect too is a trace of that Good; but since Intellect is a Form and exists in extension and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless and formless; for this is how he makes forms. But if that was a form, Intellect would have been [only a derived] rational principle. But the first must be not in any way multiple: for its multiplicity then would depend on another again before it.

18. But in what way do the things in Intellect have the form of good? Is it in that each of them is a Form, or in that they are beautiful, or what is it? Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet, and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect—for it came to exist from the activity derived from him—and Intellect exists through him and the beauty of the Forms comes from there, all would have the form of good, life and intellect and idea. But what is it that is common to all? For coming from that Good does not suffice for sameness; for what is common should be in them themselves; for what is not the same could come to be from the same, or, also, what is given in sameness might become different in the things which are going to receive it; since, too, what pertains to the first activity is one thing and what is given by the first activity another, and what depends on these another again. Now, nothing prevents it having the form of good in each way, but more in one of them. What then is it by which most of all it is this? But first of all it is necessary to look at

ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωὴ ᾗ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ζωὴ [ἡ][1] ψιλὴ θεωρουμένη καὶ ἀπογεγυμνωμένη; ἢ ᾗ[2] ζωὴ ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. τὸ δ' "ἀπ' αὐτοῦ" ἄλλο τι ἢ[2] τοιαύτη; πάλιν οὖν τί ἡ τοιαύτη ζωή; ἢ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ἐκείνῃ ἐνίοιτο ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωή, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτιμον παρ' ἐκείνου [λεκτέον εἶναι],[3] καὶ καθὸ ζωή, ἀγαθὸν ⟨λεκτέον⟩[3] εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ νοῦ δὴ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀνάγκη λέγειν τοῦ πρώτου ἐκείνου, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθοειδές, ᾗ οὖν τι ἔχει ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κοινόν, εἴτε μᾶλλον ἄλλο, εἴτε τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ δευτέρως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰλήφαμεν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχον ἤδη ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἦν ἀγαθόν—καὶ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐλέγετο ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνου, καὶ νοῦς ὁ ὄντως—δεῖ τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶσθαι. διαφόρων γὰρ ὄντων, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῶν κατηγορῆται, κωλύει μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῶν τοῦτο ἐνυπάρχειν, ὅμως δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν αὐτὸ χωρὶς τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου, καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἐπὶ ὕδατος καὶ πυρός, τὸ μὲν ὡς γένος, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως· ἢ ὁμωνύμως ἂν ἑκάτερον ἢ ἕκαστον λέγοιτο ἀγαθόν. ἆρ' οὖν ἐνυπάρχει τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ ὅλον ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐ καθ' ἓν τὸ ἀγαθόν. πῶς οὖν; ἢ

[1] del. Theiler: ᾗ H–S[1].
[2] Harder: ἡ Enn.
[3] Igal.

the following: is life a good in that it is this very thing, life considered bare and stripped of all else? Rather, in that it is the life which comes from the Good. But does this "from the Good" mean anything else but that it is of a particular kind? Again, then, what is "life of a particular kind"? It is life of the Good. But it was not life of the Good, but deriving from the Good. But if in that life the authentic life from that Good has entered and is, and nothing from that is valueless, it must be said to be good also in that it is life, and it is necessary to say also of that true and first Intellect that it is good; and it is clear also that each individual Form is good and has the form of good, in that, therefore, it has some good, either common, or more particularly one rather than another, or one primarily and another by succession and secondarily. For, since we took each Form as having something good in its substance, and it was good for this reason—for its life was not good simply as life, but because it was called true life and because it came from that Good, and Intellect because it was real Intellect—something of the same must be visible in them. For, as they are different, when the same thing is predicated of them there is nothing to prevent this being immanent in their substance, but all the same it is possible to take it separately in thought, as, for instance, "living thing" in man and horse, and "hot" in water and fire, in the one case as the genus, and in the other as one primarily and the other secondarily; otherwise each of them or each particular one of them would be called good equivocally. Is then the good immanent in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a whole; its good does not depend on just one constitu-

ὡς μέρη; ἀλλὰ ἀμερὲς τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἢ ἓν μὲν αὐτό, οὕτωσὶ δὲ τόδε, οὑτωσὶ δὲ τόδε. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρώτη ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὁρισθὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συνάμφω· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅτι γενόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι κόσμος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι συνάμφω. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ταὐτόν, οἷον εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φωνὴ καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἄλλο τι, πάντα κατορθούμενα. ἢ ἐνταῦθα, ὅτι τάξις καὶ ῥυθμός· ἐκεῖ δὲ τί; ἀλλ' εἴποι τις ἄν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ὅλον εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἔξωθεν διαφόρων ὄντων τῶν περὶ ἃ ἡ τάξις, ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτά. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ αὐτά; οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου δεῖ πιστεύοντας ἀφεῖναι· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὄντα εἶναι τίμια, ἀλλὰ ποθεῖ ὁ λόγος λαβεῖν, κατὰ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν.

19. Ἆρ' οὖν τῇ ἐφέσει καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιτρέψομεν τὴν κρίσιν καὶ τῷ ταύτης πάθει πιστεύσαντες τὸ ταύτῃ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθὸν φήσομεν, διότι δὲ ἐφίεται οὐ ζητήσομεν; καὶ τί μὲν ἕκαστον, περὶ τούτου ἀποδείξεις κομιοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τῇ ἐφέσει δώσομεν; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄτοπα ἡμῖν φαίνεται. πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν τι τῶν περί. ἔπειτα, ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ ἐφιέμενα καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων·

ent. Well then, are they good as parts? But the good is partless. Now, it is one itself, but is in this way, this particular good, and in that way, that. For the first activity is good and what is defined following upon it is good, and the pair of them together; and the one is good because it is brought into being by the Good, and the other because it is an ordered world which comes from it, and the last because it is both of them together. They come from the Good then, and not one of them is the same, as from the same [Form of man] talking and walking and a variety of other things come, all correct [according to the Form]. Now here below this is because there is order and rhythm: but why there in the intelligible? But one might say that here below always what brings about the excellence comes from outside, and the things with which the order is concerned are different [from the order], but there the things themselves also are good. But why are they also good? For we should not just trust that it is because they come from that Good and give up; for we must agree that it is because they are from that Good that they are valuable, but the discussion is anxious to grasp the reason for their goodness.

19. Shall we then hand over the decision to desire and to the soul and, trusting in this soul's experience, maintain that what is desired by this is good, and not enquire why it desires? And shall we produce demonstrations of what each and every thing is, but commit the good to desire? But we see many absurdities in this. First, because the good also will become one of the accompaniments. Then, because there are many that desire, and different ones desire different things; how then shall we decide by the

πῶς οὖν κρινοῦμεν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ, εἰ βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ βέλτιον γνωσόμεθα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγνοοῦντες. ἀλλὰ ἆρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁριούμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου ἀρετήν; ἀλλ' οὕτως εἰς εἶδος καὶ λόγον ἀνάξομεν, ὀρθῶς μὲν πορευόμενοι. ἀλλὰ ἐλθόντες ἐκεῖ τί ἐροῦμεν αὐτὰ ταῦτα ζητοῦντες πῶς ἀγαθά; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς χείροσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γιγνώσκοιμεν ἂν τὴν φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην καίτοι οὐκ ἔχουσαν εἰλικρινῶς, ἐπειδὴ[1] οὐ πρώτως, τῇ πρὸς τὰ χείρω παραθέσει, ὅπου δὲ μηδέν ἐστι κακόν, αὐτὰ δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐστι τὰ ἀμείνω, ἀπορήσομεν. ἆρ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ⟨ὁ⟩[2] λόγος τὸ διότι ζητεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπορεῖ τοῦ "διότι" τὸ "ὅτι" ὄντος; ἐπεὶ κἂν ἄλλο φῶμεν αἴτιον, τὸν θεόν, λόγου μὴ φθάνοντος ἐκεῖ ὁμοίως ἡ ἀπορία. οὐ μὴν ἀποστατέον, εἴ πῃ κατ' ἄλλην ὁδὸν πορευομένοις τι φανείη.

20. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀπιστοῦμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ταῖς ὀρέξεσι πρὸς τὰς τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιόν ἐστι θέσεις,[3] ἆρα χρὴ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις ἰέναι καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναντιώσεις, οἷον τάξιν ἀταξίαν, σύμμετρον ἀσύμμετρον, ὑγείαν νόσον, εἶδος ἀμορφίαν, οὐσίαν φθοράν, ὅλως συστασίαν ἀφάνισιν; τούτων γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα καθ' ἑκάστην συζυγίαν τίς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειε μὴ οὐκ ἐν ἀγαθοῦ εἴδει εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ

[1] Gollwitzer: ἐκεῖ δὲ Enn.
[2] Kirchhoff.
[3] R^{pc} (*ad asseverandum* Ficinus), Creuzer: θέσει Enn.

desirer whether the desired is better [than other objects of desire]? But perhaps we shall not even know the better if we are ignorant of the good. But shall we then define the good according to each thing's excellence[1]? But in this way we shall refer to Form and reason-principle, certainly a correct manner of proceeding. But when we have got there, what are we going to say when we enquire how these very Forms are good? For in the things which are inferior, it seems likely, we might recognise the nature of this kind, though it is not in a pure state, since it does not exist primarily, by comparison with things which are [still] worse. But where there is nothing evil, but the Forms themselves by themselves are the better things, we shall be in difficulties. Is the difficulty, then, there for this reason, that, since our rational discourse seeks the reason why but these are good in themselves, the "why" is the "that"? Since even if we also assert another cause, God, the difficulty remains all the same while our discourse has not arrived there. We must certainly not give up while there is any chance of something appearing if we proceed by another way.

20. Since, then, we do not at present rely on our impulses for establishing what a thing is or what it is like, should we then turn to judgements and the oppositions of things, for instance order, disorder, symmetrical, unsymmetrical, health, sickness, form, shapelessness, substance, destruction, and in general coherence and dissolution? For who is there who would argue that the first of these in each pair is not in the form of good? But if this is so, it is

[1] This is how Aristotle defines human good in *Nicomachean Ethics* A 7. 1098a16–17.

αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ τίθεσθαι. καὶ ἀρετὴ δὴ καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ψυχή, ἥ γε ἔμφρων, ἐν ἀγαθοῦ εἴδει· καὶ ὧν ἐφίεται τοίνυν ἔμφρων ζωή. τί οὖν οὐ στησόμεθα, φήσει τις, εἰς νοῦν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν θησόμεθα; καὶ γὰρ ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ νοῦ ἴχνη, καὶ τούτου ἐφίεται ψυχή. καὶ κρίνει τοίνυν καὶ ἐφίεται νοῦ, κρίνουσα μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀντ' ἀδικίας ἄμεινον καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος ἀρετῆς πρὸ κακίας εἴδους, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡ προτίμησις, ὧν καὶ ἡ αἵρεσις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν νοῦ μόνον ἐφίεται, τάχα ἂν πλείονος ἐδέησε λόγου δεικνύντων, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἔσχατον ὁ νοῦς καὶ νοῦ μὲν οὐ πάντα, ἀγαθοῦ δὲ πάντα. καὶ τῶν μὲν μὴ ἐχόντων νοῦν οὐ πάντα νοῦν κτήσασθαι ζητεῖ, τὰ δ' ἔχοντα νοῦν οὐχ ἵσταται ἤδη, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖ, καὶ νοῦν μὲν ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωῆς ἐφίεται καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, οὐχ ᾗ νοῦς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐφετόν, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ εἰς ἀγαθόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ οὕτως.

21. Τί οὖν ἓν ὂν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστον; ὧδε τοίνυν τετολμήσθω· εἶναι μὲν τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην ἀγαθοειδῆ, ἔφεσιν δὲ εἶναι καὶ τούτων, καθόσον ἀγαθοειδῆ· ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ λέγω τῷ τὴν μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι ἐνέργειαν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ ἐνέργειαν, τὸν δὲ ἤδη ὁρισθεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν. εἶναι δ'

necessary to put their makers also on the good side. And surely virtue and intelligence and life and soul, thinking soul at least, are in the form of good; and so, then, are what thinking life desires. Why then, someone will say, do we not stop at Intellect and posit this as the Good? For soul and life are traces of Intellect, and it is this Intellect that soul desires. And so in its judgements also it desires Intellect, judging righteousness better than unrighteousness, and preferring each form of virtue to the [corresponding] form of vice, and judging more valuable the same things which it chooses. But if it only desires Intellect, perhaps it might be in need of further reasoning to show that Intellect is not the ultimate and that not all things desire Intellect but all things desire the Good. And not all of the things which do not have intellect seek to gain possession of it, and the things that have intellect do not stop there, but again seek the Good, and they seek Intellect from their reasoning, but the Good even before reason. And if they also seek life, and everlasting existence and activity, what they desire is not Intellect in so far as it is Intellect, but in so far as it is good and from the Good and directed to the Good: since this is so also with life.

21. What therefore is it which is one in all these and makes each and every one of them good? Let us, then, make bold to say this: Intellect and that life of its are in the form of good and there is desire of these also in so far as they are in the form of good: I mean "in the form of good" in the sense that life is the activity of the Good, or rather an activity from the Good, and Intellect is the activity already bounded and defined. But they are both filled full of glory and

αὐτὰ μεστὰ μὲν ἀγλαΐας καὶ διώκεσθαι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα αὖ· ὡς τοίνυν οἰκεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἀγαθά· ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ ὄντα οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀπόβλητα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἴη, οἰκεῖον μέν ἐστι, φεύγει δέ τις αὐτό· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλα πόρρω ὄντα καὶ κάτω κινήσειεν ἄν. γίνεται δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔρως ὁ σύντονος οὐχ ὅταν ᾖ ἅπερ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐκεῖθεν ἤδη ὄντα[1] ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλο προσλάβῃ. οἷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων φωτὸς ἐμμεμιγμένου ὅμως δεῖ φωτὸς ἄλλου, ἵνα καὶ φανείη τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς χρῶμα τὸ φῶς, οὕτω τοι δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ καίπερ πολὺ φῶς ἐχόντων φωτὸς κρείττονος ἄλλου, ἵνα κἀκεῖνα καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀφθῇ.

22. Ὅταν οὖν τὸ φῶς τοῦτό τις ἴδῃ, τότε δὴ καὶ κινεῖται ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἐπιθέοντος ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γλιχόμενος εὐφραίνεται, ὥσπερ κἀπὶ[2] τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων οὐ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐμφανταζομένου κάλλους ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ἔστι γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν ἐφ' αὑτοῦ· ἐφετὸν δὲ γίνεται ἐπιχρώσαντος αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ χάριτας δόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐφιέμενα ἔρωτας. καὶ τοίνυν ψυχὴ λαβοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴν τ ὴ ν ἐκεῖθεν ἀ π ο ρ ρ ο ὴ ν κινεῖται καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται καὶ οἴστρων πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρως

[1] F^{3s} (=Ficinus): ὂν Enn.
[2] Beutler: καὶ Enn.

are pursued by the soul because it comes from them and again is directed to them; as akin then, but not as good; but since they are in the form of good, not to be rejected for this reason. For what is akin to one, if it is not good, is indeed akin, but one avoids it; since [if it was otherwise] other things also which are far off and deep below might move one to desire. But there comes to be the intense kind of love for them not when they are what they are but when, being already what they are, they receive something else from there beyond. For just as with bodies, though light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of another light for the light, the colour, in them to appear, so with the things there in the intelligible, though they possess much light, there is need of another greater light that they may be seen both by themselves and by another.

22. When anyone, therefore, sees this light, then truly he is also moved to the Forms, and longs for the light which plays upon them and delights in it, just as with the bodies here below our desire is not for the underlying material things but for the beauty imaged upon them. For each is what it is by itself; but it becomes desirable when the Good colours it, giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into itself an outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and

γίνεται. πρὸ τοῦδε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν κινεῖται, καίπερ καλὸν ὄντα· ἀργόν τε γὰρ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ, πρὶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φῶς λάβῃ, ὑπτία τε ἀναπέπτωκεν ἡ ψυχὴ παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἀργῶς ἔχει καὶ παρόντος νοῦ ἐστι πρὸς αὐτὸν νωθής. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἥκῃ εἰς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ θερμασία ἐκεῖθεν, ῥώννυταί τε καὶ ἐγείρεται καὶ ὄντως πτεροῦται καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρακείμενον καὶ πλησίον καίπερ ἐπτοημένη ὅμως πρὸς ἄλλο οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ μεῖζον κουφίζεται. καὶ ἕως τί ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. καὶ νοῦ μὲν ὑπεραίρει, οὐ δύναται δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν, ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι τὸ ὑπερκείμενον. ἐὰν δὲ μένῃ ἐν νῷ, καλὰ μὲν καὶ σεμνὰ θεᾶται, οὔπω μὴν ὃ ζητεῖ πάντη ἔχει. οἷον γὰρ προσώπῳ πελάζει καλῷ μέν, οὔπω δὲ ὄψιν κινεῖν δυναμένῳ, ᾧ μὴ ἐμπρέπει χάρις ἐπιθέουσα τῷ κάλλει. διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα φατέον μᾶλλον τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ ἐπιλαμπόμενον ἢ τὴν συμμετρίαν εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐράσμιον. διὰ τί γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν ζῶντος προσώπου μᾶλλον τὸ φέγγος τοῦ καλοῦ, ἴχνος δ' ἐπὶ τεθνηκότος καὶ μήπω τοῦ προσώπου

[1] Plotinus in this chapter is, as so often, inspired by the myth in Plato's *Phaedrus* 246A ff. He refers here particularly to the description of the soul in love in 251B. The phrase "falls flat on its back" in line 12 also comes from the myth (254B8), but the context is startlingly different. In Plato the charioteer of the soul falls back in reverence when he is reminded by the beauty of the beloved of the Form of beauty which he once saw, and drags his horses back with him. In Plotinus the soul lies back in boredom and indifference if it does not see over the Forms

is all stung with longing and becomes love.[1] Before this it is not moved even towards Intellect, for all its beauty; the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itself "falls flat on its back" and is completely inactive and, though Intellect is present, is unenthusiastic about it. But when a kind of warmth from thence comes upon it, it gains strength and wakes and is truly winged; and though it is moved with passion for that which lies close by it, yet all the same it rises higher, to something greater which it seems to remember. And as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love.[2] It rises above Intellect, but cannot run on above the Good, for there is nothing above. But if it remains in Intellect it sees fair and noble things, but has not yet quite grasped what it is seeking. It is as if it was in the presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but cannot catch the eye because it has no grace playing upon its beauty. So here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its

the light which comes from beyond them, from the Good. On the significance of this chapter and its relationship to some equally startling remarks on the beauty of the World of Forms in V. 5. 12 see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (*Plotinian and Christian Studies* XIX).

[2] This is the clearest statement by Plotinus of something implicit in his whole system, that our desire to return to the Good is given by the Good.

ταῖς σαρξὶ καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις μεμαρασμένου; καὶ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων δὲ τὰ ζωτικώτερα καλλίω, κἂν συμμετρότερα τὰ ἕτερα ᾖ; καὶ αἰσχίων ζῶν καλλίων τοῦ ἐν ἀγάλματι καλοῦ; ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἐφετὸν μᾶλλον· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ψυχὴν ἔχει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀγαθοειδέστερον· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ ἀμηγέπῃ φωτὶ κέχρωσται καὶ χρωσθεῖσα ἐγήγερται καὶ ἀνακεκούφισται καὶ ἀνακουφίζει ὃ ἔχει, καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτῷ ἀγαθοποιεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγείρει.

23. Ἐκεῖ δή, ὃ ψυχὴ διώκει, καὶ ὃ νῷ φῶς παρέχει καὶ ἐμπεσὸν αὐτοῦ ἴχνος κινεῖ, οὔτοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν, εἰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἔχει ἕλκον πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ ἀνακαλούμενον ἐκ πάσης πλάνης, ἵνα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναπαύσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του τὰ πάντα, οὐδέν ἐστι κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ, ἐλάττω δὲ πάντα. τὸ δὴ ἄριστον τῶν ὄντων πῶς οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι; καὶ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν αὐταρκεστάτην τε εἶναι αὐτῇ καὶ ἀνενδεᾶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν παντός, τίνα ἂν ἄλλην ἢ ταύτην οὖσαν εὕροι τις, ἢ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἦν ὅπερ ἦν, ὅτε μηδὲ κακία πω ἦν; εἰ δὲ τὰ κακὰ ὕστερον ἐν τοῖς μηδὲ καθ' ἕν τούτου μετειληφόσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπέκεινα τῶν κακῶν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, ἐναντίως ἂν ἔχοι τὰ κακὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἔχοντα μέσον πρὸς ἐναντίωσιν. τὸ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἂν εἴη· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως ἀγαθόν, ἤ, εἰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο εἴη. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲ κακὸν ἂν εἴη·

flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away? And are not the more lifelike statues the more beautiful ones, even if the others are better proportioned? And is not an uglier living man more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul; and this is because it has more the form of good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes and rises up and lifts up that which belongs to it, and as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.

23. There, surely, one need not wonder if that which the soul pursues and which gives light to Intellect and in falling upon it stirs a trace of itself has so great a power, and draws to itself and calls back from all wandering to rest beside it. For if there is something from which all things come, there is nothing stronger than it, but all things are less than it. How can the best of realities possibly not be the Good? And furthermore, if the nature of the Good must be completely sufficient to itself and without need of anything else at all, what other nature than this could anyone find, which was what it was before the others, when there was not yet any badness? But if the evils come later, in things which do not participate in this Good in any way at all, and on the very last and lowest level, and there is nothing beyond the evils on the worse side, the evils would be opposed to it without any middle term for the opposition. This then would be the Good; for either there is no Good at all, or, if it is necessary that there is, it would be this and not something else. But if someone says that there is not, then there would be no evil either; so things would be by nature indifferent for

ἀδιάφορα ἄρα πρὸς αἵρεσιν τῇ φύσει· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἃ δ' ἄλλα λέγουσιν ἀγαθά, εἰς τοῦτο, αὐτὸ δὲ εἰς οὐδέν. τί οὖν ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον ὄν; ἢ ἐποίησε νοῦν, ἐποίησε ζωήν, ψυχὰς ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα λόγου ἢ νοῦ ἢ ζωῆς μετέχει. ὃ δὴ τούτων πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχή, τίς ἂν εἴποι, ὅπως ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅσον; ἀλλὰ τί νῦν ποιεῖ; ἢ καὶ νῦν σῴζει ἐκεῖνα καὶ νοεῖν ποιεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα καὶ ζῆν τὰ ζῶντα, ἐμπνέον νοῦν, ἐμπνέον ζωήν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ δύναται ζῆν, εἶναι.

24. Ἡμᾶς δὲ τί ποιεῖ; ἢ πάλιν περὶ τοῦ φωτὸς λέγωμεν τί τὸ φῶς, ᾧ καταλάμπεται μὲν νοῦς, μεταλαμβάνει δὲ αὐτοῦ ψυχή. ἢ τοῦτο νῦν εἰς ὕστερον ἀφέντες εἰκότως ἐκεῖνα πρότερον ἀπορήσωμεν. ἆρά γε τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄλλῳ ἐφετόν, ἔστι καὶ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, καί τινι μὲν ὂν ἐφετόν τινι ἀγαθόν, πᾶσι δὲ ὂν τοῦτο λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἢ μαρτύριον μὲν ἄν τις τοῦτο ποιήσαιτο τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, δεῖ δέ γε φύσιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφετὸν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡς δικαίως ἂν τυχεῖν τῆς τοιαύτης προσηγορίας. καὶ πότερα τῷ τι δέχεσθαι τὰ ἐφιέμενα ἐφίεται ἢ τῷ χαίρειν αὐτῷ; καὶ εἰ μέν τι δέχεται, τί τοῦτο; εἰ δὲ τῷ χαίρειν, διὰ τί τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλῳ τινί; ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ πότερα τῷ οἰκείῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί. καὶ δὴ καὶ πότερα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅλως ἄλλου

[1] The phrase is taken from *Phaedrus* 245C9. But Plato uses it there of soul as "source and principle" of movement to all else.

our choice; but this is impossible. But what others call goods are referred to this, but it itself is referred to nothing. What then does it make, if it is like this? It made Intellect, it made life, and from Intellect the souls and all else that has a share in reason or intellect or life. Then, surely, what is "source and principle"[1] of these, how could one say in what way and how greatly it is good? But what is it making now? Now as well it is keeping those things in being and making the thinking things think and the living things live, inspiring thought, inspiring life and, if something cannot live, existence.

24. But what does it make us? Either let us speak again of the light and say what that light is by which Intellect is illuminated and in which Soul has a part. Or else let us leave this till afterwards[2] and, as is reasonable, deal first with the following difficulties. Is the Good good, and does it have that name, because it is desirable for another, and is it good for one because it is desirable for one, but because it is this for all we say that it is the Good? Now one might offer this as evidence that the Good exists, but surely the object of desire itself must have such a nature that it is right to call it this. And do its desirers desire it because they receive something, or because they delight in it? And if they receive something, what is it? But if it is because of delight, why do they delight in this and not in something else? And in this the question is certainly involved whether the good is so by kinship or by something else. And, indeed, the further question whether the good is altogether the good of another, or whether the good is good for

[2] Ch. 31 onwards.

ἐστίν, ἢ καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· ἢ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλου δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης; καὶ τίνι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἔστι δέ τις φύσις, ᾗ μηδὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι; κἀκεῖνο δὲ οὐκ ἀφετέον, ὃ τάχ' ἄν τις δυσχεραντικὸς ἀνὴρ εἴποι, ὡς "ὑμεῖς, ὦ οὗτοι, τί δὴ ἀποσεμνύνετε τοῖς ὀνόμασιν[1] ἄνω καὶ κάτω ζωὴν ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καὶ νοῦν ἀγαθὸν λέγοντες καί τι ἐπέκεινα τούτων; τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀγαθὸν εἴη; ἢ τί ὁ νοῶν τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ ἀγαθὸν ἔχοι αὐτὸ ἕκαστον θεωρῶν; ἠπατημένος μὲν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡδόμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις τάχα ἂν ἀγαθὸν λέγοι καὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἡδεῖαν οὖσαν· στὰς δ' ἐν τῷ ἀνήδονος εἶναι διὰ τί ἂν φήσειεν ἀγαθά; ἢ τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι; τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι καρπώσαιτο; ἢ τί ἂν διαφέροι ἐν τῷ εἶναι ἢ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, εἰ μή τις τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν αἰτίαν τούτων θεῖτο; ὥστε διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀπάτην φυσικὴν οὖσαν καὶ τὸν φόβον τῆς φθορᾶς τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομισθῆναι θέσιν."

25. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων ἡδονὴν τῷ τέλει μιγνὺς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἐν νῷ μόνῳ τιθέμενος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ γέγραπται, τάχα ἂν αἰσθόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας οὔτε παντάπασιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τίθεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν

[1] R^{2mg}: ὄμμασιν Enn.

[1] Plotinus is rather more sympathetic than might be expected to this down-to-earth and anti-metaphysical person. He gives him here a good, forcible statement of his case, and answers him seriously and carefully in ch. 29, where he indicates (lines 21–22) that he and this awkward

itself; or is whatever may be good not good for itself, but necessarily the good of another? And for what nature is it good? And is there any nature for which nothing is good? And we must not leave out the following remarks which some cantankerous person might make,[1] "Really, you people, why do you use this pompous language up and down and all around, saying life is good, and intellect is good, and something transcending these? For why should intellect be good? Or what good could the thinker of the Forms have as he contemplates each of them? If he takes a deceptive pleasure in them he might perhaps say intellect was good, and life, because it was pleasant; but if he is stuck in a pleasureless state, why should he say they are good? Is it because he exists? What then would he gain from existence? What difference would there be in existing or altogether not existing, unless one makes affection for oneself the reason for all this? In that case it would be this natural deception and the fear of dissolution which would account for the acceptance of the supposition of goods."

25. Plato, then, who mixes pleasure into the end-object and does not posit the good as simple or in intellect alone, as it is written in the *Philebus*,[2] perhaps because he was aware of this difficulty was not inclined to place the good altogether in the pleasant—and in this he was right—nor did he think

character have at least this in common, that the good of Intellect is not enough for them by itself.

[2] The passages in Plato's *Philebus* which Plotinus is discussing in this chapter (21D–22A and 61B–D) are important, in his understanding of them, for his thought about Intellect and the Good.

ἐτράπετο, ὀρθῶς ποιῶν, οὔτε τὸν νοῦν ἀνήδονον ὄντα ᾠήθη δεῖν θέσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κινοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὁρῶν. τάχα δὲ οὐ ταύτῃ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἠξίου τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχον φύσιν ἐν αὐτῷ τοιαύτην δεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης χαρτὸν εἶναι, τό τε ἐφετὸν τῷ τυγχάνοντι καὶ τυχόντι πάντως ἔχειν τὸ χαίρειν, ὥστε, ᾧ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν, ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ εἶναι, καὶ ὥστε, εἰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ, τῷ πρώτῳ μὴ εἶναι· ὥστε μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπον τοῦτο· αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν ἐζήτει, τὸ δὲ ἡμῶν, καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρου ὄντος ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἕτερον ὂν αὐτοῦ, ἐλλειποῦς ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἴσως συνθέτου· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἔρημον καὶ μόνον μηδὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἶναι ἑτέρως καὶ μειζόνως. ἐφετὸν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι τῷ ἐφετὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐφετὸν γίγνεσθαι. ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀνάβασις τὸ ὑπὲρ ἕκαστον διδοῦσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ ὑπ' αὐτό, εἰ ἡ ἀνάβασις οὐκ ἐξίσταιτο τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μεῖζον ἀεὶ προχωροῖ; τότε δὲ στήσεται ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, μεθ' ὃ οὐδέν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἄνω λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κυρίως ἔσται, καὶ αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος—εἰ γὰρ αἴσθησιν λάβοι, ἀσπάσαιτ' ἄν—τῷ δὲ σώματι ψυχή—καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἄν

[1] The phrase is again taken from the *Philebus* (63B7–8) but can only be applied to the Good by a very strained exegesis.

[2] Plotinus speaks, in the treatises in which he deals with matter, of matter desiring form or soul or good (I. 8. 14. 35–36; III. 6. 11. 32, 14. 9–10). But in I. 8 and III. 6 he goes to considerable trouble to show that matter can never really

that he ought to posit intellect which was without pleasure as the good, since he did not see what there was in it to move [us to desire it]. But perhaps it was not for this reason, but because he thought it right that the good, since it had such a nature in itself, should of necessity be delightful, and that the desired object must altogether hold delight for the one who is attaining or has attained it, so that who does not have delight does not have good, and so that, if delight belongs to the desirer, it does not belong to the First; so that neither does the good. And this is not unreasonable; for Plato himself [here] was not looking for the First Good, but for our good, and since this is altogether different, there is for him a Good other than it; for it is deficient, and perhaps composite; this is why he says that the "solitary and alone"[1] has nothing good in it, but is [the Good] in another, greater way. The Good, therefore, must be desirable, but must not become good by being desirable, but become desirable by being good. Is it then so that the good for the last and lowest among beings is what lies before it, and there is a continuous ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at the ultimate, at that after which one cannot grasp anything higher, and this is the First and the really good and the Good in the strictest sense, and the cause also of the other goods. For form is the good for matter—for if it were conscious, it would welcome it[2]—and soul for body—for without it it could receive form or be changed by it from its own evil nature.

Cp. ch. 28 lines 1–12 and n. 1, p. 173.

εἴη οὐδ' ἂν σῴζοιτο—ψυχῇ δὲ ἀρετή. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἀνωτέρω νοῦς καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἣν δή φαμεν πρώτην φύσιν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ποιεῖν τι εἰς τὰ ὧν ἀγαθά ἐστι, τὰ μὲν τάξιν καὶ κόσμον, τὰ δ' ἤδη ζωήν, τὰ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν εὖ, τῷ δὲ νῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ φαμεν καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἥκειν, καὶ ὅτι ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καὶ νῦν δίδωσί ⟨τι⟩[1] φῶς λεγόμενον· ὃ δὴ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὕστερον.

26. Καὶ δὴ τὸ πεφυκὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι παρ' αὐτόν, εἰ ἥκει αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, γινώσκειν καὶ λέγειν ἔχειν. τί οὖν, εἰ ἠπάτηται; δεῖ ἄρα τινὰ εἶναι ὁμοίωσιν, καθ' ἣν ἠπάτηται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὸν ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη [ἀφ' οὗ ἠπάτηται]·[2] ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο ἥκῃ, ἀφίσταται ἀφ' οὗ ἠπάτηται. καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις δ' αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ ὠδὶς μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀψύχοις παρ' ἄλλου τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῖς ἡ δόσις, τῷ δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχοντι ἡ ἔφεσις τὴν δίωξιν ἐργάζεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γεγενημένοις σώμασι παρὰ τῶν ζώντων ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἡ κήδευσις, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσι παρ' αὐτῶν ἡ πρόνοια. ὅτι δ' ἔτυχε, πιστοῦται, ὅταν βέλτιόν τι γίνηται καὶ ἀμετανόητον ᾖ καὶ πεπληρῶσθαι αὐτῷ γίγνηται καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνου μένῃ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ζητῇ. διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐκ αὐτάρκες· οὐ γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ ταὐτόν· οὐ γάρ, ὅ

[1] Igal.
[2] del. Harder.

not exist or be preserved—and virtue for soul. And now, still higher, there is intellect, and above this what we call the first nature. And certainly each of these effects something for those of which they are the good, some arrangement and ordered beauty, some already life, and some thought and living well, but for Intellect the Good effects something, the Good which we maintain comes also to this, both because its active actuality comes from it and because now also it gives something called light: what this is, we shall see later.[1]

26. And surely what has by itself the natural power to perceive, if the Good comes to it, has the power to know and to say that it has it. Well then, what if it is deceived? There must then be some likeness [to the Good] which accounts for the deception. But if there is this, that would be the good for it; since also, when that [Good] comes, it leaves that which was the origin of its deception. And each and every thing's desire and birth-pangs of longing bear witness that there is some good for each. For to things without soul the gift of the good comes from another, but for that which has soul it is the desire which brings about the pursuit, just as when bodies have become corpses they are tended and prepared for burial by the living, but the living take thought for themselves. But the attainment is confirmed when a thing becomes better and has no regrets, and fulfilment comes to it and it remains with the Good and does not seek something else. This is why pleasure is not self-sufficient; for one is not satisfied with the same thing; for what pleasure is satisfied with

[1] Ch. 32 ff.

τι ἡδονὴ[1] πάλιν, ταὐτόν· ἄλλο γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ἥδεται. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ αἱρεῖταί τις, εἶναι οὐ τὸ πάθος τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ τυχόντι· ὅθεν καὶ κενὸς μένει ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν νομίζων, τὸ πάθος μόνον ἔχων, ὃ ἔσχεν ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. διὸ οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιτό τις τοῦ πάθους, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔχων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῷ παιδί, ὅτι πάρεστιν, ἥδεσθαι οὐ παρόντος· οὐδέ γε οἶμαι οἷς ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι σωματικῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἥδεσθαι ὡς ἐσθίοντα μὴ ἐσθίοντα, ὡς ἀφροδισίοις χρώμενον μὴ συνόντα ᾗ ἐβούλετο, ἢ ὅλως μὴ δρῶντα.

27. Ἀλλὰ τίνος γενομένου ἑκάστῳ τὸ αὐτῷ προσῆκον ἔχει; ἢ εἴδους τινὸς φήσομεν· καὶ γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ εἶδος, καὶ ψυχῇ ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ἆρά γε τῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον; ἢ οὔ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον οἰκεῖον, κἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐτὸ καὶ χαίρῃ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, οὔπω τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκεῖον φήσομεν ἀγαθὸν εἰπόντες εἶναι; ἢ φατέον τοῦ οἰκείου τῷ κρείττονι κρίνειν δεῖ καὶ τῷ βελτίονι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς ὃ δυνάμει ἐστίν. ὃν γὰρ δυνάμει πρὸς ὅ ἐστιν, ἐνδεές ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, οὗ δὲ ἐνδεές ἐστι

[1] Beutler: ἡδονὴν Enn.

[1] This is the doctrine of *οἰκείωσις*, fundamental in Stoic ethics. See *SVF* I 197 and III 178 ff. Plotinus' criticism of it develops Diotima's rejection of Aristophanes' account of

again is not the same; for that which gives one pleasure is always something else. Certainly the good which one chooses must be something which is not the feeling one has when one attains it; that is why the one who takes this for good remains empty, because he only has the feeling which one might get from the good. This is the reason why one would not find acceptable the feeling produced by something one has not got; for instance, one would not delight in a boy because he was present when he was not present; nor do I think that those who find the good in bodily satisfaction would feel pleasure as if they were eating when they were not eating or as if they were enjoying sex when they were not with the one they wanted to be with, or in general when they were not active.

27. But what is it by the coming of which to each one it has what is appropriate to it? We shall maintain that it is a form; for form is the appropriate good for matter, and virtue is form for soul. But is this form good for that which has it by being akin to it, and is its desire directed to what is akin[1]? No: for what is like it is akin, and if it wishes the like and delights in it, it does not yet have the good. But when we say that something is good, are we not going to maintain that it is akin? Rather we must maintain that one must judge the good by what is higher than what is akin and by what is better than the thing itself, to which it is potentially directed. For, since it is potentially directed to what it is, it is in need of it, and what it is in need of as something

the origin of love (the story of the bisected spherical protohumans) in Plato *Symposium* 205D10–206A1.

κρείττονος ὄντος, ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνο. ἡ δὲ ὕλη πάντων ἐνδεέστατον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος προσεχὲς αὐτῇ· μετ' αὐτὴν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ ἡ τελειότης αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον καὶ αὖ τῷ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; ἆρ ὅτι οἰκειότατον αὐτῷ; ἢ οὔ· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστί τις ἀγαθοῦ μοῖρα. διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον οἰκείωσις πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖς εἰλικρινέσι καὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῖς. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ ζητεῖν, διὰ τί ἀγαθὸν ὂν αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ δέον πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ μὴ ἀγαπᾶν ἑαυτὸ ὡς ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἁπλοῦ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ, ὅπου μηδαμῶς ἕνι ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, ἔστιν ἡ οἰκείωσις πρὸς αὐτό, ⟨καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ⟩[1] ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ. νῦν δέ, εἰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπανάβασις ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν φύσει τινὶ κείμενον, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἔφεσις ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ὅτι ἀγαθόν, καὶ γίνεταί τι τοῖς κτωμένοις καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κτήσει ἡδύ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν "εἰ μὴ ἕποιτο ἡδονή,[2] αἱρετέον τὸ ἀγαθὸν" καὶ αὐτὸ ζητητέον.

28. Τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ λόγου συμβαῖνον νῦν ὀπτέον. εἰ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ παραγινόμενον ὡς ἀγαθὸν εἶδος, καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ δὲ εἶδος ἓν τὸ ἀγαθόν, πότερον ἠθέλησεν ἂν ἡ ὕλη, εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῇ τὸ θέλειν, εἶδος μόνον γενέσθαι; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀπολέσθαι θελήσει· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ πᾶν

[1] H–S[1].

[2] Steinhart: ἐποιεῖτο ἡδονῇ Enn.

higher than it, that is its good. And matter is the neediest of all, and the last and lowest form is next to it; for it comes after it in the upward direction. But even if a thing is a good for itself, its perfection and its form and what is higher than it would much more be a good, both because it is such by its own nature and again because it makes the thing good. But why will anything be a good for itself? Is it because it is the most akin to itself? No, but because it is a part of good. This is why those who are pure and more good have a closer kinship with themselves. It is therefore absurd to enquire why a thing which is good is good for itself, as if it would have as regards itself to get out of its own nature and not be content with itself as good. But when something is simple we must consider this question, whether, where in no way there is in it one part and another, there is kinship to itself, and if it is a good for itself. But now, if these conclusions are correct, the movement upwards grasps the good present in a particular nature, and it is not the desire which makes the good but there is desire because there is a good, and something comes to those who possess it, and also pleasure in the possession. But we must also enquire into the saying "even if pleasure did not follow, the good should be chosen."[1]

28. Now we must look at what follows from the discussion. For if everywhere what comes as a good is form, and one single form is the good for matter, would matter wish, if it had the power of wishing, to become only form? But if so, it will wish to perish;

[1] A paraphrase of Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* K 3. 1174a6–8. Plotinus discusses this in ch. 29.

ζητεῖ. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ὕλη εἶναι ζητήσει, ἀλλὰ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἔχουσα ἀφεῖναι αὐτῆς θελήσει τὴν κάκην. ἀλλὰ τὸ κακὸν πῶς ἔφεσιν ἕξει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; ἢ οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην ἐν ἐφέσει ἐτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ὑπόθεσιν ἐποιεῖτο ὁ λόγος αἴσθησιν δούς, εἴπερ οἷόν τε ἦν δοῦναι ὕλην τηροῦσιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπελθόντος, ὥσπερ ὀνείρατος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν καλλίονι τάξει γεγονέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ κακὸν ἡ ὕλη, εἴρηται· εἰ δ' ἄλλο τι, οἷον κακία, εἰ αἴσθησιν λάβοι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς, ἆρ' οὖν ἔτι τὸ οἰκεῖον πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται; ἢ οὐχ ἡ κακία ἦν ἡ αἱρουμένη, ἀλλὰ τὸ κακούμενον. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κακόν, πῶς τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται; ἀλλ' ἆρά γε, εἰ αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ λάβοι τὸ κακόν, ἀγαπήσει αὐτό; καὶ πῶς ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν[1] ἔσται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ οἰκείῳ ἐθέμεθα τὸ ἀγαθόν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ εἶδος τὸ ἀγαθὸν πανταχοῦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπαναβαίνουσι μᾶλλον εἴδος—μᾶλλον γὰρ ψυχὴ εἶδος ἢ σώματος εἶδος, καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δ' ἐπιμᾶλλον, καὶ νοῦς ψυχῆς—τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν προσχωροῖ τῷ τῆς ὕλης[2] ἐναντίῳ καὶ οἷον καθαιρομένῳ καὶ ἀποτιθεμένῳ κατὰ δύναμιν μὲν ἑκάστῳ, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα πᾶν ὅ τι ὕλης ἀποτιθεμένῳ. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις πᾶσαν ὕλην φυγοῦσα,

[1] Igal: ἀγαπητόν Enn.
[2] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): ψυχῆς Enn.

but everything seeks what will be good for itself. But perhaps it will not seek to be matter, but to be, and in possessing this to let its evil go. But how can evil have a desire of the good? But we did not assume that matter was desirous, but our argument framed a hypothesis by giving it perception—if it was possible to give it and still keep it as matter; but we assumed that when form came upon it, like a good dream, it came to be in a fairer order. If then matter is [absolute] evil, enough has been said[1]; but if it is something else, badness for instance, if its essential being acquired perception, will what is akin to it on the higher side still be the good? Now it was not [on this supposition] badness which chose, but what had become bad. But if its being and evil were one and the same, how can this choose the good? Well then, if evil acquired a perception of itself, would it be satisfied with itself? And how could what is not good be satisfactory? For we certainly did not identify the good with the kindred. And so much for that. But if form is everywhere the good, and the higher the ascent goes the more there is form—for soul is more form than the form of body, and one part of soul more form, and another very much more, and Intellect more than soul—the Good would come to that which was opposed to matter, and, we may say, which was purified from it and had put it away, according to the capacity of each, and most to that which put away everything belonging to matter. And certainly the nature of the Good, which has escaped from all matter, or rather never in any way

[1] This is Plotinus' own view: this passage is his amplification and correction of a possibly misleading general remark in ch. 25, lines 24–5: see n. 2 there, p. 165.

μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς πλησίον γενομένη, ἀναπεφευγυῖα ἂν εἴη εἰς τὴν ἀνείδεον φύσιν, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος. ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου ὕστερον.

29. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔποιτο ἡδονὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, γίνοιτο δὲ πρὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς τι, δι' ὃ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀσπαστόν; ἢ εἰπόντες ἀσπαστὸν ἡδονὴν ἤδη εἴπομεν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὑπάρξει μέν, ὑπάρξαντος δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ ἀσπαστὸν εἶναι; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, παρόντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἴσθησιν ἔχον τὸ ἔχον οὐ γνώσεται, ὅτι. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι ἄλλως μετὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχειν; ὃ μᾶλλον ἂν τῷ σωφρονεστέρῳ ὑπάρχοι καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ μὴ ἐνδεεῖ. διὸ οὐδὲ τῷ πρώτῳ, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ κτῆσις δεηθέντος ἡδεῖα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο καταφανὲς ἔσται τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα λοιπὰ προανακαθηραμένοις[1] καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀντίτυπον λόγον ἀπωσαμένοις. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος ⟨τοῦ⟩[2] ὃς ἀπορεῖ, τί ἂν καρπώσαιτο ὁ νοῦν ἔχων εἰς ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν, οὐδὲν πληττόμενος, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀκούῃ, τῷ μὴ σύνεσιν αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, ἢ ὄνομα ἀκούων ἢ ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὑπολαμβάνων ἢ αἰσθητόν τι ζητῶν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρήμασιν ἤ τισι τοιούτοις τιθέμενος. πρὸς ὃν λεκτέον,

[1] Harder: προσ- Enn.
[2] Theiler.

at all come near it, will have escaped up into the formless nature from which the first form comes. But we shall speak of this later.[1]

29. But if pleasure does not follow upon the Good, but there comes to be something before pleasure through which there is also pleasure, why is it not to be welcomed? Now in saying "to be welcomed" we have already said "pleasure". But suppose that it exists but, though it exists, there is a possibility of its not being welcome. But if this is so, when the Good is present, what has it, though it has a perception of it, will not know it is there. Or what is to prevent it from knowing and not being moved in any other way going beyond the actual possession? This would be more likely to happen to a more self-controlled person, and more likely if he was without needs. This is why the First has no pleasure, not only because it is simple but because it is the acquisition of something needed which is pleasant. But this will be luminously clear when we have first cleared up all the remaining difficulties and repelled that opposing argument. This argument is that of someone[2] who has a difficulty about what a man with intelligence would get out of it in the way of good, being in no way disconcerted when he hears these arguments of ours because he does not know what they mean; he either hears only the words or understands each thing [spoken of] differently or is looking for something perceptible [by the senses] and locating the Good in property or something of the sort. One must

[1] In chs. 32 and 33.
[2] This is the objector who states his position forcibly in ch. 24: see n. 1, p. 162.

ὡς, ὅταν ταῦτα ἀτιμάζῃ, ὁμολογεῖ τίθεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀπορῶν δ' ὅπῃ, τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῇ παρ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἐφαρμόττει. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λέγειν "μὴ τοῦτο" πάντη ἄπειρον καὶ ἀνεννόητον ὄντα τούτου. τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἀπομαντεύεται. ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ τῷ ἐγγὺς τούτου προσβάλλων ἀγνοεῖ, ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰς ἔννοιαν ἴτω. ἢ οὐδὲ κακὸν τὴν ἄνοιαν θήσεται; καίτοι πᾶς αἱρεῖται νοεῖν καὶ νοῦν σεμνύνεται. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις εἰδήσεις εἶναι θέλουσαι. εἰ δὴ νοῦς τίμιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ νοῦς ὁ πρῶτος μάλιστα, τί ἂν φαντασθείη τις, εἴ τις δύναιτο, τὸν τούτου γεννητὴν καὶ πατέρα; τὸ δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀτιμάζων ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πάθεσι πᾶσιν. εἰ δέ τις δυσχεραίνει τὸ ζῆν, ᾧ θάνατος μέμικται, τὸ τοιοῦτο δυσχεραίνει, οὐ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν.

30. Ἀλλὰ εἰ δεῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ μὴ τέλεόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, εἴ τις τὰ θεῖα θεᾠτο καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τούτων ἀρχήν, νῦν ἰδεῖν ἐφαπτομένους τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντως προσήκει. τὸ μὲν οὖν οἴεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔκ τε τοῦ νοῦ ὡς ὑποκειμένου ἔκ τε τοῦ πάθους τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ τέλος οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστι τιθέντος, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ χαίροντες τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν. καὶ εἴη

say to him that when he despises these things he admits that he does posit some good for himself, but, since he finds it difficult to see how [the Good is good], he fits these things to his own idea of it. For it is not possible to say "not this" if one has no experience or conception of "this". But perhaps also he has a prophetic intuition of what is above Intellect. But then, if when he applies his mind to the Good or that which is near it he does not recognise them, let him come to some idea of them from the things opposed to them. Or will he not even regard unintelligence as evil? Yet everyone prefers to be intelligent and is proud of himself when he uses his intelligence. And our sense-perceptions bear witness to this when they want to be knowings. But if intellect is honourable and beautiful, and above all the first Intellect, as what would one image, if one could, this Intellect's generator and father? But if [our opponent] despises existence and life, he brings evidence against himself and all his own experiences. But if anyone is dissatisfied with life with which death is mixed, it is this kind of life he is dissatisfied with, not true life.

30. But whether pleasure must be mixed with the good and life is not perfect, if someone contemplates the divine things and above all their principle, is a question which it is in every way appropriate to keep in sight now that we are getting into touch with the Good. Well then, to think that the good consists of Intellect as underlying reality and of the experience of the soul which comes from thinking does not belong to one who posits the composite of both as the goal or the Good itself, but Intellect would be the Good, and ourselves in the enjoyment of possessing

ἂν αὕτη τις δόξα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ. ἑτέρα δὲ εἴη ἂν παρὰ ταύτην, ἣ μίξασα τῷ νῷ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἕν τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὑποκείμενον τοῦτο τίθεται εἶναι, ἵν' ἡμεῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον νοῦν κτησάμενοι ἢ καὶ ἰδόντες τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχωμεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔρημον καὶ μόνον οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτε αἱρετὸν εἶναι δυνατὸν ὡς ἀγαθόν. πῶς ἂν οὖν μιχθείη νοῦς ἡδονῇ εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν φύσεως; ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν σώματος ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἄν τις οἰηθείη νῷ δυνατὴν εἶναι μίγνυσθαι, παντὶ δήπου δῆλον· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅσαι χαραὶ ψυχῆς ἂν ἄλογοι γένοιντο. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πάσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ διαθέσει δὲ καὶ ζωῇ ἕπεσθαι δεῖ καὶ συνεῖναι οἷόν τι[1] ἐπιθέον, καθὸ τῇ μέν ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν ἰούσῃ τὸ ἐμποδίζον καί τι τοῦ ἐναντίου παραμεμιγμένον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ τὴν ζωὴν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι, τῇ δὲ καθαρὸν καὶ εἰλικρινὲς τὸ ἐνέργημα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν διαθέσει φαιδρᾷ, τὴν τοιαύτην τοῦ νοῦ κατάστασιν ἀσμενιστὴν καὶ αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι τιθέμενοι ἡδονῇ μεμίχθαι λέγουσιν ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείας προσηγορίας, οἷα ποιοῦσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες, τὸ "μεθυσθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῦ νέκταρος" καὶ "ἐπὶ δαῖτα καὶ ἑστίασιν" καὶ τὸ "μείδησε δὲ πατὴρ" οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ

[1] Sleeman: τὸ Enn.

[1] Again *Philebus* 63B7–8, but here in a more appropriate context (see ch. 25, n. 1, p. 164). In this chapter Plotinus is concerned to explain and justify Plato's doctrine in the *Philebus* that the good life must be a mixture of pleasure and intelligence, taking account also of Aristotle's discussion of pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* K 1–5. 1172a–1176a.

the Good. And this would be one opinion about good. But there would be another contrary to this, which mixes pleasure with intellect as one thing made from both and posits this as the underlying reality, so that we, by possessing, or even seeing, this kind of intellect may possess the Good; for what is "isolated and single"[1] could not come to be or to be chosen as the Good. How then could intellect be mixed with pleasure into one composite perfection of nature? Well, it is, I suppose, clear to everyone that nobody would think that bodily pleasure could possibly be mixed with intellect; but neither could all the irrational joys of the soul which may occur. But, since a sort of something extra and external must follow upon and accompany every activity and disposition and life, in so far as to one of them going its natural way there will be a hindrance and something of its opposite mixed into it, which does not allow the life to be independent, but another will have its activity "pure and unmixed"[2] and its life will be a state of luminous clarity, the philosophers,[3] assuming that such a state of intellect is most pleasing and acceptable, say that it is mixed with pleasure because they cannot find an appropriate way of speaking about it; this is what the other words which we are fond of do metaphorically, like "drunk with the nectar"[4] and "to feast and entertainment",[5] and what the poets say, "the father smiled",[6] and thousands and

[2] *Philebus* 52D6–7.

[3] Plato is meant: see previous note.

[4] Plato *Symposium* 203B5 (Poros in the garden of Zeus).

[5] Plato *Phaedrus* 247A8 (with ἑστίασιν for θοίνην).

[6] A formula-phrase from Homer (not very appropriate in this context): *Iliad* 5. 426; 15. 47.

ἄλλα τοιαῦτα μυρία. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄσμενον ὄντως ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον καὶ τὸ ποθεινότατον, οὐ γινόμενον οὐδ' ἐν κινήσει, αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἐπιχρῶσαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπιλάμψαν καὶ φαιδρῦναν. διὸ καὶ ἀλήθειαν τῷ μίγματι προστίθησι καὶ τὸ μετρῆσον πρὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐπὶ τῷ μίγματι ἐκεῖθέν φησιν εἰς τὸ καλὸν ἐλήλυθεν. ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἡμεῖς καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοίρας· τὸ δὲ ὄντως ὀρεκτὸν ἡμῖν ἄλλως μὲν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῶν ἀνάγοντες ἑαυτούς, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ εἶδος ἀσύνθετον[1] καὶ ζωὴν ἐναργῆ καὶ νοερὰν καὶ καλήν.

31. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἐκαλλύνθη τὰ πάντα ἐκείνῳ τῷ πρὸ τούτων καὶ φῶς ἔσχε, νοῦς μὲν τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς νοερᾶς φέγγος, ᾧ τὴν φύσιν ἐξέλαμψε, ψυχὴ δὲ δύναμιν ἔσχεν εἰς τὸ ζῆν ζωῆς πλείονος εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθούσης. ἤρθη μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖ καὶ ἔμεινεν ἀγαπήσας τὸ περὶ ἐκεῖνον εἶναι· ἐπιστραφεῖσα δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ ἡ δυνηθεῖσα, ὡς ἔγνω καὶ εἶδεν, ἤσθη τε τῇ θέᾳ καὶ ὅσον οἷά τε ἦν ἰδεῖν ἐξεπλάγη. εἶδε δὲ οἷον πληγεῖσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσά τι αὐτοῦ συνῄσθετο καὶ διατεθεῖσα ἐγένετο ἐν πόθῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ εἰδώλῳ τοῦ ἐρασμίου κινούμενοι εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν ἐθέλειν τὸ ἐρώμενον. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐνταῦθα σχηματίζονται εἰς ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐραστῷ οἳ ἂν ἐρῶσι, καὶ τὰ σώματα εὐπρεπέστερα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἄγοντες εἰς ὁμοιότητα, ὡς μὴ λείπεσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν θέλειν τῇ

[1] H–S[1]: σύνθετον Enn.

[1] In *Philebus* 64B–65A.

thousands of others. For there in the realm of Intellect is true delight and the greatest satisfaction, the most loved and longed for, which is not in process of becoming nor in movement, but its cause is what colours and shines upon and glorifies the intelligibles. This is why Plato adds truth to the mixture, and puts what measures it before it, and says that from there the good proportion and beauty in the mixture come to the beautiful.[1] So we should be according to this and have our parts in it; but in another way what is really worth aspiring to for us is our selves, bringing themselves back for themselves to the best of themselves; this is the well-proportioned and beautiful and the form which is not part of the composite and the clear, intelligent, beautiful life.

31. But since all things were made beautiful by that which was before them and held its light, Intellect held the resplendence of its intelligent activity, with which it illuminated its nature, and soul held power to live, since a greater life came to it. So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed there, happy in being around that Good; but the soul also which was able turned to it and, when it knew and saw, rejoiced in the vision and, in so far as it was able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw, as if in utter amazement, and, since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness of it and came into a state of longing, like those who are moved by an image of the loved one to wish to see that same beloved. And just as here below those who are in love shape themselves to the likeness of the beloved, and make their bodies handsomer and bring their souls into likeness, since as far as they can they do

τοῦ ἐρωμένου σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ ἀρετῇ τῇ ἄλλῃ—ἢ ἀπόβλητοι ἂν εἶεν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις τοῖς τοιούτοις—καὶ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ συνεῖναι δυνάμενοι, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴ ἐρᾷ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν κινηθεῖσα. καὶ ἡ πρόχειρον ἔχουσα τὸν ἔρωτα ὑπόμνησιν οὐ περιμένει ἐκ τῶν καλῶν τῶν τῇδε, ἔχουσα δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα, καὶ ἂν ἀγνοῇ ὅτι ἔχει, ζητεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φέρεσθαι θέλουσα ὑπεροψίαν τῶν τῇδε ἔχει, καὶ ἰδοῦσα τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ καλὰ ὑποψίαν ἔχει πρὸς αὐτά, ὅτι ἐν σαρξὶ καὶ σώμασιν ὁρᾷ αὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ μιαινόμενα τῇ παρούσῃ οἰκήσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσι διειλημμένα καὶ οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ καλὰ ὄντα· μὴ γὰρ ἂν τολμῆσαι ἐκεῖνα οἷά ἐστιν εἰς βόρβορον σωμάτων ἐμβῆναι καὶ ῥυπᾶναι ἑαυτὰ καὶ ἀφανίσαι. ὅταν δὲ καὶ παραρρέοντα ἴδῃ, ἤδη παντελῶς γιγνώσκει, ὅτι ἄλλοθεν ἔχει, ὃ ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέον. εἶτ' ἐκεῖ φέρεται δεινὴ ἀνευρεῖν οὗπερ ἐρᾷ οὖσα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πρὶν ἐλεῖν ἀποστᾶσα, εἰ μή πού τις αὐτῆς καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐξέλοι. ἔνθα δὴ εἶδε μὲν καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ ἐπερρώσθη πλέον τῆς τοῦ ὄντος ζωῆς πληρωθεῖσα, καὶ ὄντως ὂν καὶ αὐτὴ γενομένη καὶ σύνεσιν ὄντως λαβοῦσα ἐγγὺς οὖσα αἰσθάνεται οὗ πάλαι ζητεῖ.

[1] Plotinus is thinking of the philosophic lovers in *Phaedrus* 250–257. But here, as in I. 6. 9, it is himself, not as in Plato the beloved, whom the lover shapes to the divine likeness: this of course suits the present context considerably better.

not want to fall short of the integrity and all the other excellence of the loved one—if they did they would be rejected by loved ones like these—and these are the lovers who are able to have intercourse[1]; in this way the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning. And the soul which has its love ready to hand does not wait for a reminder from the beauties here, but because it has its love, even if it does not know that it has it,[2] it is always searching and in its wish to be borne away to that Good has a contempt for the things here, and when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh and polluted by their present dwelling and disintegrated by magnitudes and are not the true beautiful things themselves; for those, being as they are, would never bring themselves to enter the mud of bodies and dirty themselves and disappear. But when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it already knows completely that they have the light which plays on them from elsewhere. And then it is borne away there, skilled in finding what it loves, and not leaving off till it catches it, unless someone were to take even its love away. There certainly it sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real being, and has become truly real itself also, and has true awareness, and it perceives that it is near to what it has long been seeking.

[2] Here, as in V. 5. 12, the unperceived presence and unconscious love of the Good are prior to the conscious recollection of the beauty of the World of Forms aroused by the beauties here.

32. Ποῦ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοσοῦτον κάλλος καὶ τὴν τοσαύτην ζωὴν καὶ γεννήσας οὐσίαν; ὁρᾷς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἅπασι ποικίλοις οὖσιν εἴδεσι κάλλος. καλὸν μὲν ὠδὶ μένειν· ἀλλ' ἐν καλῷ ὄντα δεῖ βλέπειν, ὅθεν ταῦτα καὶ ὅθεν καλά. δεῖ δ' αὐτὸ εἶναι τούτων μηδὲ ἕν· τί γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔσται μέρος τε ἔσται. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοιαύτη μορφὴ οὐδέ τις δύναμις οὐδ' αὖ πᾶσαι αἱ γεγενημέναι καὶ οὖσαι ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὑπὲρ πάσας εἶναι δυνάμεις καὶ ὑπὲρ πάσας μορφάς. ἀρχὴ δὲ τὸ ἀνείδεον, οὐ τὸ μορφῆς δεόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσα μορφὴ νοερά. τὸ γὰρ γενόμενον, εἴπερ ἐγίνετο, ἔδει γενέσθαι τι καὶ μορφὴν ἰδίαν ἔσχεν· ὃ δὲ μηδεὶς ἐποίησε, ⟨τί⟩[1] τις ἂν ποιήσειεν; οὐδὲν οὖν τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων καὶ πάντα· οὐδὲν μέν, ὅτι ὕστερα τὰ ὄντα, πάντα δέ, ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πάντα δὲ ποιεῖν δυνάμενον τί ἂν μέγεθος ἔχοι; ἢ ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη, αλλ' εἰ ἄπειρος, μέγεθος ἂν ἔχοι οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ μέγεθος ἐν τοῖς ὑστάτοις· καὶ δεῖ, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσει, αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχειν. τό τε τῆς οὐσίας μέγα οὐ ποσόν· ἔχοι δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλο τι μετ' αὐτὸν τὸ μέγεθος. τὸ δὲ μέγα αὐτοῦ τὸ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἶναι δυνατώτερον παρισοῦσθαί τε μηδὲν δύνασθαι· τίνι γὰρ τῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἴσον ἄν τι ἔλθοι μηδὲν ταὐτὸν ἔχον; τό τε εἰς ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς πάντα οὐ μέτρον

[1] ⟨τί⟩ τις coniecimus: τίς Enn.

[1] Plotinus normally uses ἐκεῖ (there) for the World of Forms and ἐνταῦθα (here) for the material world. But in this passage he is speaking as one who is already in the World of Forms and seeking to go beyond it.

32. Where then is he who made the beauty which is so great and the life which is so great, he who is the generator of substance? You see the beauty which rests upon the very Forms, all of them richly varied. It is beautiful to abide here; but when one is in beauty one must look to see whence these Forms come and whence they derive their beauty. But this itself must not be any one of them; for then it will be one of them and will be a part. Nor, then, can it be a shape of any kind or an individual power, nor again all those which have come to be and exist here above,[1] but it must be above all powers and above all shapes. The principle is the formless, not that which needs form, but that from which every intelligent form comes. For what came to be, if it did come to be, came to be something and had its own particular shape; but who could have made what no one made anything? Therefore it is none of these things and all of them: none of them because the real beings are later, but all of them because they come from it. But what size could that have which has the power to make all? Now he would be unbounded, but if unbounded he would have no size. For there is size in the last and lowest things; and, even if he makes size, he himself must not have it. And the greatness of substance is not quantitative; but something else posterior to him might also have size. But his greatness is that nothing can be more powerful than him and nothing can be compared with him; for to what that belongs to him could anything come to equality which has nothing the same? And being for ever and

αὐτῷ δίδωσιν οὐδ' αὖ ἀμετρίαν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἄλλα μετρήσειεν; οὐ τοίνυν αὖ οὐδὲ σχῆμα. καὶ μήν, ὅτου ἂν ποθεινοῦ ὄντος μήτε σχῆμα μήτε μορφὴν ἔχοις λαβεῖν, ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη. οὐ γὰρ ὥρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν τί κάλλος; ἐράσμιον δὲ ὂν τὸ γεννῶν ἂν εἴη τὸ κάλλος. δύναμις οὖν παντὸς καλοῦ ἄνθος ἐστί, κάλλος καλλοποιόν. καὶ γὰρ γεννᾷ αὐτὸ καὶ κάλλιον ποιεῖ τῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ κάλλους, ὥστε ἀρχὴ κάλλους καὶ πέρας κάλλους. οὖσα δὲ κάλλους ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖνο μὲν καλὸν ποιεῖ οὗ ἀρχή, καὶ καλὸν ποιεῖ οὐκ ἐν μορφῇ· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γενόμενον ἀμορφεῖν, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐν μορφῇ. ἡ γὰρ λεγομένη αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον μορφὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς δὲ οὖσα ἄμορφον. τὸ οὖν μετέχον κάλλους μεμόρφωται, οὐ τὸ κάλλος.

33. Διὸ καὶ ὅταν κάλλος λέγηται, φευκτέον μᾶλλον ἀπὸ μορφῆς τοιαύτης, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιητέον, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσῃς τοῦ καλοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀμυδρᾷ μετοχῇ καλὸν λεγόμενον. τὸ δὲ ἄμορφον εἶδος καλόν, εἴπερ εἶδός ἐστι, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν ἀποσυλήσας εἴῃς πᾶσαν μορφήν, οἷον καὶ τὴν ἐν λόγῳ, ᾗ διαφέρειν ἄλλο ἄλλου λέγομεν, ὡς δικαιοσύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀλλήλων ἕτερα, καίτοι

for all things gives him no measure—nor on the other hand measurelessness: for [if he was measureless] how could he measure the others? Nor again has he form either. Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most longed for and most lovable, and love for it would be immeasurable. For love is not limited here, because neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be unbounded; so his beauty is of another kind and beauty above beauty. For if it is nothing, what beauty can it be? But if it is lovable, it would be the generator of beauty. Therefore the productive power of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes beauty. For it generates beauty and makes it more beautiful by the excess of beauty which comes from it, so that it is the principle of beauty and the term of beauty. But since it is the principle of beauty it makes that beautiful of which it is the principle, and makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the very beauty which comes to be from it to be shapeless, but in shape in another way; for what is called this very thing [, shape,] is shape in another, but by itself shapeless. Therefore that which participates in beauty is shaped, not the beauty.

33. Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one must even more avoid shape of this kind; but it must not be set before the eyes, that you may not fall out of beauty into what is called beauty by obscure participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful, since it is form, and is so in proportion to the length you go in stripping all shape from it, the shape in reasoning, for instance, by which we say that one form differs from another, as we say that righteousness and integrity are different from each other,

καλὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴ ὁ νοῦς ἴδιόν τι νοεῖ, ἠλάττωται, κἂν ὁμοῦ πάντα λάβῃ ὅσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κἂν ἕκαστον, μίαν μορφὴν νοητὴν ἔχει· ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα οἷον ποικίλην τινά, ἔτι ἐν δεήσει, οἷον δεῖ θεάσασθαι ὂν ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐ ποικίλον, οὗ ὀρέγεται μὲν ψυχὴ οὐ λέγουσα διὰ τί τοιοῦτον ποθεῖ, ὁ δὲ λόγος λέγει, ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως, εἴπερ ἐν τῷ πάντῃ ἀνειδέῳ ἡ τοῦ ἀρίστου φύσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐρασμιωτάτου. διὸ ὅ τι ἂν εἰς εἶδος ἀνάγων τῇ ψυχῇ δεικνύῃς, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄλλο τὸ μορφῶσαν ζητεῖ. λέγει δὴ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι τὸ μορφὴν ἔχον καὶ ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος μεμετρημένον πᾶν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πᾶν οὐδὲ αὔταρκες οὐδὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο μέμικται. δεῖ τοίνυν ταῦτα μὲν καλά, τὸ δὲ ὄντως ἢ τὸ ὑπέρκαλον μὴ μεμετρῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, μὴ μεμορφῶσθαι μηδὲ εἶδος εἶναι. ἀνείδεον ἄρα τὸ πρώτως καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἡ καλλονὴ ἐκεῖνο ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐραστῶν πάθος, ὡς, ἕως ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ τύπον[1] αἰσθητὸν ἔχοντι, οὔπω ἐρᾷ· ὅταν δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ αἰσθητὸν γεννήσῃ τύπον ἐν ἀμερεῖ ψυχῇ, τότε ἔρως φύεται. βλέπειν δὲ ζητεῖ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἵν' ἐκεῖνο ἐπάρδοι μαραινόμενον. εἰ δὲ

[1] Sleeman: τὸν wBxUC: τὸ Q.

although they are beautiful. When the intellect thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it is also even if it takes together all things that are in the intelligible realm; if it thinks an individual, it has one intelligible shape; if it thinks all together it has a kind of variegated shape, still in need [and trying to discover] how it should contemplate that which is above that which is all-beautiful and variegated and not variegated; that which the soul desires without saying why it longs for something like this, but our reasoning says that this is the real thing, since the nature of the best and the nature of the most lovable is in the altogether formless. Therefore, whatever you bring into form and show to the soul, it seeks something else over it which gave it shape. Our reasoning insists that what has shape, and shape, and form, all this, is measured and limited, that is, it is not all or self-sufficient or beautiful of itself, but this too is mixed. These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful; but if this is so, it must not be shaped or be a form. The primarily beautiful, then, and the first is without form, and beauty is that, the nature of the Good. The experience of lovers bears witness to this, that, as long as it is in that which has the impression perceived by the senses, the lover is not yet in love; but when from that he himself generates in himself an impression not perceptible by the senses in his partless soul, then love springs up. But he seeks to see the beloved that he may water him when he is withering.[1] But if he should

[1] An allusion to *Phaedrus* 251B1–4.

σύνεσιν λάβοι, ὡς δεῖ μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμορφότερον, ἐκείνου ἂν ὀρέγοιτο· καὶ γὰρ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔπαθεν, ἐκ σέλαος ἀμυδροῦ ἔρως φωτὸς μεγάλου. τὸ γὰρ ἴχνος τοῦ ἀμόρφου μορφή· τοῦτο γοῦν γεννᾷ τὴν μορφήν, οὐχ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὕλη προσέλθῃ. ἡ δὲ ὕλη πορρωτάτω ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὅτι μηδὲ τῶν ὑστάτων μορφῶν παρ' αὐτῆς τινα ἔχει. εἰ οὖν ἐράσμιον μὲν οὐχ ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰδοποιηθὲν διὰ τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ εἶδος παρὰ ψυχῆς, ψυχὴ δὲ μᾶλλον εἶδος καὶ μᾶλλον ἐράσμιον καὶ νοῦς μᾶλλον ταύτης εἶδος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐρασμιώτερον, ἀνείδεον δεῖ τὴν καλοῦ τίθεσθαι φύσιν τὴν πρώτην.

34. Καὶ οὐκέτι θαυμάσομεν τὸ τοὺς δεινοὺς πόθους παρέχον εἰ πάντη ἀπήλλακται καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς· ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτοῦ ἔρωτα σύντονον λάβῃ, ἀποτίθεται πᾶσαν ἣν ἔχει μορφήν, καὶ ἥτις ἂν καὶ νοητοῦ ᾖ ἐν αὐτῇ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἔχοντά τι ἄλλο καὶ ἐνεργοῦντα περὶ αὐτὸ οὔτε ἰδεῖν οὔτε ἐναρμοσθῆναι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ μήτε κακὸν μήτ' αὖ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόχειρον ἔχειν, ἵνα δέξηται μόνη μόνον. ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἥκῃ πρὸς αὐτήν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν φανῇ, ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ τῶν παρόντων καὶ παρασκευάσασα αὐτὴν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα καλὴν καὶ εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα (ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δήλη που τοῖς παρασκευαζομένοις), ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα (μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἓν ἄμφω·

come to understand that one must change to that which is more formless, he would desire that; for his experience from the beginning was love of a great light from a dim glimmer. For the trace of the shapeless is shape; it is this which generates shape, not shape this, and it generates it when matter comes to it. But matter is necessarily furthest from it, because it does not have of itself any one even of the last and lowest shapes. If then what is lovable is not the matter, but what is formed by the form, and the form upon the matter comes from soul, and soul is more form and more lovable, and intellect is more form than soul and still more lovable, one must assume that the first nature of beauty is formless.

34. And we shall no longer be surprised if that which produces these strangely powerful longings is altogether free from even intelligible shape; since the soul also, when it gets an intense love of it, puts away all the shape which it has, even whatever shape of the intelligible there may be in it. For it is not possible for one who has anything else and is actively occupied about it to see or to be fitted in. But one must not have evil, or any other good either, ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it alone. But when the soul has good fortune with it, and it comes to it, or rather, being there already, appears, when that soul turns away from the things that are there, and has prepared by making itself as beautiful as possible and has come to likeness (the preparation and the adornment are clearly understood, I think, by those who are preparing themselves) and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing (for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but

οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι· μίμησις δὲ τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρῖναι θέλοντες), καὶ οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, οὐ ζῷον, οὐκ ὄν, οὐδὲ πᾶν (ἀνώμαλος γὰρ ἡ τούτων πως θέα), καὶ οὐδὲ σχολὴν ἄγει πρὸς αὐτὰ οὔτε θέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ζητήσασα ἐκείνῳ παρόντι ἀπαντᾷ κἀκεῖνο ἀντ' αὐτῆς βλέπει· τίς δὲ οὖσα βλέπει, οὐδὲ τοῦτο σχολάζει ὁρᾶν. ἔνθα δὴ οὐδὲν πάντων ἀντὶ τούτου ἀλλάξαιτο, οὐδ' εἴ τις αὐτῇ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐπιτρέποι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄλλου ἔτι ἀμείνονος οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἀγαθοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνωτέρω τρέχει τά τε ἄλλα πάντα κατιούσης, κἂν ᾖ ἄνω. ὥστε τότε ἔχει καὶ τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς καὶ γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἐφίετο, καὶ τίθεσθαι, ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀπάτη ἐκεῖ· ἢ ποῦ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀληθέστερον τύχοι; ὃ οὖν λέγει, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι, καὶ ὕστερον λέγει, καὶ σιωπῶσα δὲ λέγει καὶ εὐπαθοῦσα οὐ ψεύδεται, ὅτι εὐπαθεῖ· οὐδὲ γαργαλιζομένου λέγει τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενομένη, ὃ πάλαι, ὅτε εὐτύχει. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, οἷς πρὶν ἥδετο, ἀρχαῖς ἢ δυνάμεσιν ἢ πλούτοις ἢ κάλλεσιν ἢ ἐπιστήμαις, ταῦτα ὑπεριδοῦσα λέγει οὐκ ἂν εἰποῦσα μὴ κρείττοσι

[1] "There is nothing between" is said of Intellect and Soul in IV. 4. 2. 27–28, and, more unexpectedly, of Intellect and the material universe at V. 8. 7. 13. ἓν ἄμφω is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united

both are one[1]; nor could you still make a distinction while it is present; lovers and their beloveds here below imitate this in their will to be united), it does not still perceive its body, that it is in it, and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or living thing, or being, or all (for the contemplation of these would be somehow disturbing), and it has no time for them nor wants them, but it has been seeking it, and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead of itself; but it has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. There, truly, it would not exchange this for anything in the world, not even if someone handed over the whole universe to it, because there is nothing still better, and nothing that is more a good; for it does not run up higher, and all the other things are on its way down, even if they are in the realm above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that there is nothing better than it. For there is no deceit there; or where could it find any thing truer than the truth? What it speaks, then, is that, and it speaks it afterwards, and speaks it in silence, and in its happiness is not cheated in thinking that it is happy; and it does not say it is happy when the body tickles it, but when it has become that which it was before, when it is fortunate. But it says it in contempt of all the other things in which it delighted before, offices or powers or riches or beauties or sciences, and it would not have spoken if it had not met better things than

retain their distinct natures. See Lexicon Plotinianum s. v. ἄμφω (b). Its use in IV. 4. 2. 29, ἓν ἐστιν ἄμφω καὶ δύο, of Soul and Intellect, brings out its meaning clearly.

συντυχοῦσα τούτων· οὐδὲ φοβεῖται, μή τι πάθῃ, μετ' ἐκείνου οὖσα οὐδ' ὅλως ἰδοῦσα· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν φθείροιτο, εὖ μάλα καὶ βούλεται, ἵνα πρὸς τούτῳ ᾖ μόνον· εἰς τόσον ἧκει εὐπαθείας.

35. Οὕτω δὲ διάκειται τότε, ὡς καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καταφρονεῖν, ὃ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἠσπάζετο, ὅτι τὸ νοεῖν κίνησίς τις ἦν, αὕτη δὲ οὐ κινεῖσθαι θέλει. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνόν φησιν, ὃν ὁρᾷ, καίτοι νοῦς γενόμενος αὕτη θεωρεῖ οἷον νοωθεῖσα καὶ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῷ νοητῷ γενομένη· ἀλλὰ γενομένη μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τὸ νοητὸν νοεῖ, ἐπὴν δ' ἐκεῖνον ἴδῃ τὸν θεόν, πάντα ἤδη ἀφίησιν, οἷον εἴ τις εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἶκον ποικίλον καὶ οὕτω καλὸν θεωροῖ ἔνδον ἕκαστα τῶν ποικιλμάτων καὶ θαυμάζοι, πρὶν ἰδεῖν τὸν τοῦ οἴκου δεσπότην, ἰδὼν δ' ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀγασθεὶς οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φύσιν ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἄξιον τῆς ὄντως θέας, ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνα τοῦτον μόνον τοῦ λοιποῦ βλέποι, εἶτα βλέπων καὶ μὴ ἀφαιρῶν τὸ ὄμμα μηκέτι ὅραμα βλέποι τῷ συνεχεῖ τῆς θέας, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτοῦ συγκεράσαιτο τῷ θεάματι, ὥστε ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη τὸ ὁρατὸν πρότερον ὄψιν γεγονέναι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων ἐπιλάθοιτο θεαμάτων. καὶ τάχα ἂν σῴζοι τὸ ἀνάλογον ἡ εἰκών, εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ὁ ἐπιστὰς τῷ τὰ τοῦ οἴκου θεωμένῳ, ἀλλά τις θεός, καὶ οὗτος οὐ κατ' ὄψιν φανείς,

[1] The phrase "the intelligible place" here and in line 41 is taken from Plato's *Republic* (508C1 and 517B5).

these; it is not afraid, either, that anything may happen to it, since it does not even see it while it is with that; but if all the other things about it perished, it would even be pleased, that it might be alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it reached.

35. And the soul is so disposed then as even to despise intelligence, which at other times it welcomed, because intelligence is a kind of movement, and the soul does not want to move. For it says that he whom it sees does not move either; yet when this soul has become intellect it contemplates, when it has been, so to speak, made intellect and has come to be in the intelligible place[1]; but when it has come to be in it and moves about it, it possesses the intelligible and thinks, but when it sees that god it at once lets everything go; it is as if someone went into a house richly decorated and so beautiful, and within it contemplated each and every one of the decorations and admired them before seeing the master of the house, but when he sees that master with delight, who is not of the nature of the images [in the house], but worthy of genuine contemplation, he dismisses those other things and thereafter looks at him alone, and then, as he looks and does not take his eyes away, by the continuity of his contemplation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become sight in him, and he forgets all other objects of contemplation. And perhaps the likeness would keep in conformity with the reality if it was not a mortal who encountered the one who was seeing the sights of the house but one of the gods, and one who did not appear visibly but

ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐμπλήσας τοῦ θεωμένου. καὶ τὸν νοῦν τοίνυν τὴν μὲν ἔχειν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν, ᾗ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βλέπει, τὴν δέ, ᾗ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ, καθ' ἣν καὶ πρότερον ἑώρα μόνον καὶ ὁρῶν ὕστερον καὶ νοῦν ἔσχε καὶ ἕν ἐστι. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνη μὲν ἡ θέα νοῦ ἔμφρονος, αὕτη δὲ νοῦς ἐρῶν, ὅταν ἄφρων γένηται μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος· τότε ἐρῶν γίνεται ἁπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ· καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ μεθύειν βέλτιον ἢ σεμνοτέρῳ εἶναι τοιαύτης μέθης. παρὰ μέρος δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ἄλλα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα ὁρᾷ; ἢ οὔ· ὁ δὲ λόγος διδάσκων γινόμενα ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἀεί, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν. καὶ γὰρ ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον ἔσχε γεννήματα καὶ συνῄσθετο καὶ τούτων γενομένων καὶ ἐνόντων· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁρῶν λέγεται νοεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ᾗ δυνάμει ἔμελλε νοεῖν. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οἷον συγχέασα καὶ ἀφανίσασα μένοντα τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ὁρᾷ πρῶτος, ἔρχεται δὲ ἡ θέα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ δύο ἓν γίνεται. ἐκταθὲν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς καὶ συναρμοσθὲν τῇ ἀμφοτέρων συστάσει ἐπιδραμὸν καὶ ἑνῶσαν τὰ δύο ἔπεστιν αὐτοῖς μακαρίαν διδοὺς αἴσθησιν

[1] Plotinus may be thinking here particularly of possession by Apollo or Dionysus.

[2] For this "pre-intellectual" vision of Intellect see III. 8. 9. 29–32; V. 4. 2. 4–7; V. 3. 11. 4–12; it is the first moment in Intellect's eternal generation, its properly "intellectual" vision being the second.

filled the soul of the beholder.[1] Intellect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one.[2] And that first one is the contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind "drunk with the nectar"[3]; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having its fill; and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than to be more respectably sober. But does that Intellect see in part, at one time some things and at another others? No, but our rational discourse instructing us makes them come to be, but Intellect always has its thinking and always its not thinking, but looking at that god in another way. For when it saw him it had offspring and was intimately aware of their generation and existence within it; and when it sees these it is said to think, but it sees that by the power by which [later] it was going to think. But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the intellect which abides within it—but rather its intellect sees first and the vision comes also to it and the two become one. But the Good is spread out over them and fitted in to the union of both; playing upon them and uniting the two it rests upon them and

[3] Again the drunkenness of Poros from Plato *Symposium* 203B5; see ch. 30, n. 4, p. 179. The application of it to Intellect's eternal self-transcendence in vision of and union with the One is strikingly powerful and paradoxical. Intellect must be eternally out of its mind with drink or love to be the Divine Mind.

καὶ θέαν, τοσοῦτον ἄρας, ὥστε μήτε ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι, μήτε ἔν τῳ ἄλλῳ, ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτός που· ὁ δὲ νοητὸς τόπος ἐν αὐτῷ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. διὸ οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τότε, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο. οὐδὲ ψυχὴ τοίνυν, ὅτι μηδὲ ζῇ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τὸ ζῆν. οὐδὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μηδὲ νοεῖ· ὁμοιοῦσθαι γὰρ δεῖ. νοεῖ δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ.

36. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα δῆλα, εἴρηται δέ τι καὶ περὶ τούτου. ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ νῦν ἐπ' ὀλίγον λεκτέον ἀρχομένοις μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, διὰ λογισμῶν δὲ προϊοῦσιν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴτε γνῶσις εἴτε ἐπαφὴ μέγιστον, καὶ μ έ γ ι σ τ ό ν φησι τοῦτ εἶναι μ ά θ η μ α, οὐ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν μάθημα λέγων, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν τι πρότερον. διδάσκουσι μὲν οὖν ἀναλογίαι τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις καὶ γνώσεις τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναβασμοί τινες, πορεύουσι δὲ καθάρσεις πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κοσμήσεις καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἐπιβάσεις καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἱδρύσεις καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ ἑστιάσεις. ὅστις ⟨δὲ γ⟩γένηται[1] ὁμοῦ θεατής τε καὶ θέαμα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ γενόμενος οὐσία καὶ νοῦς καὶ ζ ῷ ο ν π α ν τ ε λ ὲ ς μηκέτι ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ βλέποι—τοῦτο δὲ γενόμενος ἐγγύς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ πλησίον

[1] coniecimus.

gives them a blessed perception and vision, lifting them so high that they are not in place nor in anything other, among things where it is natural for one thing to be in another; for he is not anywhere either; but the intelligible place is in him, but he is not in another. Therefore the soul does not move then either, because that does not move. Nor, then, is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life. Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either; for one must be made like. It does not even think that it does not think.

36. The rest, then, is clear, and something has been said also about this. But all the same, even now we must speak of it for a little, starting from that [experience] but proceeding by rational discourse. The knowledge or touching of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the "greatest study",[1] not calling the looking at it a "study", but learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it by comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues and adornings and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents. But whoever has become at once contemplator of himself and all the rest and object of his contemplation, and, since he has become substance and intellect and "the complete living being",[2] no longer looks at it from outside—when he has become this he is near, and that Good is next above him, and already close

[1] Plato *Republic* 505A2 (of the Idea of the Good).
[2] Plato *Timaeus* 31B1.

αὐτὸ ἤδη ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ νοητῷ ἐπιστίλβον. ἔνθα δὴ ἐάσας τις πᾶν μάθημα, καὶ μέχρι του παιδαγωγηθεὶς καὶ ἐν καλῷ ἱδρυθείς, ἐν ᾧ μέν ἐστι, μέχρι τούτου νοεῖ, ἐξενεχθεὶς δὲ τῷ αὐτοῦ[1] τοῦ νοῦ οἷον κύματι καὶ ὑψοῦ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οἷον οἰδήσαντος ἀρθεὶς εἰσεῖδεν ἐξαίφνης οὐκ ἰδὼν ὅπως, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ θέα πλήσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὅραμα ἦν. οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν ὁρώμενον, τὸ δὲ φῶς αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ νοῦς καὶ νοούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐγὴ γεννῶσα ταῦτα εἰς ὕστερον καὶ ἀφεῖσα εἶναι παρ᾽ αὐτῷ· αὐτὸς δὲ αὐγὴ μόνον γεννῶσα νοῦν, οὗτι σβέσασα αὑτῆς ἐν τῷ γεννῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μείνασα μὲν αὐτή, γενομένου δ᾽ ἐκείνου τῷ τοῦτο εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπέστη ἐκεῖνο.

37. Οἱ μὲν οὖν νόησιν αὐτῷ δόντες τῷ λόγῳ τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔδοσαν· καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον τὰ ἄλλα, φασί τινες, μὴ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλο τιμιώτερον αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὑρόντες τὴν νόησιν αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἔδοσαν, ὥσπερ τῇ νοήσει σεμνοτέρου αὐτοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν κρείττονος ἢ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ὅ ἐστιν ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοῦ σεμνύνοντος τὴν νόησιν. τίνι γὰρ τὸ τίμιον ἕξει, τῇ νοήσει ἢ αὐτῷ; εἰ μὲν τῇ νοήσει, αὐτῷ οὐ τίμιον ἢ ἧττον, εἰ δὲ αὐτῷ, πρὸ τῆς νοήσεώς ἐστι τέλειος καὶ οὐ τῇ νοήσει τελειούμενος. εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι

[1] Harder: αὐτῷ wBUCQ: αὐτὸ J: αὐτῷ vel αὐτὸ R.

by, shining upon all the intelligible world. It is there that one lets all study go; up to a point one has been led along and settled firmly in beauty and as far as this one thinks that in which one is, but is carried out of it by the surge of the wave of Intellect itself and lifted on high by a kind of swell and sees suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light itself is what he sees. For there is not in that Good something seen and its light, nor intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which generates these afterwards and lets them be beside it; but he himself is the ray which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the generation, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the kind it is, that would not have come into existence.

37. Those who in their reasoned account attribute thinking to the Good do not attribute to him thinking of the lesser things which derive from him[1]; yet some people do say that this is absurd, that he should not know the other things; but, however that may be, those [Peripatetics], since they did not find anything of more worth than himself, attributed to him thought of himself, on the supposition that he would become more majestic by thinking and that thinking was better than what he is in himself, but that it was not he himself who conferred majesty on thinking. For by what does he have his worth, by thinking or by himself? If it is by thinking, he is in himself of no worth or lesser worth, but if by himself he is perfect before thinking and not perfected by

[1] See Aristotle *Metaphysics* Λ 1074b17–35.

ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμις, δεῖ νοεῖν, εἰ μὲν οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀεὶ νοοῦσα καὶ τούτῳ ἐνέργειαν λέγουσι, δύο ὅμως λέγουσι, τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν, καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦν λέγουσιν, ἀλλά τι ἕτερον προστιθέασιν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ ὁρᾶν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, κἂν ἀεὶ βλέπωσιν. εἰ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ νόησις, οὐκ ἂν οὖσα νόησις νοοῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις κινοῖτο ἄν. τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγετε οὐσίαν καὶ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἕτερα, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἁπλοῦν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἄλλου δίδομεν νοεῖν καὶ οἷον ζητεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό, καὶ ἐπιστραφὲν ἐν τῇ θέᾳ καὶ γνωρίσαν νοῦν ἤδη δικαίως εἶναι· τὸ δὲ μήτε γενόμενον μήτ' ἔχον πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ⟨ὂν⟩[1] ὅ ἐστι—τίς αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἕξειν;[2] διὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων εἶναι ὀρθῶς. νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν ἀνόητος· ᾧ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο πράττοι, ἀνόητον· ᾧ δὲ μηδὲν ἔργον ἐστί, τί ἂν τούτῳ τις ἔργον προσάγων κατὰ στέρησιν αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τοῦτο, ὅτι μὴ πράττει; οἷον εἰ ἀνίατρον αὐτόν τις λέγοι. μηδὲν δὲ ἔργον εἶναι αὐτῷ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐπιβάλλει αὐτῷ ποιεῖν· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ

[1] Kirchhoff.
[2] Igal: ἕξει Enn.

thinking. But if he has to think because he is active actuality, but not potency, if he is a substance always thinking and it is because of this that they say he is active actuality, they are all the same speaking of two things, substance and thinking, and are not saying that he is simple, but adding something else to him, as actually seeing is an addition to the eyes, even if they are always looking. But if they say that he is actual because he is active actuality, that is, thought, if he was thought he would not think, just as movement is not in motion. "Well then, do you not yourselves say that those higher things are substance and active actuality?" Yes, but we agree that these are many, and being many are different, but the first is single and simple, and we attribute thinking to what comes from another, and a kind of seeking its substance and its self and what made it, and say that in turning back in its contemplation and recognising itself it is at that point rightly and properly Intellect[1]; but that what has not come to be and has nothing before it, but is always what it is—what reason will it have to think? This is why Plato rightly says that it is above Intellect. Now Intellect, if it did not think, would be unintelligent; for if that whose nature includes thought did not think, it would be unintelligent; but when something has no work to do, why should one put a work to it and then predicate the absence of this work of it because it does not do it? It would be as if one were to call him unmedical. But he has no work to do because there is no obligation on him to do anything; for he is sufficient and does not have to

[1] See ch. 35, n. 1, p. 194.

αὐτὸς καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ ζητεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ὄντα· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὢν αὐτὸς ὅ ἐστιν.

38. Ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἔστιν"· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτου δεῖται· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "ἀγαθός ἐστι" κατὰ τούτου, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὸ "ἔστι"· τὸ δὲ "ἔστιν" οὐχ ὡς κατ᾽ ἄλλου ἄλλο, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σημαῖνον ὅ ἐστι. λέγομεν δὲ τἀγαθὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ κατηγοροῦντες, ὅτι αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι αὐτό· εἶτα οὐδ᾽ "ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν" λέγειν ἀξιοῦντες οὐδὲ τὸ "τὸ" προτιθέναι αὐτοῦ, δηλοῦν δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι, εἴ τις αὐτὸ παντάπασιν ἀφέλοι, ἵνα μὴ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ποιῶμεν, ὡς μὴ δεῖσθαι τοῦ "ἔστιν" ἔτι, οὕτω λέγομεν "τἀγαθόν". ἀλλὰ τίς παραδέξεται φύσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ⟨ἐν⟩[1] αἰσθήσει καὶ γνώσει αὑτῆς; τί οὖν γνώσεται; "ἐγώ εἰμι"; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἐρεῖ τὸ "ἀγαθόν εἰμι"; ἢ πάλιν τὸ "ἔστι" κατηγορήσει αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὸ "ἀγαθὸν" μόνον ἐρεῖ τι προσθείς· "ἀγαθὸν" μὲν γὰρ νοήσειεν ἄν τις ἄνευ τοῦ "ἔστιν", εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἄλλου κατηγοροῖ· ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν[2] νοῶν ὅτι ἀγαθὸν πάντως νοήσει τὸ "ἐγώ εἰμι τὸ ἀγαθόν"· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀγαθὸν μὲν νοήσει, οὐ παρέσται δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ ὅτι αὐτός ἐστι τοῦτο νοεῖν. δεῖ οὖν τὴν νόησιν εἶναι, ὅτι "ἀγαθόν εἰμι". καὶ εἰ μὲν νόησις αὐτὴ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἔσται νόησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ νόησις. εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ νόησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἔστιν ἤδη τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως

[1] A^{3s} (= Ficinus).
[2] Kirchhoff: αὐτὸ Enn.

seek anything but himself who is above all things; for he suffices for himself and all else by being what he is.

38. But he is not even the "is"; for he has no need whatever even of this; for "he is good" is not applicable to him either, but to that to which the "is" applies; but the "is" [, when said of him,] is not said as one thing of another, but as indicating what he is. But we say "the Good" about him, not speaking of him himself nor predicating of him that good belongs to him, but saying it is himself; so then, since we do not think it proper to say "is good" nor to put the article before it, but are unable to make ourselves clear, if one takes it away altogether, we say "the good" so as not to still need the "is", that we may not make one thing and then another. But who is going to accept a nature which is not in a state of perception and knowledge of itself? What then will he know? "I am"? But he is not. Why then will he not say "I am the Good"? Again he will predicate the "is" of himself. But [perhaps] he will only say "good", with some addition; for one could think "good" without "is", if one did not predicate it of something else. But he who thinks that he is good will in every case think "I am the Good"; if not, he will think good but the thought will not be present to his mind that he is this good. The thought, then, must be "I am good".[1] And if the thought itself is the Good, it will not be a thought of himself but of good, and he himself will not be the Good, but the thought will. But if the thought of the Good is different from the Good, the Good is there already before the

[1] Cp. the closely parallel discussion in V. 3. 10.

αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' ἔστι πρὸ τῆς νοήσεως τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες, αὔταρκες ὂν αὐτῷ εἰς ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἂν δέοιτο τῆς νοήσεως τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ· ὥστε ἦ ἀγαθὸν οὐ νοεῖ ἑαυτό.

39. Ἀλλὰ ἦ τί; ἢ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἁπλῆ τις ἐπιβολὴ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ὄντος οἷον διαστήματός τινος οὐδὲ διαφορᾶς πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν ἑαυτῷ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ αὐτό; διὸ καὶ ὀρθῶς ἑτερότητα λαμβάνει, ὅπου νοῦς καὶ οὐσία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν νοῦν ἀεὶ ἑτερότητα καὶ ταὐτότητα λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ νοήσει. ἑαυτόν τε γὰρ οὐ διακρινεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑτέρου σχέσει τά τε πάντα οὐ θεωρήσει, μηδεμιᾶς ἑτερότητος γενομένης εἰς τὸ πάντα εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ δύο. ἔπειτα, εἰ νοήσει, οὐ δήπου ἑαυτὸν μόνον νοήσει, εἴπερ ὅλως νοήσει· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἅπαντα; ἢ ἀδυνατήσει; ὅλως δὲ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς γίνεται νοῶν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν νόησιν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑτέρου εἶναι, εἴ τι ὅλως δύναιτο νοεῖν αὐτό. ἐλέγομεν δέ, ὅτι οὐ νόησις τούτου,[1] οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐθέλοι ἰδεῖν. νοήσας δὲ αὐτὸς πολὺς γίνεται, νοητός, νοῶν, κινούμενος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσήκει νῷ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἀκεῖνο ὁρᾶν προσήκει, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἤδη ἐν ἄλλοις, ὡς ἑκάστη

[1] Igal: τοῦτο Enn.

thought of it. But if the Good is sufficient to itself before the thought, since it is sufficient to itself for good it will have no need of the thought about it; so, as good, it does not think itself.

39. But as what, then? Now nothing else is present to it, but it will have a simple concentration of attention on itself. But since there is no distance or difference in regard to itself, what could its attention be other than itself? Therefore Plato rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness where there is intellect and substance.[1] For one must always understand intellect as otherness and sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemplate all things if no otherness has occurred to make all things exist: for [without otherness] there would not even be two. Then, if it is going to think, it will not presumably think itself alone, if it is going to think at all; for why will it not think all things? Will it not be able to? But in general intellect is not simple when it thinks itself, but its thought about itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all. But we said that there is no thinking of this Good, not even if he wanted to see himself as another. But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and everything else appropriate to Intellect. But besides this it is appropriate to observe that point which has been discussed elsewhere,[2] that each

[1] Plotinus' usual application of the "very important kinds" of Plato *Sophist* 254–5 to Intellect.

[2] Cp. e.g. VI. 9. 2.

νόησις, εἴπερ νόησις ἔσται, ποικίλον τι δεῖ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶν οἷον κίνημα, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη οἷον ἐπαφή, οὐδὲν νοερὸν ἔχει. τί οὖν; οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε αὐτὸν εἰδήσει; [ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν ἑστήξεται][1] τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ὕστερα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν ὃ ἦν, καὶ ἐπίκτητος αὐτῶν ἡ νόησις καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ καὶ οὐχ ἑστηκότων· κἂν τὰ ἑστῶτα δὲ νοῇ, πολύς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα μετὰ τῆς νοήσεως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕξει, αἱ δὲ τούτου νοήσεις θεωρίαι κεναὶ μόνον ἔσονται. ἡ δὲ πρόνοια ἀρκεῖ ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, παρ' οὗ τὰ πάντα. τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πῶς, εἰ μὴ αὐτόν; ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν ἑστήξεται. ἔλεγε μὲν οὖν ὁ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λέγων, ὅτι νοήσει, ἀλλ' οὐ σεμνὸν ἑστήξοιτο ὡς τῆς οὐσίας μὲν νοούσης, τοῦ δὲ μὴ νοοῦντος σεμνοῦ ἑστηξομένου, τὸ μὲν "ἑστήξοιτο" τῷ μὴ ἄλλως ἂν δεδυνῆσθαι ἑρμηνεῦσαι, σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ ὄντως σεμνὸν νομίζων εἶναι τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς τὸ νοεῖν.

40. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ δεῖ νόησιν περὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι, εἰδεῖεν ἂν οἱ προσαψάμενοι τοῦ τοιούτου· δεῖ γε μὴν παραμύθια ἄττα πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις κομίζειν, εἴ πῃ οἷόν τε τῷ λόγῳ σημῆναι. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πειθὼ μεμιγμένην ἔχειν τὴν ἀνάγκην. δεῖ τοίνυν γιγνώσκειν ἐπιστήσαντα, ὡς νόησις πᾶσα ἔκ τινός ἐστι καὶ τινός. καὶ ἡ μὲν

[1] delevimus, ut e lin. 28–9 iteratum.

[1] Plotinus is here interpreting Plato *Sophist* 248D6–249A2; he seems conscious that his interpretation will seem rather odd.

thought, if it is going to be a thought, must be something multiply various, but that kind of movement, simple and all the same, if it is to be something like a touch, has nothing intelligent about it. Well then, will he not know the other things or himself? The other things come after him, and he was what he was before them, and the thought of them would be acquired from outside himself, and not always the same, and of things that do not stand still; and even if he thinks the things that stand still, he is many. For it is certainly not true that the things which come after will possess the substance with their thought, but the thoughts of this Good will be only visions empty [of real content]. But it is enough for providence that he exists from whom all things come. But what is his relation to himself, if he does not think himself? But he will stand still in majesty. Plato did say, speaking of substance, that it will think, but would not stand still in majesty, meaning that substance thinks, but that which does not think will stand still in majesty; he used "will stand still" because he could not explain what he meant in any other way, and he considered more majestic and truly majestic that which transcends thought.[1]

40. And those who have had a contact of this kind would know that thinking cannot pertain to him; but we do need to add some words of encouragement to what has been said, if discourse can indicate it in any way at all. But necessity must have persuasion mixed with it. One must, then, know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of

συνοῦσα τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἔχει τὸ οὗ ἐστι νόησις, οἷον δὲ ἐπικείμενον αὐτὴ γίνεται ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ πληροῦσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲν αὐτὴ γεννῶσα· ἐκείνου γάρ ἐστιν, οὗ ἐστι, μόνον, οἷον τελείωσις. ἡ δὲ οὖσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγέννησέ τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὖσα. ἀλλ' οὖσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὐσία, καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἡ νόησις καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὕτη καὶ αὖ ᾗ[1] ἑαυτὴν νοεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐχ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἢ λόγῳ, τὸ νοούμενον καὶ τὸ νοοῦν, πλῆθος ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται πολλαχῇ. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν γεννήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ ἴνδαλμα ὂν ἄλλου οὕτως ἐστὶ μεγάλου τινός, ὥστε ἐγένετο οὐσία. εἰ δ' ἦν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐκείνου ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόστασις ἦν. πρώτη δὴ οὖσα αὕτη ἐνέργεια καὶ πρώτη νόησις οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι οὔτε ἐνέργειαν πρὸ αὐτῆς οὔτε νόησιν. μεταβαίνων τοίνυν τις ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως οὔτε ἐπὶ οὐσίαν ἥξει οὔτ' ἐπὶ νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἐ π έ κ ε ι ν α ἥξει ο ὐ σ ί α ς καὶ νοήσεως ἐπί τι θαυμαστόν, ὃ μήτε ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν μήτε νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔρημον αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ

[1] *αὖ ᾗ* Theiler: *αὐτὴ* Enn.

something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure, being its ground's actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality without generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is. But the thinking which accompanies substance and has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be; for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated, and its active actuality is substance, and also in substance it is there with it, and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is, a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on its own. Certainly, as this is the first active actuality and the first thought, it would have neither actuality or thought before it. So then when one goes on from this substance and thought one will not arrive at substance or thought, but will come, beyond substance[1] and thought, to something wonderful, which does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone by itself, with no need of the things which come from

[1] Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

οὐδὲν δεόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας πρότερον ἐγέννησεν ἐνέργειαν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἦν, πρὶν γενέσθαι· οὐδὲ νοήσας ἐγέννησε νόησιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν νενοήκει, πρὶν γενέσθαι νόησιν. ὅλως γὰρ ἡ νόησις, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ, χεῖρον αὐτοῦ· ὥστε οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἂν εἴη· λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐχ ὅτι μὴ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθόν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω—ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐκ ἂν εἴη νόησις· ἢ ἓν ἔσται ὁμοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτοῦ, ἡ νόησις αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ χεῖρον ἔσται, ὁμοῦ ἡ νόησις ἔσται καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ κρεῖττον ἡ νόησις, τὸ νοητὸν χεῖρον ἔσται. οὐ δὴ[1] ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἡ νόησις, ἀλλὰ χεῖρον οὖσα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀξιωθεῖσα ἐτέρωθι ἂν εἴη αὐτοῦ, καθαρὸν ἐκεῖνο ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ αὐτῆς ἀφεῖσα. καθαρὸν δὲ ὂν νοήσεως εἰλικρινῶς ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν, οὐ παραποδιζόμενον τῇ νοήσει παρούσῃ, ὡς μὴ εἰλικρινὲς καὶ ἓν εἶναι. εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο ἅμα νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ νόησιν συνοῦσαν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ νοοῦν θέλει ποιεῖν, ἄλλου δεήσεται καὶ τούτου πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἐπείπερ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ νόησις ἢ ἄλλου ὑποκειμένου τελείωσις ἢ συνυπόστασις οὖσα πρὸ αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴ ἄλλην ἔχει φύσιν, ᾗ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν εἰκότως. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὃ νοήσει, ὅτι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτῆς· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ αὑτήν, οἷον καταμανθάνει ἃ ἔσχεν ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θέας ἐν αὐτῇ. ᾧ δὲ μήτε τι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτοῦ μήτε τι σύνεστιν αὐτῷ ἐξ

[1] Kirchhoff: οὐδὲ Enn.

it. For it did not act before it generated activity; for then activity would have been there before it came to be; nor did it think before it generated thought; for then it would have thought before thought came to be. For in general thought, if it is of the Good, is worse than it; so that it would not be thought of the Good; but I mean "not of the Good" not in the sense that it is impossible to think the Good—this may well be so—but that there would be no thought in the Good itself; otherwise the Good and what is less than it, the thought of it, would be a unity together. But if [thought] is going to be worse [than the Good], thought and substance will be together. But if thought is better, the object of thought will be worse. Certainly then thought is not in the Good but, being worse and given its value by this Good, would be somewhere else than it, leaving that Good clear of thought itself as well as everything else. But being clear of thought it is purely what it is, not hindered by the presence of thought from being pure and one. But if someone makes this also at once thinker and thought and substance and thought in company with substance, and in this way wants to make it self-thinking, he will need another, and this other prior to itself, since active actuality and thought is either the bringing to completion of something else underlying it or a co-existent and so has itself also another nature prior to it by which thinking comes naturally. For it has something to think about because there is something else before it; and when it thinks itself it is in a way comprehending what it had from the vision of another in itself. But that which has nothing else before it nor anything accompanying it from something else—

ἄλλου, τί καὶ νοήσει ἢ πῶς ἑαυτόν; τί γὰρ ἐζήτει ἢ τί ἐπόθει; ἢ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ὅση, ὡς ἐκτὸς οὔσης αὐτοῦ, καθὸ ἐνόει; λέγω δέ, εἰ ἄλλη μὲν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, ἣν ἐμάνθανεν, ἄλλη δέ, ᾗ ἐμάνθανεν· εἰ δὲ μία, τί ζητεῖ;

41. Κινδυνεύει γὰρ βοήθεια τὸ νοεῖν δεδόσθαι ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς θειοτέραις μέν, ἐλάττοσι δὲ οὔσαις, καὶ οἷον αὐταῖς τυφλαῖς οὔσαις ὄμμα. ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς τί ἂν δέοιτο τὸ ὂν ὁρᾶν φῶς αὐτὸς ὤν; ὃ δ' ἂν δέηται, δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ σκότον ἔχων παρ' αὐτῷ φῶς ζητεῖ. εἰ οὖν φῶς τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δὲ φῶς φῶς οὐ ζητεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνη ἡ αὐγὴ[1] φῶς μὴ ζητοῦσα ζητήσειε νοεῖν, οὐδὲ προσθήσει αὐτῇ τὸ νοεῖν· τί γὰρ καὶ ποιήσει; ἢ τί προσθήσει δεόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, ἵνα νοῇ; οὐκ αἰσθάνεται οὖν ἑαυτοῦ—οὐ γὰρ δεῖται—οὐδ' ἔστι δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ⟨οὐδὲ⟩[2] πλείω, αὐτός, ἡ νόησις—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ νόησις αὐτός—δεῖ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν, πάντη ἓν γενόμενα ἀφανιεῖ αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς· διακριθέντα δὲ τῷ "ἄλλο" πάλιν αὖ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται. ἐατέον οὖν τὰ ἄλλα πάντη ἐπὶ φύσεως ἀρίστης οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπικουρίας δεομένης· ὃ γὰρ ἂν προσθῇς, ἠλάττωσας τῇ προσθήκῃ τὴν οὐδενὸς δεομένην. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ νόησις καλόν, ὅτι ψυχὴ δεῖται νοῦν ἔχειν, καὶ νῷ, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ

[1] Kirchhoff: αὐτὴ Enn.
[2] coniecimus.

whatever will it think and how will it think itself? For what did it seek and what did it long for? Was it to know how great its power was, as if it was outside it in so far as it thought it? What I mean by this is, if the power which it learnt about was one thing and the power by which it learnt another; but if they were one, what was it seeking?

41. For it seems likely that thinking has been given as a help to the natures which are of the more divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an eye for their blindness. But why should the eye which is itself light[1] need to see real being? But what does need to seeks light through the eye because it has darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light does not seek light, that ray which does not seek light would not seek to think, and will not add thinking to itself; for what will it do with it? Or what will even Intellect itself add in its need in order to think? So he has no perception of himself—he does not need it—and he is not two, or rather not several, himself, his thinking—for his thinking is certainly not himself—and what is being thought must be the third. But if intellect, thinking, and object of thought are the same, if they become altogether one they will make themselves disappear in themselves; but if they are distinguished by being other they will, again, not be that Good. With the best nature, then, which needs no assistance, we must leave aside everything; for whatever you add, you have lessened by the addition the nature which needs nothing. For thinking is a fine thing for us, because the soul needs to possess intellect, and for Intellect, because its

[1] Cp. IV. 5. 4 and 7; V. 5. 7.

ταὐτόν, καὶ ἡ νόησις πεποίηκεν αὐτόν· συνεῖναι οὖν δεῖ τῇ νοήσει τοῦτον καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀεί, ὅτι τοῦτο τοῦτο, ὅτι τὰ δύο ἕν· εἰ δ' ἓν ἦν μόνον, ἤρκεσεν ἂν αὑτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐδεήθη λαβεῖν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ "γνῶθι σαυτὸν" λέγεται τούτοις, οἳ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἑαυτῶν ἔργον ἔχουσι διαριθμεῖν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μαθεῖν, ὅσα καὶ ποῖα ὄντες οὐ πάντα ἴσασιν ἢ οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὅ τι ἄρχει οὐδὲ κατὰ τί αὐτοί. εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν αὐτό, μειζόνως ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ γνῶσιν καὶ νόησιν καὶ συναίσθησιν αὑτοῦ· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰσάγει εἰς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖ αὐτό. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν δέοιτο ἑαυτοῦ· γελοῖον γάρ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐνδεὲς ἦν αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ βλέπει δὴ ἑαυτό· δεῖ γάρ τι εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ βλέπειν. τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων παρακεχώρηκε τοῖς μετ' αὐτό, καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν τῶν προσόντων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκείνῳ παρεῖναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οὐσία· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, εἴπερ ἐνταῦθα ἡ οὐσία καὶ ὁμοῦ ἄμφω ἡ νόησις ἡ πρώτη καὶ κυρίως καὶ τὸ εἶναι. διὸ οὔτε λόγος οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ἐπιστήμη, ὅτι μηδὲν ἔστι κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ ὡς παρόν.

42. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀπορῇς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ζητῇς,

[1] A reference to Parmenides fr. B 3 DK.

being is the same as thinking,[1] and thinking made it; therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with thinking and to be always getting an intimate understanding of itself, that this is this, because the two are one; but if it was only one, it would have sufficed to itself and would not have needed to get understanding. Since also "Know yourself" is said to those who because of their selves' multiplicity have the business of counting themselves up and learning that they do not know all of the number and kind of things they are, or do not know any one of them, not what their ruling principle is or by what they are themselves. But if the Good is anything, it is so in a greater way than by knowledge and thought and self-perception; since it is not anything for itself; for it does not bring anything into itself, but itself suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for the others; for they need it, but it could not need itself; that would be ridiculous; for if it did it would be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at itself; for it must have and get something from the looking. For it has left all these things to the beings which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the additions to the others are with it, just as even substance is not; so not thinking either, since that is where substance is and the primary and authentic thinking and being are both together. Therefore "There is neither discourse nor perception nor knowledge"[2] because it is impossible to predicate anything of it as present with it.

42. But when in this kind of enquiry you adopt a rational approach to these things and get into dif-

[2] Plato *Parmenides* 142A3–4.

ὅπου δεῖ ταῦτα θέσθαι, λογισμῷ ἐπ' αὐτὰ στελλόμενος, ἀπόθου ταῦτα, ἃ νομίζεις σεμνὰ εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς δευτέροις, καὶ μήτε τὰ δεύτερα προστίθει τῷ πρώτῳ μήτε τὰ τρίτα τοῖς δευτέροις, ἀλλὰ τὰ δεύτερα περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τίθει καὶ τὰ τρίτα περὶ τὸ δεύτερον. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἐάσεις, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ τὰ ὕστερα ἐξαρτήσεις ἐκείνων ὡς ἐκεῖνα περιθέοντα ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα. διὸ καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ ταύτῃ λέγεται περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστὶ κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, τὰ πάντα ὄντα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αἴτιος αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷον ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου ἑτέρου ὄντος τῶν πάντων καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐκείνοις πάρεστιν· ἢ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι τὰ πάντα, εἴ τι ἐκείνῳ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν παρείη. εἰ οὖν καὶ νοῦς τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ νοῦς ἐκείνῳ. αἴτιον δὲ λέγων πάντων καλῶν τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι φαίνεται τιθέμενος, αὐτὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ καλὸν πᾶν τοῦτο. ταῦτα δὴ δεύτερα τιθεὶς εἰς ⟨αὐτὰ⟩ [1] τὰ τρίτα φησὶν ἀνηρτῆσθαι τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα γενόμενα, καὶ περὶ τὰ τρίτα δὲ τιθεὶς εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν τρίτων, κόσμον τόνδε, εἰς ψυχήν. ἀνηρτημένης δὲ ψυχῆς εἰς νοῦν καὶ νοῦ εἰς τἀγαθόν, οὕτω πάντα εἰς ἐκεῖνον διὰ μέσων, τῶν μὲν πλησίον, τῶν δὲ τοῖς πλησίον γειτονούντων, ἐσχάτην δ' ἀπόστασιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ψυχὴν ἀνηρτημένων.

[1] H–S[1].

[1] The reference is to *Platonic Letter* II 312E1–2. This

ficulties and enquire where you should put them, put away these things which you regard as majestic on the second level, and do not add the seconds to the first or the thirds to the seconds, but set the seconds around the first and the thirds around the second. For thus you will leave each of them as they are and will make the things which come after depend upon those higher realities which exist in independence as the later things circle round them. This is why it is rightly said in this regard also "All things are around the King of all and all are for the sake of that King"[1]; Plato is speaking of all the real beings and says "for the sake of that King", since he is the cause of their being and they, we may say, strive after him, who is other than all of them and has nothing which belongs to them; otherwise they would not still be "all things" if any of the other things which come after him belonged to him. If then Intellect is one of "all things" it does not belong to him. But when Plato calls him "Cause of all beauties" he is clearly putting beauty in the world of Forms, but the Good itself above all this beauty. Now when he puts these second, he says that the thirds depend on them, that is the things which come to be after them, and what he posits around the thirds, clearly the things that came to be from the thirds, this universe here, he makes depend on Soul. But since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, so all things depend on him through intermediaries, some close to him, some neighbours of those close to him, and the things of sense dependent on Soul at the ultimate distance from him.

cryptic passage, very unlikely to be authentic Plato, had great authority for the Neoplatonists.

VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, number 39, immediately follows in Porphyry's chronological order its predecessor in the *Enneads*, VI. 7 (38). The two together contain the profoundest and most powerful expression of the thought of Plotinus about the One or Good. This First Principle is spoken of here in more strongly positive terms than anywhere else in the *Enneads*: the language of will and love and thought is used about him, and he appears as something more like a "personal God" than he does elsewhere in the *Enneads*. But, as Plotinus makes clear in the treatise, this positive emphasis is in no way intended to be inconsistent with the negative way of approach to the One on which he so strongly insists. It is rather a powerful contribution to that negating of negations which the later Neoplatonists showed clearly was the final stage on the negative way and was necessary to attain that fruitful and illuminating silence in which alone the One can be contemplated.

Plotinus starts the treatise with an analysis of our concept of human freedom and it is from this that he ascends, with considerable trepidation but admitting that he has no better starting-point, to consider the freedom of the One which is the main subject of the work. At chapter 7 he introduces a "rash statement starting from a different way of thinking" which says that since the Good "happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom,

and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power." It is not clear whether Plotinus regards this as a positive statement of a doctrine other than his own or as an objection to his own doctrine; and if the latter, whether it is a possible objection which he has himself thought of or an objection which he has actually heard from others; a view of my own that it comes from a Christian source much concerned to assert the absolute freedom of God's will has not been generally accepted (A. H. Armstrong, "Two Views of Freedom" in *Studia Patristica* XVIII, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1982, 397–406). But however that may be, he takes it very seriously, and concentrates in the rest of the treatise on establishing his own doctrine of the One against it. It is in doing this that he uses language more likely than anything else in the *Enneads* to commend his version of Platonism to theists (Platonist, Jewish or Christian) accustomed to think of God as a Supreme Being possessed of intelligence and will; though, as has already been said, he is careful to show that this positive language is in no way inconsistent with his negative theology.

Synopsis

Statement of scope of the enquiry: it is to extend as high as the One; but we must begin with our own experience of "having something in our power" (ch. 1). Problems about the freedom of human beings in our present state, as embodied souls (chs. 2–3). Freedom is power to go to the Good: Intellect possesses this in the fullest degree (ch. 4). Our souls in their highest, contemplative, activity can share in this freedom of Intellect (chs. 5–6). How can we drag the lord and master of all things, the Good, into our discussion of freedom? A rash and absurd statement about

it (ch. 7). Total inadequacy of all our language to the Good (ch. 8). And especial inadequacy of "it happened to be" (ch. 9). Chance is later than and inferior to Intellect; and though the Good necessarily is what he is he is not bound by necessity but is the necessity and law of the others (ch. 10). Questions which cannot properly be asked about the Good; necessity to overcome our persistent tendency to imagine it as in a place (ch. 11). That which gives freedom to substance itself must be still freer; though "master of himself" is inadequate (ch. 12). Yet perhaps we must use this sort of inadequate language, understanding "as if" with every word; then we shall say that the Good is master of himself and is as he willed himself to be (ch. 13). Cause and substance are one in the world of real being; still more in the cause of that world. He is cause of himself, self primarily and beyond being (ch. 14). He is supremely lovable and love of himself; when we attain to him we are far above chance, more than free and more than independent (ch. 15). He is everywhere and nowhere, giving himself existence in being awake to himself (ch. 16). Intellect is beyond providence, choice and chance, and its cause still more so, by himself what he is, related and directed to himself (ch. 17). Intellect and the One: image of the circle with the One as centre, being as he wished to be and ought to be (ch. 18). Experience of the Good transcends language; he who made being has no need of being and is so beyond it (ch. 19). He is eternally his own self-making, totally self-determined and at his own disposal (ch. 20). He is his will, truly free and truly himself (ch. 21).

VI. 8. (39) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Ἆρ' ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ θεῶν εἴ τί ἐστιν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀδυναμίαις τε καὶ ἀμφισβητησίμοις δυνάμεσι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν πρέποι ζητεῖν, θεοῖς δὲ τὸ[1] πάντα δύνασθαι ἐπιτρεπτέον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα εἶναι; ἢ τὴν δύναμιν δὴ πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ πάντα ἑνὶ ἐπιτρεπτέον, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δ' ἐκείνως ἔχειν, καὶ τίσιν[2] ἑκατέρως; ἢ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ζητητέον, τολμητέον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῦ ἄνω ὑπὲρ πάντα ζητεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον, πῶς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, κἂν πάντα συγχωρῶμεν δύνασθαι. καίτοι καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦτο σκεπτέον πῶς ποτε λέγεται, μήποτε οὕτως τὸ μὲν δύναμιν, τὸ δ' ἐνέργειαν φήσομεν, καὶ ἐνέργειαν μέλλουσαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀναβλητέον, πρότερον δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐφ' ὧν καὶ ζητεῖν ἔθος, εἴ

[1] H–S[1]: τε Enn.
[2] Harder, Theiler, recte: τισιν H–S[2].

VI. 8. ON FREE WILL AND THE WILL OF THE ONE

1. Is it possible to enquire even about the gods whether there is anything which is in their power, or is it true that this kind of enquiry is proper in dealing with human impotences and dubious powers, but we must attribute to the gods omnipotence and say that not just something but everything is in their power? Or is it true that omnipotence and having everything in his power is indeed to be attributed to the One, but with the other gods we should say that some things are this way and some the other way, and of which gods each is true? Now we must certainly enquire about this as well [as human freedom] and we must dare to push our enquiry on to the first beings and to him who is on high above all things, and enquire in this way what "being in his power" means, even if we agree that he is omnipotent. And we must investigate as well what this "potent" means, in case by using this term we intend to say that it sometimes means potency and sometimes actual activity, and an activity which belongs to the future.[1] But we must postpone these questions for the present, and first enquire about ourselves, as we usually do, whether

[1] Plotinus shows himself here very well aware of the ambiguity inherent in the Greek philosophical usage of *δύνασθαι, δύναμις*, which it is often necessary to take into account in reading him.

τι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὂν τυγχάνει. πρῶτον ζητητέον τί ποτε δεῖ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναί τι λέγειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τίς ἔννοια τοῦ τοιούτου· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πως γνωσθείη, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ θεὸν ἁρμόζει μεταφέρειν ἢ οὐ μετενεκτέον· ἢ μετενεκτέον μέν, ζητητέον δέ, πῶς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων. τί τοίνυν νοοῦντες τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν λέγομεν καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦντες; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις κινούμενοι τύχαις τε καὶ ἀνάγκαις καὶ παθῶν ἰσχυραῖς προσβολαῖς τὴν ψυχὴν κατεχούσαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κύρια νομίσαντες εἶναι καὶ δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς καὶ φερόμενοι ᾗ ἐκεῖνα ἄγοι, μή ποτε οὐδέν ἐσμεν οὐδέ τί ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἠπορήσαμεν, ὡς τούτου ἐσομένου ἂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὃ μὴ τύχαις δουλεύοντες μηδὲ ἀνάγκαις μηδὲ πάθεσιν ἰσχυροῖς πράξαιμεν ἄν βουληθέντες οὐδενὸς ἐναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, εἴη ἂν ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὃ τῇ βουλήσει δουλεύει καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον[1] ἂν γένοιτο ἢ μή, παρ' ὅσον βουληθείημεν ἄν. ἑκούσιον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ μὴ βίᾳ μετὰ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δέ, ὃ καὶ κύριοι πρᾶξαι. καὶ

[1] Kirchhoff: τοῦτον wBRQ: τοῦτο JU: τούτων C.

[1] In this discussion of human freedom, which continues to ch. 6, Plotinus takes account of earlier, mostly Peripatetic, discussions, especially Aristotle's treatment of the voluntary and involuntary in *Nicomachean Ethics* Γ 1–5. 1109b30–1114b25. But he is not concerned with

anything does happen to be in our power.[1] First we must ask what something "being in our power" ought to mean; that is, what is the idea of this kind of thing in our minds; for in this way it might come to be known whether it is suitable to transfer it to the gods and, still more, to God, or whether it should not be transferred; or whether it should be transferred, but we should enquire how "being in their power" is to be applied to the other gods and to the first beings. What then do we have in our minds when we speak of "being in our power", and why are we trying to find out? I myself think that, when we are pushed around among opposing chances and compulsions and strong assaults of passions possessing our soul, we acknowledge all these things as our masters and are enslaved to them and carried wherever they take us, and so are in doubt whether we are not nothing and nothing is in our power, on the assumption that whatever we might do when not enslaved to chances or compulsions or strong passions, because we wished it and with nothing opposing our wishes, this would be in our power. But if this is so, our idea of what is in our power would be something enslaved to our will and would come to pass (or not) to the extent to which we wished it. For everything is a voluntary act which we do without being forced to and with knowledge [of what we are doing], and in our power which we are also competent to do. And

refuting or criticising his predecessors but with building up his own distinctive Platonic view of human freedom, that we are only truly free when we live on our highest level in the realm of Intellect.

συνθέοι μὲν[1] ἂν πολλαχοῦ ἄμφω καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἔστι δ' οὗ καὶ διαφωνήσειεν ἄν· οἷον εἰ κύριος ἦν τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἦν ἂν οὐχ ἑκούσιον αὐτῷ πεπραχότι, εἰ τὸν πατέρα ἠγνόει τοῦτον εἶναι. τάχα δ' ἂν κἀκείνῳ διαφωνοῖ ἔχοντι τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ· δεῖ δὴ καὶ τὴν εἴδησιν ἐν τῷ ἑκουσίῳ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως. διὰ τί γάρ, εἰ μὲν ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι φίλιος, ἀκούσιον, εἰ δὲ ἀγνοεῖ, ὅτι μὴ δεῖ, οὐκ ἀκούσιον; εἰ δ' ὅτι ἔδει μανθάνειν; οὐχ ἑκούσιον τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἔδει μανθάνειν, ἢ τὸ ἀπάγον ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν.

2. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ζητητέον· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον εἰς ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον τίνι δεῖ διδόναι; ἢ γὰρ τῇ ὁρμῇ καὶ ἠτινιοῦν ὀρέξει, οἷον ὃ θυμῷ πράττεται ⟨ἢ μὴ πράττεται⟩,[2] ἢ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ λογισμῷ τοῦ συμφέροντος μετ' ὀρέξεως [ἢ μὴ πράττεται].[2] ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, καὶ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τι εἶναι δώσομεν καὶ μαινομένοις καὶ ἐξεστηκόσι καὶ φαρμάκοις ἁλοῦσι καὶ ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις, ὧν οὐ κύριοι· εἰ δὲ λογισμῷ μετ' ὀρέξεως, ἆρ' εἰ καὶ πεπλανημένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ; ἢ τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ ὀρέξει. καίτοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερα ὁ λογισμὸς τὴν ὄρεξιν ἐκίνησεν, ἢ τοῦτον ἡ ὄρεξις. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν αἱ ὀρέξεις, εἰ μὲν ὡς ζῴου καὶ τοῦ συνθέτου, ἠκολούθησεν

[1] Kirchhoff: *συνθοῖ μὲν* UC^{pc}: *συνθεῖ μὲν* wBxC: *συνθείμεν* Q, H–S^1.

[2] transpos. Igal.

both may often coincide, even if their definition is different; but sometimes they might be discordant; for instance, if one was competent to kill, it would not be a voluntary act when one did so if one did not know that this man was one's father. But perhaps that ignorance would be incompatible with having something in one's power; and certainly the knowledge involved in a voluntary act must not only apply in the particular circumstances but generally. For why is the action involuntary if one does not know that it is a relation, but not involuntary if one does not know that one ought not to do it? Possibly because one ought to have learnt that? Not knowing that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary, nor is what leads one away from learning.

2. But we must enquire into the following: to what ought we to attribute this which is referred to us as being in our power? One possibility is to attribute it to impulse and any kind of desire, for instance what is done or not done by passion or lust or calculation of the beneficial accompanied by desire. But if by passion or lust, we shall grant that something is in the power of children and wild animals and madmen and those who are beside themselves and caught by drugs or casually occurring imaginations of which they are not master; but if by calculation accompanied by desire, is this so if the calculation has gone wrong? Should we perhaps attribute it to correct calculation accompanied by correct desire? Yet even here one might enquire whether the calculation set the desire in motion or the desire the calculation. Then also, if the desires are according to nature, if they are of the kind that belong to the living being, that is, the composite, the soul followed

ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ· εἰ δὲ ὡς ψυχῆς μόνης, πολλὰ τῶν νῦν ἐφ' ἡμῖν λεγομένων ἔξω ἂν τούτου γίνοιτο. εἶτα καὶ τίς λογισμὸς ψιλὸς πρόεισι τῶν παθημάτων; ἥ τε φαντασία ἀναγκάζουσα ἥ τε ὄρεξις ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν ἄγῃ ἕλκουσα πῶς ἐν τούτοις κυρίους ποιεῖ; πῶς δ' ὅλως κύριοι, οὗ ἀγόμεθα; τὸ γὰρ ἐνδεὲς ἐξ ἀνάγκης πληρώσεως ὀρεγόμενον οὐκ ἔστι κύριον τοῦ ἐφ' ὃ παντελῶς ἄγεται. πῶς δ' ὅλως αὐτό τι παρ' αὑτοῦ, ὃ παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἀρχὴν εἰς ἄλλο ἔχει κἀκεῖθεν γεγένηται οἷόν ἐστι; κατ' ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ζῇ καὶ ὡς πέπλασται· ἢ οὕτω γε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα ἕξει τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τι εἰληφέναι· ποιεῖ γὰρ ὡς γεγένηται καὶ τὸ πῦρ. εἰ δ' ὅτι γιγνώσκει τὸ ζῷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὃ ποιεῖ, εἰ μὲν αἰσθήσει, τίς ἡ προσθήκη πρὸς τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις πεποίηκε τοῦ ἔργου κύριον ἰδοῦσα μόνον. εἰ δὲ γνώσει, εἰ μὲν γνώσει τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἶδε μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἄγει· εἰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖ ἢ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ κρατεῖ, εἰς τί ἀναφέρει ζητητέον, καὶ ὅλως ποῦ τοῦτο συμβαίνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄλλην ὄρεξιν ποιεῖ, πῶς ληπτέον· εἰ δὲ τὴν ὄρεξιν παύσας ἔστη καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐν πράξει τοῦτο ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐν νῷ στήσεται τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν πράξει πᾶν, κἂν κρατῇ ὁ λόγος, μικτὸν καὶ οὐ καθαρὸν δύναται τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχειν.

the necessity of nature; but if they are of the kind that belongs to the soul alone, many of the things which are now said to be in our power will be outside it. Then also, what bare calculation precedes our passions? Or when imagination compels and desire pulls us in whatever direction it leads, how are we given the mastery in these circumstances? And how in general can we have the mastery where we are led? For that which is in need and necessarily desires to be filled does not have the mastery over that to which it is simply being led. But how in general can something be self-originated which comes from something else and whose origin is referred to something else and has come to be as it is from thence? For it lives according to that and as it is formed by it; or in this way soulless things will be able to have something in their power; for fire also acts as it has come to be. But if it is because the living being and the soul knows what it does, if it knows by sense-perception, what help is that to things being in their power? For sense-perception does not give mastery of the work since it only sees. But if by knowledge, if it is by knowledge of what is being done, here too it only knows, but something else leads to action; but if reason or knowledge acts against the desire and gets the better of it, we must enquire to what this is to be referred, and in general where it takes place. And if reason itself makes another desire, we must understand how; but if it puts a stop to the desire and stands still and this is where what is in our power is, this will not be in action, but will stand still in Intellect; since everything in the sphere of action, even if reason is dominant, is mixed and cannot have being in our power in a pure state.

3. Διὸ σκεπτέον περὶ τούτων· ἤδη γὰρ αὖ[1] καὶ ἐγγὺς γινόμεθα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ θεῶν. ἀναγαγόντες τοίνυν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰς βούλησιν, εἶτα ταύτην ἐν λόγῳ θέμενοι, εἶτα ἐν λόγῳ ὀρθῷ—ἴσως δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι τῷ ὀρθῷ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· οὐ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐδόξασεν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἔπραξεν, ἔχοι ἂν ἴσως ἀναμφισβήτητον τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, εἰ μὴ εἰδὼς διότι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἢ φαντασίᾳ τινὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον ἀχθείς· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λέγοντες τοὺς κατ' αὐτὴν δρῶντας πῶς ἂν εἰς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τάξαιμεν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν φαντασίαν, ἣν ἄν τις καὶ φαντασίαν κυρίως εἴποι, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῶν παθημάτων ἐγειρομένην (καὶ γὰρ κενώσεις σίτων καὶ ποτῶν φαντασίας οἷον ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ πληρώσεις αὖ καὶ μεστός τις σπέρματος ἄλλα φαντάζεται καὶ καθ' ἑκάστας ποιότητας ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν σώματι) τοὺς κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἐνεργοῦντας εἰς ἀρχὴν αὐτεξούσιον οὐ τάξομεν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις κατὰ ταύτας πράττουσι τὰ πολλὰ οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὔτε τὸ ἑκούσιον δώσομεν, τῷ δὲ διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐλευθέρῳ τῶν παθημάτων τοῦ σώματος τὸ αὐτεξούσιον δώσομεν—εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες

[1] H–S[1]: ἂν Enn.

[1] In his earlier discussion of imagination and memory in his great work on the soul, IV. 3–5 (27–29), Plotinus comes to the conclusion that there are two *φαντασίαι*, one

3. We must therefore enquire about these matters; for [in doing so] we are already also coming near to our subject of discourse, the gods. Well then, we traced back what is in our power to will, and then placed this in the context of discourse, and then of correct discourse—but perhaps we ought to add to "correct" that it belongs to rational knowledge; for if someone had a right opinion and acted on it he would not indisputably have the power of self-determination if he acted, without knowing why his opinion was right, but led to his duty by chance or some imagination; since when we say that imagination is not in our power, how can we put those who act by it in the class of the self-determined? But we do say this about the imagination which one can properly call imagination,[1] that which is roused by the experiences of the body, for being empty, or again full, of food and drink in a way gives the imaginations shape, and one who is full of semen has different imaginations, and so it is according to all the qualities of the bodily fluids, and we shall not class those who are active according to imaginations of this kind among those whose principle of action is self-determined; therefore we shall not grant to bad men, who do most things according to these, either having something in their power or voluntary action, but we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities of Intellect and who is free from bodily affections. We trace back what is in our power to the noblest

belonging to the higher and one to the lower soul (IV. 3. 31). But here he seems to exclude the higher *φαντασία* from consideration.

τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὰς ἐντεῦθεν προτάσεις ἐλευθέρας ὄντως ⟨εἶναι⟩[1] δώσομεν, καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νοεῖν ἐγειρομένας οὐκ ἀκουσίους [εἶναι δώσομεν],[1] καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τοῦτον ζῶσι τὸν τρόπον [ὅσοι νῷ καὶ ὀρέξει τῇ κατὰ νοῦν ζῶσι][2] φήσομεν παρεῖναι.

4. Καίτοι ζητήσειεν ἄν τις, πῶς ποτε τὸ κατ' ὄρεξιν γιγνόμενον αὐτεξούσιον ἔσται τῆς ὀρέξεως ἐπὶ τὸ ἔξω ἀγούσης καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐχούσης· ἄγεται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον, κἂν εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄγοιτο. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπορητέον, εἰ ὅπερ πέφυκε καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν ἐνεργῶν λέγοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἔχειν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχων ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα, εἰ ὅλως κυρίως λέγοιτο ἐπ' ἐκείνων τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, οἷς πρᾶξις οὐ πάρεστιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πρᾶξις, ἡ ἀνάγκη ἔξωθεν· οὐ γὰρ μάτην πράξουσιν. ἀλλ' οὖν πῶς τὸ ἐλεύθερον δουλευόντων καὶ τούτων τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει; ἤ, εἰ μὴ ἑτέρῳ ἕπεσθαι ἠνάγκασται, πῶς ἂν τὸ δουλεύειν λέγοιτο; πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν τι φερόμενον ἠναγκασμένον ἂν εἴη ἑκουσίου τῆς ἐφέσεως οὔσης, εἰ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθὸν ἴοι; τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἀπαγωγὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἠναγκασμένον, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο φέροιτο, ὃ μὴ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ· καὶ δουλεύει τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ κύριόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρου κρείττονος ἐφεστηκότος ἀπάγεται τῶν αὑτοῦ ἀγαθῶν δουλεῦον ἐκείνῳ. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ δουλεία ψέγεται οὐχ οὗ τις οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν

[1] transposuimus.
[2] del. H–S[1], ut glossam.

principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant that the premises of action derived from this are truly free, and that the desires roused by thinking are not involuntary, and we shall say that the gods who live in this way have self-determination.

4. But all the same one might enquire how what happens under the impulse of desire can be self-determined when desire leads one to what is outside [oneself] and has deficiency in it; for that which desires is led, even if it is led to the good. And a difficulty must be raised about Intellect itself, whether, when its activity is what it is by nature and as it is by nature, it could be said to have freedom and anything in its power, when it does not have it in its power not to act. And then whether "in their power" can properly be said of those beings which have no practical action. But the necessity comes from outside also to those beings which are engaged in practical action; for their action will not be purposeless. But then how is there freedom when even these higher beings are slaves to their own nature? Now, where there is no compulsion to follow another, how can one speak of slavery? How could something borne towards the Good be under compulsion since its desire for the Good will be voluntary if it knows that it is good and goes to it as good? For the involuntary is a leading away from the good and towards the compulsory, if something is carried to that which is not good for it; and that is enslaved which is not master of its going to the Good, but, since something stronger than it stands over it, it is enslaved to that and led away from its own goods. For it is for this reason that slavery is ill spoken of, not where one has no power to go to the bad, but

ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὗ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγόμενος πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἄλλου. τὸ δὲ καὶ δουλεύειν λέγειν τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει δύο ποιοῦντός ἐστι τό τε δουλεῦον καὶ τὸ ᾧ. φύσις δὲ ἁπλῆ καὶ ἐνέργεια μία καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ δυνάμει ἔχουσα ἄλλο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκε λέγοιτο ἂν ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλης οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας, τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας ἄλλης, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν. εἰ οὖν οὔτε δι' ἕτερον οὔτε ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ, πῶς οὐκ ἐλευθέρα; καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἁρμόσει, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὅτι μὴ ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ μηδ' ἄλλο τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴπερ ἀρχή. καὶ εἰ ἄλλην δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξω αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. καὶ εἰ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ⟨τὸ⟩[1] ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τις ζητεῖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ χάριν. εἰ οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνεργεῖ, μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ· ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενον[2] καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ [εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτό],[3] ὃ ἄμεινον ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἂν εἶναι, εἴπερ πρὸς αὐτό.

5. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐν νῷ μόνῳ νοοῦντι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν νῷ τῷ καθαρῷ ἢ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργούσῃ καὶ κατὰ ἀρετὴν πραττούσῃ; τὸ μὲν οὖν πραττούσῃ εἴπερ δώσομεν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς τὴν

[1] Kirchhoff.
[2] Kirchhoff: ὁρώμενον Enn.
[3] delevimus.

where one has no power to go to one's own good but is led away to the good of another. But to speak of being enslaved to one's own nature is making two things, one which is enslaved and one to which it is enslaved. But how is a simple nature and single active actuality not free, when it does not have one part potential and one actual? For it could not be said to be active according to its nature as if its substance was one thing and its activity another if being and acting there are the same. If then the activity is neither because of another or in the power of another, how is it not free? And even if "being in its own power" is unsuitable language, but there is something higher than being in its power here, even so it is in its own power because it is not in the power of another nor is another master of its activity; nor indeed of its substance, if it is principle of its substance. And even if Intellect does have another principle, it is not outside it, but it is in the Good. And if it is active according to the Good, it is much more in its own power and free; since one seeks freedom and being in one's own power for the sake of the Good. If then it is active according to the Good, it would be still more in its own power; for it has already what goes from itself to it, and in itself what would be better for it, being in it, if it is directed towards it.

5. Is self-determination and being in one's own power, then, only in Intellect when it thinks, that is, pure intellect, or is it also in soul when it is active according to intellect and engaged in practical action according to virtue? Now if we are going to grant it to the soul engaged in practical action, first of all it should not perhaps be granted in reference to

τεῦξιν ἴσως χρὴ διδόναι· οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι. εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ πάντα ποιῆσαι τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ, τάχα μὲν ἂν τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγοιτο. ἐκεῖνο δὲ πῶς ἐφ' ἡμῖν; οἷον εἰ, διότι πόλεμος, ἀνδριζοίμεθα· λέγω δὲ τὴν τότε ἐνέργειαν πῶς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὁπότε πολέμου μὴ καταλαβόντος οὐκ ἦν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην ποιήσασθαι; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράξεων τῶν κατὰ ἀρετὴν ἁπασῶν πρὸς τὸ προσπῖπτον ἀεὶ ἀναγκαζομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς τοδὶ ἢ τοδὶ ἐργάζεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις αἵρεσιν αὐτῇ δοίη τῇ ἀρετῇ, πότερα βούλεται, ἵν' ἔχοι ἐνεργεῖν, εἶναι πολέμους, ἵνα ἀνδρίζοιτο, καὶ εἶναι ἀδικίαν, ἵνα τὰ δίκαια ὁρίζῃ καὶ κατακοσμῇ, καὶ πενίαν, ἵνα τὸ ἐλευθέριον ἐνδεικνύοιτο, ἢ πάντων εὖ ἐχόντων ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, ἔλοιτο ἂν τὴν ἡσυχίαν τῶν πράξεων οὐδενὸς θεραπείας δεομένου τῆς παρ' αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἰατρός, οἷον Ἱπποκράτης, μηδένα δεῖσθαι τῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ τέχνης. εἰ οὖν ἐνεργοῦσα ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἠνάγκασται βοηθεῖν, πῶς ἂν καθαρῶς ἔχοι τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ; ἆρ' οὖν τὰς πράξεις μὲν ἀναγκαίας, τὴν δὲ βούλησιν τὴν πρὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἠναγκασμένον φήσομεν; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἐν ψιλῷ τιθέμενοι τῷ πρὸ τοῦ πραττομένου, ἔξω τῆς πράξεως τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρετῇ θήσομεν. τί δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν; ἆρ' οὐ κακῶς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης φήσομεν αὐτὴν εἰς κατακόσμησιν ἐλθεῖν συμμετρουμένην τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις; τίνα οὖν τρόπον λέγομεν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ

the accomplishment; for it is not we who are in charge of the accomplishment. But if it is granted in reference to acting finely and doing everything which comes from oneself, perhaps this might be correctly said. But how is that in our power? For instance if we are brave because there is a war; what I mean is, how is the activity then in our power when if war did not break out it would not be possible to carry out this activity? But it is also the same with the other actions done according to virtue, since virtue is always being compelled to do this or that to cope with what turns up. For certainly if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, that it might display its liberality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it would choose to rest from its practical activities because nothing needed its curative action, as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish that nobody needed his skill. If then when it is active in practical affairs virtue is compelled to be helpful, how can things be purely and simply in its power? Are we then to assert that the actions are compelled but the will and the reason which are before the action are not compelled? But if this is so, by placing them only in what comes before the action we shall be placing self-determination, and being in the power of virtue itself, outside the action. And what about virtue itself which is according to state and disposition? Are we to say that when the soul is in a bad way it comes to set it to rights by bringing the passions and desires within proper limits? In what

ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδέσποτον τὴν ἀρετήν; ἢ τοῖς γε βουληθεῖσι καὶ ἑλομένοις· ἢ ὅτι ἐγγενομένη αὕτη κατασκευάζει τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ ἔτι δούλους εἶναι, ὧν πρότερον ἦμεν. εἰ οὖν οἷον νοῦς τις ἄλλος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἕξις οἷον νοωθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ποιοῦσα, πάλιν αὖ ἥκει οὐκ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν νῷ ἡσύχῳ τῶν πράξεων.

6. Πῶς οὖν εἰς βούλησιν πρότερον ἀνήγομεν τοῦτο λέγοντες "ὃ παρὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι γένοιτο ἄν"; ἢ κἀκεῖ ἐλέγετο "ἢ μὴ γένοιτο". εἰ οὖν τά τε νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεται, ἐκεῖνά τε τούτοις συμφώνως ἕξει, φήσομεν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κύρια εἶναι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα χρῆναι ἀνάγειν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον· ἀδέσποτα δὲ ὄντα ταῦτα τὸν μὲν ἐφ' αὑτοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν βούλεσθαι μὲν ἐφ' αὑτῆς εἶναι ἐφεστῶσαν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι ἀγαθήν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου αὐτήν τε ἐλευθέραν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλευθέραν παρασχέσθαι· προσπιπτόντων δὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων παθημάτων τε καὶ πράξεων ἐφεστῶσαν ταῦτα μὲν μὴ βεβουλῆσθαι γενέσθαι, ὅμως γε μὴν καὶ ἐν τούτοις διασώσειν τὸ ἐφ' αὑτῇ εἰς αὑτὴν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀναφέρουσαν· οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφέψεσθαι, οἷον σῴζουσα τὸν κινδυνεύοντα, ἀλλ' εἰ δοκοῖ αὐτῇ, καὶ προϊεμένην τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ζῆν κελεύουσαν προΐεσθαι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τέκνα καὶ αὐτὴν πατρίδα, σκοπὸν τὸ καλὸν αὑτῆς ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἀνάγεσθαι οὐδ' εἰς τὴν ἔξω,

[1] A favourite text from the proclamation which introduces the choice of lives in the Myth of Er: Plato *Republic* X 617E3.

[2] Ch. 1, lines 32–3.

way then are we saying that being good is in our power and "virtue has no master"[1]? Yes, it is if we wish and choose it; or because when virtue comes to be in us it constructs freedom and being in our own power and does not allow us to be any more slaves of what we were enslaved to before. If then virtue is a kind of other intellect, a state which in a way intellectualises the soul, again, being in our power does not belong to the realm of action but in intellect at rest from actions.

6. How then did we refer this before[2] to will when we said "which would come to pass to the extent that we wished it"? Now it was said there also "or would not come to pass". If then what we are saying now is correctly said and what we said before will be in tune with it, we shall assert that virtue and intellect have the mastery and that we should refer being in our own power and freedom to them; and since these have no master, intellect is independent and virtue wishes to be independent by supervising the soul to make it good, and up to this point is free itself and makes the soul free; but when compulsory passions and actions come in the way it has not in its supervision wished that they should occur, but all the same even among these it will keep its independence by referring back to itself even here; for it will not follow the lead of the facts, for instance by saving the man who is in danger, but, if it thinks fit, it will sacrifice him and command him to sacrifice his life and property and children and even his fatherland, having in view its own excellence and not the existence of what is subject to it; so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our own power is not referred to practice and outward

ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς ἐνέργειαν καὶ νόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς. δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην νοῦν τινα λέγειν εἶναι οὐ συναριθμοῦντα τὰ πάθη τὰ δουλωθέντα ἢ μετρηθέντα τῷ λόγῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔοικε, φησίν, ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ σώματος ἕθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσι κατορθωθέντα. ὥστε εἶναι σαφέστερον, ὡς τὸ ἄυλόν ἐστι τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ βούλησις ἡ κυρία καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς οὖσα, καὶ εἴ τι ἐπιτάξειε πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὅσα οὖν ἐκ ταύτης καὶ διὰ ταύτην, ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἔξω τε καὶ ἐφ' αὑτῆς· ὃ αὐτὴ βούλεται καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀνεμποδίστως, τοῦτο καὶ πρῶτον ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς καὶ πρῶτος οὕτω τὸ ἐφ' αὑτῷ, ὅτι τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ μηδαμῶς ἐπ' ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἐπέστραπται πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ κείμενος ἀνενδεὴς καὶ πλήρης ὑπάρχων καὶ οἷον κατὰ βούλησιν ζῶν· ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις, βούλησις δ' ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν· ἡ[1] γὰρ λεγομένη βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μιμεῖται. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις θέλει τὸ ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ νοεῖν ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ἔχει οὖν ἐκεῖνος, ὅπερ ἡ βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὗ τυχοῦσα ἂν ταύτῃ νόησις γίνεται. εἰ οὖν βουλήσει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τίθεμεν[2] τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὸ ἤδη ἐν ᾧ θέλει ἡ βούλησις εἶναι ἱδρυμένον πῶς οὐ τὸ ἐφ' αὑτῷ ἔχει; ἢ μεῖζον εἶναι

[1] Igal: καὶ Enn.
[2] Theiler: ἐτίθεμεν Enn.

[1] *Republic* 518D10–E2.
[2] Plotinus is playing here on the common meaning of κατὰ νοῦν, "according to one's mind", "as one likes it", and the sense required by context here, "according to Intellect". The Divine Intellect lives, of course, according to itself and so as it likes. The whole passage shows clearly how Plotinus, like other Greek philosophers, makes no sharp distinction between thinking and willing.

activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. But one must say that this virtue is a kind of intellect and not count in with it the passions which are enslaved and limited by the reason; for these, Plato says, "come close to the body, since it is by habits and exercises"[1] that they are set in order. So it is still clearer that the immaterial is the free, and it is to this that being in our power is to be referred and the will which has the mastery and is independent, even if something directs it by necessity to what is outside. All therefore that comes from this will and is done according to it is in our power, when it is acting externally and when it is by itself; what it wishes and makes actual without hindrance, this is primarily what is in our power. But the contemplative, that is the primary, Intellect is what is in its own power in this way, that its work in no way depends on another, but it is all turned to itself and its work is itself and it rests in the Good, being without need and fulfilled, and, one might say, living according to its will; but its will is its thought, but was called will, because it was to its mind; for what is called will imitates what is to its mind.[2] For will wants the Good; but thinking is truly in the Good. That Intellect therefore has what its will wants, that by which it becomes thought when it attains it. If then we allot being in our power to willing the Good, surely that which is already firmly settled in what its will wants must possess it. Or else

θετέον, εἰ μή τις ἐθέλει εἰς τοῦτο ἀναβαίνειν τὸ ἐφ'
αὐτῷ.

7. Γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ μὲν ἐλευθέρα διὰ νοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδουσα ἀνεμποδίστως, καὶ ὃ διὰ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἐφ' αὑτῇ· νοῦς δὲ δι' αὑτόν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ δι' ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἔχει τὸ ἐφ' αὑτοῖς, ὅταν τὸ μὲν τυγχάνειν ἀνεμποδίστως δύνηται, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν. πῶς δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ κύριον ἁπάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ τιμίων καὶ ἐν πρώτῃ ἕδρᾳ ὄν, πρὸς ὃ τὰ ἄλλα ἀναβαίνειν θέλει καὶ ἐξήρτηται αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε δύνασθαι τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔχειν, πῶς ἄν τις εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἄγοι; ὅπου καὶ νοῦς μόλις, ὅμως δὲ βίᾳ εἵλκετο. εἰ μή τις τολμηρὸς λόγος ἐτέρωθεν σταλεὶς λέγοι, ὡς τυχοῦσα οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ οὖσα κυρία τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν, οὖσα τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν οὐ παρ' αὑτῆς οὔτε τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἂν ἔχοι οὔτε τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ ποιοῦσα ἢ μὴ ποιοῦσα, ὃ ἠνάγκασται ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν. ὃς δὴ λόγος ἀντίτυπός τε καὶ ἄπορος καὶ παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἑκουσίου τε καὶ αὐτεξουσίου φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη ἂν ἀναιρῶν, ὡς μάτην εἶναι ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ φωνὰς πραγμάτων ἀνυποστάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον μηδὲν ἐπὶ μηδενὶ εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν οὐδὲ συνιέναι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ

it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want being in one's own power to go up so high.

7. The soul, then, becomes free when it presses on without hindrance to the Good by means of Intellect, and what it does through this is in its power; but Intellect is free through itself; but the nature of the Good is the very goal of the striving and that through which the others have what is in their power, when one is able to attain it without hindrance and the other to have it. Now how can one bring the very lord and master of all things of value after it, that which sits in the first seat, to which all things else want to ascend, and depend on it and have their powers from it so as to be able to have something in their power—how can one bring it [down to the level of] what is in your and my power to which Intellect also was only dragged with difficulty, though it was all the same violently dragged? Unless some rash statement starting from a different way of thinking says that since [the nature of the Good] happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power.[1] This statement is indeed contrary and absurd and would altogether do away with the nature of free will and self-determination and our idea of what is in our power, as if this was empty talk and names for non-existent things. For not only must the one who makes it say that nothing is in anyone's power, but he must say that he does not think or

[1] On this statement see *Introductory Note* p. 224.

λέγειν ταύτην τὴν φωνήν. εἰ δὲ ὁμολογοῖ συνιέναι, ἤδη ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐλέγχοιτο τῆς ἐννοίας τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐφαρμοζομένης οἷς ἐφαρμόττειν οὐκ ἔφη. ἡ γὰρ ἔννοια τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ οὐδὲ ἐκείνην προσπαραλαμβάνει—ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἑαυτό τι ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ὑπόστασιν ἄγειν—ἀλλὰ ἐθέλει θεωρεῖν ἡ ἐπίνοια, τί τῶν ὄντων δοῦλον ἑτέρων, καὶ τί ἔχει τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τί μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας κύριον, ὃ καθαρῶς ⟨καὶ⟩[1] τοῖς ἀιδίοις ὑπάρχει [καὶ τοῖς][1] καθό εἰσιν ἀίδιοι καὶ τοῖς ἀκωλύτως τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκουσιν ἢ ἔχουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὴ ταῦτα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος οἷον ἄλλο παρ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν ἄτοπον. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τύχην λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθόν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕστερον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἡ τύχη· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἂν λέγοιμεν, οὔτε οὐ κύριον τῆς αὐτοῦ γενέσεως, ὅτι μηδὲ γέγονε. τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὡς ἔχει ποιεῖ ἄτοπον, εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τότε εἶναι τὸ ἐλεύθερον, ὅταν παρὰ φύσιν ποιῇ ἢ ἐνεργῇ. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ τὸ[2] μοναχὸν ἔχον ἀφῄρηται τῆς ἐξουσίας, εἰ τὸ μοναχὸν μὴ τῷ κωλύεσθαι παρ' ἄλλου ἔχοι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἀρέσκειν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ· ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ μάλιστα τυγχάνον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀφαιρήσεταί τις τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, ἀτοπώτερον ἂν γίνοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀποστερεῖν τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μένει οὐ δεόμενον κινεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν ἄλλων

[1] transposuimus.
[2] Creuzer: τὸν Enn.

understand this term. But if he did admit that he understood it, he could be easily refuted, because our idea of what is in our power fits what he said it did not fit. For the idea is not concerned with the substance of a thing and does not take it as well into consideration—for it is impossible for a thing to make itself and bring itself into existence—but our idea wants to observe what among beings is a slave of others and what has self-determination and what is not subject to another but itself master of its activity, which is purely and simply the case with eternal beings in that they are eternal, and with those which pursue or possess the good without hindrance. But certainly since the Good is above these it is absurd to seek as if for another good beside it. Then also it is not correct to say that it exists by chance; for chance occurs among things that are later and among many things; but we could not say that the First is by chance and is not master of its own coming to be, because it has not come to be. And the remark that it does as it is is absurd if it involves a claim that there is freedom when it does things or is active against its own nature. Nor indeed does its possession of uniqueness take away its independence, if it possesses uniqueness not because it is obstructed by something else but because it is this very thing and is, we may say, satisfied with itself and has nothing better than itself; otherwise one will take self-determination away from what attains the Good in the highest degree. But if this is absurd it would be more absurd to deprive the Good itself of self-determination because it is good and because it remains on its own and does not need to move to something else, since

κινουμένων πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ οὐδὲν δεόμενον οὐδενός. ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἡ οἷον ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ ἡ οἷον ἐνέργεια ᾖ—οὐ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἕτερον, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν, εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ τοῦτο, ὅτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἡ ἐνέργεια ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὸ εἶναι—ὥστε οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ὡς πέφυκεν ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οἷον ζωὴ ἀνενεχθήσεται εἰς τὴν οἷον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἡ οἷον οὐσία συνοῦσα καὶ οἷον συγγενομένη ἐξ ἀιδίου τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐδενός.

8. Ἡμεῖς δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτεξουσίων ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτό· πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ ἐλάττω ἀπὸ ἐλαττόνων μεταφέροντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ τυχεῖν τῶν ἃ προσήκει λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴποιμεν. καίτοι οὐδὲν ἂν εὕροιμεν εἰπεῖν οὐχ ὅτι κατ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ κυρίως· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ ὕστερα. τούτων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀρχή· καίτοι ἄλλον τρόπον οὐκ ἀρχή. ἀποτιθεμένοις δὴ πάντα καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὡς ὕστερον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον—ἤδη γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο ἐνέργειαν λέγει—καὶ ὅτι ἀνεμποδίστως καὶ ὄντων ἄλλων τὸ εἰς αὐτὰ ἀκωλύτως. δεῖ δὲ ὅλως πρὸς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν λέγειν· ἔστι γὰρ ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ "ἔστιν" ἀφαιροῦμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ὄντα ὁπωσοῦν· οὐδὲ

the other things move to it and it has no need of anything. But when his, so to speak, existence is his, as it were, activity—for one is not one thing and the other another if this is not even so with Intellect, because[1] its activity is more according to its being than its being according to its activity—so that it cannot be active according to what it naturally is, nor will its activity and its life, as we may call it, be referred to its, in a manner of speaking, substance, but its something like substance is with and, so to put it, originates with its activity and it itself makes itself from both, for itself and from nothing.

8. But we see self-determination not as that Good's incidental attribute but itself by itself, by taking away the opposing factors from the self-determinations in other things; we might say this about it by transferring what is less from lesser things because of incapacity to find what we ought to say about it. All the same, we could find nothing to say which is applicable to it, or even really about it; for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he himself is the origin of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin. For those who put away everything, "being in his power" [is to be put away] as later, and "self-determination"—for it already speaks of activity towards another—and "that he is unimpededly active" and "that when others exist his activity directed to them is unhindered". But we must say that he is altogether unrelated to anything; for he is what he is before them; for we take away the "is", and so also any kind of relations

[1] I retain ὅτι here with H–S. But οὔτι (Kirchhoff: *non* Ficino) would fit the context better.

δὴ τὸ "ὡς πέφυκεν"· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ λέγοιτο καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἄλλου ἂν λέγοιτο, ὥστε πρώτως ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔφυ· εἰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐν χρόνῳ ἡ φύσις, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ "οὐ παρ' αὑτῆς εἶναι" λεκτέον· τό τε γὰρ "εἶναι" ἀφῃροῦμεν, τό τε "οὐ παρ' αὑτῆς" λέγοιτο ἄν, ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλου. οὕτως οὖν συνέβη; ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ "συνέβη" ἀκτέον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὔτε πρὸς ἄλλο· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς τὸ "συνέβη", ὅταν τὰ μὲν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις συμβῇ. πῶς οὖν τὸ πρῶτον συνέβη; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ἵνα ζητῇς "πῶς οὖν ἦλθε; τύχη τίς ἤγαγεν ἢ ὑπέστησεν αὐτό;" ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τύχη πω ἦν οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτόματον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ παρ' ἄλλου καὶ ἐν γινομένοις.

9. Ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἴ τις λαμβάνοι τὸ "συνέβη", οὕτοι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα ἵστασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅπως νοεῖ ὁ λέγων συνιέναι. τί οὖν νοεῖ; τοῦτο, ὅτι ταύτην ἔχον τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀρχή·[1] καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἄλλην εἶχεν, ἦν ἂν [ἀρχή][2] τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἦν, καὶ εἰ χεῖρον, ἐνήργησεν ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν. πρὸς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λεκτέον, ὅτι μὴ οἷόν τε ἦν ἀρχὴν οὖσαν πάντων τὸ τυχὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι χεῖρον, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν μέν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἄλλως, οἷον ἐνδεέστερον. ἀλλὰ δεῖ κρείττονα εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν

[1] Kirchhoff: ἀρχήν Enn.
[2] del. Kirchhoff.

to the real beings; nor, certainly, [do we accept] the "as he naturally is"; for this also is later, and even if it may be said about those real beings, it would be said about those which come from another, and so first about substance, because it grew naturally from him; but if nature is in the things in time, it cannot be applied to substance. Nor indeed must we say this nature "is not from itself"; for we took away the "is", and the "not from itself" would be said when it [was brought into being] by something else. Did it then just happen to be like this? No, we must not bring in "happened to be"; nothing happened to him or in relation to something else; for "happened to be" applies among many things, when some are there and something happens to be besides them. How then could the First happen to be? For it did not come, so that you might enquire "How then did it come? What chance brought it or established it in being?" For chance did not yet exist, nor accident either; for accident comes from something else, and among things which have come to be.

9. But if someone takes "happened to be" as applying to the Good, one must not stop at the word, but understand what the man who says it has in mind. What, then, does he have in mind? This, that it is because it has this nature and power that it is principle; for if it had another, it would have been what it was, and if it was worse, it would have been active according to its own substance. To this we must reply that it was not possible for it, since it is the principle of all, to be what chanced, and certainly not to be worse, not even to be good but good in another way, a kind of lesser way. But the principle must be better than all the things which come after

ἁπάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτήν· ὥστε ὡρισμένον τι. λέγω δὲ ὡρισμένον, ὅτι μοναχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀνάγκη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἑπομένοις τῇ ἀρχῇ ἡ ἀνάγκη καὶ οὐδὲ αὕτη ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν βίαν· τὸ δὲ μοναχὸν τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο οὖν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτως· τὸ δὲ "ἔδει" τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει. τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἂν οὕτως εἴη, ὡς συνέβη· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅπερ ἐχρῆν, ἀλλὰ ἀναμένειν δεῖ τὰ ἄλλα, τί ποτε αὐτοῖς ὁ βασιλεὺς φανείη, καὶ τοῦτο ⟨αὐτὸν θέσθαι⟩,[1] ὅπερ ἐστίν αὐτός [τοῦτο αὐτὸν θέσθαι],[1] οὐχ ὡς συνέβη φανέντα, ἀλλὰ ὄντως βασιλέα καὶ ὄντως ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὄντως, οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν—οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἕπεσθαι ἄλλῳ—ἀλλ' ὄντα ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὥστε οὐ κατ' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο. εἰ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ "συνέβη"—τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, εἴ τι συμβήσεται, τὸ "συνέβη", ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν συνέβη, οὐδὲ συνέκυρσε τὸ ὂν οὕτως εἶναι, οὐδὲ παρ' ἄλλου τὸ οὕτως εἶναι, ὂν ὡς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' αὕτη ὄντως φύσις ὂν εἶναι—πῶς ἄν τις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τοῦτο ἐνθυμοῖτο τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη", ᾧ ὑπάρχει γεγεννηκέναι τὸ ὄν, ὃ οὐχ οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία, οὖσα ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς; ἐπεὶ οὕτω τις κἂν[2] τὸν νοῦν

[1] Igal.
[2] Theiler: καὶ Enn.

it; so it must be something defined. But I mean defined by its uniqueness, and not of necessity; for there was no necessity; for necessity is in the things which follow the principle, and even this [subsequent] necessity does not have power to force them; but this uniqueness comes from the principle itself. It is this, then, and not something else, but what it ought to be; it did not then happen to be like this, but had to be like this; but this "had to be" is principle of all things that had to be. It could not then be this in the sense that it happened to be; for it is not what it chanced to be but what it ought to be; or rather, not what it ought to be, but the other things have to wait and see how their king will appear to them and affirm that he is what he himself is, not appearing as he happened to be, but as really king and really principle and really the Good, not active according to the Good—for in this way he would seem to be following another—but being one, what he is, so that he is not active according to that, but is that. If then "happened to be" does not even apply to real being—for, if anything is going to happen, it happens to being, but being itself does not happen, nor is it a casual occurrence that being is like this, nor does it derive being like this from something else, being as it is, but this is really its nature, to be real being—how could one imagine about what transcends being[1] that it happened to be like this, that to which it belongs to have generated being, which did not happen to be like this but is as its substance is, being what substance is and what Intellect is; for in this way one could even say of Intellect "it just

[1] Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

εἴποι "οὕτω συνέβη νοῦν εἶναι", ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι ἂν τὸν νοῦν ἐσόμενον ἢ τοῦτο, ὃ δὴ φύσις ἐστὶ νοῦ. τὸ δὴ οὐ παρεκβεβηκὸς ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἀκλινὲς ὂν ἑαυτοῦ, αὐτὸ ἄν τις κυριώτατα λέγοι εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν τις λέγοι ἐκεῖ εἰς τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἀναβὰς καὶ εἰσιδών; ἆρά γε τὸ "οὕτως ⟨συνέβη⟩",[1] ὡς εἶδεν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα; [τὸ οὕτως συνέβη][1] ἢ οὔτε τὸ "οὕτω" οὔτε τὸ "ὁπωσοῦν συνέβη", ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὅλως τὸ "συνέβη". ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὕτω μόνον καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως, ἀλλ' οὕτως"; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ "οὕτως"· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁρίσας εἴης καὶ τόδε τι· ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ἰδόντι οὐδὲ τὸ "οὕτως" εἰπεῖν δύνασθαι οὐδ' αὖ τὸ "μὴ οὕτως"· τί γὰρ ἂν εἴποις αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων, ἐφ' ὧν τὸ "οὕτως". ἄλλο τοίνυν παρ' ἅπαντα τὰ οὕτως. ἀλλ' ἀόριστον ἰδὼν πάντα μὲν ἕξεις εἰπεῖν τὰ μετ' αὐτό, φήσεις δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκείνων εἶναι, ἀλλά, εἴπερ, δύναμιν πᾶσαν αὐτῆς ὄντως κυρίαν, τοῦτο οὖσαν ὃ θέλει, μᾶλλον δὲ ὃ θέλει ἀπορρίψασαν εἰς τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὴν δὲ μείζονα παντὸς τοῦ θέλειν οὖσαν τὸ θέλειν μετ' αὐτὴν θεμένην. οὔτ' οὖν αὐτὴ ἠθέλησε τὸ "οὕτως", ἵνα ἂν εἴπετο, οὔτε ἄλλος πεποίηκεν οὕτως.

10. Καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι χρὴ τὸν λέγοντα τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη"· πῶς ἂν ἀξιώσειε ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ "συνέβη", εἰ τί[2] εἴη; καὶ πῶς ἄν τις ἀφέλοι τὸ

[1] Theiler.
[2] Igal: εἴ τι Enn.

[1] A clear statement of the necessity of negating one's negations as the final step in the negative way, very

happened in this way to be Intellect", as if Intellect was going to be anything else but this which the nature of Intellect is. That, surely, which does not depart from itself, but is its own without declination, one would most properly say is what it is. What, then, is one to say at the point where one goes up to and looks upon what is above this? Is it what it happens to be as one sees that it is? No, it did not happen to be in this way or in that way, but it did not happen to be at all. But [could one say] "in this way", and "not otherwise, but in this way"? But [you must] not [say] "in this way"; for in this way you would be defining it, and it would be a particular thing; but the one who sees it cannot say "in this way" or again "not in this way"[1]; for you would be saying that it was one of the beings to which "in this way" applies. It is then something else besides all the things which are in this way. But, since you see it as without definition, you will be able to speak of all the things which come after it, but you will affirm that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it is all power, really master of itself, being what it wills to be, or rather throwing "what it wills to be" away to the beings, and being itself greater than all willing, setting willing after itself. It did not then will the "in this way" so that it might conform to it, nor did another make it like this.

10. And then one must also put these questions to the one who said "happened to be": on what conditions would he affirm that "happened to be" was false, if there was any [happening to be]? And how

strongly stressed by the Athenian Neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius and by Pseudo-Dionysius.

"συνέβη"; καὶ εἰ τίς[1] εἴη φύσις, τότε φήσει οὐκ ἐφαρμόζειν τὸ "συνέβη"; εἰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀφαιροῦσαν τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη" ἀνατίθησι τύχῃ, ποῦ ποτε τὸ μὴ ἐκ τύχης εἶναι γένοιτο; ἀφαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ "ὡς ἔτυχεν" αὕτη ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδος καὶ πέρας καὶ μορφὴν διδοῦσα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὕτω κατὰ λόγον γινομένοις τύχῃ ἀναθεῖναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο λόγῳ τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ προηγουμένως καὶ μὴ ἀκολούθως, ἀλλὰ συμπτώμασιν, ἡ τύχη. τὴν δὴ ἀρχὴν παντὸς λόγου τε καὶ τάξεως καὶ ὅρου πῶς ἄν τις τὴν τούτου ὑπόστασιν ἀναθείη τύχῃ; καὶ μὴν πολλῶν μὲν ἡ τύχη κυρία, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου καὶ τάξεως εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ταῦτα οὐ κυρία· ὅπου καὶ ἐναντίον γε δοκεῖ λόγῳ εἶναι τύχη, πῶς ἂν γεννήτειρα αὐτοῦ γένοιτο; εἰ οὖν μὴ γεννᾷ νοῦν τύχη, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ οὐδὲ τὸ κρεῖττον νοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ εἶχεν ὅθεν γεννήσει, οὔτε ἦν τὸ παράπαν αὕτη οὐδ' ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ἀιδίοις. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν πρὸ ἐκείνου, αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτος, στῆναι ἐνταῦθα δεῖ καὶ μηδὲν ἔτι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν πῶς ἐγένετο, αὐτὸ δὲ μηκέτι ὅπως, ὅτι ὄντως τοῦτο μὴ ἐγένετο. τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, ἔστι δὲ οἷός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὢν τῆς αὑτοῦ οὐσίας κύριος; καὶ εἰ μὴ οὐσίας δέ, ἀλλ' ὢν ὅς ἐστιν, οὐχ ὑποστήσας ἑαυτόν, χρώμενος δὲ ἑαυτῷ οἷός ἐστιν,

[1] Igal: εἴ τις Enn.

would one remove the "happened to be"? And if there is a nature, will he then say that the "happened to be" does not fit? For if he attributes to chance the nature which takes away the "happened to be" from the others, wherever will existence which is not by chance come to be? But this principle takes away the "as it chanced" from the others by giving them form and limit and shape, and one cannot attribute anything to chance in things which come to be rationally in this way, but [must maintain] this very thing, that their cause is rational; but chance is in what does not come to be as a result of what goes before and consistently, but is mere coincidence. But as for the principle of all reason and order and limit, how could one attribute the existence of this to chance? Chance is certainly mistress of many things, but is not mistress of intellect and reason and order so as to generate them; when chance even seems to be in direct opposition to reason, how could it be reason's generator? If then chance does not generate Intellect, then certainly not that which is before Intellect and better than Intellect; for it would not have any resources to generate it from, nor did it exist at all in any way among the eternal beings. If then there is nothing before him, but he is the first, one must stop here and say nothing more about him, but enquire how the things after him came to be, but not how this did, because it really did not come to be. Well then, suppose he did not come to be, but is as he is and is not of his own substance. And if he is not master of his substance, but is who he is, as he did not bring himself into existence but manages with himself as he is, then he is what he is of necessity, and could

ἐξανάγκης τοῦτο ἂν εἴη, ὅ ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως. ἢ οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως, οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἄριστον οὕτως. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον ἐλθεῖν οὐ πᾶν αὐτεξούσιον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθεῖν οὐδὲν ὑπ' ἄλλου κεκώλυται. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ ἦλθε, παρ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐλήλυθεν, οὐ τῷ κεκωλῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ μὴ ἐλήλυθε· καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ἀδυναμίαν σημαίνει τοῦ μὴ ἥκοντος, ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν τὸ μὴ ἥκειν. καὶ τὸ μὴ ἥκειν πρὸς μηδὲν ἄλλο τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ κατειλημμένου, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλλων οὔσης καὶ νόμου. αὐτὴν οὖν ἡ ἀνάγκη ὑπέστησεν; ἢ οὐδὲ ὑπέστη τῶν ἄλλων ὑποστάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτό. τὸ οὖν πρὸ ὑποστάσεως πῶς ἂν ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ ὑπέστη;

11. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὑποστὰν τοῦτο τί; ἢ σιωπήσαντας δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ἀπόρῳ τῇ γνώμῃ θεμένους μηδὲν ἔτι ζητεῖν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ζητήσειεν εἰς οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔχων προελθεῖν πάσης ζητήσεως εἰς ἀρχὴν ἰούσης καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἱσταμένης; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζήτησιν ἅπασαν χρὴ νομίζειν ἢ τοῦ τί ἐστιν εἶναι ἢ τοῦ οἷον ἢ τοῦ διὰ τί ἢ τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὡς λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, ἐκ τῶν μετ' αὐτό. τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ζητεῖ· ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς πάσης οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. τὸ δὲ οἷόν ἐστι ζητεῖν τί συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ, ᾧ συμβέβηκε μηδέν. τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι δηλοῖ μᾶλλον τὸ μηδὲν δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν, αὐτὸ μόνον εἰ δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς λαβόντας ἐν νῷ[1]

[1] Kirchhoff: τῷ Enn., H–S[1].

not be otherwise. Now he is not as he is because he cannot be otherwise, but because being what he is is the best. For not everything has the power over itself to go to the better, but nothing is hindered by another to go to the worse. But that it did not go was due to itself; it was not because it was hindered but because it was itself what did not go; and inability to go to the worse does not indicate the powerlessness of what does not go, but its not going comes from itself and is because of itself. And not going to anything else has in it the extreme of power; [that which does not go] is not held fast by necessity, but is itself the necessity and law of the others. Did necessity, then, bring itself into existence? No, that did not come into existence; the other things after it came to existence through it. How then could that which is before existence have come to existence either by another's agency or by its own?

11. But what is this which did not come to existence? We must go away in silence and enquire no longer, aware in our minds that there is no way out. For why should one even enquire when one has nothing to go on to, since every enquiry goes to a principle and stands still in it? And besides, one must consider that every enquiry is about either what something is, or of what kind it is, or why it is or if it is. Now being, in the sense in which we say that that is, [is known] from what comes after it. And the question "why?" seeks another principle; but there is no principle of the universal principle. And to enquire into what kind of thing it is is to enquire what attributes it has, which has no attributes. And the question "what is it?" rather makes clear that we must make no enquiry about it, grasping it, if

μηδὲν αὐτῷ θεμιτὸν εἶναι προσάπτειν μαθόντας. ὅλως δὲ ἐοίκαμεν ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν ἐνθυμηθῆναι, περὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως οἵπερ ἐνεθυμήθημεν, ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τίθεσθαι χώραν καὶ τόπον, ὥσπερ τι χάος, εἶτα χώρας ἤδη οὔσης ἐπαγαγεῖν ταύτην τὴν φύσιν εἰς τὸν ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἡμῶν γεγονότα ἢ ὄντα τόπον, εἰσάγοντες δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν τοιοῦτον τόπον οὕτω τοι ζητεῖν, οἷον πόθεν καὶ πῶς ἐλήλυθεν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ὥσπερ ἔπηλυν ὄντα ἐζητηκέναι αὐτοῦ τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ οἷον τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος βάθους ἢ ἐξ ὕψους τινὸς ἐνθάδε ἐρρῖφθαι. διόπερ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἀπορίας ἀνελόντα ἔξω ποιήσασθαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸ πάντα τόπον καὶ μηδὲ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τίθεσθαι αὐτό, μήτε ἀεὶ κείμενον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἱδρυμένον μήτε ἐληλυθότα, ἀλλ᾽ ὄντα μόνον, ὡς ἔστι, λεγόμενον ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης τῶν λόγων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὕστερον καὶ ὕστερον ἁπάντων. τὸ οὖν ἄτοπον τοῦτο νοοῦντες, ὡς νοοῦμεν, οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτὸ ἔτι τιθέντες οἷον κύκλῳ οὐδὲ περιλαβεῖν ἔχοντες ὅσος, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσον αὐτῷ συμβεβηκέναι φήσομεν· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ποιόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ μορφή τις περὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ νοητὴ ἂν εἴη· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο· ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ γὰρ καὶ ὑφέστηκε, πρὶν ἄλλο. τί ἂν οὖν ἔτι εἴη τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη"; ἢ πῶς φθεγξόμεθα τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀφαιρέσει πάντα τὰ περὶ τούτου

[1] Plotinus is thinking of the Chaos with which Hesiod

possible, in our minds by learning that it is not right to add anything to it. But in general we probably think of this difficulty, those of us who think about this nature at all, because we first assume a space and place, a kind of vast emptiness,[1] and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into the place which has come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind of place we enquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from some height. Therefore one must remove the cause of the difficulty by excluding from our concentrated gaze upon it all place, and not put it in any place either as resting and settled in it or as having come to it, but [think of it] as being what it is (this is said by the necessity of speech), but that place, like everything else, is afterwards, and last of all afterwards. When therefore we think, as we do think, of this being out of place, and put nothing round it in a kind of circle, and are unable to encompass its extent, we shall not attribute extension to it; and certainly not quality either; for there could not be any shape about it, even intelligible; and not relation to something else; for it existed by itself before there was anything else. What then could the "it happened to be like this" still mean? And how shall we be able to say this, because everything else about it is said negatively?

begins his account of the generation of the gods (*Theogony* 116), which he understands as Aristotle does (*Physics* Δ 1208b31–3) as the empty space or place which things occupy.

λεγόμενα; ὥστε ἀληθὲς μᾶλλον οὐ τὸ "οὕτω συνέβη", ἀλλὰ τὸ "οὐδὲ οὕτω συνέβη", ὅπου καὶ τὸ "οὐδὲ συνέβη ὅλως".

12. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ ἐστι; τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ὃ ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι ἆρά γε κύριος αὐτός; πάλιν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδέν τι πεισθεῖσα τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἄπορός ἐστι. λεκτέον τοίνυν πρὸς ταῦτα ὧδε, ὡς ἕκαστος μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα πόρρω ἂν εἴη οὐσίας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὃ μάλιστά ἐσμεν μετέχομεν οὐσίας καί ἐσμέν τις οὐσία, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν οἷον σύνθετόν τι ἐκ διαφορᾶς καὶ οὐσίας. οὔκουν κυρίως οὐσία οὐδ' αὐτοουσία· διὸ οὐδὲ κύριοι τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας. ἄλλο γάρ πως ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄλλο, καὶ κύριοι οὐχ ἡμεῖς τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσία αὐτὸ ἡμῶν, εἴπερ αὖτη καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν προστίθησιν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὅπερ κύριον ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς πώς ἐσμεν, οὕτω τοι οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα λεγοίμεθα ἂν αὐτῶν κύριοι. οὗ[1] δέ γε παντελῶς ἐστιν ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοουσία, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν αὐτό, ἄλλο δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα ὅπερ ἐστί, τούτου ἐστὶ[2] καὶ κύριον καὶ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο, ᾗ ἔστι καὶ ᾗ ἐστιν οὐσία. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἀφείθη κύριον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ᾗ ὃ πρῶτον εἰς οὐσίαν. τὸ δὴ πεποιηκὸς ἐλεύθερον τὴν οὐσίαν, πεφυκὸς δηλονότι ποιεῖν ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἐλευθεροποιὸν ἂν λεχθέν, τίνι ἂν δοῦλον εἴη, εἴπερ ὅλως καὶ θεμιτὸν φθέγγεσθαι τόδε; τῇ

[1] Theiler: ὃ Enn.
[2] Harder: τοῦτό ἐστι wBUCQ: om. x.

So that not "it happened to be like this" but "not even like this did it happen to be" is truer, where it is true that it did not happen to be at all.

12. Well then, is he not what he is? And is he himself really master of his being what he is or transcending being? For again the soul is not in the least persuaded by what has been said and sees no way out of its difficulty. So we must say this as well, that each one of us may be far from substance in respect of his body but in respect of the soul and what we most are we participate in substance and are a particular kind of substance, that is a particular kind of composite of substance and difference. We are not then substance in the strict and proper sense or absolute substance; and for this reason we are not masters of our own substance. For in some way substance is one thing and we are another and we are not masters of our own substance, but substance, the very thing itself, is master of us, given that this also adds the difference. But since in some way we are that which is master of us, in this way, all the same, even here below we could be called masters of ourselves.[1] But where absolute substance is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance another, what it is it is also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another in that it is and in that it is substance. For, again, it has been let go into self-mastery in that it is what is primarily related to substance. That, then, which has made substance free, which is clearly of a nature to liberate and can be called liberator—to what could it be a slave, if it is even in any way permitted to utter this

[1] The sense in which this is true is explained in V. 3. 4.

αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ; ἀλλὰ καὶ αὕτη παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐλευθέρα καὶ ὑστέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔχον οὐσίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τις ἐνέργεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸν θησόμεθα, οὐδ' ἂν διὰ τοῦτο εἴη ἄν ἕτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κύριος, ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὅτι μὴ ἕτερον ἐνέργεια καὶ αὐτός. εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν οὐ δώσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τἆλλα περὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἴσχειν, ἔτι μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ κύριον οὔτε τὸ κυριευόμενον ἐκεῖ εἶναι δώσομεν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτοῦ κύριος", οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλο αὐτοῦ κύριον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ "αὐτοῦ κύριον" τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπέδομεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν τιμιωτέρῳ ἢ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐθέμεθα. τί οὖν τὸ ἐν τιμιωτέρῳ τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ κύριον; ἢ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐκεῖ δύο πως ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐδίδου τοῦ κυρίου, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτόν, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ χωρὶς ἐγένετο τὸ κύριον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγετο κύριον. ὅπου δὲ οὐ δύο ὡς ἕν, ἀλλὰ ἕν—ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια μόνον ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνέργεια—οὐδὲ τὸ "κύριον αὐτοῦ" ὀρθῶς.

13. Ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἐπάγειν δεῖ [οὐκ ὀρθῶς][1] τοῦ ζητουμένου, πάλιν αὖ λεγέσθω, ὡς τὰ μὲν ⟨οὐκ⟩[2] ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ ποιητέον οὐδ' ὡς εἰς ἐπίνοιαν δύο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πειθοῦς χάριν καί τι παρανοητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ γὰρ δοίημεν ἐνεργείας

[1] del. Theiler.
[2] Igal.

word? To its own substance? But this substance gets its freedom from it and comes after it, and it is not in possession of substance. If then there is an active actuality in him, and we are going to locate him himself in the active actuality, he would not because of this be something else than himself and not himself master of himself, he from whom the active actuality comes, because active actuality and he himself are not different. But if we are not in any way going to grant that there is active actuality in him, but say that the other things have their existence by being active round him, then still more shall we refuse to grant that there is mastery or being mastered at that level. But we shall not even admit the "master of himself", not because something else is master of him, but because we have allotted the "master of himself" to substance, and put him in a more honourable place than this applies to. What then is that which is in a more honourable position than being its own master? It is because, since substance and activity there are in a way two and gave, from the point of view of activity, the idea of mastery, but this was the same thing as substance, for this reason mastery came to be separated, and it was said to be master of itself. But where there are not two as one, but there is one—either only active actuality or not active actuality at all—"master of himself" is not correct.

13. But if one must bring in these names of what we are looking for, let it be said again that it was not correct to use them, because one must not make it two even for the sake of forming an idea of it; but now we must depart a little from correct thinking in our discourse for the sake of persuasion. For if we

αὐτῷ, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οἷον βουλήσει αὐτοῦ—οὐ γὰρ ἀβουλῶν ἐνεργεῖ—αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι ἡ οἷον οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἡ βούλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ταὐτὸν ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα ἐβούλετο, οὕτω καὶ ἔστιν. οὐ μᾶλλον ἄρα ὡς πέφυκε βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ἢ ὡς βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ οὐσία ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. κύριος ἄρα πάντη ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχων καὶ τὸ εἶναι. ἴδε δὴ καὶ τόδε· τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἢ ὅ ἐστιν εἶναι, καὶ τότε μάλιστα οἴεται εἶναι, ὅταν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλάβῃ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ αἱρεῖται ἑαυτῷ ἕκαστον τὸ εἶναι καθόσον[1] ἂν παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴσχῃ, ὡς τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἑαυτῷ[2] δηλονότι πολὺ πρότερον αἱρετῆς οὔσης, εἴπερ τὸ ὅση μοῖρα ἀγαθοῦ παρ' ἄλλῳ αἱρετωτάτη, καὶ οὐσία ἑκούσιος καὶ παραγενομένη θελήσει καὶ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν οὖσα θελήσει καὶ διὰ θελήσεως ὑποστᾶσα. καὶ ἕως μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ εἶχεν ἕκαστον, ἠθέλησεν ἄλλο, ᾗ δὲ ἔσχεν, ἑαυτό τε θέλει ἤδη καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε κατὰ τύχην ἡ τοιαύτη παρουσία οὔτε ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, καὶ τούτῳ καὶ ὁρίζεται καὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστι τούτῳ. εἰ οὖν τούτῳ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ, δῆλον δήπου γίνεται ἤδη, ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον πρώτως, ᾧ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑαυτοῖς ἐστιν εἶναι, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἡ θέλησις τοῦ οἷον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν

[1] Kirchhoff: *καὶ ὅσον* Enn.
[2] Theiler: *ἑαυτῇ* Enn.

were to grant activities to him, and ascribe his activities to what we might call his will—for he does not act without willing—and his activities are what we might call his substance, his will and his substance will be the same thing. But if this is so, then as he willed, so also he is. He does not then will and act as it is his nature to, any more than his substance is as he wills and acts. So he is altogether master of himself since he has even his being in his own power. Observe this also: every being in its desire for the Good wants to be that Good rather than what it is, and thinks that it is in the highest degree when it participates in the Good, and in such a state each being will choose for itself to be in so far as it has being from the Good; so the nature of the Good is obviously far more worthy of choice for himself, if it is true that whatever share of the Good there may be in something else is most worthy of choice, and is its freely willed substance which comes to it in accordance with its will and is one and the same thing as its will and is established in existence through its will. And as long as each individual did not have the Good it wished something else, but in that it possesses the Good it wills itself, and neither is this kind of presence by chance nor is its substance outside its will, and it is by this Good that its substance is defined and by this that it belongs to itself. If then it is by this that each thing itself makes itself, it becomes, I suppose, obvious that that Good is primarily the kind of thing it is by its own agency, by which the other things also are able to be by their own agency, and that the will, as it were, to be the kind of thing it is goes with its, as we please to call it, substance, and it is not possible to apprehend him

αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο ὤν, ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἕν, καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἧττον ἕν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός, ὅπερ ἔτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἄν. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἢ τοῦτο, ὅ ἐστι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅ τι θέλοι γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτ' ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὄν, ὅ ἐστι, τοῦτο τὸ "αὐτὸς εἶναι" ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει. ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ οὐ δεδεκασμένου οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἐπισπομένου, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἑλομένου, ὅτι μηδὲ ἦν ἄλλο, ἵνα πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐλχθῇ. καὶ μὴν κἀκεῖνο ἄν τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τὰ ἄλλα οὐσίᾳ οὐ περιείληφε τὸν λόγον τὸν τοῦ ἀρέσκεσθαι αὑτῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ δυσχεραίνοι τι αὐτό. ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάσει ἀνάγκη τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ θέλησιν ἐμπεριειλημμένην εἶναι ἢ σχολῇ γ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχοι ἑαυτῷ ἀρεστῷ εἶναι, ἃ μετουσίᾳ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίᾳ ἀρέσκεται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, εἴ τις περὶ ἐκείνου λέγων ἐξανάγκης ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρῆται, ἃ ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἐῶμεν λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ "οἷον" ἐφ' ἑκάστου. εἰ οὖν ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνυφίστησιν αὐτὸ ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ βούλησις—ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται—δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, συνακτέον εἰς[1] ἓν τὴν

[1] Kirchhoff: ὡς Enn.

without the will to be by his own agency what he is, and that his willing to be himself by his own agency is concurrent with his being what he wills, and his will and he himself are one, and not less one by this, that he himself is not one thing as he happened to be and what he would have liked to be another. For what could he have wished to be except this which he is? For even if we assumed that he could choose to become what he wished, and it was possible for him to change his own nature into something else, he would not wish to become something else, or have any fault to find with himself, as if he is this thing which he is by necessity, this being himself which he always willed and wills. For the nature of the Good is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted nor following his own nature, but choosing himself, because there was nothing else at all that he might be drawn to. And one might also make the following point, that the other things do not each of them include in their substance the character of being satisfied with themselves; for a thing could even dislike itself. But it is necessary for the choice and willing of itself to be included in the existence of the Good, or it would hardly be possible for anything else to find itself satisfactory; they are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the Good. But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to indicate it expressions which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used; but one should understand "as if" with each of them. If then the Good is established in existence, and choice and will join in establishing it—for without these it will not be—but this Good must not be many, its will and substance

βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν [καὶ τὸ θέλειν]·[1] τὸ δὲ θέλειν ⟨εἰ⟩[2] παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ εἶναι, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὑτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὑτόν· ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός.

14. Ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ ταύτῃ· ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων εἶναι ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἕτερον· οἷον ἄνθρωπος ὅδε ἕτερος, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἄλλο· μετέχει γε μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ψυχὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, εἰ ἁπλοῦν ψυχὴ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἄλλου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν κατὰ τύχην γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος, ὅσῳ[3] ἕτερον τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κατὰ τύχην· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ "παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄνθρωπος αὐτό". εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην τοῦτο οὐδὲ συμβέβηκε, πῶς ἂν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄνθρωπος αὐτό, τὸ γεννητικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου αὐτό, καὶ οὗ τὰ ὄντα πάντα, κατὰ τύχην ἂν λέγοιτο, φύσις ἁπλουστέρα τοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως τὸ ὂν εἶναι; ἔτι[4] πρὸς τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἰόντι οὐκ ἔστι συναναφέρειν τὴν τύχην, ὥστε καὶ

[1] del. Vitringa.
[2] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus).
[3] H–S^1: ὅτῳ Enn.
[4] Harder: εἰ Enn.

must be brought into one; but if its willing comes from itself, it is necessary that it also gets its being from itself, so that our discourse has discovered that he has made himself. For if his will comes from himself and is something like his own work, and this will is the same thing as his existence, then in this way he will have brought himself into existence; so that he is not what he happened to be but what he himself willed.

14. And, further, one must look at it also in this way: each of the things which is said to be is either the same as its being or different; for instance, this particular human being is one thing and essential humanity another; the human being, of course, participates in essential humanity. But soul and essential soulness are the same thing if soul is simple and not predicated of something else, and the human being as such is the same as essential humanity.[1] And the one might become a human being by chance, in so far as it is different from essential humanity, but essential humanity could not come to be by chance: this means "the human being as such comes to be from himself". If then essential humanity comes to be from itself and not by chance or as it happens, how could that which is above humanity as such and which generates humanity as such, and to which all the real beings belong, be said to be by chance, a nature simpler than essential humanity and universal essential being? Further, as one goes towards the simple it is not possible to take chance

[1] There is a reference here (with a Platonic correction to bring in the Form of man) to Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 3. 1043b2–4.

εἰς τὸ ἁπλούστατον ἀδύνατον ἀναβαίνειν τὴν τύχην. ἔτι δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἀναμνησθῆναι προσήκει ἤδη που εἰρημένον, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὄντων καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως ἐλθόντων εἰς ὑπόστασιν, καὶ εἴ τι δὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τοιοῦτον,[1] τῷ ἀπ' ἐκείνων τοιοῦτον· λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τὸ σὺν αὐτῶν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἔχειν καὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τὴν αἰτίαν, ὥστε τὸν ὕστερον θεατὴν ἑκάστου ἔχειν εἰπεῖν, διὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων, οἷον διὰ τί ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ διὰ τί πόδες τοῖσδε τοιοίδε, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν συναπογεννῶσαν ἕκαστον μέρος ἑκάστου εἶναι καὶ δι' ἄλληλα τὰ μέρη εἶναι. διὰ τί πόδες εἰς μῆκος; ὅτι καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε καὶ ὅτι πρόσωπον τοιόνδε, καὶ πόδες τοιοίδε. καὶ ὅλως ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων συμφωνία ἀλλήλοις αἰτία· καὶ τὸ διὰ τί τόδε, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ὥστε ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἴτιον. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς οὕτως ἦλθεν οὐ λελογισμένης, ἀλλὰ παρεχούσης ὅλον ἀθρόον τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὸ εἶναι. πηγὴ οὖν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί εἶναι ὁμοῦ ἄμφω διδοῦσα· ἀλλὰ οἷα τὰ γινόμενα, πολὺ ἀρχετυπώτερον καὶ ἀληθέστερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' ἐκεῖνα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ταῦτα. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν εἰκῇ μηδὲ κατὰ τύχην μηδὲ τὸ "συνέβη γὰρ οὕτως" τῶν

[1] τοιοῦτον del. Igal, H–S².

up with one, so that it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest of all. And, further, it is appropriate to remember that statement which has already been made somewhere[1] that each and every one of the things which in truth are and have been brought to existence by that nature, and anything among the things of sense which is of this kind, is of this kind by what comes from those higher beings: I mean by "of this kind" having together with their substance also the cause of their existence, so that the observer afterwards can say why each of its inherent parts is there, for instance why there is an eye and why the feet of these particular beings are as they are and the cause which brings into existence together each part of each thing and brings them into existence on account of each other. Why are the legs and feet as long as they are? Because this is as it is, and because the face is as it is the feet and legs are as they are. And in general the harmony of all the parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and the reason why this part is, is that this is essential humanity; so that the being and the cause are one and the same. But these came in this way from a single source which did not reason but gave the reason why and the being together as a whole. It is the source therefore of being and the why of being, giving both at once; but that from which these come is like the things which have come to be much more originally and more truly and more than as it is on their level in that it is better. If then there is nothing random or by chance and no "it happened to be like

[1] The reference is a general one to the first two chapters of the preceding treatise VI. 7.

ὅσα τὰς αἰτίας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἅπαντα, λόγου ὢν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους πατήρ, ἃ δὴ πάντα πόρρω ὑπάρχει τύχης, εἴη ἂν ἀρχὴ καὶ οἷον παράδειγμα τῶν ὅσα μὴ κεκοινώνηκε τύχῃ, τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀμιγὲς τύχαις καὶ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ συμβάσει, αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.

15. Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως, ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν εἴη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἓν καὶ τὸ οἷον ἐφιέμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἕν, τὸ δὲ ἐφετὸν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οἷον ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν αὖ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταὐτὸν ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πάλιν αὖ αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τι ἕτερον ἠθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός. καὶ μὴν καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὔτε τι εἰς αὐτὸν δέχεσθαι οὔτε ἄλλο αὐτὸν καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν εἴημεν ἔξω ποιοῦντες τοῦ τύχῃ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ μόνον τῷ μονοῦν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ καθαρὸν ποιεῖν ἁπάντων, ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνίδοιμέν τινα φύσιν

[1]There is a reference here to the *Platonic Letter* VI 323D4, one of the esoteric passages (with *Letter* II 312E) from dubiously genuine letters which were foundation-texts for

this" with the things which have their cause in themselves, and all things which come from him do have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and causative substance,[1] which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exemplar of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself; for he is primarily self and self beyond being.

15. And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same. But if this is so, again it is he himself who makes himself and is master of himself and has not come to be as something else willed, but as he himself wills. And further, when we say that he does not receive anything into himself nor does anything else receive him, in this way too we shall be placing something of this kind outside chance existence not only by making him one alone and clear of all things but for this reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this

the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the doctrine of the Three Hypostases.

τοιαύτην οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήρτηται ἡμῖν, καθὰ πάσχειν ὅ τί περ ἂν συμβῇ [καὶ][1] κατὰ τύχην ὑπάρχει—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἡμῶν, δοῦλα κἀκκείμενα[2] τύχαις καὶ οἷον κατὰ τύχην προσελθόντα, τούτῳ δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον φωτὸς ἀγαθοειδοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ μείζονος ἢ κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοεῖν ἐχούσης· εἰς ὃ δὴ ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀφέντες, τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πλέον ἢ αὐτεξούσιοι; τίς δ' ἂν ἡμᾶς προσάψειε τότε τύχαις ἢ τῷ εἰκῇ ἢ τῷ "συμβέβηκεν" αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ζῆν γενομένους ἢ ἐν τούτῳ γενομένους, ὃ μηδὲν ἔχει ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ μόνον; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς αὐτάρκη εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἐστι καὶ μονούμενον. ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν ἀψύχῳ οὐδ' ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ· ἀσθενὴς γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ αὕτη σκέδασις οὖσα λόγου καὶ ἀοριστία· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ πρόεισιν εἰς λόγον, ἀπολείπει τύχην· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον οὐ τύχῃ· ἀναβαίνουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὐ λόγος, κάλλιον δὲ ἢ λόγος· τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ τύχῃ συμβῆναι. ῥίζα γὰρ λόγου παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς τοῦτο λήγει τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ φυτοῦ μεγίστου κατὰ λόγον ζῶντος ἀρχὴ καὶ βάσις, μένουσα γὰρ αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, διδοῦσα δὲ κατὰ λόγον τῷ φυτῷ, ὃν ἔλαβεν, εἶναι.

[1] del. H–S[1].
[2] coniecimus: καὶ κείμενα Enn.

kind which has nothing of the other things which are attached to us by which we have to experience whatever happens by chance—for all the other things which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances, and come to us in a way by chance, but this alone has self-mastery and self-disposal by the active presence of a light in the form of good, and good, and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, having its transcendence of Intellect not as something brought in from outside; surely, when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except that we are more than free and more than independent? Who could then make us depend on chances or randomness or just happening when we have become the true life itself or come to be in it, which has nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient enough to exist; but this is what it is also when it is isolated. But as first existence it is not in the soulless and not in irrational life; for this also is too weak to exist and is a dispersal of rational principle and an indefiniteness; but in so far as it advances towards rational principle, it leaves chance behind; for that which is in accordance with rational principle is not by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not rational principle but more beautiful than rational principle; so far is it from happening by chance. For it is the root of rational principle from itself, and all things come to a stop in it; it is like the principle and fundament of a mighty tree living according to rational principle which remains itself by itself but gives to the tree existence according to the rational principle which it receives.

16. Ἐπεὶ δέ φαμεν καὶ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ τε εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ αὖ εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ, τοῦτό τοι χρὴ ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ νοῆσαι, οἷον δεῖ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν σκοπουμένοις θέσθαι περὶ ὧν ζητοῦμεν. εἰ γὰρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε, καὶ εἰ πανταχοῦ, ὅσος ἐστὶν αὐτός, τοσοῦτος πανταχοῦ· ὥστε τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντη αὐτός, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὢν τῷ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο καὶ δοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακεῖσθαι. ὁ δ' ὑπερτάτην ἔχων τάξιν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὢν ὑπέρτατος αὐτός, δοῦλα πάντα ἔχει, οὐ συμβὰς αὐτοῖς, αὐτῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μᾶλλον δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ πρὸς αὐτὰ βλέποντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτόν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ εἴσω οἷον φέρεται αὐτοῦ οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας, αὐγὴν καθαράν, αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἠγάπησε· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὑτόν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἷον νοῦς. νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός· ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός. ἔτι τοίνυν, εἰ ἔστι μάλιστα, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν οἷον στηρίζει καὶ οἷον πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει καὶ τὸ οἷον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν, οἷον ποιοῖ ἂν αὐτόν, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸς θέλει, καὶ οὐδ' ἡ θέλησις εἰκῇ οὐδ' οὕτω συνέβη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀρίστου ἡ θέλησις οὖσα οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκῇ. ὅτι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη νεῦσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν οἷον ἐνέργεια οὖσα αὐτοῦ καὶ μονὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι

[1] The light in which the souls see the Forms in *Phaedrus* 250C4; for Plotinus this light is the Good (or comes from the Good: VI. 7. 21–22).

16. But since we maintain, and it appears to be so, that this is everywhere and again is nowhere, we must ponder this and think out what we ought to posit about the subject of our enquiry when we look at it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the "everywhere" and "in every way" are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere. But he, since he has the highest place, or rather does not have it, but is himself the highest, has all things as slaves; he does not happen to them, but they to him, or rather they happen around him; he does not look to them, but they to him; but he is, if we may say so, borne to his own interior, as it were well pleased with himself, the "pure radiance",[1] being himself this with which he is well pleased; but this means that he gives himself existence, supposing him to be an abiding active actuality and the most pleasing of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualisation; so that he is an actualisation. But not of anything else; he is then an actualisation of himself. He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he acts. And then, further, if he is supremely because he so to speak holds to himself and so to speak looks to himself, and this so-called being of his is his looking to himself, he as it were makes himself and is not as he chanced to be but as he wills, and his willing is not random nor as it happened; for since it is willing of the best it is not random. But that an inclination of this kind to himself, being in a kind of way his activity and abiding in himself, makes him be what

ποιεῖ, μαρτυρεῖ ὑποτεθὲν τοὐναντίον· ὅτι, εἰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω νεύσειεν αὐτοῦ, ἀπολεῖ τὸ εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστί· τὸ ἄρα εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρὸς αὐτόν· τοῦτο δὲ ἓν καὶ αὐτός. αὐτὸς ἄρα ὑπέστησεν αὑτὸν συνεξενεχθείσης τῆς ἐνεργείας μετ' αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν μὴ γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἐγρήγορσις οὐκ ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος, ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὑπερνόησις ἀεὶ οὖσα, ἔστιν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγρηγόρησεν. ἡ δὲ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ζωῆς ἔμφρονος· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτός ἐστιν. αὐτὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ζωήν· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ οὐ παρ' ἄλλου. παρ' αὐτοῦ ἄρα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρα, ὡς συνέβη, οὕτως ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός ἐστιν.

17. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε· ἕκαστά φαμεν τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν ἔσχεν, ὡς ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος προαίρεσις ἠθέλησε, καὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν προϊέμενος καὶ προϊδὼν ἐν λογισμοῖς κατὰ πρόνοιαν οὗτος[1] εἰργάσατο. ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων καὶ ἀεὶ οὕτως γιγνομένων, οὕτω τοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς συνοῦσι κεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους ἐν μείζονι εὐθημοσύνῃ ἑστῶτας· ὥστε ἐπέκεινα προνοίας τἀκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπέκεινα προαιρέσεως καὶ πάντα ἀεὶ νοερῶς ἑστηκότα εἶναι, ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὄντι. ὥστε τὴν οὕτω διάθεσιν εἴ τις ὀνομάζει

[1] Theiler: οὕτως Enn.

he is, is evident if one posits the opposite; because, if he inclined to what is outside him, he would put an end to his being what he is; so then his being what he is is his self-directed activity; but these are one thing and himself. He therefore brought himself into existence, since his activity was brought out into existence along with himself. If then he did not come into being, but his activity was always and a something like being awake, when the wakener was not someone else, a wakefulness and a thought transcending thought which exists always, then he is as he woke himself to be. But his waking transcends substance and intellect and intelligent life; but these are himself. He then is an active actuality above intellect and thought and life[1]; but these are from him and not from another. His being then comes by and from himself. He is not therefore as he happened to be, but he is himself as he willed.

17. And further, [consider it] also like this: we affirm that each and every thing in the All, and this All here itself, is as it would have been if the free choice of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if this maker proceeding regularly in his calculations with foresight had made it according to his providence. But since things here are always like this and always come to be like this, so their rational principles also always rest among the things which exist all together, standing still in a better order; so that the things there transcend providence and transcend free choice, and all the things which are in real being stand in intellectual stillness. So that if someone calls this disposition of things providence,

[1] Again *Republic* VI 509B9.

πρόνοιαν, οὕτω νοείτω, ὅτι ἐστὶ πρὸ τοῦδε νοῦς τοῦ παντὸς ἑστώς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθ' ὃν τὸ πᾶν τόδε. εἰ μὲν οὖν νοῦς πρὸ πάντων καὶ ἀρχὴ ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὡς ἔτυχε, πολὺς μὲν ὤν, συνῳδὸς δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ οἷον εἰς ἓν συντεταγμένος. οὐδὲν γὰρ πολὺ καὶ πλῆθος συντεταγμένον καὶ λόγοι πάντες καὶ περιληφθέντες ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς ὡς ἔτυχε καὶ ὡς συνέβη, ἀλλὰ πόρρω φύσεως τῆς τοιαύτης καὶ ἐναντίον, ὅσον τύχη ἐν ἀλογίᾳ κειμένη λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀρχή, δηλονότι προσεχὴς τούτῳ τῷ οὕτω λελογωμένῳ, καὶ τὸ οὕτω λεγόμενον τοῦτο κατ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ μετέχον ἐκείνου καὶ οἷον θέλει ἐκεῖνο καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου. ἀδιάστατος τοίνυν ἐκεῖνος, εἷς ⟨εἰς⟩[1] πάντα λόγος, εἷς ἀριθμὸς καὶ εἷς μείζων τοῦ γενομένου καὶ δυνατώτερος, καὶ οὐδὲν μεῖζον αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ κρεῖττον. οὐδὲ ἄρα ἐξ ἄλλου ἔχει οὔτε τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ὁποῖός ἐστιν εἶναι. αὐτὸς ἄρα αὐτῷ ὅ ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ εἰς αὐτόν, ἵνα μηδὲ ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω ᾖ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν πᾶς.

18. Καὶ σὺ ζητῶν μηδὲν ἔξω ζήτει αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἴσω πάντα τὰ μετ' αὐτόν· αὐτὸν δὲ ἔα. τὸ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτός ἐστι, περίληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον. ἢ εἴσω ἐν βάθει, τὸ δ' ἔξω αὐτοῦ, οἷον κύκλῳ ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξηρτημένον πᾶν ὃ λόγος καὶ νοῦς· μᾶλλον δ' ἂν εἴη

[1] Cilento.

he must understand it in this way, that Intellect is there standing still before this All, and this All here is from and according to Intellect. If then Intellect was before all things and an intellect of this kind was the principle, it would not be just as it chanced to be, being many but in tune with itself and as it were brought together into a single order. For what is many and an ordered multiplicity, and all rational forms included in one which goes through all, none of this is as it chanced and as it happened to be, but it is far from a nature of this kind and opposed to it, as much as chance whose place is in unreason is to rational principle. But if that before the Intellect of this kind is the principle, it is obviously close to this which is rationalised in this way, and what we speak of in this way is according to that and participates in that and is as that wills and is the power of that. He is then without dimensions, one rational principle for all things, one number and one which is greater and more powerful than what has come into being, and there is nothing greater or better than him. He does not then have from another either his being or his being what he is. He himself therefore is by himself what he is, related and directed to himself, that he may not in this way either be related to the outside or to something else, but altogether self-related.

18. And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him; but leave him himself alone. For he himself is the outside, the encompassment and measure of all things. Or within in depth, but what is outside him, touching him in a kind of circle and depending on him, is all which is rational principle and intellect;

νοῦς, καθὸ ἐφάπτεται καὶ ᾗ ἐξήρτηται[1] αὐτοῦ [καὶ ᾗ ἐξήρτηται],[2] ἅτε παρ' ἐκείνου ἔχων τὸ νοῦς εἶναι. ὥσπερ ἂν οὖν κύκλος, ⟨ὃς⟩[3] ἐφάπτοιτο κέντρου κύκλῳ, ὁμολογοῖτο ἂν τὴν δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ κέντρου ἔχειν καὶ οἷον κεντροειδής, ᾗ[4] γραμμαὶ ἐν κύκλῳ πρὸς κέντρον ἓν συνιοῦσαι τὸ πέρας αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον ποιοῦσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ πρὸς ὃ ἠνέχθησαν καὶ ἀφ' οὗ οἷον ἐξέφυσαν, μείζονος ὄντος ἢ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτῶν σημεῖα τῶν γραμμῶν—καὶ ἔστι μὲν οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀμυδρὰ δὲ καὶ ἴχνη ἐκείνου τοῦ ὃ δύναται αὐτὰ καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς δυνάμενον, αἳ πανταχοῦ ἔχουσιν αὐτό· καὶ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, οἷον ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον—οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ ὂν χρὴ λαμβάνειν, γενόμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ οἷον ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξελιχθὲν καὶ ἐξηρτημένον, ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοερᾶς φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἷον ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα· ἓν γάρ. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐκεῖ γραμμὰς οὐδὲ κύκλον τὸ κέντρον, κύκλου δὲ καὶ γραμμῶν πατέρα, ἴχνη αὐτοῦ δόντα καὶ δυνάμει μενούσῃ γραμμὰς καὶ κύκλον οὐ πάντη ἀπηρτημένα αὐτοῦ ῥώμῃ τινὶ γεγεννηκότα· οὕτω τοι κἀκεῖνο, τῆς νοερᾶς περιθεούσης δυνάμεως, τὸ οἷον ἐνδάλματος αὐτοῦ ἀρχέτυπον, ἐν ἑνὶ νοῦν, πολλοῖς καὶ εἰς πολλὰ οἷον νενικημένου καὶ νοῦ διὰ ταῦτα γενομένου, ἐκείνου πρὸ νοῦ μείναντος ⟨ἐκ⟩[5] τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ νοῦς γεννήσαντος—τίς ἂν συντυχία (ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον ἢ τὸ "ὡς συνέβη εἶναι") τῆς τοιαύτης

[1] coniecimus: ἐφάπτεται Enn.
[2] delevimus.
[3] Theiler.
[4] F^{3mg} (= Ficinus): ἢ Enn.
[5] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus), H–S^1: om. H–S^2.

but, rather, it would be Intellect, in so far as it touches him and in the way that it depends on him, in that it has from him its being Intellect. Just as a circle, therefore, which touches the centre all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the centre and to have in a way the centre's form, in that the radii in the circle coming together to one centre make their terminal point at the centre like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the centre is greater than is proportionate to these lines and their terminal points, the points of the lines themselves—and the terminal points are like that centre, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines; and what that centre is like is revealed through the lines; it is as if it was spread out without having been spread out—it is like this that we must apprehend that Intellect-Being, coming to be from that Good and as if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it, is, by its own intelligent nature, evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect; for it is one. Just as in our example also the radii and the circle were not the centre, but it is the father of circle and radii giving traces of itself and with an abiding power generating radii and circle, not at all cut off from it, by a kind of strength; so also is that too, as the intellectual power runs round it, a kind of archetype of the image of itself, Intellect in one, an image, as it were, overcome by many and into many and so becoming Intellect, while that remains before Intellect and generates intellects from its power—what chance happening (or accident or "as it happened to be") could come near a power like this

δυνάμεως τῆς νοοποιοῦ καὶ ὄντως ποιητικῆς πλησίον ἦκοι; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν νῷ, πολλαχῇ μεῖζον ἢ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὥσπερ φωτὸς ἐπὶ πολὺ σκεδασθέντος ἐξ ἑνός τινος ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντος διαφανοῦς· εἴδωλον μὲν τὸ σκεδασθέν, τὸ δ' ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἀλλοειδὲς τὸ σκεδασθὲν εἴδωλον ὁ νοῦς, ὃς οὐ τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ καθέκαστον αὐτοῦ λόγος καὶ αἰτία, αἴτιον δὲ ἐκεῖνο τοῦ αἰτίου. μειζόνως ἄρα οἷον αἰτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἰτία, ὁμοῦ πάσας ἔχον τὰς μελλούσας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἔσεσθαι νοερὰς αἰτίας καὶ γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός. ἡ δὲ θέλησις οὐκ ἄλογος ἦν οὐδὲ τοῦ εἰκῇ οὐδ' ὡς ἐπῆλθεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔδει, ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἐκεῖ εἰκῇ. ὅθεν καὶ δέον καὶ καιρὸν ὁ Πλάτων ὡς οἷόν τε ἦν σημῆναι ἐφιέμενος, ὅτι πόρρω τοῦ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστί, τοῦτο δέον. εἰ δὲ τὸ δέον τοῦτο, οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο, καὶ εἰ καιρός, τὸ μάλιστα κυριώτατον ἐν τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρότερον αὐτῷ καὶ οὐχ οἷον ἔτυχε τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅπερ οἷον ἐβουλήθη αὐτός, εἴπερ τὰ δέοντα βούλεται καὶ ἓν τὸ δέον καὶ ἡ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἔστι δέον οὐχ ὡς ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια πρώτη τοῦτο ἑαυτὴν ἐκφήνασα, ὅπερ ἔδει. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀδυνατοῦντα λέγειν ὥς τις ἐθέλει.

[1] Taken from an entirely different context, Plato's discussion of the two kinds of measurement, *Statesman* 288

which makes Intellect and is maker of reality? For something like what is in Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One; it is like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself; what is dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed image, Intellect, is not of alien form; it is not chance, but each and every part of it is rational principle and cause, but that One is cause of the cause. He is then in a greater degree something like the most causative and truest of causes, possessing all together the intellectual causes which are going to be from him and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he himself willed. And his willing is not irrational, or of the random, or just as it happened to occur to him, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is random. For this reason Plato speaks of "due" and "right moment",[1] desiring to indicate as far as possible that it is far from "as it chanced", but what it is is what it ought to be. But if this is what ought to be, it is not so irrationally, and if it is the right moment it has the most authentic mastery among the things which come after it, and has priority in its own right and is not what it in a way chanced to be, but what he in a way wished to be, since he wishes what ought to be and what ought to be and the active actuality of what ought to be are one; and it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be. For this is how one has to speak of him since one is unable to speak as one should.

284D–E, from which Aristotle develops his doctrine of the Mean.

19. Λαμβανέτω τις οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνακινηθεὶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐκεῖνο αὐτό, καὶ θεάσεται καὶ αὐτὸς οὐχ ὅσον θέλει εἰπεῖν δυνάμενος. ἰδὼν δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα λόγον ἀφεὶς θήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνο τοῦτο ὄν, ὡς, εἴπερ εἶχεν οὐσίαν, δούλην ἂν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ οἷον παρ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι. οὐδ' ἂν τολμήσειέ τις ἰδὼν ἔτι τὸ "ὡς συνέβη" λέγειν, οὐδ' ἂν ὅλως φθέγξασθαι δύναται· ἐκπλαγείη γὰρ ἂν τολμῶν, καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἔχοι ἀίξας "ποῦ" εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντη αὐτῷ ἐκείνου οἷον πρὸ ὀμμάτων τῆς ψυχῆς προφαινομένου καί, ὅποι ἂν ἀτενίσῃ, ἐκεῖνον βλέποντος, εἰ μή που ἄλλῃ ἀφεὶς τὸν θεὸν ἀτενίσῃ μηδὲν ἔτι[1] περὶ αὐτοῦ διανοούμενος. χρὴ δὲ ἴσως καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας καὶ ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λεγόμενον δι' αἰνίξεως, οὐ μόνον ὅτι γεννᾷ οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ δουλεύει οὐδὲ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ, οὐδέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν οὐχ αὑτῷ ἐποίησε τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ποιήσας ταύτην ἔξω εἴασεν ἑαυτοῦ, ἅτε οὐδὲν τοῦ εἶναι δεόμενος, ὃς ἐποίησεν αὐτό. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ καθό ἐστι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔστι.

20. Τί οὖν; οὐ συμβαίνει, εἴποι τις ἄν, πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι γεγονέναι; εἰ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἑαυτόν, τῷ μὲν "ἑαυτὸν" οὔπω ἐστί, τῷ δ' αὖ ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἤδη πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ ποιουμένου ὄντος αὐτοῦ. πρὸς ὃ δὴ λεκτέον,

[1] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): εἴ τι wBUCQ: ἤτοι x.

19. Raised up, then, towards that by what has been said one should take hold of that itself, and he will see also himself and will not be able to say all that he wishes. But when he sees that in itself he will put away all reasoning and will set that by itself as being such that, if it had substance, its substance would be its slave and as if derived from it. Nor would one who sees it still be rash enough to say "as it happened to be"; nor is he able to utter a word about it; if he did he would be struck dumb in his rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to say "where" about it; it appears everywhere to him as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he fixes his gaze, he is looking at him, unless he leaves the God and fixes his gaze elsewhere and thinks no more about him. And one ought perhaps to understand that it was in this sense that the ancients spoke of "beyond being" with a hidden meaning,[1] not only that he generates substance but that he is not a slave to substance or to himself, nor is his substance his principle, but he, being principle of substance, did not make substance for himself but when he had made it left it outside himself, because he has no need of being, he who made it. He does not then even make being in accordance with his being.

20. "Well then," someone might say, "does he not happen to be already before he comes into being? For if he makes himself, as regards himself he does not yet exist, but on the other hand as regards the making he exists already before himself, as he himself is what is made." To this we must reply that he is

[1] The reference is of course again to Plato *Republic* VI 509B9.

ὡς ὅλως οὐ τακτέον κατὰ τὸν ποιούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἀπόλυτον τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ τιθεμένοις, καὶ οὐχ ἵνα ἄλλο ἀποτελεσθῇ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως, ἄλλου τῆς[1] ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀποτελεστικῆς, ἀλλ' ὅλου τούτου ὄντος· οὐ γὰρ δύο, ἀλλ' ἕν. οὐδὲ γὰρ φοβητέον ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρώτην τίθεσθαι ἄνευ οὐσίας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν οἷον ὑπόστασιν θετέον. εἰ δὲ ὑπόστασιν ἄνευ ἐνεργείας τις θεῖτο, ἐλλιπὴς ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀτελὴς ἡ τελειοτάτη πασῶν ἔσται. καὶ εἰ προσθείη ἐνέργειαν, οὐχ ἓν τηρεῖ. εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατον δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, πρῶτον ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη. ἐνεργήσας οὖν ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦτο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς πρὶν γενέσθαι ἦν· τότε[2] γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη πᾶς ἦν. ἐνέργεια δὴ οὐ δουλεύσασα οὐσίᾳ καθαρῶς ἐστιν ἐλευθέρα, καὶ οὕτως[3] αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ αὐτός. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἐσῴζετο εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπ' ἄλλου, οὐ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται συνέχειν, αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ παράγων ἑαυτόν, εἴπερ, ὅπερ συνέχει κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεποίηκεν εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν χρόνος ἦν, ὅθεν ἤρξατο εἶναι, τὸ πεποιηκέναι κυριώτατον ἂν ἐλέχθη· νῦν δέ, εἰ καὶ πρὶν αἰῶνα εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἦν, τὸ πεποιηκέναι ἑαυτὸν τοῦτο νοείτω τὸ σύνδρομον εἶναι τὸ πεποιηκέναι καὶ αὐτό· ἓν γὰρ τῇ ποιήσει καὶ οἷον γεννήσει ἀιδίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ "ἄρχων ἑαυτοῦ".

[1] H–S[1]: ἀλλ' οὔσης Enn.
[2] Theiler: ὅτε Enn.
[3] Nicephorus Gregorius: οὗτος Enn.

not at all to be classed as made, but as maker; we must posit that his making is absolute, and not in order that something else should be brought to perfection by his making, since his activity is not directed to the perfection of something else, but is altogether this God; for there are not two, but one. Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity is without substance, but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. In his activity, therefore, he is already this first, and it cannot be that he was before he came to be; for then he was not before coming to be, but already altogether was. Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself. For indeed, if he was kept in being by another, he would not be first self from himself; but if he is rightly said to hold himself together, he is both himself and the bringer of himself into being, granted that what he by his nature holds together is what from the beginning he has made to be. Now if there was a time from which he began to be, "he has made" would be used in the strict and proper sense; but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, this "he has made" must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent; for the being is one with the making and what we may call the eternal generation. From this too [it comes that we say] "ruling himself"; and if there were two, this is properly said, but if there is

καὶ εἰ μὲν δύο, κυρίως, εἰ δὲ ἕν, τὸ "ἄρχων" μόνον· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἀρχόμενον. πῶς οὖν ἄρχον οὐκ ὄντος πρὸς ὅ; ἢ τὸ ἄρχον ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μηδὲν ἦν. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν, πρῶτον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ τάξει, ἀλλὰ κυριότητι καὶ δυνάμει αὐτεξουσίῳ καθαρῶς. εἰ δὲ καθαρῶς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ λαβεῖν τὸ μὴ αὐτεξουσίως. ὅλον οὖν αὐτεξουσίως ἐν αὐτῷ. τί οὖν αὐτοῦ, ὃ μὴ αὐτός; τί οὖν, ὃ μὴ ἐνεργεῖ; καὶ τί, ὃ μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ; εἰ γάρ τι εἴη μὴ ἔργον αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ καθαρῶς ἂν εἴη οὔτε αὐτεξούσιος οὔτε πάντα δυνάμενος· ἐκείνου τε γὰρ οὐ κύριος πάντα τε οὐ δυνάμενος. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν οὐ δύναται, οὗ μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν.

21. Ἐδύνατο οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὃ ἐποίησεν; ἢ οὔπω[1] καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν ἀναιρήσομεν, ὅτι μὴ ἂν κακὸν ποιοῖ. οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὸ δύνασθαι ἐκεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀστεμφεῖ καὶ ἀμετακινήτῳ δυνάμει, ἣ μάλιστα δύναμίς ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ ἐξίστηται τοῦ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύνασθαι ἀδυναμίας ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου μένειν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν ποίησιν αὐτοῦ, ἣν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην ἅπαξ εἶναι· καλὴ γάρ. καὶ τίς ἂν παρατρέψειε βουλήσει γενομένην θεοῦ καὶ βούλησιν οὖσαν; βουλήσει οὖν μήπω ὄντος; τί δὲ βούλησιν ἐκείνου ἀβουλοῦντος τῇ ὑποστάσει; πόθεν οὖν αὐτῷ ἔσται ἡ βούλησις ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἀνενεργήτου; ἢ ἦν

[1] Theiler: οὕτω Enn.

one, the "ruling" only; for he does not have what is ruled. How then can we say "ruling" when there is nothing to rule? Now "ruling" here refers to what was before him, because there was nothing before him. But if there was nothing, he is the first; but this means not in rank, but in authentic mastery and purely self-determined power. But if it is purely self-determined, it is not possible to accept absence of self-determination there. He is therefore altogether at his own disposal in himself. What then is there of his which is not himself? What which is not his activity? And what which is not his work? For if there was anything in him which was not his work, he would not then be purely and simply at his own disposal and capable of all things; for he would not be master of that and would not be capable of all things; at any rate he would not be capable of that of whose making he was not himself master.

21. Could he then make himself anything else than he did? Now we shall not yet do away with his making himself good because he could not make himself evil. For power to make there is not to be understood as power to make the opposites, but as making with power unshaken and not to be deflected, which is power in the highest degree when it does not go out of the One; for to be capable of the opposites belongs to incapacity to remain with the best. But his making which we speak of must be once for all; for it is beautiful. And who would alter it when it has come to be by the will of God and is his will? By the will, then, of a God who did not yet exist? And what could his will be when he is without will in his very existence? How will he come to have a will from his inactive substance? Now his will is in

βούλησις ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ· οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρα τῆς οὐσίας οὐδέν. ἦ τί ἦν, ὃ μὴ ἦν, οἷον ἡ βούλησις; πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἔνι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα. πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός. καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἑπόμενον, ὃ ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα—ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ—τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη ἦν. τὸ δὲ συνέχειν ἑαυτὸν οὕτω ληπτέον νοεῖν, εἴ τις ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ φθέγγοιτο, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶ παρὰ τούτου συνέχεται· μετουσίᾳ γάρ τινι αὐτοῦ ἐστί, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἀναγωγὴ πάντων. αὐτὸς[1] δὲ ἤδη παρ' αὑτοῦ οὔτε συνοχῆς οὔτε μετουσίας δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἑαυτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν πάντων δεόμενος εἰς αὐτόν· ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπῃς ἢ ἐννοηθῇς, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἄφες. ἀφελὼν πάντα, καταλιπὼν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῇς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ μή τί πω οὐκ ἀφῄρηκας ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν γνώμῃ τῇ σῇ. ἔστι γάρ τινος ἐφάψασθαι καὶ σέ, περὶ οὗ οὐκέτι ἄλλο ἐνδέχεται οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὑπεράνω κείμενον μόνον τοῦτο ἀληθείᾳ ἐλεύθερον, ὅτι μηδὲ δουλεῦόν ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντως αὐτό, εἴ γε τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἄλλο.

[1] A^{3mg} (= Ficinus): *αὐτοῖς* Enn., H–S^2.

his substance; so there is nothing different from his substance. Or what was there that he was not, will for instance? So he was all will, and there is nothing in him which is not that which wills—nothing, then, before willing. So he himself is primarily his will. So then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed, and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will generated—but it generated nothing further in himself, for he was this already. But his holding himself together must be understood, if one is to say it correctly, as meaning that all the other things that exist are held together by this; for they exist by some kind of participation in him, and it is to this that their origin is to be traced. But he himself has no longer any need from himself of holding together or participation, but is all things by and in himself—but rather none of them, and he does not need all things to be himself; but when you speak or think of him, put away all the other things. When you have put away all things and left only himself, do not try to find what you can add, but if there is something you have not yet taken away from him in your mind. For even you can grasp something about which it is not possible any more to say or apprehend anything else; but it is something which has its place high above everything, this which alone is free in truth, because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself and really itself, while every other thing is itself and something else.

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, number 9 in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first clear presentation by Plotinus of the One as the ultimate principle and of union with it as the goal of the philosophic or spiritual life. It is the first and one of the clearest and most powerful of his great ascents of the mind, in which he both uses philosophic reason as far as it will go to show the way and urges his readers to go on beyond any thinkable reality to the union which he does not presume to describe. Though the treatise was probably meant for a rather wider circle of readers than the more technical works like VI 1–3, the discussion of the Categories, or VI 6, on numbers, it would still be intended to be read only by a chosen few, those among his friends and hearers who were capable of making the tremendous moral and spiritual effort required to travel by this way and reach the goal, and who already fully accepted the fundamentals of Platonic philosophical religion and were trying to live the philosophical life. Beginning from some fairly commonplace observations on the scale of unity and the necessity of unity for the existence of anything, it leads the reader rapidly through the Platonic World of Forms which is also Divine Intellect (where many Platonists and later theists wished to stop) to its source, and concludes with a passage about (not a description of) the mystical union which has rightly become a classic, though it should not be read and thought about in isolation from the rest of the *Enneads*; the two great works which precede it in the

Ennead order, though they were written some years later, VI 7 [38] and VI 8 [39], need particularly to be taken into consideration.

Synopsis

All beings are beings by the one; unity is the condition of their existence. Soul unifies all beings in this world, but is not itself the One, but one by something else (ch. 1). Nor is real being, either individual or universal, the One; the world of Forms, which is Being, and is alive, and is Intellect, is manifold, and neither as the totality of real beings nor as living and thinking can it be the One which gives it unity (ch. 2). Difficulty of thinking or speaking about the One because it is formless; we must first reach the level of Intellect and then go beyond it; the One is not one of things it generates, and all which is said of them must be denied of it (ch. 3). We are aware of the One by a presence above knowledge; teaching and reasoning can only help on the way to it (ch. 4). We must first come to an understanding of the soul and its derivation from Intellect, and go on from there; inadequacy of all names, including "One", for the source of Intellect (ch. 5). What we mean by using this inadequate term for it; the absolute self-sufficiency of the One; it is beyond the need for thinking (ch. 6). Need to turn inwards, away from all other things, and even oneself, to find the One (ch. 7). The image of the circles; how we must turn to the One, the centre, by putting away otherness (ch. 8). The One is always present, always giving its gifts, but we must put away all other things to possess him truly (ch. 9). The vision which is perfect union, with no consciousness of duality (ch. 10). The final mystery of that union; how we fall from it and rise to it again (ch. 11).

VI. 9. (9) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ Η ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Πάντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἑνί ἐστιν ὄντα, ὅσα τε πρώτως ἐστὶν ὄντα, καὶ ὅσα ὁπωσοῦν λέγεται ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν εἶναι. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη; ἐπείπερ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ ἓν ὃ λέγεται οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα. οὔτε γὰρ στρατὸς ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἓν ἔσται, οὔτε χορὸς οὔτε ἀγέλη μὴ ἓν ὄντα. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἰκία ἢ ναῦς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἔχοντα, ἐπείπερ ἡ οἰκία ἓν καὶ ἡ ναῦς, ὃ εἰ ἀποβάλοι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ οἰκία ἔτι οἰκία οὔτε ἡ ναῦς. τὰ τοίνυν συνεχῆ μεγέθη, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἓν αὐτοῖς παρείη, οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τμηθέντα γοῦν, καθόσον τὸ ἓν ἀπόλλυσιν, ἀλλάσσει τὸ εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ ζῴων σώματα ἓν ὄντα ἕκαστα εἰ φεύγοι τὸ ἓν εἰς πλῆθος θρυπτόμενα, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν, ἣν εἶχεν, ἀπώλεσεν οὐκέτι ὄντα ἃ ἦν, ἄλλα δὲ γενόμενα καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ὅσα ἕν ἐστι. καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια δέ, ὅταν εἰς ἓν συνταχθῇ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ κάλλος, ὅταν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μόρια κατάσχῃ φύσις· καὶ ἀρετὴ δὲ ψυχῆς, ὅταν εἰς ἓν καὶ εἰς μίαν ὁμολογίαν ἑνωθῇ. ἆρ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ τὰ πάντα εἰς ἓν ἄγει δημιουργοῦσα καὶ πλάττουσα καὶ μορφοῦσα καὶ συντάττουσα, ἐπὶ ταύτην ἐλθόντας δεῖ

[1] The scale of different degrees of unity which Plotinus uses in this chapter and elsewhere is Stoic. Cp. *SVF* II 366–8 and 1013.

[2] On beauty and unity cp. I. 6. 2. 18–28.

VI. 9. ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE

1. It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, since the house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house nor the ship a ship. So then continuous magnitudes, if the one was not with them, would not exist; at any rate, if they are cut up they change their being in proportion as they lose their one. And again the bodies of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they escape their one by being broken up into a multiplicity, lose the substance which they had and are no longer what they were but have become other things, and are those other things in so far as each of them is one.[1] And there is health when the body is brought together into one order, and beauty when the nature of the one holds the parts together[2]; and the soul has virtue when it is unified into one thing and one agreement. Is it true then that, since the soul brings all things to their one by making and moulding and shaping and composing them, we should, when we have arrived at it, say that it is this

λέγειν, ὡς αὕτη τὸ ἓν χορηγεῖ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τὸ ἕν; ἢ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα χορηγοῦσα τοῖς σώμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ὃ δίδωσιν, οἷον μορφὴ καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἕτερα αὐτῆς, οὕτω χρή, εἰ καὶ ἓν δίδωσιν, ἕτερον ὂν αὐτῆς νομίζειν αὐτὴν διδόναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν βλέπουσαν ἓν ἕκαστον ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, συλλαμβάνουσαν μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἕν. τῶν γὰρ ἓν λεγομένων οὕτως ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἕν, ὡς ἔχει καὶ ὃ ἐστιν, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἧττον ὄντα ἧττον ἔχειν τὸ ἕν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴ ἕτερον οὖσα τοῦ ἑνὸς ⟨τὸ⟩ μᾶλλον ⟨ἓν⟩[1] ἔχει κατὰ λόγον τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ὄντως εἶναι. [τὸ μᾶλλον ἓν][1] οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν· ψυχὴ γὰρ μία καὶ συμβεβηκός πως τὸ ἕν, καὶ δύο ταῦτα ψυχὴ καὶ ἕν, ὥσπερ σῶμα καὶ ἕν. καὶ τὸ μὲν διεστηκός, ὥσπερ χορός, πορρωτάτω τοῦ ἕν, τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἐγγυτέρω· ψυχὴ δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον κοινωνοῦσα καὶ αὐτή. εἰ δ' ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν ψυχὴ εἴη, ταύτῃ εἰς ταὐτόν τις ἄγει ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ ἕν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ⟨ἅ⟩[2] ἐστιν ἕκαστα μετὰ τοῦ ἓν εἶναί ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕν—οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα μετέχει τοῦ ἕν—ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ μία κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐκ μερῶν· πλεῖσται γὰρ δυνάμεις ἐν αὐτῇ, λογίζεσθαι, ὀρέγεσθαι, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἃ τῷ ἑνὶ ὥσπερ δεσμῷ συνέχεται. ἐπάγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ τὸ ἓν ἕν

[1] transposuimus, ut correctionem.
[2] H–S[1].

which provides the one and this which is the one? Rather we should consider that, just as with the other things it provides for bodies, it is not itself what it gives, shape and form for instance, but they are other than it, so, even if it gives the one, it gives it as something other than itself, and that it is by looking to the one that it makes each and every thing one, just as it is by looking to [the Form of] man that it makes something man, taking the one in it along with the man. For of the things which are said to be one each is one in the way in which it also has what it is, so that the things which are less beings have the one less, and those which are more beings, more. And the soul too, which is other than the one, has its being more one in proportion to its greater and real being. It is certainly not the one itself; for the soul is one and the one is somehow incidental to it, and these things, soul and one, are two, just like body and one. And what has separate parts, like a chorus, is furthest from the one, and what is a continuous body is nearer; and the soul is nearer still, but still participates in it. But if because without being one it would not be soul, for this reason someone makes soul and the one the same, first of all, all the other things are what they are along with their being one; but all the same the one is different from them—for body and one are not the same thing, but the body participates in the one—and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from parts; for there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things

οὖσα[1] καὶ αὐτὴ ἄλλῳ· πάσχει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπ' ἄλλου.

2. Ἆρ' οὖν ἑκάστῳ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἓν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἕν, ὅλῳ δὲ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ταὐτὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν; ὥστε τὸν ἐξευρόντα τὸ ὂν ἐξευρηκέναι καὶ τὸ ἕν, καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἕν· οἷον, εἰ νοῦς ἡ οὐσία, νοῦν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι πρώτως ὄντα ὂν καὶ πρώτως ἕν, μεταδιδόντα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι οὕτως καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ ἑνός. τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ παρ' αὐτὰ εἶναι αὐτὸ φήσαι; ἢ[2] γὰρ ταὐτὸν τῷ ὄντι—ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ εἷς ἄνθρωπος ταὐτόν—ἢ οἷον ἀριθμός τις ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ εἰ δύο τινὰ ἔλεγες, οὕτως ἐπὶ μόνου τινὸς τὸ ἕν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἕν· καὶ ζητητέον τί ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργημα τὸ ἀριθμεῖν ἐπεξιούσης, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ ἕν. ἀλλ' ἔλεγεν ὁ λόγος, εἰ ἀπολεῖ ἕκαστον τὸ ἕν, μηδ' ἔσεσθαι τὸ παράπαν. ὁρᾶν οὖν δεῖ, εἰ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὅλως ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἑκάστου πλῆθός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἀδύνατον πλῆθος εἶναι, ἕτερον ἂν

[1] ἓν οὖσα A[3] (= Ficinus): ἐνοῦσα BxUCQ: ἑνοῦσα w.
[2] A[3] (= Ficinus): εἰ Enn.

[1] That Intellect-Real Being is the first principle was the view of most Platonists before Plotinus, including his fellow-pupil of Ammonius, Origen the Platonist (to be distinguished from Origen the Christian). See Origen fr. 7 Weber (= Proclus *Platonic Theology* II 4, p. 31, 5–11 Saffrey-Westerink). H. R. Schwyzer has suggested that Ammonius himself may have held a view closer to that of Plotinus (*Ammonios Sakkas, der Lehrer Plotins*, Opladen 1983, 72–78).

being also itself one by something else: it too experiences this unity by the act of another.

2. Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and its one are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole substance and being and one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered the one, and substance itself is the one itself: for example, if intellect is substance, intellect is also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things a share in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one.[1] For what can anyone say that it is besides being and intellect? For it is either the same as being—for "man" and "one man" are the same thing—or it is like a kind of number of the individual; you say "one" of a thing alone just as you say "two things". Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and we must investigate what it is. But if numbering is an activity of soul going through things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. But our argument said that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see if the individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and the universal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible for the one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate

εἴη ἑκάτερον. ἄνθρωπος γοῦν καὶ ζῷον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ πολλὰ μέρη καὶ συνδεῖται ἑνὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα· ἄλλο ἄρα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἕν, εἰ τὸ μὲν μεριστόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμερές. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ὂν πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχον τὰ ὄντα πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑνός, μεταλήψει δὲ ἔχον καὶ μεθέξει τὸ ἕν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ζωὴν [καὶ νοῦν][1] τὸ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ νεκρόν· πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ὄν. εἰ δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴη, καὶ οὕτω πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, εἰ τὰ εἴδη περιέχοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἰδέα ἕν, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς μᾶλλον καὶ ἑκάστη καὶ ἡ σύμπασα, καὶ οὕτως ἕν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη[2] ὁ κόσμος ἕν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ νοῦς καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὸ ὂν οὐ πρῶτα. εἶδός τε γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ σύνθετον καὶ ὕστερον· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι, πρότερα ἐκεῖνα. ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸν νοῦν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον ἔσται· τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τόν γε ἄριστον καὶ τὸν οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντα νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διπλοῦς ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς οὐδὲ τὸ ἕν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ οὕτως δεύτερον. καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι, οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ

[1] del. Harder.
[2] Harder: εἰ ἦ wBCQ: εἰ ἦν U: εἰ καὶ x.

"man" and "living being" and "rational" are many parts and these many are bound together by the one. "Man" and "one" are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. And, further, universal being, which has all the beings in it, will be still more many and different from the one, and will have the one by sharing and participation. But being also has life; for it is certainly not a corpse; being therefore is many things. But if it is intellect, in this way too it must be many; and still more if it includes the Forms. For the Idea is not one, but rather a number, both each individual one and the total Idea, and is one in the way in which the universe is one. But altogether the one is primary and the Forms and being are not primary. For each Form is of many parts and composite and posterior; for those elements from which an individual thing is composed are prior to it. And it is clear also from the following that intellect cannot be the first: it is necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and that the best intellect, the one which does not look outside itself, thinks what is before it[1]; for in turning to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one; but if it looks to another, it must certainly be to that which is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of such a kind that it is present to the good and the first

[1] Here Plotinus is developing and correcting Aristotle's account of the self-thinking divine mind in *Metaphysics* Λ 9. 1074b15–1075a12.

πρώτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκεῖνον, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ ἑαυτῷ νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὄντα τὰ πάντα. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ἓν εἶναι ποικίλον ὄντα. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν τὰ πάντα ἔσται, οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη· οὐδὲ νοῦς, καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἴη τὰ πάντα τοῦ νοῦ τὰ πάντα ὄντος· οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ὂν τὰ πάντα.

3. Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη τὸ ἓν καὶ τίνα φύσιν ἔχον; ἢ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι, ὅπου μηδὲ τὸ ὂν ῥᾴδιον μηδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν γνῶσις εἴδεσιν ἐπερειδομένη. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν εἰς ἀνείδεον ἡ ψυχὴ ἴῃ, ἐξαδυνατοῦσα περιλαβεῖν τῷ μὴ ὁρίζεσθαι καὶ οἷον τυποῦσθαι ὑπὸ ποικίλου τοῦ τυποῦντος ἐξολισθάνει καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ. διὸ κάμνει ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἀσμένη καταβαίνει πολλάκις ἀποπίπτουσα ἀπὸ πάντων, μέχρις ἂν εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἥκῃ ἐν στερεῷ ὥσπερ ἀναπαυομένη· οἷον καὶ ἡ ὄψις κάμνουσα ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀσμένως περιπίπτει. καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἓν οὖσα τῷ ἓν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἴεταί πω ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὴ χρὴ οὕτως ποιεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τὸ ἓν φιλοσοφήσειν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἕν ἐστιν ὃ ζητοῦμεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἐπισκοποῦμεν, τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, οὔτε πόρρω δεῖ

[1] Plotinus may be thinking here of Numenius' comparison of the attempt to see the Good to someone

and looks to him, but is also present with itself and thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things. It is far, then, from being the one since it is richly various. The one then cannot be all things, for so it would be no longer one; and it cannot be intellect, for in this way it would be all things since intellect is all things; and it cannot be being; for being is all things.

3. What then could the One be, and what nature could it have? There is nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being or Form is; but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all. Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often gladly comes down and falls away from all this, till it comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid ground; just as sight when it gets tired of small objects is glad to come upon big ones.[1] But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought. But all the same this is what one must do if one is going to philosophise about the One. Since, then, that which we seek is one and we are considering the principle of all things, the Good and the First, one must not go far away from the things around the primary by

straining his eyes to catch sight of a little boat far away among the waves (fr. 2 des Places, 11 Leemans).

γενέσθαι τῶν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν πάντων πεσόντα, ἀλλ' ἰέμενον εἰς τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐσχάτων ὄντων, κακίας τε πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένον εἶναι ἅτε πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα γενέσθαι, ἐπί τε τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἀναβεβηκέναι καὶ ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον. νοῦν τοίνυν χρὴ γενόμενον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αὐτοῦ νῷ πιστεύσαντα καὶ ὑφιδρύσαντα, ἵν' ἃ[1] ὁρᾷ ἐκεῖνος ἐγρηγορυῖα δέχοιτο, τούτῳ θεᾶσθαι τὸ ἓν οὐ προστιθέντα αἴσθησιν οὐδεμίαν οὐδέ τι παρ' αὐτῆς εἰς ἐκεῖνον δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ τὸ καθαρώτατον θεᾶσθαι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρώτῳ. ὅταν τοίνυν ὁ ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐσταλμένος ἢ μέγεθος ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ὄγκον περὶ ταύτην τὴν φύσιν φαντασθῇ, οὐ νοῦς τούτῳ ἡγεμὼν γίνεται τῆς θέας, ὅτι μὴ νοῦς τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης ἑπομένης αἰσθήσει ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλὰ δεῖ λαβεῖν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ὧν δύναται. δύναται δὲ ὁρᾶν ὁ νοῦς [ἢ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ][2] ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸ[3] αὐτοῦ. καθαρὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἔτι δὲ καθαρώτερα καὶ ἁπλούστερα τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ νοῦς τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ νοῦ· τὶ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὔ τι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὄν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὂν οἷον μορφὴν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει, ἄμορφον δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς. γεννητικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις οὖσα τῶν πάντων οὐδέν ἐστιν αὐτῶν. οὔτε οὖν τι οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε ψυχήν· οὐδὲ

[1] A[3] (= Ficinus): ἵνα Enn.
[2] del. Igal.
[3] Igal: παρ' Enn.

falling down to the last things of all, but as one goes to the primary one must lift oneself up from the things of sense which are the last and lowest, and become freed from all evil since one is hastening to the Good, and ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One. Therefore one must become Intellect and entrust one's soul to and set it firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to receive what that sees, and may by this Intellect behold the One, without adding any sense-perception or receiving anything from sense-perception into that Intellect, but beholding the most pure with the pure Intellect, and the primary part of Intellect. When therefore he who is embarked on the contemplation of this kind imagines size or shape or bulk about this nature, it is not Intellect which guides his contemplation because Intellect is not of a nature to see things of this kind, but the activity is one of sense-perception and opinion following sense-perception. But one must take one's information from Intellect where it is competent. And Intellect is competent to see its own things and the things before it. The things in it also are pure, but those before it are purer and simpler—or rather that which is before it. It is not therefore Intellect, but before Intellect. For Intellect is one of the beings, but that is not anything, but before each and every thing, and is not being; for being has a kind of shape of being, but that has no shape, not even intelligible shape. For since the nature of the One is generative of all things it is not any one of them. It is not therefore something or qualified or quantitative or intellect or soul; it is not in movement or at rest,

κινούμενον οὐδ' αὖ ἑστώς, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, οὐκ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ[1] καθ' αὑτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνείδεον πρὸ εἴδους ὂν παντὸς, πρὸ κινήσεως, πρὸ στάσεως· ταῦτα γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἃ πολλὰ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ. διὰ τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ κινούμενον, οὐχ ἑστώς; ὅτι περὶ μὲν τὸ ὂν τούτων θάτερον ἢ ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη, τό τε ἑστὼς στάσει ἑστὼς καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ στάσει· ὥστε συμβήσεται αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκέτι ἁπλοῦν μενεῖ.[2] ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἐστι συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔχομέν τι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ· δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνου" μηδὲ "ὄντος"[3] λέγειν ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς οἷον ἔξωθεν περιθέοντας τὰ αὐτῶν ἑρμηνεύειν ἐθέλειν πάθη ὁτὲ μὲν ἐγγύς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀποπίπτοντας ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸ ἀπορίαις.

4. Γίνεται δὲ ἡ ἀπορία μάλιστα, ὅτι μηδὲ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἡ σύνεσις ἐκείνου μηδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα. πάσχει δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόστασιν καὶ οὐ πάντη ἐστὶν ἕν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμην του λαμβάνῃ· λόγος γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, πολλὰ δὲ ὁ λόγος. παρέρχεται οὖν τὸ ἓν εἰς ἀριθμὸν καὶ πλῆθος πεσοῦσα. ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμην τοίνυν δεῖ δραμεῖν καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐκβαίνειν τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀποστῆναι δεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητῶν καὶ παντὸς ἄλλου καὶ καλοῦ θεάματος. πᾶν

[1] Heintz: ἀλλὰ τὸ Enn.
[2] Dodds: μένει Enn.
[3] Page: ὄντως Enn.

not in place, not in time,[1] but "itself by itself of single form",[2] or rather formless, being before all form, before movement and before rest; for these pertain to being and are what make it many. Why, then, if it is not in movement is it not at rest? Because each or both of these must necessarily pertain to being, and what is at rest is so by rest and is not the same as rest; so rest will be incidental to it and it will not be the same as rest. For to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself; but one who speaks precisely should not say "that" or "is"; but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about it.

4. The perplexity arises especially because our awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge. The soul experiences its falling away from being one and is not altogether one when it has reasoned knowledge of anything; for reasoned knowledge is a rational process, and a rational process is many. The soul therefore goes past the One and falls into number and multiplicity. One must therefore run up above knowledge and in no way depart from being one, but one must depart from knowledge and things known, and from every other, even beautiful, object of vision. For every

[1] This comes from an established Platonic-Pythagorean exegesis of the First Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*.
[2] Plato *Symposium* 211B1.

γὰρ καλὸν ὕστερον ἐκείνου καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ πᾶν φῶς μεθημερινὸν παρ' ἡλίου. διὸ ο ὐ δ ὲ ῥ η τ ὸ ν οὐδὲ γραπτόν, φησίν, ἀλλὰ λέγομεν καὶ γράφομεν πέμποντες εἰς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνεγείροντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν ὥσπερ ὁδὸν δεικνύντες τῷ τι θεάσασθαι βουλομένῳ. μέχρι γὰρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ δίδαξις, ἡ δὲ θέα αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἤδη τοῦ ἰδεῖν βεβουλημένου. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦλθέ τις ἐπὶ τὸ θέαμα, μηδὲ σύνεσιν ἔσχεν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀγλαΐας μηδὲ ἔπαθε μηδὲ ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον ἐρωτικὸν πάθημα ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἐραστοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐρᾷ ἀναπαυσαμένου, δεξάμενος[1] φῶς ἀληθινὸν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν περιφωτίσαν[2] διὰ τὸ ἐγγυτέρω γεγονέναι, ἀναβεβηκέναι δὲ ἔτι ὀπισθοβαρὴς ὑπάρχων, ἃ ἐμπόδια ἦν τῇ θέᾳ, καὶ οὐ μόνος ἀναβεβηκώς, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὸ διεῖργον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἢ μήπω εἰς ἓν συναχθείς—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄπεστιν οὐδενὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ πάντων δέ, ὥστε παρὼν μὴ παρεῖναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις, ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θιγεῖν ὁμοιότητι· καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἤδη δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι—εἰ οὖν μήπω ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἔξω, ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦντος λόγου καὶ πίστιν περὶ αὐτοῦ παρεχομένου, δι' ἐκεῖνα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐν αἰτίᾳ

[1] Kirchhoff: δεξάμενον Enn.
[2] suspic. Harder: περιφωτίσας Enn.

beautiful thing is posterior to that One, and comes from it, as all the light of day comes from the sun. Therefore, Plato says, "it cannot be spoken or written",[1] but we speak and write impelling towards it and wakening from reasonings to the vision of it, as if showing the way to someone who wants to have a view of something. For teaching goes as far as the road and the travelling, but the vision is the task of someone who has already resolved to see. But if someone has not come to the vision, and his soul has no awareness of the glory there, and he has not experienced and does not have in himself in seeing a kind of passionate experience like that of a lover resting in the beloved, then, having received the true light and illumined his whole soul through drawing nearer, but being still held back in the ascent by a burden which hinders the vision, and having ascended not alone but taking something with him which keeps him from the One, or being not yet brought together into unity—for that One is not absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to those who are able and prepared to receive it, so as to be in accord with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their likeness; and, by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One, when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen—if then someone is not yet there but is outside because of these impediments, or through lack of a reasoning to guide him and give him assurance about the One, let him blame himself for those hindrances and try to

[1] Plato *Letter* VII 341C5.

τιθέσθω, καὶ πειράσθω ἀποστὰς πάντων μόνος εἶναι, ἃ δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπιστεῖ ἐλλείπων, ὧδε διανοείσθω.

5. Ὅστις οἴεται τὰ ὄντα τύχῃ καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ διοικεῖσθαι καὶ σωματικαῖς συνέχεσθαι αἰτίαις, οὗτος πόρρω ἀπελήλαται καὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐννοίας ἑνός, καὶ ὁ λόγος οὐ πρὸς τούτους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλην φύσιν παρὰ τὰ σώματα τιθεμένους καὶ ἀνιόντας ἐπὶ ψυχήν. καὶ δὴ δεῖ τούτους φύσιν ψυχῆς κατανενοηκέναι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὡς παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ λόγου παρὰ τούτου κοινωνήσασα ἀρετὴν ἴσχει· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα νοῦν λαβεῖν ἕτερον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ λογιστικοῦ καλουμένου, καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἤδη οἷον ἐν διαστάσει καὶ κινήσει, καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας λόγους ἐν ψυχῇ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐν φανερῷ ἤδη γεγονυίας τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεγονέναι τὸν νοῦν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἴτιον. καὶ νοῦν ἰδόντα οἷον αἰσθητὸν τῷ ἀντιληπτὸν εἶναι ἐπαναβεβηκότα τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πατέρα αὐτῆς ὄντα κόσμον νοητόν, νοῦν ἥσυχον καὶ ἀτρεμῆ κίνησιν φατέον πάντα ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα ὄντα, πλῆθος ἀδιάκριτον καὶ αὖ διακεκριμένον. οὔτε γὰρ διακέκριται ὡς οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἤδη καθ' ἓν νοούμενοι, οὔτε συγκέχυται τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· πρόεισι γὰρ ἕκαστον χωρίς· οἷον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις πάντων ἐν ἀμερεῖ ὄντων ὅμως ἐστὶν ἕκαστον χωρὶς αὐτῶν. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ὁμοῦ πλῆθος, ὁ κόσμος ὁ νοητός, ἔστι μὲν ὃ πρὸς τῷ πρώτῳ,

depart from all things and be alone, but as for what he disbelieves because he is deficient in his reasonings, let him consider the following.

5. Whoever thinks that reality is governed by chance and accident and held together by bodily causes is far removed from God and from the idea of the One, and our discourse is not directed to these people but to those who posit another nature besides bodies and have gone up as far as soul. Now these must come to an understanding of the soul, in other ways and especially that it derives from Intellect, and that it is by sharing in the rational principle which comes from it that it possesses virtue; after this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other than that which is called reasoning and reckoning, and that reasonings are already in a kind of separation and motion, and that our bodies of knowledge are rational principles in the soul and of a kind which have already become manifest there because Intellect the cause of knowledges has become present in the soul. And when one has seen Intellect as something like an object of sense because it is apprehended as transcending the soul and being its father, an intelligible universe, one must say that Intellect is a quiet and undisturbed movement, having all things in itself and being all things, a multiplicity which is undivided and yet again divided. For it is not divided as are the rational principles which are already thought one by one, nor are its contents confused; for each one proceeds separately; it is as it is in our bodies of knowledge, where all the items are in a partless whole and yet each of them is separate. This multiplicity all together, then, the intelligible universe, is what is near to the First, and our

καί φησιν αὐτὸ ὁ λόγος ἐξανάγκης εἶναι, εἴπερ τις καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ κυριώτερον ψυχῆς· οὐ μέντοι πρῶτον, ὅτι μὴ ἓν μηδὲ ἁπλοῦν· ἁπλοῦν δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡ πάντων ἀρχή. τὸ δὴ πρὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τιμιωτάτου, εἴπερ δεῖ τι πρὸ νοῦ εἶναι ἓν μὲν εἶναι βουλομένου, οὐκ ὄντος δὲ ἕν, ἑνοειδοῦς δέ, ὅτι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐσκέδασται ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν ἑαυτῷ ὄντως οὐ διαρτήσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ πλησίον μετὰ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἀποστῆναι δέ πως τοῦ ἑνὸς τολμήσας—τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν, ὃ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ' ἄλλου τὸ ἕν, ᾧ ὄνομα μὲν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσῆκον, εἴπερ δὲ δεῖ ὀνομάσαι, κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν προσηκόντως ἕν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν, χαλεπὸν μὲν γνωσθῆναι διὰ τοῦτο, γιγνωσκόμενον δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννήματι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ—καὶ ἄγει εἰς οὐσίαν νοῦς—καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη, ὡς πηγὴν τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν γεννῶσαν τὰ ὄντα μένουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐλαττουμένην οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς οὖσαν. ὅ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ὀνομάζομεν ἕν ἐξανάγκης τῷ σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις αὐτὴν τῷ ὀνόματι εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀμέριστον ἄγοντες καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑνοῦν θέλοντες, οὐχ οὕτως ἓν λέγοντες καὶ ἀμερές, ὡς σημεῖον

[1] Normally, in this treatise as elsewhere in the *Enneads*, intellect does not "lead to" substance: the two are identical. Perhaps Plotinus means that it is intellect *in us* that leads us to substance, and inserts this parenthesis to remind his readers, in the middle of his account of the supra-intellectual way to the One, that this can only begin when the intellectual way has reached its goal.

argument says that it must necessarily exist, if one says that the soul exists, and that it must be of higher authority than soul; it is not, however, the First, because it is not one nor simple; but the One is simple and the principle of all things. Now that which is prior to what is most honourable among real beings, given that there must be something before Intellect which wants to be one but is not one, but in unitary form, because Intellect is not dispersed in itself but is in reality all together with itself and its nearness after the One has kept it from dividing itself, though it did somehow dare to stand away from the One—that which is before this Intellect, this marvel of the One, which is not existent, so that "one" may not here also have to be predicated of something else, which in truth has no fitting name, but if we must give it a name, "one" would be an appropriate ordinary way of speaking of it, not in the sense of something else and then one; this is difficult to know for this reason, but can be better known from its product, substance—and it is intellect which leads to substance[1]—and its nature is of such a kind that it is the source of the best and the power which generates the real beings, abiding in itself and not being diminished and not being one of the things which it brought into being. Whatever is even before these, we give the name of "One" to by necessity, to indicate its nature to one another, bringing ourselves by the name to an indivisible idea and wanting to unify our souls; we do not when we

ἢ μονάδα λέγομεν·[1] τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἓν ποσοῦ ἀρχαί, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ὑπέστη μὴ προούσης οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ πρὸ οὐσίας· οὔκουν δεῖ ἐνταῦθα βάλλειν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁμοίως αἰεὶ ἐκείνοις ἐν ἀναλογίαις τῷ ἁπλῷ καὶ τῇ φυγῇ τοῦ πλήθους καὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ.

6. Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ἕν, καὶ πῶς τῇ νοήσει ἐφαρμοστέον; ἢ πλεόνως τιθέμενον ἓν ἢ ὡς μονὰς καὶ σημεῖον ἐνίζεται. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος ἡ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πλῆθος καταλήγει εἰς τὸ σμικρότατον καὶ ἐπερείδεταί τινι ἀμερεῖ μέν, ἀλλὰ ὃ ἦν ἐν μεριστῷ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ· τὸ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν μεριστῷ οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερές, ὡς τὸ μικρότατον· μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἀμέγεθες δυνάμει· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ ὄντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμέριστα καὶ ἀμερῆ, οὐ τοῖς ὄγκοις. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως. ὅταν γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσῃς οἷον ἢ νοῦν ἢ θεόν, πλέον ἐστί· καὶ αὖ ὅταν αὐτὸν ἑνίσῃς τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα πλέον ἐστὶν ἢ ὅσον[2] ἂν αὐτὸν ἐφαντάσθης εἰς τὸ ἑνικώτερον τῆς σῆς νοήσεως εἶναι· ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος. τῷ αὐτάρκει δ' ἄν

[1] Harder: λέγοντες Enn.
[2] Gollwitzer: θεὸν Enn.

[1] This is, perhaps, the clearest explanation in the *Enneads* of the way in which Plotinus intends his use of the terms "one" and "infinite" as applied to the First Principle

call it one and indivisible mean it in the sense of a point or a unit; for what are one in this way are principles of quantity, which could not have come to exist unless substance and that before substance had preceded it; so that is not where one should direct one's thought; but all the same these correspond to those higher things in their simplicity and avoidance of multiplicity and partition.

6. In what sense, then, do we call it one, and how are we to fit it into our thought? "One" must be understood in a larger sense than that in which a unity and a point are unified. For there the soul takes away size and multiplicity of number and comes to a stop at the smallest and rests its thought on something which is partless but was in something divisible and is in something else; but what is not in something else or in the divisible is not partless either in the same way as the smallest; for it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power, so that its sizelessness also is a matter of power; since the things after it also are indivisible and undivided in their powers, not in their bulks. And it must be understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended.[1] For when you think of him as Intellect or God, he is more; and when you unify him in your thought, here also the degree of unity by which he transcends your thought is more than you imagined it to be; for he is by himself without any incidental attributes. But someone could also think of his oneness in terms of self-

to be taken: they are to point beyond any comprehensible unit or unboundedness.

τις καὶ τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ἐνθυμηθείη.[1] δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανώτατον ⟨ὂν⟩[2] ἁπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέστατον, καὶ ἀνενδεέστατον εἶναι· πᾶν δὲ πολὺ καὶ [μὴ ἕν][3] ἐνδεὲς μὴ ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν γενόμενον. δεῖται οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἓν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ οὐ δεῖται ἑαυτοῦ· αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι. καὶ μὴν πολλὰ ὂν τοσούτων δεῖται, ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὂν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐνδεὲς τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχον, καὶ καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνδεὲς παρέχεται. εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τι αὐταρκέστατον εἶναι, τὸ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ τοιοῦτον ὂν μόνον, οἷον μήτε πρὸς αὐτὸ μήτε πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνδεὲς εἶναι. οὐ γάρ τι ζητεῖ, ἵνα ᾖ, οὐδ' ἵνα εὖ ᾖ, οὐδὲ ἵνα ἐκεῖ ἱδρυθῇ. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις αἴτιον ὂν οὐ παρ' ἄλλων ἔχει ὅ ἐστι, τό τε εὖ τί ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ ἔξω αὐτοῦ; ὥστε οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ· αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι. τόπος τε οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ· οὐ γὰρ δεῖται ἱδρύσεως ὥσπερ αὐτὸ φέρειν οὐ δυνάμενον, τό τε ἱδρυθησόμενον ἄψυχον καὶ ὄγκος πίπτων, ἐὰν μήπω ἱδρυθῇ. ἵδρυται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τοῦτον, δι' ὃν ὑπέστη ἅμα καὶ ἔσχεν εἰς ὃν ἐτάχθη τόπον· ἐνδεὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τόπον ζητοῦν. ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεὲς τῶν μετ' αὐτό· ἡ δ' ἁπάντων ἀρχὴ ἀνενδεὲς ἁπάντων. ὅ τι γὰρ ἐνδεές, ἐφιέμενον ἀρχῆς ἐνδεές· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐνδεές του, ζητεῖ δηλονότι τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕν· ὥστε ἐνδεὲς ἔσται τοῦ φθεροῦντος· πᾶν δὲ ὃ ἂν λέγηται ἐνδεές, τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ σῴζοντός ἐστιν ἐνδεές. ὥστε τῷ

[1] Gollwitzer: ἓν οὐ μὴ θείη Enn.
[2] Harder.
[3] del. Puelma.

sufficiency. For since he is the most sufficient and independent of all things, he must also be the most without need; but everything which is many is also in need unless it becomes one from many. Therefore its substance needs to be one. But the One does not need itself: for it is itself. Certainly anything which is many needs all the things which it is, and each of the things in it, since it is with the others and not by itself, and exists in need of the others, makes a thing like this needy both in each single part and as a whole. Given, then, that there must be something supremely self-sufficient, it must be the One, which is the only thing of such a kind as not to be in need either in relation to itself or to anything else. For it does not seek anything for its being or for its well-being, or its establishment in its place. For since it is the cause of the others it does not have from the others what it is, and what could its well-being be outside itself? So its well-being is not incidental to it: for it is itself. And it has no place: for it needs no establishment as if unable to support itself; and that which has to be established is soulless and a mass which falls if it is not yet established. And the other things are established through him, through whom they at once exist and have the place to which they are assigned; but that which is looking for its place is in need. But a principle is not in need of the things which come after it, and the principle of all things needs none of them. For whatever is in need is in need as striving towards its principle; but if the One is in need of anything, it is obviously seeking not to be one; so it will be in need of its destroyer; but everything which is said to be in need is in need of its well-being and its preserver. So that there is nothing

ἑνὶ οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ βούλησις τοίνυν οὐδενός· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ αὐτὸ οὐχ ἑαυτῷ, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀγαθόν, εἴ τι αὐτοῦ δύναται μεταλαμβάνειν. οὐδὲ νόησις, ἵνα μὴ ἑτερότης· οὐδὲ κίνησις· πρὸ γὰρ κινήσεως καὶ πρὸ νοήσεως. τί γὰρ καὶ νοήσει; ἑαυτόν; πρὸ νοήσεως τοίνυν ἀγνοῶν ἔσται, καὶ νοήσεως δεήσεται, ἵνα γνῷ ἑαυτὸν ὁ αὐτάρκης ἑαυτῷ. οὐ τοίνυν, ὅτι μὴ γινώσκει μηδὲ νοεῖ ἑαυτόν, ἄγνοια περὶ αὐτὸν ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια ἑτέρου ὄντος γίγνεται, ὅταν θάτερον ἀγνοῇ θάτερον· τὸ δὲ μόνον οὔτε γιγνώσκει, οὔτε τι ἔχει ὃ ἀγνοεῖ, ἓν δὲ ὂν συνὸν αὐτῷ οὐ δεῖται νοήσεως ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἵνα τηρῇς τὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι[1] ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν νοοῦντα δεῖ τάττειν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν νόησιν. νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, ἀλλ' αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἄλλῳ· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ αἰτιατῷ. τὸ δὲ πάντων αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐκείνων. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν λεκτέον τοῦτο, ὃ παρέχει, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως τἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθά.

7. Εἰ δ' ὅτι μηδὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἀοριστεῖς τῇ γνώμῃ, στῆσον σαυτὸν εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων θεῶ· θεῶ δὲ μὴ ἔξω ῥίπτων τὴν διάνοιαν. οὐ γὰρ κεῖταί που ἐρημῶσαν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ δυναμένῳ θιγεῖν ἀεὶ[2] παρόν, τῷ δ' ἀδυνατοῦντι οὐ πάρεστιν. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἔστι τι νοεῖν ἄλλο νοοῦντα καὶ πρὸς

[1] Preller: συνιέναι Enn.
[2] suspic. Harder, approb. Puelma: ἐκεῖ Enn.

good for the One; so then it does not wish for anything; but it transcends good, and is good not for itself but for the others, if anything is able to participate in it. And it does not think, because there is no otherness; and it does not move: for it is before movement and before thought. For what will he be able to think? Himself? Then before his thinking he will be ignorant, and will need thinking in order to know himself, he who suffices for himself. There is, then, no ignorance about him because he does not know or think himself; for ignorance is of what is other, when one thing is ignorant of another; but the One alone does not know and has nothing of which it is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself does not need thought of itself. For in order to keep to the one you should not add the "in union", but take away thinking and being in union and thought of itself and of the others; for we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather on that of the thought. But thought does not think, but is a cause of thought to another; and the cause is not the same as what is caused. But the cause of all things is none of them. So we must not even call this One good, the good which he gives, but the Good in another way beyond all goods.

7. But if because it is none of these things you become indefinite in your thought of it, stand fast on these and contemplate it from these. But contemplate it without casting your thought outwards. For it does not lie somewhere leaving the other things empty of it, but is always present to anyone who is able to touch it, but is not present to the one who is unable. But, just as with other things it is not possible to think anything when one is thinking

ἄλλῳ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μηδὲν προσάπτειν τῷ νοουμένῳ, ἵν' ᾖ αὐτὸ τὸ νοούμενον, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλου ἔχοντα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύπον ἐκεῖνο νοῆσαι ἐνεργοῦντος τοῦ τύπου, οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλοις κατειλημμένην τήν ψυχὴν καὶ κατεχομένην τυπωθῆναι τῷ τοῦ ἐναντίου τύπῳ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα ἄποιον εἶναι δεῖ πάντων, εἰ μέλλει δέχεσθαι τοὺς πάντων τύπους, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀνείδεον τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἐγκαθήμενον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς πλήρωσιν καὶ ἔλλαμψιν αὐτῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς πρώτης. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πάντων τῶν ἔξω ἀφεμένην δεῖ ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἴσω πάντη, μὴ πρός τι τῶν ἔξω κεκλίσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοήσαντα τὰ πάντα καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν τῇ αἰσθήσει,[1] τότε δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἀγνοήσαντα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ θέᾳ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι, κἀκείνῳ συγγενόμενον καὶ ἱκανῶς οἷον ὁμιλήσαντα ἥκειν ἀγγέλλοντα, εἰ δύναιτο, καὶ ἄλλῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν· οἵαν ἴσως καὶ Μίνως ποιούμενος ὁ ἀριστὴς τοῦ Διὸς ἐφημίσθη εἶναι, ἧς μεμνημένος εἴδωλα αὐτῆς τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθει τῇ τοῦ θείου ἐπαφῇ εἰς νόμων πληρούμενος θέσιν. ἢ καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ οὐκ ἄξια αὐτοῦ νομίσας ἀεί[2] ἐθέλει μένειν ἄνω, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ πολὺ ἰδόντι γένοιτο ἂν πάθημα.

[1] Page: διαθέσει Enn.
[2] van Winden: νομίσασα εἰ Enn.

[1] A summary paraphrase of Plato *Timaeus* 50D–E.
[2] The quotation is from *Odyssey* 19. 178–9. But Plotinus may have taken it from the account of Minos in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue of that title (*Minos* 318E–320D) which he is using here.

something else and has one's mind on something else, but one must add nothing to what is being thought about, that it may really be it which is being thought about, so here one must know that it is not possible when one has the impression of something else in one's soul to think that One while the impression is acting, and that the soul when it is taken up with and possessed by other things cannot take the impression of the opposite; but just as it is said of matter that it must be free from all qualities if it is going to receive the impressions of all things,[1] so much more must the soul be without form if there is going to be no obstacle settled in it to its fulfilment and illumination by the first nature. But if this is so, the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignoring itself, come to be in contemplation of that One, and having been in its company and had, so to put it, sufficient converse with it, come and announce, if it could, to another that transcendent union. Perhaps also it was because Minos attained this kind of union that he was said in the story to be "the familiar friend of Zeus",[2] and it was in remembering this that he laid down laws in its image, being filled full of lawgiving by the divine touch. Or, also, he may think civic matters unworthy of him and want to remain always above; this is liable to happen to one who has seen much. Plato says the One is not outside anything,[3]

[3] Plato *Parmenides* 138E4.

οὐδενός φησίν ἐστιν ἔξω, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι σύνεστιν οὐκ εἰδόσι. φεύγουσι γὰρ αὐτοὶ αὐτοῦ ἔξω, μᾶλλον δὲ αὑτῶν ἔξω. οὐ δύνανται οὖν ἐλεῖν ὃν πεφεύγασιν, οὐδ' αὐτοὺς ἀπολωλεκότες ἄλλον ζητεῖν, οὐδέ γε παῖς αὐτοῦ ἔξω ἐν μανίᾳ γεγενημένος εἰδήσει τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δὲ μαθὼν ἑαυτὸν εἰδήσει καὶ ὁπόθεν.

8. Εἴ τις οὖν ψυχὴ οἶδεν ἑαυτὴν τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, καὶ οἶδεν ὅτι ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς οὐκ εὐθεῖα, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅταν κλάσιν λάβῃ, ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις οἷα ἡ ἐν κύκλῳ περί τι οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλὰ περὶ κέντρον, τὸ δὲ κέντρον ἀφ' οὗ ὁ κύκλος, κινήσεται περὶ τοῦτο, ἀφ' οὗ ἐστι, καὶ τούτου[1] ἀναρτήσεται συμφέρουσα ἑαυτὴν πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, πρὸς ὃ ἐχρῆν μὲν πάσας, φέρονται δὲ αἱ θεῶν ἀεί· πρὸς ὃ φερόμεναι θεοί εἰσι. θεὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνῳ συνημμένον, τὸ δὲ πόρρω ἀφιστάμενον ἄνθρωπος ὁ πολὺς καὶ θηρίον. τὸ οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς οἷον κέντρον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον; ἢ ἄλλο τι δεῖ νομίσαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα οἷον κέντρα συμπίπτει; καὶ ὅτι ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ κέντρον τοῦδε τοῦ κύκλου; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτω κύκλος ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς τὸ σχῆμα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ ἀρχαία

[1] Kirchhoff: τοῦτο Enn.

[1] The phrase "the ancient nature" of the soul occurs in Plato at *Symposium* 192E9 (Aristophanes' story), *Republic* X 611D2 (the simile of the sea-god Glaucus) and *Timaeus* 90D5 (in the context of the education of the soul). In all these places it means the true original nature of soul.

but is in company with all without their knowing. For they run away outside it, or rather outside themselves. They cannot then catch the one they have run away from, nor seek for another when they have lost themselves. A child, certainly, who is outside himself in madness will not know his father; but he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he comes.

8. If then a soul knows itself for the rest of the time, and knows that its movement is not in a straight line, except when there is a kind of break in it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside but a centre, and the centre is that from which the circle derives, then it will move around this from which it is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord with that which all souls ought to, and the souls of the gods always do; and it is by bringing themselves into accord with it that they are gods. For a god is what is linked to that centre, but that which stands far from it is a multiple human being or a beast. Is then this, as it were, centre of the soul what we are looking for? Or should we think it is something else in which all such centres coincide? And that the centre of the circle here below is only like it analogically? For the soul is not a circle in the same way as a geometrical figure, but because there is in it and around it the ancient nature,[1] and because it comes

Plotinus uses it again in this sense at VI. 5. 1. 16 and this must be its meaning here. Harder gives a different explanation of the passage based on the interpretation of "the ancient nature" as matter in I. 8. 7. 6. See his note *ad loc.*

φύσις, καὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ τοιούτου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ὅτι χωρισθεῖσαι ὅλαι. νῦν δέ, ἐπεὶ μέρος ἡμῶν κατέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς πόδας ἔχοι ἐν ὕδατι, τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ σώματι ὑπερέχοι, τῷ δὴ μὴ βαπτισθέντι τῷ σώματι ὑπεράραντες, τούτῳ συνάπτομεν κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ, καθάπερ τῶν μεγίστων κύκλων τὰ κέντρα τῷ τῆς σφαίρας τῆς περιεχούσης κέντρῳ, ἀναπαυόμενοι. εἰ μὲν οὖν σωματικοὶ ἦσαν, οὐ ψυχικοὶ κύκλοι, τοπικῶς ἂν τῷ κέντρῳ συνῆπτον καί που κειμένου τοῦ κέντρου περὶ αὐτὸ ἂν ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐταί τε αἱ ψυχαὶ νοηταί, ὑπὲρ νοῦν τε ἐκεῖνο, δυνάμεσιν ἄλλαις, ᾗ πέφυκε τὸ νοοῦν πρὸς τὸ κατανοούμενον συνάπτειν, οἰητέον τὴν συναφὴν γίνεσθαι καὶ πλεόνως τὸ νοοῦν παρεῖναι ὁμοιότητι καὶ ταὐτότητι καὶ συνάπτειν τῷ συγγενεῖ οὐδενὸς διείργοντος. σώμασι μὲν γὰρ σώματα κωλύεται κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα σώμασιν οὐ διείργεται· οὐδ' ἀφέστηκε τοίνυν ἀλλήλων τόπῳ, ἑτερότητι δὲ καὶ διαφορᾷ· ὅταν οὖν ἡ ἑτερότης μὴ παρῇ, ἀλλήλοις τὰ μὴ ἕτερα πάρεστιν. ἐκεῖνο μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔχον ἑτερότητα ἀεὶ πάρεστιν, ἡμεῖς δ' ὅταν μὴ ἔχωμεν· κἀκεῖνο μὲν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐφίεται, ὥστε περὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνου, ὥστε ἡμεῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνο. καὶ ἀεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτό, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπομεν, ἀλλ' οἷον χορὸς ἐξῆς ᾄδων[1] καίπερ ἔχων περὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον τραπείη ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔξω τῆς θέας, ὅταν δὲ ἐπιστρέψῃ, ᾄδει τε καλῶς

[1] ἐξῆς ᾄδων Puelma: ἐξάδων Enn.

from an origin of this kind, and because souls are wholly separated. But now, since a part of us is held by the body, as if someone had his feet in water, but the rest of his body was above it, we lift ourselves up by the part which is not submerged in the body and by this join ourselves at our own centres to something like the centre of all things, just as the centres of the greatest circles join the centre of the encompassing sphere, and we are at rest. If then our circles were bodily, not soul-circles, they would be in touch with the centre at a place; the centre would be in some place and they would be around it; but since the souls themselves belong to the realm of Intellect and that One transcends Intellect, we must suppose that the contact takes place by other powers, in the way in which the thinker is naturally united to the thought, and that the thinker is present more completely by sameness and otherness and joined to what is akin to it with nothing to keep them apart. For bodies are hindered from communion with each other by bodies, but incorporeal things are not kept apart by bodies; nor are they separated in place, but by otherness and difference; when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One, therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness; and the One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it. And we are always around it but do not always look to it; it is like a choral dance: in the order of its singing the choir keeps round its conductor but may sometimes turn away, so that he is out of their sight, but when it turns back to him it sings beautifully and is truly

καὶ ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀεὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτόν—καὶ ὅταν μή,[1] λύσις ἡμῖν παντελὴς ἔσται καὶ οὐκέτι ἐσόμεθα—οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ εἰς αὐτόν· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἴδωμεν, τότε ἡμῖν τέλος καὶ ἀνάπαυλα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπᾴδειν χορεύουσιν ὄντως περὶ αὐτὸν χορείαν ἔνθεον.

9. Ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ χορείᾳ καθορᾷ πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς, πηγὴν δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, ῥίζαν ψυχῆς· οὐκ ἐκχεομένων ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, εἶτ' ἐκεῖνον ἐλαττούντων· οὐ γὰρ ὄγκος· ἢ φθαρτὰ ἂν ἦν τὰ γεννώμενα. νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ἀίδια, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ὡσαύτως μένει οὐ μεμερισμένη εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλ' ὅλη μένουσα. διὸ κἀκεῖνα μένει· οἷον εἰ μένοντος ἡλίου καὶ τὸ φῶς μένοι. οὐ γὰρ ἀποτετμήμεθα οὐδὲ χωρίς ἐσμεν, εἰ καὶ παρεμπεσοῦσα ἡ σώματος φύσις πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡμᾶς εἵλκυσεν, ἀλλ' ἐμπνέομεν[2] καὶ σῳζόμεθα οὐ δόντος, εἶτ' ἀποστάντος ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ χορηγοῦντος ἕως ἂν ᾖ ὅπερ ἐστί. μᾶλλον μέντοι ἐσμὲν νεύσαντες πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ ⟨δὲ⟩[3] πόρρω εἶναι μόνον καὶ ἧττον εἶναι. ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀναπαύεται ψυχὴ καὶ κακῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸν τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸν τόπον ἀναδραμοῦσα· καὶ νοεῖ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ ἀπαθὴς ἐνταῦθα. καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς ζῆν ἐνταῦθα· τὸ γὰρ νῦν καὶ τὸ ἄνευ θεοῦ ἴχνος ζωῆς ἐκείνην μιμούμενον,[4] τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἐνέργεια μὲν νοῦ· ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ γεννᾷ θεοὺς ἐν ἡσύχῳ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἐπαφῇ, γεννᾷ δὲ κάλλος, γεννᾷ δικαιοσύνην, ἀρετὴν γεννᾷ. ταῦτα γὰρ κύει ψυχὴ πληρωθεῖσα θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ μέν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, τέλος δέ, ὅτι τὸ

[1] Kirchhoff: ᾗ Enn.
[2] Kirchhoff: ἓν πνέομεν Enn.
[3] Müller.
[4] A^3 (= Ficinus): μιμουμένου Enn.

with him; so we too are always around him—and if we were not, we should be totally dissolved and no longer exist—but not always turned to him; but when we do look to him, then we are at our goal and at rest and do not sing out of tune as we truly dance our god-inspired dance around him.

9. And in this dance the soul sees the spring of life, the spring of intellect, the principle of being, the cause of good, the root of the soul; these are not poured out from him with the result that they diminish him; for there is no bulk; otherwise the things generated from him would be perishable. But as it is they are eternal, because their principle remains the same, not divided up into them but abiding as a whole. So they also abide; just as the light abides if the sun abides. For we are not cut off from him or separate, even if the nature of body has intruded and drawn us to itself, but we breathe and are preserved because that Good has not given its gifts and then gone away but is always bestowing them as long as it is what it is. But we exist more when we turn to him and our well-being is there, but being far from him is nothing else but existing less. There the soul takes its rest and is outside evils because it has run up into the place which is clear of evils; and it thinks there, and is not passive, and its true life is there; for our present life, the life without God, is a trace of life imitating that life. But life in that realm is the active actuality of Intellect; and the active actuality generates gods in quiet contact with that Good, and generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with God, and this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end

ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ. καὶ ἐκεῖ γενομένη γίγνεται αὐτὴ καὶ ὅπερ ἦν· τὸ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ καὶ πτερορρύησις. δηλοῖ δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ σύμφυτος, καθὸ καὶ συνέζευκται Ἔρως ταῖς Ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἕτερον θεοῦ ἐκείνη, ἐξ ἐκείνου δέ, ἐρᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐξανάγκης. καὶ οὖσα ἐκεῖ τὸν οὐράνιον Ἔρωτα ἔχει, ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάνδημος γίγνεται· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖ Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία, ἐνταῦθα δὲ γίγνεται πάνδημος οἷον ἑταιρισθεῖσα. καὶ ἔστι πᾶσα ψυχὴ Ἀφροδίτη· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια καὶ ὁ Ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος. ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλοῦ πατρὸς[1] καλὸν ἔρωτα. ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀλλαξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται· μισήσασα δὲ πάλιν τὰς ἐνταῦθα ὕβρεις ἀγνεύσασα τῶν τῇδε πρὸς τὸν πατέρα αὖθις στελλομένη εὐπαθεῖ. καὶ οἷς μὲν ἄγνωστόν ἐστι τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο, ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμείσθω ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐρώτων, οἷόν ἐστι τυχεῖν ὧν τις μάλιστα ἐρᾷ, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐρώμενα θνητὰ καὶ βλαβερὰ καὶ εἰδώλων ἔρωτες καὶ μεταπίπτει, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τὸ ὄντως ἐρώμενον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν οὐδ' ὃ

[1] Kirchhoff: πρὸς wBRCQ: om. JU.

[1] From the *Phaedrus* myth, 248C8.

[2] For the distinction of the two Aphrodites (which seems to have been a sort of Athenian homosexual in-joke, without foundation in cult or popular belief) see Plato *Symposium* 180D–E. It had, of course, a much more serious history from Plotinus onwards.

[3] *Symposium* 203B. Plotinus' fullest interpretation of the myth is III. 5. 7–9.

because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was; for what it is here and among the things of this world is a falling away and an exile and a "shedding of wings".[1] And the soul's innate love makes clear that the Good is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in pictures and stories. For since the soul is other than God but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him, and when it is there it has the heavenly love, but here love becomes vulgar; for the soul there is the heavenly Aphrodite, but here becomes the vulgar Aphrodite, a kind of whore.[2] And every soul is Aphrodite; and this is symbolised in the story of the birthday of Aphrodite and Eros who is born with her.[3] The soul then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him; it is like the noble love of a girl for her noble father. But when the soul has come into the world of becoming and is deceived, so to say, by the blandishments of her suitors, she changes, bereft of her father, to a mortal love and is shamed; but again she comes to hate her shames here below, and purifies herself of the things of this world and sets herself on the way to her father and fares well.[4] And if anyone does not know this experience, let him think of it in terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to attain what one is most in love with, and that these earthly loves are mortal and harmful and loves only of images, and that they change because it was not what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what

[4] Plotinus uses this comparison again at V. 5. 12. 37. But there it is not the beauty of the world of sense which draws the daughter away from the father, but the beauty of the intelligible: on this see my note *ad loc.*

ζητοῦμεν. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἔστι καὶ συνεῖναι μεταλαβόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα, οὐ περιπτυσσόμενον σαρξὶν ἔξωθεν. ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἄλλην ἴσχει τότε καὶ προσιοῦσα[1] καὶ ἤδη προσελθοῦσα καὶ μετασχοῦσα αὐτοῦ, ὥστε γνῶναι διατεθεῖσαν, ὅτι πάρεστιν ὁ χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι. τοὐναντίον δὲ ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι τούτῳ, καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι μόνον περικόψαντα τὰ λοιπὰ ὅσα περικείμεθα· ὥστε ἐξελθεῖν σπεύδειν ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα δεδεμένους, ἵνα τῷ ὅλῳ αὐτῶν περιπτυξώμεθα καὶ μηδὲν μέρος ἔχοιμεν, ᾧ μὴ ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ. ὁρᾶν δὴ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖνον καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὡς ὁρᾶν θέμις· ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἠγλαϊσμένον, φωτὸς πλήρη νοητοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸ καθαρόν, ἀβαρῆ, κοῦφον, θεὸν γενόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα, ἀναφθέντα μὲν τότε, εἰ δὲ πάλιν βαρύνοιτο, ὥσπερ μαραινόμενον.

10. Πῶς οὖν οὐ μένει ἐκεῖ; ἢ ὅτι μήπω ἐξελήλυθεν ὅλος. ἔσται δὲ ὅτε καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔσται τῆς θέας οὐκέτι ἐνοχλουμένῳ οὐδεμίαν ἐνόχλησιν τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἑωρακὸς οὐ τὸ ἐνοχλούμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλο, ὅτε τὸ ἑωρακὸς ἀργεῖ τὴν θέαν οὐκ ἀργοῦν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἐν ἀποδείξεσι καὶ πίστεσι καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς διαλογισμῷ· τὸ δὲ ἰδεῖν καὶ τὸ ἑωρακός ἐστιν οὐκέτι λόγος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ

[1] Kirchhoff: προϊοῦσα Enn.

[1] The phrase seems to have been a fairly commonplace one, used by a mystery-initiate when addressing others to avoid divulging secrets. See Pausanias I 37. 4–5 (where it is

we seek. But there is our true love, with whom also we can be united, having a part in him and truly possessing him, not embracing him in the flesh from outside. But "whoever has seen, knows what I am saying",[1] that the soul then has another life and draws near, and has already come near and has a part in him, and so is in a state to know that the giver of true life is present and we need nothing more. But quite otherwise, we must put away other things and take our stand only in this, and become this alone, cutting away all the other things in which we are encased; so we must be eager to go out from here and be impatient at being bound to the other things, that we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light—but rather itself pure light—weightless, floating free, having become—but rather, being—a god; set on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down again.

10. How is it, then, that one does not remain there? It is because one has not yet totally come out of this world. But there will be a time when the vision will be continuous, since there will no longer be any hindrance by the body. But it is not that which has seen which is hindered, but the other part which, when that which has seen rests from vision, does not rest from the knowledge which lies in demonstrations and evidence and the discourse of the soul; but seeing and that which has seen are not reason, but greater than reason and before reason

used in the very down-to-earth and unspiritual context of beans). Plotinus also uses it at I. 6. 7. 2.

λόγῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. ἑαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν τότε, ὅτε ὁρᾷ, τοιοῦτον ὄψεται, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἁπλοῦν γενόμενον. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ "ὄψεται" λεκτέον, τὸ δὲ "ὀφθέν", εἴπερ δεῖ δύο ταῦτα λέγειν, τό τε ὁρῶν καὶ ὁρώμενον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἓν ἄμφω· τολμηρὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος. τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὑτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κἀκείνου γενόμενος ἕν ἐστιν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα συνελθόντα ἕν ἐστι, τό τε δύο, ὅταν χωρίς. οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν λέγομεν ἕτερον. διὸ καὶ δύσφραστον τὸ θέαμα· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀπαγγείλειέ τις ὡς ἕτερον οὐκ ἰδὼν ἐκεῖ ὅτε ἐθεᾶτο ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτόν;

11. Τοῦτο δὴ ἐθέλον δηλοῦν τὸ τῶν μυστηρίων τῶνδε ἐπίταγμα, τὸ μὴ ἐκφέρειν εἰς μὴ μεμυημένους, ὡς οὐκ ἔκφορον ἐκεῖνο ὄν, ἀπεῖπε δηλοῦν πρὸς ἄλλον τὸ θεῖον, ὅτῳ μὴ καὶ αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν εὐτύχηται. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δύο οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἓν ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, ἀλλ' ἡνωμένον, ὃς ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐκείνῳ ἐμίγνυτο εἰ μεμνῷτο, ἔχοι ἂν παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἐκείνου εἰκόνα. ἦν δὲ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸς διαφορὰν ἐν αὑτῷ οὐδεμίαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχων οὔτε κατὰ ἄλλα—οὐ γάρ τι ἐκινεῖτο παρ' αὐτῷ, οὐ θυμός, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία ἄλλου παρὴν αὐτῷ ἀναβεβηκότι—ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις νόησις οὐδ'

and above reason, as is that which is seen. When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple. But perhaps one should not say "will see", but "was seen", if one must speak of these as two, the seer and the seen, and not both as one—a bold statement. So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre. For here too when the centres have come together they are one, but there is duality when they are separate. This also is how we now speak of "another". For this reason the vision is hard to put into words. For how could one announce that as another when he did not see, there when he had the vision, another, but one with himself?

11. This is the intention of the command given in the mysteries here below not to disclose to the uninitiated; since that Good is not disclosable, it prohibits the declaration of the divine to another who has not also himself had the good fortune to see. Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but united to him), if he remembers who he became when he was united with that, he will have an image of that in himself. He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to himself or to other things—for there was no movement in him and he had no emotion, no desire for anything else when he had made the ascent—but there was not even any

ὅλως αὐτός, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁρπασθεὶς ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἐρήμῳ καὶ καταστάσει γεγένηται ἀτρεμεῖ, τῇ αὑτοῦ οὐσίᾳ οὐδαμῇ ἀποκλίνων οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος, ἑστὼς πάντη καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος. οὐδὲ τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἤδη ὑπερθέων, ὑπερβὰς ἤδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν χορόν, ὥσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ ἀδύτου εἰσδὺς εἰς τοὐπίσω καταλιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νεῷ ἀγάλματα, ἃ ἐξελθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πάλιν γίνεται πρῶτα μετὰ τὸ ἔνδον θέαμα καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαλμα οὐδὲ εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ αὐτό· ἃ δὴ γίγνεται δεύτερα θεάματα. τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἦν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις καὶ ἄπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφὴν καὶ στάσις καὶ περινόησις πρὸς ἐφαρμογήν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται. εἰ δ' ἄλλως βλέποι, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πάρεστι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μιμήματα· καὶ τοῖς οὖν σοφοῖς τῶν προφητῶν αἰνίττεται, ὅπως θεὸς ἐκεῖνος ὁρᾶται· σοφὸς δὲ ἱερεὺς τὸ αἴνιγμα συνιεὶς ἀληθινὴν ἂν ποιοῖτο ἐκεῖ γενόμενος τοῦ ἀδύτου τὴν θέαν. καὶ μὴ γενόμενος δὲ τὸ ἄδυτον τοῦτο ἀόρατόν τι χρῆμα νομίσας καὶ πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν, εἰδήσει ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ καὶ συγγίνεται [καὶ][1] τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. ⟨καὶ⟩[1] οὐδὲν παραλιπὼν τῶν θείων

[1] transposuimus.

[1] This is the only passage in the *Enneads* where ἔκστασις (usually rather inadequately and misleadingly translated "ecstasy") is used in any context relevant to the mystical union, if with Theiler and H–S we read ἐκτάσει in VI. 7. 17. 40. Theiler would prefer, for this and other reasons, to read [ἐκ]στάσις here and delete καὶ στάσις in the next line: see *Plotins Schriften* VI (*Indices*) p. 174. But even if the reading of the MSS is kept here, there is no good reason for

reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest and having become a kind of rest. He had no thought of beauties, but had already run up beyond beauty and gone beyond the choir of virtues, like a man who enters into the sanctuary and leaves behind the statues in the outer shrine; these become again the first things he looks at when he comes out of the sanctuary, after his contemplation within and intercourse there, not with a statue or image but with the Divine itself; they are secondary objects of contemplation. But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself[1] and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary. But if one looks in another way, one finds nothing. These are images; and this, therefore, is how the wise among the expositors of holy things express in riddles how that god is seen; and a wise priest who understands the riddle may make the contemplation real by entering the sanctuary; and even if he has not been there, and thinks that this sanctuary is something invisible, and the source and the principle, he will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like. And he will neglect none of the divine properties which the soul can have even

describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an "ecstasy". It gives a very misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism.

ὅσα δύναται ψυχὴ ἔχειν καὶ πρὸ τῆς θέας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τῆς θέας ἀπαιτεῖ· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῷ ὑπερβάντι πάντα τὸ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ πάντων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὸ πάντη μὴ ὂν ἥξει ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, ἀλλὰ κάτω μὲν βᾶσα εἰς κακὸν ἥξει, καὶ οὕτως εἰς μὴ ὄν, οὐκ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν. τὴν ἐναντίαν δὲ δραμοῦσα ἥξει οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτήν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὖσα ⟨οὐκ⟩[1] ἐν οὐδενί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ· τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ· γίνεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτός τις οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ταύτῃ, ᾗ προσομιλεῖ. εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν γενόμενον ἴδοι, ἔχει ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου αὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ μεταβαίνοι ὡς εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, τέλος ἂν ἔχοι τῆς πορείας. ἐκπίπτων δὲ τῆς θέας πάλιν ἐγείρας ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κατανοήσας ἑαυτὸν ταύταις κεκοσμημένον πάλιν κουφισθήσεται δι' ἀρετῆς ἐπὶ νοῦν ἰὼν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ διὰ σοφίας ἐπ' αὐτό. καὶ οὗτος θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων θείων καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος, ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῇδε, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν τῇδε, φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον.

[1] Thedinga.

[1] "Beyond substance" is the often quoted foundation-text from Plato *Republic* VI 509B9; "the end of the journey" from *Republic* VII 532E3, again in the context of the ascent to the Good.

[2] These last words, in the common translation "flight of the alone to the Alone", are the only words of Plotinus at all generally known and remembered. He uses the "alone to the alone" formula elsewhere in the *Enneads* when speaking of our encounter with the Good (I. 6. 7. 8; VI. 7. 34. 7). It is in fact a fairly commonplace Greek phrase, generally, but not always, in a religious context. The closest parallel to Plotinus' use of it is in Numenius fr. 2 des

before the vision, and will seek the rest from the vision; and the rest, for him who has gone beyond all, is that which is before all. For the nature of the soul will certainly not arrive at absolute non-existence, but when it goes down it will arrive at evil and in this way at non-existence, not at absolute non-existence. But if it runs the opposite way, it will arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this way since it is not in something else it will not be in nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not substance, but "beyond substance" by this converse. If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from oneself, as image to original, one has reached "the end of the journey".[1] And when one falls from the vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself, and considering himself set in order and beautiful by these virtues he will again be lightened and come through virtue to Intellect and wisdom and through wisdom to that Good. This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed men, deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary.[2]

Places (11 Leemans) 11–12 *ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον*. See E. R. Dodds "Numenius and Ammonius" in *Les Sources de Plotin* (*Entretiens Hardt* V), Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, 16–17. It does tell us something important about the mysticism of Plotinus, but can be misleading if considered in isolation from the rest of his writing about the spiritual life and Porphyry's account of Plotinus as he knew him. See my "The Apprehension of Divinity in the Self and Cosmos in Plotinus" (*Plotinian & Christian Studies* XVIII).